#Bears *ASEAN DA* #Bears

UQ

Centrality High
US-ASEAN centrality better than everecon, security,
human rights
White House 16 (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
February 12, 2016, FACT SHEET: Unprecedented U.S.-ASEAN Relations, The
White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/12/factsheet-unprecedented-us-asean-relations) RR
Engagement with Southeast Asia, a strategically important, economically dynamic region at the heart
of the Asia-Pacific, is a central pillar of the U.S. Rebalance to Asia . Sitting astride some of the
worlds busiest shipping lanes, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is strategically
important to U.S. interests, and is a key partner in addressing regional and
global challenges. Collectively, the ten member states of ASEAN comprise the third-largest economy in Asia and
the seventh-largest in the world, with a combined GDP of $2.4 trillion. The ASEAN region is young and dynamic, with a

The United States

and ASEAN share a strong interest in building and sustaining a rules-based
order in the Asia-Pacific, one in which countries can pursue their objectives
peacefully and in accordance with international law and norms. Recognizing
ASEANs diplomatic, economic, and strategic importance to the U nited States, the
Obama Administration has invested heavily in its relationship with ASEAN. In 2009, his
first year in office, President Obama became the first U.S. president to meet all ten ASEAN leaders as a group; he has
met ASEAN leaders a total of six times. He has made seven separate visits to
the ASEAN region, more than twice the number of any previous U.S. president. In 2009, the
United States became a party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia -- the bedrock diplomatic document of ASEAN -- opening the door for
combined population of 632 million people--more than 65 percent of whom are below the age of 35.

the United States to join the East Asia Summit (EAS). President Obama participated in the EAS for the first time in 2011

With strong U.S. support, the EAS has become

the Asia-Pacifics premier leaders-level forum on political and security issues, helping to
advance a rules-based order and spur cooperation on pressing challenges, including maritime
security, countering violent extremism, and transnational cyber cooperation.
Secretary Kerry, Secretary of Commerce Pritzker, and other senior U.S. officials have also significantly
expanded their engagement with ASEAN leaders, both in regional fora and through visits to ASEAN
countries. In 2010, the United States became the first non-ASEAN country to establish a
dedicated diplomatic mission and appoint a resident Ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat
and has attended three of the four Summits since.

in Jakarta. The Obama Administration also launched the Lower Mekong Initiative in 2009, creating a partnership between
the United States and the countries of the Mekong sub-region -- Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam -- to
support sustainable and responsible development, and to narrow the development gap by building capacity in ASEANs

Obama Administration has provided $4 billion in

development assistance to ASEAN countries. This assistance directly supports our strategic Rebalance
to Asia by promoting regional stability and sustainable development . The United
States is strengthening people-to-people links across ASEAN . In December 2013, President
Obama launched the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI), a network of people-to-people ties
least developed members. Since 2010, the

that will benefit U.S.-ASEAN relations for generations to come. YSEALI now engages more than 60,000 young leaders

The initiative provides training,

fellowships, and funding opportunities, as well as a platform to address regional
issues, including entrepreneurship, environmental protection, and education . The United
(aged 18-35) from across ASEAN and the United States.

States is also working with ASEAN to strengthen womens leadership in the region by supporting emerging women leaders
in the public and private sectors. In 2012, the United States launched the Fulbright U.S.-ASEAN Visiting Scholar Initiative,

bringing academics from ASEAN countries to study in the United States, which adds to the more than 700 U.S. Fulbright
scholarships awarded to ASEAN members annually. In 2014, the United States and ASEAN launched the Science and
Technology Fellows Program, which connects young scientists in ASEAN with opportunities to solve real world challenges,
like biodiversity, climate change, and alternative fuels. Today, three million Americans visit the ASEAN region annually and

economic ties are

strong, and growing stronger. ASEAN countries are collectively the United States
fourth-largest trading partner, with GDP growth that has exceeded the global average every year for the
past 15 years. Trade in goods expanded 5 percent in 2015 and now tops $226 billion. During the Obama
Administration, trade in goods with ASEAN countries has expanded by 55
percent. More than 500,000 American jobs are now supported by trade in goods and services with ASEAN. U.S.
visitors from ASEAN countries spend over $4 billion in the United States each year. Our

companies have been the leading source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in ASEAN. With a stock of over $226 billion,

U.S. FDI

has nearly doubled since 2008. FDI from ASEAN countries in the United States was
Four ASEAN countries -- Brunei,
Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam -- are part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). We also have Trade and
in ASEAN

$24.2 billion in 2014. We have expanded our trade ties with the region.

Investment Framework Agreements or other formal trade dialogues with nine of the ten ASEAN countries and separately

These agreements and dialogues provide a mechanism to

address trade and investment issues and deepen our economic ties . The United
with ASEAN as an institution.

States collaborated with ASEAN countries to create the ASEAN Single Window, which facilitates customs processing and

We have strengthened defense ties

throughout the ASEAN region. Under the Obama Administration, we have significantly expanded our
reinforces an efficient regional trade environment.

defense cooperation with ASEAN countries. Since 2010, the Secretary of Defense has attended every ASEAN Defense

the United States

became the first country to establish a dedicated Military Advisor/Liaison Officer
at the U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta. The Secretary of Defense hosted his ASEAN counterparts in the
Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), an important forum for advancing security cooperation. In 2011,

United States for the first time for the U.S.-ASEAN Defense Forum in Hawaii in 2014 to discuss important strategic issues.
In 2015, the United States announced a new Technical Advisor to ASEAN to support increased information-sharing on

ASEAN members are important partners in global security

efforts, including the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL (Malaysia, Singapore) and
counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand). We are partnering to address a growing
number of shared global challenges. The United States and ASEAN pledged more than a year ago to
achieve a new global climate change agreement, which we did with the rest of the world in Paris
last December. The United States and ASEAN cooperate closely to create a low-carbon economic
growth trajectory and build more climate resilient societies . U.S. assistance for
climate change adaptation in Cambodia and the Philippines has strengthened the capacity of local
authorities to mitigate the impacts of destabilizing disasters. In Indonesia, the Philippines, and
transregional threats.

Vietnam, U.S. climate change mitigation programs are promoting environmentally sustainable development strategies.
The United States works with ASEAN institutions, like the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance, to
improve disaster response coordination in support of the One ASEAN, One Response initiative. The ASEAN region has
been at peace for 40 years, and ASEAN plays an active and positive role in the region and in the world. ASEAN countries
collectively provide 4,866 personnel to U.N. peacekeeping efforts. Fifteen years ago, many feared that Southeast Asia
would be the second front in the fight against terror. Instead, Southeast Asian nations have made major strides in
dealing with terrorism, though it remains a threat as elsewhere. We are committed to working together with ASEAN to
implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda around the world and in
the region. Our economic development and governance programs in countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and
Indonesia have helped to generate jobs, increase incomes, and create a more reliable regulatory environment. The U.S. is
also partnering with ASEAN to advance the Global Health Security Agenda. By accelerating capacity to prevent, detect,
and rapidly respond to infectious disease threats, we are saving lives and advancing peace and security. Our investments
in health and education in seven ASEAN countries are increasing prospects for expanded and more inclusive economic
growth. The United States will continue to partner with ASEAN countries like the Philippines and Indonesia that are
promoting good governance and transparency across the region, including through the Open Government Partnership. Our
support for democracy programs in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Burma are building institutions that foster rules-based

ASEANs leadership is central to building and

sustaining a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific. Under the Obama Administration,
the United States has strongly backed ASEANs central role at the heart
of the evolving institutional architecture of the Asia-Pacific region,
as demonstrated by our commitment to institutions like the EAS and
order and respect for human rights.

ADMM+. ASEANs leadership of regional institutions is founded on respect for

international law and norms and peaceful resolution of disputes , principles the United
States shares. In 2015, ASEAN formally launched the ASEAN Community to mark nearly 50 years of integration efforts.

The United States strongly supports ASEANs effort to realize a rules-based

Community that serves the people of ASEAN and ensures human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including by helping ASEAN integrate
international human rights standards into legislative and judicial
processes. The ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, endorsed in
November 2015, is a landmark achievement and established a framework to effectively address human trafficking and

The United States will continue to support

ASEANs leadership in ensuring full implementation of the Convention. The United States and
ASEAN are taking their relationship to a new level. In November 2015, the leaders of the
United States and ASEAN formally elevated their relationship to a strategic
partnership. The Sunnylands Summit -- the first U.S.-ASEAN standalone Summit in the United States and the first
Summit for the ASEAN Community -- marks a new milestone in our cooperation. The
U.S.-ASEAN partnership has been important in addressing shared
challenges on a diverse range of issues -- from combatting terrorism
and pandemic disease, to upholding international law and standards
in the South China Sea and in cyberspace, to taking meaningful
action on climate change, inclusive economic growth, and
trafficking-in-persons. The United States is firmly committed to the
Asia-Pacific and to ASEAN as an essential pillar of the region.
ensure protection of people throughout the region.

Centrality high now

East Asia Forum 2/15 (East Asia Forum is a news source, Feb 15, 2016,
East Asia Forum, United States goes acourting ASEAN,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/02/15/united-states-goes-acourtingasean/)
President Barack Obama is hosting leaders of 10 Southeast Asian
countries in Sunnylands in California this week in a bold move to deepen
and broaden US engagement with ASEAN. This is a positive development
but it also imposes risks that, in the end, will be up to ASEAN to manag e. Other Asia Pacific
countries have regular meetings with ASEAN leaders. The United States has come late in
acknowledging the geo-strategic significance of the organisation .
Southeast Asian leaders have already had 18 summits with China and 17 with Japan. The Sunnylands
Summit is a continuation of the US rebalance to Asia which started in 2009. USASEAN summits have been

the United States ratified

the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and appointed an ambassador to
ASEAN the first non-ASEAN country to do so. The ASEAN group is the
fourth largest trading partner of the United States and American
companies are the largest single source of foreign direct investment in the
region. In fact, US companies have invested more in Southeast Asia than they have in Japan, China and
India combined. The USASEAN relationship was elevated to a strategic
partnership in Kuala Lumpur in November 2015 and a Plan of Action is being worked
out for engagement over the next five years. The agenda for Sunnylands is to
strengthen economic, political, security and people-to-people ties . But the
held on the sidelines of East Asia Summit meetings since 2013 after

meeting comes at a time when ASEAN is at sixes and sevens and has the potential to undermine regional
coherence unless the ASEAN group is clear about what it wants from its relationship with the United States.

ASEAN is a central anchor in Asias geostrategic order. Against how some realists called the odds, ASEAN has not only
survived but has also been a useful fulcrum in managing relations
among the major regional powers. Driven to unity and cooperation in its
relations with large neighbouring countries, ASEAN has been larger than the
sum of its parts. ASEANs approach to international diplomacy carries weight
despite the contradictions in coordination and coherence across a vastly
diverse group of nations. ASEAN, in the face of Chinas rise and its competitive rivalry with the
United States, now seems more important than ever. Maintaining ASEAN centrality will
depend on progress with its own economic integration . The ASEAN Economic
This raises some big questions.

Community (AEC) came into force at the beginning of this year. It is an ambitious project to move ASEAN

The United States, China, Japan, Australia

and others in the region have a deep intersection of interests in a strong
ASEAN. Making the AEC work is now essential to that. The Regional Comprehensive Economic
towards a single market and production base.

Partnership (RCEP) is being negotiated between ASEAN and its six East Asian free trade agreement
partners China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. RCEP is an ASEAN-led agreement
that, if successfully negotiated, will entrench ASEAN centrality. At best it can reinforce and extend the AEC
so it is of vital importance to conclude an ambitious agreement that ultimately matches or betters the
ambition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). High on the US agenda in Sunnylands will be a strategy for
dealing with the maritime territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea and getting more countries
lined up to sign on to the recently concluded TPP. ASEAN cannot approach the TPP with a common position
any time soon. Four ASEAN members Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam are members of the
TPP and Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have expressed interest in joining. It is unrealistic to
expect that there can be movement towards their membership for half a decade or more. That leaves the
three least developed countries, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, still at the starting blocks given the high
hurdles to entry and also because they are not members of APEC a requirement under the current TPP
arrangement. Meanwhile ASEANs engagement in the East Asian economy is the main game. The TPP is
yet to be ratified by its 12 members which include Japan, Australia and the United States, but not China
or India and will not come into force until at least the beginning of 2018. It is very unclear how much
longer after that new members will have to wait before they can expect to join. And even when they are
eligible, they will have to negotiate entry separately through US Congress. This could be a very divisive
process for the ASEAN group. Former Indonesian trade minister, Mari Pangestu argues in this weeks lead
that the discussion around the TPP this week should not be about urging ASEAN members to join the TPP.
Instead, ASEAN should address the potential diversion of trade and investment away from those ASEAN
members not in the TPP. This is especially important for the least developed ASEAN countries, such as
Cambodia, which are set to lose the most. The

Summit should consider other initiatives

that will help to secure ASEAN centrality and provide some transition flexibilities for
countries choosing to join the TPP, she says. If individual countries chase entry to the TPP there is a risk
that the focus in ASEAN will shift away from the AEC and ASEANs core agenda in East Asia through RCEP.
Dealing with ASEAN countries bilaterally in this manner is precisely what the United States opposes China
doing on territorial issues in the South China Sea. And yet, ironically, the conduct of its economic relations
with the ASEAN economies embeds this strategic error. In the economic and security spheres, ASEAN
needs a common position that embodies the interests of all ASEAN members. The Philippines, Vietnam and
Brunei have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. Peaceful resolution of these disputes

The
United States and ASEAN have similar positions on these issues but, as
Pangestu suggests, it would be unwise of the United States to wrongfoot ASEAN efforts to secure agreement on its code of conduct in the South
China Sea. Leadership and neutrality from the largest ASEAN country,
Indonesia which is not a claimant can help achieve a code of conduct
that is being negotiated in an ASEAN-led regional forum, says Pangestu. That
would seem to be a more likely way forward towards a peaceful resolution
than a US-led response, especially since the United States is not yet signed up to the United
and counterbalancing Chinas assertiveness will be the other major agenda item in Sunnylands.

ASEAN will need American

backing but it is with ASEAN that the diplomatic initiative needs to
remain. ASEAN needs to balance the United States and China . China is ASEANs
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Of course,

most important economic partner. Asian countries may support America against China to avoid Chinese

They are too polite to say that

out loud, but if President Obama listens carefully to his guests that is what
he will learn. Lets hope that ASEAN leaders speak up, and also hope that the
importance of ASEAN centrality to the region is not accidentally overlooked in
the pursuit of other objectives.
hegemony, says Hugh White, but not to preserve US primacy.

ASEAN centrality isnt key to credibility Members want U.S. support

Prakash 12

(Anita Prakash is Director of Policy Relations at the Economic Research Institute for
AESAN and East Asia, Will the US commit long term to the East Asia Summit?,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/01/17/will-the-us-commit-long-term-to-the-east-asia-summit/) RR
The US has numerous close allies in the Asia Pacific region, and shares good relations with many others.
Despite these traditional relations, the US decision to become a member of the EAS was big news. This
was the first time the US had joined a multilateral platform that consists of countries which are uniquely
East Asian. And though the US remains a member of APEC, some ASEAN countries are not members of
this organisation, meaning the US presence in Honolulu had little bearing on a few ASEAN countries.

The overall mood of the EAS

was one of regional cooperation, with an overwhelmingly economics-focused
agenda even if there were underlying frictions over the mode and membership of this cooperation.
Before the sixth EAS, the summit was largely driven by ASEAN.

