G.R. No.

77679 September 30, 1987

VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON, respondents.
FACTS:

The action arose from a vehicular accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "headon" the store-residence of the private respondent, causing damages thereto which were
inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22.

The petitioner alleged principally: "that his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a
very diligent (and) careful manner; that the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as
a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo truck hit the storeresidence of plaintiff (private respondent) and that the said accident was an act of God for which
he cannot be held liable." 1

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner guilty of quasi-delict?
HELD:
In order a person guilty of quasi-delict the requisites must be present in the case at bar. These requisites
are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person
for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages. It is show that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was
sufficiently established by the policy report and the testimony of Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of
negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. A mishap caused by defective
brakes cannot be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the
accident preventable.
Based on the foregoing finding by the respondent Court that there was negligence on the part of the
petitioner, the petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in awarding private respondent
actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and costs, is untenable.

[G.R. No. 118889. March 23, 1998]

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR TRANSPORT,
INC., and FORTUNE INSURANCE CORPORATION,respondents.
FACTS:

This was a two-car collision at dawn.

The two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising northward along Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic accident.

The car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the outer
lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, with Plate No. PCT 792,
owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as
lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle.

Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the
right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did
not possess a Philippine driver's license.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation can collect with the respondent based on quasi
delict?
HELD:
The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x
x"
To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. The petitioner failed to prove the
existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the
damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen
swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the
negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle
his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein..
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the
part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and
vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. [7] Yet, as correctly observed
by
respondent
court,
Art.
2180
is
hardly
applicable
because
none
of
the
circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being

engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there
was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor
vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could
have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in the motor
vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither
applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and DahlJensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasidelict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.

G.R. No. L-24837

June 27, 1968

JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, plaintiffs,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President of
the said Bank, defendants.

FACTS:
Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, in
which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein, namely, Celso
Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling
Co. Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as
against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and executory. In due course, a writ of
garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the Philippine Islands in which the Singsons
had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned. What
happened thereafter is set forth in the decision appealed from, from which we quote:
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all matters of execution
and garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a
party defendants, without further reading the body of the said garnishment and informing himself that said
garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin Teus,
Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter for the signature of the President of the
Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that
case. Another letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the Bank for the Special
Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, in favor of B. M. Glass Service
and in favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn against the said Bank, were deposited by the said
drawers with the said bank. After the first check was returned by the bank to the B. M. Glass Service, the

latter wrote plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, advising him that his check was not honored by the bank for
the reason that his account therein had already been garnished plaintiff Singson's account.
ISSUE: Whether the existence of contracts etween the parties bars a claim for damages based on
torts.
HELD:
No. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane
passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation
and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the
air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between a passenger and
a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort".
G.R. No. L-29356

December 29, 1928

THE CITY OF MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:

In the City of Manila, there occurred a collision between a street car of the Manila Electric
Company, of which Sixto Eustaquio was the motorman, and a truck belonging to the City of
Manila.
As a result of the collision, the truck was damaged.
Sixto Eustaquio was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through
reckless imprudence.
He was convicted by final judgment and was sentenced to pay a fine, to indemnify the offended
party, the City of Manila, with subsidary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Not being able to collect the indemnity from the accused, the City of Manila began an action to
obtained payment from the Manila Electric Company.

ISSUE:
whether or not a case of this character should be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code or by the
provisions of the Civil Code.
HELD:
The Penal Code authorizes the imposition of subsidiary liability in default of the persons criminally liable.
Article 20 of the Penal Code provides that this subsidiary liability shall "apply to masters, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies and misdemeanors committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties." It is under
this provision that the City of Manila is attempting to collect damages from the Manila Electric Company. If
the Philippines still lay beneath the dominion of Spain, the pronouncement of primary and subsidiary
liability would be taken much as a matter of course. The Penal Code then takes cognizance of the Civil
Code when in article 133 it is provided: "Civil liability arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be
extiguished in the same manner as other obligations, in accordance with the rules of civil law."
In connection with the Penal Code, there must be taken into view certain provisions of the Civil Code.
Book IV, Title XVI, Chapter II, of the Civil Code concerns obligations which arise from fault or negligence.

