Indian Standard - Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis-Code of Practice

11/11/2016
IndianStandard:HAZARDIDENTIFICATIONANDRISKANALYSISCODEOFPRACTICE
PREAMBLE(NOTPARTOFTHESTANDARD)
Inordertopromotepubliceducationandpublicsafety,equaljusticeforall,abetterinformed
citizenry,theruleoflaw,worldtradeandworldpeace,thislegaldocumentisherebymadeavailable
onanoncommercialbasis,asitistherightofallhumanstoknowandspeakthelawsthatgovern
them.
ENDOFPREAMBLE(NOTPARTOFTHESTANDARD)
IS15656:2006
IndianStandard
HAZARDIDENTIFICATIONANDRISKANALYSIS
CODEOFPRACTICE
ICS13.100
BIS2006
BUREAUOFINDIANSTANDARDS
MANAKBHAVAN,9BAHADURSHAHZAFARMARG
NEWDELHI110002
May2006
PriceGroup9
i
OccupationalSafetyandHealthandChemicalHazardsSectionalCommittee,CHD8
FOREWORD
ThisIndianStandardwasadoptedbytheBureauofIndianStandardsafterthedraftfinalized
byOccupationalSafetyandHealthandChemicalHazardsSectionalCommitteehadbeenapproved
bytheChemicalDivisionCouncil.
Withtheprogressiveadvancesintechnology,thecontinuingtrendtowardslargerandmore
highlyintegratedproductionunits,andtheeverincreasingdemandbygovernmentalandpublic
bodiesforimprovedsafetyandenvironmentalstandards,hithertoconventionalmethodsofdesign
basedonestablishedprinciplesandCodesofpracticearenolongeradequateinthemselvesfor
ensuringacceptablestandardofsafetyinprocessindustry.Asapreventivemeasureofminimizing
thechanceofaccidenttooccurinhazardousinstallationsandtherebyreducingthepossibilityof
injury,lossofmaterialanddegradationoftheenvironment,itisnecessarytousemoresearching
andsystematicmethodsforriskcontroltosupplementexistingprocedures.Theinherentpropertyof
materialusedintheprocessandtheprocessesthemselvesposethepotentialhazardinany
hazardousinstallationandacomprehensiveriskassessmentisneededforeffectivemanagementof
risk,whichneedstobeidentified,assessedandeliminatedorcontrolled.Thetechniquesshouldbe
usedfromtheconceptionofaprojectandmustbeusedperiodicallythroughoutthelifeofan
installationtothepointofdecommissioning.Theassessmentofhazardsiscarriedoutby
combinationofhazardanalysis,consequenceanalysisandprobabilitycalculations.
https://law.resource.org/pub/in/bis/S02/is.15656.2006.html
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Preventionofhumanandpropertylossesisintegraltotheoperationandmanagementof
chemicalprocessplants.Thismaybeachievedthroughtheselectionofatechnologythatis
inherentlysafe.Alternativelysafetyofplantdesignand/oroperationcanbeauditedbythe
applicationofhazardidentificationandriskanalysistechniques,andadoptingmeasuressuggestedby
theanalysis.ThelatterapproachconstitutesQuantitativeRiskAnalysis(QRA).
ThisCodeofpracticeisintendedforsafetyprofessionalsandengineersintheareasof
chemicalplantsafetytoupgradesafetyperformanceoftheplantsandcoversthemethodsof
identifying,assessingandreducinghazardsincludingevaluationandselectionofmethodsfor
particularapplications.Afewusefultechniquesareelaboratedwithworkedoutexamples.
Intheformulationofthisstandard,considerableassistancehasbeenderivedfromthe
followingpublications:
a.GuidelinesforHazardEvaluationProcedures,CentreforChemicalProcessSafety,American
InstituteofChemicalEngineers,1992.
b.GuidelinesforChemicalProcessQuantitativeRiskAnalysis,CentreforChemicalProcess
Safety,AmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers,2000.
c.TheMondIndex,ImperialChemicalIndustries(ICI)PLC,1993.
d.DOWsFireandExplosionIndexHazardClassificationGuide,AmericanInstituteof
ChemicalEngineers,1994.
e.DOWsChemicalExposureIndexGuide,AmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers,1994.
f.MethodsforDeterminationofPossibleDamagetoPeopleandObjectsResultingfromRelease
ofHazardousMaterialsCommitteeforthePreventionofDisasterscausedbyDangerous
Substances,TheHague,1992,TNO.
g.MethodsforCalculationofPhysicalEffectsCommitteeforthePreventionofDisasterscaused
byDangerousSubstances,TheHague,1997,TNO.
Thecompositionofthetechnicalcommitteeresponsibleforformulatingthisstandardisgiven
atAnnexG.
Forthepurposeofdecidingwhetheraparticularrequirementofthisstandardiscomplied
with,thefinalvalue,observedorcalculated,expressingtheresultofatestoranalysis,shallbe
roundedoffinaccordancewithIS2:1960Rulesforroundingoffnumericalvalues(revised).The
numberofsignificantplacesretainedintheroundedoffvalueshallbethesameasthatofthe
specifiedvalueinthisstandard.
IndianStandard
ii
HAZARDIDENTIFICATIONANDRISKANALYSISCODEOFPRACTICE
1SCOPE
ThisCodedescribesspecifictechniquestopreventhumanandpropertylossesintheoperation
andmanagementofprocessplant.TheoverallmethodologypresentedinthisCodeallowssystematic
identificationofhazardsaswellasquantificationoftherisksassociatedwiththeoperationof
processplants.Appliedwithdueexpertiseandrigourtheprescribedmethodologycanhelptheuser
understandtherelativelevelsofhazardsandriskpotentialinaninstallation.Thisaidstheselection
andprioritizationofnecessarystrategiesforaccidentpreventionandlimitingtheirconsequences.
Therefore,theCodecanbeusedforimprovingplantsafetyperformanceaswellastoreducehuman
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andpropertylosses.Riskanalysisisaprocessthatconsistsofanumberofsequentialstepsas
follows:
a.HazardIdentificationIdentifyingsourcesofprocessaccidentsinvolvingreleaseofhazardous
materialintheatmosphereandthevariousways(thatisscenarios)theycouldoccur.
b.ConsequenceAssessmentEstimatingtheprobablezoneofimpactofaccidentsaswellasthe
scaleand/orprobabilityofdamageswithrespecttohumanbeingsandplantequipmentand
otherstructures.
c.AccidentFrequencyAssessmentComputationoftheaveragelikelihoodofaccidents.
d.RiskEstimationCombiningaccidentconsequenceandfrequencytoobtainriskdistribution
withinandbeyondaprocessplant.
ThisCodedescribestheessentialnatureofeachoftheabovesequenceofstepsanddescribesa
varietyoftechniquesforidentifyinghazardsandthequantificationofaccidentconsequenceandthe
frequencytowardsthefinalriskestimation.
TheQuantitativeRiskAnalysis(QRA)ismostapplicableandprovidesmeaningfulresultswhen
aplantisbuilt,operatedandmaintainedasperdesignintentandgoodengineeringpractices.
2TERMINOLOGY
ForthepurposeofthisCode,thefollowingtechnicaltermsusedareinterpretedand
understoodasgivenbelow.
2.1
AccidentAspecificunplannedeventorsequenceofeventsthathasundesirable
consequences.
2.2
BasicEventAfaulttreeeventthatissufficientlybasicthatnofurtherdevelopmentis
necessary.
2.3
ConsequenceAmeasureoftheexpectedeffectsofanincident.
2.4
ExplosionAsuddenreleaseofenergycharacterizedbyaccompanimentofablastwave.
2.5
ExternalEventAneventcausedbyanaturalhazard(earthquake,flood,etc)orman
inducedevents(aircraftcrash,sabotage,etc).
2.6
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FireAprocessofcombustioncharacterizedbyheatorsmokeorflameoranycombination
ofthese.
2.7
FrequencyThenumberofoccurrencesofaneventperunitoftime.
2.8
HazardAcharacteristicofthesystem/plantprocessthatrepresentsapotentialforan
accidentcausingdamagetopeople,propertyortheenvironment.
2.9
InitiatingEventThefirsteventinaneventsequence.
2.10
MitigationSystemEquipmentand/orproceduresdesignedtorespondtoanaccident
eventsequencebyinterferingwithaccidentpropagationand/orreducingtheaccidentconsequence.
2.11
ProbabilityAnexpressionforthelikelihoodofoccurrenceofaneventoranevent
sequenceduringanintervaloftimeorthelikelihoodofthesuccessorfailureofaneventontestor
ondemand.
2.12
RiskAmeasureofpotentialeconomiclossorhumaninjuryintermsoftheprobabilityof
thelossorinjuryoccurringandthemagnitudeofthelossorinjuryifitoccurs.
2.13
TopEventTheunwantedeventorincidentatthetopofafaulttreethatistraced
downwardtomorebasicfailuresusinglogicgatestodetermineitscausesandlikelihood
2.14
WorstCaseConsequenceAconservative(high)estimateoftheconsequencesofthe
mostsevereaccidentidentified.
1
3RISKANALYSISMETHODOLOGY
TheflowchartforriskanalysisisgiveninFig.1
3.1
ThetermsinFig.1areexplainedasfollows.
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3.1.1Goal
Goalforcarryingoutriskanalysisisrequiredasapartofstatutoryrequirement,emergency
planning,etc.dependingonthenatureofindustry.
Fig.1FlowChartforRiskAnalysis
2
3.1.2Location,Layout,ProcessParameters
Theinformationonplantlocation,thelayoutofequipment,theprocessconditions,etc,is
requiredfortheriskanalysis.
3.1.3HazardIdentification
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Hazardidentificationisdonebycomparativeand/orfundamentalmethodsleadingto
qualitativeorquantitativeresults.
3.1.4QuantificationofHazards
Theindicesmethodforhazardidentificationcanassessthehazardpotentialfortheidentified
scenariosandcanbeusedasatoolforscreening.