And while the EAS provided a forum for broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest
and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity [in East Asia], it was only
during the last EAS that the issue of maintaining peace and enhancing security cooperation in the region
was given real attention. The adoption of the Bali Principles at this summit also helped ensure the equal
status of all member countries in all matters of strategic importance and spelt out the overarching
importance of relevant international laws, especially those related to maritime matters. This was a positive
move for countries previously concerned by a perceived flux between the ideal of ASEAN centrality and the

while the US influence cannot be

underestimated in this new development, it must be recognised that most
ASEAN member countries were more than ready to welcome the US and Russia,
as they realised that no amount of emphasising ASEAN centrality could make
a dent in Chinas growing influence both inside and outside the summit. The 19th ASEAN
Summit saw many leaders requesting the EAS to focus on strategic and
maritime cooperation in the region. Clearly, this appeal was aimed at the
US attendance, and the EAS Chairs Statement also shows that the participation
of the US led members to agree on the supremacy of principles and
norms of international law. The emphasis on equal roles for all members and the
supremacy of international law has been the single most important
achievement of the sixth EAS, and it would not have been possible without the
anchorage and support provided by the US. Bali equally saw EAS members committing to positive
reality of Chinas weight in the forum. But

multilateralism in the region, and the US can help ensure the sustainability of this multilateralism by
preventing the balance of power from tilting to any one side. But the success of Bali raises an important
question: is the US willing to make this a long-term commitment? Washington will
have to answer this question with unambiguous and concerted action. Its participation at the leadership
level is an absolute must; attendance at the 2012 summit and its related meetings in Cambodia will

it is imperative that the

US leadership attend the summit. At the very least, the US will have to bear in
mind the ASEAN culture, whereby high-level representation at the summit is both desired and
expected of all countries, including the US. In terms of potential contributions, the lack of
perhaps provide the first test. Despite being an election year in the US,

institutional support is one significant shortcoming in the EAS which may be

of immediate interest to the US. So far, ASEAN members determine the EAS agenda and the
admission of new members. The ASEAN Secretariat also provides support to the summit, but is otherwise
beset by ASEANs day-to-day business, and is currently gearing up preparations for the ASEAN Economic
Community. Non-ASEAN members argue that they should be able to set and contribute to the EAS agenda,
and the summits expected outcomes have not received adequate monitoring in the past few years. The
US may consider strengthening the EAS institutional support by establishing a lean and effective EAS

The US presence in the

EAS could well be a positive for both the US and other member countries. As
the gravity of the world economy shifts toward East Asia, it would be
worthwhile for the US to remain engaged with this region. The US will also
bring with itself the equilibrium needed in the region . In this way, the newly reinvigorated
Secretariat, which monitors the summits outcomes throughout the year.

EAS may turn out to be a win-win for all members and an important contributor to regional cooperation in
its own right.

ASEAN centrality now EAS forums prove

Ho 12 (Benjamin Ho Tze Ern is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies, S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, ASEAN centrality: a year of
big power transitions, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/06/asean-centrality-a-year-of-big-powertransitions/) RR

The need to straddle both Washingtons and Beijings interests is not lost on
ASEAN. While visiting Washington earlier this February, Singapores foreign minister, K. Shanmugam,
suggested that the US needed to avoid anti-Chinese rhetoric in its domestic debates. Ambassador-at-large
Professor Tommy Koh also explained the ASEAN strategy in a recent interview as [bringing] the major
powers (particularly the US and China) together and [embedding] them in a cooperative framework
thereby [reducing] the deficit of trust. With the newly revamped East Asia Summit (EAS) in the regional

scholars have described the need for ASEAN to lead the EAS in
such a way as to make it acceptable to Beijing as well as relevant to
Washington. One approach currently being pursued is the stress on ASEAN centrality
limelight of late, some

the notion of an ASEAN-led regional architecture in which the regions relations with the wider world are

the usefulness of
this strategy has been demonstrated at the EAS, a forum whose
agenda and membership are determined solely by ASEAN members.
The inclusion of the US and Russia in the meeting last year suggests
that greater attention is now being accorded to the ASEAN political
theatre. Last years ASEAN Regional Forum also saw participating countries discuss a wide range of
conducted with the interests of the ASEAN community in mind. Over the years,

issues from territorial disputes in the South China Sea to North Koreas nuclear weapons program. Indeed,
the forum found considerable traction among top global leaders, as seen by the attendance of both Hillary

there is a danger of
overstretching the usefulness and effectiveness of such an approach , especially
if ASEAN countries start to adopt an inward-looking, it-is-all-about-ASEAN
mentality. Paradoxically, ASEANs ascension to global prominence came about as a
result of member states willingness to open up to the wider global community
of nations. In other words, ASEAN centrality was made possible because
individual ASEAN countries chose to align their fortunes with the
rest of the world; this opening up is the main driver of the ASEAN communitys collective success.
Clinton and Chinas foreign minister, Yang Jiechi. Nevertheless,

In light of the increasingly complex and multifaceted nature of global challenges, the tendency and
temptation for ASEAN to look inwards and close in on itself will grow. Anxieties over big-power relations
and the uncertainties of how these interactions will play out could lead ASEAN member states to disengage
from global challenges and develop parochial and isolationist tendencies instead. The Bali Concord III,
signed in November 2011 by ASEAN leaders, must not be used to justify an overly ASEAN-centric view of
the world. Such an outcome would paralyse a region whose very growth was founded upon the diverse and
dynamic relationships its member states have with the wider world. Already the first two months of 2012

have witnessed the emergence of several political narratives that could define global matters for the rest
of the year. ASEAN will inevitably be drawn into the picture ; its ability to maintain global
engagement while keeping its own house in order will be a critical test of its readiness and relevance
as a regional stakeholder.

Credibility High
Perception of credibility highcreation of human rights
framework
Poole 16 (Avery Poole, Lecturer in International Relations at The University
of Melbourne, Jun 28, 2016, The World is Outraged: Legitimacy in the
Making of the ASEAN Human Rights Body," R2P Live, http://r2plive.org/theworld-is-outraged-legitimacy-in-the-making-of-the-asean-human-rights-body/)
NV
Human Rights in the Charter and External Regional Legitimacy Concerns regarding ERL were
important in the decision to establish an ASEAN human rights body. During the drafting process,

states publicly linked the need for a human rights

body to ASEANs credibility and international standing , thus making a direct
representatives of several

claim about ERL. For example, in March 2007, then Thai Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram stated that
the foreign ministers had agreed in principle that an establishment of the regional human rights

failing to address human rights in the

would impact ASEANs credibility.57 Similarly, a Malaysian analyst argued that without
references to human rights in the Charter, other countries will say ASEAN is rubbish .53 A
mechanism will be reflected in the Charter because
Charter

former ASEAN official referred to credibility in regard to the mandate of the human rights body: A key

Myanmar and
Vietnam agreed on this. To be credible, we must go beyond this .59 These
statements link the choice to create a human rights body to ASEANs
legitimacy as a regional actor. In particular, the inclusion of references to human rights in
the Charter was motivated by criticisms of Myanmar from outside the region . The
history of repression, political violence and crackdown s on demonstrations has long
drawn international attention to Myanmar, and ASEAN has (particularly before Myanmar
introduced political reforms in 2011) been perceived as unable or unwilling to pressure the
regime to change. The regimes violent reaction to protests led by Buddhist monks in September
consideration is that it cannot be a body that just sits there and listens. Even

2007 highlighted, for the HLTF and ASEAN leaders, the ramifications for ASEANs image and reputation of
Myanmars continued membership, and the need to include a human rights mechanism in the Charter.
Various governments (e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom and France) and organizations (the EU,
UN, G8, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group) condemned the crackdown.60 In November

the US Senate voted unanimously to urge ASEAN to suspend Myanmar until the
Human Rights Watch sent an open
letter to then ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong, arguing that the events in Myanmar show the
need for a strong Charter to deal with grave human rights violations through a n
effective regional human rights mechanism in ASEAN.62 Ong acknowledged that The world
2007,

regime shows respect for human rights.61 In the same month,

is outraged after the shooting of monks by soldiers.63 Officials from member states also publicly
recognized the impact of the situation on ASEANs reputation. For example, Marty Natalegawa, then
Indonesias Permanent Representative to the UN (and later its Foreign Minister from 2009 to 2014), told
the UN Security Councilin October 2007 that, in regard to Myanmar, the

tragic events in the

country do have serious implications for the credibility and
reputation of ASEAN.64 Similarly, Alberto Romulo, then Foreign Secretary of the
Philippines, said in July 2007 that his government saw the human rights body as
necessary to give ASEAN more credibility in the international community .65
He argued that the world is looking to [Myanmar] to live up to its promises, and to ASEAN to encourage
progressive development in our region, which must entail improvements in both human security and
freedom.66 Ong stated in July 2006 that ASEAN

is concerned about the impact of

this [Myanmar] issue on our credibility and standing, because the

world seems to think that ASEAN should be the one tackling this
issue and bring about some positive outcome.67 These officials
made a direct connection between human rights in Myanmar and
member states perceptions of ERL. As a Malaysian academic and human rights activist
pointed out, ASEAN leaders probably wish the situation in Myanmar wasnt so because it attracts so much
international attention to ASEAN.63 This attention came at a critical time: shortly before the Charter was
due to be signed by member states. The agreement by consensus to create an ASEAN human rights body,
despite earlier objections from some member states, was in part a response to this criticism from outside
the region. Hiro Katsumata argues that the human rights body was created for the
international audience, to show [ASEAN] is doing something.69 This implies that there was an

to
signal that ASEAN could address human rights concerns in the region . Thus,
instrumental dimension to the agreement that it was both an appropriate entity and a strategy

ASEAN sought to enhance ERL. Some scholars, however, have adopted a different perspective. For
example, Stephen McCarthy argues that through international pressure exerted over Burma democracy
and human rights have been forced onto ASEANs political agenda.70 Certainly Myanmars membership
had heightened the impetus for paying attention to these issues, but it is an overstatement to suggest that
member states were forced to do so. Part of ASEANs raison dtre as an intergovernmental organization
is regional resilience in the face of external pressure.71

Links

Bilateral Engagement
A balanced approach like the plan undermines ASEAN
centrality which hurts U.S. credibility
Webster 16 (Graham, fellow @ East West Inst., 2/16, Will ASEAN
Remain Central to U.S. Foreign Policy?,
https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/will-asean-remain-central-us-foreign-policy)

When U.S. President Barack Obama hosts leaders from the 10

countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Monday
and Tuesday, he will symbolically reinforce the concept of ASEAN
centralitytraditionally the idea that the groups diverse
states should economically integrate and gradually develop a
collective voice in the world. But other kinds of centrality will also be
apparent as observers and officials confront regional security issues in which
two of ASEANs strongest suitors, the United States and China, are on
opposing sides. U.S. officials have, with some legitimacy, sought to
deemphasize the U.S.China narrative in U.S. relations with ASEAN. Speaking
Thursday at the Center for American Progress, Deputy National Security
Adviser Ben Rhodes described an agenda emphasizing economic growth and
innovation and a variety of security challenges, including counterterrorism
and disaster response. Rhodes also described the Obama administrations
strategy as using ASEAN as a huba platform to build out a broader series
of engagements, and that ultimately is what the East Asian Summit became.
That East Asia Summitwhich now includes the ASEAN 10, plus Australia,
China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States
supports another notion of ASEAN centrality, in which regular ASEAN
meetings become occasions for even broader summits at the same time.
Obama became the first U.S. president to attend the East Asia Summit in
2011, on the same trip during which he announced a greater emphasis on the
Asia-Pacific. The U.S. engagement with ASEAN as a group is, on its own,
broad and evolving. But any time the U.S. media see East Asia on the
agenda, the China story of the day comes to mind. In a briefing for reporters,
when the first questioner raised ASEAN countries diverse relationships with
China, both the chief White House Asia adviser and the top U.S. diplomat for
the region said the summit is not about China. Clearly, thats not entirely
true. Drawn out by a question on the South China Sea, Assistant Secretary of
State Daniel Russel described the present summit, which will last a full day
and does not come with the usual structured agenda, as a unique
opportunity: What the leaders can do that they often are unable to do, partly
due to the constraints of time, is to delve a little more deeply into what they
see as the realm of the possible in terms of lowering tensions in the South
China Sea and setting up a dynamic that can build on, for example, the
decision of the tribunal in the Hague. Here, Russel is referring to the legal
case brought by the Philippines under the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) that challenges Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Though

the arbitral tribunal found that it has jurisdiction to decide a number of the
questions raised by the Philippines, the Chinese government has declared the
proceedings illegitimate, called the tribunals decision on jurisdiction null
and void, and refused to participate in the process. It is entirely reasonable
for regional governments to discuss what might happen after the tribunal
releases its decision, but doing so is surely, at least partly, about China.
The reality is that ASEAN is a unique institution that plays a central role in
convening regional governments, coordinating their efforts, and confronting
challenges. And in East Asia, if not everywhere in the world, China is involved
in opportunities, challenges, initiatives, and disputes. The scale of Chinese
economic, security, and diplomatic efforts is one reason ASEAN has gained
such prominence. Holding this months summit in California at Sunnylands,
where Obama hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping for their first major
meeting in 2013, sends an unmistakable signal that the Obama
administration places an emphasis on strong independent ties with ASEAN as
a group. Administration officials in briefings said part of the intention is

to cement the U.S.ASEAN relationship so that the next president can

build on the Obama teams efforts. That seems true, but this kind of
diplomatic courtship also raises expectations of a continued U.S.
commitment. From the current administrations perspective, this move
can help to lock in deeper engagement. For the next president, raised
expectations would make a shift of priorities away from ASEAN more
costly in terms of U.S. credibility.

ASEAN relations are central now, but Southeast Asia is

sensitive to shifts in U.S. policy The plan kills credibility
Wickett & Webb 16 (Xenia, fellows @ Chatham House, 2/17, Obamas Asia
Approach is Caught in a Sunnylands Triangle,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/obama-s-asia-approach-caughtsunnylands-triangle#sthash.aedhEZOa.dpuf)

However, while much of the media attention is focusing on China, Sunnylands

is as much an effort to underline the importance of the US-ASEAN relationship
in its own right. There may be ample reasons to be sceptical of ASEANs
organizational viability; it is yet to establish itself as a credible security actor,
capable of recognizing a common interest and actively contributing to the
regions security architecture. Nonetheless, ASEANs 632 million people and
combined GDP of $2.4 trillion have earned it a central role in Washingtons
rebalance to Asia. In the context of promoting a broader Asia policy, President
Obama has continuously offered US support for institution and capacitybuilding around ASEAN. But since the announcement of the US rebalance

to Asia, many in the region have wondered whether the pendulum

might swing back, essentially questioning Washingtons reliability as an
ally. In spending two days with ASEAN, Obama is trying to allay such
concerns. The parties will be emphasizing common interests,
particularly over economic and security issues like open sea lanes.

While the next US president might have differing priorities, Asia will
likely continue to be towards the top of the list as it was for Presidents
George W Bush and Bill Clinton before Obama.

