MI' D ' ' D R E' L I T '

an articl e in MI' D ' ' III the prese n t writer atte mpted a
criticism of certain modern hypotheses concerning R eality De
structive work being much easier than co n structive this second
study attempts with some dread the task of considering the
whole subject from another point of view ' et the comfort for
the writer lies in the fact that the thoughts here to be set forth
are in the main n ot n ew The need seems to be j u st now that
certain ideas known but in our age too much neglecte d should
be n ot simply revivi ed but rather reformed to brin g them
in to closer con n e xion with modern progress
This study will fall into two p arts I n the rst we shall
suppose our whole task to be the suggestion of a plausible
of a simple adequate and consistent hypothesis about the nature
of ex tern al reality In the seco n d part we shall consider more
critically the nature of such hypothes e s In this rst part then
we shall suppose that by a perfect theory of k n owledge the fol
lowin g res ul t has bee n reached ' Human beings are able to form
id e as that correspo n d in some way with a real world outside o f
themsel ves That is the sequence o f human ideas corresponds
to seque n ces o f extern al events or to relations of coe xistence
among external thin gs The n ecessary or u niform conne xions
of human ideas correspo n d to regul ar or to universal connexions
among external thin gs Or in the brief form of Mr Herbert
Spe n cer s phraseology to each necessary relatio n as b i n huma n
consciousness there corresponds a relation ' B in the external
world Suppose then that all this has been established ' 0
o n e wil l admit more readil y tha n the write r that this supposi
tion is merely tentative The theory of knowledge is yet to be
compl eted and betwee n its conception a n d its reali s ation there
are wide oceans of doubt We shall in fact touch upo n the
problems of this theory in the second part of our paper But
for the m oment suppose admitted what scientic thought
generally takes for granted via the correspondenc e of inner and
outer r elations in such wi s e that the former are naturally 'opies
of the latter And o n this foundation suppose that we intend
to consider what hyp othesis as to th e na ture of the related
terms ' and B in the external worl d is on the whole the most
p l ausibl e
I'

I
For the sake o f a v oiding co n troversy we m ay for the mo
m ent leave out o f account two old questions We cannot
reall y escape either a n d both will sternl y co nfro n t us before we
.

Mind

R eality

and

get i n at the door of the temple of certainty But here at the

outset we are playing with hypotheses and may be absolv e d
from the responsibility of securing ourselves beforehand from
all possible attacks The rst is the question of the idealists '
How can any reality be conceived unless as implying or includ
in g states of consciousness ' For the moment we will waive
the Berkeleya n contention altogether ' for we are not no w co n
cern ed to prove by metaphysic al analysis the u niversal c o inci
dence of consciousness and reality We wish merely a plausible
hypothesis to be advanced as to the nature of W ha t more
popular thought means by real ity The second que s tion that at
the outset we avoid is the one concernin g the ground of the
assumed agreement between the external and the internal orders
of facts Whether this ground lies i n a causal determination of
our consciousness by the extern al world or in a pre establi s hed
harmony of b oth matters not We take our stand then upo n
the admitted facts of popu l ar b elief Here are feelings se
u ences
of
feelings
thoughts
trains
of
thought
systems
of
q
scientic b elief ' all in ternal facts Beyond the consciousness
of these internal facts stretches '
so we now assume an d only
assume ) another world of facts in whi ch somethin g corresponds
to each o n e of these feeli ngs some order of facts to each
sequence of feeling some system of facts and of laws to each
properly constituted system of beliefs The external order of
the world beyond correspo n ds to the order of this internal world
of our consciousness b ut is not thi s order ' plausible h y
o
t
h
i
s
i
e
s
is
required
as
to
the
n
ature
o
f
this
correspond
ng
e
x
p
ternal order
M any hypotheses have been suggested in answer to this re
u irem ent
di
The
doctrine
previously
scussed
the
doctrine
of
q

M ind Stu ff was such an hypothesis Mind Stu ff was to

be lik e in nature to consciousness ' but by reason of the sim
i
lik
i
l
of
its
timate
units
ach
of
these
was
to
be
again
u
n
e
c
t
u
l
e
p
y
consciousn e ss For consciousness it was assumed is an aggre
gate o f uni ts ' each unit by its elf has only intensive quality
and lacking complexity of content is of course unconscious
O u r consciousness then is employed in mi rroring the comple x
relations in which the unco nscious Mind Stu ff el e ments outside
of us are involved The usefulness of this hypothesis we have
previously tested But the motives that led to its formation are
int e resting
These motive s were one may fancy twofold
Th e re was the inuence of Berkeley s argument reiterated as it
h as been in so many forms
Accordi ng to this argument ex
ternal reality can be consistently conceived only by assimilating
it in nature to consciousness The second motive was the ex
presse d one o f formul atin g in simple terms the phenome n a of
.

evolutio n and of physiological psychol ogy The tran sitio n from

th e material to the conscious the connexion of the psychical
with the physical coul d b e st be conceived by supposing the
physical to be but a di sguised or attenuated or very simple form
The rst motive if it was really very active
o f the psychical
we have decided to omit for the moment from consideration
The second and more expr e ssly promin ent motive we shoul d
consid e r responsible for the most faulty part of the theory
the und e ned double sided nature of these hybrid Mind Stuff
atoms the fact that they try to appear among old fashioned
atoms as being quite dead enough for all the purpose of me
ch anics while they show th e ir ghostly selves at the gates of
psychology and in very thin voices with very uncanny b e
haviour try to convince us that they are after all really quite
alive and qui te ready to take part in the building up of con
scious mind
The Mind Stuff hypothesis lan d s us in a dilemma Eithe r
our elementary atoms are as dead as those of Democritus ' and
then the whole problem of the evolution and th e physiology of
mind is unsolved ' or they have such mental life that out of
them complex consciousnes s can b e built up but then they are
Monads minds of more or less clear consciou s nes s And in that
case following the reasoning by which the Mind Stuff theory
itself was reached we are led natu rally to the hypothesis that
every atom of matter is a little mind ' not an in tensive element
of sensation but a compl e x of many elements in a conscious
unity of some sort an apperceptive in dividual
To s u ch a n h ypothesis be it noticed we are led o nl y when
we accept the method and the p remisses that led to the h y
h
i
o
t
s
M
ff
e
of
ind
Stu
and
when
we
free
the
conclu
ion
from
s
s
p
ambig uity But the hypothesis in questio n that for which the
atoms are little conscious souls with a life of their o wn like our
human l ives only simpler will hardly meet very soon with
general favour It is in fact complex and not plausible And
why ' Though reall y better than the Min d Stu ff h yp othesis
this other is unacceptable because it asks us to assum e
the existence of a conscious re acting thinking being wh ere
no symptom of reaction or of thought or of conscio usn e ss
appears beyond the simple behaviour of an atom in the pre sence
of other atoms Better is this hypothesis that is more con
sist e nt and adequate than the Mind Stuff hypothe s is because
we can form some idea of how a M on ad can e xist can enter into
relations with other like Monads can unfold its elf can even
under favourable conditions develop into a higher ord e r of
being become the theatre of a rational conscious life ' while we
ca n form n o n otio n o f complex interrel ations amo ng ab s o lu tely
.