3.1.5SelectMostCredibleScenario
Thecrediblescenarioswhichcanculminateintoanaccidentoutofseveralmajorandminor
scenarios,possibleforthereleaseofmaterialandenergy.
3.1.6SelectWorstCaseScenario
Theincident,whichhasthehighestpotentialtocauseanaccidentofmaximumdamage,is
selectedforfurtheranalysis.
3.1.7EstimateConsequences
Theconsequencesofscenariosintheplantintheformoffire,explosionandtoxiceffects
havetobeestimatedandpresented.
3.1.8EstimateFrequencyofOccurrence
Theprobabilityorfrequencyofitsoccurrenceofanyincidentistobefoundoutbyreliability
analysis,whichincludesfaulttree/eventtree,etc.
3.1.9EstimatetheRisk
Riskisexpressedastheproductoffrequencyofaneventandthemagnitudeofthe
consequencesthatresulteachtimetheeventoccurs.Thecalculatedriskcanbecomparedwith
nationalorinternationalvalues.
3.1.10PrioritizeandReduceRisk
Basedontheestimatedriskthecontributingfactorsleadingtoevents/accidentsareanalysed
andprioritizedintheriskanalysis.
4STAGESOFPROCESSPLANTANDRISKANALYSIS
Thelifespanofaprocessindustrycomprisesanumberofstagesfromconceptualto
decommissioning.Eachstageofaplantmayhavehazards,somegeneralandsomestagespecific.
Hazardidentificationandriskanalysistechniquesthatmaybeappliedatdifferentstagesofaplant
aregiveninTable1.
Table1PlantStagesvisvisHazardIdentificationandHazardAnalysisTechniques
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SLNo.
ProjectStage
HazardIdentification/HazardAnalysisTechniques
(1)
SLNo.
(2)
ProjectStage
(3)
HazardIdentification/HazardAnalysisTechniques
i)
(1)
Predesign
(2)
a) Hazardindices
(3)
b) Preliminaryhazardanalysis
c)
Whatifanalysis
d) Checklists
ii)
Design/Modification
a) Processdesignchecksanduseofchecklist
b) HAZOPstudies
c)
d) Whatifanalysis
e)
Faulttreeanalysis
f)
Eventtreeanalysis
iii)
Construction
a) Checklists
b) Whatifanalysis
iv)
Commissioning
a) Checklist
b) Plantsafetyaudits
c)
v)
Operationandmaintenance
a) Plantsafetyaudits
b) Whatifanalysis
c)
vi)
Decommissioning/Shutdown
a) Checklists
b) Whatifanalysis
Failuremodesandeffectsanalysis
Whatifanalysis
Checklists
5HAZARDIDENTIFICATIONANDHAZARDANALYSIS
Ahazardisgenerallyrealisedasalossofcontainmentofahazardousmaterial.Theroutesfor
suchlossofcontainmentcanincludereleasefrompipefittingscontainingliquidorgas,releases
fromvents/reliefandreleasesfromvesselrupture.Adheringtogoodengineeringpracticesalonemay
notbeadequateforcontrollingplanthazardsthus,avarietyoftechniquesofhazardidentification
andprobabilityoftheiroccurrencehavebeendevelopedforanalysisofprocesses,systemsand
operations.
Theobjectiveofhazardidentificationistoidentifyandevaluatethehazardsandthe
unintendedevents,whichcouldcauseanaccident.Thefirsttaskusuallyistoidentifythehazards
thatareinherenttotheprocessand/orplantandthenfocusontheevaluationoftheevents,which
couldbeassociatedwithhazards.Inhazardidentificationandquantificationofprobabilityof
occurrenceitisassumedthattheplantwillperformasdesignedintheabsenceofunintendedevents
(componentandmaterialfailures,humanerrors,externalevent,processunknown),whichmay
affecttheplant/processbehaviour.
5.1HazardIdentification
Formalhazardidentificationstudiesgeneratealistoffailurecases.Thelistcanusuallybe
derivedreliablyby
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considering:(a)forminwhichchemicalsarestoredorprocessed,(b)natureofhazardit
poses,and(c)quantityofthematerialcontained.Thehazardidentificationmethodsmaybe
categorizedascomparativemethodsandfundamentalmethods.Thesetechniquesarealsodescribed
inA2.
5.1.1ComparativeMethods
Thesetechniquesarebasedonhazardidentificationbycomparingwithstandards.Thevarious
methodsarechecklist,safetyaudit,hazardindicesandpreliminaryhazardanalysis.
5.1.1.1Checklist
Purpose
Forquickidentificationofhazards.
Applicability Inallphasesdesignconstruction,commissioning,operationandshutdown.
Data
Checklistispreparedfrompriorexperience/standardprocedure/manual/knowledgeofsystem
required
orplant.
Results
Essentiallyqualitativeinnatureandleadstoyesornodecisionwithrespecttocompliance
withthestandardproceduresetforth.
5.1.1.2Safetyaudit
Purpose
Forensuringthatproceduresmatchdesignintent.
Applicability Inallphasesoftheplantandperiodicityofreviewdependingonthelevelofhazard.
Data
Applicablecodesandguides,plantflowsheet,P&Idiagrams,startup/shutdownprocedure,
required
emergencycontrol,injuryreport,testingandinspectionreport,materialproperties.
Results
Qualitativeinnaturetheinspectionteamsreportdeviationfromdesignandplanned
proceduresandrecommendsadditionalsafetyfeatures.
5.1.1.3Hazardindices
Purpose
Foridentifyingrelativehazards.
Applicability Indesignandoperationphaseusedasanearlyscreeningtechniqueforfire/explosionpotential.
Data
Plotplanofaplant,processflowcondition,FireandExplosionIndexForm,RiskAnalysis
required
Form,Worksheets.
Results
Relativequantitativerankingofplantprocessunitsbasedondegreeofrisk.
5.1.1.4Preliminaryhazardanalysis
Purpose
Forearlyidentificationofhazards.
Applicability Inpreliminarydesignphasetoprovideguidanceforfinaldesign.
Data
Plantdesigncriteria,hazardousmaterialsinvolvedandmajorplantequipment.
required
Results
Listofhazards(relatedtoavailabledesigndetails)withrecommendationtodesignerstoaid
hazardreduction.
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5.1.2FundamentalMethods
Thesetechniquesareastructuredwayofstimulatingagroupofpeopletoapplyforesightalong
withtheirknowledgetothetaskofidentifyingthehazardsmainlybyraisingaseriesofquestions.
ThesemethodshavetheadvantagethattheycanbeusedwhetherornottheCodesofpracticeare
availableforaparticularprocess.Threemaintechniquesareavailableinthisfamilyofmethodsthat
isWhatifAnalysis,FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis,(FMEA)andHazardandOperabilityStudy
(HAZOP).
5.1.2.1Whatifanalysis
Purpose
Identifyingpossibleeventsequencesrelatedtohazards.
Applicability Duringplantchanges,developmentstageoratprestartupstage.
Datarequired Detaileddocumentationoftheplant,theprocessandtheoperatingprocedure.
Results
Tabularlistingofaccidentscenarios,theirconsequencesandpossibleriskreductionmethods.
5.1.2.2(Failuremodesandeffectsanalysis)
Purpose
Identifyingequipmentfailuremodesandtheireffects
Applicability Indesign,constructionandoperationphases,usefulforplantmodification.
Data
Knowledgeofequipment/system/plantfunctions.
required
Results
Qualitativeinnatureandincludesworstcaseestimateofconsequenceresultingfromfailureof
equipment.
5.1.2.3Hazardandoperabilitystudy
Purpose
Identifyinghazardandoperabilityproblem.
Application Optimalwhenappliedtoanew/modifiedplantwherethedesignisnearlyfirm.
Data
4
Detailedprocessdescription,detailedP&Idrawingandoperatingprocedureforbatchprocess.
required
Results
Identificationofhazardsandoperatingproblems,recommendschangeindesign,procedureand
furtherstudy.
5.2HazardAnalysis
Theprincipletechniquesarefaulttreeanalysis(FTA)andeventtreeanalysis(ETA).These
techniquesarealsodescribedinA3.
5.2.1FaultTreeAnalysis
Purpose
Identifyinghowbasiceventsleadtoanaccidentevent.
Applicability Indesignandoperationphasesoftheplanttouncoverthefailuremodes.
Datarequired Knowledgeofplant/systemfunction,plant/systemfailuremodesandeffectsonplant/system.
Results
Listingofsetofequipmentoroperatorfailuresthatcanresultinspecificaccidents.
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5.2.2EventTreeAnalysis
Purpose
Identifyingtheeventsequencesfrominitiatingeventtoaccidentscenarios.
Applicability Indesign/operatingplantstoassessadequacyofexistingsafetyfeatures.
Data
Knowledgeofinitiatingeventsandsafetysystem/emergencyprocedure.
required
Results
Providestheeventsequencethatresultinanaccidentfollowingtheoccurrenceofaninitiating
event.
6CONSEQUENCEANALYSISMETHODOLOGIES
Allprocesseshaveariskpotentialandinordertomanageriskseffectively,theymustbe
estimated.Sinceriskisacombinationoffrequencyandconsequence,consequence(orimpact)
analysisisanecessarystepinriskanalysis.Thissectionprovidesanoverviewofconsequenceand
effectmodelscommonlyusedinriskanalysis.
Anaccidentbeginswithanincident,whichusuallyresultsinlossofcontainmentofmaterial.
Thematerialmaypossesshazardouspropertiessuchasflammability,explosivity,toxicity,etc.Typical
incidentsmightincludetheruptureofapipeline,aholeinatankorpipe,runawayreaction,external
fireimpingingonthevesselandheatingit.
Oncetheincidentisdefinedsourcemodelsareselectedtodescribehowmaterialsare
dischargedfromthecontainment.Sourcemodelsprovideadescriptionoftherateofdischarge,the
totalquantitydischarged,thedurationofdischarge,andthestateofdischarge,thatisliquid,vapour
ortwophaseflow.Evaporationmodelsaresubsequentlyusedtocalculatetherateatwhichthe
materialbecomesairborne.
