Javellana v.

Executive 50 SCRA 33
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana,
a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from
implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because
the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim
the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to
ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices
expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the
Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent
evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the
people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the
1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity
to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

Aquino vs. Enrile 39 SCRA 183

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered
the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge
against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile.
Enriles answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid
pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial
Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the
case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is
a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the
Presidents order.

PVTA v CIR 65 scra 416

Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
, petitioner, vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al.
, respondents. G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975
Facts:
Private respondents alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the
regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation
in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
denied the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. The respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents
for overtime services and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid.
There was a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the respondent Court. Petitioner
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration contends that it is beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the
operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
Held: Yes, the Petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. The Supreme
Court ruled that a reference to the enactments creating Petitioner Corporation
suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioners plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary
functions. Under Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives are: "(a) To promote the
effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those
engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and
maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured
products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient
to cover the cost of production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign
market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing
facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the
farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their investments; (d) To
prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of Virginia
tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the
tobacco industry."

Ruiz v Cabahug 54 O.G. 351

Amigable V ceunca 43 SCRA 360

USA v. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487

Facts:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent
alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the construction of wharves in said
base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance
was filed by him against the US.
Issue:
Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
Held:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another
state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles
of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them

between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. The
result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts. The
restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes

PNR v. IAC 217 SCRA 401

The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant PNR, coming from
San Fernando, La Union and bound to Manila. t collided at railroad crossing at
!aria !alumnae, "alum pit bulacan at around #$%& PM on 'august #&#()*. The
collision resulted to damage to plaint+ s bus and passengers, eighteen of -home died and % ere reported -founded. Plaintiff+ alleging that the proximate cause of the collision -as the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive/e engineer, 0onorio "irbado, in
operating its train in a bus1 intersection-without an1 bars, semaphores, signal lights, 2agman or
s-itch man. 3n the other hand, defendant endear/oared to show- that the proximate and immediate
cause of the collision -as the negligence of the bus dri/er, failure to ma4e a stop
before ascending the railtrac4, and failure to 5stop, loo4 6 listen7 a /iolation of sec *8 9d:of R'
*%#;. 9Land Transportation and Tra<c "ode:
Issue 1. ho between the petitioner and respondent "as negligent in the operation of their
vehi le 2. hether or not PNR is immune from suit
# . T h e r e i s n o a d m i s s i b l e e / i d e n c e t h a t t h e b u s
d r i / e r d i d n o t t a 4 e precautionar1 measure in tra/ersing the railtrac4.
"Ontributor1 negligence cannot be ascribed to the bus dri/er for he has ta4en necessar1
precautionsbefore passing o/er the rail-a1 trac4. The failure of PNR, to put a cross bar,signal
light, 2agman or s-itchman and semaphores is e/idence of negligenceon their part.8 . ! 1 t h e
doctrine of implied po-ers, the po-er to sue and be sued is implicitf r o m
the facult1 to transact pri/ate business. PNR is not
e x e r c i s i n g go/ernmental po-ers, in such it is not immune from suit.Ratio$ ' railroad compan1 has
been ad=udged guilt1 of negligence and ci/ill1 liable fordamages -hen it failed to
install semaphores, or -here it does not see to it that its2agman or s-itchman compl1 -ith
their duties faithfull1, to motorist in=ured b1 a
DOE v San diego 180 SCRA 533
Facts:
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitionerclaims that
he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, thepetitioner rejected his
application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela tocompel his admission to the
test.In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and
qualityeducation. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on
April16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he
squarelychallenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule.
Theadditional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
Issue:Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process and
equalprotection.
Held:No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission
tomedical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education

People v Rittes 194 SCRA 690

PEOPLE vs. RITTER
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991 P l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l e e
:
People of the Philippines
A c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t
:
Heinrich Stefan Ritter
FACTS
On or about October 10, 1986, accused Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside
his hotel room in Olongapo City. Inside the hotel room, the accused told them to take a bath.
When Rosario came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by the accused and
to join him in bed. At that time, Jessie was already asleep but Rosario touched him to call his
attention. When he looked, he saw the accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario
and that he was trying to penetrate but it would not fit. The following morning the accused left
after paying the children. Rosario then told Jessie that the accused inserted something in her
vagina. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was
already removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie claimed that on the
evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and
when he asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Seven months later,
Rosario was brought to the hospital with bloodied skirt, unconscious and foul smelling. After 6
days, Rosario got serious and was pronounced dead subsequent to her operation with a portion of
a sexual vibrator extracted from her vagina. A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against
Ritter. The Regional Trial Court of Olongapo rendered a decision declaring him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt citing the
rationale of Art 4 of the Revised Penal
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused
. The Supreme Court however, reversed the judgment of the lower court and acquitted Ritter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from
civil liability
RULING: It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is
that a person while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. While the guilt of the accused
in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 559

Ondoy v Ignacio 97 SCRA 611

Facts: Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio.
According to thechief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the
workforce. He was invited byfriends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found
dead. Therefore, Estrella wasasking for compensation from the death of her son while in the
respondent s employ. However, thestatement given by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored
by the hearing officer and thereforedismissed the claim for lack of merit. Even when a motion
for reconsideration was filed, this was alsodenied by the Secretary of Labor for the same reason,
that is, lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is social
justiceapplicable in this case?
Ruling: Yes.Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It
merely disregardedthe statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle
of social justice applied inthis case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court recognized
the right of the petitioner to theclaim of compensation because her son was shown to have died
while in the actual performance of hiswork. To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social
justice and protection to labor, The Courtquoted another case as between a laborer, usually
poor and unlettered, and the employer, who hasresources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to
demand from the latter the strictercompliance.
Radaza v singson 180 SCRA 496
Daza V. Singson
CaseDaza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments andwas listed as representative of the Liberal
Party. LDP was reorganizedand 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Becauseof this, the House of
Representatives revised its representation bywithdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to the newlyformedLDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in accordance toproportional representation.
Issues1.Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable politicalparty2.Whether it is
necessary for the party to be registered to beentitled to proportional representation in the CA
Held and Ratio Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of
Cunanan v. Tan.
Inthe said case, 25 Members of the Nacionalista Party reorganizedthemselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3
NacionalistaCongressmen, originally chosen, were deprived of their seats bycolleagues who joined the Allied
Majority. Carlos Cunanans
ad interim
appointment was rejected by the CA. Jorge Tan wasdesignated in his place. Cunanan contended the validity of
therejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority was merely atemporary combination; officially, they were still
part of theNacionalista Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA at that timewas not based on proportional
representation. The Court held thatmere shift of votes should not affect the organization of the CA, orelse, it would
forever be at the mercy of the House of Representatives. The petitioner argues that LDP is not a permanent
party and has notyet achieved stability. However, the LDP has already been inexistence for a year. They

command the biggest following. They notonly survived but prevailed.Regarding being a duly registered party, the
LDP was granted itsregistration as a political party by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering theargument of the petitioner
that registration is required
Adaza v Pacaa 935 SCRA 431
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,
1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial
governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province
in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3,
1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP
elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner
won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as
Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said
office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before
President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be
the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to
be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and
that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand,
a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be
an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the
province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can
assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the
governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any
other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of
prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law
practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for
the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP.
This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members
of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors,
mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate
of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably, respondent
falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of

candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.