US Unilateralism makes ASEAN diplomatic capabilities

defunct
Jones 2010 (Dr. Lee Jones is is a lecturer in politics at Queen Mary,
University of London, 2010, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Still in
the Drivers Seat, But for How Long? ASEANs Capacity for Leadership in
East Asian International Relations, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/viewFile/295/295)RR
It is arguably mistaken to see ASEANs role through the ARF as expressing a forceful desire to manage and
direct Asia-Pacific international relations, or as reflecting a delusion that it is capable of doing so (cf. Jones
and Smith 2006). Understood historically, it is clear that the ARF emerged for two quite different reasons.
First, ASEAN was bounced into proposing some sort of Asia-Pacific security forum in the early post-Cold War
period largely to avoid being eclipsed by alternative proposals modelled on the OSCE, which were being

ASEAN had acquired a diplomatic

centrality unprecedented for a third-world grouping over the Cambodian conflict and
was also keen to preserve this after that issue had been settled, since it
conveyed important benefits. ASEAN had been forced to cohere itself as a
diplomatic community (mediating its internal disagreements, developing
greater basic capacities for collective action such as sufficient Englishspeaking diplomats, etc.), had become a group that was now regularly
consulted on extra-regional diplomatic initiatives at the UN, had entered into
dialogue partnerships with key external players (notably the EU and the US)
which yielded important cooperation on trade, investment and security
issues, and so on. The enhanced autonomy, respect and material benefits
thereby gained needed to be preserved . Furthermore, at the end of the Cold War there was
mooted by Japan and Australia (Acharya 1995).

profound strategic uncertainty in East Asia over Washingtons desire to remain engaged in the region

ASEANs
preferred strategic orientation is omni-enmeshment, whereby as many great
powers as possible remain competitively engaged in the region so as to
balance each others influence (Goh 2008). This enhances ASEAN states
autonomy and influence over the regional agenda (in order to, e.g., exclude issues
(caused by President Bushs drawing down of US troops) and Chinas unknown ambitions.2

around human rights or democratisation in the context of the Wests new interventionism in the 1990s)

and enhances their collective weight and bargaining power , maximising the
resources they are able to extract from these external relationships . These
somewhat defensive motivations are about making the best situation out of ASEANs relatively weak
position and are obviously quite different from a delusional desire to exercise a powerful, managerial role
in East Asia. The second reason for the ARFs emergence is that, from the perspective of the non-ASEAN
states relevant to the region, it offered the leastworst option to bring some sort of structure to their
international relations. The end of the Cold War had swept away the internationalised social, ideological
and political conflicts that had provided a meaningful structure to international relations in East Asia, and
there was a basic desire among all parties to recreate some sort of order or pattern out of the fin de sicle
flux. However, while Australia and Japan might have preferred a thick, robust institution along the lines of
the OSCE, the US and China were more reluctant. The US was and is essentially satisfied with the hub-andspokes model of alliances it has constructed since WWII which gives it a permanent presence in the region
without being constrained by major institutional commitments and obligations. China had only begun to
join significant numbers of international organisations in the 1980s and was equally suspicious of intrusive

institutional settings, particularly in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre and the implementation
of US sanctions. The position of these two key players meant that a weakly-institutionalised, informal, nonbinding, consultative forum was all that was likely to be possible. As it happened, that was what ASEAN
was offering. The ARF was thus resorted to as a sort of default option. Other betterresourced and perhaps
more progressive states might have a greater capacity in institutional terms to devise more elaborate
organisations with more expansive agendas, but this is irrelevant for practical purposes. In a world divided
into sovereign states, the extent of international cooperation depends fundamentally on the extent of
consensus among states representatives. Without a more meaningful degree of international consensus it
is simply impossible for Asian regional institutions to develop much capacity. Those who bash ASEAN for
failing to do more in terms of Asia-Pacific security institution-building (including some ARF member-states)
are thus wrongly blaming ASEAN for a fundamentally restrictive strategic situation over which they have
no real control. Chinas willingness to veto Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) at the ARF, even on
apparently benign issues like biodiversity, is a more significant check on cooperative ventures than lack of
leadership from ASEAN (Foot 1998: 434). Despite the grumbling, and despite renewed recent efforts from
Japan and Australia to propose alternative regional arrangements, the ARF has endured because the
ASEANs Capacity for Leadership in EA International Relations 99 absence of significant consensus among
the key players means that it is unlikely that anything better could be devised. The implication of this
historical and strategic context is rarely, if ever, openly admitted: despite ASEANs role in East Asia being
touted as one of bringing peace and stability to the region, in practical terms it actually depends to a large

If, say, China, Japan and the

US were able to form a strategic condominium or Asian concert based on
common interests and ideologies and a high degree of trust , there would essentially
extent on distrust, rivalry and non-cooperation among the great powers.

be no need for the ARF from their perspective.3 By the same token, if China, South Korea and Japan were
able to establish closer, friendlier relations, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) forum which groups them with

ASEAN would become defunct hence the considerable anxiety in some

Southeast Asian chancelleries over the three countries leaders holding annual
summits since 2008. The remarkable frequency with which ASEAN seeks formal
reiteration of its position in the driving seat of Asian regional cooperation
from its partners also testifies to its own insecurities .4 In this sense, ASEANs
capacity to stabilise great power relations in Asia correlates with the
incapacity of great powers to successfully mediate their relationships fully on
their own. However, it also depends on the rivalry among the great powers
remaining within tolerable bounds. The current healthy competition yields
considerable benefits to ASEAN as they are courted with offers of funding,
investment and free-trade agreements. However, if this escalated into a more hostile rivalry
(e.g., through China adopting an aggressive military posture in the South China Seas), ASEAN would be

It is thus in
ASEANs interests and arguably everyone elses to try to moderate this
rivalry, which is why the Association has focused on elaborating peaceful
norms of interstate conduct and enmeshing the great powers in a bewildering
web of regional bodies, dialogue partnerships, cooperative projects, freetrade areas, and so on. Those who criticise, for example, the bilateralism that characterises trade
faced with its nightmare scenario of having to choose between strategic partners.5

cooperation in the region as irrational, since it is less efficient than multilateralism, to some extent miss
the point (e.g., Dieter 2009: 89-113). These arrangements are not always about the concrete material
benefits they can be expected to yield; sometimes they are simply one more strand through which to tie-in
the great powers, providing one more reason for these states to think twice before acting rashly. We might
visualise this as many Lilliputians tying down a few Gullivers. The ropes may not be very strong, even in
combination, but so long as the Gullivers do not cooperate to help free one another, they have little choice
but to play the Lilliputians game. Great-power relations have improved encouragingly of late, particularly
between Japan and China, but residual conflicts and wariness seem likely to prevail in the short-to-medium
term, providing a continued need for something like the ARF. Speculation that the Six Party Talks could
evolve into a permanent Northeast Asian security institution seem overly optimistic at present.

Furthermore, the present arrangements do yield benefits to the great powers,

helping to keep them engaged and thus boosting ASEANs capacity to keep
the process going. As noted above, a desire for some degree of predictability and order in interstate

relations is satisfied by the ARF. There are sufficient disagreements and conflicts of interest among the
great powers that they do require some way of mediating their relations so that they can come together to
discuss issues of common concern, and the ARF does provide this. At times of serious crises in Sino-US
relations in the mid-1990s, or Sino-Japanese or US-North Korean relations in the early and mid-2000s,
states whose formal bilateral relations had perhaps broken down were nonetheless able to engage in
multilateral dialogue at the ARF and informal ASEANs Capacity for Leadership in EA International Relations
101 bilateral talks on its sidelines. On the assumption that jaw-jaw is better than war-war this can only be
a good thing. The APT and ARF processes have also generated a few beneficial, albeit low-level,
cooperative outputs, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (a currency swap arrangement that has reinforced
monetary stability in East Asia) and the publication of increasingly detailed defence white papers which

the willingness of the

great powers to play ASEANs game can never be taken for granted . As we have
help generate more transparency and confidence internationally. However,

seen recently with the proposals of an Asia-Pacific Community and an East Asian Community from Australia
and Japans (now both former) prime ministers, Kevin Rudd and Yukio Hatoyama, alternative institutional

the
commitment of key players frequently wavers, signalled notably by the
sporadic absences of the US secretary of state from ARF meetings . Moreover,
settings are still occasionally mooted by frustrated, non-Southeast Asian states. Moreover,

there is a fundamental disjuncture between the de facto scope of ASEAN institutions and the location of
the most serious security issues in Asia. The ARF, despite formally encompassing an area from South Asia
to North America, is obviously centred on Southeast Asia, yet the most dangerous threats to international
security are clearly located in South and Northeast Asia, especially the Korean peninsula. Because
involving itself in the enormous conflicts of interest involved in these theatres could only harm its goal of
omnienmeshment, ASEAN prefers to do as little as possible about these issues, merely endorsing, e.g., the

In order to maintain support for ASEANs centrality and all

it implies, therefore, it is necessary for the Association to prove its credibility and
relevance in relation to other issues especially those in Southeast Asia to
key external partners, particularly the US (and to a lesser degree the EU). Fear of
losing international credibility is a major driver behind ASEANs recent
internal developments, to which we will turn momentarily. ASEANs capacity to influence
great power relations in East Asia thus depends , to a large extent, on what great
power relations are actually like. Historically, East Asia has been a site of serious great power
Six Party Talks on Korea.6

conflicts and was declared ripe for rivalry at the end of the Cold War. This judgement was well overstated
because it failed to appreciate that the drivers behind this historic conflict had often been ideological and
socio-economic particularly during the Cold War rather than some abstract balance of power, and that
these drivers had to a large extent dissipated. Tension has occasionally flared, but dangerous confrontation
has been avoided and cooperation and economic interdependence has deepened considerably. Great
power relations are characterised by a mixture of uncertainty, mutual suspicion, long-range jostling for
position, a desire for cooperation to advance vital security and economic interests, a widely-shared desire
to somehow manage the rise of China, and Chinas wish to disprove the China threat theory. This context
creates the space for the kind of forum ASEAN wishes to offer and not much beyond this. So long as this
admixture of conflict and cooperation among great powers continues and as long as ASEAN continues to
satisfy minimal standards of credibility, ASEANs capacity to host great power summits, and thereby
influence great power relations to some degree, is likely to continue to exist by default.

Unilateralism undermines ASEAN centrality; centrality is

k2 balance of power in Asia
Sarith 13 (Heng Sarith is a Research Fellow at the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace,
ASEAN: between China and America, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/12/asean-between-chinaand-america/) RR

ASEAN may exercise balance of power and could become an object of

great power competition. In 2011, the United States announced its pivot to Asia and began
First,

deploying most of its naval power back to the Asia Pacific region. This has resulted in an escalating rivalry
with China. Some countries in ASEAN, especially Myanmar and Vietnam, have actively engaged in strategic
balancing between China and America.

These countries are seeking more robust

economic

relationships with the United States as an option to hedge against

Chinas threat. But being closer to a great power is considered harmful to
ASEAN unity and centrality. The game of balance of power would have adverse
and strategic

consequence, such as rifts in ASEANs solidarity, if it is exercised carelessly. ASEAN has long been
considered neutral it is not dominated by a great power. Since its establishment in 1967, ASEANs
neutrality has given it strategic success. Second, the sceptics of East Asian regionalism fear that China will
eventually dominate East Asia through a China-led East Asian Community, even though Japan originally
proposed this initiative. ASEAN recognises that ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea) is the
main mechanism for building an East Asian Community. In this scenario, ASEAN countries would move
closer to China with regional economic integration and mega-regional infrastructure projects, such as the
SingaporeKunming Rail Link, bilateral assistance packages, FTA frameworks, and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). An ASEANChina FTA would provide great economic benefits

But
ASEAN countries discount Chinas military threat on the issue of the South China Sea.
Since the United States would not be involved in any of these institutions ,
most analysts believe that ASEAN would fall under Chinese hegemony in East Asia.
In contrast, the third scenario would see the United States extend its security umbrella
and lead the region economically through multilateral forums . In this particular
scenario, ASEAN nations would sign up to US-led multilateral forums , such as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) initiatives, in order to
diversify their export markets and increase US FDI flow to the region. Currently, four members of
ASEAN (Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam) are participating in TPP negotiations. Since America
needs strategic balance with China, ASEAN can benefit more from
these initiatives. ASEAN countries, too, need closer strategic relations
with United States in order to counter Chinas influence, especially on territorial disputes
to ASEAN because of Chinas strong economic growth and its big middle-class consumption market.

in the South China Sea. Some countries are already making this choice Vietnam and the Philippines are
co-operating politically and militarily with the United States and Japan, through high-level visits and joint
military exercises. ASEAN could use an alliance with the United States as an economic and military shield
against threats from China. In the case of armed conflict in the South China Sea, America would be

ASEAN enthusiasts would

prefer to safeguard ASEAN centrality in order to balance itself between China
and the United States. ASEAN knows that being too close to China or the United
States is harmful to its unity. It can maintain centrality by using the ASEAN way of consultation
and consensus to accommodate all the voices and needs of its members. Fear of domination
by major powers may prompt ASEAN to strengthen itself and
maintain unity, safeguard the consensus principle, and engage more
carefully with regional powers. ASEANs importance to East Asian regionalism is mostly
expected to help ASEAN countries, whatever the circumstances. Fourth,

due to its neutrality China and Japan might not trust each other, but ASEAN is believed to be impartial.
With this priceless asset and the ASEAN way, ASEAN can take into account the interests and preferences
of all parties. ASEAN should choose this last option. Safeguarding ASEAN centrality is the most acceptable
strategic choice. Doing so will advance its strategic position and help maintain regional peace, stability and
prosperity. The first step toward achieving this policy is to focus on ASEAN community building and to build
a regional initiative on dispute settlements. ASEAN has to strengthen itself and find the right distance
between the two great regional powers.

Centrality high now the aff derails US commitment to

ASEAN which wrecks its diplomatic capability
Webster 16 (Graham Webster is a researcher, lecturer, and senior fellow of The China Center at Yale Law School,
where he focuses on U.S.China relation, Will ASEAN Remain Central to US Asia Policy?, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/willasean-remain-central-to-us-asia-policy/) RR
When U.S. President Barack Obama hosts leaders from the ten countries of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Monday and Tuesday,

he will symbolically

reinforce the concept of ASEAN centralitytraditionally the idea that the groups

diverse states should economically integrate and gradually develop a collective voice in the world. But

other kinds of centrality will also be apparent as observers and officials confront regional
security issues in which two of ASEANs strongest suitors, the United States and China, are on opposing

U.S. officials have, with some legitimacy, sought to deemphasize the

U.S.China narrative in U.S. relations with ASEAN. Speaking Thursday at the
sides.

Center for American Progress, Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes described an agenda
emphasizing economic growth and innovation and a variety of security challenges, including

Rhodes also described the Obama

administrations strategy as using ASEAN as a hub a platform to build out a
broader series of engagements, and that ultimately is what the East Asian Summit became.
counterterrorism and disaster response.

That East Asia Summitwhich now includes the ASEAN 10, plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New
Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United Statessupports another notion of ASEAN centrality, in
which regular ASEAN meetings become occasions for even broader summits at the same time. Obama
became the first U.S. president to attend the East Asia Summit in 2011, on the same trip during which he
announced a greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. engagement with ASEAN as a group is, on its
own, broad and evolving. But any time the U.S. media see East Asia on the agenda, the China story of the
day comes to mind. In a briefing for reporters, when the first questioner raised ASEAN countries diverse
relationships with China, both the chief White House Asia adviser and the top U.S. diplomat for the region

Drawn out by a question on

the South China Sea, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel described the present
summit, which will last a full day and does not come with the usual structured agenda, as a unique
opportunity: What the leaders can do that they often are unable to do, partly due to the constraints of
said the summit is not about China. Clearly, thats not entirely true.

time, is to delve a little more deeply into what they see as the realm of the possible in terms of lowering
tensions in the South China Sea and setting up a dynamic that can build on, for example, the decision of
the tribunal in the Hague. Here, Russel is referring to the legal case brought by the Philippines under the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that challenges Chinese claims in the South China Sea.
Though the arbitral tribunal found that it has jurisdiction to decide a number of the questions raised by the
Philippines, the Chinese government has declared the proceedings illegitimate, called the tribunals
decision on jurisdiction null and void, and refused to participate in the process. It is entirely reasonable
for regional governments to discuss what might happen after the tribunal releases its decision, but doing

that ASEAN is a unique

institution that plays a central role in convening regional
governments, coordinating their efforts, and confronting challenges .
And in East Asia, if not everywhere in the world, China is involved in opportunities,
challenges, initiatives, and disputes. The scale of Chinese economic, security,
and diplomatic efforts is one reason ASEAN has gained such
prominence. Holding this months summit in California at Sunnylands, where Obama hosted Chinese
so is surely, at least partly, about China. The reality is

President Xi Jinping for their first major meeting in 2013, sends an unmistakable signal that the Obama
administration places an emphasis on strong independent ties with ASEAN as a group. Administration

officials in briefings said part of the intention is to cement the U.S.ASEAN

relationship so that the next president can build on the Obama
teams efforts. That seems true, but this kind of diplomatic courtship also
raises expectations of a continued U.S. commitment. From the current
administrations perspective, this move can help to lock in deeper engagement. For the next president,

raised expectations would make a shift of priorities away from ASEAN more
costly in terms of U.S. credibility. With the presidential campaign wide open and even the
candidate closest to the administration, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, now opposing the TransPacific Partnership, this summit should be seen in the context of efforts to make Obamas policies stick.
ASEAN is not just central to its members priorities or playing off the two Pacific giants of the United States
and China. For two days,

policy.

