Electrical Systems and Installarions Power RP12-3 PDF

RP 12-3
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND

INSTALLATIONS
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
October 1994
Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.
Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

All rights reserved. The information contained in this document is subject to the terms
and conditions of the agreement or contract under which the document was supplied to
the recipient's organisation. None of the information contained in this document shall
be disclosed outside the recipient's own organisation without the prior written
permission of Manager, Standards, BP International Limited, unless the terms of such
agreement or contract expressly allow.
BP GROUP RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR ENGINEERING

Issue Date
Doc. No.
RP 12-3
October 1994
Latest Amendment Date
Document Title
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND

INSTALLATIONS
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
(Replaces BP Engineering CP 17 Pt. 3)
APPLICABILITY
Regional Applicability:
International
SCOPE AND PURPOSE

This document describes the basic approach to electrical power system design which is
recommended for all BP operated sites. It provides guidance only and actual practices
may vary to meet requirements of national or local regulations. However, in deviating
from the approaches detailed in this document, security of supply factors may be created
which will need to be assessed in order to ensure fit for purpose power system design.
AMENDMENTS
Amd
Date
Page(s)
Description
___________________________________________________________________
CUSTODIAN (See Quarterly Status List for Contact)
Electrical
Issued by:-
Engineering Practices Group, BP International Limited, Research & Engineering Centre

Chertsey Road, Sunbury-on-Thames, Middlesex, TW16 7LN, UNITED KINGDOM
Tel: +44 1932 76 4067
Fax: +44 1932 76 4077
Telex: 296041
CONTENTS
Section
Page
FOREWORD .........................................................................................................................iii
1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
1.1 Scope ...................................................................................................................1
2. SYSTEM PARAMETERS.................................................................................................1
2.1 Voltage...................................................................................................................1
2.2 Frequency ...............................................................................................................2
2.3 Rating ...................................................................................................................2
3. LOADS ...............................................................................................................................3
3.1 Rating and Diversity Factors ...................................................................................3
3.2 Types of Load.........................................................................................................4
4. POWER SUPPLY SOURCES...........................................................................................5
4.1 General ...................................................................................................................5
4.2 Emergency Power Supply Equipment......................................................................8
4.3 Reliability................................................................................................................10
4.4 Primary Substation..................................................................................................10
4.5 Frequency and Voltage Regulation..........................................................................13
4.6 Synchronising .........................................................................................................15
4.7 Power Supplies for Control Systems .......................................................................16
5. POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS..............................................................................17
5.1 General ...................................................................................................................17
5.2 Single Radial...........................................................................................................18
5.3 Double Radial .........................................................................................................18
5.4 Triple Radial ...........................................................................................................19
5.5 Ring Fed Systems....................................................................................................20
5.6 Interconnected or Mesh Systems.............................................................................21
5.7 Power System Control ............................................................................................22
5.8 Electrical Distribution Substations...........................................................................25
6. POWER SYSTEM FAULT CONSIDERATIONS ...........................................................26
6.1 Fault Calculations ...................................................................................................26
6.2 Equipment Fault Current Ratings ............................................................................28
6.3 Methods of Limiting Fault Currents.........................................................................29
6.4 Effects of Faults on Distribution Systems ................................................................31
7. POWER SYSTEM EARTHING .......................................................................................32
7.1 General ...................................................................................................................32
7.2 Un-Earthed (Isolated) Neutral.................................................................................33
7.3 Solidly Earthed Neutrals (For systems below 1000 V).............................................33
7.4 Impedance Earthed Neutrals (For Systems rated 1000 V and above) .......................34
7.5 Generator Earthing .................................................................................................35
7.6 Earthing Resistors...................................................................................................37
8. POWER SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS .................................................................37
8.1 Motor Starting ........................................................................................................37
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ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTALLATIONS
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE i
8.2 Overvoltages...........................................................................................................38
8.3 Harmonics ..............................................................................................................40
8.4 Power Factor ..........................................................................................................42
9. POWER SYSTEM STUDIES............................................................................................44
9.1 General ...................................................................................................................44
9.2 Conventional Studies ..............................................................................................45
9.3 Special Studies........................................................................................................48
FIGURE 1 (A) ........................................................................................................................49
DOUBLE RADIAL FEED DISTRIBUTION ...............................................................49
FIGURE 1 (B) ........................................................................................................................50
CLOSED RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION ....................................................................50
FIGURE 1 (C) ........................................................................................................................51
OPEN RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION .........................................................................51
APPENDIX A.........................................................................................................................52
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................52
APPENDIX B.........................................................................................................................53
LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS ....................................................................53
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE ii
FOREWORD
Introduction to BP Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering
The Introductory Volume contains a series of documents that provide an introduction to the
BP Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering (RPSEs). In particular,
the 'General Foreword' sets out the philosophy of the RPSEs. Other documents in the
Introductory Volume provide general guidance on using the RPSEs and background
information to Engineering Standards in BP. There are also recommendations for specific
definitions and requirements.
Value of this Recommended Practice
This document represents the accumulated practices of the BP Group for ensuring a high
degree of plant availability and electrical system integrity within the constraints for cost
effective engineering.
Application
Text in italics is Commentary. Commentary provides background information which supports
the requirements of the Recommended Practice, and may discuss alternative options.It also
gives guidance on the implementation of any 'Specification' or 'Approval' actions; specific
actions are indicated by an asterisk (*) preceding a paragraph number.
This document may refer to certain local, national or international regulations but the
responsibility to ensure compliance with legislation and any other statutory requirements lies
with the user. The user should adapt or supplement this document to ensure compliance for
the specific application.
Principal Changes from Previous Edition
This Recommended Practice is a major revision of BP CP 17 Pt. 3 Power Systems Design
which was last issued in April 1986. It has been updated in the Way Forward Style to reflect
significant advances in power system design.
Feedback and Further Information
Users are invited to feed back any comments and to detail experiences in the application of
BP RPSE's, to assist in the process of their continuous improvement.
For feedback and further information, please contact Standards Group, BP International or the
Custodian. See Quarterly Status List for contacts.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE iii
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Scope
The BP Group RP 12 series of Recommended Practices specify general
requirements for electrical systems, equipment, materials and
installations. This document specifies those items which apply generally
to power system design for systems with a highest nominal voltage of
36 kV.
It is considered that most of the installations within the sphere of BP operations
would be 34.5kV or below. However, it has been found that even for voltages of
132 kV, the same principles would tend to apply for industrial systems.
1.2
Although the following items may form part of power systems in certain
activities of the BP Group, their designs are not covered by this
document. Where necessary, the relevant international or national
standard must be applied to these elements of electrical systems.
(i)
Design of overhead line.
(ii)
Design of large power rectifier plant.
(iii)
Design aspects of electrical systems which are special to mine

winding plant, earth-moving equipment, conveying, crushing
and associated metalliferous treatment plants.
(iv)
Electrical systems in ships.
(v)
Electrical systems for subsea installations.
(vi)
Electrical design of installations in commercial, administrative,

or domestic premises.
The above exclusions are considered special in nature and/or can be undertaken
more efficiently by directly adopting practice which is common in the area where
the installation is to be employed.
2.
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
2.1
Voltage
The most economical voltages shall be selected for a Power System.
In general the voltages selected should accord with the economical voltage levels
for machines which are included in BP Group RP 12-11.
In any existing installation, the selection of voltage levels will be subject also to site
conditions. The requirement for having the most economic system voltage is
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 1
intended to ensure that an economic appraisal of alternative courses of action is

undertaken or has been considered.
The nominal phase to phase voltage for systems where voltages exceed
1000 V, should be selected from those detailed in IEC 38. When the
phase to phase voltage is below 1000 V, the appropriate nominal
voltage to meet the national standards of the site location should be
used. For 'greenfield' sites or offshore locations, where the possibility
of interconnection with an outside authority is low, the use of nonstandard voltages below 1000 V (e.g. 660 V) shall be based on
economic considerations.
In the UK the nominal LV voltage would be either 415 V or 440 V, phase to phase
with a tolerance of 5%. (Notwithstanding current legislation which may suggest
that nominal voltages will in future be 380 V 10% or the provisions of the
Electricity Supply Regulations 1988 which require voltage tolerances to be within
6% for voltages less than 132 kV). See also 4.5.1
Any deployment of non standard voltage systems should be based upon specific
economic studies which take full account of the need to hold spares which may be
beyond normal stock levels.
2.2
Frequency
The frequency selected for power systems will be either 50 or 60 Hz
depending on the national standards of the site location. Where a site is
to be remotely located and powered only from on-site generation, the
frequency selected should be compatible with the frequency of supply
of the nearest local electrical supply source or public utility if it is
envisaged that future inter-connection is desirable. Where future interconnection with other sources of electricity supply is not envisaged as
being possible or where economic advantages outweigh the benefits in
future possible interconnections, the frequency of supply shall be
selected on economic considerations and on ease of obtaining suitable
equipment.
North Sea experience indicates that selecting 60 Hz frequency tends to offer
possible economic advantages and as European equipment (i.e. widely available
equipment) suppliers can gear their product range to this frequency and the
'standard' voltages within Europe, such selection becomes more likely.
2.3
Rating
(i)
Power systems with a voltage in excess of 1000 V should be so

designed that the rms. value of the a.c. component of the shortcircuit breaking current of circuit breakers designed to IEC 56
and/or BP Group GS 112-9 should be selected from values
readily available from equipment manufacturers.
The selection of 25 kA as a symmetrical short circuit breaking capacity
could be found to represent a general economic ceiling to the available
fault levels for equipment. Where there will be economic advantage in
providing switchgear of higher ratings, e.g. 40 kA, then this would be
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 2
encouraged. In any case in a green field situation, the Short Circuit

capability of the installation should be based upon economic grounds. The
capability of switchgear should always be proven by test before being
accepted into full duty service. Testing would be particularly important
where 'enhanced make' fault levels or enhanced d.c. content at break levels
are required. The requirements for testing is contained within BP Group
GS 112-9 however, at the design stage account should be taken for any
need for Type Testing. See also 6.3.1
(ii)
For power systems with a voltage less than 1000V. the rms.
value of the a.c. component of the short-circuit breaking current
of circuit breakers designed to IEC 947 and/or BP Group GS
112-8 should not exceed 50 kA.
See the commentary for (i) above. Where economically viable the selection
of 80 kA or above rated switchgear is encouraged. BP Group GS 112-8
includes testing requirements for LV circuit breakers.
3.
LOADS
3.1
Rating and Diversity Factors
3.1.1
Electrical equipment shall be rated to carry continuously the maximum

load associated with peak design production with an additional 10%
contingency. The ambient conditions at which this rating applies shall
be defined in equipment specifications, and shall not be less than 40C
maximum air temperature at an altitude not exceeding 1000 m.
A load list would normally identify all process loads and would further identify the
power to be absorbed by the mechanical drive. This would be adjusted for
efficiency of the electrical drive to arrive at a value of power to be drawn from the
electrical system. Aggregated plant loading should be carried out in accordance
with 3.1.2. Beyond this estimate only one allowance of contingency should be taken
on the thus identified 'after diversity plant load'. Where a total system load is to be
estimated, which includes a number of individual switchgear loads estimated in this
manner, care should be taken to be assured of only one overall estimate for
contingency.
The specification of maximum temperature and elevation are chosen in order to be
assured that equipment has sufficient capacity for the most arduous of likely
conditions, albeit at a 'standard' elevation. However, where the location is such that
it is clear that there is no possibility of reaching the 'standard' 40C level and there
is economic advantage in relaxing the temperature, the actual maximum and
minimum temperatures should be specified. Similarly if the elevation is above
1000m the actual elevation should be specified.
3.1.2
Assessment of maximum load requirements of an installation shall allow

for diversity between various loads, drives or plants. Appropriate
factors shall consider the likelihood of loads, drives, production or
process trains coincidentally requiring peak demands and shall be based
on similar installations wherever possible.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
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It is considered important that power system loading estimates be based upon

absorbed demands for machine loads with appropriate allowances for efficiency
and power factor. In addition the effect of diversity should be assessed preferably
by using a concept of intermittence or alternatively by the application of well
proven diversity factors. In the absence of either of these methods, an average
maximum loading expectation may be assessed by adding 50% of the intermittent
load (that controlled by level switches or by thermocouples or other control
devices) to the continuously running loads. In addition to this aggregated load, an
assessment of likely standby load operating should be made. A maximum of
standby operation may be obtained by considering boiler outage (insufficient steam
for steam turbine drivers) or by a maximum product throughput condition.
3.2
Types of Load
All loads shall be presented with clear definition of their types in
accordance with the following:-
3.2.1
Basic Information
For each identified electrical load, a description of the service should be
given together with an indication of whether the device is a machine or
a static load.
(i)
Dynamic
These are electric motors driving rotating equipment.
(ii)
Static
These are non-moving types of electrical equipment such as lighting, heating,

supplies to rectifiers, etc.
The bulk of the loads on the majority of BP installations comprise dynamic loads
and the proportions of dynamic to static loads are generally in the ratio of 10:1.
Where there are machines supplied by Variable Speed Drives, these may exhibit
properties similar to those of some static loads viz. constant power demand despite
voltage variations. Their contribution to system fault level is limited by the power
electronic system, in some cases to zero contribution.
3.2.2
Essential Loads
These are loads which are important to the safety of the installation or
the operational staff, and which require power to permit a reasonably
controlled shutdown in emergency. They shall have a second
independent power source and be generally associated with no break
supplies. In certain cases, a short supply break may be acceptable if this
does not represent a hazard to safety.
BP Group RP 12-5 contains advice concerning the categorisation of power supplies
suitable for control systems. The concept of essential loads used here is fairly close
to the concept of Class A contained in that RP, however, the loads would not
require the level of duplication required for Class A systems. Included in the
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 4
concept of essential power system loads are such devices as Lub. oil pumps for Gas
Turbines, ventilation systems, helipad lighting some floodlighting systems,
navigational aids, radio systems etc. The term Essential used here was chosen to
align with the term Essential as defined in the IEE Recommendations for the
Electrical and Electronic Equipment of Mobile and Fixed Offshore Installations.
It is noted that some loads which are essential by this definition may require the
provision of Emergency Power Supply Facilities in order to meet Legislative
Requirements. This is not inconsistent with the definition of Essential Loads used
here which is aimed at providing a convenient process for being assured that all
such critical loads are covered by the appropriate level of power supply. (See
further Section 4.2.1)
3.2.3
Process Sensitive Loads