'

'

Mind

and

Reality

simple an d purely in te n sive sensation el eme n ts n or conceive

how out of them a complex and united consciousness can be
formed But u n satisfactory is this hypothesis because we are
u n willing to admit a denite conscious life individual and voli
tio nal like o u r own unless we see some symptom of life and of
v olition more marked than an atom has yet shown Above all
the mark of action with a purpose seems wanting in the case of an
atom whose velocity or whose combination with other atoms is
n ot a reaction determined by any di scoverable inner purpose
b ut simply the result of surrounding conditions modied by the
simple nature of the atom Arbi trary then and confounded
seems the hypothesis of any denitely conscious M onad atoms '
for to explain the facts of experience such an hypoth esis assumes
a whole world of unkn own and unknowable fac t s via the inner
life and thought of what seem to us dead atoms ' et i f arbi
trary the hypothesis is irrefutable
It is as said preferable to
the Mind Stu ff doctrine ' and its consistency not to menti o n its
poetic charm will always k e ep it on the verge of speculative
thought recognised by a fanciful few a n d ignored or despised
by the common sense many
But have we exha usted the possibl e hypotheses as to the e x
ternal foundation of the phenomena of experience ' By no
means We must indeed pass over those for which the external

world is the embodiment of an ' nco n scious Mind ' and that
simply because we shall look in vain among the volumes of glib
writing upon this topic for any clear notion of what people
m ean by unconscious mind
If by unconscio u s mind is
meant what is ge n erally call ed matter we remain j u st where we
were at the outset with an inquiry b efore us as to what is the
n ature of the external fact to which corresponds our idea of
matter But if unconscious mind means aught else then the

term seems to be equiv al ent to unconscious consciousness

For no idea of a reason or of a thought can be formed in such
wise as to separate reason and thought from consciousness
Thought is a series of active conscious states ' and all the in
n
u it
of
generations
of
Von
Hartmanns
shall
not
induce
us
to
e
g
y
corrupt our s peculation with the monstrous marriages of contra
d icto ry n otions whereof the
Philosophy of the ' nconscious
se e ms so proud ' et thus we are not done with hypotheses Nor
are we forced to go back t o the vague and uncritical hypothesis
that only matter ind e nab l e inexplicable matter exists outside
of our minds Of the existence of matter we can giv e hypo
thetically some little account At all events there is Berkeley s
hypothesis which as a mere hypothesis we can examine apart
from any study o f Berkeley s phil osophical arguments for hi s
i d ealis m
-

'

Mind

and

R eality

According to Berkeley there exist conscious beings more or

l e ss like ours elve s of whom the head and father is ' o d Now
This
e xternal to all being s besides ' o d there is a real world
real w orld is made up of the eternal system of ' od s thoughts
,

d eny s ens i b l e thi ngs an ex is ten c e o u t o f th e m in d I d o no t

m ean m y m i nd in p articu l ar b u t all m ind s ' o w it is pl ai n th ey h av e an
ex i s ten c e ex teri o r to m y m i n d s i n c e I n d th e m b y ex p eri en c e t o b e in d e
T h er e is th er efo r e s o m e o th er m i n d wh erei n th ey ex is t,
en d e n t o f it
pu ring th e interv als b etween th e ti m es o f m y p erc eiving th em as likewis e
th e y d i d b e fo re m y b irth an d w o u l d d o afte r m y s u pp o s ed ann i h il ati o n
' n d as th e s am e is tr ue wi th r egar d to all o th er ni te c reate d s p ir i ts it
th er e is an O m nip res ent Eterna l M ind wh ic h kn o ws
n e c es s ar ily fo ll o ws
th e m to o u r vi e w in s u ch a
an d c o mp reh en d s al l th ing s
an d ex h i b i ts
m anner and acc o rd in g to s u ch ru l es as h e hi m s el f h ath o rd ain ed an d are

b y u s term ed th e laws of natu re 'D ia logu es between Hy las cf' Philonoas ,

I I I)

Wh en

This so famil iar hypothesis of Berkeley is in part founde d

upon a thought that for the present we have agreed to neglect
i e upon the notion of the external world as the cau s e of our in
ternal impressions Not being caused by myself my idea s
rea s ons Berkeley must have an external cause And the only
intelligible cause is an active spirit ' et for our present pur
pose this thought is not important We are not asking about
the cause of our conscious states but about the way in whi ch
we can most plau s ibly conceive of an external world correspond
ing to these state s The correspondence is assumed Into its
ground be it pre established harmony or physical in uence
we do not just now in quire
Our only criteria of plausi
b il ity causal explanation bein g dropped are therefore adequacy
simplicity and consistency Is Berkeley s hypothesis consistent
with itself and is it the simplest hy pothesis possible ' Stripped
o f n on essential features the hypothesis is that there corresponds
to our consciousness another higher and farther reaching con
s cio u s nes s containing all that is abi di n g in our consciousness
and much more be s ides This consciousness is in form and
matter a rational spirit having denite purposes in the creation
a n d education of the various nite Spirits Th es e purpos e s re
quire for their accomplishment that our conscious stat es should
within certain limits agr ee with this higher consciousn e ss
correspond to it in form and Ito a certain extent This corres
n
d
n
o
e
c
e
constitutes
what
we
mean
by
tr
th
There
is
n
o
u
p
external world but this other consciousness
To Berkeley as we k n ow the essential part of thi s doctrine
was the teleological part That ' od s thoughts and our corres
n
o
d
n
e
c
e
ther
e
to
res
t
from
and
express
od
s
purposes
in
u
l
'
p
creating the world thi s was for Berkel ey the main poin t to be
p ro v e n But if the theological ele m e n t of the d octrin e b e for
,

'

Mind

and

Rea lity

the rst le ft out of account there is another part that we just

no w wish to hold fast
Ou r th o ugh t is tru e by r eas o n of its
cor r esp o nd ence to th e fa cts of a n a ctu a l co ns ciou s nes s ex ter n al to
o u r o wn ' this hypothesis has an interest apart from its origi n
and fr om its original use Wh y in philosophy should we be
afraid of doctrine s because th ey have an association with some
dreaded theological dogma or with some enthusiastic and over
c o nd ent sy s tem of the past ' About the nature of the external
Before
world we have at the outset nothing but hypothese s
we test th em in any very exact way we may with s afety try to
understand them Perhaps what seemed the wildest of them
Because a certain hypo
all may turn out to be the very best
thesis was put forward rather as a demonstrable and et ernal
truth than as a n hypothesis shall we rej ect it without further
examination
The hypothesis now be fore us is Berkeley s with the telco
How this ex
l ogical element omitted along with the caus al
ternal consciousness comes to a ffect us and why it takes just
such forms as it does we care not This we as k ' What is this
supposed external consciousness ' How does it correspond to
our own ' We shall not call the supposed consciousness by
question begging names It is not for us just now either ab s o
lute o r divine It is simply consciousness and external The
hypothesis is that truth consists in some kind of correspondence
between our thought and this outer reality What kind of cor
respondence
Two conscious beings can have correspo nd ing states o f con
The notes of a melody
s cio u s n es s without havi n g like states
co u ld have corresponding to them the variation s i n intensity of
some source of light The light as h es or beats would correspond
to the notes of music by having the like rhythm ' yet there
would be no resemblance in the conte n t Correspondence may
be y e t more obscured The dashes on a piece of paper that has
passed under the point of a telegraphic pen the series o f
characters printed from the press in a do 'en l angua es the
sound s of the voice of a reader the series of signals ashed from
shore to a di stant vessel all these dissimilar series of events
might correspond exactly and throughout if it were their pur
pose to convey in various ways the same meaning In order
then that my consciousness should correspond to some other
conscious ness ext ernal to mine it is only necessary that for
each event or f act in my consciousness there should exist some
event or fact in the other consciousness and that some relation
exi s ting amo n g my conscious states shoul d b e like or parallel to
th e relation existing among th e conscious states e x ternal to
min e Th e m ore nu m erous the poi n ts o f rese mbl a n ce b etwee n
,