ASEAN is also central to struggles over the future of U.S. foreign

US pivot to Asia causes divides in ASEAN stancewrecks

their relationship with China
Emmerson 13 (Author: Donald K. Emmerson Senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies at Stanford University. 1/13/13. Challenging ASEAN: the American pivot in Southeast
Asia; East Asia Forum. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/13/challenging-asean-the-american-pivot-insoutheast-asia/)

As much as China is front and centre for the United States and Asia, the
American pivot is not all about the dragon. It is also very much about the 10
member states of ASEAN. In its vaguest sense, the pivot is a turn toward Asia
writ large. But it is particularly in Southeast Asia that the pivots three themes
security, economy and democracy are most evident. The accent on
security was already clear in the concern for freedom of navigation in the
South China Sea expressed by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the
ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010. In November 2011 President Barack Obama stopped in
Darwin to announce that 2500 US marines would eventually be stationed there. And in June 2012
Singapore agreed to host in rotation as many as four US combat ships. One might have thought that on a
spectrum of ASEAN states from the most to the least deferential toward China, reactions would have run
from jeers to cheers. They did not. No government was willing to denounce the pivot and jeopardise the
chance of somehow benefiting from it. The shift in Washingtons attention from Afghanistan to ASEAN
could easily be seen by Southeast Asian policy makers as a way to slow, if not reduce, their own increasing

At the same time, the pivots association with security

unbalanced the policy itself; assertions of American military power
overshadowed the pivots economic rationale. This imbalance of security over economy
exposure to Beijings strength.

tended to legitimate a division of labour that from an American viewpoint could only seem invidious. By
enlarging its profile in the western Pacific, the US Navy would even more thoroughly underwrite the
maritime security that ASEAN economies needed to continue profiting from Chinese trade and investment.
The pivot appeared to reinforce a formula that, crudely put, ran thus: Americans would make the peace;
Asians would make the money. Accordingly, if the actual purpose of Obamas pivot could be summarised in
a single word, that word is inclusion, in terms of both security and economy. Any inclination to portray the
pivot as a purely military ploy is unfair. Obama travelled to Darwin and Bali in November 2011 from
Honolulu. In Hawaii he hosted the annual APEC forum, where he claimed progress in ongoing talks for the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In July 2012 in Cambodia, Secretary Clinton co-hosted the first USASEAN
Business Forum, and the USASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement Initiative was launched in November

On the pivots economic dimension, ASEAN has developed an

independent stance between the United States and China, albeit one that
leans modestly in the latters direction. But ASEAN is divided. Of its member
states, only Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam were among the 11
governments negotiating the US-backed TPP in Auckland in December 2012.
Meanwhile, at its summit in Phnom Penh a month before, ASEAN could have
pleased China by supporting Beijings preferred vehicle for regional economic
cooperation, ASEAN+3, which necessarily excludes the United States while limiting the non-ASEAN
checks on Chinese influence to Japan and South Korea . ASEAN agreed instead to launch
negotiations toward a new entity: a 16-member Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) that would augment the ASEAN+3 grouping by
adding three more potential restraints on China Australia, India and New
Zealand. The economic rationale for including these six non-ASEAN states
was that they already have FTAs with ASEAN. But five of the six, all but China,
are democracies oriented more or less toward the West . The potentially China2012.

balancing value of that distribution was not lost on those who proposed RCEP as a superior alternative to
ASEAN+3. The result is a benign race between two vastly different models of economic integration: the
non-American, loosely declarative RCEP that subsumes existing arrangements, versus the Americanpromoted, intrusively gold-standard TPP that requires domestic reform.

The affs bilateral engagement disrupts ASEANs strategic

orientation
Jones 10 (Lee, lecturer in politics at Queen Mary, University of London. His research focuses on
issues of sovereignty, intervention, state-society relations, regionalism, and governance, particularly in
developing countries, Still in the Drivers Seat, But for How Long? ASEANs Capacity for Leadership in
East-Asian International Relations, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 3, 95-113. ISSN: 18684882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print)) RR

ASEANs preferred strategic orientation is omni-enmeshment, whereby as

many great powers as possible remain competitively engaged in the
region so as to balance each others influence (Goh 2008). This enhances
ASEAN states autonomy and influence over the regional agenda (in order to, e.g.,
exclude issues around human rights or democratisation in the context of the Wests new interventionism

and enhances their collective weight and bargaining power,

maximising the resources they are able to extract from these external
relationships. These somewhat defensive motivations are about making the best situation out of
in the 1990s)

ASEANs relatively weak position and are obviously quite different from a delusional desire to exercise a

The second reason for the ARFs emergence is that,

from the perspective of the non-ASEAN states relevant to the region, it offered the leastworst
option to bring some sort of structure to their international relations. The end of
powerful, managerial role in East Asia.

the Cold War had swept away the internationalised social, ideological and political conflicts that had
provided a meaningful structure to international relations in East Asia, and there was a basic desire among
all parties to recreate some sort of order or pattern out of the fin de sicle flux. However, while Australia
and Japan might have preferred a thick, robust institution along the lines of the OSCE, the US and China
were more reluctant. The US was and is essentially satisfied with the hub-and-spokes model of alliances it
has constructed since WWII which gives it a permanent presence in the region without being constrained
by major institutional commitments and obligations. China had only begun to join significant numbers of
international organisations in the 1980s and was equally suspicious of intrusive institutional settings,
particularly in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre and the implementation of US sanctions. The
position of these two key players meant that a weakly-institutionalised, informal, non-binding, consultative
forum was all that was likely to be possible. As it happened, that was what ASEAN was offering. The aim of
this paper is to review and assess ASEANs historical and contemporary role in facilitating China-U.S. ties

Paradoxically,
China-U.S. competition and cooperation can equally be the bane of
ASEANs efforts in this regard. While ASEAN-based multilateral diplomacy and regional
cooperation in Asia have served Chinese and American interests, their utility has of late
diminished as a consequence of two related developments . On the one hand,
tensions between China and the United States have risen, brought about by the posttoward, at the very least, peaceful strategic competition, if not outright cooperation.

Afghanistan strategic rebalancing of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region. So, too, have tensions
between China and some Southeast Asian rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. On the

divergent perceptions and perspectives among ASEAN member

states, exacerbated by centrifugal pulls exerted on ASEAN by the two great powers and rendered
worse by China-U.S. tensions have contributed to marked cleavages within
the regional organization. Ironically, the creeping institutionalization of China-U.S. cooperation,
other hand,

with the bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) process in particular, can prove equally
problematic for ASEANs facilitating role should that development end up rendering the organizations
services defunct. However, t is neither in Chinas nor Americas interest to adopt a G2 approach to
regional governance, and hitherto there has been no hint at all that President Xi Jinpings call for a new
type of great power relations implies that the Chinese desire such an approach.6 In that respect, ASEAN
diplomacy still matters. A brief conceptual note is in order at this juncture. Broadly, there are three ways to
define a middle power according to capabilities, function, or behavior. Middle power diplomacy generally
involves the adoption of an internationalist perspective and policy, actively participating in multilateral
forums, leading in specific niche areas, and acting as a bridge among nations.7 There are countless
reasons why ASEAN should not be equated with a middle power, not least because it is neither a unitary
state actor nor, for that matter, a unitary regional actor. That said, with a combined population of well over

six hundred million and substantial economic heft, and with the anticipated establishment of the sixteencountry Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) the hub of what would be the worlds
largest free trade area ASEAN arguably possesses the material requisites to function like a middle power.
And if middle powers are, according to one seminal contribution, defined primarily by their behavior8
characterized principally, though not exclusively by the penchant for multilateralism then the way by
which ASEAN promotes and protects its interests through negotiating with, rather than simply obeying or
resisting, great powers suggests behavioral similarities between ASEAN-style diplomacy and middle power
diplomacy vis--vis great powers.9

SCS
US Interference in the SCS is ineffective and Decentralizes
ASEAN
Frasure 16 (William G. Frasure is a Professor of Government and International Relations at
Conneticut College. 5/3/16. US Credibility in the South China Sea; The Diplomat.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/u-s-credibility-in-the-south-china-sea/)

By drawing closer to the U.S., Chinas Southeast Asian adversaries seek to

acquire some degree of balance in the region, so as to dissuade China from
brazen invocations of military might to enforce its sweeping claims. Which is
to say, they hope a more visible, active American military presence will deter
China. There is no doubt that the United States has, for the time being,
adequate military resources to more than balance anything China can put
into the South China Sea. But, as aficionados of the Cold War will recall, a
fundamental component of deterrence is credibility. It is one thing to possess
assets, it is another to convince an adversary of your willingness to use them,
and another still to convince friends of your willingness to use them on their
behalf. A further step requires that your friend believes that your adversary is
intimidated by your posture. It is this last element that seems to be at play in
the South China Sea. The United States seeks to assure the Philippines and
Vietnam, perhaps others, that China will be sufficiently intimidated by
growing U.S. involvement to move toward more reasonable, more
accommodating policies, and accept the need to resolve the conflict through
serious multilateral negotiation. There is little to indicate that the approach is
working. The steady course of events in the South China Sea Chinas
construction of artificial islands, introduction of surface-to-air missiles,
landing strips, fighter jets, advanced radar, encouragement of provocative
intrusions by fishing fleets and oil rigs indicates Chinas emerging
confidence that major gains in the establishment of virtual sovereignty within
its nine-dash line can be had by patiently undertaking a series of many very
small steps. China flaunts its belief that no such steps will be obstructed or
interfered with by the U.S. It is hard to imagine that one more dock or airstrip
or even one more SAM battery would elicit a military confrontation by the
U.S. Nor is it likely that China will unambiguously attack an American ship or
plane, or commit any clear act of war against the U.S. China, then, can just
keep on piling sand.

Lack of ASEAN centrality in the SCS creates a multitude of

regional problems
Storey 15 (Ian Storey is the Senior Fellow and editor of Contemporary Southeast Asia at the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. 7/31/15. ASEANs Failing Grade in the South China Sea;
The ASAN Forum. http://www.theasanforum.org/aseans-failing-grade-in-the-south-china-sea/)

Tensions in the South China Sea are serious but have not brought the
countries in dispute to the brink of war (though the risk that one of the
growing number of incidents at sea could blow-up into a bloody

confrontation should give regional leaders pause for thought). Nor has
increasing friction among the various parties hampered the huge volume of
maritime traffic that flows through the South China Sea and which lubricates
the global economy. Yet, the failure of ASEAN and China to arrest and turn
about the deteriorating situation in the S outh China Sea has created a set of
acute problems. First and foremost, it fuels enmity between China and the
Southeast Asian claimants (who do not, as a general rule, squabble among
themselves despite overlapping claims) as well as contention between China
and the other major powers, especially the U nited States and Japan, which
feel that Chinas assertiveness undermines their national interests, including
freedom of navigation. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to state that
the South China Sea has quickly become the locus of geostrategic rivalry
between Washington and Beijing. Second, and related, rising tensions among
the principal players, and the lack of progress toward a resolution, generates
nervousness, apprehension, and uncertainty about where the region is
headed, and this, in turn, creates arms build-ups and security dilemmas .
Third, the worsening dispute undermines ASEANs aspiration to retain
centrality in the regional security architecture it has played the leading role in
creating since the end of the Cold War. Why has the two-decade long conflict
management process between ASEAN and China in the South China Sea
yielded such meager returns? The answer is due to a combination of ASEANs
internal dynamics, and the growing conviction in China that its territorial and
jurisdictional claims are superior to those of its neighbors, and that its birth
right is to protect and advance them.

ASEAN credibility dependent on being the central power

in the SCS dispute
AP 15 (Associated Press 1/28/15. Philippines Says ASEANs Credibility at
Stake Over Chinas Reclamation of Disputed Reefs; Fox News.
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/01/29/philippines-says-asean-credibilityat-stake-over-china-reclamation-disputed.html)
The Philippines has urged fellow Southeast Asian nations to jointly demand
that China stop its land reclamation in contested South China Sea reefs.
Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario said the credibility of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations could be undermined if it does not respond to the
Chinese reclamation, which he said appeared "to be near completion as
portrayed by available photos." Del Rosario expressed the Philippines' alarm
over the reclamation in a statement to fellow ASEAN ministers on Wednesday
in Malaysia's Kota Kinabalu city. A copy of the statement was obtained by The
Associated Press on Thursday. Del Rosario said: "ASEAN cannot remain silent
on these serious developments. To do so would be a grave mistake with
fundamental strategic consequences."

ASEAN needs a clear and collective stance on the SCS

disputethe plans unilateral US action destroys this
Ram 15 (Vignesh Ram is a Ph. D. Candidate at the Department of Geopolitics and International
Relations at Manipal University. 6/4/15. ASEAN Must Take a Collective Stance on the South China Sea;
East Asia Forum. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/04/asean-must-take-a-collective-stance-on-thesouth-china-sea/)

A code of conduct is not the way forward for ASEAN. ASEAN should pursue a
more inclusive approach and united stand on the dispute. The time might
now be ripe for such a new approach. An economically slowing China, revised
defence guidelines for the USJapan alliance, US military deployments in
Southeast Asia as well as its interests with India might be enough to signal to
ASEAN that the power can tilt in the favour of its member states provided
they are willing to wholeheartedly pursue a resolution . The current ASEAN
chair, Malaysia, has already signalled that 2015 will only set the wheels
rolling for the community building process. Future chairs of ASEAN will need
to display more commitment towards reaching a beneficial agreement over
the issue. But if ASEAN fails to disengage from Chinas growing divisive
influence soon, it may become too weak for to act decisively on the S outh
China Sea dispute. A new understanding of the terms of engagement with
China would be a welcome start. The building of a new consensus and
renegotiating the ambiguous provisions will give more scope for temporary
peace in the region. For instance, Clause 6 (a), which speaks about maritime
research, has been used for various activities that lead to resource
exploitation and escalation of tension. Such clauses should clearly indicate
what falls under the ambit of such measures. Similarly, newer amendments
are needed so that there is a clearer understanding about the non-restrictive
access to airspace (this in case to avoid a unilateral Air Identification Defence
Zone) like in the East China Sea. A fractured ASEAN undermines any future
ability for the organisation to bargain with China. ASEAN is already split by
competing trade and security agreements between China and the US. The
South China Sea dispute is slowly but steadily undermining the centrality of
ASEAN in the regions geopolitics. ASEANs credibility as a torchbearer of
successful regionalism in Asia is on the line. Unless ASEAN takes a more
decisive collective stand on the South China Sea dispute, it would seriously
undermine the concept of a community that ASEAN is seeking to build.

US intervention in the SCS undermines ASEAN credibility

Kapila 14 (Dr Subhash Kapila is a former Indian diplomat to Japan and United States that is now a
senior fellow at the South Asia Analysis Group, a non- profit think tank based in India. 10/27/14 South
China Sea and the US-India-Japan Trilateral Revitalisation; South Asia Analysis Group.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1642)

The US-India-Japan Trilateral is an international coalition which represents the

coalescing of the strategic convergences that exist among these three
nations impelled by their legitimate stakes in the freedom of passage and
manoeuvres through global commons which cannot illegally be appropriated

by China as its own. Visible attempts are noticeable in the revitalisation of the
US-India-Japan Trilateral in the form of renewed officials-level dialogues and
some joint naval exercises amongst the three nations for better
interoperability. With Chinas unrestrained brinkmanship in the South China
Sea and the East China Sea, enough prospects exist that may encourage
other countries to join and expand this Trilateral as a nucleus. Importantly,
this urge should logically emerge in the ASEAN countries as a whole which
China has successfully attempted to divide over a united regional response.
ASEAN needs to resist Chinese disruptive strategies over the S outh China Sea
issue for if ASEAN fails to do so it may endanger the very continuance and
existence of ASEAN as a solid regional actor. The US-India-Japan Trilateral
comprises nations which not have sizeable stakes in the S outh China Sea
security and safety but also have sizeable stakes in Asian security and safety
as whole and share concerted perceptions that no regional hegemonistic
power emerges endangering it. That should be the driving force that should
logically impel the US-India-Japan Trilateral to provide the strategic ballast
against any such impulses and this would require further revitalisation
transcending officials-level dialogues and periodic naval exercises.

I/Ls

Regional
ASEAN centrality is k2 balance of power in Asia their
ASEAN fails cards are outdated
Acharya 15 (Amitav Acharya is the UNESCO chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance
and professor of international relations at the School of International Service, American University,
Washington, ASEAN can survive great-power rivalry in Asia,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/04/asean-can-survive-great-power-rivalry-in-asia/) RR

policymakers increasingly see changing great-power politics in

Asia as a challenge to ASEAN. Chinas growing military assertiveness
in the South China Sea, the US rebalancing strategy, Japans moves
to reinterpret its constitution, and Indias growing military presence
and assertive diplomacy all press upon ASEANs choices in the
region. Some argue that ASEAN is both toothless and clueless in responding to these changes. Seen as
Pundits and

talk shops, ASEANs regional institutions the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and
the East Asian Summit (EAS) might have been sufficient when great-power relations were less volatile
right after the Cold War, but they have outlived their usefulness. ASEAN

centrality, and even its

very survival, is being written off. But this critique misses a major point.
ASEANs challenges are less about its external environment than strains in internal cohesion and capacity.

