Duygun Ruben

2015780108

Political Economy of Turkey(POLS 635)

Commentary II
In this paper, I will try to describe and criticize some of the main
arguments and concepts of David Waldner in his book State Building and
Late Development.
Waldners most general argument is that different paths of state building
result in different economic outcomes(Waldner, 1999, pg.1). Probably the
best way to elaborate on this thesis is to clarify how he substantiates the
notions different paths of state building and different economic
outcomes.
To begin with, what he means by state building is the transition from
mediated to unmediated states, or in other words from indirect to direct
rule(Waldner, 1999, pg.21). In mediated states, the rulers govern in
collaboration with urban and rural elites. The local elites conduct many of
the governing actions in mediated states which are normally associated
with the sovereign states, ranging from tax collection to military
recruitment. The reason why the local elites can exercise such power is
their control over socioeconomic resources. In contrast, unmediated states
are distinguished by various institutions which serve to connect society
and economy with centralized public authority(Waldner, 1999, pg.21).
Waldner argues that the transition from a mediated to an unmediated
state involves features such as the establishment of institutional networks
in place of local notables, expansion of states provision of public goods,
state

assuming

regulating

the

responsibility
economy

for

and

economy(Waldner, 1999, pg.23).

establishing
managing

infrastructure,

ties

to

the

state
global

Having analysed what he means by state building, we come to the

question of what he means by different paths to state building. Waldner
identifies two paths regarding the transformation from mediated to
unmediated states. In one path, which are examplified by Syria and
Turkey, state transformation and popular sector incorporation occur
simultaneously. In the other path, which is exemplified by Korea and
Taiwan, state transformation occurs before popular sector incorporation.
These paths determine different economic outcomes. He argues that while
the first path leads to a precocious Keynesian state, which is
economically less successful, the second path leads to developmental
state which is economically more successful. (Waldner, 1999, pg.1)
Then the question arises as to what determines the pursuit of these two
different paths. Waldners answer is elite conflict. He argues that
contending elites seek for alliances, which they find in the masses, or in
Waldners words the popular sector. This results in cross-class coalitions,
which are utilized by the elites for securing their status aganist competing
elites. This is the path which leads to the precocious Keynesian states. In
contrast, in countries with cohesive elites, the elites can afford to
transform the state without the alliances mentioned above, hence state
transformation occurs before popular sector incorporation, which results in
developmental states which are economically more efficient according to
Waldners arguments. (Waldner, 1999, pg.29)
Having described the main analytical framework of Waldner, now I will
elaborate on my criticism of this framework. My first contention is
regarding the notion of state transformation, i.e the transformation from
mediated to unmediated states. I

think this

conception of state

transformation is very Eurocentric, and overgeneralizes the Western

European experience of state transformation. This is not implicit in
Waldners book, on contrary it is very explicit. Waldner argues that the
transition from a mediated to an unmediated state involves features such
as the establishment of institutional networks in place of local notables,
expansion

of

states

provision

of

public

goods,

state

assuming

responsibility for establishing infrastructure, state regulating the economy

and managing ties to the global economy(Waldner, 1999, 23). Also while
explaining the elite conflicts in Europe, he identifies three main conflicts,
which are about gradual extension of state authority, the conflict between
agrarian elites and nascent industrialists, and the division of elites
regarding how to deal with increasingly assertive popular classes. Then he
goes on to say that what distinguishes Europe from the developing world
is that these conflicts occured sequentially, and the state had already
acquired its organizational characteristics before the occurance of these
conflicts. (Waldner, 1999, 30). Here he assumes two things, first that all of
the premodern states had the characteristics he ascribes to Europe,
secondly that the elite conflicts he attributes to Europe have at some point
occured also in non-European contexts, and have shaped the nature state
transformation if the state was not transformed before the occurance of
these conflicts.
This problematic conception of state transformation is also evident in the
way Waldner explains the state transformation regarding Turkey.

He

argues that the Turkish republic inherited a political infrastructure of

indirect rule from the Ottoman Empire. Numerous modernizing reforms
implemented between 1923 and 1950 retained intact the structure of a
mediated state(Waldner, 1999, pg. 54). I find this argument problematic.
First of all, it assumes that the Ottoman Empire had the same qualities of
an unmediated state, a concept which he generalizes from the Western
European premodern state-type. Elaborating the differences between that
type of state and the Ottoman state is beyond the limits of this paper and
of the time I have to write it, but I think it is sufficient to say that whereas
the premodern western European state type was characterized by
decentralized feudal arrangements, which of course lead to Waldners
conception of mediated states, in the Ottoman Empire the state had a very
important if not the most important role in institutional arrangements like
timar system or later tax-farming system, which performed functions such
as tax collection and military recruitment(Zrcher, 2004, pg. 17). Although
feudal tendencies occured especially by the late 18th and early 19th

century, with the rise of the ayan, their power was eventually either
curbed or totally supressed(Zrcher, 2004, pg. 27). In sum, I argue that
the Ottoman Empire can not be simply characterized as a mediated state.
This is not to say that it had the characteristics of a modern, unmediated
state, but it was qualitatively different from the feudally arranged western
European state. Secondly, even if we did accept for the sake of the
argument that Ottoman Empire was a mediated state, the statement I
quoted above is still problematic in terms of neglecting the reforms in
Ottoman Empire since the early 19th century and Turkish Republic until
1950 which among other things aimed at establishing a centralized state
structure. I think the centralization reforms beginning with Mahmud II and
continuing through the Tanzimat era, Abdlhamit era, Young Turk era and
finally the early republic, with their aim and with their many successes and
failures in terms of establishing a centralized state structure(Zrcher,
1999), should not be so easily neglected if we are talking about state
transformation regarding Turkey. Yet Waldner ignores all that and assumes
that Turkey until 1950 was simply a mediated state.
I have some other contentions regarding Waldners arguments. I think his
conception of change in societies which is driven by elites is very
problematic. The two different paths of state transformation are wholly
determined by whether the elites are coherent or whether they are
competing. This elite driven conception of change silences many other
things which can equally be the source of state transformation, such as
the class conflicts, the structural constraints and opportunities deriving
from

the

international

context,

the

influence

pre-existing

colonial

arrangements, the influence of new ideas and so on. In fact, Waldner

explicitly states that other variables such as class conflict, position in the
global economy, security threats and colonial legacies are incorporated
into the analysis of elite conflict(Waldner, 20). Incorporating all these
variables into the analysis of elite conflict is way too reductionist and
simplistic. Also, his conception of the elites seems to be not very
historically grounded. When one reads his text, one has the impression
that the elites are aliens who aim at retaining their dominant position vis-

a-vis the masses. He totally neglects the possibility what he describes as

elites might be the representatives of the masses, or the popular-sector in
his words. I would like to know how he would explain the emergence of a
new elite group within a society with his ahistorical conception of elites.
Finally, I am concerned that his theory of state transformation occuring
before

popular-sector

incorporation

yielding

favourable

results

for

economic development might be justified in defense of authoritarian

regimes. He seems to regard that decision making in the economy is a
depoliticized process(Waldner, 1999, pg.32), whereas in my opinion any
decision making regarding any policy including economic policies is a
political process.

A Note: I am aware that in this paper I repeated the same pattern of first
explaining the theory and later voicing my own criticism which you already
suggested me not to do so after my first paper. However I am very
accustomed in this type of response paper organization and find it very
difficult to write it in a different way. I hope you can give me further
suggestions regarding alternative ways of writing a response paper.

References
Waldner, David, State Building and Late Development, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1999.
Zrcher, Eric J., Turkey: A Modern History, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.