'

Mind

and

R eality

the two series o f states the closer the corresponde n ce But

correspondence in the abstract implies o nl y s ome one denit e
and permanent re semblance found throughout the two s e rie s
Such being the nature of corre s pondence in general let us
con s ider our hypothe s is more in detail Suppo s e that the clock
yonder has some such reality as thi s hypothe s is suppose s
There is th e clock with its pendulum beatin g For me now
that clock is a combination of sensatio ns j oined with a beli ef in
certain possible sensations For one in the same room with me
the clock has a like exi s tence But suppose that the clock has
apart from my conscio usne s s apart from the consciousness of
any other human being or animal an e xistence for some other
as yet undened co nsciousness Suppo s e that for this conscious
n e ss the clock in its whole present condition exi s ts not at all as
a possibility of sensations but sol ely and in all its parts as a
present group of sensible facts stan di ng in d e n ite relations
Suppose that the sen s ible facts that con s titute this clock as it is
given to this hypothetical consciousnes s are in quality unlike the
sensations that for me constitute the clock ' but that in their
relations in their number in their grouping in their differe n ces
from one another these se n sible facts as they are for the hypo
thetical consciousness agree with the sensations and with the
possibili ties of sensatio n that for me constitute the clock
Suppose that the clock as it is in the hypothetical consciousness
endures for a considerable time and is called the real clock
Then when I shut my eyes or go away or di e there exists still
the real clock i e the clock in the hypothetic al consciousness
Though all my fell ows die there is still the re al clock in de
pende n t o f our consciousness The clock may for a time go on
running ' that is in the hypothetical con s ciousness there may
b e a rhythm of sensible events corresponding to what for me
were I present would be the rhythm of the pendulum beats
a n d the movement of the hands
Now suppose thi s hypothetical consciousness extended so
that it contains facts correspondin g to my ideas of the ether
vibrations that fa ll upon or that are re e cted from the face of
this clock Suppose that it further contains facts corre s pondi ng
to each of my ideas of the relative positio n of thi s clock and of
other objects
Suppose at last that the hypothetical consciou s
ness is extended to all the facts of what I call my universe o f
actual a n d of possible sensation Suppose that each possible or
actual experience of each moment in my life or in the life of
any other animal is represent e d by s ome actual momentarily
present fact in the hypoth etical consciou s ness Then consid er
the hypothetical consciousness at any moment and see what it
will co n tai n Every material atom e v e ry wav e o f eth er e v ery
.

Mind

and

Reality

point o f space every conguration o f material b odies every

po s sible geometrical relation will be r eprese nted in the hypo
thetical consciousness by some denite fact The relations of
these facts will be in nature and in complexity similar to the
relations among the facts of my actual or possible sensations
On the other han d the limi ts of my possible consciousness at
any moment will be the limits of the actual consciousness of
this suppo s ed universal Knowin g One What it actually knows
I conceivably might now know If it is conscious of a certain
series of facts then I might be conscious were I now on the
other side of the moon of living creatures there If the hypo
thetical consciousness contains another set of facts then I might
be unable to nd such l iving beings were I there An d so with
all facts of possible experience
We can easily see how un der this supposition co n formity to
th e suppos e d universal consciousness will become o n my part a
goal of e ffort Kn owledge of possible experiences is useful to me
But all possible experiences are or will be actual in the hypo
thetical consciousness If I am standing n ear a conceal ed pit
fall o r am in danger of a blow or i n danger of death from
poison that fact translated into ul timate terms means we may
suppose that in the universal consciousness there is n ow the
knowledge of certain rel ative positions and motio n s of atoms
The sequence of states in the u niversal co n sciousness must b e
supposed to be a regular sequence subj ect to x ed law But
sequence does n ot now especially concern us ' sin ce we speak
o nly of the n ature of this extern al consciousness It is enough
therefore to poin t out that this supposed universal knowin g
consciousness this Not Ourselves has under the co n ditio n s
stated all the essential characteristics of a real world It is b e
yond us ' it is independent o f us ' its facts hav e a certain corre
s po nd enc e to our sensations
' nder the suppositio n that by
nature we tend to be in agreement with this consciousness
progress in the d e nitenes s and extent of our agreement with it
may be both possible and practically useful This agreement
w ould constitute truth
N0 other real world need be supposed
behind or above this consciousness R ej ectio n of a n old theory
and acceptance of a n ew as when the Copern ica n doctrine re
places the Ptolemaic will mean the growth of a belief that the
new system of ideas corresponds more n early than the old not
with dead matter but with the sequen ce of states i n the uni
v ersal consciousness The universal co n sciousness itself will be
n o ill usory consciousness It will n ot need a further conscious
n ess to support it It will need n o dead matter outside of it
Our nature leads us to l ook up to it as to our m odel Itself is th e
l
u rp ose o f thought
atter
n
l
ookin
u
p
to
n
o
other
m
o
d
e
T
h
e
p
g
p
,

will be conform ity with this perfect untrammeled thou ght

For us there i s a little range of actual sensation in the mid s t
of a vast ocean of possible sensation For the uni versal con
We see
s cio u s nes s there are at any moment only actual data
the clock face ' and for us the inside of the clock is possible
For the supposed consciousness the in s ide will
s ensation only
For us colours and odours
b e as much present as the outs ide
s uggest possible sensations which scienc e interprets as being in
the las t analysis the pos s ible sen s ation s known as atoms
motion s velocitie s di s tances For the universal co nsciousness
thes e atoms motions velocities and distances or the ultimate
facts to which these notions correspond are not po s s ible but
actual data There need be then in the last analysis no dead
unconscious atoms no r yet unconscious little atom souls s triv
ing ghti ng loving u ni ting ' there need be in the last analysis
o nl y a con s ciousne s s of facts corr esponding to what we mean by
motion velocity extension di stanc e impe netrability Corr es
ponding to the relation a l) in our consciousness there will
the n be the external fact A B whereof so much is supposed to
be known ' rst that the relation a b is somewhat like the re
l ation A B seco n dly that the terms A and B wha tever their
particular character are facts for a con s ciousness and nothing
but facts for a consciousness An d the hypothetical conscious
ness for which these facts are all present together with their
manifol d relations this we may call a World Consciousness
A n illusion for my consciousness wil l mean a failure to corres
pond with the world consciousness A truth for my conscious
n e ss will be a relation a b that corr e sponds with some r elation
But for the world conscious
' B in the world consciou s ne s s
n ess itself there will be no questio n of its own truth or falsity
It will be for and in itself It will not have to create a re al
world it wi ll be a real world It will not have a Nature as its
own Otherness over against its elf It will be in its own facts
and i n their sequence a nature It will bear no mystical rela
tion to the individual intelligences as if they were its emana