The external environment actually reinforces ASEANs security role . If unity holds
and it scales back its ambitions, ASEAN can survive and play an effective role in
managing great-power competition, at least in Southeast Asia. Traditional perspectives on the
nature of great-power politics are helpful in understand ASEANs role in the region. John Mearsheimer

rising powers must expand to survive, often leading them to seek

regional hegemony and provoking conflict . Others argue that international stability is a
argues that

function of the number of great powers and the distribution of capabilities among them. A multipolar
system is more prone to instability and conflict than a bipolar or unipolar one. These perspectives would
point to a bleak future for ASEAN. Chinese regional hegemony, whether coercive or benign, is bad news. It
would certainly cover at least parts of Southeast Asia, including South China Sea claimants. A multipolar
system dominated by great powers also gives little space to smaller, weaker states. Chinese moves in the
South and East China Seas and Russian moves in Ukraine give credence to this view of the world. Some
see these developments as signs of expansionism, a return of geopolitics and the resurrection of
nineteenth-century European geopolitics in Asia. There are alternative interpretations of what is
happening in the world. Hedley Bull stressed the special responsibility of the great powers in managing

multipolarity invariably
leads to great-power competition and conflict. It may make a potential aggressor less
sure about its alignments and the size and power of a countervailing
coalition. At the core of all these ideas is the assumption of great-power primacy in maintaining
international order. Karl Deutsch and David Singer rejected the idea that

stability. None recognises the influence of smaller, weaker players on great-power politics. If traditional

ASEAN is an
anomaly. It has contributed significantly to reducing and managing conflict in
Southeast Asia. Asia is now the only region in history where the strong live in the world of the weak,
and the weak lead the strong. Its record may have been mixed, but the experience of ASEAN
turns traditional realism on its head. Today the phrase great-power rivalry is misleading.
perspectives were correct, ASEAN would have been doomed from its birth in 1967.

Significant and far-reaching cooperation exists at the regional and global levels. This is underpinned by a
type of interdependence that did not exist a century ago.

ASEAN centrality k2 exert soft power diplomacy

Blankert 14 (The EUs Special Adviser for relations with ASEAN from 2009-2013, ASEANs much
underrated soft power, http://europesworld.org/2014/06/15/aseans-much-underrated-softpower/#.V4Uc0ZMrK9Z) RR

Equally impressive is ASEANs role as a political stabiliser in the region

through its network of dialogues on issues ranging from maritime security,
health and climate change. These ASEAN-driven initiatives tend to go largely
unnoticed in the west but they are the tools of preventive diplomacy .
ASEANs Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) began as a peace treaty between its own member states but now
includes a growing number of countries and regional organisations (since the TAC was adapted so the EU could join) that
have committed to the TACs message of peaceful co-operation and non-interference. In 2003, China was the first nonASEAN member to sign up to the TAC, and others that have followed included the U.S. in 2009, the EU in 2012 and Norway

ASEAN has, significantly,

managed to keep relations with China on an even keel despite the tensions in
the South China Sea over conflicting territorial claims of China and Vietnam, and China and the Philippines.
and Pakistan as the most recent members, with Turkey and Brazil about to join.

This may lead some to indulge in simplistic conclusions of inevitable war in the region but the reality is very different.

China, after long, patient but relentless lobbying by ASEAN, has finally agreed to talk with
ASEAN as a bloc about a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.
This ASEAN-China dialogue is still fragile, and fresh incidents could yet
lead to future misunderstandings and escalation, so armed conflict can
never be ruled out. In the meantime though, ASEAN has played an important stabilising role. Indonesia,
accounting for some 40% of ASEANs population and economy, is in the vanguard of efforts to keep the peace with China
and has steered clear of China-U.S. rivalry in the region. Indonesia seeks to keep ASEAN, which includes some very proU.S. members and others who are allied with China, on a similarly neutral course. When East Timor said it wanted to join
ASEAN, Indonesia was clear about ASEANs role as a counter-balance to China, with Indonesias foreign minister, Marty
Natalegawa warning that a negative ASEAN reaction to East Timors entry bid could only lead to greater influence of
China in East Timor. This said, the minister has stressed on more than once occasion that there is no need to create a
new Cold War climate ASEAN executed much behind-the-scenes influence to spur political change and reform in
Myanmar. Its decision in 1997 to accept military-ruled Myanmar as a member was in part related to growing Chinese
influence in that country, and ASEAN member states felt it was better to deal with Myanmar through a policy of
constructive engagement than to exclude it. Myanmars ASEAN membership of course led to difficulties in relations with
the EU, the U.S. and other Western countries. But ASEAN felt it was not up to those outside the region to pass judgment
on the issue, and it can now claim with some justification that this inclusive approach towards Myanmar produced the
right results. ASEAN diplomats like to explain that it played an equally important role by showing Myanmar that the
international community was not composed of a bunch of unpleasant bullies. ASEANs rapid response to cyclone Nargis
when it struck Myanmar in 2008 also helped to spur change in the country. Former ASEAN Secretary General Surin
Pitsuwan convinced Myanmars leaders of the need to accept foreign assistance, and in addition, there was constant soft
pressure from Indonesia, whose leaders never spoke out openly against the regime, but for many years met with their
Myanmar counterparts to underline the importance of becoming democratic, holding up their own country as an example
of a transformation from an authoritarian regime to a vibrant democracy. Myanmar isnt there yet, but the process of

ASEANs post-modern
diplomacy and its role as a factor of stability and peace in the region have long
been underestimated by Europe and the U.S. But both Brussels and Washington are now waking to
change now underway is testimony to ASEANs little-noticed soft power

ASEANs importance, recognising that it shares with the EU the fate of a regional peace organisation that seldom makes
the headlines. ASEAN plays a crucial stabilising and balancing role in a south-east Asia, and in the face of rivalries

its protective fence is of utmost

importance to the regions smaller countries . And even Indonesia finds itself better able to
between China, the U.S., Australia, India, Russia and others,

promote its policy of zero enemies, thousand friends in the ASEAN context than alone. In spite of the shouting matches
that at times erupt between individual ASEAN members and China, ASEAN as a group has a constructive relationship with
its huge neighbour.

ASEAN-China co-operation covers many sectors and the two

sides have concluded an ambitious free trade agreement . There remain problems, but
these are dealt with in a way that is arguably more mature and proactive than, for instance, the uneasy relationship

ASEANs soft power may be hard to understand for

those who think of power in terms of helicopters and gunboats. But
todays world needs peace-builders and conflict managers and
ASEANs stabilising role should not be underestimated. It is time Europe took
between the EU and Russia.

note.

ASEAN continuity & diplomacy k2 regional stability

prevents great power war
Rolls 13 (Mark Rolls has an MA in Defence and Security Analysis from Lancaster University and a
PhD in South-East Asian Studies from the University of Hull, Centrality and Continuity: ASEAN and
Regional Security since 1967, 31 January 2011 / Accepted: 12 August 2011 / Published online: 1
September 2011) RR

ASEAN has explicitly acknowledged the important role which

extra-regional powers have to play in securing its members and the Southeast Asian
sub-region from non-traditional security threats. In so doing it is entirely in keeping with the
In establishing ADMM-Plus,

long-standing view that Acharya [1] has clearly identified as realist thinking on ASEAN. This view posits
that ASEANs

survival and role have been dependent on, and shaped

by, a wider regional balance of power system (Ibid. p. 6). It is a view which is,
perhaps, also acknowledged by the ASEAN members themselves. One of the reasons for opposition to the
original Indonesian proposal for an ASC, it has been suggested, was that the greater role for ASEAN which
it envisaged and the concomitant attempt to reduce external power involvement effectively undermined

ASEANs very important role in

fostering the co-operation which has engendered regional stability, and
ensured the members continuing political independence and territorial
integrity, should not be seen in isolation from its commitment to foreign and
security policies which have given external powers a significant role in maintaining a stable regional
the basis of the existing regional order ([27], p. 211).

order (Ibid.). Security has undoubtedly been a central and continuous feature of the Association during its
first four decades. Continuity has also been apparent in the degree to which ASEAN has adhered to its
basic thinking on security and the attendant principles, aims and way of operating. Although it has
modified and adapted elements of them to meet changed circumstances, and even established new bodies
and groups (including the ARF, EAS, ADMM and ADMM-Plus), the level of consistency is still readily

ASEAN
has consciously sought to position itself at the heart of the
developing security architecture in both East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific and this
ASEAN Centrality has been widely accepted by the extra-regional powers who
participate in it. The Association has been largely successful at limiting
competition and preventing inter-state conflict among its members
and at fostering a stable regional order in Southeast Asia (and an incipient
observable. Centrality of a different sort has been evident, too, during the post-Cold War period.

one outside of the boundaries of Southeast Asia) though its efforts to promote security cooperation can
appear modest. Hindering ASEANs efforts in this regard, and indeed those to foster multilateral security
co-operation more generally, is the lack of trust across the region particularly the distrust, if not outright
rivalry, that exists among the major powers ([20], p. 86). Despite this rivalry, it has until now been in the
interests of the major external powers to pursue policies which have aided and abetted ASEANs own
efforts to promote regional stability. The extent to which a stable regional order remains in the interests of
the major powers will be one of the great questions for the next phase of ASEANs life.

Econ

ASEAN centrality is k2 economic growth trade

Sile 15 (Aza Wee Sile is a news assistant in CNBC.com's Asia-Pacific team. She manages the video
content for the site and writes articles on a broad range of topics from an Asia Pacific perspective. Aza
graduated from Australia's University of Newcastle with a Bachelor of Communications, Will the ASEAN
Economic Community be a bang or a bust?, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/31/will-the-asean-economiccommunity-be-a-bang-or-a-bust.html) RR
However, Joseph Incalcaterra, Asia-Pacific economist at HSBC Global Research, wants to make it clear that
"the AEC represents an important new chapter rather than inflection point." Similarly, a
Mizuho Bank note cautions against expecting a "big bang" from the roll-out of the AEC. The boost to
growth should be felt over the next decade as measures are gradually implemented through the AEC
Blueprint 2025, which maps out how the bloc will continue working towards an integrated economy from

the ASEAN Single Window, a regional initiative to

expedite cargo clearance, notes Incalcaterra. This initiative has already been established by
many ASEAN countries and will help to facilitate the trade of goods. "The free
2015 to 2025. But one timely impact is

trade in goods is largely a fait accompli, and the free flow of skilled labor [remains] complicated due to
political concerns, which leads us to believe that the liberalization of services and investment are the most
important parts of the AEC and can bring about the most tangible economic benefits," said Incalcaterra. On
the 2015 OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index, ASEAN is seen as fairly closed in terms of services,
particularly Indonesia which had one of the lowest scores. HSBC notes that Indonesia's closed services
sector is a "largely structural issue in Indonesia [and] serves as a significant impediment to the country's

The
integration of services trade will benefit Singapore the most with its high
value-add finance and insurance industry, followed by the Philippines and
Malaysia, said HSBC. On the investment liberalization front, Rahul Bajoria, regional
economist at Barclays Capital said he expects "rapidly growing economies such as
Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines to gain the most in terms of investments ."
broader reform efforts" adding that this is why Indonesia will not stand to gain much from the AEC.

In addition, more mature economies such as Malaysia and Singapore could see more corporate
investments, "which they will leverage by deploying capital within the region," said Bajoria to CNBC.

Financial integration and capital account liberalization will help to

facilitate economic rebalancing within ASEAN , towards the AEC's goal of equitable
development, said HSBC. However, this coordinated approach might be hard to
reach because without political integration, the ASEAN has a much
weaker institutional framework to ensure that commitments are me t.
HSBC adds that the ASEAN Secretariat that acts as the main authority of the bloc and implements projects
has limited powers and only a tiny budget of $17 million as of 2014. Therefore, improvements need to be
made not only to the AEC but to ASEAN as a whole, before the region can see stronger integration and
benefit from it.

ASEAN centrality K2 regional economic partnerships -sustains innovation, productivity, & entrepreneurship
VNA 15 (Vietnam News Agency, a governmental agency - is the official state news provider of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, http://en.vietnamplus.vn/asean-crucial-part-of-global-economystudy/85960.vnp) RR

ASEAN is a fertile ground for innovation driven by

entrepreneurship, according to a study conducted by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM).
The study, which was done in Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand,
shows that ASEAN is among the most potential areas for business in the
world with 66 percent of their people viewing business as a positive career
choice, 3.54 percent higher than the global average. The study said the region is appropriate
for business as neighbouring countries in Asia and in the Pacific Rim see that
Kuala Lumpur (VNA)

ASEAN is providing good opportunities for trade, business and economic

partnerships. GEM Executive Director Mike Herrington said ASEAN plays an increasingly important role
on the global economic stage. An ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is no longer an abstract
but a reality that the regional governments are urged to embrace, he added. The GEM report
recommended 10 key focus areas to boost entrepreneurship and innovation across the region, including
building the professional ability of governments to better understand and support entrepreneurs, and

It also stressed the need to invest in IT

infrastructure and create tailored development programmes for
entrepreneurs. With their focus on reforms, regional governments create a
favourable environment to foster innovation, facilitate more productive
economies, as well as open up new and better job opportunities for people
from every walk of life. ASEANs established business rate of 14.1 percent is the highest regional
meaningful media communications.

average and is also significant compared to GEMs average of 8.4 percent, the study reported. Vietnam
and Thailand lead the pack, followed by Indonesia while Malaysia and Singapore lag with lower levels of
entrepreneurship across all stages of business, it said.

Prolif
ASEAN centrality K2 Stopping Nuclear Proliferation
Duong 2006 (Nguyen Duong is Deputy Director General of Institute for
Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies under Diplomatic Academy of Viet Nam,
2006, ASEAN and the Threat of Nuclear Proliferation in Southeast Asia,
Pages 1-3)RR
Nuclear proliferation is potentially the most damaging threat to Southeast Asian
security today. Closely linked to nuclear energy, nuclear proliferation is linked
to the goals of security and development, key national concerns in the 21st
century. Put in a broader context, this regional issue is part of the global combat
against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and is also a political conflict
between developed and developing countries over nuclear technology and
power. Individual and collective responses to nuclear proliferation by Southeast Asian states are notable,
but leave much to be desired. This paper examines sources of nuclear danger in contemporary Southeast
Asia and regional cooperation against nuclear proliferation. It also offers personal views on nuclear politics
and recommendations the region could take to preserve stability and prosperity. The threat of nuclear
proliferation in Southeast Asia The possibility of nuclear proliferation presented no serious risk to Southeast
Asia, even at the height of the Cold War. Although regional confrontation and superpower rivalry ravaged
Southeast Asia, no regional government attempted to acquire nuclear weapons to bolster its security or
political influence. Now that the Cold War has ended, it has been difficult to argue that these countries
have any intention to develop nuclear weapon programs for political or security reasons. With regional
economies growing rapidly, interest in nuclear power is on the rise in Southeast Asia. Regional
governments are looking at nuclear power to fuel their expanding economies. Currently there are eight
operating research reactors in Southeast Asia (Malaysia: 1; Vietnam: 1; Philippines: 1; Indonesia: 3;
Thailand: 1+1), with more to be constructed in the near future.1 Of the 10 regional states, Indonesia and
Vietnam are undertaking prefeasibility studies on nuclear power plants, and there are plans to build two
power reactors in each country.2 The rise of terrorism in Southeast Asia since Sept. 11, 2001 has triggered

clandestine
nuclear weapon programs under the cover of peaceful nuclear projects , they do
create opportunities for terrorists who aim to inflict catastrophic damage . Civil
nuclear projects can become sources of materials for terrorists as substances
used at regional research reactors and nuclear power stations are not
properly secured. Terrorist groups are especially interested in nuclear and other radioactive
substances because they are pre-requisites to the fabrication of nuclear devices. Attempted thefts
and trafficking of radioactive substances from regional research reactors have
been detected in Southeast Asia; the region is said to be a target for
terrorists. The issue gets more complicated when power politics enter the game, which can be seen in
security concerns over these nuclear projects. Although these are rarely suspected as

the case of Iran. As ASEAN is a group of developing countries that are concerned with the right to acquire
nuclear technology for development purposes, it naturally sides with the developing world in the debate
over the possession of civilian nuclear capacity. Although the nuclear weapons states (NWS) have shown
no intention to achieve the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) goal of nuclear disarmament, they still
demand that developing countries comply with their own NPT plus terms, i.e., to abandon the right to
acquire nuclear technology on the grounds that it has military applications. To date, ASEAN countries are
not the focal points of international nuclear politics, but their aspiration for nuclear energy may lead to