Nextadispersionmodelisusedtodescribehowthematerialistransporteddownwindand
dispersedtospecifiedconcentrationlevels.Forflammablereleases,fireandexplosionmodels
convertthesourcemodelinformationonthereleaseintoenergyhazardsuchasthermalradiation
fluxandexplosionoverpressures.Finallyeffectmodelsconverttheseincidentspecificresultsinto
effectsonpeopleandstructures.Environmentalimpactscouldalsobeconsideredbuttheseare
beyondthescopeofthepresentCode.
InthisCodeabriefintroductiontothemethodsofconsequenceanalysisisprovided.AnnexF
showsthestepstobefollowedinconsequenceanalysis.ThesemodelsarealsodescribedinA4.
6.1SourceModels
Sourcemodelsareusedtoquantitativelydefinethelossofcontainmentscenariobyestimating
thedischargerate,totalquantityreleased,releaseduration,extentofflashandevaporationfroma
liquidpoolandaerosolformationandconversionofsourcetermoutputstoconcentrationfields.
6.1.1DischargeRateModels
Purpose
Evaluationofdischargeofmaterial.
Applicability
Firststageindevelopingtheconsequenceestimates.
Datarequired
a)Physicalconditionofstorage.
b)Phaseatdischarge.
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c)Pathofthedischarge(holesize).
Results
a)Dischargerateofthegas/liquid/twophaseflow.
b)Durationofrelease.
c)Phasechangeduringrelease.
6.1.2FlashandEvaporationModels
Purpose
Estimationofthetotalvapour.
Applicability
Duringspillageofliquidonsurfacebecauseoflossofcontainment.
Datarequired
a)Heatcapacity,latentheat,boilingpointofliquid.
b)Leakrate,poolarea,windvelocity,temperature.
c)Vapourpressure,masstransfercoefficient.
d)Viscosity,density,aturbulentfrictioncoefficient.
Results
a)Amountofvapourfromaliquiddischarge.
b)Timedependentmassrateofboiling.
c)Radiusorradialspreadvelocityofthepool.
6.1.3DispersionModels
Accuratepredictionoftheatmosphericdispersionofvapoursiscentraltoconsequence
analysis.Typically,thedispersioncalculationsprovideanestimateofthegeographicalareaaffected
andtheaveragevapourconcentrationsexpected.Thesimplestcalculationsrequireanestimateofthe
releasedrateofthegas,theatmosphericconditions,surfaceroughness,temperature,pressureand
releasediameter.Twotypesofdispersionmodelsareusuallyconsidered:
a.Positivelybuoyantorneutrallybuoyant,and
b.Negativelybuoyantordensegas.
Thedispersionofgasesthatarelighterthanorequaltothedensityofdispersingmediumare
consideredaspositivelybuoyantandthegaseswithhigherdensityatthepointofdispersionis
consideredasnegativelybuoyantordensegas.Thedispersionisfurthercategorizedintopuffmodel
thatis,instantaneousreleaseorplumemodelthatiscontinuousreleaseortimevaryingcontinuous
release.
Alargenumberofparametersaffectthedispersionofgases.Theseincludeatmospheric
stability,windspeed,localterraineffects,heightofthereleaseabovetheground,releasegeometry,
thatis,point,lineorareasource,momentumofthematerialreleasedandthebuoyancyofthe
materialreleased.
AnnexCgivesthemeteorologicalconditionsdefiningthePasquillGiffordStabilityClasses
denotedbylettersAtoF,whichcorrelatetowindspeedandcloudcover.Thestabilityiscommonly
definedintermsofatmosphericverticaltemperaturegradient.Forlocalapplication,thewindspeed
andcloudcovershouldbetakenfrommeteorologicalrecords.Forpracticalpurposetwostability
conditionsgivenbelowcanbeusedtofindthedispersionpattern:
Normal:Datwindvelocityof5m/s(Windydaytimecondition),andExtremecalm:Fat
windvelocityof2m/s(Stillnighttimecondition).
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AnnexDgivestheterraincharacteristicsthataffectthemixingofthereleasedgasandairas
theyflowoverthegroundthusthedispersionoveralakewouldbedifferentfromthatoveratall
building.Valuesofthesurfaceroughnessvaryfrom10mforhighlyurbanareato0.0001mover
sea.Formostpracticalpurposesflatruralterrain(Fewtrees,longgrass,fairlylevelgrassplains)with
surfaceroughnessvalueof0.1isused.
Asthereleaseheightincreases,thegroundlevelconcentrationdecreasessincetheresulting
plumehasmoredistancetomixwithfreshairpriortocontactingtheground.
6.1.3.1Positivelybuoyantorneutraldispersionmodel
Purpose
Predictionofaverageconcentrationtimeprofile.
Applicability Usedinpredictionofatmosphericdispersionoflightergasesthanair.
Data
Dischargerate,releaseduration,stabilityclass,windspeed,location,averagingtime,
required
roughnessfactor.
Results
Downwindconcentration,areaaffected,durationofexposure.
6.1.3.2Negativelybuoyantordensegasmodel
Purpose
Predictionofaverageconcentrationtimeprofile.
Applicability
Usedinpredictionofatmosphericdispersiondenserthanair.
Datarequired
Dischargerate,releaseduration,densityofair,densityoffluid,location.
Results
Downwindconcentration,areaaffected,durationofexposure.
6.2FiresandExplosionsModels
Thesemodelsareusedonlywhenthematerialreleasedisflammableandthevapourcloud
concentrationiswithintheflammablerange.Thevarioustypesoffireandexplosionmodelsare:
a.Poolfires,
b.Jetfires,
c.Flashfires,
d.Vapourcloudexplosions,
e.Boilingliquidexpandingvapourexplosions(BLEVE),and
f.Physicalexplosions.
6.2.1PoolFireModel
Purpose
Calculationofthermalradiation.
Applicability Fireresultingfromburningofpoolsofflammableliquidspilled.
Data
Quantity,pooldiameter,heatofcombustionandvaporization,densityofair,temperature,
required
viewfactor,etc.
Results
Thermalradiationfluxatadistance.
6.2.2JetFireModel
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Purpose
Applicability Fireresultingfromcombustionofmaterialasitisbeingreleasedfrompressurizedprocessunit.
6
Data
Flowrate,holediameter,heatofcombustionandvaporization,densityoffluid,temperature,
required
viewfactor,etc.
Results
6.2.3FlashFireModel
Purpose
Applicability Fireresultingfromnonexplosivecombustionofavapourcloud.
Data
Materialreleased,dispersioncoefficients,flameemissivity,viewfactor,atmospheric
required
attenuation.
Results
6.2.4VapourCloudExplosionModel
Purpose
Calculationofoverpressure.
Applicability
Explosionofaflammablecloudformedduetorelease/flashestovapour.
Datarequired
Massofflammablematerialinvapourcloud,heatofcombustionofmaterial,etc.
Results
Overpressureatadistance.
6.2.5.BoilingLiquidExpandingVapourExplosion(BLEVE)Model
Purpose
Applicability Releaseofalargemassofpressurizedsuperheatedliquidtotheatmosphere.
Data
Massinvolvedinfireball,radiativefractionofheatofcombustion,heatofcombustionforunit
required
mass,atmospherictransmissivity.
Results
Thermalradiationfluxfromthesurfaceoffireball.
6.2.6PhysicalExplosionModel
Purpose
Calculationofmissiledamage
Applicability
Vesselruptureresultinginreleaseofstoredenergyproducingashockwave.
Datarequired Pressure,volume,heatcapacity,massofcontainer,ratioofheatcapacities,temperature.
Results
Overpressureatadistance,fragmentsizeandvelocity
6.3EffectModel
ThismodelisdescribedinA5.
Applicability Methodofassessingpropertydamageandhumaninjury/fatalitydueto:
a.thermalradiation.
b.overpressure.
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c.toxicexposure.
Data
IntheProbitfunctionPr=a+bInVthecausativefactorVintheProbitEquationvariesas
required
follows
a.Fire:Pr=a+bIn(tI4/3),tisdurationofexposureandIisthermalintensity
b.Explosion:Pr=a+bIn(Ps),wherePsisthepeakoverpressure
c.Toxicity:Pr=a+bIn(C n tc),whereC=concentrationinppmbyvolume,tc=exposure
time,inminutesandn=constant.
Theconstantsaandbintheprobitequationarecalculatedfromtheexperimental
dataandareavailableinMethodsfordeterminationofpossibledamagetopeopleand
objectsresultingfromreleaseofhazardousmaterials[seeForeword(f)].
Results
Thepercentoffatalityorthepercentofdamagetoequipment.
7RISKCALCULATION
7.1
Riskcanbedefinedasameasureofeconomicloss,humaninjuryorenvironmentaldamage
bothintermsoflikelihoodandmagnitudeofloss,injuryordamage.Inthisdocumentonlythe
propertydamage,thatis,economiclossandhumanlosshavebeenconsidered.Riskisexpressedas
theproductoffrequencyofaneventandthemagnitudeoftheconsequencesthatresulteachtime
theeventoccurs.Themathematicalexpressionforriskis:
R=FC
where
R
risk(lossorinjuryperyear)
frequency(eventperyear)and
consequence(lossorinjuryperevent).
7.2
Inmanycasesthehazardcannotbecompletelyeliminatedthoughtheprobabilityof
occurrencecanbereducedwithadditionofsafetymeasuresandatafinancialcost.
7.3
Thebasicapproachforestimatingfrequencyhasbeendiscussedin5.2.
7.4
Theconsequenceintermsofdeaths/yearorintermsofmonetarylossperyearcanbe
estimatedbythemethodsofconsequenceanalysisdescribedin6.
7.5RiskCriteria
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Riskcriteriaaretheacceptablelevelsofriskthatcanbetoleratedunderaparticularsituation.