tions or its modes

It wil l be in and for its elf as
indepe n dent o f them as if they were not They will b e self
existent devoid of any such unreali ty as the mystics like to
give them But their whole busin ess and purpose will be to
carry out and to m ake ful l an d deni te that correspondence with
this universal consciousness upon which their existence and
their peace depend A certain lack of correspondence with the
universal consciousness on the part of an y a nim al s ideas will
be followed by the cessatio n of that particular grouping of facts
in the universal consciousness that is known to us as this ani
m al s b ody With the di ssolutio n o f this an im al s b ody will
,

10

eas e his conscious n ess his chan ce of d isagreei ng in h is states

with the states of the universal consciousness and therefore h is
lack of corr e spondence A n ultimate law of sequence with
which as with all causal connexion we have here nothing to
do thu s binds the in dividual beings to the World Conscious
n ess The whole universe exhibits the phenomenon rst o f
o n e great consciousness embracing an in nitu d e of geometrical
phys ical chemical physiological facts and secondly of a vast
multitude of individual conscious bein gs whose number and
sorts we shall nev er be able to tell who s e destiny how ever de
mands of all of th e m a more or less imperfect likeness between
their states and the relations thereof on the one hand and the
facts of the uni versal consciousness on the other hand The
u ni versal consciousness b e it noted is so called merely as in
cluding in its ken all ultimate mathematical and physical facts
Of its nature beyond this we pre tend to suppose nothing And
it does not include within itself the individual conscious beings
O u r hypoth es is is not pantheistic or theistic
We simply sup
pose a No t Ourselves that includes all n atural knowledge
This is the External R eality
We have o mi tted all r eference to th e teleological element that
is generally in troduced into any theory of a World Spirit S o
far i n fact our W orld Consciousness is not what people m ean
by a World Spirit A Spirit weaving the livin g robe of
Deity our Worl d Co n s ciousnes s is not ' for as so far described
it does nothi ng it merely looks on It looks at its own states
and these are supposed to be altogether its o wn given from no
h igh er s ou rce
But as to their succe s sion or their worth their
beginning or their end we have s aid n othing This Conscious
ness has th ese state s but we have supposed them to be attended
by n o emotion of pleasure or of pain by n o modify i ng reactio n
of wil l Thi s consciousnes s is not a Creator it is a Seer As
for the i n dividual conscious beings it does not make or unmake
them by an exercise of power They on the contrary are made
and unmade according as there arise or disappear in this uni
versal consciousness certain groups of data that as represe n ted
in our mortal thought are called organic living bodies with
tissues motions structures functions These groups pass and
with them the individual consciousness that coexisted with each
This growth and decay is simply a law of experience an ultimate
and in explicable sequence But the u niversal consciousness o f
n ature for which each of these groups of physical facts existed
that remains In other words Each animal body is repre
sented in the universal consciousness and exists o nl y in so far
as it is represe n ted therein or is known to its posses s or or to
other an im al s The in di vi du al min d that coe x ists with this
c

'

11

body h as no representative in the uni versal consciousness b ut

exists and is r e al for its elf With th e group of facts in the
unive rsal consciou s ness to which as we say corr espond s our
idea of the body the ind epend e nt group of facts called the
a nimal s mind lives and di es Th e un ivers al con s ciou s ness and
the individual min ds make up togeth e r the sum to tal of reality
Continuing to m ention the cons e qu e nc e s of our hyp othesis
we see that the well known qu es tions so often a s ked of ideali sts
are no longer pu''ling when we acc ept s uch an idea as the fore
going Such que s tions are ' What e xi s ted before th e r e was any
conscious life on the planet ' In what sense was th e re light or
heat matter or motion b efore there were eyes to see tactile
organs to feel animal intelligence to understand these external
facts
The qu es tion of Kant too about the subjectivity of space
would seem to have been an s wered Before there were con
scious beings o n this planet this planet existed only in and for
the u niv ersal consciousnes s In that consciousnes s w e re facts
x
r
e
e
i
orresponding
to
all
phenomena
or
possibilities
of
h
e
t
c
p
ence that geological science may declare to have real ly exis ted
at such a time Wh en the earth became lled with life there
appeared in the u ni versal consciousness the data known as
organisms And at the same time be s id e the univers al con
s cio u s nes s
beyond its ken there arose individual con s cious
b eings whose states were more or less imperfect copi e s of the
univers al consciousness in certain of its facts Eve n so empty
space is n ow existent beyond the borders of nite observation
only as a group of states i n the world consciousness Space is
subjective belonging to the states of the universal conscious
ness ' and yet to us objective since in thinking it we merely
conform ours elv es to the universal conscious ness But the con
sequences o f our hypoth e sis are numberl ess Enough has been
said of th em for the present purpose
Mind Stu ff was a
Wild and airy indeed ' But why so
worse h y po thesis because wh e n you tri e d to express all its con
se quenc es it b e came unintelligible The ordinary uncritical
Atomism is a worse hyp othesis because we never get from it th e
le ast notion of how this eternally existent matter may look and
feel when nobody sees or feels it The mystical one substance
with two faces is worse because that is no hypothesis o nly a
heap of words Schopenhauer s Wille is worse because it is
only a metaphor The hypothesis that ascribes to the atoms in
dependent life an d voli tion is no more adequate th an our hypo
thesi s and much less simple The old fashioned panth ei s tic
Welt 'eis t of Schelling and of the romantic philosophy generally
is more poetic al than our hypoth e sis but yet wors e for all that '
for n o o n e e v er com es to understan d how thi s One Spirit is re
,

Mind

12

a nd

Reality

to the many i nd ividual min d s They are parts o f him or

else apart from him In the one case their invincible condence
that they really exist and are not things in his dream is nu
founded ' in the other case his all embracing unity is destroyed
In our hypothesis nothing is wonderful but the one miracle of a
series of orderly conscious states foll owing through all time
according to xed laws Beyond that all is clear That there
should be a consciou s ness containing ideas of all material rela
tions is n o hard er to believe than it is to believe in the ordinary
unintelligible world of at o ms That beside this consciousness
and in xed relation to its facts there should exist a great number
of di fferent series of conscious states each series being called an
individual this is no harder to beli eve than are the ordinary
facts of nervous physiology In reality this hypothesis gives us
a simple expression easily intelli gible for all the facts and
l aws of physics of nervous physiology and of consciousness
Take as a nal example the man looking at the candle In the

world co n sciousness there is the group of state s 0 c c

That is the real candle In the world consciou sness there is

al so the group o f states h h

h
That is the cerebral
image of the candle a physiological fact Fin ally according
to the l aws of reality the existence in the world consciousness

of the facts h h h
grouped as th ey are has cc existent
with it the group of ideas C in the man s mind This group

