Juwan Woods

Professor Swanson
Political 487
October 10, 2016
Okoli v. City of Baltimore (2011)
Facts: The plaintiff, Katrina Okoli, was hired as the executive assistant of John P. Stewart,
director of Baltimores Commission of Aging and Retirement (CARE). After a few months,
Stewart began propositioning Okoli to have sex with him, and making sexual comments to her as
well as asking sexual questions. Stewart also touched Okolis leg several times, and eventually,
forcibly kissed her. Okoli began reaching out to higher up members of CARE, as well as people
within the Mayors cabinet looking to file a formal complaint. After sending a formal complaint
to the Mayor and two others, the complaint was forwarded to Stewart, who fired Okoli the same
day. After taking her allegations to and being dismissed by the Baltimore Community Relations
Commission (BCRC), Okoli put forth a pro se action against Stewart and the City of Baltimore
(as well as the Mayor and several others) alleging harassment and other claims under Title VII.
The district court granted summary judgement to the City of Baltimore, and the Appellate court
now reviews.
Issue: Under Title VII, were did the claims made by the plaintiff constitute sexual harassment,
quid pro quo discrimination, and retaliation?
Holding: Yes, the claims made by the plaintiff were sufficient to constitute sexual harassment,
quid pro quo discrimination, and retaliation. The District Courts grant of summary judgement is
vacated and remanded for further proceedings to a jury.
Reasoning:
A. Rule: "To demonstrate sexual harassment and/or a racially hostile work
environment, a plaintiff must show that there is (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the
plaintiff's sex [and/or race]; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff's
conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is
imputable to the employer.
Next, the court looks at the claim of quid pro quo discrimination, in which the employee
must prove five elements, 1 The employee belongs to a protected group. 2 The employee was
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment.3 The harassment complained of was based upon sex. 4
The employee's reaction to the harassment affected tangible aspects of the employee's
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The acceptance or rejection of the
harassment must be an express or implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit or cause of a
tangible job detriment to create liability. Further, as in typical disparate treatment cases, the
employee must prove that she was deprived of a job benefit which she was otherwise qualified to
receive because of the employer's use of a prohibited criterion in making the employment
decision. 5 The employer, as defined by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), knew or should have
known of the harassment and took no effective remedial action.
Lastly, the court looks at the claim that the plaintiff was retaliated against, To state a
prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected
activity, such as filing a complaint with the EEOC; (2) the employer acted adversely against the
plaintiff; and (3) the protected activity was causally connected to the employer's adverse action.

B. Application: Addressing this rule and applying them to the facts, the court finds that
the Okoli has shown that there was a possible hostile work environment. This is predicated upon
her presenting of twelve incidents that occurred within four months. The court argues that the
nature of these incidents could create action out of themselves, and thus could create a hostile
work environment. As for the content of Stewarts statements, the court argues that they do not
represent simple teasing and offhand comments and are personal, gender-based comments that
have previously been acted upon by a court. The court also argues that Okolis defense of her
work performance was not a valid argument against her hostile work environment claims, as she
can hold both sentiments. The court thus finds that Okoli has a strong claim for hostile work
environment.
As for quid pro quo harassment, the court finds that Okoli has met all of the requirements
of putting forth this claim. They argue that the fourth requirement was met by Stewart firing
Okoli hours after learning of her complaint. The fifth requirement was automatically met by the
plaintiffs prima facie showing, and the city shifted the burden back to Okoli, but the court found
that she still meets the fifth requirement due to there not being much evidence that she should
have been fired for a nondiscriminatory reason.
In regards to the retaliation claim, the court argues that though the lower court found that
Stewart decided to fire Okoli before she complained and that her complaint was too vague, and
thus her complaint was not protected, this was not the case, because of her previous complaint
specifically citing harassment. The court infers that Stewarts action was directly caused by the
complaint to the Mayor, even if he had a draft of a termination letter prepared prior to this
complaint. Thus, the appellate court vacates the grant of summary judgement and remands the
case to a jury.