Accountable Officer; Custody and Control of Funds (Re Malversation)

Section 101. Accountable officers; bond requirement.

1. Every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or
custody of government funds or property shall be accountable therefor and for the
safekeeping thereof in conformity with law.
2. Every accountable officer shall be properly bonded in accordance with law.

An accountable officer under Article 217 is a public officer who, by reason of his
office is accountable for public funds or property. Sec. 101 (1) of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines (PD No. 1445) defines accountable officer to be
every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the
possession or custody of government funds or property and who shall be
accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law.
In the determination of who is an accountable officer, it is the nature of the
duties which he performs and not the nomenclature or the relative importance the
position held which is the controlling factor. Querijero v. People, G.R. No.
153483, February 14, 2003

Is petitioner Arriola, who signed as custodian in the seizure receipt for the
confiscated lumber an accountable officer with respect to its loss?
Chapter IV, I-E, (4) of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging states that:
In cases where the apprehension is made by the field DENR
officer, the forest products and the conveyance used shall be deposited to
the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED office, as the case may be, for
safekeeping, wherever it is most convenient. If the transfer of the seized
forest products to the above places is not immediately feasible, the same
shall be placed under the custody of any licensed sawmill operator or the
nearest local public official such as the Barangay Captain,
Municipal/City Mayor, Provincial Governor or the PC/INP; at the
discretion of the confiscating officer taking into account the safety of the
confiscated forest products x x x. In any case, the custody of the forest
products shall be duly acknowledged and receipted by the official taking
custody thereof.

In the case of United States v. Lafuente, (Arriola vs. Sandiganban, G.R. No.
165711, June 30, 2006), the accused was a Municipal Secretary and a member of
the auction committee. A public auction for the sale of fishery privileges was held
pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Law and a municipal ordinance. When
the auction was concluded, the bidders deposited the amount of their respective
bids with the accused. The latter embezzled the money for his personal use. It was
held that the accused is guilty of misappropriation of public funds. Although a
Municipal Secretarys duties do not normally include the receipt of public funds,
the accused in this case was nonetheless held accountable for the same because the
money was deposited with him under authority of law. The obligation of the
secretary was to safeguard the money for the Government.[21]

[G.R. Nos. 161784-86. April 26, 2005]

DINAH
C.
BARRIGA, petitioner,
SANDIGANBAYAN

vs.

THE

HONORABLE

We agree with the petitioners contention that under Section 474 of the Local
Government Code, she is not obliged to receive public money or property, nor is
she obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an accountable officer
within the context of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, under the said
article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual control of public funds
or property by reason of the duties of his office. Even then, it cannot thereby be
necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be convicted for
malversation under the Revised Penal Code. The name or relative importance of
the office or employment is not the controlling factor.[24] The nature of the duties of
the public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public
money for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor
which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public
officer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal
government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public
funds and misappropriates the same.

Falsification of Public Document (Art. 171)

Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for falsification of a public
document to be established, the following elements must concur:
1.
2.
3.

That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;

That he takes advantage of his official position;
That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following
acts:
a) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
b) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
c) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
d) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
e) Altering true dates;
f) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning;
g) Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a
copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original;
h) Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry or official book x x x (Andres S.
Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA
350, 358-359)

Use of Falsified Document; Presumption

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made
use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption
is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use
or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the
forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore,
had complicity in the forgery (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People vs. De Lara, 45
PMI. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28: People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338;

People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). In the absence of a satisfactory

explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or
uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs. Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969,
30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)

En Banc, NORMALLAH A. PACASUM vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 180314, April

16, 2009
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a person
had in his position a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is presumed to be the material author of
the falsification. He argues that the Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact that there
was no evidence to prove that petitioner made use of or uttered the Employees
Clearance, because there was no evidence that she submitted it -- if not, at least
caused it to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. To support such
claim, she said there were no "receipt marks" in the Employees Clearance to show
that the Office of the Regional Governor received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and distinct
from the "falsification" of a public document. The act of "using" falsified
documents is not necessarily included in the "falsification" of a public document.
Using falsified documents is punished under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the Employees Clearance was
consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the
falsification of a public document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents set
forth therein were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of another
was counterfeited. It is a settled rule that in the falsification of public or official
documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to
injure a third person for the reason that in the falsification of a public
document, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. Thus, the purpose for
which the falsification was made and whether the offender profited or hoped to
profit from such falsification are no longer material.