C corresponds more or less completely to the group 0 c c

as that group exists beyond the man s mi nd in the world con
s cio u s n es s
The group C is th e man s idea of the can dl e Such
is our hypothesis in a nut shell We u rge for the moment
only this in its favour ' that it is simple intelligibl e plausible
A fter all it is but a n h ypothesis
l ated

II

But of what use all these hypotheses ' They are n ot

philosophy but at best merely the sca ffolding of phil osophy
Ontology is play Theory of Knowledge alone is work O n
to l o gy is the child blowi ng soap bubbles
Philosophical analy
sis is the miner digging for gold A n d yet not quite that
is ontology Not all play this occupation of mankind for so
many centuries Ontology to speak quite carefully about it is
n ot philosophy b ut an education of the ph il o s 0ph ic spirit
Had we but the foregoin g hypothesis to o ffer this article should
n ever have bee n written We have suggested and developed
the hypothesis merely that in a pure and somewhat simple form
we might express the n ature of human thought about reality
This n ature o f thought o n ce graspe d our hyp othesis ab out
,

Mind

R eality

and

13

reality will become transformed into a philosophical theory of

reality A dogmatic statement prepares us for a critical an alysis
The rst impression of one that has fairly comprehend e d the
for egoing hypothesis as to the nature of reality will b e that if
an idealistic hypothesis thi s one is at all events as ethically
unsatisfactory as the coldest materialism Of the aims of the
will of the worth of this universal consciousne s s we have bee n
able to say nothi ng It was not a Spirit It was not a product
of human desire It was the material world s imply transformed
into ideas All the cold and deadness of inexplicable eternal
law in the succession of phenomena was there unr eli eved by
any trace of an emotional element It was mind but inhuman
min d recalli n g the address to the To des gotter in Schi ll er s 'u ng
fr au
Bei eu c h d o rt u nten in d er ew gen ' acht
Da s ch l agt kei n Her' m ehr d a is t all es e wi g

S te ht all es u nb eweglic h fes t

.

This fact is noticed to ward o ff the suspicion of any ulterior

designs hi dden by thi s our hypothesis The meaning of the
fact may appear before we nish But now to the philosophic
task of testing our hypothesis
Every belief about an e x te rnal worl d is a n active assumption
or acknowledgment of something more than the data of our con
s cio u s n es s
What is directly given in consciousness is not
external 'll direct data are internal facts ' and in the strictest
Suppose a merely passive acceptance
s ense all data are dire ct
of what is in consciousness and you have no belief in an ex
ternal world A n addition to the data of consciousn es s a more
or less clearly voluntary reaction is necessary to the idea of
extern al reality The truth of this principle appears when our
b elief in any particular extern al thing is called in question I
hold that I see yond er a snowy mountain My companion in
sists that beyo n d the wide misty vall ey there is to be seen only
a grey cloud I reassert my belief and in the reass ertion feel
more denitely than at rst the active addition of my own belief
to the meagre data of s ense The addition existed however in
my rst asse rt ion Or again one man is trying perchanc e in
sport to make anoth e r doubt the exist ence of m aterial obj ects
There is no external reality says the rst
There are but
these states of consciousnes s in our minds Nothing beyond
them corresponds to them
The second maintain ing the posi
tion of the man of common sense retorts sharply
Doubtless
I cannot refute altogether your ne spun arguments ' but they
are neverth eless non s ense For I p ersist in believing in this
world of sense I live in it I work for it my fellows believe in
it our hearts are bou n d up in it our success depe n ds upon our
.

14

faith Only dreame rs doubt it I am not a dreamer Her e is

a sto n e ' I hit it Here is a precipic e ' I fear and shun it My
strongest conviction is concerned with the exi s t ence of thi s
world of sense Do your worst ' I am not afraid of talk
Thus then by every device of the active spirit by reminding
himself of his most ch e ri s hed interests of his a ffections and
hatreds by arousin g his social sentiments by bod ily acts the
practical ma n pre s erves himself from fantastical sp eculation
When better trained thinkers call the belief in an ex ternal
reality a natural conviction to be retained until we are com
l
l
e
p ed to abandon it or a convenient working hypothesis to
be rec eive d on the testimony of consciousness testimony
assumed to be trustwo rt hy until the opposite is proven what
are these b u t similar practical considerations appeals to the
'
l
wi l
Concerning data of immediate consciousness such re
marks would b e wholly out of place That I see a certain

colour at this moment is n ot a convenient working hypothesis

Is consciousness merely a presumably trustworthy witnes s

when it testies to the pang s of toothache ' Nobody coul d
balance evidence as to the r e ality o f his sensation gu d sensation
when consciousne s s is ll e d with the sound of a street organ
Sound colour pang these are data n ot merely things b elieved
i n But the external world that is actively accepted as b eing
symbolis ed or indicated by the present consciousness not as
being given in the present consciousness
In short every assertion of an external world bei ng an asser
tion of somethin g beyond the present data of consciousness
m ust spri ng from an activity of judgment that does more tha n
me rely reduce present data to order Such an assertion must
be an active construction of non data We do n ot receive i n
our senses but we posit through our ju dgment whatever ex
ternal world there may for us be
All theories all hypotheses as to the external world ought to
face this ultimate fact of thought If th e h istory of popul ar
speculation on the s e topics could be written how much of
cowardice and shu fing would be found in the behaviour of the
natural m in d before the ul timate question ' How do s t thou
k n ow of an extern al real ity ' Inst e ad of simply and pl ainly
answering ' I know the extern al world only as something that
I accept or demand that I po s it postul ate actively construct on
the basis of sense data the n atural man gives us all kinds of
vague compromise answers ' I believe in the external reality
with a reasonable degree of condence ' the experience of ma n
kind renders the existence of external reality ever more and
more probable the Creator cannot have intend ed to deceive us '
it is unn atural to doubt as to e x tern al reality ' only yo u n g
.

