2

The Received View

fundamental theories

Abstract
All sciences used to take theories in Physics as their exemplar. Perhaps reductionism
and the received view in philosophy of science are to be blamed. Reductionism asserts
that all sciences ought to be based on, if not reduced to, physics. Recent developments
in physics forced physicists (theoretical and experimental) to believe that our best
fundamental theories are not able to explain some of the phenomena in the accepted
domains of these theories. Hence, the new theoretical representations in physics lack
being fundamental in the received view sense. This leaves us with the question: In
view of these developments in physics, what ought to be the status of other branches
of science? This paper tries to give an answer to this question.

Reductionism

2000 12

Unified theory of everything

1
2

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286
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Social Psychology

Cat

superconductivity

psychology

hydro
cell

ecology

dynamics

biology
optics
accoun
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Oxford
A 40

Fig. 2.1 B

Pessimistic meta- induction

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16

History

Mathematics
Superconductivity

Theory of Heat

quantum
Physics

Thermodynamics
Optics

Electronics

Physics
Fig 2.2

17