These are loads whose loss would affect continuity of plant operation
resulting in loss of revenue but would not result in an unsafe situation
arising. Any decision to provide an alternative source of supply for
these types of load shall be based on economic considerations.
Included in this category are general lighting systems and process demands.
It is sometimes possible, particularly where process loadings are relatively low, to
include sufficient into an emergency generator capacity to allow some processes to
continue on reduced capacity when main power generators are not available.
There are no general rules for this type of provision except to emphasise that
application of such loads should not compromise any emergency services. Each
case would be project specific.
3.2.4
Non-sensitive Loads
Non-sensitive loads are those which do not form an important
component of a production or process plant and their disconnection
could be borne for relatively long periods with minimal or nuisance
value. They usually form a small proportion of the total connected load
and may have a single power source.
Typical examples of these loads are the domestic part of accommodation, offices,
Workshops, some water injection, some potable water systems etc.
4.
POWER SUPPLY SOURCES

4.1
General
The power supply system shall be designed to provide safe and
economical operation. The safety aspects should cover both plant and
personnel. Economic considerations shall cover capital, maintenance
and running costs and include an assessment of the reliability and
consequent availability of the system. The cost of improved power
systems reliability should be weighed against the progressive potential
savings due to decreased loss of production.
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POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
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It is expected that for any significant power system design there will have been an
economic comparison of alternative arrangements. Larger projects would be
expected to initiate a formal safety review and this process would ensure that the
basic safety needs of the project would be satisfied. For smaller projects or plant
extensions where such a formal review may not be arranged, the designer should
nonetheless consider safety aspects relating to the electrical system and produce an
outline document which presents these issues for the record.
All negotiations with public utilities shall be the sole responsibility of

BP
In as much as the arrangements with Public Authorities will form part of the long
term operational environment for the installation, it is considered necessary that
the operator (assumed to be BP in the context of this document) is fully aware and
has the sole responsibility for the longer term compliance with the requirements
arising from any negotiations. Such responsibility should not be delegated to a third
party unless the third party has an ongoing operational responsibility.
It is considered that Contractors may request information from Public Utilities on
behalf of BP in pursuit of the determination of options relating to possible
installations or changes to existing installations but that in doing so it is made clear
that any formal agreement which arises from the information or investigation will
be with the operating company (BP.)
The principal source of electrical supply for any location, subject to the
requirements of 4.1.1 to 4.1.3. shall be defined.
The power supply arrangements are fundamental to any operating site and need to
feature strongly in the overall project concept. A power supply philosophy
document which records the arrangements for power supply and the reasoning
associated with any selection is considered highly desirable. A contractor may
have part of his workscope associated with an evaluation and selection of power
supply arrangements in which case such a presentation is assured. The selection of
the power supply arrangements may have formed part of a feasibility (or Statement
of Requirements) study which may have been produced by BP in which case the
definition of the power supply arrangements would form part of a contractors
specification.
4.1.1
Electrical Import from a Public Utility

Where the principal source of electrical power is selected to be from a
public utility, the supply should be via duplicate feeders. An exception
to this may be permitted for economic reasons where low power loads
are to be supplied and where a single feeder may be employed.
It would be expected that there could be a cost/benefit statement to justify the use of
single feeds. Where the supply is low power and not essential for operations (e.g.
Cathodic Protection supplies) the justification is trivial, however single supplies
with on site standby generation which will operate to supply full load in the event of
a main power supply failure may be an economic alternative to a duel supply
arrangement.
Essential loads should always be provided for by on-site power supply

equipment.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 6
See 3.2.2 (commentary.)
Where economically viable, power generation on site may be arranged

to peak-lop or otherwise supplement the external power supply.
4.1.2
On-site Generation with no Public Utility Connection

Where a site is offshore, or remote from a public utility network, or has
a surplus of fuel or process energy, on-site generation will normally be
expected as the principal source of power. The on-site power
generation arrangements shall be defined taking into account the
following factors:(i)
The fuel source.
(ii)
The nature of the process energy.
(iii)
The process steam or other heat requirements, if any.
(iv)
The relationship between electric power requirements and the

energy sources on any given site.
The number and arrangement of power generating sets should reflect

the particular needs of the installation in terms of Availability and
Reliability. Where an availability of above 80% is required, a minimum
of 2 generating sets, will be required on sites where there is no
alternative electricity supply. Under these circumstances, the following
criteria should be satisfied:(i)
There should be sufficient generation to meet the Maximum

Demand when the largest single source of electrical supply is
out of service at peak demand times due to maintenance or any
other reason.
(ii)
Where more than 2 generators are installed, those loads

considered as Process Sensitive (i.e. those loads which must
operate to maintain either full or a reduced production) shall be
supplied when the largest capacity generator is out of service
and the second largest generator is coincidentally shut down due
to unforeseen circumstances.
All power generation facilities which cannot derive alternative power

from another source shall be arranged with Black Start facilities. The
Black Start arrangements may involve use of Emergency or In-House
diesel generators.
For systems requiring high reliability, the probability of having sufficient power
generation for 100% of the load (provided by the main power supply system) in a 12
month period should be 99%. This would normally require an installation of at
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 7
least 3 generators. Under some circumstances this (high) reliability requirement

can be relaxed, particularly where the consequences of power supply failure are not
severe. In such circumstances only two (or even one) main power generators could
be considered.
Where multiple power generators are provided there needs to be a philosophy of
supply related to normal operation, maintenance shutdown and to failure. Where 3
generators are installed it is reasonable to expect that substantial production could
be achieved by a single set remaining available following failure of the second set
with the third unavailable.
4.1.3
On-site Generation Run in Parallel with a Public Utility

Where on-site generation is selected to be the principal source of power
and where a connection to a public utility is available, consideration
shall be given to the following options related to connection to the
Public Utility:(i)
As a standby source of electric power.
(ii)
A means of export of surplus electrical power.
(iii)
A combination of both.
(iv)
As a Black Start Facility
It is expected that the power generation philosophy would consider these options
which would be contained within a formal design record. See also 4.1.1 where
there may be economic benefit in peak lopping of the Public Utility supply taking
advantage of tariff opportunities.
4.2
Emergency Power Supply Equipment
4.2.1
Power supplies to Essential loads should be achieved by one or more of

the following:(i)
Providing an alternative source of energy, such as batteries.
(ii)
Increasing the amount (or being assured of sufficient sheer

numbers) of normal supply generation equipment with an
arrangement for duplicate fuel supply which effectively avoids
single contingency power outage.
(iii)
Ensuring a number of alternative supply feeds are available to

the loads and that the alternatives effectively provide duplication
to avoid single contingency power loss.
(iv)
Local Diesel Generation.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 8
In general it is expected that Essential loads would receive battery supplies or

would be associated with an emergency generator. However where this is
impractical, leads to low reliability or is prohibitively expensive, the least cost of
the remaining alternatives should normally be adopted.
The concept of increased power generation in (ii) above is meant to allow for
emergency power supplies to be designed as part of a normal power generation and
distribution system. The criteria for design would be that the power source and the
distribution system for the Essential loads would maintain sufficiently high security
for these safety critical systems. A similar concept is considered appropriate for
the concept of having a suitable number of alternative supply feeds detailed in (iii)
above.
4.2.2
In the application of 4.2.1 (ii), the power supply to Essential loads shall
be designed to remain available in the event of at least two of the
installed main power generators being unavailable. The probability of
zero interruptions to the Essential load feed busbar over a 12 month
period shall be 99% or better. Where necessary a loadshedding scheme
shall be installed to secure the supply to the Essential loads. Essential
loads shall not form part of the loadshedding arrangements.
The concept of additional power generation being suitable for emergency supply
duty will clearly not be possible without there being at least 3 power generation sets
available. Where one power generator thus installed is of lower capacity than the
system maximum demand and/or the nature of the load can lead to instability, it is
expected that a load shedding scheme would be employed to ensure that the
Essential loads would be maintained for any fault condition which could leave a
single machine on the busbar.
4.2.3
Where increased main generating plant or local standby plant is selected

to provide power to Essential loads, it shall be either diesel engine or
gas turbine driven generator set(s). Local standby or emergency
generator prime movers shall have their own dedicated fuel supply. All
prime movers, for main generators (where these are deemed to provide
Essential supplies) shall be arranged for two fuel sources with
automatic transfer. Power generation for Essential loads shall be rated
to have a spare capacity of at least 10%.
These provisions are designed to ensure that a single contingency fault (e.g. fuel
supply failure) will not cause power supply loss.
4.2.4
Emergency generator sets shall be capable of starting and running when

no alternative source of electrical a.c. power is available i.e., a 'black
start' capability. This may be achieved by compressed air starting with
air receivers being capable of six engine starts from one air charge, or
by battery starting with a similar capability or by both methods.
The requirements for emergency generators are contained in BP Group GS 160-1.
In general two starting methods are required. It should be noted that the location
of emergency generators should normally be in a non-classified area with supply
air derived from a clean source. For offshore installations the location of the
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 9
emergency generator should be on an outside wall which can have louvers open to
supply combustion air. Care should be taken to ensure that the exhaust and air
intakes are located to avoid problems associated with other adjacent plant or
systems.
4.2.5
Emergency generators shall be provided with automatic starting and

loading facilities. A simple and reliable method of ensuring that
emergency generators can be immediately switched to their pre-defined
load shall be arranged. Manual facilities shall also be provided for
regular testing purposes. Testing facilities should permit the loading of
standby generator sets.
It is preferred that the emergency generator should be capable of running in
parallel with the mains supply for testing purposes and for the purposes of
transferring load without the need for supply break.
4.3
Reliability
For each power supply arrangement a reliability assessment shall be
carried out to determine the probability of failure of supply.
In the early stages of design a reliability study may be undertaken as part of the
comparison of alternative methods of providing power supplies. Such studies would
also be useful in determining the cost of material failures. The undertaking of
these studies may form part of the Contractors workscope. Where the Project Team
is required to carry out such a study, the terms of reference related to objectives,
data gathering, and evaluation shall be clearly specified.
4.4
Primary Substation
4.4.1
Generator circuits (other than local emergency generators) and public

utility power intakes, should be connected together at a common
primary substation, the busbars of which are used as the main load
distribution centre. Where generators and public utility power intakes
may be located at different points throughout the site, these shall be
interconnected.
Thus there will be at least one and, for larger sites more primary substations.
4.4.2
The switchgear for primary substations shall comply with BP Group GS

112-9 (or BP Group GS 112-8 where only LV supplies are involved).
Detailed guidance for HV and LV switchgear is contained in BP Group RP 12-6
and BP Group RP 12-7.
4.4.3
Busbar arrangements shall be selected to be cost effective, operationally

flexible and safe. The following technical points shall be taken into
account.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 10
(i)
Operational flexibility to permit loads and power supplies to be effectively

connected under scheduled and unscheduled outages of circuits and
busbar sections.
(ii)
Minimal switchgear per circuit and simple control and protection.
(iii)
Unscheduled loss of busbar sections shall not shut down the system beyond
the level designed and provided for.
(iv)
Scheduled maintenance of busbars shall be possible without system

shutdowns beyond those designed and provided for.
It may often be found necessary to locate the incoming circuit breakers of a busbar
to a location half way along one side of a busbar in order to be more assured that
100% of the load is unlikely to flow in one section of the busbars.
The possibility of bus section circuit breaker fault conditions in metal enclosed
switchgear which may cause a full switchboard shutdown for remedial repairs
should be considered. However, unless there are overriding reasons for the
contrary, BP do not design switchboards to cater for this eventuality.
4.4.4
Single busbar arrangements for primary supply substations should be

provided subject to the following criteria:(i)
The switchgear shall be indoor metalclad type.
(ii)
The single busbar shall be split into a number of sections by

using suitable switchgear. The number of sections of busbars
shall be consistent with the acceptable loss of incoming or
outgoing circuits under both scheduled and unscheduled loss
conditions.
(iii)
Routine busbar maintenance shall not be considered to be

necessary or shall be an infrequent occurrence.
Where there would be 3 incoming transformer feeders, the busbar would normally
be expected to be in 3 parts with feeder circuit breakers arranged on each of the
sections of busbar.
4.4.5
Double busbar arrangements shall be provided in installations where

outdoor air insulated busbars are installed or where regular busbar
maintenance is considered necessary for environmental or pollution
reasons. They may also be supplied, where the operational flexibility
available from being able to connect incoming power circuits and
outgoing load circuits in a variety of ways is considered to be
particularly advantageous.
The perceived need for double busbar arrangements for indoor metalclad HV
switchgear was strong in early Refinery designs but has virtually disappeared from
modern Refinery and other industrial installations. Therefore the use of double
busbar arrangements needs to be carefully considered and advantages balanced
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 11
against the considerable additional costs of Building, Switchgear and Protective

arrangements. One generally clear case for double busbar arrangements lies in
outdoor installations where maintenance work on busbars would be greater.
4.4.6
Ringbars or mesh busbars arrangements shall not be used.