'

15

people and fa n tastic persons doubt the exis tence of the external
world ' no man in hi s senses doubts the external reality of the
world ' science would be impos s ible were there no external
world ' morality is undermin ed by doubts as to the ext ern al
world ' the immovabl e condence that we all have in the prin
cipl e of causality im plies the xity of our belief in an external
Where shall these endless turnings
cause of our sensations
and twistings have a n end ' The habits of the law courts as
condensed into rules of evidence the traditional rules of de
bate the fashion o f appealin g to the good s ense of honourable
g e ntlemen opposite th e motive s of shame and fear the dread of
b eing call e d fantastical Philistine de s ire to thin k with the
m ajority Phil istine terror of all revolutionary suggestions the
fright or the anger of a man at nding some metaphysician try
ing to question what seem to be the foundations upon whi ch
one s breadwinni n g depends ' all these lesser motives are ap
p e aled to and th e one ultimate motive is neglected The
ultimate motive is the will to have an extern al world What
ever conscious ness contains reason will persist in spon
taneo u s ly addin g the thought ' But there shall be something
beyond thi s
The bey ond can never be proven because never
v eried Verication is transformation of non data in to data
The extern al reality as suc h
the space beyond the farthest
star any space not accessible even wha tever is not at any
moment given in so far as it is viewed from that moment in
particular every past e vent) is never a datum But the very
nature of the postulate of external reality both forbids and
renders needless the actual verication We co nstruct but do
n ot receive the external reality The immovable certainty
is not such a dead passive certainty as that with which we r e
ceiv e a pain or an electric shock
The certainty of an external
world is the xed determin ation to make one now and hence
forth
But we make b e it n oticed only when we have material with
which to make The sense datum at any time suggests what
external reality we sh al l at that moment conceive But with
out the spontaneity th e sens e datum would be no in dication to
us of an e xternal fact This being the general truth there
arises the special question so often discussed ' What r elation
does the external r e ality bear to the sen s e datum ' Do we con
c eive this extern al real ity as being p rimarily the cau s e of our
consciou s n ess or as being primarily the e xternal counterpart of
consciousn e s s ' If the rst the external real ity n eed not re
semble consciousn e ss ' if the second this reality must be con
c eiv e d as resembling consciou s n es s
Modern thought seems at rst sight to have decide d this

16

question once for all The ether waves that cause but that do
not resemble colour sensations the molecular vibrations that
have no like n ess to the feeling of heat seem decisive of the
whol e matter But if these instances indicate a disposition to
regard external reality as the cause of consciousness and as
therefore possibly wholly unlike con s ciousness they also equally
indicate a disposition to regard our thought s as de s tined to 'opy
more or less perfectly a n ext ernal reality I have a sensation
a supposed to be caused by the wholly unlike molecular vibra
tion V But of the external fact V I have an idea 72 ' nd
this idea is supposed to resembl e the external thin g V is not
the direct cause of i) but only of a ' e t V re s embles o The
resemblan ce o f o and V is that k n own through the postulate of
-

'

D oubtl ess the answer wil l be ma d e that the resemblan ce of v

and V is kn own or believed by means o f a course of reasoning
that throughout d epends on the postulate of causality
If
some one may say I assumed no external cause for a I should
never reach the idea of this cause as being the particular group
of molecular vibrations or of ether waves known to me as V
and conceived b y means of the idea
But on the other hand
we may rej oin if I conceived of the external reality solely as the
cause of a not as having any necessary like ness to any idea
that I might form how should I ever rend er denite my idea of
the cause of a
The ex tern al reality woul d remain what it was
at the outset an unknown postulated cause of our conscious
states No labour would ever make it knowable At every
step of the process by which I proceed from the sensation a to
the denit e idea 72 of its cause V I d epend for my progress on
the assurance that extern al real ity is with me not m erely as the
unknow n cause but as the counterpart of my conscious states
This whole process involves for example constant accumul ation
classing an d siftin g of experiences Any text book on Heat
on Optics on Physiologic al P s ychology will il lustrate sufciently
what is meant But how is the accumulation of experiences
possible ' O nl y through constant backward reference in con
s cio u s nes s and so only through constant assumption that present
conceptions are adequat e representatives of past experience
Now if we are serious with ourselves we shall nd that trul y
past experiences of whatever kind are as much truly e xternal
facts when viewed from the present moment as are the s odium
and hydroge n in the sun or the buttons on our neighbour s
coat The past is n ot a present datum otherwise it woul d no t
be past but present The past is postulated as an external
reali ty Now this or that past event is indeed a cause of m y
p rese n t consciousness of some eve n t ' b ut m y co n de n ce that
'

,
,

Mi nd

18

and

Reality

b e combined with the greatest simplicity of co n ception The

e o rt of consciousness seems to be to combi n e the greatest rich
n ess of content with the gr e atest d e nitenes s of organisation
This character of our activity in formi ng our notion of re ality
implies the subordination of the causal postulate to other motives
In the scientic eld the postulate of Causali ty is predomin ant
b ecause there the notion of a world of u niform sequences in
time an d in space has been already po s tulated and what remains
is to ll out the picture by discoverin g the particular sequences
But if I try to banish altogether from my notion of external
reality the idea that it is an adequate counterpart of my sub
i
c
t
n
v
e
e
states
of
co
sciousness
what
will
remain
Simply
the
j
n otion of an utterly unknowable ext ernal cause of my sensations
Of thi s n othing will be said but that it is S cience experience
serious reection about reality will utterly cease I shall have
rem aining a kind of D is g u red R eali s m where the re al will be
a n unknowable as unreal as possible
But reintroduce the
omitted po s tul ate admit that reality is conceived as the counter
part o f consciousness and then the principle of causal ity ca n b e
fruitfully applied Then indeed experience m ay lead us to con
c eiv e the external reality as un l ike this or that suggestive s e nsa
tion u nlike this or that provisional idea But we shall be l ed
to new conceptions and shall be able to mak e denite progress
so long as we postul ate some sort of Like n ess betwee n inner and
outer
I n b rief as causality means uniform sequence the acceptance
of any causal relation as real invol ves a conception of the uni
form sequence that is to be accepted When nally accepted
the sequence in question is conceived as a real fact wholly or
partially external to present consciousness but like our present
idea of itself Causal sequence cannot th erefore be placed rst
as giving us a totally und ened notion of an external reality
but second as enabling us to develop in d e tail the id e a that
reality is like our own states of consciousness Of course to
prove by actual v erication that the external reality is like our
states of consciousne s s this we can never accomplish But
from the outset we have seen that verication is in thi s field
impossible The whole of external reality past present future
all that is outside of what one now sees and fe els all space time
matter motion li fe beyond this immedi ate experience all that
is for each one a po s tulate a demand an assertion never a
datum never as a whole veriable Sinc e we believe in this
external reality if exp erience suggests with sufcient force the
idea that some causal sequence is real our postul ate that such
suggestion s hav e their counterpart in an external world l e ads us
to regard t h e concei v ed causal seque n ce as a n extern al ly real
.