It is provided in article 1903 that the obligation imposed for the damage to another caused by fault or
negligence is enforcible against those persons for whom another is responsible. But it is added that "The
liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage." Found prior to these articles of the
Civil Code in the Chapter of Title I, Book IV, pertaining to general provisions of obligations, are articles
1092 and 1093. The first provides: "Civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code." The last mentioned provides: "Those arising from
wrongful or negligent acts or ommissions not punishable by law shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter second of Title sixteen of this book." - that is among others to the provisions of article 1903
above-mentioned.
The Civil Code refers to the Penal Code as the rule applicable in the first place, since the latter
determines and punishes the acts giving rise to said obligations, or creates said obligations, thereby
determining their existence and is, therefore, for that reason of preferential application.
But, then, as the Penal Code is concerned with, and is interested only in determining how the civil
obligation it creates comes into existence and develops under the influence of the illicit character, it lays
down only those rules inspired by those motives; and once the connection of that obligation with the
criminal liability is established in its provisions, with the consequences that may be inferred from the fact
that the former is based on the latter; and after an effort has been made, within the sphere of that civil
responsibility, toward making the indemnification coextensive with the effects of the crime, and a special
necessity, which is characteristic of punishment and is the subject matter of the Penal Code, has been
shown in the provisions regulating said liability, the Penal Code, could not, without going beyond its one
sphere, give all the rules relative to said obligations, nor did it have any necessity for doing so, because
once the peculiar nature of said obligations is saved by its provisions, the essence thereof common to the
other obligations must, as in the latter, be defined by the civil law, which will thus become an important
source, although suppletory, of those derived from crime.
The peculiar rules of the Penal Code, as may be seen, are inspired by those motives which, as we have
stated, might make them necessary for said Code to establish, as distinguished from the criterion of the
civil law with regard to obligations in general. Thus, the fundamental declaration of article 18 gives the
connection of civil obligation with criminal liability and explains the origin of the former: article 19 solves
the doubt which that connection, among certain liabilities, may create, and determining its limits in the
nature and consequences of the act, it mentions those which are of a civil nature, basing the civil liability
upon principle of justice, and rather upon casualty than upon liability of a criminal character. The intention
to make indemnification proportionate to the nature and effects of the act, from which the obligation
arises, inspires the provisions contained in articles 121 to 124, both inclusive; the necessity to distiguish,
in order to give the consequences which the crime may produce within the sphere of civil law, whether or
not the persons thereby bound are guilty, prevails in article 128 and partly in article 122; article 125 gives
the essential difference between the civil obligation and the personal criminal liability, and dissipates a
doubt which, due to the latter's instranmissibility, might arise as to the former by reason of its accessory
character in connection with the other, and by the intimate connection between both which the crime or
misdemeanor creates and the criminal law declares; the influence of the severity on the punishment is
noted in articles 20 and 21, even though the latter coincide with the criterion followed in analogous cases
by the Civil Code, and already deviating from the latter's criterion by reason of that severity founded on
the illicit origin of the obligations which it declares, it provides for the latter a necessary solidarity in article
127; and abandoning also the criterion of the civil law in article 126, it establishes within that solidarity, not
the presumption of equal division which the latter provides in such a case, but a prudent division which

may, and generally must be, unequal, in order that the influence of the different participation in the crime
or misdemeanor which is the origin of the former may also reach the Civil obligation.
While the Civil Code, in its article 1092, simply makes reference to the Penal Code, yet, it is beyond doubt
that by this reference it means those rules of a general nature which regulate the civil liability arising from
the particular crimes or misdemeanors therein mentioned, and that, in connection therewith, they shall
have the preferential application which this article recognizes in favor of the Penal Code. (8 Manresa
Codigo Civil Espanol, 3d ed., pp. 28-32.)

With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the
Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of
subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from
crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the
motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was
not a wrongful or negligent act or ommision not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation
connected up with Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code
affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence
out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.