Ring or mesh arrangements are generally difficult to extend and therefore are
considered to have limited application. However, this type of arrangement has
switchgear saving advantages where the system is unlikely to require modification.
4.4.7
Where the power supply is obtained from a public utility via equipment
such as transformers or feeders, the busbars shall be sectionalised to
prevent total power system shutdown in the event of unscheduled
outage of any busbar section. Coincidental maintenance of a public
utility intake transformer shall not be considered.
It is considered that maintenance of incoming transformers and feeds would be low
and would be quickly completed. Therefore high expense in order to reduce an
already unlikely event is not considered worthwhile.
4.4.8
The maximum number of busbar sections should not exceed the number
of individual power sources.
This requirement sets out to avoid over flexibility in a power system which, although
useful in contemplation, is of little economic benefit in practice.
4.4.9
The outgoing load circuits shall be connected to busbar sections in such

a way as to optimise power flow across busbar section switches
commensurate with reliability and operating considerations and shall
also permit unscheduled and scheduled busbar section outages with the
minimum disturbance to the loads being supplied.
See also the commentary to section 4.4.3
4.4.10
Generators may be connected either directly to the primary power

supply busbar or via generator transformers. The type of connection
shall be selected depending upon the economics associated with both
the generation voltage and the primary supply busbar voltage.
Typical arrangements for primary substations for a variety of types of
power supply are shown in Figure 1.
Primary substations should be located in areas which are not classified
as hazardous. The selected location within the site shall:(a)
Take account of the ability to distribute power to the onsite

loads without unnecessarily high distribution equipment costs.
(b)
Be adjacent to the generation or public utility intake.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 12
(c)
Be suitable for future expansion.
Where it is impossible to locate the primary substation outside of the hazardous

areas, arrangements for forced ventilation of the substation shall be made. Air for
the ventilation shall be taken from a remote and safe area, the substation shall be
equipped with air lock doors, gas detectors (which shall cause immediate deenergisation of all electrical equipment in the substation which is not suitable for a
zone 1 environment) and loss of sufficient ventilation and pressurisation shall
initiate an alarm condition which, although not causing a trip of the switchgear,
shall be used as an operator based time dependent system for the effect of repair.
Shutdown shall be initiated should repairs not be possible within an operator
defined time scale.
4.5
Frequency and Voltage Regulation
4.5.1
The power system design shall be arranged to ensure that the voltage
variation (between full load and lightly loaded conditions) experienced
at any piece of equipment designated as a load (i.e. not including
distribution equipment) shall not exceed 5% of the declared system
nominal voltage. Further the power system shall be arranged to be able
to withstand without undue stress a transient voltage variation to 80%
of nominal for a 10 second period or such longer duration at specific
points if necessary. Special consideration shall be given to power
frequency overvoltage effects and the need for Power System
equipment to withstand higher overvoltages under some circumstances.
This requirement ensures that standard equipment parameters would not be
compromised. Where the system voltage deviates beyond the 5% limit, apart from
equipment life expectation being eroded, there is a danger of exceeding the
hazardous area certification limits for that equipment installed in a hazardous area.
This may not actually yield failures or temperatures likely to cause ignition of a
vapour which may be present but will increase the likelihood of such occurrences
and will infringe the basic safety intention.
The Electricity Supply Regulations 1988 requires voltage variations to be within
6%. However, standards for equipment state a 5% tolerance for voltage. Hence
the lower limit is specified here.
Where power systems which have automatic voltage control can experience
significant load rejection (e.g. as may be the case of a Power System supplied by
generators must direct-on-line start large machines which subsequently exhibit
rapid VAr decrease leaving machines in an overexcited state), significant
overvoltage levels may be predicted (120% to 125% of nominal voltage can be
predicted). This may require special specification of transformers to avoid
problems caused by overfluxing or increased current due to magnetic excitation.
Special attention should be paid to voltage and frequency tolerance specifications
for generator transformers which may need to match the run up characteristic of the
generator. This can require the transformer to be capable of withstanding full rated
voltage at 80% of rated frequency.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 13
See 8.1.1 for motor starting requirements. This can give rise to a voltage
depression at motor terminals of 20% which therefore requires that the power
system should be able to successfully accept this condition for the starting period.
Typical starting periods can range from 1 to 10 seconds depending upon machine
and system ratings and machine inertia. Starting times beyond 10 seconds are
possible where particularly high inertia loads need to be accelerated (e.g. fans)
however, these would constitute a special application and should be treated by
exception.
4.5.2
Where the public utility intake of a site is via transformers, these

transformers and their voltage regulation equipment shall comply with
BP Group GS 112-5.
Detailed guidance on transformer construction and specification is given in BP
Group RP 12-9.
Where necessary for voltage regulation purposes, the incoming transformers shall
be equipped with on load and automatic tap change equipment.
4.5.3
Where there is on-site generation, the generators and their governor

and voltage regulation equipment shall comply with BP Group GS 1126 or BP Group GS 160-1.
Detailed guidance on generator application is not featured as a separate part of the
BP Group RP 12 series of documents.
4.5.4
Automatic voltage regulation equipment of power systems which have

both on-site generation and public utility intakes via transformers shall
be designed so that there is no detrimental inter-action.
There are a number of options which can be considered for voltage control. In
general the excitation of the power generators can be arranged for zero VAr
import/export for the whole site and at the same time the intake transformer
controller can be arranged to maintain voltage at a pre set level.
4.5.5
The excitation systems of synchronous motors shall be arranged to

ensure no detrimental interactive effects with transformer automatic tap
change equipment.
In the case of synchronous motors where it is probable that the synchronous motor
would be small in relation to the supply intake capacity, it is probable that the
excitation can be arranged to maintain a constant power factor to the machine and
the transformer tap change control would be arranged to maintain voltage within
pre set levels.
4.5.6
The controls associated with the governors of on-site generation where

the site has no public utility connection shall be designed such that
generator loading may be automatically shared between the operating
sets and that the nominal supply frequency is maintained within the
approved tolerance.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 14
Where governor droop control is employed, there should be an operator in

attendance who could take action from time to time to ensure that the system
frequency remained within reasonable limits. Such limits should be 1% and the
output system frequency time should be within 30 seconds of "standard" time.
Statement of these limits for design purposes does not indicate a need to supply an
appropriate "standard" clock arrangement although power plants supplying
townships or camp areas are encouraged to have this facility. The limit for
frequency time may be relaxed for small power plants, and those where frequency
time is considered unimportant. (e.g. Where there are no time signals reliant upon
mains frequency.)
For unmanned power plants or for those where constant operator intervention
would be undesirable, the system frequency may be controlled by an isochronous
controller designed to provide overall frequency and generator loadings within
prescribed limits.
4.5.7
The controls associated with the governors of on-site generation at a

site with a public utility connection shall be designed for parallel
operation with the public utility and shall incorporate the protection
arrangements which shall ensure that under public utility collapse ( or
unacceptable major disturbance), the site will retain a defined loading
condition. The arrangement shall also incorporate the means for
independent operation.
Where a facility is interconnected with a Public Utility, the control of the power
system frequency must be under the control of the Public Utility. Therefore only
defined load governor settings or droop load sharing control systems are possible.
However, such interconnection is always subject to disconnection under automatic
protection system operation which will leave the power generators supplying the
site load. Under these conditions, whatever the original generator control
arrangements, the generators must revert to independent load sharing control.
4.6
Synchronising
4.6.1
Synchronising and/or check synchronising equipment shall be provided

wherever more than one source of power may be operated in parallel
with another. A synchronising philosophy shall be prepared.
See also sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4. Because there can be many alternative ways of
achieving a reasonable synchronising arrangement, it is expected that there would
be prepared a synchronising/check synchronising philosophy (or design document)
for every installation which will define the particular arrangements.
4.6.2
Manual synchronising arrangements shall always be provided for the

incoming power generator circuit breakers. This shall comprise
voltmeters and a synchroscope to show the voltage and frequency
differences between the two systems that need to be paralleled. A
check synchronising relay should be utilised to prevent operator
maloperation but in order to allow closing a power source on to a dead
system, as is required under black start conditions, the check
synchronising relay shall have a means of manual or automatic override.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 15
Wherever possible and economically feasible, the manual synchronising system

supplied shall also include automatic synchronising applied to the generator
controls.
Manual synchronising facilities should also be applied to any primary switchgear
bus section circuit breaker and to circuit breakers incoming to the primary
switchboard which can make a parallel connection with other sources.
4.6.3
Synchronising or check synchronising facilities shall be fitted to busbar

section and bus coupler circuit breakers where it is possible to run the
two systems feeding either section of a busbar completely segregated
from the other. The number of circuit breakers provided with
synchronising or check synchronising facilities should be kept to a
minimum. A similar logic shall be applied to public utility intake
circuits. Alternatively, circuit breaker interlocking schemes shall be
installed to preclude the possibility of paralleling two sources of power
where synchronising facilities are excluded.
Notwithstanding the provisions of 4.6.4, it is not expected that there would be a
need to include synchronising or check synchronising facilities on system voltage
levels more than two levels removed from the power generation busbar where the
power system is operated with bus sections normally closed. However, this is a
general rule and should the system be commonly operated with open bus sections
for significant periods and there is little central system control or information
dissemination, the arrangement should be reviewed.
4.6.4
Synchronising facilities shall be provided at the primary power supply

voltage and should be avoided at other voltages by use of appropriate
circuit breaker interlocking.
The form of interlocking should avoid the need for break-before-make action unless
absolutely necessary. This may need to be associated with upstream bus section
circuit breakers and incoming circuit breakers to the upstream switchboard. See
4.6.3 (commentary) for provisions should distances be too great for the economic
use of interlocking.
4.7
Power Supplies for Control Systems

Detailed guidance on this subject is given in BP Group RP 12-5. d.c.
power supplies for control systems shall comply with BP Group GS
112-11 and a.c. power supplies shall comply with BP Group GS 11210.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 16
5.
POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

5.1
General
5.1.1
The distribution network shall be designed to carry continuously at least

110% of the Maximum Demand associated with peak design
production at the maximum ambient conditions.
The requirement for 110% capacity is considered to be applicable to all
components within the distribution system including transformer capacity. It does
not include capacity of equipment considered to constitute a load to the power
system e.g. Induction Machines, which should be rated as close as possible to
actual process demands.
Refer also to the commentary to Section 3.1.1.
Switchboards should be supplied with a degree of spares and room for expansion.
Further details may be found in BP Group RP 12-6 and 7.
5.1.2
Where required the reliability associated with any part of the system
shall be assessed and presented in qualitative and quantitative terms.
In general the design of the power system distribution should be based upon
qualitative requirements which include assessments for meeting power supply
continuity in the event of maintenance and in the event of failure. Since electrical
distribution systems are inherently reliable, the design requirements are commonly
based upon the need to disconnect distribution electrical equipment to carry out
routine maintenance and at the same time keep power supplies available for
operating plant. However, under some circumstances the need to assess the
electrical reliability may arise (perhaps as part of an overall assessment of plant
failure but possibly as part of a comparison of alternative supplies for new plant).
Under these circumstances, the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and the Mean
Time To Repair (MTTR), concerning power system failure at any particular
switchboard would be required. In addition it is recommended that the quantitative
statement indicate the probability of failure occurring over a particular timeframe.
(e.g. Provide a value and definition of the probability of zero failures over a 12
month period).
See also sections 4.1.2 (commentary), 4.2.2 and 4.3.
5.1.3
The distribution system shall be designed using one of the basic

arrangements further outlined in 5.2 through 5.6 and incorporating the
control features of 5.7. The system designed shall be described in a
design philosophy document.
It is considered that the design features contained in sections 5.2 through 5.6 would
be suitable for all of the industrial power systems likely to be required by BP.
However, should an alternative philosophy be available, it should be compared with
a "standard" double radial system in terms of operation, reliability, maintainability
and cost.
The depictions in the drawings which illustrate the texts of 5.2 and 5.5 are fairly
conventional in that Contactors are employed only for motor feeders. Under some
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 17
circumstances Contactors can prove an economic choice for transformer or

Switchboard feeders. The depictions are for an extensive installation typical of
Refinery or other large system. Offshore systems may be considered as similar but
without the higher voltage level and interconnections to Public Utility.
5.2
Single Radial
5.2.1
These should be used to provide power to non essential electrical loads,

those where alternative sources of energy are available such as standby
generating plant or those process loads for which a lower availability
can be accepted.
Where minimum facilities engineering is required and the process plant can be (or
will regularly be) switched off, then single radial systems may be contemplated to
satisfy process demands. It is considered that maintenance of electrical systems
could be scheduled for normal process plant shutdown times and the reliability of
electrical distribution systems is generally much better than required by the process
system.
5.2.2
Each component of the single radial circuit shall be capable of supplying