Inmanycountries
7
theacceptableriskcriteriahasbeendefinedforindustrialinstallationsandareshownin
AnnexE.ThesecriteriaareyettobedefinedintheIndiancontext,butvaluesemployedinother
countriescanbeusedforcomparison.
8GUIDELINESFORAPPLICATIONOFRISKANALYSISTECHNIQUES
ThisCodeessentiallyoutlinesthevariousapproachesandtechniquesthatmaybeusedduring
theriskanalysisofaprocessplant.Thisconcludingsectionenumeratessomeofthecriticalfeatures
ofthemethodologyofriskanalysissoastoaidtheprospectiveusersapplytheCodemosteffectively:
a.Whileundertakingariskanalysis,carefulconsiderationofthevariouspossible
approaches/techniquesisnecessary,sinceeachhavetheirindividualstrengthsandlimitations.
b.Themethodofriskanalysisrequiresrealisticaccidentscenarioassumptionsaswellas
comprehensiveplantoperationalinformationand,inparticular,reliabledatapertainingto
component/systemfailurefrequencies,humanerrorrates,etc.Intheeventofany
uncertaintiesrelatingtotherelevantinformationanddata,theuseofexperienceand
judgmentwouldbecriticaltoobtainingriskestimatesthatprovidereliablesupportto
subsequentdecisionmaking.
c.Allassumptionsappliedduringariskanalysisexerciseneedbedocumentedwithclarity,soas
toenablebettercomparisonandcommunication.
d.Inspecificinstances,theriskanalysismethodmayrequireconsiderationoftheexternalevents
asprobablecausativefactorsinlargescalehazardouschemicalreleases.
e.Whereverfeasibletheriskanalysisforaprocessplantshouldincorporatepossible
environmentalconsequencesaswellaspossiblehumanhealtheffectsthatareimmediate
and/ordelayed.
f.Riskanalysisneedbeundertakennewlyintheeventofanymajorchangesintroducedinthe
plantconfiguration.Itmustalsobeupdatedperiodicallywheneverimprovedplantoperational
informationandequipment/humanfailuredatabecomesavailable.Further,itisadvisableto
improveriskcalculationsusingneweranalyticalmethodsasandwhentheyaredeveloped.
Withthetechniquesusedfortheanalysislargenumberofresultsbasedonnumbersof
accidentscenariosused,thevariousweatherclasseschosen,theassumptionsincalculatingeach
caseswouldbeavailable.Butfinallyitisveryimportanttosummarizealltheresultsinoneformat
providingclearlywhatfactorappeartobeimportantinoverallanalysis.Aformathastobechosen
forpresentingtheresultsoftheanalysisandacceptabilityistobeestablishedeitherintermsofrisk
criteriaordistanceunderconsiderationwhichfacetheconsequenceor%damageuptoadistance
underconsideration.
OnetypicalformatforreportingtheanalysisisgiveninAnnexB.
8
ANNEXA
DETAILSOFCHEMICALPROCESSRISKANALYSISMETHODS
(Clauses5.1,5.2and6)
A1HAZARDIDENTIFICATIONANDRISKANALYSISSEQUENCE
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Thepurposeofhazardidentificationandriskanalysisistoidentifypossibleaccidentsand
estimatetheirfrequencyandconsequences.Conceivablytheinitiatingeventcouldbetheonlyevent
butusuallyitisnotandasamatteroffactthereanumberofeventsbetweentheinitiatingeventand
theconsequenceandtheseeventsaretheresponsesofthesystemsandtheoperators.Different
responsestothesameinitiatingeventwilloftenleadtodifferentaccidentsequenceswithvarying
magnitudeofconsequences.
Whileidentifyingthehazard(s)afilteringprocessiscarriedandonlyportionswithpotential
riskareinvolvedforriskanalysis.Hazardisnotconsideredforfurtheranalysis,if(a)itis
unrealisable,and(b)ifitisnotverysignificant.Inmanycases,oncethehazardhasbeenidentified
thesolutionisobvious.Insomemorecasesthesolutionisobtainedfromexperience.Inmanyother
casesitistakencareofbyCodesofpracticeorstatutoryrequirement.
A2HAZARDIDENTIFICATIONANDQUANTIFICATION
A2.1Checklist
Thesearesimpleandquickmeansofapplyingtheexperiencetodesignsorsituationstoensure
thatthefeaturesappearinginthelistarenotoverlooked.Checklistsareusedtoindicatecompliance
withthestandardprocedure.Itisintendedforstandardevaluationofplanthazardsanda
convenientmeansofcommunicatingtheminimalacceptablelevelofhazardevaluationthatis
requiredforanyjobgenerallyleadingtoyesornosituation.
Thechecklistisfrequentlyaformforapprovalbyvariousstaffandmanagementfunctions
beforeaprojectcanmovefromonestagetothenext.Itservesbothasameansofcommunication
andasaformofcontrolandcanhighlightalackofbasicinformationorasituationthatrequiresa
detailedevaluation.
Checklistsarequalitativeinnaturelimitedtotheexperiencebaseoftheauthorofthe
checklist,hence,shouldbeauditedandupdatedregularly.Itisawidelyusedbasicsafetytoolandcan
beappliedatanystageofaprojectorplantdevelopment.AccordinglyitisnamedasProcess
checklist,Systemchecklist,Designchecklist,etc.
Aprocessorsystemchecklistcanbeappliedtoevaluatingequipment,material,orprocedures
andcanbeusedduringanystageofaprojecttoguidetheuserthroughcommonhazardsbyusing
standardprocedures.
A2.2SafetyAudit
Itisanintensiveplantinspectionintendedtoidentifytheplantconditionsoroperating
proceduresthatcouldleadtoaccidentsorsignificantlossesoflifeandproperty.Itisusedtoensure
thattheimplementedsafety/riskmanagementprogramsmeettheoriginalexpectationsand
standards.ItisalsocalledSafetyreview,Processreview,andLosspreventionreview.Inessence,
safetyauditisacriticalappraisalofeffectivenessoftheexistingsafetyprogrammeinaplant.
Thereviewlooksformajorhazardoussituationandbringsouttheareasthatneed
improvement.Thestepsfortheidentificationprocessare:
a.Obtainingresponsefromplantonapreauditquestionnaire
b.Preparationofchecklist,inspectionandinterviewplantpersonneland
c.Preparationofsafetyauditreportintheformofrecommendation.
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Theresultsarequalitativeinnature.Thereviewseekstoidentifyinadequacyindesign,
operatingproceduresthatneedtoberevisedandtoevaluatetheadequacyofequipment
maintenanceorreplacement.Assigninggradesforeffectivenessofsafetymanagementoftheplantin
theareassuchasorganization,operatingprocedures,monitoring,maintenance,etcispossible,a
scorecardcanbepreparedtogetanappraisalofsafetystatusofplant.
Whilethistechniqueismostcommonlyappliedtooperatingplantsitisequallyapplicableto
pilotplants,storagefacilitiesorsupportfunctions.
Theperiodicityofsuchstudiesdependsontheriskinvolvedintheprocessandthe
commitmentofthemanagement.Itusuallyvariesfromonceinayeartooneinsevenyears.
A2.3HazardIndices
Hazardindicescanbeusedforrelativerankingofprocessplantsfromthepointofviewof
theirhazardpotentials.Themostwellknowntechniquesare:DOWfireandexplosionindex,Mond
fire,Explosionandtoxicityindex
9
andChemicalexposureindex.Allthesemethodsprovideadirectandeasyapproachtoa
relativerankingoftherisksinaprocessplant.Themethodsassignpenaltiesandcreditsbasedon
plantfeatures.Penaltiesareassignedtoprocessmaterialsandconditionsthatcancontributetoan
accident.Creditsareassignedtoplantsafetyfeaturesthatcanmitigatetheeffectsofanincident.
Thesepenaltiesandcreditsarecombinedtoderiveanindexthatisrelativerankingoftheplantrisk.
Thefollowingchartdescribestheuseofsuchindices:
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10
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ThedetailedmethodologyofusingtheMondandtheDOWindicesforthehazard
identificationarenotprovidedinthisstandard,forwhichusersmaylookatdifferentguides[see
Foreword(c)and(d)].
TheChemicalexposureindex(CEI)methodisafurtherdevelopedtechniquederivedfrom
DOWF&Eindices,usefulforidentificationofhazardsarisingoutoftoxicchemicalspresentina
plant.Itisalsoatooltofindouttherequirementforfurtherhazardassessmentforsuchchemicals.
Itprovidesasimplemethodofratingtherelativeacutehealthhazardspotentialtopeoplein
theneighbourhoodplantsorcommunitiesfrompossiblechemicalreleaseincidents.The
methodologyutilizesexpressionforestimatingairbornequantityreleasedfromhazardouschemicals.
TheCEIsystemprovidesamethodofrankingonehazardrelativetootherhazardbutitisneither
intendedtodefineaparticulardesignassafe/unsafenortoquantify/determineabsolute
measurementofrisk.Flammabilityandexplosionhazardsarenotincludedinthisindex.
A2.4PreliminaryProcessHazardAnalysis
Itisusedduringtheconceptual,earlydevelopment,earlydesignphase,ofaplant.Themethod
isintendedforuseonlyinthepreliminaryphaseofplantdevelopmentforcaseswherepast
experienceprovideslittleornoinsightintopotentialsafetyproblems,forexample,anewplantwith
newprocess.Earlyidentificationofmostofthehazardscouldbepossibleresultingineffectivesaving
incostthatcouldotherwiseresultfrommajorplantredesignsifhazardsarediscoveredatalater
stage.Itisveryusefulforsiteselection.Itdoesnotprecludetheneedforfurtherhazard
assessmentinsteaditisaprecursortosubsequenthazardanalysis.Itemsforconsiderationconsistof
meticulouspreparationofalistofhazards:
a.Rawmaterials,intermediates,byproducts,finalproducts
b.Plantequipment(highpressuresystems)
c.Interfaceamongsystemcomponents(materialinteractions,fire)
d.Environment(earthquake,vibration,extremetemperature)and
e.Operations(testmaintenanceandemergencyprocedure)Safetyequipment.