At the global level, many

international mechanisms have been set up to improve global nuclear
security. However, Southeast Asian countries are reluctant to engage deeply
in global nonproliferation regimes because of their concerns over sovereignty
and the right to development. In that context, regional cooperation under the
ASEAN framework is a promising avenue for Southeast Asians to address
nuclear security. To date, the most significant effort by ASEAN to counter nuclear proliferation is the
clashes with the NWS. Regional solutions to nuclear proliferation

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The treaty requires states to abstain

The
signing of the SEANWFZ Treaty in 1995 is the achievement of a long process
of ASEAN consultation beginning in the early 1970s, which was aimed at
securing the region from nuclear confrontation . Its Protocol calls on the NWS to respect
from acquiring nuclear weapons and for the NWS to spare the region the risks of nuclear war.3

SEANWFZ and not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the treaty. Despite its significance
in preventing a nuclear arms race and contributing to confidence building in Southeast Asia, SEANWFZ
exerts only indirect effects on preventing nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorist. As
SEANWFZ was designed to cope with traditional nuclear threats, it is not up to the current demands to

ASEAN has shown its collective efforts to counter terrorism

in numerous political declarations, the most notable of which was the 2001 ASEAN Declaration
combat nuclear terrorism.

on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. However, substantive cooperation in this field is rather slow due to
rigid compliance with the age-old ASEAN principle of state sovereignty. Moreover, nuclear terrorism was
not given due attention, as can be seen through the absence of the term in ASEAN counterterrorism
documents. More attention is given to nuclear security issues within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an
extension of ASEAN, thanks to the participation of Western powers. The 2004 Second ARF Inter-sessional
Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime appealed to member states to support
internationally agreed upon security standards such as the International Ships and Port Security (ISPS)
Code and various UN security conventions and protocols. Recently, the 11th ARF Meeting in Jakarta in July
2004 issued an ARF Statement on Non- 3 See M. C. Abad, A Nuclear Weapon-Free Southeast Asia and Its
Continuing Strategic Significance, Contemporary Southeast Asia, No. 2, August 2005, p. 165-87. 39
Proliferation, according to which ARF participants agreed to review their abilities to control radioactive
sources and to cooperate with the IAEA to strengthen nuclear safeguard measures. However, much has to
be done to turn the ARF into an effective mechanism for collective action on nonproliferation and not just a
forum for dialogue. Meanwhile, non-ASEAN collaboration is recognized as more efficient in the fight against

Several ASEAN members enjoy good relations

and have close bilateral cooperation with the United States in countering
terrorism and proliferation. The annual Cobra Gold exercise has recently shifted its focus to
military preparedness for incidents of nuclear terrorism. 4 Non-ASEAN cooperation has its
own merits but it may undermine ASEAN as an all-region institution and
create distrust among member countries. Recommendations The final part of this
paper makes recommendations to enhance ASEAN cooperation on
nonproliferation as ASEAN still provides a cherished mechanism for Southeast
Asians. Before specific steps could be taken, enhancing regional awareness of the threat of nuclear
terrorism should be made a priority. Nuclear security should be singled out as a distinct
and important field within the framework of ASEAN peace and security
cooperation. Nonproliferation should be continuously included in ASEAN and
ARF agendas and become one of ASEANs central themes for consultation .
ASEAN should also develop its own cooperative mechanism for nuclear
energy, as this mechanism can give more legitimacy to the nuclear energy
programs pursued by member states. ASEAN should work out measures to
facilitate the accession of the NWS to the SEANWFZ Protocol . (The main point of
nuclear proliferation in Southeast Asia.

contention between ASEAN and the NWS is over the geographical scope of the treaty, which covers not
only the territory and the territorial sea of the state parties but also their continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone.) Furthermore, the SEANWFZ Treaty should be amended to include articles dealing with
nonstate actors and provide mechanisms to collectively address nuclear security in the age of terror. As all
10 ASEAN countries have concluded agreements with the IAEA for the application of full-scope safeguards
to their peaceful nuclear activities, all ASEAN countries should consider signing the IAEA Additional

Fighting nuclear proliferation requires concerted efforts at both

regional and global levels. ASEAN should encourage member states to engage more deeply on
Protocol.

global activities in counter-proliferation. While preserving their rights to sovereignty and development,
ASEAN countries should not alienate themselves from international efforts to address one of the most
pressing security issues. ASEAN should call on member states to sign and ratify various international
conventions such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and others. In

ASEAN can assert itself not only as a pillar in maintaining regional

nuclear security but also as a strong supporter of global nonproliferation
regimes.
so doing,

Impacts

Regional Stability
ASEAN continuity k2 prevent Asia war
Kurlantzick 14 (5/29, Josh, fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, China's
Ready to Rumble, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-29/is-chinaready-to-use-military-might-in-southeast-asia)

All-out conflict in Asia is not inevitable, despite Chinas

burgeoning power and nationalism. If the Asean nations were
able to unite more effectively, it could apply diplomatic
pressure on China to negotiate some of the claims, reducing
the possibility of military conflict. A hotline connecting top Chinese leaders to
the capitals of Southeast Asia doesnt exist. But if one were put in place, it
might help prevent small incidents from escalating into war.
Otherwise, the potential for conflict is high. If China tried to move Philippine marines already encamped on
the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, Manila, riding a wave of nationalist sentiment, might feel compelled to
strike back, launching an attack on Chinese ships. If China struck back with its own navy and air force,

Manila would have no one to talk to immediately in Beijing to

stop the violence from escalating

ASEAN centrality is k2 regional stability stability w/o it is

impossible
Bu 15 (Xu Bu is a correspondent for Straights Times, Asean centrality matters for
East Asia cooperation, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/asean-centrality-mattersfor-east-asia-cooperation) RR
What impact the Asean Community will have on Asean centrality in regional affairs is a topical issue for

Asean centrality is the principle that the South-east Asian grouping of 10

countries should remain at the centre of regional cooperation . Asean centrality,
and the development of Asean countries, sets a good example of successful promotion of
democracy in international relations in East Asia, and well serves peace,
stability and development in the region . These days, the process of world
multi-polarisation and regional integration remains in the ascendant .
many observers.

With Asean being the most integrated and representative inter-governmental organisation in East Asia,
maintaining

Asean centrality not only serves the current regional development, but is also

consistent with the major trend of world development . No country knows better than Asean
countries do about the urgent challenges confronting South-east Asia and the top priorities in regional

common interests and

concerns of the countries in the region could be represented and addressed to the
cooperation. With Asean being the locomotive for regional cooperation,

utmost, and the development of the various regional cooperation mechanisms could be well oriented.

The regional cooperation mechanisms spearheaded by Asean could

also provide an important platform for countries both within and
outside the region to share views and meet challenges in regional
affairs. From my point of view, the establishment of the Asean Community will further strengthen
Asean centrality. Some analyses show that the establishment of the Asean
Economic Community may boost the growth rate of the Asean economy by

up to about 7 per cent. By 2020, Asean economic aggregate output would

have grown from US$2.5 trillion (S$3.5 trillion) to US$4.7 trillion, rising from
the seventh largest to the fourth in the world . By 2030, Asean's middle-class population
will have doubled, topping 163 million. We will also see a sharp increase in foreign investment in Asean.
Under the Asean Community, member countries will be further integrated in terms of politics, security,
economy and socio-culture, which will give Asean as a whole a resonant voice in regional cooperation.

Asian instability escalates to nuclear armed conflict

Campbell 8 (

Kurt M, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dr. Campbell served in several capacities in government, including

as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific, Director on theNational Security Council Staff, previously the Chief Executive Officer and co-founder of
the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), served as Director of the Aspen Strategy Group and the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Washington Quarterly, and
was the founder and Principal of StratAsia, a strategic advisory company focused on Asia, rior to co-founding CNAS, he served as Senior Vice President, Director of the
International Security Program, and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctorate in International
Relation Theory from Oxford, former associate professor of public policy and international relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and Assistant Director of
the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, member of Council on Foreign Relations and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Power
of Balance: America in iAsia June8, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatelSingh_iAsia_June08.pdf)

Asian investment is also at record levels. Asian countries lead the world with unprecedented infrastructure
projects. With over $3 trillion in foreign currency reserves, Asian nations and businesses are starting to
shape global economic activity. Indian firms are purchasing industrial giants such as Arcelor Steel, as well
as iconic brands of its once-colonial ruler, such as Jaguar and Range Rover. Chinas Lenovo bought IBMs
personal computer We call the transformations across the Asia-Pacific the emergence of iAsia to reflect
the adoption by countries across Asia of fundamentally new strategic approaches to their neighbors and

Asian nations are pursuing their interests with real power in a period of both
tremendous potential and great uncertainty. iAsia is: Integrating: iAsia includes increasing
the world.

economic interdependence and a flowering of multinational forums to deal with trade, cultural exchange,
and, to some degree, security. Innovating: iAsia boasts the worlds most successful manufacturing and
technology sectors and could start taking the lead in everything from finance to nanotech to green tech.

the
continent remains plagued by: Insecurity: Great-power rivalry is alive in Asia. Massive
military investments along with historic suspicions and contemporary territorial and
other conflicts make war in Asia plausible. Instability: From environmental degradation to violent
Investing: Asian nations are developing infrastructure and human capital at unprecedented rates. But

extremism to trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons, Asian nations have much to worry about.
Inequality: Within nations and between them, inequality in Asia is more stark than anywhere else in the
world. Impoverished minorities in countries like India and China, and the gap in governance and capacity
within countries, whether as backward as Burma or as advanced as Singapore, present unique challenges.
A traditional approach to Asia will not suffice if the United States is to both protect American interests and
help iAsia realize its potential and avoid pitfalls. business and the Chinese government, along with other
Asian financial players, injected billions in capital to help steady U.S. investment banks such as Merrill
Lynch as the American subprime mortgage collapse unfolded. Chinese investment funds regional
industrialization, which in turn creates new markets for global products. Asia now accounts for over 40
percent of global consumption of steel 4 and China is consuming almost half of worlds available concrete.
5 Natural resources from soy to copper to oil are being used by China and India at astonishing rates,
driving up commodity prices and setting off alarm bells in Washington and other Western capitals. Yet

Asia is not a theater at peace. On average, between 15 and 50 people die every day from
causes tied to conflict, and suspicions rooted in rivalry and nationalism run deep. The
continent harbors every traditional and non-traditional challenge of our age: it is a cauldron of
religious and ethnic tension; a source of terror and extremism; an accelerating driver of the insatiable
global appetite for energy; the place where the most people will suffer the adverse effects of global

and the most likely theater on

nuclear conflict. Coexisting with the
optimism of iAsia are the ingredients for internal strife, non-traditional threats like terrorism,
and traditional interstate conflict, which are all magnified by the risk of
miscalculation or poor decision-making.
climate change; the primary source of nuclear proliferation;
Earth

for

a major conventional confrontation and even a

Econ
ASEAN centrality is k2 economic growth trade
Sile 15 (Aza Wee Sile is a news assistant in CNBC.com's Asia-Pacific team. She manages the video
content for the site and writes articles on a broad range of topics from an Asia Pacific perspective. Aza
graduated from Australia's University of Newcastle with a Bachelor of Communications, Will the ASEAN
Economic Community be a bang or a bust?, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/31/will-the-asean-economiccommunity-be-a-bang-or-a-bust.html) RR
However, Joseph Incalcaterra, Asia-Pacific economist at HSBC Global Research, wants to make it clear that
"the AEC represents an important new chapter rather than inflection point." Similarly, a
Mizuho Bank note cautions against expecting a "big bang" from the roll-out of the AEC. The boost to
growth should be felt over the next decade as measures are gradually implemented through the AEC
Blueprint 2025, which maps out how the bloc will continue working towards an integrated economy from

the ASEAN Single Window, a regional initiative to

has already been established by
many ASEAN countries and will help to facilitate the trade of goods. "The free
2015 to 2025. But one timely impact is

expedite cargo clearance, notes Incalcaterra. This initiative

trade in goods is largely a fait accompli, and the free flow of skilled labor [remains] complicated due to
political concerns, which leads us to believe that the liberalization of services and investment are the most
important parts of the AEC and can bring about the most tangible economic benefits," said Incalcaterra. On
the 2015 OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index, ASEAN is seen as fairly closed in terms of services,
particularly Indonesia which had one of the lowest scores. HSBC notes that Indonesia's closed services
sector is a "largely structural issue in Indonesia [and] serves as a significant impediment to the country's

The
integration of services trade will benefit Singapore the most with its high
value-add finance and insurance industry, followed by the Philippines and
Malaysia, said HSBC. On the investment liberalization front, Rahul Bajoria, regional
economist at Barclays Capital said he expects "rapidly growing economies such as
Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines to gain the most in terms of investments ."
broader reform efforts" adding that this is why Indonesia will not stand to gain much from the AEC.

In addition, more mature economies such as Malaysia and Singapore could see more corporate
investments, "which they will leverage by deploying capital within the region," said Bajoria to CNBC.

Financial integration and capital account liberalization will help to

facilitate economic rebalancing within ASEAN , towards the AEC's goal of equitable
development, said HSBC. However, this coordinated approach might be hard to
reach because without political integration, the ASEAN has a much
weaker institutional framework to ensure that commitments are me t.
HSBC adds that the ASEAN Secretariat that acts as the main authority of the bloc and implements projects
has limited powers and only a tiny budget of $17 million as of 2014. Therefore, improvements need to be
made not only to the AEC but to ASEAN as a whole, before the region can see stronger integration and
benefit from it.

ASEAN centrality K2 Global Economic GrowthEconomic

Integration
JP Morgan 14 (JP Morgan is a bank, 2014, JP Morgan, ASEANs Bright
Future: Growth Opportunities for Corporations in the ASEAN Region,
https://www.jpmorgan.com/country/US/EN/cib/investment-banking/tradeasean-future)
With a population of more than 600 million and a nominal GDP of $2.31
trillion, ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), made up of Brunei Darussalam,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, is fast
becoming a major economic force in Asia and a driver of global growth . As the

economies of neighboring China and India decelerate, and as the U.S. shifts
its focus to the East, the region is increasingly becoming a destination for
investment. In support, the ASEAN Economic Community has a goal of integrating the regional
economies by 2015 to make the countries more competitive with the rest of the world. Today, as growth
opportunities are counterbalanced by a variety of political and economic risks, what does this group of 10
disparate countries have to offer for global investors? Located at the heart of the Asia-Pacific region and
situated across major trade routes $5.3 trillion of global trade1 passes through its waterways each year

ASEAN is the United States third-largest Asian trading partner and the largest
Asian destination for U.S. investment.2 It also receives the largest chunk of outgoing
investment from the EU, at 24%.3 At current growth rates, ASEAN should become the fourthlargest market after the EU, U.S. and China by 2030,4supported by an increasingly welleducated workforce, abundant natural resources and favorable geographic
location. J.P. Morgan has been operating in Southeast Asia for 50 years and has witnessed the evolution
of the sub-region from a low-cost manufacturing base to a solid pillar of Asias GDP growth, says Pravin
Advani, J.P. Morgans global trade and loan products head of global sales and the Asia-Pacific region. We
see a bright future for ASEAN as the countries strive to sharpen their overall competitiveness through
closer collaboration. ASEANs next step is to meet its stated goal of regional economic integration a
single market and production base and the free movement of goods, services and labor by forming the
AEC. Integration

within ASEAN will be a key boost to the regions economic

growth in the medium term. We are already seeing a striking increase in intraregional trade both within ASEAN and among emerging Asias economies
more broadly, says Benjamin Shatil, regional Asia economist at J.P. Morgan .
One of the key stumbling blocks to integration, however, is the multitude of political, cultural and
economic differences among ASEANs countries. Most recently, the group included three constitutional
monarchies, two communist states, three republics, a sultanate and a former military junta. Per-capita GDP
ranges from more than $40,000 in Singapore and Brunei Darussalam to less than $1,000 in the emerging
economies of Myanmar and Cambodia. Economic integration for ASEAN is an ambitious goal. It is
challenging, although not completely impossible, says Agatha Lee, head of APAC trade sales for J.P.
Morgan, adding that there are many hurdles to overcome, from currency regulation in economies such as
Malaysia and Vietnam to political worries in Thailand, all of which are concerning to investors. As ASEAN
grows, recent research shows the region now receives more foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows than
China. In 2013, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, known as the ASEAN-5
countries, received $128.4 billion in foreign investment, up 7% from the previous year and topping Chinas
FDI receipts of $117.6 billion, which declined 2.9% from 2012.5 ASEAN was also home to huge, marketmoving IPOs in 2013, including a $2.1 billion listing for BTS Rail Mass Transit Growth Infrastructure Fund in
Thailand6 and a $2.6 billion IPO for Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust, Singapores largest-ever
real estate investment trust listing.7 But with fierce global competition for foreign direct investment, can
these countries create enough incentives to lure capital away from other emerging regions? Now that
these countries are part of ASEAN, people are starting to feel a bit more comfortable about investing there,
so we may even see export flows from these countries coming into the U.S., which might be cheaper than
those from Latin America or Africa, says Lee. The challenge of attracting foreign investment plays out in
ASEANs economies in different ways, adds Shatil. In the regions frontier markets, such as Myanmar,
improving regulation and increasing transparency will be key to sustaining FDI inflows. At the other end of
the spectrum, in ASEANs more developed economies, maintaining competitiveness will be critical. In

ASEANs economic performance continues to outpace the rest

of the world. The Asian Development Bank estimates the blocs GDP growth at 5.6% in 2014, up from
spite of challenges,

5.3% in 2013. In addition to expanding our footprint in the region, J.P. Morgan is also deepening our
presence and support for growth industries in each country as well as for our business partners, says
Advani. We are proud to be working alongside some of the most established corporate names in
Southeast Asia and look forward to another 50 years of partnership. For corporations that are
contemplating including ASEAN in their business strategy, J.P. Morgans Lee has one piece of advice: If you
want to look at the ASEAN business opportunity, test a set-up in Singapore first. From there, its easier for
you to maneuver as well as tap into the knowledge and experience of the business councils that can help
you enter these newer markets.