110% of the required electrical load. Transformers or other plant
which includes forced cooling equipment shall not rely entirely on the
forced cooling arrangements to obtain the necessary rating.
Refer to the commentary to Section 3.1.1 for more detail on load estimation.
Where the loading is of a cyclical nature and the forced cooling would not be
expected to operate for more than 2 hours in any 12 hour period, then capacities
based upon forced cooling can be considered. However, where this is the case, a
cooling system failure alarm shall be provided.
5.3
Double Radial
5.3.1
Essential and Process Sensitive loads should be supplied by two or

more identically rated radial systems.
Figure 1(a) details a double radial system of feed.
5.3.2
In double radial systems, each circuit shall be capable of carrying a

110% of the Maximum Demand and all busbars shall include bus
section switchgear. They shall be arranged to ensure that unscheduled
outage of any component of the circuit would not result in loss of
power supply after the faulty equipment has been disconnected from the
system.
See section 3.1.1 for detail on load estimation.
Exceptions to the requirement for all supplies to be maintained may be made in the
following cases:-
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 18
5.3.3
(a)
For bus section circuit breaker faults. These may sometimes cause damage
which may require complete switchboard shutdown. However, the
occurrence of such faults is sufficiently rare as to be neglected.
(b)
Where there may be some non-essential loads supplied from a double

radial system. These may receive a single radial supply from a double
radial system and therefore would not receive a supply in the event of some
forms of double radial system outage.
Double radially fed systems should generally be operated in parallel

with all bus-section switches closed.
It is considered that the advantage of continuity of supply in the event of relatively
light fault conditions which is offered by closed bus section systems outweighs the
disadvantages of increased fault disturbance for heavy fault conditions. It is also
more inherently safe since the switchgear fault conditions are based upon the worst
possible supply condition. However, see also section 5.3.4.
5.3.4
Where switchgear fault levels are found to be above the values outlined
in 2.3, attention shall be given to operating with bus-section breakers
open as opposed to purchasing higher fault level switchgear. Where an
open bus-section breaker philosophy is being given attention, the need
to restore rapidly the supplies to drives shall determine whether
automatic closure of bus section circuit breaker(s) is to be employed.
Switchgear fault levels could be readily reduced by increasing the impedance of
incoming transformers. (Where new transformers will be purchased.) However,
increasing the impedance of transformers increases the voltage regulation between
light and full load. There is therefore a trade-off between fault duty and normal
voltage regulation.
See 5.7 for automatic transfer schemes.

5.4
Triple Radial
5.4.1
Critical and essential loads may be alternatively supplied by triple

identically rated radial systems. These systems are preferred to double
radial systems wherever there is an overall total cost advantage.
A triple radial system comprises three feeders and three feeder transformers to
provide supply to a distribution switchboard.
5.4.2
Each circuit of triple fed radial systems shall be capable of providing at

least 55% of the Maximum Demand and all busbars shall be split into at
least three sections with two bus-section switches.
This will allow for the loss of any one of the three circuits, leaving the two healthy
circuits still capable of providing 110% of the Maximum Demand.
5.4.3
Triple radial systems shall be provided where the power flow is

relatively large. They shall generally be operated with only two circuits
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 19
in parallel to reduce switchgear fault levels. The incoming circuit

breaker on the third identically rated feeder shall be left open and
automatically reclosed in order to restore rapidly full supplies to the
load.
See 5.7 for automatic transfer schemes.
Switchgear fault duty shall be based upon 2 of the 3 transformer incomers
connected. An electrical interlock scheme shall be arranged to ensure that fault
duties shall not be exceeded.
5.5
Ring Fed Systems
5.5.1
Power may be distributed from a primary or central substation to a

number of subsidiary load centres by using two primary cable feeds
connected in a ring emerging from the source busbar and controlled by
circuit breakers. Ring type distribution systems should be used only if
the lower reliability of supply to the load supplied can be accepted.
Figures 1(b) and (c) details ring systems of feed.
These systems have lower reliability than double radial systems but can offer a cost
optimal choice where distances between substations is large. The cost benefits
should be weighed against the lower reliability for those cases where ring systems
are contemplated.
It is expected that there would be a design philosophy document which would
provide the reasoning leading to acceptance of the ring system of feeding. This
reasoning could be qualitative in nature or could contain a cost/benefit analysis
should the question of reduced reliability be of concern.
5.5.2
Ring fed systems should normally duplicate only the primary cables to
the load substation. They may however, duplicate the load substation
transformers and the low voltage busbar by providing a low-voltage or
secondary bus section breaker.
Duplication of downstream equipment would be dependent upon the need to
maintain electrical equipment and retain electrical feeds to the downstream
substation.
5.5.3
Where the ring feed is operated closed, intermediate primary circuit

breakers, including unit feeder protection, shall be provided at all vital
or essential load centres on the ring, thereby ensuring fault clearance of
only the unhealthy section of the ring. The whole of the ring circuit
shall be fully rated to be capable of supplying 110% of the Maximum
Demand at all substations.
It is not proposed that economy should be made by arranging that the ring feeders
be 'tapered'.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 20
Essential or critical loads may be supplied by ring systems if they are operated
closed. Their choice shall be based on the comparative reliability and cost as
compared to the duplicate radial systems.
Refer to Section 3.1.1 for detail on load estimation.
5.5.4
Ring fed systems which are operated open need not include circuit
breakers on the ring.
Fault clearance would be achieved at the source substation and in that event power
would be lost to all loads fed between the source and the open point on the ring.
In order that a faulty section of the primary ring may be disconnected

and repaired without power loss during the whole of the repair period,
the ring shall include isolating means at every load substation. These
ring isolators may be of the off-circuit or on-load type dependent on
availability, cost, and the need for rapid reconnection of load.
The need for fault location shall be considered in order to assist rapid
re-connection of healthy components and avoid possible re-application of the fault.
Open operated ring fed systems shall be permitted only to supply nonsensitive loads.
The choice of an open ring system shall consider the comparative reliability and
cost of a single radially fed systems with a non automatic standby power supply
backup.
The rating of each section of open operated rings shall be capable of

providing 110% of the Maximum Demand of the ring taken as a whole.
It is not proposed that economy should be made by arranging that the ring feeders
be 'tapered'.
It is recognised that manual initiated switching will be necessary before loads can
be applied to each of the normally operating legs of the ring. Therefore, under
some circumstances it may be possible to ensure that only a known amount of load
is transferred to a ring feeder. Where economically desirable and under such
known and flexible loading conditions, the requirement for the first sections of the
ring to carry the Maximum Demand of the whole ring may be relaxed.
5.6
Interconnected or Mesh Systems

The distribution of electrical power by solidly interconnected systems
should be undertaken only upon specific design justification which
confirms reliability, operation and safety.
Mesh connected schemes considered for HV systems are permissible providing
protection arrangements are suitable for the process plant needs and providing that
the fault duties of switchgear are not compromised.
Solidly interconnected mesh systems for LV are rarely found in industrial settings
and can be difficult to predict in terms of protection system operation and level of
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 21
disturbance during a fault condition. For this reason and because they would
present a point of non-standardisation if used in hazardous areas they are to be
avoided.
5.7
Power System Control
5.7.1
The operational control of the power system shall be described in a

prepared control philosophy document. The operator actions and his
access to power system information shall be defined and the level of
Central Control Room operator control shall be defined.
It is expected that for power systems having multiple machines, the Central Control
Room operator would have control of the generation functions:(a)
Stop/Start.
(b)
Synchronising.
(c)
Generator Loading (i.e. Speed Control).
(d)
Generator Excitation (Possibly AVR Setting only).
Additionally it is expected that the Central Control Room Operator would have
control of:(a)
Primary Substation Circuit Breakers.
(b)
Emergency Generator Stop/Start/Synchronisation (where significant).
(c)
Some downstream circuit breakers.
See 5.7.2 for method of information and control. It is recommended that the
Central Control Room Operator have available information and control of the
entire power system by the means described. However, it is recognised that in
general there would need to be some limitations placed upon the ability of the
power system operator to individually control process loads.
5.7.2
The power system shall utilise protection relays which incorporate the
means for indication and control via a Hiway connection. The form and
performance of the dual function protection relay system shall detail;(a)
Speed of response for the control functions.
(b)
Degree of programmable automation of power system

operation.
(c)
Range of protection functions offered in the relay types

proposed.
(d)
System architecture.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 22
(e)
Central Operator Information and Control Screens.
(f)
Proposed alarm and information conditions.
(g)
Interface arrangements with process control systems.
The dual function protection and information/control relay should be arranged with
a clear and effective method for ensuring that protection settings cannot be
changed by the action of control system software. Sole reliance of a password
embedded in the high level software system is not considered sufficient for this
purpose and a relay located function is generally expected.
It is expected that in the longer term the availability of the information offered and
the availability of the control offered by such dual function relays will provide
benefit to BP operations. Therefore relaxing the requirement for new installations
to be equipped with these relays should be specific and based upon the assertions:(a)
That the site will never need to gather data and have such control
and
(b)
That the alternative system indeed yields a significant cost saving.
It is recognised that under some circumstances only the dual function relays may be
employed with a later intent to effect operator control via Hiway connections.
5.7.3
Within switchboards, automatic transfer schemes shall be provided

where there is a need to obtain a reliability level consistent with two or
more sources of supply (and the scheme is not arranged as a parallel
operating arrangement). Their use shall be economically justified when
compared against other ways of providing duplication of power
sources, and shall be limited to installations where there is a need to
reduce switchgear short circuit levels either for reasons of cost or nonavailability of switchgear with sufficiently high rating. All schemes shall
include only load transfers that never parallel the preferred and
emergency sources. Load transfer schemes may use circuit breakers, or
on load transfer switches/contactors. Where automatic transfer
schemes are provided, the power system design shall be arranged to
successfully transfer the load without causing a general system failure.
Other methods of ensuring duplication of supply include:(a)
Feeding alternative loads from different switchboards.
(b)
Providing a parallel operating arrangement of the incomers.
Where manual transfer is to be arranged (perhaps in order to undertake

maintenance on the presently employed incomer) and it is undesirable to suffer a
break-before-make operation, the manual intervention may be considered as a
make-before-break arrangement which automatically disconnects the transferring
(from) circuit upon successful energisation of the transferring (to) circuit.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 23
5.7.4
Load transfer schemes may be applied to either static loads or induction

motor loads or a combination of the two. They shall not be used where
synchronous motor loads are supplied. The load transfer shall be
arranged so that the residual voltage of induction motors has decayed
to less than 25% of the rated source voltage before the transfer is
initiated. The rate of residual voltage decay shall be calculated and the
motor's ability to withstand the out-of-phase reclosure shall be checked.
The need to ensure that the induction motor flux has decayed arises form the need
to ensure that both switchgear and machine system are not over stressed upon
direct-on-line re energisation. These factors should be addressed when considering
the speed of operation of a transfer scheme. in general 1 second should be adequate
for all 415 V machines and 1.8 seconds should be selected for HV machines up to
1000 kW.
5.7.5
Induction motors which are controlled by circuit breakers, or contactors

of the mechanically latched type shall include a time delay under voltage
relay. This relaying shall be set to trip the controller under those power
system under voltage conditions from which recovery would be
otherwise not possible. Transfer schemes associated with switchgear
supplying these types of induction motor controllers shall be designed
either to be capable of re accelerating the motors if the transfer takes
place within the motor under voltage tripping time, or time delaying the
transfer to be in excess of the motor under voltage tripping time.
The selection of under voltage trip time should be confirmed by power system
studies which would be aimed at ensuring reasonable power system recovery
following a fault. An infinite setting would indicate that the machine would be able
to accelerate to operating level whenever the voltage recovers from total collapse
and considering that there could be a number of such latched machines on the
circuit. In general a setting of say 2 seconds where the voltage has fallen below
75% may be appropriate.
5.7.6
Motors which are controlled by unlatched a.c. contactors will inherently

disconnect from the supply on loss of voltage. Where it is required to
restore power to these types of motor drives the auto transfer schemes
shall be supplemented by contactor control schemes which restart
motors individually or in groups after a requisite time delay.
It is expected that the re-acceleration scheme would be achieved by relays
individually associated with each motor starter.
5.7.7
Load transfer schemes for the start up, run up and loading of a standby
generator on to a busbar normally fed from a preferred a.c. source shall
be initiated by time delayed under voltage relaying which shall trip the
a.c. source and auto-start up the standby generator.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 24
The auto start of the emergency (or standby) generator could be initiated before
disconnection of the normal supply in order to provide the main power system
greater chance of recovery (i.e. taking advantage of the finite time it takes a
standby generator to start).
It is expected that start initiation would be based upon main power system collapse
below 75% for say 2 seconds and that trip of the main supply and energisation of
the emergency supply would be initiated upon 85% voltage at system frequency for
the incoming set. (NB energisation would need to be time delayed from the trip
signal to allow flux decay of the machines which may have been hitherto in
operation).
5.7.8
Power system re-acceleration and restart studies to determine the most

technically acceptable and cost effective solution shall be carried out for
each load transfer scheme considered.
The studies should provide confirmation of under voltage relay settings and define
the fault conditions which give rise to the conclusions. BP approval is considered
necessary to ensure that process and other wider system issues have been
considered (e.g. System fault conditions which may be remote from the system under
immediate calculation).
5.8
Electrical Distribution Substations