'

19

fact Not however do we rs t co n ceiv e of the extern al reality

as cause and then in the s econd place o nl y nd it to be or not
to be th e counterpart of present consciousn es s All our thinking
is based on the postulate that the external reality is a counter
part and not merely a cause If with time we drop anthropo
morphic conceptions of external reali ty we do so o nl y because
in the pre s ence of a larger and ful ler experi en ce we no longer
nd old conceptions founded largely on lower forms of emotion
and on narrower experience adequate to our notion of the
external counterpart of con s ciousness For demons and entities
we substitute atoms and e therial media not because we abandon
the positio n that external r e ality resembles our ideas but because
wider experience is found to be b est reduced to un ity by the
latter not by the former ideas The atoms and the media are
themsel ves only pro vis ional notions since more experience may
be better reduced to u nity for all we yet know by some other
ideas But through out remain s the postulate ' external reality
is somewhat l ike our ideas of its nature
We have been betrayed by the doctrine that we have com
bated in to forms of speech that do not adequately express the
Critical notion of reality We h aste n to comple te our conceptio n
by adding the omitted elements External reality is like our
co n ceptions of it so much we have seen is universall y postu
l ated '
postul ated be it n oticed not directly experienced n ot
forced upon us from without) But the kind of li keness still
remains to be dened Can the extern al reality be conceived as
being al though in nature like our conscious states yet in no
n ecessary rel atio n to consciousness as being neither a conscious
ness n or for a consciousness
The answer is the whole struggle
of ideali stic thought the whole progress of ph ilosophical
an alysis in modern times O n e cannot go over the eld again
and again for ever The state of the controversy can be roughly
stated thus
Whe n the n otion of external reality is based
solely upon the application of the n otion of cau s ality all degrees
of l ikeness or unlikeness between thought and thi ngs are assumed
according to the tastes o f individual thinkers External reality
is once for all absolved from the condition of being intell igible and
becomes capable of being anythi ng you please a dead atom an
e l ectric uid a ghost a devil an ' nknowable But if the sub
ordi n ate character o f this postulate of causality is once under
stood the conception o f reality is altered What is real must be
not o nly vaguely correspondent to an ill d ened postulate but
in a denite relation of like n ess to my present consciou s ness
That this is the actual postulate of human thought is s hown by
those systems them s el ves th at ignore the postulate of likeness
an d has b ee n ill us trated i n the foregoing But what form s d oes
.

'

Mind

20

and

Reality

this postulated likeness take

For the rst the postulate d l ike
ness betwe e n my idea and the external reality may b e a likeness
between my present con s cious state and a past or future state of
my own or between this present state and the conscious state of
another being
The whole social consciousness implies the
postulate of a likeness betwee n my ideas and a n actual conscious
ness external to mine fas hioned in my own image But the
second generally recognised form in which the postulate of the
likeness of internal and external appears is the form accord
ing to which I postulate that a present idea of my own is not
l ike one of my own past or future states not like any actual
past or future state in another being of my own kind but like a
possible experience That our id e as can adequately express
possibilities of sensation that are actually n ever realised either
in ourselves or in any other known creature this is a familiar
postulate of natural science Th e laws of nature are generally
as is admitted by all what Lewes called ideal c o ns tru c
tions expres s ing experiences for us n ever realised but per
m anently pos s ible
And so extended is the use of the concept
of possible experience that as we know M ill in o n e of his most
interesting chapters gave permane nt possibility of sensation
as an adequate denition of matter
Now the positio n of modern phe n ome nism is that by these
two postulates or forms of the one postulate o f Likeness the
whole n otion of e x ternal reality is exhausted
The external world means according to this positio n the
possible a n d actual present past and future content of conscious
ness for all beings And this resul t of modern phenomenism we
accept As for the detailed proof we cannot go over that well
beaten battle el d here M ore or less purely the position is
maintained by the whole army of moder n idealists The positio n
is maintained in Fich te s Bes timmu ng d es Mens ch en and other
shorter philosophic essays '
less clearly we think though much
more at length in the two larger expositions of the Wis s en
s ch a ts leh r c
i
in
the
Hegelian
e
in
chopenhauer
s
n
o
m
n
o
l
o
e
Ph
d
S
f
)
g
Welt a ls Wille u nd Vors tellu ng in Ferrier s I ns titu tes of Meta
r
h
i
t
in
M
Shad
s
c
o
H
a
mil
o
n
in
S
ill
s
'
m
i
a
i
o
n
M
E
x
a
n
t
p y
f
worth Hodgson s Time and Shaace and Ph ilos op hy of R eflection in
M R eno u vier s L og iqu e 'ener ale in lesser books innumerable
ey
i n Prof Baumann s Philos op hic als Or ientiru ny ub er d ie Welt
i
e
c
h
n
i
s
s
t
h
eor
t
s
e
E
r
h
e
nn
t
in
the
rst
chapter
in
Prof
u
s
c
h
e
S
)
'
pp
L og ik i n Prof Bergmann s R eine L oyilc
Not of course that all
this multitude of thi nkers di fferent in method in ability in aim
in everything but in the fact that they are post Kantian idealists
would accept the foregoing statement as a fai rly compl e te
So m e o f th e m woul d l augh at the
acco u nt of th eir d o ctri n es
,

21

simplicity of our terms But we maintain in substance they

all agr e e about one fundamental truth via that thought
when it inquires into its own meaning can never r e st s atis e d
with any idea of external reality that makes such reality other
than a datum of consciousness and so material for thought
S ensualism and the most transcendent a pr ior i speculation agree
in coming at last to ee in ceaseless unrest from every support
fo r an external reality that may seem to o ffe r itself beyond the
bounds of con s ciou s ness This phenomenism of post Kantian
speculation we acc ept
All extern al reality is then postulated as being not merely
like conscious data but in truth an actu al or a possible datum
of some pre sent pas t or future consciousness
But th ere
remains in this d e nition of the postulate still one obscure point
What is meant by possible consciousness
What can there be
for consciousness beyond the grand total of all actual pa s t and
future states of consciousness in all b e ings
For what purpo s e
and by what right shall we build a world of possibility above or
beside the world of actual experience
Thi s question seems too
little appreciated and too much evaded by mo s t thinkers When
Mill call ed matter a permanent po s sibili ty of sen s ation he
l e ft room open for the pu ''ling question
But what is this
creature called a possibili ty
Is it an actu al fact
Then what
actual fact
If not actual then in being a mere possibil ity
matter is non existent
This scholastic character of the ab s tract nou n possibility
was remarked and criticised by Prof M ax Muller in an article
1
in MI ' D III
We shall not nd in most writers on this subj ect
less scholastic or better dened terms for naming the same
asp e ct of the postulate of external reality
In fact if we
suppose that one surveys the whole range of actual conscious
ness past present and future and postulates no facts that
are n ot for and in consciousness it is di cu l t to see what
will be the mean ing of any added possible reality
Possible
for the rst is anything that one conceives in so far as one co n
c eiv e s it at all
I could possibly have wings and a long tail an
hundred eyes a n d a mountain of gold All that is possible but
i n what sense
I n this sense that I d o actually imagin e myself
as possessing these thin gs
Empty possibili ties or im
.