Global Economic Decline Causes War

Collier 2006 (Paul Collieris a professor in the Department of Economics at
Oxford University, April 2006, Oxford University, Economic Causes of Civil
Conflict and their Implications for Policy, Pages 4-23)
Modern economics has two powerful tools: statistics and theory . People who are
not economists are seldom convinced simply by economic theory so I will begin with the statistical

Together with Anke Hoeffler, I have analyzed the pattern of conflict

using a large new data base on civil wars during the period 1965-99 (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004). Completely independently, two political scientists James Fearon and David
Laitin, followed the same approach and their results are very similar (Fearon and
evidence.

Laitin, 2003). I will focus on my own work, simply because I am more familiar with its limitations. 5 A civil
war is classified as an internal conflict with at least one thousand

battle-related deaths. During this period globally there were 73 civil wars, and in principle we analyze the

pattern as to why these wars occurred among the 161 countries in our sample. We divide the period up into eight five-year sub-periods, and attempt to predict the occurrence of war during a sub-period by the characteristics at its start. The statistical techniques we use are logit and
probit regressions. In practice, some civil wars occur in situations where there is virtually no other data about the country. We know that it had a war, but we do not know enough of its other characteristics to include it in our analysis. This reduces our sample to 47 civil wars. However,
this is still sufficient to find some strong patterns. The 47 wars are listed in the Appendix. While our published results do not use data beyond 1999, in our more recent work we have revisited our analysis including data through to the end of 2004. The core results remain the same. In
order to get some feel for how important different risk factors are, it is useful to think of a baseline country. I will take as a baseline, a country all of whose characteristics were at the mean of our sample. By construction then, this is an extraordinarily ordinary country. These
characteristics give it a risk of civil conflict of around 14% in any particular five year period. Now, one-by-one, I will vary some of the more important risk factors. One important risk factor is that countries which have a substantial share of their income (GDP) coming from the export of
primary commodities are radically more at risk of conflict. The most dangerous level of primary commodity dependence is 26% of GDP. At this level the otherwise ordinary country has a risk of conflict of 23%. By contrast, if it had no primary commodity exports (but was otherwise the
same) its risk would fall to only one half of one percent. Thus, without primary commodity exports, ordinary countries are pretty safe from internal conflict, while when such exports are substantial the society is highly dangerous. Primary commodities are thus a major part of our conflict
story. Recently, a number of scholars have revisited the issue: the August 2005 issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution was devoted to it. James Fearon may be correct in arguing that what we took for an inverted-U relationship between primary commodities and the risk of conflict is
no such thing: there is no downturn. Fearon himself things that the risk is largely confined to oil, but other scholars disagree on this point. Rather, beyond a certain point the risk simply levels off. In our current work, Anke and I have updated our analysis by five years to December 2004
and incorporated the latest revisions from political scientists on what events were and were not civil wars. With this new data we still find the same results but at the time of writing our work is not yet completed. By the time of publication it should be on my website. What else matters?
Both geography and history matter. Geography matters because if the population is highly geographically dispersed, then the country is harder for the government to control than if everyone lives in the same small area. The geography of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (the
former Zaire), makes it unusually hard for government forces to control because the population lives around the fringes of a huge area, with the three main cities in the extreme west, extreme south-east and extreme north. By comparison, Singapore would be a nightmare for a
rebellion. In this city state 6 there is nowhere to hide and government forces could be anywhere in the country within an hour. With Congo-like geographic dispersion our otherwise ordinary country has a risk of conflict of around 50% whereas with Singapore-like concentration its risk
falls to around 3%. There is also some evidence that mountainous terrain increases the risk: presumably because it offers greater possibilities of safe haven for rebel forces. History matters because if a country has recently had a civil war its risk of further war is much higher.
Immediately after the end of hostilities there is a 40% chance of further conflict. This risk then falls at around one percentage point for each year of peace. However, how much history matters depends upon the size of the diaspora. For example, some countries have very large
diasporas in the USA relative to their remaining resident population, whereas others do not. Suppose that our otherwise ordinary country has ended a civil war five years ago and now wants to know what are its chances of peace during the next five years. If the country has an unusually
large American diaspora its changes of conflict are 36%. If it has an unusually small diaspora its chances of conflict are only 6%. We focus on diasporas living in America because the data are not available for most other countries. Anecdotal evidence points to diasporas based in other
countries being a similar problem. For example, finance for explosives used in massacres committed by the Tamil Tigers has been traced to a bank in Canada, and the Albanian diasporas in Europe financed the Kosovo Liberation Army. So, diasporas appear to make life for those left
behind much more dangerous in post-conflict situations. Economic opportunities also matter. Conflict is concentrated in countries with little education. The average country in our sample had only 45% of its young males in secondary education. A country which has ten percentage
points more of its youths in schools- say 55% instead of 45% - cuts its risk of conflict from 14% to around 10%. Conflict is more likely in countries with fast

population growth: each percentage point on the

Conflict is also
more likely in countries in economic decline. Each percentage point off the
growth rate of per capita income raises the risk of conflict by around one
percentage point. Conceivably, the apparently adverse effect of slow growth
might be spurious, due to reverse causation. If there is a high risk of civil war,
investment might decline and hence growth would slow: the slow growth
would appear to cause subsequent conflict but actually causality would be
the other way around. This problem has recently addressed in a valuable
contribution by Miguel et al. (2004). They manage to isolate variations in the
growth rate that are completely unrelated to the risk of civil war. They isolate
these growth shocks by studying the impact of rainfall shocks on growth
using long time series on rainfall, country-by-country across Africa.
Essentially, in a year when rainfall is above its normal level for that country,
growth is also atypically high, and conversely when rainfall is below normal.
They show that the growth shocks predicted from rainfall shocks powerfully
affect the risk of civil war. By design, these growth shocks are
uncontaminated by the risk of war and so the direction of causality is
unambiguous. So, rapid growth really does reduce the risk of civil war. The ethnic and religious
rate of population growth raises the risk of conflict by around 2.5 percentage points.

composition of the country matters. If there is one dominant ethnic

group which constitutes between 45% and 90% of the population, - enough to give 7 it control, but not

enough to make discrimination against a minority pointless the risk of conflict doubles. For example, in Sri Lanka the Tamils are a minority of around 12% of the population, and in Rwanda and Burundi the Tutsi are around 10-15% of the population. Of course, in Sri Lanka the Tamils are
a weak minority whereas in Rwanda the Tutsis are a strong minority, controlling the government. However, clearly, in Rwanda, the Tutsi minority is too scared of being subject to ethnic dominance to hand over power. While ethnic dominance is a problem, ethnic and religious diversity
does not make a society more dangerous in fact, it makes it safer. A country which is ethnically and religiously homogenous is surprisingly dangerous the risk is 23%. By comparison, a country with ethnic and religious diversity equal to the maximum we find in our sample has a risk
of only around 3%. Other than in the fairly unusual case of dominance, diversity makes a society much safer. Finally, some good news. Since 1990 the world has been significantly safer from civil conflict. If we add a dummy variable for the period since the end of the Cold War it is
statistically significant with quite a large effect. Holding the above causes of conflict constant at the average, the risk of conflict was only half as great during the 1990s as during the Cold War. Of course, some of the other causes of conflict also changed during the 1990s on average
per capita incomes rose faster than during the 1980s, so that this also reduced the risk of conflict. However, some countries became more dependent upon primary commodity exports, or their economies collapsed, and these countries became more prone to conflict. As of 1995, the
country with the highest risk of civil conflict according to our analysis was Zaire, with a three-in-four chance of conflict within the ensuing five years. Sadly, our model predicted this all too accurately. I should stress, however, that our analysis in not well-suited to prediction: firefighters
have to look elsewhere. To predict a civil war it is surely more useful to focus on near-term indicators such as political incidents and rising violence. Rather, our model is useful in pointing to the typical structural risks and so provides some guidance on longer term policies for prevention.
This is the statistical pattern of civil conflict since 1960. It is interesting both for what is important and for what is not. Clearly, there are some powerful dangers coming from primary commodities and diasporas, and there used to be risks from the Cold War. However, equally striking is
what does not appear to affect conflict risk. Inequality, whether of incomes or of assets, has no discernible effect. Unequal societies are not more prone to conflict, although conflicts in unequal societies do seem to last longer (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004). A lack of democratic
rights appears to have no significant effect. Ethnic and religious diversity, as noted, far from increasing the risk of conflict, actually reduces it. These are all obvious proxies for objective grievances. Unequal, ethnically divided societies, with few political rights might sound exactly the
sort of places which would be most prone to rebellion. They are surely the sort of places most in need of protest. And yet, such places, as far as we can tell, have no higher risk of violent conflict than anywhere else indeed, thanks to their ethnic diversity, they are somewhat safer. The
only protest-type variable which matters is if the society is characterized by ethnic dominance. This may be because we are not measuring objective grievances well enough. However, we have made an honest effort to utilize all the available comparable 8 indices of objective grievance,
of which there are now a number. At least as a working hypothesis, civil war is much more strongly related to the above economic and geographic variables than it is to objective grievances. There are thus two surprises to be explained: why is rebellion so unrelated to the objective need
for protest, and why is it so strongly related to primary commodities and diasporas? Why is rebellion not like protest? Economists have studied the dynamics of protest (Kuran, 1989). The first problem with getting a protest going is that it is a public good. That is, even if the protest
succeeds in securing justice, everyone will benefit whether or not they bother to take part in the protest. Always, public goods face collective action problems: it makes more individual sense to free-ride on the efforts of others, and if everyone free-rides, nothing happens. This is a
problem in a protest because the government might punish people who take part, unless there are so many people that there is safety in numbers. Further, in order to protest, most people will lose a day of income. This is one reason why such a high proportion of protesters are often
students. The temptation to free-ride on a justiceseeking rebellion is very much stronger than the temptation to free-ride on a justiceseeking protest. A protest costs little, risks little, and offers a sense of citizenship. In effect, protestors are forcing an open election on an issue. Rebellion
is a full-time commitment, and it is dangerous. Economists would predict that the collective action problem for a justice-seeking rebellion would usually be insuperable. Kurans insight in analyzing the dynamics of protest was to see that a successful protest would be one which
escalated, and that this depended upon a cascade of participation, drawing in increasingly luke-warm supporters. Suppose the potential supporters of a protest are ranked in order of their willingness to take personal risk. The most ardent supporters join the protest first, at the stage
when because it is small, it is easy for the government to victimize participants. Each time an additional supporter joins the protest the risks of punishment for participation go down. The cascade depends upon the reduction in this risk inducing enough people to change their minds and
join the protest that the risk falls further, inducing another group of people to change their minds. If the cascade works, then when a few committed people create an initial spark it turns into a prairie fire. Could the rebellions we observe be failed protest movements, cases where brave
few hundred created the spark, but the rest of the society failed to ignite, leaving the brave core to turn into guerrilla fighters against the government? Are rebels just heroes who have been let down by the mass of cowards and so driven into more violent actions to protect themselves?
Well if they were, we would observe a clear pattern in rebellion. Kuran suggests that the cascade is more likely to work in fairly homogenous societies. In such societies there will be a dense continuum of opinion. Many people will be on the margin of changing their minds and so will be
swung into action as the risks of government punishment start to fall. By contrast, if the society is split up into many 9 different groups who see the concerns of other groups as irrelevant to their own, instead of a continuum of opinion there are clusters broken by gaps. As soon as the
cascade reaches the first gap it stops. One implication of this insight is that the societies in which protest will get stuck are those which are diverse. That is, if rebellions are the stuff of heroes let down by cowards, we should expect to find more of them in diverse societies. Recall that in
fact we find precisely the opposite. Diverse societies have a much lower risk of rebellion than homogenous societies. Of course, if we scour history sufficiently thoroughly we will find examples of protest movements which aborted into rebellion. If we scour history we can find anything.
However, the image of the rebel band as that part of the population which is the most dedicated and self-sacrificing is difficult to reconcile with the facts. Rebellion is not generally linked to the objective grievances inequality, political repression, diversity which is repeatedly used in
rebel discourse. Nor is its incidence high in societies where we would expect protest movements to face the most difficulties. The sole exception to this is that in situations of ethnic dominance with or without democracy minorities (or majorities) may take to the gun. Other than this,
the modern rebel appears truly to have been a rebel without a cause. A recent analysis of rebel recruitment by Jeremy Weinstein (2005) adds an important insight to how rebel motivations may evolve over time. Initially the rebellion may be motivated by a desire to rectify perceived
grievances. However, if there are prospects of gaining control of lucrative revenues, for example through natural resources or kidnap, this will gradually affect the composition of recruitment. The volunteers who seek to join the movement will increasingly be drawn from those with
criminal rather than altruistic intent, and even an altruistic rebel leader will have difficulties in screening out the criminals. Whatever characteristics the leader demands, will be mimicked by criminals wishing to join. Hence, the rebel organization will gradually evolve from being
altruistic to being criminal. This may well describe the evolution of the FARC from its origins as a rural protest movement to its present reality as a massive drugs operation. Even when rebel recruits are truly dedicated and self-sacrificing, this devotion to a cause is not a reliable
indicator that the cause is worthwhile. Probably the largest collective self-sacrificing organization in history was Hitlers SS: towards the end of the Second World War thousands of men were prepared to die hopelessly for a cause that was despicable beyond measure. Suicide bombers,
billionaires who abandon their wealth for the fugitive life, are evidently devoted. This does not make their cause remotely worthy of respect. Most societies have a small minority of people seeking meaning in a cause, whatever that might be. What conditions make predatory rebellions
profitable? Empirically, the risk of rebellion is strongly linked to three economic conditions: dependence upon primary commodity exports, low average income of the country, and slow growth. I now suggest why this is the case. Primary commodity exports are the most lootable of all
economic activities. An economy which is dependent upon them thus offers plenty of opportunities for predatory rebellion.1 One indication that primary commodity exports are highly lootable is that they are also the most heavily taxed activity the same characteristics which make it

easy for 1 Collier (2000) sets out a formal model of loot-seeking rebellion. 10 governments to tax them, make it easy for rebels to loot them. Indeed, rebel predation is just illegal taxation. Conversely, in some countries government has been described as legalized predation in which
primary commodities are heavily taxed in order to finance the government elite. In the worst cases, those who are the victims of such predation may not discriminate much between the behavior of the rebel organization and that of the government. This does not, however, mean that
the rebels are `no worse than the government. The presence of a rebel organization plunges the society from peace to civil war, and the costs of war are likely to outweigh the costs of government predation. Primary commodity exports are especially vulnerable to looting and taxation
because their production relies heavily on assets which are long-lasting and immobile. Once a mine shaft has been sunk, it is worth exploiting it even if much of the anticipated profits are lost to rebels. Once coffee trees have been planted, it is worth harvesting them even if much of the
coffee has to be surrendered. Thus, rebel predation does not kill the activity off or shift it elsewhere as would happen were manufacturing the target. Further, because the produce is exported, it has to be transported to the port. Along the way there are many geographic choke points
which if rebels can control, even if only spasmodically, they can extract a tribute. The government can be presumed to control the best choke point of all the port itself. This behavior makes a rebel group somewhat like organized crime. However, it is organized crime with a difference.
The government will try to defend the choke points from rebel attacks it is, after all, defending its own revenue. Hence, unlike a mafia, the rebel group must expect sometimes to confront substantial government forces, and so will need to protect itself. Rebel groups therefore need to
be much larger than mafias. Typically, rebel organizations have in the range 500-5,000 fighters, whereas mafias are generally in the range 20-500. It is because rebel organizations need to be large and to confront government forces in order to function as predators that conflicts can
produce cumulative mortality in excess of 1,000 and so qualify empirically as civil wars. Why is the risk of conflict much higher in countries where incomes are low? The explanation which jumps to mind is that when people are poor they have little to lose from joining a rebel group, so
that rebel organizations find recruitment cheap. There may be something in this, but if young men can be recruited cheaply for the rebel organization, they can also be recruited cheaply by the government. Hence, low income does not automatically give rebellion an advantage.