The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees
Clearance. The fact that the same was circulated to the different division heads for
their signatures is already considered use of falsified documents as contemplated in
Article 172. The lack of the stamp mark "Received" in the Employees Clearance
does not mean that said document was not received by the Office of the Regional
Governor. We find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio,
Executive Secretary of Office of the Regional Governor - ARMM, as contained in
the Employees Clearance, to be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to the
Office of the Regional Governor. It must be stressed that the Executive Secretary is
part of the Office of the Regional Governor.
Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating
the signature of Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge about the
falsification because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who
worked for her Employees Clearance.
Petitioners denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial,
when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and selfserving evidence, which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial is intrinsically
weak, being a negative and self-serving assertion.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie Cris
Batuampar, the person whom she instructed to work for her Employees Clearance.
Her failure to present this person in order to shed light on the matter was fatal to
her cause. In fact, we find that the defense never intended to present Marie Cris
Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial order, because the defense
never listed her as a witness. Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to help her
cause after she has been convicted is already too late in the day, and Ms.
Batuampars testimony, which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered newly
discovered evidence as to merit the granting of her motion for new trial and/or
reception of newly discovered evidence.
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the
signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We
have ruled that it is not strange to realize that in cases of forgery, the prosecution
would not always have the means for obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts
contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on circumstantial evidence consisting

of pieces of facts, which if woven together would produce a single network

establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. We totally agree
with the Sandiganbayan, which said:
While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself "actually" forged
the signature of Laura Pangilan in the Employees Clearance in question, the Court
nevertheless finds the following circumstances, obtaining in the records, to
establish/indicate that she was the one who committed the forgery or who asked
somebody else to forge or caused the forgery of the signature of Laura Pangilan in
her Employees Clearance, to wit
1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris Batuampar to work for her
Employees Clearance in compliance with the Memorandum of ARMM
Regional Governor Nur Misuari and that the forged signature of Laura
Pangilan was affixed on her clearance are strong evidence that the accused
herself either falsified the said signature or caused the same to be
falsified/imitated, and that possession by Maricris of the falsified clearance
of the accused is possession by the accused herself because the former was
only acting upon the instructions and in behalf of the latter;
2. that it was the accused who is required to accomplish and to submit her
Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the months of
August and September 2000 is sufficient and strong motive or reason for her
to commit the falsification by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan or
order someone else to forge it; and
3. that the accused was the only one who profited or benefited from the
falsification as she admitted that she was able to collect her salary for the
month of August 2000 after her falsified Employees Clearance was
submitted and approved by the ORG-ARMM and therefore, she alone could
have the motive for making such falsification.
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no reasonable and fair-minded man
would say that the accused a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM had no
knowledge of the falsification. It is an established rule, well-buttressed upon
reason, that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, when a person has in his
possession or control a falsified document and who makes use of the same, the
presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger or the one who

caused the forgery and, therefore, guilty of falsification. Thus, in People v.

Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court held that
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made
use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption
is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use
or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the
forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers. (U.S. v.
Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49 Phil.
28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took
advantage and profited in the use of the falsified Employees Clearance in question,
the presumption is inevitable that she is the material author of the falsification. And
despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut such presumption by failing to
show that it was another person who forged or falsified the signature of Laura
Pangilan
or
that
at
least
another
p
erson and not she alone, had the reason or motive to commit the forgery or
falsification, or was or could have been benefited by such falsification/forgery.
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of
petitioner, convince us to apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory e
xplanation, one who is found in possession of, and who has used, a forged
document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of falsification. The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence
to overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered,
will thereby prevail. A prima facie case of falsification having been established,
petitioner should have presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome such
burden. This, she failed to do.

Preliminary investigation. In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor

merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires

after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow
the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Hon. Sec of Justice Raul M. Gonzales, et
al., G.R. No. 180165, April 7, 2009.

Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019

Anent the issue on the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction committed by the court a quo when it took cognizance of Criminal
Case No. 24182, charging petitioner for "taking advantage of her official position
and the discharge of the functions as such," petitioner averred that the charge was
erroneous because borrowing of money is not a function of a Municipal Treasurer
under the Local Government Code. Petitioner asserts that the last sentence of Sec.
3(e) of RA 3019 cannot cover her.
We find such reasoning misplaced.
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.31

There is no doubt that petitioner, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer
discharging official functions when she misused such position to be able to take
out a loan from Moleta, who was misled into the belief that petitioner, as municipal
treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality.
In Montilla v. Hilario,32 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to
the office" as:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution
is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the
Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot
exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of
the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either
murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the
penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is
increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even
as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but
on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the
manner of the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information, but was proved with
certainty during trial that the manner by which petitioner perpetrated the crime
necessarily relates to her official function as a municipal treasurer. Petitioners
official function created in her favor an impression of authority to transact business
with Moleta involving government financial concerns. There is, therefore, a direct
relation between the commission of the crime and petitioners office the latter
being the very reason or consideration that led to the unwarranted benefit she
gained from Moleta, for which the latter suffered damages in the amount
of P320,000.00. It was just fortunate that Rusillon instructed the bank to stop
payment of the checks issued by petitioner, lest, the victim could have been the
Municipality of General Luna.
As regards the two other elements, the Court explained in Cabrera v.
Sandiganbayan33 that there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates
Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by

causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The accused may
be charged under either mode or under both. 34 This was reiterated in Quibal v.
Sandiganbayan,35 where the Court held that the use of the disjunctive term "or"
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
In this case, petitioner was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under
the alternative mode of "causing undue injury" to Moleta committed with evident
bad faith, for which she was correctly found guilty. "Evident bad faith" connotes
not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive
or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purposes,36 which manifested in petitioners actuations and representation.
The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner capitalized on her official function to
commit the crimes charged. Without her position, petitioner would not have
induced Moleta to part with her money. In the same vein, petitioner could not have
orchestrated a scheme of issuing postdated checks meddling with the
municipalitys coffers and defiling the mayors signature. As correctly found by the
court a quo:
x x x Likewise worthy of stress is [petitioners] failure to establish that the amount
she disbursed to Rusillon came from the money she loaned from Moleta. If indeed
the P268,800.00 advanced to Rusillon was charged against the loan, then, this
should have been reflected in the municipalitys books of accounts. The same is
true with theP320,000.00 and the P32,000.00 given to Moleta if the proceeds of the
loan really went to the municipalitys treasury. It is a standard accounting
procedure that every transaction must be properly entered in the books of accounts
of the municipality. A cash that comes in is a debit to the asset account and every
loan incurred is a credit to the liability account.37
Given the above disquisition, it becomes superfluous to dwell further on the issue
raised by petitioner that Sec. 3(e) applies only to officers and employees of offices
or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or other
concessions. Nonetheless, to finally settle the issue, the last sentence of the said
provision is not a restrictive requirement which limits the application or extent of
its coverage. This has long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan,38 where we categorically declared that a prosecution for violation
of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused

public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other

concessions." Quoted hereunder is an excerpt from Mejorada:39
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is
without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We
agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of
paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and
employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary
concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained
construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers
charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above pronouncement was reiterated in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, 40 where the
Court affirmed the Mejorada ruling that finally puts to rest any erroneous
interpretation of the last sentence of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law.
All the elements of the crimes as charged are present in the case at bar. All told,
this Court finds no justification to depart from the findings of the lower court.
Petitioner failed to present any cogent reason that would warrant a reversal of the
Decision assailed in this petition.