P 347
I f th erefo re Mill and h is fo ll owers i m agi ne th at b y d e ni ng
Matter as th e p erm anent p o s s i bility o f s ens ati o n, and Min d as th e erm an en t
p
p o s s i b ili ty o f fe eling , th ey h av e re m o v ed th e d ii cul ty o f ' ant s D ing an
s ich , th e y are m i s take n
T h eir p o s s i bility o f s ens ati o n, i f p ro p erly an aly s e d ,

Pr o f
m eans thi ngs o r s u bs tan c es wh ic h can b e c o m e o b j ects o f s e n s ati o n

M iil l er s res u lt is n o t o n e th at we can wh o lly acc ep t h is cri ticis m o f th e

wo rd pos s i b ility is i mpo rtant
1

Mind

22

and

Reality

aginatio ns

as o n e woul d are facts of co n sciousness i n so far

forth as they are imagined ' and they have n o other existence
The world of truth is not enriched by these possibilities whose
whole existence is in the actual conscious idea of them But
not in this sense is matter to be a permanent possibility of
sensation
The icebergs i n the polar seas are to be real not i n
so far as I now imagine them but i n so far as there exists or
holds good the law that were I present I should see them were
I to touch them I should feel them and that both seeing and
feeling would be determined in c ertain ways beyond the control
of my will The pages of that closed book the bones inside the
body of that cat my own brain the molec ul es of the oxygen that
I am breathi ng all these in so far as they are not now actually
in any consciousness are to be still real as possible experiences
But what kin d of unreal reality is this potential actual ity '
If we inquire into th e motive that leads us to postul ate th ese
possible experiences we shal l nd it to be at least in part the
e ffort to apply the postulate of u ni formity to our confused actual
experience Our actu al experience is not always governed by
obvious laws of regular sequence But in postulating co n scious
n ess beyond o u r own immediate data we are l ed by a certai n
prejudice i n favour o f unity and simplicity to postul ate that the
real successions of facts are uniform whatever may be the case
with the fragme n ts of re ali ty that fall withi n our in dividual e x
l
I
see
a
n
apple
fal
and
no
more
than
that
But
I
r
i
n
c
e
e
e
p
postulate that if I could have had experience of all the facts I
shoul d have observed a series of material changes in the twig
on which the apple hung that would have su fced to restor e the
broken uniformity and co n tin u ity of my experiences I n this
way it is that as remarked above the conc eption of causal
sequence does n ot create but organi ses a n d perfects our notio n
of external reality There is something beyond our experience
that is the rst postulate Experiences
via another experience
form an uniform and regular whole of laws of sequence That
is the other postul ate subordin ate to the rst This postul ate
helps to form for us our idea of the materi al world beyond indi
vidu al consciousness an idea that science accepts for its
uniformity without inquiring further into its nature whil e a
more critical reection declares that the facts assumed as existent
beyond the range of in di vidual conscious beings are possible
experie n ces
If we try to express the nature of this assum ption of possible
experiences we must therefore take account of the fact that
they are a s sumed to satisfy the secondary and subordinate postu
late of uniformity by lli ng up the breaks and gaps in the
postul ate d actua e xperie n ces of oursel v es and o f our f ell ow
,

Mind

and

R eality

23

beings They lead us therefore to the conception of one uniform

absolute exp erience
This absolut e experi ence to whi ch all
facts would exhibit th e mselves in their conn e xion as uniforml y
subject to x e d law is conceived as possible
But once
again what do e s that m e an
Is the meaning only the empty
tautology that if all the gaps and irregularities of in di vidual
experience were got rid of by means of connecting links and
additional experience s these gaps and irr egularities would
di s appear
Is the meaning o nl y thi s that if there were an
ab s olute experience of an absolu tely regular series of facts this
'
u
expe ri ence wo ld be absolute and uniform
Or again is it
enough to say that any possible exp e rience a n iceberg in the
polar sea my brain the inside of yonder book exists for me o nl y
as my r epresentation ' Of course I know of it only what
I conceive of it yet I postulate that it has some reality beyond
my representation This postulate is for us in this di scussion
an u ltimate fact of which we want to know n ot the justicatio n
for
ther
is
none
higher
than
the
fact
itself
of
the
postulate
e
'
)
but the meaning I know of my fell ow only what I conceive of
him ' et I postulate that my conception of him is like hi m
whereas I do not postulate that my conception of a dragon is
like any real animal 'ust so I postulate that my conception of
the possible experience call ed an atom or the North Pole is
v alid beyo n d my experi ence and beyond the actual experience
of any known a nimal But I do n ot postulate that my co ncep
tion of the possibili ty that future m e n might have wings and
tail s is like any future re ality whatever or in any way valid
b eyond my conception
Here then is our dilemma M atter as a mere possibility o f
experienc e is more than any animal s known actual experience
And yet this matter is to be re al for consciousness Nor is it
to be real for consciousness simply in so far as the possibl e ex
rie nc e is repre s ented or conceiv e d
s
The
reality
con
ists
not
e
p
m erely in the representation in present consciousness of a
po s s ible experience but i n the add e d postulate that this con
c e ptio n is valid beyond the present consciousness
How is this
postulate to be satised '
Let us sum up the conditions to which our notion of external
reality is subject External r e ality is something po s tulated not
give n it is for us because we will it to be To a portion of our
conscious s tates we ascribe a validity beyo nd the present This
asc ription of validity is the source of our whole knowledge of
th e external world
ay of our belief in our own past and future
states in our neighb o ur s existence and in th e e xistence of space
of matter and of motion Th e ext ernal reality is always con
c eived as m ore or l ess completely the co u n terpart of our idea o f
.

Mind

24

and

R eality

it and hence as in nature like the facts of our consciousness

The idea that we at any moment form of the reality beyond our
selves is the expression of th e e ffort to reduce to unity th e
present sense data and the present conception of our own past
experience Thi s reduction to unity takes place in certain forms
Thus we conceive the external reality as in space and i n time
and in the seco n d place as in causal relation to ourselves
The conception of causal relations thus projected into the
external r eality becom es when comp l eted the conception of a
completely united and uniform whole of facts We conceive
the external reality as subj e ct to xed laws of sequence certainly
existent even though in our limited experience they be undis
coverable As subj ect to such laws the external reality is a
whole possessing o rganic unity But the external reality is also
conceived as being real for consciousness and re al only for con
The extern al reality being an organic whole must
s c io u s nes s
therefore be conceived as the object of an abs olute experience
to which all facts are known and for whic h all facts are subj ect
to u ni versal l aw But there th u s arises an obscurity in our
theory of reality The real is to b e only for consciousness
Consciousness is however postul ated only as existent in our
fellow beings An d yet th e postulated reality is to be an
organic whole containing seri e s of facts that to these beings
are known o nl y as p ossible not as actual experiences
We are then in thi s position To complete our theory we
want a hero
Not to be sure a D on 'uan but an hypo

the tical subj ect of the possible experiences

This hypo
thetical subj ect we shall postul ate o nl y as an hypothesis That
is its existence is not a necessary res ul t of the postulate that
there is an external reality One can form other hypotheses
But this hypothesis has the advantage of being simple and ade
quate Moreover to assume a consciousness for which the
possible experiences are present facts is to do no more than
our theory seems to need ' whereas any other hypothe s is
al
Berkeley
s
theologic
hypothesis
for
exampl
e in its
origin
a
l
'
form) seems to assum e more than is demanded by our purely
theoretical conception of reality For the sake then of ex
pressing one aspect o f our fundamental postulate we shall
suggest what of course n ever can be proven that all the con
possible experiences are actual in a Consciousness of
c eiv ed
which we suppose nothing but that it knows these experiences
or knows facts corresponding in number and in other relations
to these experiences This Consciousness is the ' niversal Con
s cio u s nes s o f the rst part of our paper
The cold and deadness of this universal Knowing One is thus
expl ained We do not endow it with l ife and with will and
,

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