The requirements for substations which are detailed as part of Section 5.8 are
generally based upon Shore installations. Substation designs for Offshore
installations should firstly consider project specific parameters which will include
module construction philosophy, economic layout factors and safety considerations.
Other than the project specific factors, Offshore installations can be considered as
needing to satisfy subsequent clauses of Sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2.
5.8.1
All substations shall be located as close as possible to the electrical

centre of the load being supplied. They should normally be connected
to their incoming supplies by cables. The primary and secondary
voltage switchgear and auxiliaries shall be installed in permanent rooms
or buildings which if located in areas classified as potentially hazardous
(Zone 1 or Zone 2) shall be ventilated in such a manner (type of
protection p), to permit the use of standard industrial equipment.
For rooms located in areas classified as Zone 2, standard industrial equipment
may be used, providing there is no opening from the building into the classified
area or if there is such an opening, the opening has been assessed to determine that
a flammable atmosphere will not enter the room.
Smaller non essential process switchgear may be located outdoors or equipped with
a shelter and if situated in an area classified as hazardous, the equipment shall be
selected in accordance with BP Group RP 12-2.
5.8.2
Transformers shall be located as close as possible to the secondary

switchgear.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 25
This requirement is designed to keep the more expensive and high capacity
electrical connections as short as possible.
5.8.3
Substation building design shall ensure that no possibility exists for

ingress of surface water or for any hydrocarbon which may migrate
along the sheath of cables which enter the Substation.
Building design requirements are contained in BP Group RP 4-4. The requirements
consider that there would always be a possibility for hydrocarbon contamination to
enter buildings via rainwater, a rising water table or by finding a way through the
sheath of buried cables and travelling beneath the cable sheath and into the switch
room. By raising the elevation of the lowest point of a substation well beyond the
exterior grade level, the surface and sub-surface water ingress is eliminated. The
provision of a cable basement is a more effective remedy because there would then
be no possibility for hydrocarbon vapour (which may have been given off from
contaminated water present in an entry duct albeit not reaching floor level) from
entering the substation.
6.
POWER SYSTEM FAULT CONSIDERATIONS

6.1
Fault Calculations
6.1.1
The fault currents that flow as a result of short circuits should be

calculated at each system voltage for both three phase and phase to
earth fault conditions. These calculated currents shall be used to select
suitably rated switchgear and to allow the selection and setting of
protective devices to ensure that successful discriminatory fault
clearance is achieved.
It is expected that in order to be assured of reasonable accuracy, the study should
be based upon a suitable computer calculation package. The contribution of
induction motors should be included in the study, preferably by direct dynamic
modelling and the studies should include break and make points for the fault level.
(See also section 6.1.3) It is important to ensure that at design stage, tolerances for
equipment should be considered and also that a design margin is allowed to
account for later additions. The allowance is best arranged by undertaking the
studies showing later additional loads on stream and represented by induction
motors.
6.1.2
The voltage disturbance sustained during the faults and after fault
clearance should also be ascertained to ensure that transient
disturbances do not result in loss of supplies due to low voltages or
over stressing of plant insulation due to high voltages.
In assessing the transient performance of the system, accurate modelling of any
AVR action is required. It would also be necessary to model the governor system of
any rotating power generators.
6.1.3
The calculation of fault currents shall include the fault current

contributions from generators and from synchronous and induction
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 26
motors. Both the a.c. symmetrical and d.c. asymmetrical components

of fault currents should be calculated at all system voltages. Public
utility fault infeeds should be obtained from the public utility concerned,
and they shall exclude any decrement associated with fault duration,
though maximum and minimum values consistent with annual load
cycles and anticipating utilities systems switching conditions should be
obtained.
The fault levels of utility company networks is subject to variation due to the
amount of generation plant which they may have connected and also could be
subject to variation due to the manner in which the public utility operates the
system (e.g. Line outages will affect fault levels as will open busbar systems.
6.1.4
Three phase balanced fault current calculations should be carried out to

obtain prospective circuit breaker duties and should include:(i)
Asymmetric make capacity Expressed in peak amperes and

calculated half a cycle after fault inception. Both a.c. and d.c.
current decrements shall be included for the half cycle.
(ii)
Asymmetric break capability Expressed in rms. amperes

calculated at a time at which the breaker contacts are expected
to part and allowing a maximum of 10 ms for instantaneous type
protection operation. Both a.c. and d.c. decrements shall be
included for the selected time.
(iii)
Symmetrical break capability Expressed in rms. amperes

calculated at a time as defined in item (ii) above. This assumes
nil d.c. current component and shall allow for a.c. decrement for
the selected time.
6.1.5
On systems where the earth fault currents are limited by neutral earthing
equipment, the currents may be assumed to include no decrement and
shall be considered constant whatever the level of bonding between the
conductor and the faulted phase.
6.1.6
Both the a.c. and d.c. components of motor fault current contributions
should be calculated and included in calculation of prospective fault
currents.
At the instant of fault inception the a.c. peak symmetrical component and the d.c.
component shall be taken to be identical. Both values shall be taken as the peak
direct-on-line starting current, this being dictated by the motor locked rotor
reactance. Both these currents shall be taken to decay exponentially with time
using a.c. and d.c. short circuit time constants respectively. The a.c. time constant
should be determined by using the ratio of the locked rotor reactance and the
standstill rotor resistance. The d.c. time constant should be determined by using
the locked rotor reactance and the stator resistance.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 27
Where faults are not directly on the motor terminals, these time constants would
be modified (preferably by the integrated computer programme) to take account of
external impedances to the point of fault.
6.1.7
The calculation of individual fault current contributions should be

carried out for individual motors of significant ratings on the power
system. All other motors on the system may be treated as a number of
typical equivalent motors of total rating equal to the connected rotating
loads, at different locations. The ratings of these equivalent motors
shall be selected to be consistent with the actual drives at a given
location.
Generally motors with ratings 1000 kW or greater should be represented as
individual machines. However, where there are multiples of these on a single
busbar, they too may be represented by lumped parameters.
6.1.8
Any computer based model used for calculation shall be of a reputable

type with software support and validation checks available.
It is equally important that where system stability models are examined, the specific
model for the parameters used has validity. (e.g. Where machine AVRs and
Governors are used on particular machines, factory and site test arrangements
should be modelled and the predicted and actual behaviour of the machine or
system can then be compared with the model). In this manner some form of
assurance can be obtained for the system studied.
Where it is necessary for BP to retain the results for future use or in support of later
power system studies to be carried out in support of operations, the software used
should be IPSA or should be IPSA compatible. See also section 9.2.2.
6.2
Equipment Fault Current Ratings
6.2.1
The power distribution system should be designed to provide the

required security and quality of supply with prospective fault levels
within the capability of commonly available switchgear (See 2.3). All
equipment shall be capable of withstanding the maximum short circuit
requirements when operating in accordance with 5.1.1.
Security of supply generally is a subjective judgement. See also 5.1.2 (commentary).
However, a quantitative assessment of security can be considered. See 4.2.2.
Quality of supply is reflected by tolerances of measured quantities, (see 4.5.1) and
by the severity of expected disturbances (see 8.1 and 8.2).
6.2.2
All switchgear and distribution equipment on the power system shall be

capable of carrying the prospective symmetrical fault currents for a
specified short time duration of 1 or 3 seconds without deleterious
effect. The choice between 1 and 3 second durations shall be dictated
by availability, economics and fault current protection clearing times.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 28
The backup fault current protection clearing times shall always be less
than the equipment short time current rating.
Generally 3 second short time ratings for switchgear are preferred to avoid the
necessity for rapid protection.
Where switchgear of 0.6 second short circuit withstand time is offered, the
protection arrangements should be reviewed to ensure that the switchgear will be
fully protected.
6.2.3
The closure of switchgear on to a short circuit fault or other possible

out of sequence condition shall not result in shock load damage to
healthy parts of the system as a result of peak asymmetrical make
currents flowing.
6.2.4
The selection of circuit breakers shall be dependent on the make and

break duty which the breaker is required to cater for. Switching
devices that may be closed on to a fault shall have the necessary fault
making capability.
6.2.5
Where plant is protected by fault current limiting HRC type fuses, the
fuse characteristic may be taken into account in assessing the short
circuit duty of the plant.
It is expected that where fuse cut off action is accounted, there would be presented
appropriate calculations and fuse data to demonstrate the validity of the fault duty.
6.3
Methods of Limiting Fault Currents
6.3.1
Where the power system design indicates prospective short circuit

requirements exceeding the proposed circuit breaker ratings, the
following alternatives should be considered:(i)
Increase the system reactances, provided this causes no other

technical or commercial problem.
(ii)
Change the operating mode by operating with certain breakers

open and provide auto transfer facilities to reinstate the supply
security and quality levels.
(iii)
Purchase switchgear and equipment to provide for the higher

short circuit levels if these are available.
(iv)
Provide fault current limiting devices other than fuses.
(v)
Carry out any combination of the alternatives listed in items (i)

to (iv) above.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 29
See also 2.3
6.3.2
The selection of the most appropriate of the alternatives (i) to (v) given
in 6.3.1 shall be based on least cost.
Saturable reactors (used as resonant links) offer elegant methods for short circuit
limitation for HV systems and do not suffer from attendant regulation problems ,
however, their expense generally precludes their use. The use of Is limiters should
be avoided for new installations but sometimes find useful application where
existing systems will be expanded or interconnected with new systems.
6.3.3
Where fault limiting (series) reactors are used to increase the reactance
between the source and potential fault location, these shall comply with
BP Group GS 112-5.
Detailed guidance is given in BP Group RP 12-9.
6.3.4
Where fault limiting reactors are deemed necessary, they should be

installed between busbar sections, thereby limiting voltage profile
problems under normal operating conditions.
It is recognised that interconnection of reactors in bus sections may not be a cost
optimum arrangement. Therefore alternative arrangements would be acceptable
provided that the alternative of connection between the bus section switch has been
considered.
6.3.5
The impedance of series reactors shall be chosen to limit the fault

current passed through the reactor to a level which ensures that total
calculated fault levels on either side of the reactor are no greater than
90% of the selected plant short circuit ratings. The reactors themselves
may be single or three phase, dependent on space and cost
considerations. They shall have a thermal ability to carry the rated short
circuit symmetrical current for at least 2 seconds.
The time rating of the reactor would be dependent upon the protection
arrangements.
6.3.6
The voltage drop through series reactors under the motor start, restart
or re acceleration conditions shall be checked to ascertain that no
unacceptable transient under voltage occurs.
6.3.7
Where series reactors are installed between two power systems, the
transient stability of the generator sets should feature in power systems
studies.
See also 10.2
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 30
6.4
Effects of Faults on Distribution Systems

The effects of three phase fault applications and clearances should be
investigated for the following conditions:(i)
Possible loss of synchronism between parallel running

synchronous machines. This would only be likely for dissimilar
machines or for identical machines connected to the fault which
are not electrically symmetrical.
See also 9.2.4
(ii)
The possibility of motor contactors dropping out, (due to low

voltage) and the consequential need to re-start the motors,
either manually or automatically.
Three phase faults on the system (considering zero fault impedance) will depress the
voltage at the point of fault and downstream of the fault to approximately zero. All
locations between the source of fault current and the fault will experience reduced
voltages. This condition will apply until the faulty section has been cleared at
which stage voltages will be rapidly restored.
Such studies would form part of the conventional study series described in 9.2.1.
(iii)
Possible extinction of certain discharge lamps and the time for

re-ignition.
The provision of emergency lighting systems may avoid the need to feature this as
discharge lighting may be limited to those areas where the outage time may not be
important. (e.g. Street lighting).
(iv)
Loss of electronic and control equipment supplies resulting in

maloperation.
The provision of d.c. or 'no break' supplies (possibly using UPS equipment) for vital
loads may avoid the need to feature this.
(v)
The extent of overvoltage on the system components resulting

from fault clearance.
This could cause unacceptable transient recovery voltages occurring for short
periods which may have a destructive effect on electrical insulation. However, it is
recognised that many analysis programmes are based upon linear theory and may
not account for saturation effects which may preclude overvoltages occurring but
could result in an electrical protection relay trip.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 31
7.
POWER SYSTEM EARTHING

7.1
General
Guidance on the earthing of equipment and systems is detailed in BP
Group RP 12-16. The following clauses relate only to neutral earthing
of power systems.
There is a statutory requirement to conform with the Electricity Supply Regulations
1988 and with the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989.
7.1.1
The earthing of each part of a power system operating at a specific

voltage shall be considered individually. Where such systems are
required to be earthed solidly, or via an impedance, the neutrals should
be connected to a common plant earthing system. This system shall
have a resistance to earth that ensures operation of protective devices in
the various circuits in accordance with BP Group RP 12-16, and shall
not be in excess of 4 Ohms. If connected to a Public Utility supply HV
system earth, the combined earth resistance of the Public Utility earth
and this earthing system shall be less than 1 Ohm.
The selection of 4 Ohms as power system resistance to earth is relatively arbitrary
and therefore this value may vary depending upon the basic design and safety
requirements (See 7.1.4). However, the possibility of earthing system resistance
variation due to varying soil conditions through time needs to be considered also.
The requirement for 1 Ohm resistance of a combined Public Utility HV system earth
and the interconnected earth for solidly earthed neutrals arises from the need to
minimise neutral potentials under Public Utility HV earth fault conditions. The
requirement for an interconnected value of less than 1 Ohm is specified in the
Electrically at Work Regulations 1988.
A 1 Ohm earthing resistance is not considered mandatory where HV systems and LV
systems are both owned and operated by BP and are earth bonded together with
negligible probability of HV faults giving rise to LV system neutral potential rise
with respect to 'true' earth. (Where true earth represents the potential of the earths
core. This may be transferred to structures if these are not bonded to the site
earthing system).
7.1.2
The neutral connections for earthing equipment shall be provided at

generators, transformers or both, which have their neutral brought out,
and which are the source of power to the distribution system. Where
such power sources are delta connected, and do not have neutrals
brought out, neutral earthing may be carried out at other star connected
power transformers on the system or by the provision of earthing
transformers.
It is intended that power systems will be earthed. However, under some
circumstances BP would consider operating unearthed power systems. See 7.2.
7.1.3
Power systems operating at a common voltage which may be normally

or abnormally run unparalleled shall have a neutral earthing connection
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 32
facility provided for each system. The neutral earthing system shall be
designed to ensure that there is no possibility of inadvertently operating
a system with an isolated neutral.
Under some circumstances, an alarm for the condition of power system in operation
without neutral earthing should be satisfactory. Typical of such circumstances is
the condition whereby a single earthed neutral is desirable (perhaps in order to
limit circulating currents between power generators) and there would be a complex
and difficult automatic system for earthing switching in the event of power system
disconnection.
7.1.4
All plant earthing system designs shall be subject to approval by BP.

