Facts: In 1956, Felix Matabuena, the brother of the plaintiff, donated a property to his common-law spouse, Petronila Cervantes. In 1962, six years after the donation of property, Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes got married. In the same year, after five months, Felix Matabuena died. Being the only sister and the nearest collateral relative of the deceased, Cornelia Matabuena filed a claim over the property. The lower court of Sorsogon then declared that the donation was valid as long as it happened before Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes got married. This decision was in accordance with the Article 133 of Civil Code which states that donation made between spouses is null and void. Issue: Whether the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to common law relationship. Ruling: Yes, a donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is null and void as it is contrary to public policy. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. However, the lack of validity of the donation of Felix Matabuena to Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result to plaintiff having exclusive rights to the disputed property. Because Petronila and Felix Matabuena were legally married before Felix died, Petronila is his widow. Hence, she is entitled to 1/2 of the property of the deceased. The other half would be given to Felix Matabuenas sister, Cornelia Matabuena. Hence, the assailed decision is reversed. Doctrine: Omission must be remedied by adherence to its avowed objective. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be
attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of
the language used must be remedial by an adherence to its avowed objective.
Sunshine State Bank, South Miami, Florida, Rafael L. Corona, Ray L. Corona, and Ricardo R. Corona v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 783 F.2d 1580, 11th Cir. (1986)