Slide 3 (Introduction):

Security is an important aspect in the successful operation of a power system.

System security involves many precautions and practices suitably designed, to keep the system
operating, when any of its components fail. Apart from economizing the fuel cost and minimizing emission
of gases like CO, CO2, NOx, SO2 etc., the power system should be operationally secure. For example,
a generating unit may have to be taken offline because of auxiliary equipment failure. By maintaining
proper amounts of spinning reserve, the remaining units on the system can make up the deficit without
too low a frequency drop or need to shed any load. Similarly, a transmission line may be damaged by a
storm and taken out by automatic relaying. If, in committing and dispatching generation, proper regard for
transmission flows is maintained, the remaining transmission lines can take the increased loading and still
remain within limit.
Slide 4 (Equipment Disconnection):
All equipment in a power system is designed such that it can be disconnected from the network. The
reasons for these disconnections are generally divided into two categories: scheduled outages and forced
outages.
Scheduled outages are typically done to perform maintenance or replacement of the equipment, and, as
its name implies, the time of disconnect is scheduled by operators to minimize the impact on the reliability
of the system.
Forced outages are those that happen at random and may be due to internal component failures or
outside influences such as lightning, wind storms, ice buildup, etc. Because the specific times at which
forced outages occur are unpredictable, the system must be operated at all times in such a way that the
system will not be left in a dangerous condition should any credible outage event occur.
Slide 5 (System Blackout):
If a forced outage occurs on a system that leaves it operating with limits violated on other components,
the event may be followed by a series of further actions that switch other equipment out of service. If this
process of cascading failures continues, the entire system or large parts of it may completely collapse.
This is usually referred to as a system blackout. An example of the type of event sequence that can cause
a blackout might start with a single line being opened due to an insulation failure; the remaining
transmission circuits in the system will take up the flow that was flowing on the now-opened line. If one of
the remaining lines is now too heavily loaded, it may open due to relay action, thereby causing even more
load on the remaining lines. This type of process is often termed a cascading outage. Most power
systems are operated such that any single initial failure event will not leave other components heavily
overloaded, specifically to avoid cascading failures.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

July 2, 1996 disturbance of WSCC (Western North American Interconnected) System

August 10, 1996 disturbance of WSCC system
1998 power failure of Auckland business districts, New Zealand
March 11, 1999 Brazil blackout
July 29, 1999 Taiwan disturbance
August 14, 2003 blackout of Northeast U.S. and Ontario

System security can be broken down into three major functions that are carried out in an operations
control center:
Slide 6,7,8 (System Monitoring):
System monitoring supplies the power system operators or power dispatchers with pertinent up to date
information on the conditions of the power system on real time basis as load and generation change.
In every substation, telemetry systems measure, monitor and transmit the data like, voltages, currents,
frequency, current flows, generator outputs, transformer tap positions, the status of circuit breakers &
switches
in
a
transmission
network.
Digital computers then process the telemetered data and place them in a data base form and inform the
operators in case of an overload or out of limit voltage. Important data are also displayed on large size
monitors. Alarms or warnings are also given if required.

State estimation techniques are normally used to combine telemetered data to give the best estimate (in
statistical sense) of the current system condition or state .
Such systems often work with supervisory control systems to help operators to control, circuit breakers,
operate switches and taps remotely. These systems together are called SCADA (supervisory control and
data acquisition) systems.
Slide 9 (contingency analysis):
Many of the problems that occur on a power system can cause serious trouble within such a quick time
period that the operator could not take action fast enough. This is often the case with cascading failures.
Because of this aspect of systems operation, modern operations computers are equipped with
contingency analysis programs that model possible system troubles before they arise. These programs
are based on a model of the power system and are used to study outage events and alarm the operators
to any potential overloads or out of limit voltages.
Slide 10,11,12 (SCOPF):
The third major security function is security-constrained optimal power flow. In this function, a contingency
analysis is combined with an optimal power flow that seeks to make changes to the optimal dispatch of
generation, as well as other adjustments, so that when a security analysis is run, no contingencies result
in violations. This enables the operator to change the operation of the power system if a contingency
analysis program predicts a serious problem in the event of the occurrence of a certain outage. Thus it
provides preventive and post-contingency control. A simple example of corrective action is the shifting of
generation from one station to another. This may result in change in power flows and causes a change in
loading on overloaded lines.
To show how this can be done, we shall divide the power system into four operating objectives.
Normal state dispatch: This is the state that the power system is in prior to any contingency. It is optimal
with respect to economic operation, but it may not be secure.
Post contingency: This is the objective after a contingency has occurred. We shall assume here that this
condition has a security violation (line or transformer beyond its flow limit or a bus voltage outside the
limit).
Secure dispatch: This is the objective with no contingency outages is to correct the operating
parameters to account for security violations.
Secure post contingency: The objective is to re-mediate the contingency as applied to the baseoperating condition with corrections.
By adjusting the generation on unit 1 and unit 2, we have prevented the post contingency operating state
from having an overload. This is the essence of what is called security corrections. Programs that can
make control adjustments to the base or pre contingency operation to prevent violations in the post
contingency conditions are called security-constrained optimal power flows or SCOPF. These programs
can take account of many contingencies and calculate adjustments to generator MW, generator voltages,
transformer taps, interchange, etc.
Slide 14,15 (States of P.S):
Normal usually means that there are no alarms being presented and contingency analysis is not reporting
any contingencies that would cause overloads or voltage violations.
Alert state: If a system suffers from any event like, sudden increase of load, its security level reduces.
Then the system would switch to Alert state. The E and I would still be satisfied. However, with
preventive control strategy, the operator takes control actions to return the system to its normal state.
Emergency State: In the Alert state, if some additional disturbance occurs or in normal state a major
disturbance is encountered (e.g., tripping of tie line or loss of an additional generator), then the system
will enter to emergency state. In this state the system remains intact, i.e., E is still satisfied i.e, the
demand is still met by the generation, one or more component or state violate the prescribed operation
limits. but I change to _ (e.g., overloads of system components) refers to the constraint violation. By
means of emergency control (like generator rescheduling) the operator would try to relieve the transition
due to normal state overload situations.