The potential between immediate metalwork and a 'true earth' (which
may be transferred to the immediate locale typically by telephone
services) shall be calculated for all representative single phase to earth
conditions. The calculations shall be presented as support to the
earthing system design.
The earthing arrangements of a site are a fundamental feature of safety and it is
therefore necessary that BP, where acting as an operator is assured that no
dangerous potentials can be obtained. It is important that touch potentials be less
than 430 V under any single phase-earth fault where there is overcurrent protection
arranged to de-energise the live conductor.
It is common for Control Systems to demand 'clean' or 'reference' earth points
which are associated with earthing electrodes not connected to the general site
earthing system. This practice can give rise to dangerous situations under HV
system faults and should be avoided.
7.2
Un-Earthed (Isolated) Neutral
7.2.1
An un-earthed or isolated neutral system shall be used only subject to

approval by BP.
Such systems may be used where the highest integrity against faults is required.
(e.g. Unearthed systems are often used for Oil Well Drilling power supplies and for
d.c. shutdown system power supplies).
Where unearthed systems are installed it should be recognised that the power
system conductors (phase conductors) could constitute a danger of electrical shock
or fire as a result of contact with them and earth. The danger is a result of
capacitance coupling of the power system conductors and earth.
Where it is approved that the power system should be unearthed, an earth fault
detection system should be installed and there should be operator action to clear
any earth faults that occur as a matter of priority.
7.3
Solidly Earthed Neutrals (For systems below 1000 V)
7.3.1
All low voltage systems should have their neutrals solidly connected to
the plant earthing system. Impedance earthing of systems with a voltage
below 1000 V shall only be used subject to approval by BP.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 33
Where single phase supplies are taken from LV systems, the neutral shall be solidly
earthed at the supply point only. (TN-S system to IEE Regs Section 542). Where the
LV supply is taken from a Public Utility, the neutral will be solidly earthed but the
supply system may be defined as TN-C-S. In this latter case the installation within
the BP premises shall conform with a TN-S arrangement with no further neutral
earths being required within the installation. Where PME (Protective Multiple
Earth) power supplies are taken from a Public Utility it is considered that there
should be no need for isolation transformers to achieve the TN-S arrangement
within the BP premises, however, the design shall conform with government
legislation and this may require that under certain circumstances, isolation
transformers are required. (Refer to HS(G) 41).
Impedance earthed LV systems may be considered where the system will be 3 wire
without neutral connections and there is benefit in limiting damage during earth
fault conditions. (e.g. Where a special voltage 660 V may be used in preference to
say 3.3 k V and in effect replaces the HV system in its application).
7.4
Impedance Earthed Neutrals (For Systems rated 1000 V and

above)
7.4.1
Neutral earthing equipment to limit earth fault currents should be

provided in the neutral connection to the plant earth system on all highvoltage power systems.
Such provision limits the overall transient system disturbance caused by earth faults
and also limits the amount of damage caused by this most common type of fault.
7.4.2
Where the power system at the specific voltage contains no direct

connected generators under any mode of operation, the provision of the
earthing resistor and its earth connection should consider the following
possibilities:(i)
At the source star connected transformers.
(ii)
At other star connected power transformers.
(iii)
At earthing transformers.
The neutral earthing equipment should comprise a resistor with a

minimum 10 second fault rating selected to reduce the fault current to
the full load rating of the power source transformer. The use of
reactors to earth neutral systems shall only be used subject to approval
by BP.
Systems employing reactor earths are uncommon in UK practice but have been used
in other countries or under special circumstances. One special circumstance is
where a 'Petersen Coil' is used to avoid a circuit trip due to a transient earth fault
e.g. lightning induced flashover in overhead lines. Such special circumstances are
unlikely in industrial installations.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 34
Where reactance earthing is considered, its use should be tested against the
cost/benefit compared with resistance earthing. Special attention should be taken
of the possible tuning effects between the earthing reactor and the power system.
7.4.3
Where direct connected generators are or may be operated in parallel

with source transformers, the neutral earthing arrangements shall
provide for either system operating independently. The neutral earthing
equipment shall, wherever practical, be identically rated for all power
sources. Where resistors are provided, these should comprise 10
second fault rated, solid resistors. The resistors shall reduce the fault
current to a convenient level one half to full load rating of the lowest
rated power source, provided this fault current is sufficient to operate
the distribution system earthing protection and provide suitable
discrimination. Where the normal ratings of the source transformer and
parallel running generators are significantly different, the resistor rating
selection shall be dictated by the requirement to ensure that the most
insensitive earth fault protection on any incoming or outgoing circuit
operates positively with the smallest possible source of earth fault
current connected to the system.
Where there is a 4 wire supply system, solid earthing will be provided in order to
keep neutral voltages as close to earth as possible. In this case the neutral earthing
arrangement should be simplified by arranging for the neutral to be earthed at the
switchboard. See also 7.5.3.
Refer also to 7.1.3 for the requirements for systems having more than one power
source.
7.5
Generator Earthing
7.5.1
The neutrals of generators directly connected to the distribution

switchgear in 3 wire systems (i.e. HV systems or special LV systems)
may be solidly or resistance earthed. However, solid earthing should be
limited to generators where the earth fault capacity of the generator is
approximately equal to the current level required to operate the
distribution system protection.
Where solid earthing of the neutral is applied to a system where the (relatively) low
capacity generator is in parallel with a larger power source which has resistance
earthing, the generator should have a neutral circuit breaker which should be
automatically controlled. However, where the influence of the fault on other
equipment is not unduly compromised by too high an earth fault current, the
generator neutral could be allowed to remain solidly connected.
7.5.2
Resistor earthing of generators directly connected to the distribution

switchgear should be used wherever possible. The resistor should be of
the 10 second (minimum) fault rated, solid type, and its resistance
should be selected to reduce the fault current to a level between the half
and full load current rating of the machine, provided this is sufficient to
operate the distribution system protection system selectively.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 35
Grid type resistors offer a virtually maintenance free installation and should be
employed wherever possible. However, this type of earthing resistor will prove
uneconomic for 33 kV systems where liquid neutral earthing resistors will offer an
optimum choice.
7.5.3
Where generators directly connected to the distribution switchgear are

operated in parallel and earthed either solidly or through resistors, the
provision of neutral switchgear for each generator shall be considered
to avoid third harmonic current flows and their heating effect. Where
such neutral switchgear is provided, it shall be connected and operated
in a manner to ensure that only one generator neutral switch is always
closed at a time. Neutral switchgear may comprise contactors on
resistor earthed schemes instead of circuit breakers. The provision of
neutral switchgear schemes may be avoided if identical pitch generators
are paralleled, or if the provision of neutral earthing resistors
sufficiently reduces the prospective third harmonic currents to
acceptable levels. A 1% or less derating as a result of third harmonic
currents shall be considered acceptable.
A possibility would be for the neutral of each generator to be permanently earthed
via a resistor where the resistance thus installed would limit the circulating currents
to acceptable levels. However, this type of earthing would mean that earth fault
current levels on the power system would vary depending upon how many power
generators were operating. Such an installation would be acceptable where it
showed economic advantages.
7.5.4
Where generators are connected to the distribution switchgear system

via unit transformers, the generator neutral shall be connected to earth
via the primary winding of a single phase distribution transformer. The
secondary winding of this transformer shall be shunted by a resistor
with a resistance value which is calculated to be approximately the same
as the zero sequence capacitance for the generator winding system.
Manufacturers standard arrangements for high impedance earthing systems for
these types of generators will be acceptable. It is expected that the arrangements
will be aimed at raising 5 to 10 A under earth fault conditions. Selection of a
resistance equal to the system-to-earth capacitance under earth fault conditions will
ensure that the system capacitance will discharge energy reasonably and
overvoltages will be eliminated even for arcing earth faults.
7.5.5
The rated primary voltage of generator earthing transformers shall be

taken as the generator phase voltage although voltages of at least 1.5
times generator line to neutral voltages will be acceptable to obtain
standard transformers. Transformer ratings shall be the product of the
primary current and rated primary voltage using a 30 second (6 times
overload factor) duty cycle.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 36
Conservative sizing of the transformer is preferred as its reactance has little effect
on the earthing system. The secondary resistor should have a continuous duty as its
size and cost will not normally be significant.
7.6
Earthing Resistors
All earthing resistors shall be provided with insulation suitable for the
phase to phase voltage of the systems to which they are connected.
They shall be designed to carry their rated fault current for the times
specified in the preceding clauses, without any destructive effect to their
component parts.
It is expected that resistors will be located in an outdoor environment where
transformer earthing is involved but could be indoors for generators. There is no
mandatory requirement for locating these devices indoors other than normal
economic factors.
8.
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS

8.1
Motor Starting
8.1.1
Direct-on-line (DOL) starting of motors shall be arranged wherever

possible. The maximum voltage drop at the motor terminals during
starting shall be limited to 20% calculated for the minimum generation
and system configuration which would be deemed as representing the
minimum duty condition. Where connection is made to a public utility,
system voltage dips at the public utility point of common coupling shall
be kept to a value which has been agreed between BP and the public
utility.
There is a general requirement implied that the power system will be capable of
withstanding this 20% voltage depression. See 4.5.1 for this requirement.
Public utility systems in the UK require that voltage depressions observed at the
point of common coupling (which is a concept related to how the interference will
affect others on the electrical power system and needs to be established as to exact
location with the public utility) shall be no more than 3% for infrequently started
machines (i.e. no more frequent than once in 2 to 6 hours, the time here should be
established with the public authority) and no more than 1% for frequently started
machines.
8.1.2
The acceptability of the above voltage dips during motor starting shall
be contingent on the motor satisfactorily accelerating, and the voltage
dips not causing unacceptable disturbances to the power system. The
DOL starting of the largest and electrically most remote motors (or
groups of motors on an automatic re-acceleration scheme) at all
voltages, shall be investigated to ensure that no problem exists. Where
unacceptable voltage dips during motor starting may be found, the
following solutions shall be considered:-
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 37
(i)
Time vary the starting time to be assured of less co-incident

starting between machines.
(ii)
Obtain motor(s) with a lower starting current.
(iii)
Increase the short circuit level within the presently envisaged

switchgear rating limits by decreasing system source impedance
to the motor busbars.
(iv)
Consider assisted start methods to reduce voltage dips if this

solution is limited to a few specific motor drives.
(v)
Any combination of items (i) to (iv) above.
(vi)
Increase the system short circuit level to a level beyond that

presently envisaged if such higher short circuit level switchgear
is available.
The selection of the most appropriate method will normally be made on the
basis of lowest cost and under some circumstances may require provision
of a mechanical driver other than electricity for the largest machine
envisaged.
Reduced voltage starting of a few specific motors should be considered
only if it is found to be economical and the additional complication
associated with assisted start equipment is operationally acceptable.
8.1.3
Where motor load shedding and restart schemes are adopted, the
method of initiation shall be developed on the basis of cost effectiveness
for the project under consideration.
Where the load is predominantly induction motors, voltage reductions would not
cause load shedding whereas lower system frequency would tend to be an effective
load shedding method. For this reason it is likely that system load shedding would
best be initiated by a frequency based arrangement. Anticipation of a power
generation deficiency can be employed if total generation capacity is known
together with total system load. Under these conditions immediate load shedding
may be initiated. Such immediate load/generation matching schemes can vary from
a simple generator auxiliary contact used to initiate fixed loadshedding to a
complex microprocessor based system which monitors multiple generators and
multiple loads and constantly updates the amount of loadshedding for any specific
incident.
The effect that electrical load shedding will have on the process system needs to be
presented for Project approval. There may need to be some massaging of the
scheme to ensure that particular loads critical to process well-being is not shed.
8.2
Overvoltages
8.2.1
Overvoltages due to static charging shall be avoided by effectively

earthing the electrical system and all metallic structures that may, or
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 38
may not, contain electrical conductors, detailed guidance being given in