G.R. Nos. 103442-45

May 21, 1993

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:
Defendants-appellees knew of the impending onslaught of and imminent danger posed by typhoon
"Kading". For as alleged by defendants-appellees themselves, the coming of said super typhoon was
bannered by Bulletin Today.
Defendants-appellees doubly knew that the Angat Dam can safely hold a normal maximum headwater
elevation of 217 meters.
Yet, despite such knowledge, defendants-appellees maintained a reservoir water elevation even beyond
its maximum and safe level, thereby giving no sufficient allowance for the reservoir to contain the rain
water that will inevitably be brought by the coming typhoon.
From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are convinced, and so hold that the flash flood, was
caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the
Angat Dam by defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight up to the morning hours.

ISSUE:
1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is a fortuitous event
HELD:
1. To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an
obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable
or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act
of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in
any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which
results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.The principle embodied in the act of
God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of
nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result
of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the
whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the
acts of God. Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of
God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate
cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of
God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage
may have been occasioned. Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or
force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since
they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by
an act of God or force majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened.
The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly,
resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it
were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.

G.R. No. L-7567

November 12, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SEGUNDO BARIAS, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
In the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Segundo Barias was a motorman on street car No. 9, run
7 of the Pasay-Cervantes lines of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, a corporation duly
organized and doing business in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands; as a such motorman he was
controlling and operating said street car along Rizal Avenue, formerly Calle Cervantes, of this city, and as
such motorman of the said street car he was under obligation to run the same with due care and diligence

to avoid any accident that might occur to vehicles and pedestrians who were travelling on said Rizal
Avenue; said accused, at said time and place, did willfully, with reckless imprudence and inexcusable
negligence and in violation of the regulations promulgated to that effect, control and operate said street
car, without heeding the pedestrians crossing Rizal Avenue from one side to the other, thus knocking
down and causing by his carelessness and imprudent negligence that said street car No. 9, operated and
controlled by said accused, as hereinbefore stated, should knock down and pass over the body and head
of one Fermina Jose, a girl 2 years old, who at said time and place was crossing the said Rizal Avenue,
the body of said girl being dragged along street-car on said Rizal Avenue for a long distance, thus
crushing and destroying her head and causing her sudden death as a result of the injury received; that if
the acts executed by the accused had been done with malice, he would be guilty of the serious crime of
homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence shows such carelessness or want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant as
to amount to reckless negligence (imprudencia temeraria).

Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed., 1324) defines negligence to be: "The failure to observe, for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other persons suffers injury."

HELD:
"Reckless negligence consists of the failure to take such precautions or advance measures in the
performance of an act as the most prudence would suggest whereby injury is caused to persons or to
property."

Prudence is that cardinal virtue which teaches us to discern and distinguish the good from bad, in order to
adopt or flee from it. It also means good judgment, temperance, and moderation in one's actions.
`Temerario is one who exposes himself to danger or rushes into it without reflection and without
examining the same. Consequently, he who from lack of good judgment, temperance, or moderation in
his actions, exposes himself without reflection and examination to the danger of committing a crime, must
be held responsible under the provision of law aforementioned.
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstancesOrdinary care,
if the danger is great, may arise to the grade of a very exact and unchangeable attention.

G.R. No. L-44264

September 19, 1988

HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
The accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in
front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on
one side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven
by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming
from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it
and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-on collision with the
oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the
Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning
him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move
forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was
damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints, and the truck sustained
scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro
Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on
arrival.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another.
HELD:
Emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."
We therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar
and consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under
consideration.

[G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999]

JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA R.
AGUILAR, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners
Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar
(ZHIENETH).

CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA
was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of
wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the
floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was
crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the
people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor.
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The next day
ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate.
The injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after the
accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence; and
2) whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to
CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store
premises.
HELD:
1. An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the
defendant. It is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. On the other hand,
negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident
occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of
any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common
prudence.[19]

2.Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children
below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute
contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should
have occurred if we accept petitioners theory that the counter was stable and sturdy.

CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDAs waist, later to the latters hand.[31] CRISELDA momentarily released the childs hand from
her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for
CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she
was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA.[32] The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not
loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at
the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

RAMOS VS. CA
PEOPLE vs. DELOS SANTOS

G.R. No. L-65295

March 10, 1987

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio
had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home,
and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly
failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the
right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding),
facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a
manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights
nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The
dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular
driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it
was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some
physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
ISSUE:
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondents own
negligence

HELD:
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio
was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should
have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto
the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal
and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a
reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and
respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.