Andrew S. Terrell - Capitalism & Globalization!

fall 2009

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500-2000. Paul Kennedy @ 1987 Random House, New York

In his monograph, Paul Kennedy presents a macro approach to the relationship between

economic strength and military might for what he deems “the Great Powers” from the post

Renaissance world through the twentieth century. At the time of its release, such a large study

had not been completed to such a degree. Being the latter part of the 1980s, public opinions and

estimates already guessed the end of the Soviet Union was in the near future. However,

Kennedy drew criticism for including the United States in his model for “Great Powers” decline.

His book can be approached from multiple angles, but for our purposes, we will explore the two

prevailing approaches.

The primary purpose of the first sections of the monograph are to detail the timelines and

events that allowed for the rise and fall of sequential powers since the latter portion of the

fifteenth century. The year 1500 is chosen as a rough starting point for the book as world events

were moving society from the archaic to modernity. Warfare changed around 1500 because of

cast iron capabilities. This led to the adaptation of gun powder in canons and eventually muskets

which replaced wooden weapons and denounced the myth of unbreakable walls in fortifications.

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, military power expanded and evolved

rapidly, especially in Europe.

Kennedy’s argues that the military expansion was possibly because of the new economic

power of states. The sixteenth century had seen European empires expand across Asia and

Africa while also conquering and colonizing the Middle and South America. However it may

seem as though powers must obtain a strong economy to maintain an expansive military,

Kennedy was careful to mention an internal balance of power within the great powers. As in the
Andrew S. Terrell - Capitalism & Globalization! fall 2009

case of the Dutch, the motherland became rich beyond compare for many centuries by setting

trade routes that covered all of the known world. However, the Dutch never invested heavily

into warfare technology to the extent that the Hapsburg empire would. Thereby, many powers

that seemed to have been rising to prominence Kennedy would use as examples of how

economic and military might must go hand-in-hand for dominance.

The fallacy of such thinking is that national strength is only measures by warfare

capacity. Kennedy makes adequate examples to defend his argument, however, using his model

suggests that even peacetime powers were constantly preparing for war. While this was the case

in many instances, it bypasses the evolution of thought and dissemination of societal

developments that also played key roles in the imperial rises of the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. The Renaissance did not simply stop at 1500, it was perpetuated as it spread. For

Europe was a unique continent of lose kingdoms and alliances through most of the early modern

era. Former great powers, notably those of Asia, were united and expanded rapidly.

Nevertheless, the great powers of Sung or Ming China all fell as they closed off from the world

stage. Ming China especially had moved from naval supremacy in the world to a country in

constant land defense. Leaving the world stage was their downfall. However, Kennedy would

say Ming China declined because they cutback on expansion and military spending. But China

still had to pay for land warfare so it was not as though military spending disappeared when an

edict destroyed the mighty navies of Gheng Ho.

Additionally, citing military spending and economic prowess as the sole factors of

defining great powers overlooks nationalist trends. The English colonies in North America did

not win their independence because they had a greater military than Great Britain, nor because
Andrew S. Terrell - Capitalism & Globalization! fall 2009

they had a stronger economy. The American War for Independence was won by the individuals

of the colonies. The lack of a strong military and economy forced the colonies to establish a

nation-state from scratch in the aftermath of the war. That is the point at which Kennedy’s

argument can be defended. Nonetheless, it overlooks the reasons and motivation to establish

military and economic might before rising to power.

The Industrial Revolution was also a key factor in the rise of great powers. Kennedy

alludes to this, but never to industrial capitalism that accelerated military technology and the

draw on states’ economies. Early globalization was composed of communication, trade, and

culture diffusion. In each of these fields the industrial revolution allowed for the accelerated

expansion. Military spending grew because of the cost of the new technology, not necessarily

because economies were expanding. For new trade routes required faster ships which were

results of the industrial revolution in turn.

Finally, the majority of the explored conflicts in Kennedy’s survey were alliances.

Kennedy, however, insists on focusing on individual state preeminence. The problem with this

approach is that Europe has been separated by alliances since the rise of the modern era. In each

conflict there were two opposing forces even if minute. To Kennedy’s credit, he does recognize

that European conflicts were results of interstate competition. Europe was unique from Asia and

the Native tribes of the Americas because the powers were largely isolated from each other, but

connected enough to copy technology and ensue an arms race similar to that of the twentieth

century. The world before the twentieth century was largely multipolar because of the interstate

arms race. To fuel the military spending, greater powers did have to stimulate their economies

constantly, that was inevitable.

Andrew S. Terrell - Capitalism & Globalization! fall 2009

The second point Kennedy seems to stress deals with the contemporary rise and decline

of powers in the twentieth century. Technological and organizational breakthroughs brought

greater advantages to one state over another. The arms build up before World War I was another

example of Kennedy’s thesis that economic capability allows for military strength. Similarly, the

lack of economic capability allowed Hitler to expand as his opponents early on could not

financially afford to oppose him.

The fall of modern states, according to Kennedy, is largely due to overextension.

Germany in both World Wars overextended itself and the economy along with its military

faltered. The British Empire was overextended throughout the world and slowly the empire fell

apart. Similarly, the Soviet Union at the time of the book’s publishing in 1987 was faltering

financially because they had built up a military second only to the United States. The difference

between the Soviet Union and the United States was the economic backing to arms build up.

The twentieth century was a bipolar world. Kennedy notes that after WWI, neither

Russia nor the United States took the lead because of internal resolutions in defense of isolation.

For Russia it was the Bolshevik regime which shook and transformed Russia rapidly. The then

Soviet Union grew in power to rival the United States through the half century after WWII. For

the United States, isolationism led to huge decreases in military spending and an illusion of

economic prosperity after WWI. While the world lingered into the Great Depression the two

global powers capable of revival did nothing. It took a military conflict in Europe that would

consume the world a second time by 1941 to spark economic growth and military spending.

Kennedy links the declines of former great powers to that of the Soviet Union and the

United States in the latter twentieth century. The shares of the two respective powers GNP being
Andrew S. Terrell - Capitalism & Globalization! fall 2009

spent on defense has consistently decreased while rising countries have begun to spend great

portions of their GNP. The effect of this is a steady shift in power that will play out in the

twenty-first century. While the United States remains the clear leader in the global economy, it

has not experienced the growth of countries such as China and Japan. In Kennedy’s model for

decline of great powers, the United States is giving way to the expanding economies in Europe,

China, and Japan.

Despite the large scope of the book, Kennedy’s argument is consistent with his model;

great powers rise as their economies and militaries expand, and fall as their militaries are

overextended causing havoc for the economies. History is cyclical to Kennedy’s realist approach

to empires. The problem with turning his study into a general theory or rule, is that the past is

constantly reevaluated. Political scientists may look to his study in order to form over

generalized laws for hegemony, but historians will find most use of the book in the earlier

sections where early modern powers faltered largely because of the states failed to balance the

economy and military.