BP Group RP 12-16. Physical contact between higher and lower
voltage systems shall be guarded against by using metal enclosures and
barriers wherever practical between the two systems. Overvoltages of
this type between transformer windings shall be limited by effectively
earthing the neutrals of the secondary voltage system.
Auto
transformers if used shall have the neutral solidly earthed.
It should be noted that an auto transformer will effectively connect the neutral
earthing systems of both the primary and secondary systems.
8.2.2
Overvoltages due to resonant effects shall be investigated on all

unearthed neutral systems, those which may be earthed by reactors or
systems with high impedance earthing. These effects shall also be
considered when power system equipment is or could be operated
without a neutral earth connection for short periods of time.
Resonant inductive-capacitive overvoltages can occur when normally unearthed
systems experience earth faults. The prospect of resonant or ferroresonance effects
should be avoided by solid earthing the neutrals of systems below 1000 V, and
resistance earthing the neutrals of systems rated 1000 V and above. See 7.4.2
(commentary).
Intermittent earth faults on unearthed systems may cause overvoltages of the order
of five or six times system voltages. Neutral earthing, or resistor earthing
arranging for earth fault currents greater than line to earth charging currents, may
be used to eliminate these prospective overvoltages. (See also 7.5.4).
8.2.3
Switchgear and power system equipment shall be selected to ensure

that transient recovery voltages produced by switchgear arc extinctions
do not exceed the insulation capability of the system.
Current zero arc extinctions commonly result in transient overvoltages when
switchgear is opened under fault conditions and the healthy side of the system
endeavours to return to the normal system voltage but overshoots. The introduction
of resistance during fault current flow either by special means or by using
switchgear with naturally high arc resistances should be considered to reduce the
value of transient recovery voltage that is generated.
8.2.4
Where the use of vacuum switches is considered they should be

designed to limit overvoltages to acceptable withstand levels for a
particular voltage rating.
The production of high overvoltages due to the forcing of a current zero can occur
with fuses and vacuum switches. Current limiting fuses shall only be used within
their voltage class. Such fuses of a particular voltage rating shall not be used on
electrical systems of lower operating voltages.
Limiting the voltage overvoltage on vacuum break devices may require the
provision of surge limiting equipment on the vacuum switch.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 39
8.2.5
The highest overvoltage to which power systems are subjected are

those caused by lightning. To avoid problems caused by lightning
strikes on outdoor electrical equipment, all such equipment shall be
earthed. Detailed guidance is given in BP Group RP 12-16. Lightning
overvoltages can reach the equipment by travelling down overhead lines
Sites which are fed by a public utility via overhead lines shall be
protected against travelling surges and the methods for protection will
be subject to agreement between BP and the public utility.
It would be the normal intention to ensure that the public utility provided surge
diversion and/or arcing horns on the equipment connection at the overhead line.
(e.g. on a pole box for cables or on the primary winding of a transformer. Where
there will be appreciable overhead lines within the installation operated by BP,
suitable surge diversion equipment shall be specified for all of the equipment
interfaces.
8.2.6
Overvoltage surge protection shall be provided for power generators

where these are interconnected with an overhead line system by short
lengths of cable. The switchgear connecting power generators to the
power system shall be assessed for switching overvoltage generation
and, if necessary, surge diverters shall be provided for the generator
stator winding.
UK practice has generally not found it necessary to provide power generators with
surge diverters to account for switching surges. However, it is prudent that the
matter be checked in order to be assured of there being no problem.
8.3
Harmonics
8.3.1
The power systems voltage waveform shall be arranged to be within the

tolerance 5% THF. as defined in IEC 34-1.
This level of distortion is compatible with hazardous area certification assumptions
and must therefore be adhered to where the voltage will be used to supply electrical
equipment in hazardous areas. Specific reference to the distortion is made in IEC
34-1 which details irregularities of waveform. Although primarily concerning
synchronous generators, it is clear that the distortion could be imposed on to any
equipment supplied from the generator's output. Hence it is reasonable that the
supply would have at least this level of distortion and still remain suitable for
supplying equipment which will be used in hazardous areas. The most sensitive
equipment from a hazardous area viewpoint will be that which employs magnetic
effects. This includes machines, relays and any equipment with transformers.
Where more than 5% THF is anticipated the system equipment receiving supply
should be rated for the specific harmonic content of the voltage waveform.
Greater than 5% THF voltage waveform distortion may be allowed for that supply
feeding hazardous area equipment provided that the equipment has been suitably
certified or, where waveform irregularities are not significantly different from this
tolerance, assessed and confirmed by the manufacturer as satisfactory for the
certification for the duty. (One extreme example of a case of such need is where a
Variable Speed Drive will be used for a machine in hazardous area duty. In this
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 40
case the machine should be certified for such use given the specific harmonics
yielded by the VSD)
Where more than 5% THF is anticipated and the manufacturer of the electrical
equipment cannot confirm its suitability for this service, then in principle the
following should be considered:-
Re-specify the equipment for Ex(p).
Revise the electrical system to eliminate the harmonic problem by:-
Power system supply configuration modifications to the circuits

providing supply to the non-linear equipment causing the
problem.
Provision of filter equipment at a convenient point on the Power

System which will protect the supply to the hazardous area
equipment.
However, in some cases it may be that the voltage waveform interference is a

transient effect, (e.g. as may be the case of drilling activities offshore). Where the
transient nature of the problem may be confidently defined, this can ease the
equipment manufacturers concers over possible temperature effects.
.
8.3.2
Notwithstanding any arrangements needed to meet 8.3.1, any harmonic

distortion of the voltage waveform shall be of a type which will cause
no maloperation of power system protection, control or other
equipment.
Often multiple zero crossings of the voltage waveform can lead to maloperation of
equipment receiving the supply. This is particularly true for that equipment which
uses mains supply for information transfer or for timing operations.
8.3.3
Where interconnection is made with a public authority, that authorities

regulations in respect of harmonic loading shall be adhered to.
Harmonics result in power losses and overheating of rotating machinery,
interference on communication and control circuits, overloading of capacitor
banks, and maloperation of electronic equipment. In the UK, Engineering
Recommendation G5/3, dated September 1976 issued by The Electricity Council
specifies acceptable limits of harmonics in the UK public supply system and this
shall be taken as a guide for all BP systems, in the absence of other particular
detailed requirements.
8.3.4
Wherever significant amounts of rectification or inversion equipment is

purchased, the possible use of phase shifted transformers or harmonic
filters shall be taken into account. The presence of harmonics in
common earthing systems shall be assessed and limited if they are
considered to cause prospective hazards.
See 9.3.1 for further information concerning the need for harmonic studies.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 41
8.3.5
Transformer inrush harmonic current caused by energisation shall be considered in

the design of the electrical protection system.
See BP Group RP 12-4 for further information concerning the protection
arrangements associated with transformer inrush.
8.4
Power Factor
8.4.1
Power factor improving equipment shall be considered for all

installations where energy is imported from a public utility which
applies a tariff associated with low power factor energy provision. The
equipment may be capacitors or synchronous motors, depending on
economics and suitability over the range of known operating condition.
It is expected that an economic assessment would be made to determine the merit of
installing power factor improvement equipment. The economic case should be
illustrated both in terms of payback and for an Internal Rate of Return based upon
a 10 year project life. The economic case for installing such equipment will
normally be considered as proved if the capital expenditure for the equipment is
recovered from reduced energy payments within 2 years of commencement of
operation.
8.4.2
Where the public utility system is normally operated in parallel with

onsite generation, the generating equipment should be designed and
operated to supply the as much of the reactive load of the site as is
feasible. The economic case for power factor correction equipment
shall be made based upon the differing scenarios which may be
considered from there being site generation available and there being no
site generation available. Availability of the power generation system
shall be included in the assessment.
Using the on site power generation to supply site reactive demand will avoid the
need for power factor improving equipment to be installed for the normal parallel
operating mode and will limit its consideration to that required for standby
(unparalleled) operation alone. See also 4.5.4 (commentary).
8.4.3
Any installation of capacitance provided either to reduce system losses,

provide system voltage control or increase the loading density of the
installation shall be subject to approval.
The economic case for such a proposal for installing capacitors should follow the
same criteria as outlined in 8.4.1. The location for the capacitors needs to be
carefully considered where voltage support and reduction of losses are the
motivators and a comparison of alternative methods of achieving the same
objectives would be expected as part of the justification for the installation.
Where existing plant power factors are known to be below 0.8 lagging, plant
extensions may compare the cost of providing power factor improvement equipment
against that of increasing the distribution system capacity. On new installations,
there could be an economic investigation into the provision of power factor
improving equipment, as a means of reducing power distribution system capacity.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 42
Such analysis should be undertaken wherever it is imperative that costs be saved

and where loading estimates are considered to be firm. Where the case for
installing capacitors is proven, synchronous motors or capacitors (whichever has
been found to offer the appropriate advantage) shall be located as near as possible
to the loads.
See also the requirements of 8.4.5 and 8.4.6.

8.4.4
Where synchronous motors are supplied for power factor improvement,

they shall include constant power factor control equipment.
It is recognised that synchronous machines may be changed from operating in a
reactive power control mode to operating in a constant power factor mode. This
would be the case should the motor be a small part of the overall installation
demand or where operation in reactive control mode could make the motor operate
for long periods near an excitation condition which may give rise to stability
problems.
8.4.5
In order to avoid risks of overvoltages or high transient torque,

induction motors shall not be switched as a unit with any power factor
improving capacitors, unless the capacitive current at full voltage is less
than the no load magnetising current of the associated induction motor.
Any capacitor installed on the motor side of the switchgear can act as
an excitation source when the motor is coasting. Two problems may be
apparent:(a)
The machine terminal voltage may exceed insulation capability.
(b)
The terminal voltage can remain high for a long period and thus
compromise reclosure.
Thus if capacitance on the motor side of the switchgear is excessive, either the
motor insulation should be able to withstand high overvoltages (not above 150% as
the induction motor iron circuit can be expected to show some signs of saturation)
or the capacitor needs to be separately switched.
8.4.6
Where power factor correction capacitors are installed, induction motor

voltage under supply system circuit breaker trip shall be considered and,
if necessary, overvoltage protection shall be applied to the induction
motor control circuit.
An induction motor could be connected to a system having large capacitance and
suffer an upstream circuit breaker trip effectively leaving the motor coasting with
high system capacitance. Under this situation an overvoltage trip should be
arranged for the induction motor circuit breaker.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 43
9.
POWER SYSTEM STUDIES

9.1
General
9.1.1
The power system design aspects of new installations and extensions to

existing plants should be studied using computer programs to aid
analysis where necessary. The performance of the system shall be
defined together with any arrangements necessary for ensuring the
defined performance.
See also sections 5.7.5 (commentary), 5.7.8, 6.1 and 6.3.7.
It is considered necessary that a document be prepared which details the basic
design performance of the Power System. The document may also contain or
reference the protection relay arrangements and settings.
Switchgear ratings and voltage limits are readily assessed for acceptability.
However, power system dynamic performance is often project specific and
acceptance is often accompanied by the economic assessment of 'would it be worth
the cost of any improvement?'.
9.1.2
The analysis shall be used:(i)
To define equipment parameters before purchasing.
(ii)
To select control arrangements and protective relay settings.
(iii)
To ascertain the system reaction to normal and abnormal

operating conditions.
Where system instabilities are predicted measures which may be contemplated

include:-
9.1.3
(a)
reduce the severity of the disturbance, possibly by decreasing

the fault severity.
(b)
load shedding. (With or without load re-acceleration).
(c)
detection of the condition and sectionalising the power system

into 'Islanding ' units.
System behaviour and performance shall be examined under steady

state, transient stability following fault disturbance and voltage recovery
following fault disturbance. Induction motor stability shall feature in
the studies and the starting performance of the most critical drives (and
groups of drives) shall be examined to ensure that the system can
perform satisfactorily under the defined conditions.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 44
It is clearly necessary to define the steady state conditions prior to a particular

fault condition and also to define the fault (or onerous) condition which the system
is required to experience and recover from. These conditions could include:(a)
Minimum power generation, one line (or transformer) out of service for
maintenance and starting of the largest induction machine (presumed
direct-on-line).
(b)
Maximum load, minimum spinning spare and a 3 phase symmetrical fault

condition which removes the largest capacity generator from the power
system.
(c)
Simple loss of the largest capacity generator from the power system at
times of minimum spinning spare. (NB This may be a less severe condition
than if the generator were faulted but could illustrate the level of load
shedding which may occur).
(d)
Maximum loading and power transfer between two systems followed by a 3

phase short circuit which removes one of a number of links between power
generation sources (and thus may cause transient instability).
9.2
Conventional Studies
9.2.1
These should include:(i)
Loadflow analysis. To check voltage profiles and circuit

loading conditions under steady state conditions.
(ii)
Short circuit studies. To analyse fault currents that might flow

under a variety of symmetrical, asymmetrical and unbalanced
fault conditions.
These shall be used for switchgear
specification and control and protective relay application and
setting purposes. The requirements of these studies are
specified in 6.1.
(iii)
Stability studies. To analyse the transient and dynamic

performance of power systems after large load changes and fault
disturbances. These should be used to check:-
(a)
The ability of the system to stay in synchronism.
(b)
Induction motor stability after start.
(c)
Re acceleration and restart schemes.
(d)
The need and effectiveness of under frequency load shedding