Example:
ToxicgasAisoneofthecomponentsusedinprocesscausesforthedangers:
a.Thehazardsduetostoringthegas
b.Hazardsfromtheexcessgasaftertheuse
c.LinessupplyingthegasAand
d.Leakageduringthereceiptofthegasetc.
Theeffectsofthesecausescanbe:
a.Injury/Fatalitytopersonsinsidetheplantornearbyareas,and
b.Damageofpropertyduetoexplosion.
Safetymeasures/correctiveactionsprovidedtominimizeeffect:
a.Whetherlesstoxicmaterialcanbeused
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b.Minimizingtheinventoryforthestorageofthematerial
c.Procedureforsafestorageofthegaswithenclosuresystem
d.Provisionofplantwarningsystem
e.Trainingforoperatorsonproperties,effectofmaterialand
f.Informingneighboringlocalitiesaboutthetoxiceffect.
Thefinalresultsoftheidentificationprocesscanberecordedas:
Hazard
Causes
Effects
Preventive
Measures
A2.5FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis
Themethodisatabulationofsystem/plantequipment,theirfailuremodes,andeachfailure
modeseffectonsystem/plant.Itisadescriptionofhowequipmentfails(open,closed,on,off,leaks,
etc)andthepotentialeffectsofeachfailuremode.Thetechniqueisorientedtowardsequipment
ratherthanprocessparameters.FMEAidentifiessinglefailuremodesthateitherdirectlyresultinor
contributesignificantlytoanimportantaccident.Human/operatorerrorsaregenerallynot
examinedinaFMEAhowever,theeffectsofamaloperationareusuallydescribedbyanequipment
failuremode.Thetechniqueisnotefficientforidentifyingcombinationsofequipmentfailuresthat
leadtoaccidents.AmultidisciplinaryteamofprofessionalscanperformFMEA.
FMEAhasfollowingsixmainsteps:
a.Determiningthelevelofresolution,
b.Developingaconsistentformat,
c.Definingtheproblemandtheboundaryconditions,
d.Listingvariousfailuremodes,
e.Eacheffectsofthefailuremode,and
f.CompletingtheFMEAtable.
Thelevelofresolutiondependsontherequirementoftheplant,namelyplantlevel,system
levelorinotherwordswhetherthestudyisforawholeplantoraportionofplantoraparticular
systemorindividualequipment.Markingtheportionofstudyonthedrawingcanindicatethe
physicalsystemboundariesandstatingtheoperating
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conditionsattheinterface.Identificationoftheequipmentisnecessarytodistinguishbetween
twoormoresimilarequipmentbyanynumberanddescriptionoftheequipmentisrequiredtogive
briefdetailsaboutprocessorsystem.
Allthefailuremodesconsistentwiththeequipmentdescriptionaretobelistedconsidering
theequipmentsnormaloperatingconditions.
Exampleofvariousfailuremodesofanormallyoperatingpumpis:
a.Failstoopenorfailstoclosewhenrequired,
b.Transferstoaclosedposition,
c.Valvebodyrupture,
d.Leakofseal,and
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e.Leakofcasing.
Theeffectsforeachfailuremode,forexample,theeffectsofthefailstoopenconditionfor
thepumpis:(a)lossofprocessfluidinaparticularequipment,and(b)overheatingofthe
equipment.Theeffectofpumpsealleakisaspillintheareaofthepumpifthefluidisflammablea
firecouldbeexpected,andsoon.
Theanalystmayalsonotetheexpectedresponseofanyapplicablesafetysystemsthatcould
mitigatetheeffect.
Exampleofthetabulatedformatmaybe:
Plant
System
Boundary
Condition
Reference
Equipment
Description
Failuremodes
Effect
A2.6HazardandOperabilityStudy(HAZOP)
TheHAZOPstudyismadetoidentifyhazardsinaprocessplantandoperabilityproblems,
whichcouldcompromisetheplantsabilitytoachievedesignintent.Theapproachtakenistoforma
multidisciplinaryteamthatworkstoidentifyhazardsbysearchingfordeviationsfromdesign
intents.Thefollowingtermsareusedfortheprocessforanalysis:
a.IntentionsIntentiondefineshowtheplantisexpectedtooperate,
b.DeviationsThesearedeparturesfromintentions,
c.CausesThesearereasonswhydeviationsmightoccur,and
d.ConsequencesResultsofdeviationsshouldtheyoccur.
Themethodusesguidewords,whichareusedtoquantifyorqualifytheintentioninorderto
guideandstimulatethehazardidentificationprocess.Theguidewordsareusedtogeneratedeviations
fromthedesignintent.Theteamthenidentifiescauseandconsequencesofthedeviations.
HAZOPguidewordsandtheirmeanings:
Guidewords
Meaning
No
NegationofDesignIntent
Less
QuantitativeDecrease
More
QuantitativeIncrease
Partof
QualitativeDecrease
Aswellas
QualitativeIncrease
Reverse
LogicalOppositetoIntent
Otherthan
CompleteSubstitution
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TheHAZOPstudyrequiresthattheplantbeexaminedforeveryline.Themethodappliesall
theguidewordsinturnandoutcomeisrecordedforthedeviationwithitscausesandconsequences.
Example:
a.Foraparticularline,
b.TakinganyguidewordforexampleNo,
c.Deviationinprocessparameters,namelyflow/temperature,
d.Foreachdeviationthecausesforsuchdeviations,
e.ConsequencesmaybeseveralC1,C2,C3,etc,and
f.Measurestorectifytherootcausefordeviation.
Thetabulationoftheresultsismadeasfollows:
GuidewordDeviationCausesConsequencesAction
A2.7WhatIfAnalysis
Whatifanalysisisusedtoconductathoroughandsystematicexaminationofaprocessor
operationbyaskingquestionsthatbeginswithWhatIf.Thequestioningusuallystartsattheinputto
theprocessandfollowstheflowoftheprocess.Alternatelythequestionscancentreonaparticular
consequencecategory,forexample,personnelsafetyorpublicsafety.Thefindingsareusually
accidenteventsequences.Effectiveapplicationofthetechniquerequiresindepthexperienceof
plantoperation.
TwotypesofboundariesthatmaybedefinedinaWhatIfstudyare:(a)Consequence
categorybeinginvestigated,and(b)Physicalsystemboundary.Theconsequencecategoriesare
mainly:(a)publicrisk,(b)workerrisk,and(c)economicrisk,forspecificplant.Thepurposeof
physicalboundariesistokeeptheinvestigatingteamfocusedonaparticularportionofaplantin
whichconsequenceofconcerncouldoccur.ThetypicalinformationrequiredforWhatifanalysisis:
12
a.Operatingconditions,physicalandchemicalpropertiesofmaterials,equipmentdescription
b.Plotplan
c.ProcessandInstrumentationdiagramoftheplantincludingalarmsmonitoringdevices,gauges
etc
d.Responsibilitiesandthedutiesoftheoperatingpersonnel,communicationsystemetcand
e.Proceduresforpreventivemaintenance,workpermitsystem,forhazardousjob,tackling
emergencysituations.
Theresultsaredescribedinachart,forexample,forreactionoftwosubstancesA(toxic)and
B.
WhatIf
Hazard
Recommendation
WrongdeliveryinsteadofB
Notlikely
ActualproductBisinwrong
Toxicgasmaybe
ConcentrationofBistobechecked
concentration
released
Biscontaminated
Notlikely
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WhatIf
InletValveforBisclosed
Hazard
Recommendation
UnreactedAwillbe
Alarm/shutoffforvalveforthesupplyline
released
forA
A3QUANTIFICATIONTECHNIQUES
A3.1FaultTreeAnalysis(FTA)
Itisadeductivetechniquethatfocusesononeparticularaccidenteventandprovidesa
methodfordeterminingbasiccausesofthatevent.Thismethodisusedtoidentifycombinationsof
equipmentfailuresandhumanerrorsthatcanresultinanaccidentoraninitiatingevent.The
solutionofthefaulttreeisalistofthesetsofequipmentfailures/humanerrorthataresufficientto
resultintheaccidenteventoftheinterest.FTAallowsthesafetyanalysttofocusonpreventive
measuresonthesebasiccausestoreducetheprobabilityofanaccident.
Essentiallythefaulttreeisagraphicalrepresentationoftheinterrelationshipsbetween
equipmentfailuresandaspecificaccident.Theequipmentfaultsandfailuresthataredescribedina
faulttreecanbegroupedintothreeclasses,namely:
a.Primaryfaultsandfailuresattributedtotheequipmentandnottoanyotherexternalcause
orcondition.
b.Secondaryfaultsandfailuresattributedtootherexternalcauseorcondition.
c.Commandsfaultsandfailuresattributedneithertoequipmentintendednortoanyexternal
causebutduetosomesourceofincorrectcommand.
Therearefourstepsinperformingthefaulttreeanalysis:
a.Problemdefinitions,
b.Faulttreeconstruction,
c.Faulttreesolution(determiningminimalcutsets),and
d.Minimalcutsetranking.
A3.1.1ProblemDefinitions
Thisconsistsof:(a)definingaccidenteventtopeventofthefaulttreeanalysis,(b)defining
analysisboundaryincludingunallowedevents,existingevents,systemsphysicalboundary,levelof
resolution,andotherassumptions.
A3.1.2FaultTreeConstruction
ItbeginswiththetopeventandproceedslevelbylevelusingsymbolsnamelyOrAndetc.
untilallthefaulteventshavebeendevelopedtotheirbasiccontributingcauses.
A3.1.3FaultTreeSolution
Thecompletedfaulttreeprovidesusefulinformationbydisplayingtheinteractionsofthe
equipmentfailuresthatcouldresultinanaccident.Thematrixsystemofanalysisgivestheminimal
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cutsets,whichareusefulforrankingthewaysinwhichaccidentmayoccur,andtheyallow
quantificationofthefaulttreeifappropriatefailuredataareavailable.
