PROBATION LAW

Salgado v. CA - G.R. No. 89606 - August 30, 1990

FACTS: Petitioner was found guilty with the crime of serious physical injuries before the RTC after trial. Said accused was sentenced of
imprisonment for a period of four (4) months and twenty (20) days, with the accessories provided for by law, and to indemnify the victim, Francisco
Lukban, Jr., in the sum of P126,633.50 as actual or compensatory damages, and the sum of P50,000.00 as for damages.
Subsequently, the accused filed an application for probation with the trial court. The application was granted in an Order which contained the
condition to indemnify the victim FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in a monthly installment of P2,000.00 every month during the entire period of his
probation. From May to October, petitioner complied.
Private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the civil liability adjudged in his
favor in the criminal case and it was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied. Then, the petitioner filed directly
with the Supreme Court a petition for review of the trial court's order granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. It was referred to the
Court of Appeals which they affirmed.
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review and argued that the CA erred in holding the order as far as the civil aspect is concerned
and in holding that the condition in the probation order modifying or altering the civil liability of the offender is unauthorized and not sanction by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the order of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution
HELD: Yes. The court does not believe that the order granting the application for probation and imposing some conditions therein altered or
modified the decision. The order of the trial court in granting the application for probation and providing as one of the conditions therein that
petitioner indemnify private respondent P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probation did not increase or decrease the civil liability adjudged
against petitioner but merely provided for the manner of payment by the accused of his civil liability during the period of probation.
It is the submission of private respondent that in the case of Budlong v. Apalisok, the court already ruled that "The 'conviction and sentence' clause
of the statutory definition clearly signifies that probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case. In interpreting the phrase within the context of
that case, it means that although the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant of probation, it does not follow that the civil liability of the
offender, if any, is extinguished.
Under Article 113 of the RPC, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him,
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the
same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason. In the instant case, the issue is not the survival or extinction of
the civil liability of a probationer but, whether or not the trial court may impose as a condition of probation the manner in which a probationer may
settle his civil liability against the offended party during the period of probation.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the order of the trial court granting the motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution as well as the resolution of the same court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Francisco v. CA G.R. No. 108747 - April 06, 1995

FACTS: As President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company, petitioner failed to control his outburst and blurted, You employees in this
office are all tanga, son of a bitches, bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.
Thus, for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his
employees, each information charging him with gravely maligning them.
After nearly ten (10) years, the MeTC of Makati found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court but it his
conviction was affirmed but appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation
After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom, the decision of the RTC became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the
MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But before he could be arrested, petitioner filed an application for probation which the
MeTC denied.
Forthwith, he went to the Court of Appeals but dismissed his petition on the ground that respondent court did not commit any capricious, arbitrary,
despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the petitioner's application for probation and the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner
out of time. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner argues before the court that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his appeal from the
MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the Probation Law because the
original Decision of the MeTC was such that he would not then be entitled to probation." He contends that "he appealed from the judgment of the
trial court precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the said court to enable him to qualify for probation."
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC
except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
HELD: No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. The grant of probation rests solely upon the
discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.

Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals which interprets the quoted provision, offers
any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner.
Then, the application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. The law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides
thus:
'SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. -- Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal x x x x place the defendant on probation x x x x'
In the petition is a clear statement that the petitioner was up for execution of judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D. No. 968
says that the application for probation must be filed "within the period for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for appeal had passed,
meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had attained finality, and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law. The petitioner did
not file his application for probation before the finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt at probation was filed too late. The
instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

Moreno v. COMELEC - G.R. NO. 168550 - August 10, 2006

FACTS: Norma L. Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final
judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisronment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and
Four (4) Months by the RTC.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Moreno argued that under
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court allegedly terminated his
probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary hearing and after due proceedings, the
Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides
that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released
from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years. The grant of probation to Moreno merely

suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and
not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence.
In its Comment on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec definitively settled a
similar controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted probation. The
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Moreno be allowed to run for Punong Barangay even under probation
HELD: Yes. The court ruled that the COMELEC and the OSG erred in focusing on the fact that Moreno's judgment of conviction attained finality
upon his application for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been served.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code, which reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
Clearly, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
The court clarified that those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from
running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct
class of offenders not covered by the disqualification. On this score, the court agreed with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as
an exception to the Local Government Code.
Therefore, Moreno shall not be disqualified to run for Punong Barangay. The petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections
as well as all other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Colinares v. CA - G.R. No. 182748 - December 13, 2011

FACTS: The public prosecutor of charged the accused Arnel Colinares with frustrated homicide before the Regional RTC of Camarines Sur.
Arnel claimed self-defense but the RTC found him guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide
with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision. Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court
on petition for review.
The Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser
crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months
of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that
makes his offense probationable. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be
entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court, given a finding that he is entitled to conviction for
a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty
HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the
RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
However, the Court found Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him
should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees and contend that Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated
homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.

But in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his
conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court's finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for
the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Clearly, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two
years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation.
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision of the Court of Appeals and FINDS petitioner Arnel
Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of
P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has
been remanded for execution to the RTC.