schemes.
They should also be used to consider the technical merit of:(e)
Auto-changeover schemes.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 45
(f)
Parallel or open operation, or radial feeders.
(g)
Operation of fault limiting devices.
(h)
Insertion of switched reactors or capacitors, etc.
See sections 4.5.1 (for steady state voltage conditions), 8.1.1 (for transient voltage
conditions). Motor Starting, Dynamic Performance (including load shedding
arrangements and protection arrangements) and Short Circuit requirements will be
subject to the specific design features of the project.
9.2.2
The studies detailed by 9.2.1 should be carried out with clear terms of
reference early as possible within a project. The software programs and
computer capability should also be defined. Models for generators,
automatic voltage regulators, governors, motors, transformers, cables
and loads should be sufficiently detailed and proven to give confidence
in the results of the studies.
The terms of reference for studies which are to be presented by a design contractor
should be developed as soon as possible. These should contain definitions for the
required system performance where this is not sufficiently detailed by sections
4.5.1, 5.7.3, 5.7.7 and 6.4.
In certain circumstances, preliminary study work may be carried out by BP to
ensure that design contractors terms of reference are reasonable and to instigate a
permanent data file, which would be suitable for operational use and can be
modified as changes occur. This would be the basis of detailed design, and should
be modified as necessary to include the detailed design equipment parameters. the
computer data file would then be available throughout the life of the installation.
This process would be considerably eased if the power system analysis software
were the same for preliminary studies through to final studies and the data files
were directly transferable between the systems used by Contractors and that used by
BP. Therefore, it is preferable that power system studies are undertaken using the
IPSA power systems analysis suite. Should an alternative power system analysis
programme suite be employed, the data should be transferable either manually or
via a computer based conversion programme into an IPSA compatible form.
See also section 6.1.9 for software validation.
9.2.3
Generator operating charts should be prepared and presented to assist

in assuring that they are always likely to be operated within their
prescribed stability limits.
The operating charts should be presented for voltages between 0.95 p.u. to 1.05 p.u.
in steps of .05 p.u. The charts should also contain those key machine parameters
from which the charts are constructed. e.g. Xd , Xq , etc.
9.2.4
Transient stability studies shall be carried out on systems which

include:(i)
Dissimilar on-site generators.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 46
(ii)
On-site generators operating in parallel with a public utility.
(iii)
Synchronous motors.
(iv)
Where power generation busbars are interconnected by

appreciable impedance.
These studies shall be used to determine whether synchronous machines

are liable to lose synchronism after the most severe single disturbance.
Generally the most severe fault condition would be a three phase fault applied at
the generator busbars for a fault duration determined by the protecting switchgear,
which when cleared results in the disconnection of the largest single fault
contributor from the system. However, a number of fault locations followed by
plant disconnections should be tried.
9.2.5
Where transient stability studies are undertaken, (in order to assess the
ability of generators to remain in synchronism following a fault
disturbance) the steady state operating condition before the fault is
applied should be one in which the spinning reserve of generation is
kept at a minimum due to assumed maintenance of the largest onsite
generator.
The primary object should be to identify the maximum acceptable fault clearing
time, but secondary objectives, such as the best location of system open bus section
points and the relationship between impedance earthing to stability, should also be
ascertained from these studies. The studies would be used as support for a
particular system design and also to ensure that the protection arrangements would
not compromise the expected system performance. In pursuit of this latter factor,
the studies may be undertaken with actual protection arrangements if these are
known. In doing this it should be noted that if protection settings were to change,
the system response to fault conditions may need to be re-studied.
See also 9.1.3 (commentary).
9.2.6
Dynamic and induction motor stability studies shall be carried out to

investigate the voltage and frequency performance of the system after a
major disturbance for the period from fault inception to the time when
steady state equilibrium is reached. These studies shall require detailed
Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) and governor modelling as these
items assist the return to steady state and will react positively in the
time scales likely to be considered.
These studies are expected to illustrate successful system recovery. A decreasing
oscillatory voltage or frequency result where the average is within acceptable
bounds would indicate a satisfactory performance.
9.2.7
System stability studies shall be carried out to consider the effect of the
loss of the largest power supply component under a fault condition
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 47
which causes no other electrical disturbance. Where the transient

frequency excursion is predicted to exceed 6%, under frequency load
shedding schemes shall be considered. The stability studies shall be
used to define the minimum number and magnitude of the various
stages of load shedding that will be necessary to keep the frequency loss
within acceptable limits.
Earth faults or mechanical system trip conditions do not normally result in motor
loads being tripped by a.c. contactors dropping off under low voltage, and may
therefore result in the greatest post fault generation deficiency.
9.2.8
Induction motor performance studies shall be carried out to

demonstrate the ability to start, re accelerate or restart motor loads
without their stalling or tripping under overload. Re acceleration
studies shall determine whether motors re accelerate after disturbances
(e.g. Fault conditions or under voltage conditions) have cleared. Where
motor restart schemes are required, induction motor performance
studies shall be used to define the maximum number and magnitude of
the various stages of restart that will be possible after clearance of
faults.
9.3
Special Studies
9.3.1
Harmonic studies may be necessary to analyse the magnitude and

location of harmonic distortions within the power system. These
studies shall be required whenever conversion equipment represents a
significant proportion of the total rating of a system at any one voltage
level or where there is concern about harmonic levels being excessive.
See 8.3. The studies would normally be expected to be based upon frequency
domain methods which involve conversion equipment manufacturers providing a
Fourier series for the harmonics in the load current assuming a sine wave voltage
input. Using this data the amount of voltage waveform disturbance at any point in
the network can be estimated. However, if the voltage waveform contains
harmonics, then the conversion equipment would actually yield a differing set of
load current harmonics. Therefore the frequency domain analysis is at best an
approximation and needs to be compared with actual plant performance to be
assured that the system predictions can be accurate. An alternative technique may
be to undertake the harmonic study by employing a time domain approach where
system parameters are used directly into the analysis. In this manner the need for
iteration of data input is avoided. However, there remain inaccuracies caused by
approximations used for system component impedances to each harmonic
frequency. Therefore the check with actual system performance should still be
carried out.
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 48
PUBLIC UTILTY
PRIMARY
SUBSTATION
A
A
UP TO 36KV
A
A
AREA
SUBSTATION
UP TO 12KV
C
DESCRIPTION
PROCESS
SUBSTATION
UP TO
7.5KV
C
D
A
C
CIRCUIT BREAKER - LOCAL

CONTROL
VACUUM CONTACTOR TYPE

MOTOR STARTER - REMOTE
CONTROL
M
G
C
CIRCUIT BREAKER - REMOTE

OR LOCAL CONTROL
AIRBREAK CONTACTOR TYPE MOTOR

STARTER - REMOTE CONTROL
SWITCHFUSE - MANUALLY
OPERATED
FAULT MAKE, LOAD BREAK
ISOLATING SWITCH - MANUALLY
OPERATED
C
A
PROCESS
SUBSTATION
GENERATOR
UP TO
1KV
C
M
MOTOR
FIGURE 1 (A)
DOUBLE RADIAL FEED DISTRIBUTION
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 49
FROM THE PRIMARY SUBSTATION
AREA
SUBSTATION
UP TO 12KV
A
CLOSED RING
MAIN SYSTEM
(TYPICAL)
PROCESS
SUBSTATION
UP TO 12KV
C
DOUBLE RADIAL
MAIN DISTR.
(TYPICAL)
C
TRIPLE RADIAL
MAIN DISTR.
(TYPICAL)
SINGLE RADIAL
MAIN DISTR.
(TYPICAL)
C
D
UP TO 7.2KV
C
C
PROCESS SUBSTATION
PROCESS
SUBSTATION
C
UP TO 1KV
DESCRIPTION
M
DOUBLE RADIAL
FEED (TYPICAL)
SINGLE RADIAL
FEED (TYPICAL)

OR LOCAL CONTROL

CONTROL

CONTROL
AIRBREAK CONTACTOR TYPE

CONTROL
TRIPLE RADIAL
FEED (TYPICAL)
SWITCHFUSE MANUALLY OPERATED

ISOLATING SWITCH MANUALLY OPERATED
GENERATOR
MOTOR
FIGURE 1 (B)
CLOSED RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 50
FROM THE PRIMARY SUBSTATION
A
AREA
SUBSTATION
A
UP TO 12KV
A
A
OPEN RING
MAIN SYSTEM
(TYPICAL)
PROCESS
SUBSTATION
UP TO 12KV
C
SINGLE RADIAL
MAIN DISTR.
(TYPICAL)
PROCESS
SUBSTATION
UP TO 12KV
DESCRIPTION
A
C

CONTROL

CONTROL
M
C
G
UP TO 1KV
PROCESS
SUBSTATION

OR LOCAL CONTROL
AIRBREAKCONTACTOR TYPE MOTOR

STARTER - REMOTE CONTROL
SWITCHFUSE - MANUALLY
OPERATED
ISOLATING SWITCH - MANUALLY
OPERATED
GENERATOR
M
M
MOTOR
FIGURE 1 (C)
OPEN RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 51
APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Definitions
Standardised definitions may be found in the BP Group RPSEs Introductory Volume.
Abbreviations
AVR
DOL
HV
HRC
IEC
IEE
IPSA
LV
MTBF
MTTR
PME
THF
VSD
Automatic Voltage Regulator

Direct On Line
High Voltage
High Rupturing Capacity
International Electrotechnical Committee
Institution of Electrical Engineers
Interactive Power System Analysis
Low Voltage
Mean Time Between Failures
Mean Time to Repairs
Protective Multiple Earth
Telephone Harmonic Factor
Variable Speed Drive
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 52
APPENDIX B
LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
A reference invokes the latest published issue or amendment unless stated otherwise.
Referenced standards may be replaced by equivalent standards that are internationally or
otherwise recognised provided that it can be shown to the satisfaction of the purchaser's
professional engineer that they meet or exceed the requirements of the referenced standards.
International
IEC 34
IEC 38
IEC 56
IEC 947
Rotating Electrical Machines

Standard Voltage (6th Edition)
HVAC Circuit Breakers
LV Switchgear and Control Gear
Industrial
IEE Wiring Regulations (16th Edition)
Electricity Council Recommendation G5/3 (1976)
Health and Safety Executive Guidance Note 41
BP Group Documents
BP Group RP 4-4
Buildings
(replaces BP CP 19)
BP Group RP 12-2
Equipment in Flammable Atmospheres and Combustible Dusts

(replaces BP CP 17 Part 2)
BP Group RP 12-4
Power System Protection and Control

BP Group RP 12-5
Power Supplies for Control Systems

BP Group RP 12-6
HV Switchgear
BP Group RP 12-7
LV Switchgear
BP Group RP 12-9
Transformers and Reactors

RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 53
BP Group RP 12-11
Motors
BP Group RP 12-16
Earthing and Bonding

BP Group GS 112-5
Transformers and Reactors

(replaces BP Std 223)
BP Group GS 112-6
Electrical Requirements for A.C. Generators

(replaces BP Std 224 Part 1)
BP Group GS 112-8
LV Switchgear and Controlgear

BP Group GS 112-9
HV Switchgear and Controlgear

BP Group GS 160-1
Emergency Generator Package
UK Law
Electricity supply Regulations (1988)
Electricity at work Regulations (1989)
RP 12-3
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
PAGE 54

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RP 12-3

ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND

Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

BP GROUP RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR ENGINEERING

Latest Amendment Date

ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

CUSTODIAN (See Quarterly Status List for Contact)

Engineering Practices Group, BP International Limited, Research & Engineering Centre

Design of overhead line.

Design of large power rectifier plant.

Design aspects of electrical systems which are special to mine

Electrical systems in ships.

Electrical systems for subsea installations.

Electrical design of installations in commercial, administrative,

intended to ensure that an economic appraisal of alternative courses of action is

Power systems with a voltage in excess of 1000 V should be so

encouraged. In any case in a green field situation, the Short Circuit

Rating and Diversity Factors

Electrical equipment shall be rated to carry continuously the maximum

Assessment of maximum load requirements of an installation shall allow

It is considered important that power system loading estimates be based upon

These are non-moving types of electrical equipment such as lighting, heating,

Process Sensitive Loads

POWER SUPPLY SOURCES

All negotiations with public utilities shall be the sole responsibility of

Electrical Import from a Public Utility

Essential loads should always be provided for by on-site power supply

See 3.2.2 (commentary.)

Where economically viable, power generation on site may be arranged

On-site Generation with no Public Utility Connection

The fuel source.

The nature of the process energy.

The process steam or other heat requirements, if any.

The relationship between electric power requirements and the

The number and arrangement of power generating sets should reflect

There should be sufficient generation to meet the Maximum

Where more than 2 generators are installed, those loads

All power generation facilities which cannot derive alternative power

least 3 generators. Under some circumstances this (high) reliability requirement

On-site Generation Run in Parallel with a Public Utility

As a standby source of electric power.

A means of export of surplus electrical power.

As a Black Start Facility

Emergency Power Supply Equipment

Power supplies to Essential loads should be achieved by one or more of

Providing an alternative source of energy, such as batteries.

Increasing the amount (or being assured of sufficient sheer

Ensuring a number of alternative supply feeds are available to

Local Diesel Generation.

In general it is expected that Essential loads would receive battery supplies or

Where increased main generating plant or local standby plant is selected

Emergency generator sets shall be capable of starting and running when

Emergency generators shall be provided with automatic starting and

Generator circuits (other than local emergency generators) and public

The switchgear for primary substations shall comply with BP Group GS

Busbar arrangements shall be selected to be cost effective, operationally

Operational flexibility to permit loads and power supplies to be effectively

Minimal switchgear per circuit and simple control and protection.

Scheduled maintenance of busbars shall be possible without system

Single busbar arrangements for primary supply substations should be

The switchgear shall be indoor metalclad type.