A3.1.4MinimalCutSetRanking
Minimalcutsetanalysisismathematicaltechniqueformanipulatingthelogicstructureofa
faulttreetoidentifyallcombinationsofbasiceventsthatresultinoccurrenceofthetopevent.The
rankingofminimalcutsetsisthefinalstepforthefaulttreeanalysisprocedure.Thebasicevents
calledthecutsetsarethenreducedtoidentifythoseminimalcutsetswhichcontaintheminimal
setsofeventsnecessaryandsufficienttocausethetopevent.Rankingmaybebasedonnumberof
basiceventsthatareminimalcutset,forexample,oneeventminimalcutismoreimportantthan
twoeventminimalcutsetatwoeventminimalcutsetismoreimportantthanthreeeventminimal
cutsetandason.Thisisbecauseofthechanceofoccurrenceofoneeventismorethanthatoftwo
eventstooccur.Moreover,thehumanerrorisrankedattop,thentheactiveequipmentfailure,then
passiveequipmentfailure.
13
Example:
Fig.2FaultTreeforNoLightinRoomonDemand
InFig.2thecausesB1,B2,B3,B4andB5arethebasicevents,whichcanleadtoTopeventT,
whichisNolightinroomondemandandthemathematicalexpressionforthattopeventis
T =
G1G2
(B1+B2)(B3+B4+B5)
B1B3+B2B3+B1B4+B2B4+B1B5+B2B5(6minimalcutsets)
ThisindicatestheoccurrenceofeitherofbasiceventsB1orB2alongwithoccurrenceofany
ofthebasiceventsB3,B4&B5wouldleadtotopeventT(seeChartonpage15).
InFig.3thelogicstructureismathematicallytransformedusingBooleanAlgebraintoa
minimalcutFaulttree.
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G1G2
(B1+G3)+(B2+G4)
[B1+(B3B4)](B2+B5+B6)
whichshowsthatanyofthebasiceventsB1B6shouldbeincombinationsasintheabove
expressiontocausefailureofthetopevent.
A3.2EventTreeAnalysis(ETA)
ETAisaforwardthinkingprocess,beginswithaninitiatingeventanddevelopsthefollowing
sequencesofeventsthatdescribepotentialaccidentsaccountingfor:(i)successes,and(ii)failuresof
theavailablesafetyfunctionastheaccidentprogresses.Thesafetyfunctionincludesoperator
responseorsafetysystemresponsetotheinitiatingevent.Thegeneralprocedurefortheeventtree
analysishasfourmajorsteps:
a.Identifyinganinitiatingeventofinterest,
b.Identifyingsafetyfunctionsdesignedtodealwiththeidentifyingevent,
c.Constructionoftheeventtree,and
d.Resultsofaccidenteventsequence.
A3.2.1IdentifyinganInitiatingEvent
Thisidentificationoftheeventdependsontheprocessinvolvedanddescribesthesystemor
equipmentfailure,humanerrororanyotherprocessupsetthatcanresultinotherevents.
A3.2.2IdentifyingSafetyFunctions
Thesafetyfunctions/safetysystemsavailabletomitigate
14
thesituationanddealwiththeidentifyingeventincludeautomaticshutdownsystem,alarm
systemthatalerttheoperator,operatoraction,containmentmethod,etc.Theanalystneedsto
identifyallsafetyfunctionsthatcaninfluencethesequenceofeventsfollowingtheinitiatingevent.
Thesuccessesandthefailuresofthesafetyfunctionsareaccountedintheeventtree.
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Fig.3FaultTreeforDamagetoReactorDuetoHighProcessTemperature
A3.2.3ConstructionoftheEventTree
Theeventtreedescribesthechronologicaldevelopmentoftheaccidentsbeginningwiththe
initiatingevent.Consideringeachsafetyfunctionstodealwiththeinitiatingeventonenodalpoint
isgeneratedwiththetwoalternatives(A1andA2)thatisthesuccessandfailureofthesafety
system.Atthefirstnodalpointtwoalternativesarefoundtoconsiderthesecondsafety
system/componenttodealwiththeevent.Thesuccessandfailureofthesecondsafetysystemalso
givebranchingtothetwoalternativesA3andA4.
A3.2.4ResultsofAccidentEventSequence
Thesequencesoftheconstructedeventtreerepresentavarietyofoutcomesthatcanfollow
theinitiatingevent.Oneormoreofthesequencesmayrepresentthesaferecoveryandreturnto
normaloperationwhiletheothersmayleadtoshutdownoftheplantoranaccident.Oncethe
sequencesaredescribedtheanalystcanranktheaccidentsbasedonseverityoftheoutcome.The
structureoftheeventtreealsohelpstheanalystinspecifyingwhereadditionalproceduresorsafety
systemsareneededinmitigatingtheaccidentsorreducingitsfrequency.
Example:
InthefollowingfiguretheinitiatingeventisassignedthesymbolA,andsafetyfunctionsthe
symbolsB,C,D.Thesequencesarerepresentedbysymbols(A,B,C,D)oftheeventsthatfailand
causethatparticularaccident.ForexampleanerrorissimplylabelledAtointerpretthe
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15
initiatingeventoccurringwithnosubsequentfailureofthesafetyfunctionsB,CandD.
SimilarlythesequenceACDrepresentscombinationofinitiatingeventwithsuccessofsafety
functionBandfailureofsafetyfunctionsCandD.
A4CONSEQUENCEANALYSISMETHODOLOGIES
A4.1DischargeRateModels
Hazardousincidentsstartwithadischargeofaflammableortoxicmaterialfromitsnormal
containment.Dischargecantakeplacefromacrackorfractureofprocessvesselsorpipework,an
openvalveorfromanemergencyvent.Thereleasemaybeintheformofgas,liquid,ortwophase
flashingofgasliquid.
Thedischargeratemodelsprovidebasicinputforthefollowingmodels:
a.Flashandevaporationmodeltoestimatethefractionofaliquidreleasethatformsacloudfor
useasinputtodispersionmodels,and
b.Dispersionmodeltocalculatetheconsequencesforatmosphericdispersionofthereleased
gas/liquid.
A4.2FlashandEvaporationModels
Thepurposeofflashandevaporationmodelistoestimatethetotalvapourorvapourratethat
formsacloud.Superheatedliquidstoredunderpressureatatemperatureaboveitsnormalboiling
point,willflashpartiallyorfullytovapourwhenreleasedtotheatmosphericpressure.Thevapour
producedmayentrainasignificantquantityofliquidsasdroplets.Theamountofvapourandliquid
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thatareproducedduringflashingofasuperheatedliquidcanbecalculatedfromthermodynamics
considerations.Asignificantfractionofliquidmayremainsuspendedasafineaerosol.
Themajoruseofflashandevaporationmodelsistoprovideaninitialpredictionofcloudmass
thesourcetermforfurtheranalysis.
A4.3DispersionModels
A4.3.1Neutral/PositivelyBuoyantPlumeandPuffModels
Neutralandpositivelybuoyantplumeorpuffmodelsareusedtopredictconcentrationand
timeprofilesofflammableortoxicmaterialsdownwindofasourcebasedontheconceptofGaussian
dispersion.Atmosphericdiffusionisarandommixingprocessdrivenbyturbulenceinthe
atmosphere.Gaussiandispersionmodelsareextensivelyusedinthepredictionofatmospheric
dispersionofpollutants.TheGaussianmodelsrepresenttherandomnatureofturbulence.Input
requirementsforGaussianplumeorpuffmodellingarestraightforward.
16
PasquillandSmithprovidedescriptionofplumeandpuffdischarges[seeForeword(b)]and,
thatwithariskanalysisorientationisgivenbyTNO.
Indispersionmodeltheaveragingtimefortheconcentrationprofileisimportantand
generallythepredictionrelateto10minaverages(equivalentto10minsamplingtimes).
A4.3.2DenseGasDispersionModels
Theimportanceofdensegasdispersionhasbecomerecognizedforsometimeandmanyfield
experimentshaveconfirmedthatthemechanismsofdensegasdispersiondiffermarkedlyfrom
neutrallybuoyantclouds.Twodistinctmodellingapproacheshavebeenattemptedfordensegas
dispersion:mathematicalandphysical.
Detaileddescriptionsofthemechanismsofdensegasdispersionandthespecific
implementationsforawidevarietyofmathematicalmodelsarenotgiveninthestandardbutone
maylookforintheavailableguide[seeForeword(b)].Themajorstrengthofmostofthedensegas
modelsistheirrigorousinclusionoftheimportantmechanismsofgravityslumping,airentrainment,
andheattransferprocesses.
A4.4FiresandExplosionsModels
A4.4.1VapourCloudExplosions(UVCE)andFlashFire
Whengaseousflammablematerialisreleasedavapourcloudformsandifitisignitedbeforeit
isdilutedbelowitslowerexplosivelimit,avapourcloudexplosionoraflashfirewilloccur.
Insignificantlevelofconfinementwillresultinflashfire.Thevapourcloudexplosionwillresultin
overpressures.
A4.4.2PhysicalExplosion
Whenavesselcontainingapressurizedgas/liquidruptures,theresultingstoredenergyis
released.ThisproducesaShockwaveandacceleratedvesselfragments.Ifthecontentsareflammable
thentheignitionofthereleasedgascouldresultinfireandexplosion.Themethodcalculates
overpressure.
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A4.4.3BLEVEandFireball
ABoilingLiquidExpandingVapourExplosion(BLEVE)occurswhenthereisasuddenlossof
containmentofapressurevesselcontainingasuperheatedliquidorliquifiedgas.Itissuddenrelease
oflargemassofpressurizedsuperheatedliquidtoatmosphere.Theprimarycausemaybeexternal
flameimpingingontheshellaboveliquidlevelweakeningthevesselandleadingtoshellrupture.