Under COA rules and regulations, the certification of the budget officer is a
mandatory requirement for the disbursement of public funds. (Section 57
of COA Circular No. 92-382 (July 3, 1992) which states that: The budget officer
shall certify to the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the
purpose by signing Certification No. 1 of the ROA)

The essential elements of Section 3(e) of R.A.No. 3019, as amended, are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.56
The Court finds it no longer necessary to discuss at length the first element as it is not disputed,
having been stipulated by the parties during pre-trial that during the material time and date alleged in
the Information, Palomo was the Executive Director, Umipig was the Administrative Officer, Mabitad
was Chief Accountant and Fontanilla-Payabyab was the Budget Officer of NMP.The third element of
undue injury to the Government is likewise a non-issue since it was likewise stipulated during pretrial that after payments totaling P8,910,260 were made to Solis for the subject lots, the latter
disappeared and the SPAs he showed to NMP were found to be fake. Clearly, this is a quantifiable
loss for the Government since NMP was not able to acquire title over the subject lots. Thus, the
controversy lies in the second element of the crime charged.
Palomoacted with evident bad faithand gross inexcusable negligence;Umipig and Mabitad
were grosslynegligent in the performance of their duties
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is,
through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence." There is
"manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one
side or person rather than another.57"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.58 "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purposes.59 "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons
may be affected.60 These three modes are distinct and different from each other. Proof of the
existence of any of these modes would suffice.61
56

Albert v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015, February 26, 2009, 580 SCRA 279, 289-290.

57

Id. at 290, citing Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 34, 72 (2003).

58

Id., citing Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 132 (2002).

59

Id., citing Air France v. Carrascoso, et al., 124 Phil. 722, 737 (1966).

60

Id.

61

Soriquez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 153526, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 222, 229.

Malversation

More importantly, in malversation of public funds, the prosecution is burdened to

prove beyond reasonable doubt, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the
public officer appropriated, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment
or negligence, permitted another person to take public property or public funds
under his custody. Absent such evidence, the public officer cannot be held
criminally liable for malversation. Mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of
conversion; neither is the mere failure of the public officer to turn over the funds at
any given time sufficient to make even the prima facie case. In fine, conversion
must be proved. (Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 178626, June 13, 2012)

The elements of Art. 217 are: (1) the offender is a public officer, (2) he or she has
custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (3)
the funds or property are public funds or property for which the offender is
accountable, and, most importantly, (4) the offender has appropriated, taken,
misappropriated or consented, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them. The last and most important element of malversation
was not proved in this case. There is no proof that Pescadera used the GSIS
contributions for his personal benefit. The prosecution merely relied on the
presumption of malversation which we have already disproved due to lack of
notice. Hence, the prosecution should have proven actual misappropriation by the
accused. Pescadera, however, emphasized that the GSIS premiums were applied in
the meantime to the salary differentials and loan obligations of Sulu, that is, the
GSIS premiums were appropriated to another public use. Thus, there was no
misappropriation of the public funds for his own benefit. And since the charge
lacks one element, we set aside the conviction of Pescadera. (Munib S. Estino and
Ernesto Pescadera vs. People of the Philippines/ Ernesto G. Pescadera vs. People
of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 163957-58/G.R. Nos. 164009-11, April 7, 2009)

While demand is not an element of the crime of malversation, it is a requisite for

the application of the presumption. Without this presumption, the accused may still
be proved guilty under Art. 217 based on direct evidence of malversation. In this
case, the prosecution failed to do so. There is no proof that Pescadera
misappropriated the amount for his personal use. (Munib S. Estino and Ernesto
Pescadera vs. People of the Philippines/ Ernesto G. Pescadera vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 163957-58/G.R. Nos. 164009-11, April 7, 2009)

Icdang vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.

No. 185960 Jan 25, 2012

In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is

sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds,
that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was
made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so.
Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly
necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the
shortage in his accounts.
In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption
in Article 217, supra, of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or
property to personal uses. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable.
Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can
nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal
use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is
effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence
of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the
presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never
deemed to have existed at all. In this case, however, petitioner failed to
overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt.

Conviction for Falsification alone in Malversation thru Falsification

Fifthly, as correctly pointed out by the assistant provincial fiscal in his motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, even assuming that the reimbursements
made by the accused Miranda had extinguished any criminal liability he might
have incurred for malversation, there is still the charge of falsification of public
documents embodied in the same information. It is clear enough that even if
Miranda is able to show that he committed no malversation, he may still be found
guilty of the lesser crime of falsification of public documents, which is necessarily
included in the complex crime of malversation through falsification of public
documents charged in this case. This is another salient reason why the dismissal of

the information against Miranda by the lower court before trial was improper and
premature. (En banc, People vs. Miranda, G.R. No. L-16122, May 30, 1961).