Cascade State: If the emergency control fails, then a series of cascading events may lead to the cascade
(extreme) state. Typically, the system would breakup into islands , each of which would be operating at
their own frequencies. Both E and I would not satisfied and the system will result in a blackout. The
control actions needed in this state must be really powerful. Usually load shedding of the most
unimportant loads and separation of the system into small independent parts are required.
Restorative State: A series of resynchronization controls are required to restart generators and gradually
generators pickup the loads. This is a long process and the state of the system is called restorative
state. Restoration can take many hours especially if large generators are involved.
Slide 16 (Factors Affecting P.S):
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Increased probability of component failures and malfunction leading to system disturbances

Overloading of transmission facilities leading to protection operation or contributing to phenomena such
as voltage collapse
Component failures and disturbances such as flashovers to trees
Increased probability of inadvertent/incorrect operation of protections / Increased unpredictability of
cascading events
Increased difficulty in adequate system design due to uncertainty in distributed generators generation
plans
Unpredictable power flows and system usage leading to congestion and/or poor dynamic behavior/New
forms of stability problems such as voltage and small signal stability
Software/hardware failures may leave large portion of the system unobservable to operators, leading to
inappropriate, or lack of, control actions during disturbances
Insufficient/improper generation and transmission resources
Exposure to cascading disturbances brought on by events in neighboring Systems
Lack of experienced personnel that may lead to the inability to deal appropriately with emergency
conditions
Slide 17,18 (Security Analysis):
System security is monitored at the energy control center by carrying out two major functions.
Security Assessment gives the security level of the operating state.
Security control determines the appropriate security constrained scheduling required to optimally attain
the target security level.
Slide 20 (Contingency Analysis):
This gives the list of contingencies to be processed whose probability of occurrence is high. This list,
which is usually large, is in terms of network changes. i.e., branch and/or injection outages. These
contingencies are ranked in rough order of severity employing contingency selection algorithms to shorten
the list.
Not much accuracy is required in the results. Therefore an approximate (linear) system model where
results are obtained at high speed is used.
Contingency evaluation is then performed (using AC power flow) on the successive individual cases in
decreasing order of severity. The evaluation process is continued up to the point where no postcontingency violations are encountered.
Hence, the purpose of contingency analysis is to identify the list of contingencies that, if occur, would
create violations in system operating states. They are ranked in the order of severity.
Slide 22 (Outages):
In the past many widespread blackouts have occurred in interconnected power systems. Therefore, it is
necessary to ensure that power systems should be operated most economically such that power is
delivered reliably. Reliable operation implies that there is adequate power generation and the same can
be transmitted reliably to the loads. Most power systems are designed with enough redundancy
(flexibility) so that they can withstand all major failure events. Here, the possible consequences of the two
main failure events and the remedial actions required for them are explained. The events are,
Transmission line failures cause changes in the line flows and voltages on the transmission equipment
remaining connected to the system. Therefore, the analysis of transmission failures requires method to
predict these flows and voltages so as to be sure they are within their respective limits.

Generation failures can also cause flows and voltages to change in the transmission system, with the
addition of dynamic problems involving system frequency and generator output.
Slide 23,24,25,26 (T/X Error):
Consider the five bus system with its load flow results. A power flow of 24.7 MW and 3.6 MVAR on the
line from bus 2 to bus 3 can be seen. At present, only the MW loading of the line is considered.
Simulation of line outage is more complex than a generator outage since line outage results in a change
in system configurations.
Examine what will happen if the line from bus 2 to bus 4 were to open. The resulting line flows and
voltages are shown in line diagram below. It may be noted that the flow on the line 2 to 3 has increased
to 37.5 MW and that most of the other line flows are also changed. It may also be noted that bus voltage
magnitudes also get affected, particularly at bus 4, the change is almost 2% less from 1.0236 to 1.0068
pu.
Suppose the line from bus 2 to bus 5 were to open. Now the maximum change (almost 10%) in voltage is
seen at bus 5.
Slide 27 (Contingency Analysis Summary):
It is important to know which line or unit outages will render line flows or voltages to cross the limits.

o
o
o

To find the effects of outages, contingency analysis techniques are employed. Contingency analysis
models, single failure events i.e., one line outages or one unit outages) or multiple equipment failure
events (failure of multiple unit or lines or their combination) one after another until all credible outages
are considered. For each outage, all lines and voltages in the network are checked against their
respective limits.
Difficulties are:
Speed of Solution
Selection of All Credible outages
Changed system conditions over time