Calculationsaredonefordiameteranddurationoffireballandtheincidentthermalflux.
A4.4.4PoolFireandJetFire
Poolfiresandjetfiresarecommonfiretypesresultingfromfiresoverpoolsofliquidorfrom
pressurizedreleasesorgasand/orliquid.Theytendtobelocalisedineffectandaremainlyof
concerninestablishingpotentialfordominoeffectsandemployeesafety.Modelsareavailableto
calculatevariouscomponentsburningrate,poolsize,flameheight,flametiltanddrag,flame
surfaceemittedpower,atmospherictransmissivity,thermalflux,etc.
Injetfiremodellingthestepsfollowedforthethermaleffectsarecalculationoftheestimated
dischargerate,totalheatreleased,radiantfraction/sourceviewfraction,transmissivityandthermal
fluxandthermaleffects.
A5METHODSFORDETERMININGCONSEQUENCEEFFECTS
Methodsareavailabletoassesstheconsequencesoftheincidentoutcomes.Forassessingthe
effectsonhumanbeings,consequencesmaybeexpressedintermsofinjuriesandtheeffectson
equipment/propertyintermsofmonetaryloss.Theeffectoftheconsequencesforreleaseoftoxic
substancesand/orfirecanbecategorizedas:
a.Damagecausedbyheatradiationonmaterialandpeople,
b.Damagecausedbyexplosiononstructureandpeople,and
c.Damagecausedbytoxicexposure.
Theconsequencesofanincidentoutcomeareassessedinthedirecteffectmodel,which
predictstheeffectsonpeopleorstructuresbasedonpredeterminedcriteria.Themethod
increasinglyusedforprobabilityofpersonalinjuryordamageisgiveninProbitanalysis.
TheProbitisarandomvariablewithamean5andvariance1andtheprobability(range01)is
generallyreplacedinProbitworkbyapercentage(range0100)andthegeneralsimplifiedformof
Probitfunctionis:
Pr=a+bInV
WhereProbitPrisameasureofpercentageofvariableresource,whichsustainsinjuryor
damageandvariableVisameasureintensityofcausativefactorwhichharmsthevulnerable
resource.
ThecausativefactorV:
a.forfireisthermalintensityandtime,
b.forexplosionisoverpressure,and
c.fortoxicgasreleaseistoxicdose.
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Theconstantsaandbarecalculatedfromtheexperimentaldata,whicharealsoavailablein
methodsfordeterminationofpossibledamagetopeopleandobjectsresultingfromreleaseof
hazardousmaterials[seeForeword(f)].ThepercentageoffatalitywiththeProbitvalue(Pr)
calculated
17
fromtheequationcanbeobtainedusingthechartandtablegiveninthemethodsfor
determinationofpossibledamage[seeForeword(f)].
A5.1EffectofFire
Theeffectoffireonahumanbeingsisintheformofburns.Therearethreecategoriesof
burnssuchasfirstdegree,seconddegreeandthirddegreeburn.Durationofexposure,escape
time,clothingandotherenclosuresplayactiverolewhilecalculatingtheeffectoffire,however,the
primaryconsiderationsaredurationofexposureandthermalintensitylevel.
Theheatradiationlevelsofinterestare:
a.4kW/m2:Causespainifunabletoreachcoverwithin20s,
b.4.7kW/m2:Acceptedvaluetorepresentinjury,
c.10kW/m2:Seconddegreeburnafter25s,
d.12.5kW/m2:Minimumenergyrequiredformeltingofplastic,
e.25kW/m2:Minimumenergyrequiredtoignitewood,
f.37.5kW/m2:Sufficienttocausedamagetotheequipment,
g.125KJ/m2:causingfirstdegreeburn,
h.250KJ/m2:causingseconddegreeburn,and
i.375KJ/m2:causingthirddegreeburn.
ThethermaleffectcanbecalculatedwiththehelpofProbitequationforwhichconstantsa
andbareavailable.ThethermalintensityanddurationofexposuregivesthevalueofV.Thegeneral
equationfortheProbitfunctionis:
Pr=a+bIntI4/3,tisdurationofexposureandIisthermalintensity.
A5.2EffectofExplosion
Theeffectofoverpressureonhumanbeingsistwofold:
a.Directeffectofoverpressureonhumanorgans,and
b.Effectofdebrisfromstructuredamageaffectinghuman.
Directeffectofoverpressureonhumanorgan:Whenthepressurechangeissudden,a
pressuredifferenceariseswhichcanleadtodamageofsomeorgans.Extentofdamagevarieswith
theoverpressurealongwithfactorssuchaspositionoftheperson,protectioninsideashelter,body
weightaswellasdurationofoverpressure.Theorganspronetogetaffectedbyoverpressureareear
drumandlung.
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Effectofoverpressureonstructure/effectofdebrisfromstructuredamageaffectinghuman:
Theoverpressuredurationisimportantfordeterminingtheeffectsonstructures.Thepositive
pressurephasecanlastfor10to250milliseconds.Thesameoverpressurecanhavemarkedly
differenteffectdependingonduration.
Theexplosionoverpressuresofinterestare:
a.1.7bar:Burstingoflung,
b.0.3bar:Majordamagetoplantequipmentstructure,
c.0.2bar:Minordamagetosteelframes,
d.0.1bar:Repairabledamagetoplantequipmentandstructure,
e.0.07bar:Shatteringofglass,and
f.0.01bar:Crackinglass.
TheProbitequationcanbeappliedforcalculatingthepercentageofdamagetostructureor
humanbeings,theconstantsaandbbeingavailableforvarioustypesofstructuresandthecausative
factorVdependingonthepeakoverpressure,Ps.TheProbitequationfortheoverpressureis:
Pr=a+bIn(Ps)
A5.3ToxicEffect
Thecriticaltoxicityvalueswhichshouldbeconsideredforevaluatingeffectonhumansinthe
eventofreleaseofchemicalsare:
a.Permissibleexposurelimits.
b.Emergencyresponseplanningguidelines.
c.Lethaldoselevels.
A5.3.1ThresholdLimitValues(TLV)ShortTermExposureLimitValues(STEL)
Thesearethelimitsonexposureexcursionslastingupto15minandshouldnotbeusedto
evaluatethetoxicpotentialorexposurelastingupto30min.TLVSTELlimitsareusedinevolving
measurestoprotectworkersfromacuteeffectssuchasirritationandnarcosisresultingfrom
exposuretochemicals.UseofSTELmaybeconsideredifthestudyisbasedoninjury.
A5.3.2ImmediatelyDangeroustoLifeandDeath(IDLH)
Themaximumairborneconcentrationofasubstancetowhichaworkerisexposedforaslong
as30minandstillbeabletoescapewithoutlossoflifeorirreversibleorgansystemdamage.IDLH
valuesalsotakeintoconsiderationacutetoxicreaction,suchassevereeyeirritationthatcould
hinderescape.
A5.3.3EmergencyExposureGuidanceLevels(EEGL)
EEGLisdefinedasanamountofgas,vapourandaerosolthatisjudgedtobeacceptableand
thatwillallowexposedindividualstoperformspecifictaskduringemergencyconditionslastingfrom
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1to24h.
18
A5.3.4ShortTermPublicEmergencyGuidanceLevels(SPEGL)
Thesearedefinedastheacceptableconcentrationforexposuresofmembersofgeneralpublic.
SPEGLsaregenerallysetat1050percentofEEGL.
SubstancesforwhichIDLHvaluesareunavailableanestimatedlevelofconcerncanbe
estimatedformedianlethalconcentration(LC50 )ormedianlethaldose(LD50 )levelsreportedfor
mammalianspecies.TheLC50 andLD50 areconcentrationsorthedosethatkill50percentofthe
exposedlaboratoryanimalsincontrolledexperiments.Lowestreportedlethalconcentration(LCLO)
orlethaldoselevel(LDLO)canalsobeusedaslevelsofconcern.
Probitequationsestimatetheinjuryormortalityratewithinputsattwolevels:
a.Predictionsoftoxicgasconcentrationanddurationofexposure.
b.Toxiccriteriaforspecifichealtheffectsforparticulartoxicgas.
ThecausativefactorV,dependsontheabovetwofactors.Theconcentrationandexposure
timecanbeestimatedusingdispersionmodels:
Pr=a+bIn(Cntc )
where
C
concentrationinppmbyvolume,inppm
tc
exposuretimeinminand
characteristicconstantforthatchemical.
ANNEXB
FORMATFORRISKANALYSISREPORT
(Clause8)
B1GENERAL
a.Executivesummary,
b.Introduction,
c.Objectiveandscope,
d.Systemdescription,and
e.Methodologyadopted.
B2HAZARDIDENTIFICATION
a.HazardIdentificationmethodsusedandthebasisfortheselectionofthemethods,
b.Credibleaccidentsources/worstcasescenarios,
c.Sourcecharacteristics,and
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d.Methodologyforhazardidentification,namely,HAZOPandworksheetsforidentifiedunits.
B3CONSEQUENCEMODELLING
Resultinterpretationbasedonconsequencemodellingwithdamagecontoursclearlydrawnto
scaleonsite/plotplanindicatingthepopulationaffected.
B3.1AccidentFrequencyEstimation
a.Systemboundaries
b.Specificassumption,basicfrequencydatausedanditssourcesand
c.Calculatedfrequencyofoccurrenceoftheworstaccident.
B4DETERMINATIONOFPLANTRISK
Riskcriteria.
B5LIMITATIONS
Summaryofanalyticalmethod,itsassumptionsandlimitations.
B6RECOMMENDATIONS
19
ANNEXC
PASQUILLGIFFORDSTABILITYCLASSES
(Clause6.1.3)
C1
Insolationcategoryisdeterminedfromthetablebelow:
SurfaceWindSpeed,
m/s
Daytimeinsolation
Strong Moderate Slight
NightTimeConditions
Anytime
ThinOvercastof>4/8low
cloud
3/8
cloudiness
Heavy
overcast
<2
AB
23
AB
34
BC
46
CD
>6
NOTES
A.Extremelyunstableconditions.
B.Neutralconditions.
C.Moderatelyunstableconditions.
D.Slightlystableconditions.
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E.Slightlyunstableconditions.
F.Moderatelystableconditions.
ANNEXD
TERRAINCHARACTERISTICSPARAMETERS
(Clause6.1.3)
Terrain
Classification
TerrainDescription
SurfaceRoughnessZo
Meters
Highlyurban
Centresofcitieswithtallbuildings,veryhillyormountainousarea
Urbanarea
Centresoftowns,villages,fairlylevelwoodedcountry
Residentialarea Areawithdensebutlowbuildings,woodedarea,industrialsite
310
13
1
withoutlargeobstacles
Largerefineries Distillationcolumnsandallotherequipmentpieces
20
Smallrefineries Smallerequipment,overasmallerarea
0.5
Cultivatedland Openareawithgreatovergrowth,scatteredhouses
0.3
Flatland
Fewtrees,longgrass,fairlylevelgrassplains
0.1
Openwater
Largeexpansesofwater,desertflats
Sea
Calmopensea,snowcoveredflat,rollingland
0.001
0.0001
ANNEXE
RISKCRITERIAINSOMECOUNTRIES
(Clause7.5)
AuthorityandApplication
MaximumTolerableRisk(PerYear)
NegligibleRisk(PerYear)
VROM,TheNetherlands(New)
1.0E6
1.0E8
VROM,TheNetherlands(existing)
1.0E5
1.0E8
HSE,UK(existinghazardousindustry)
1.0E4
1.0E6
HSE,UK(Newnuclearpowerstation)
1.0E5
1.0E6
HSE,UK(Substancetransport)
1.0E4
1.0E6
31.0E6
31.0E7
1.0E5
Notused
HSE,UK(Newhousingnearplants)
HongKongGovernment(Newplants)
21
ANNEXF
FLOWCHARTFORCONSEQUENCEANALYSIS
(Clause6)
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22
ANNEXG
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ANNEXG
COMMITTEECOMPOSITION
(Foreword)
OccupationalSafetyandHealthandChemicalHazardsSectionalCommittee,CHD8
Organization
Representative(s)
NationalSafetyCouncil,NaviMumbai
ShriK.C.Gupta(Chairman)
ConfederationofIndianIndustries,NewDelhi
ShriA.K.Ghose
ShriAnikAjmera(Alternate)
IndianChemicalManufacturersAssociation,
ShriV.N.Das
Mumbai
ShriA.A.Panjwani(Alternate)
AirportAuthorityofIndia,NewDelhi
ShriA.N.Khera
ShriM.Durairajan(Alternate)
AtomicEnergyRegulatoryBoard,Mumbai
ShriP.K.Ghosh
BhabhaAtomicResearchCentre,Mumbai
DrB.N.Rathi
ShriS.Soundararajan(Alternate)
CentralBoilerBoard,NewDelhi
Representative
CentralLeatherResearchInstitute,Chennai
ShriG.Swaminathan
CentralMiningResearchInstitute,Dhanbad
ShriJ.K.Pandey
CentralWarehousingCorporation,NewDelhi
Representative
CenturyRayon,Thane
ShriH.G.Uttamchandani
ShriS.K.Mishra(Alternate)
ConsumerEducation&ResearchCentre,
DrC.J.Shishoo
Ahmedabad
ShriS.Yellore(Alternate)
DepartmentofExplosives,Nagpur
Representative
DepartmentofSpace(ISRO),Sriharikota
ShriP.N.Sankaran
ShriV.K.Srivastava(Alternate)
DepartmentofIndustrialPolicyandPromotion, DrD.R.Chawla
NewDelhi
DirectorateGeneralFactoryAdviceService&
DrA.K.Majumdar
LabourInstitute,Mumbai
ShriS.P.Rana(Alternate)
DirectorateGeneralofHealthServices,New
Representative
Delhi
DirectorateGeneralofMinesSafety,Dhanbad
Director
DeputyDirector(Alternate)
DirectorateofIndustrialSafetyandHealth,
ShriV.L.Joshi
Mumbai
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Organization
DirectorateofStandardization,Ministryof
Representative(s)
ShriP.S.Ahuja
Defence,NewDelhi
LtColTejinderSingh(Alternate)
EmployeesStateInsuranceCorporation,New
Representative
Delhi
23
HindustanAeronauticsLtd,Bangalore
ShriS.V.Suresh
HindustanLeverLtd,Mumbai
ShriB.B.Dave
ShriAdityaJhavar(Alternate)
IndianAssociationofOccupationalHealth,
Representative
Bangalore
IndianInstituteofChemicalTechnology,
ShriS.VenkateswaraRao
Hyderabad
IndianInstituteofSafetyandEnvironment,
DrM.Rajendran
Chennai
DrG.Venkatarathnam(Alternate)
IndianPetrochemicalCorporationLtd,
ShriP.Vijayraghavan
Vadodara
ShriM.R.Patel(Alternate)
IndianToxicologyResearchCentre,Lucknow
DrVirendraMishra
DrV.P.Sharma(Alternate)
MinistryofDefence(DGQA),Kanpur
ShriM.S.Sultania
ShriSujitGhosh(Alternate)
MinistryofDefence(R&D),Kanpur
DrA.K.Saxena
DrRajindraSingh(Alternate)
MinistryofEnvironment&Forest,NewDelhi
Representative
MinistryofHomeAffairs,NewDelhi
ShriOmPrakash
ShriD.K.Shami(Alternate)
NationalInstituteofOccupationalHealth,
DrH.R,Rajmohan
Ahmedabad
DrA.K.Mukherjee(Alternate)
ShriP.M.Rao
ShriD.Biswas(Alternate)
NOCIL,Mumbai
DrB.V.Bapat
ShriV.R.Narla(Alternate)
OfficeoftheDevelopmentCommissioner(SSI),
ShriMathuraPrasad
NewDelhi
ShrimatiSunitaKumar(Alternate)
OilIndustrySafetyDirectorate(Ministryof
ShriS.K.Chakrabarti
Petroleum&NaturalGas),Delhi
ShriV.K.Srivastava(Alternate)
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Organization
Representative(s)
OrdnanceFactoryBoard,Kolkata
DrD.S.S.Ganguly
ShriR.Srinivasan(Alternate)
SafetyAppliancesManufacturersAssociation,
ShriM.Kant
Mumbai
ShriKiritMaru(Alternate)
SIELChemicalComplex,NewDelhi
ShriRajeevMarwah
ShriNavdeepSinghBirdie(Alternate)
SouthernPetrochemicalIndustriesCorporation
ShriV.Jayaraman
Ltd,Chennai
ShriS.Muruganandam(Alternate)
SteelAuthorityofIndiaLtd,Ranchi
ShriV.K.Jain
TataAIGRiskManagementServicesLtd,
ShriUrmishD.Shah
Mumbai
BISDirectorateGeneral
DrU.C.Srivastava,ScientistF&Head(Chem)
[RepresentingDirectorGeneral(Exofficio)]
MemberSecretary
ShriV.K.Diundi
Director(CHD),BIS
24
ShriP.M.Rao(Convener)
SMIndiaLimited,Bangalore
ShriAbhijeetArunSaungikar
ShriVirenShah(Alternate)
IndianChemicalManufacturersAssociation,
DrM.S.Ray
Mumbai
DrS.H.Namdas(Alternate)
AirportAuthorityofIndia,NewDelhi
ShriH.S.Rawat
AtomicEnergyRegulatoryBoard,Mumbai
ShriV.V.Pande
BhabhaAtomicResearchCentre,Mumbai
DrD.K.Ghosh
ShriS.D.Barambe(Alternate)
CentralFood&TechnologicalResearchInstitute, Representative
Mysore
CentralMiningResearchInstitute(CSIR),
ShriJ.K.Pandey
Dhanbad
CentreforFire,Explosives&Environment
Representative
Safety,Delhi
DepartmentofDefenceProduction(DGQA),New ShriM.S.Sultania
Delhi
ShriB.Ghosh(Alternate)
DirectorateGeneralFactoryAdviceServices&
DrA.K.Majumdar
LabourInstitute,Mumbai
ShriS.P.Rana(Alternate)
IndianTelephoneIndustriesLtd,Bangalore
ShriP.Jayaprakash
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Organization
Representative(s)
ShriC.Mahalingam(Alternate)
IndustrialToxicologicalResearchCentre,
DrA.K.Srivastava
Lucknow
DrS.K.Rastogi(Alternate)
ISRO,Shriharikota
ShriP.S.Sastry
ShriK.Vishwanathan(Alternate)
JosephLeslie&Co,Mumbai
ShriVinodBamaniya
ShriSameerDange(Alternate)
JosephLeslieDragerManufacturingPvtLtd,
ShriCyrilPereira
NewDelhi
ShriHirendraChatterjee(Alternate)
NationalInstituteofOccupationalHealth,
DrH.R.Rajmohan
Ahmedabad
DrA.K.Mukerjee(Alternate)
OilIndustrySafetyDirectorate,NewDelhi
Representative
PNSafetechPrivateLimited,Lucknow
ShriRajeshNigam
ShriAnilKumarSrivastava(Alternate)
RelianceIndustriesLimited,Mumbai
ShriN.K.Valecha
ShriS.GPatel(Alternate)
SafetyAppliancesManufacturersAssociation,
ShriM.Kant
Mumbai
ShriKiritMaru(Alternate)
StandingFireAdvisoryCouncil,NewDelhi
ShriOmPrakash
ShriD.K.Shami(Alternate)
SteelAuthorityofIndia,Ranchi
ShriV.K.Jain
TheChiefControllerofExplosives,Nagpur
Representative
VishvesvaraEnterprises,NaviMumbai
ShriMaheshKudav
ShriRaviShinde(Alternate)
Voltech(India),Delhi
ShriPawanKumarPahuja
ShriNareshKumarPahuja(Alternate)
26
25
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