poor
economies, like Ghana and Uganda in the early 1980s, the government was only raising around 6% of
national income as taxation. This reduces the capacity of the government to spend on defense, and so
However, indirectly, low income does advantage the rebels. Around the world, the share of income which accrues to the government as tax revenue rises with income. For example, most OECD governments get around 40% of national income as tax revenue. In the really

Indeed, in low-income economies, governments will

typically derive about half of their revenue from taxes on primary commodity
exports (directly or indirectly) so that their revenue base is quite similar to
that of the rebels. At higher income levels the government supplements
these revenues with revenues from taxes on other economic activities. Thus,
poor countries have a high incidence of conflict because governments cannot
defend. Of course, there might be other reasons why poverty 11 makes it easier for rebels . Poverty
might make people desperate or angry. However, if this was an important effect we would
makes rebel predation easier.

expect to find that

inequality made conflict more likely: for a given level of average income, the more unequal is income distribution the more severe the poverty of the poorest. In fact, inequality does not seem to affect the risk of conflict. Rebellion seems

not to be the rage of the poor. Indeed, if anything, rebellion seems to be the rage of the rich. One way in which rebel groups can lock in to predation of primary commodity exports is if they can secede with the land on which the primary commodities are produced. Such attempted
secessions by rich regions are quite common. The Katangan secession movement in Zaire was the copper mining region; the Biafran secession movement in Nigeria was the oil producing region; the Aceh secession movement in Indonesia is an oil-producing region with per capita GDP
three times the national average; the successful Eritrean secession was a region with double the per capita income of the rest of Ethiopia. To the extent that the rebel group is not just benefiting itself through predation, but is fighting a political cause, that cause is the grievance of a rich
minority at paying taxes to the poor majority. Such rebellions may have more in common with the politics of Staten Island than of Robin Hood. Slow economic growth and rapid population growth both make rebellion more likely. Presumably, both of these assist rebel recruitment. The
rebel organization needs to build itself up fairly fast in order to survive against the army. Hence, for a given level of income, if there are few job opportunities, few schooling opportunities, and many young people needing work, the rebel organization has an easier task. So, the observed
pattern of rebellion is quite intelligible. High primary commodity exports, low income and slow growth are a cocktail which makes predatory rebellions more financially viable. In such circumstances rebels can do well out of war. Why might diversity make a society safer rather than more
dangerous? One of the most surprising empirical regularities is that societies which are diverse in terms of both ethnicity and religion seem to be significantly safer than societies which are homogenous. A standard measure of ethnic diversity proxies ethnicity by language and
calculates the probability that two people drawn randomly from the countrys population will be from different linguistic groups. As part of our work we constructed an equivalent measure of religious diversity. Unfortunately, there are no global data that combine ethnicity and religion:
showing us the mosaic, country-by-country of ethno-religious combinations. Anke and I approximate such a concept by combining the ethnic diversity and religious diversity measures, investigating combination both by addition and by multiplication. It is this measure that is
significantly negatively related to the risk of conflict. If ethnic and religious hatreds were an important cause of conflict it might be expected that the pattern would be the reverse, since in homogenous societies there would be no other group to hate. Conflict seems not to be generated
by such hatreds. Indeed, Fearon and Laitin actually investigate a measure the intensity of inter-group hatred and 12 find it unrelated to the risk of civil war. However, it is less evident why diversity makes a society considerably safer, instead of simply having no effect. I think that
diversity may make a society safer because it can make rebellion more difficult. This is because, first and foremost, a rebel organization is neither a mafia nor a protest movement, but an army. Armies face huge problems of organizational cohesion and motivation. To fight effectively,
soldiers must overcome their individual instincts to avoid danger, and must take risks to help other members of their team. Military history abounds in stories of small groups defeating larger groups because they were better fighting units. The government army also faces these
problems but it has the advantage of already having had a long time to deal with them. By contrast, the rebel organization cannot usually afford to take years to build up its morale before it starts operations: it must recruit from scratch and rapidly start fighting. One simple principle is
to keep the recruits as alike each other as possible. The more social ties there are within the organization, - the same kin group, or at least same ethnic group, language group, and religion, - the easier will it be to build a fighting force. This may be especially true of the officer core. The
easiest way for a government to defeat a rebellion may be to buy off some of the officers. The more social capital there is within the group the more cohesive it is likely to be. This principle implies that in ethnically diverse societies rebellions will tend to be ethnically particular. This
has two important corollaries. First, the more that the society is divided into a patchwork of different ethnic and religious groups, the more difficult will it be to recruit a force of a sufficient scale to be viable. For example, in Africa the average ethno-linguistic group has only around
250,000 people, of whom around 25,000 will be young males. Thus, even before we allow for any further divisions of religion, an organization of 5,000 fighters would need to recruit 20% of the age group. Diversity in the society thus makes the rebel task more difficult and so makes
rebellion less likely. The second corollary is that where conflict does take place in ethnically diverse societies it will take the form of some particular ethnic group rebelling against the government. As in any army, recruits will be motivated to kill the enemy by basic indoctrination in why
the enemy deserves to be killed. Indeed, the simple Leninist theory of the rebel organization, which many rebel movements adopt even if they do not adopt Marxist ideology, is that people are initially so oppressed that they do not realize they are oppressed. It is a key task of the rebel
organization to make people realize that they are the victims of injustice. The economic theory of rebellion accepts this proposition and makes one simple but reasonable extension: the rebel organization can inculcate a subjective sense of injustice whether or not this is objectively
justified. The astounding self-sacrifice displayed by SS troops in their loyalty for Hitler is a disturbing indication that passionate commitment to a cause can be inculcated by effective propaganda regardless of the underlying merits of the cause. The rebel organization needs to inculcate
a sense of injustice and will work to create it. From this follows a hatred of the enemy and a willingness to fight. The inculcation of grievance is not a frivolous activity, it is vital for a effective fighting force. Take for example, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, which is probably the
most effective rebellion in recent history. Its recruitment base was barely two million people and it had little foreign government support, yet it 13 defeated an Ethiopian army of over 400,000 men which was supported by Russia. Its success obviously depended upon having its much
smaller army well-motivated. The EPLF deliberately built this motivation by routinely withdrawing its recruits from the front for six months to send them on indoctrination courses. If the society in which the rebellion occurs is ethnically diverse, the rebel organization will nevertheless be
ethnically homogenous to assist cohesion. Since the rebels will therefore be ethnically different from most of the rest of society, the obvious discourse for the rebel leadership to adopt with its recruits is that of ethnic grievance. Hence, ethnic grievance is actively manufactured by the
rebel organization as a necessary way of motivating its forces. As a result, where conflicts occur in ethnically diverse societies, they will look and sound as though they were caused by ethnic hatreds. A more remarkable example is the conflict in Somalia. Somalia is one of the most
ethnically homogenous societies in the world although, as in all traditional societies, within the single ethnic group are many lineage or kin-groups. In the initial postindependence period, political power had been shared reasonably comfortably among these clan groups. However, in the
instability following a dictatorship, a political opportunist, Ayeed, induced the group living around the national arsenal to seize its considerable contents. The group then proceeded to build an army around these armanents. Building an army fast, Ayeed based recruitment on his clan and
its proximate lineage groups in the absence of ethnic distinctions, clan membership was the only basis for creating cohesion in a fighting force. The excluded clans naturally felt threatened by this bid for power and so armed themselves in response. The resulting violent conflict in
effect turned what had been a patchwork of closely related clusters of people, into large rival groupings which hated each other. The conflict created the equivalent of inter-ethnic hatred in an ethnically unified society. A surprisingly similar example is the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC is at the opposite end of the spectrum to Somalia, a society which is highly ethnically diverse. When President Kabila the First fell out with his Tutsi military support, he needed to build an army to oppose them. Because the DRC was so ethnically
divided, this was difficult. Kabila needed to recruit across ethnic boundaries in order to build a sufficient fighting force. He therefore manufactured an encompassing ethnic grouping, of which all groups other than the Tutsis were members, namely the Bantu. Just as in Somalia Ayeed had
forged several clans into a common fighting group distinct from the excluded clans, so Kabila hoped to forge several ethnic groups into a common fighting group. In both cases, the conflict created a need to manufacture inter-group hatred, but the basic conditions for it a society
divided into two large groups, did not exist. In both cases military necessity led to the invention not just of the grievances but of the groupings themselves. Even if conflict is not caused by divisions, it actively needs to create them. When such conflicts are viewed during or after the
event, the observer sees ethnic hatred. The parties to the conflict have used the discourse of group hatred in order to build fighting organizations. It is natural for observers to interpret such conflicts as being caused by ethnic hatred. Instead, the conflicts have caused the inter-group
hatred and may even, as in Somalia, have created the groups. 14 If the rebel organization succeeds in generating group grievance, perhaps by manufacturing both the grievance and the group, the resulting civil war becomes defined in terms of political conflict. However, it is the
military needs of the rebel organization which have created this political conflict rather than objective grievances. Analysts often reason back from the political discourse during conflict and deduce that the war is the consequence of particularly intense political conflict, based in turn
upon particularly strong reasons for grievance. Yet the intensity of objective grievance does not predict civil war. Many societies sustain intense political conflict for many years without this developing into war. Political conflict is universal, whereas civil war is rare. My argument is that
where rebellions happen to be financially viable, wars will occur. As part of the process of war, the rebel organization must generate group grievance for military effectiveness. The generation of group grievance politicizes the war. Thus, the war produces the intense political conflict, not
the intense political conflict the war. If diversity increases safety why is ethnic dominance so dangerous? The one exception to the rule that homogenous societies are more dangerous than societies with more than one ethnic group, is when there is ethnic dominance. By ethnic
dominance I mean a society in which the largest single ethnic group has somewhere between 45% and 90% of the population. It is not difficult to see why such societies are dangerous. Having 45% or more of the population is sufficient in a democracy to give the group permanent
control: what political scientists call a stable winning coalition. Having less than 90% of the population suggests that it might be worth exploiting this power by transferring resources from the minority. If the minority is much smaller than 10% of the population, there is normally so little
to be gained by exploiting it, that the gain may be more than swallowed up in the costs of the transfer system. Thus, in societies characterized by ethnic dominance, the majority probably has both the power and the interest to exploit the minority. The minority may become sufficiently
fearful of permanent exploitation that it decides to fight. This is the exception to the absence of objective grievance effects, and a reason for it may be that democracy can offer no prospect of redress. In diverse societies not characterized by ethnic dominance, small groups which are
excluded from power can hope at some stage to bid themselves in to a winning coalition. Even dictators do not last forever. Thus, for example, in Kenya, where no tribe has close to a majority, the fifteen years of President Kenyattas rule strongly favored his own large tribe, the Kikuyu.
However, Kenyatta had chosen as his Vice-President someone from a very minor tribe. On the death of Kenyatta, the VicePresident, Moi, succeeded to the Presidency and for twenty-six years to hold together a winning coalition of small tribes, excluding both the Kikuyu and the Luo, the
two largest tribal groups. The small tribes in Kenyattas Kenya were thus right to hope for eventual redressal through the political, rather than the military process. By contrast, in societies characterized by ethnic dominance, the minority has little to hope for through the political
process. Thus, it is possible that rebellion in societies with ethnic dominance is the behavior of despair. Note that it makes little difference whether it is the majority of the minority which is in power. Even if the minority is in power, it dare not trust democracy because it does not trust
the majority. This is perhaps the case with the Tutsi-dominated 15 governments of Rwanda and Burundi, and perhaps even of the minority Tigreandominated government of Ethiopia. The current acute difficulties in Iraq are thus consistent with what might be expected in a society
characterized by ethnic dominance (Collier, 2005). Why are diasporas so dangerous? Recall that empirically if a country which has recently ended a conflict has a large diaspora, its risk that the conflict will resume is sharply increased. There is little mystery about this effect. Diasporas
sometimes harbor rather romanticized attachments to their group of origin and may nurse grievances as a form of asserting continued belonging. They are much richer than the people in their country of origin and so can afford to finance vengeance. Above all, they do not have to
suffer any of the awful consequences of renewed conflict because they are not living in the country. Hence, they are a ready market for rebel groups touting vengeance and so are a source of finance for renewed conflict. They are also a source of pressure for secession. For example, the
(peaceful) secession of Slovakia from the then Czechoslovakia was initiated not in Czechoslovakia itself, but in the Czechoslovak diaspora organizations in North America. City-by-city, the diaspora organization divorced.2 The reductio ad absurdum of such a trend would be for immigrant
populations of the USA and the European Union to split their countries of origin into tiny ethnic theme parks, while themselves enjoying the advantages of living in nations with scale and diversity. Another source of foreign finance is governments which are enemies of the incumbent
government. During the Cold War each of the superpowers offered inducements for third world governments to align with them. Once a government had done this, it became the potential target of destabilization efforts from the other superpower. One means of destabilization was to
fund rebel groups. Once the Cold War ended, the need for such destabilization ended, and so the external finance for rebel organizations declined, which perhaps explains why the risk of civil conflict was lower during the 1990s. Many governments of low-income countries are on bad
terms with their neighbors. Because the international community strongly discourages international war, notably through reductions in aid, warfare with neighbors usually has to be covert. The most straightforward means of such warfare is to arm and finance a rebel group that fights
the neighbor. For many years the government of Uganda covertly supported the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army, and in response the government of Sudan supported the Lords Resistance Army in northern Uganda. One problem with such support is that because it is covert it is very
difficult to verify if it has ceased, and so correspondingly difficult to conclude an effective peace agreement between the two governments: each party has an incentive to sign an agreement but not abide by it. The costs of civil war 2 I would like to thank Professor Frederick Prior of
Swarthmore College for this information. 16 A typical civil war inflicts an immense amount of damage: death, disease, and poverty. Anke and I have attempted to put a cost on this damage, and to determine how the cost is divided among different groups of victims (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004b). Estimating the cost of conflict is an essential step towards cost-benefit analysis. In turn, cost-benefit analysis has two important applications. The first is to give some broad sense of whether civil war is worthwhile: is it usually a reasonable investment for those societies that
embark upon it? The second is to guide policies for reducing the incidence of civil war. Most policies cost money, and some cost lives. Are such expenditures warranted in terms of their likely savings? The costs of civil war are partly directly economic and partly social. By the end of the
typical war the economy is about 15% poorer than it would otherwise have been, and mortality is much higher, mainly due to disease triggered by movements of refugees and the collapse of public health systems, rather than combat deaths. These effects are highly persistent after the
end of the war: the typical war lasts about seven years but it takes over a decade to recover. Hence, much of the cost of a civil war, around half, occurs after it is over. Further, a lot of the costs accrue to neighboring countries: both economic decline and disease spread across borders.
Because the typical country has around three neighbors, all of whom are affected, the total cost to neighbors is about as large as the cost to the country itself. One implication is that most of the costs of a war accrue to either the future or to neighbors and so are not taken into account
by those who start them. Even where rebels initiate conflict with some sense of future benefits to society outweighing future costs, they omit key costs and so their decisions are biased in favor of conflict. Taking all the costs together, we estimate that the typical civil war costs around
$60 billion. This is a huge sum, more than double the annual income of the typical civil war country. It dwarfs any likely benefits: most civil wars are terrible investments. It also suggests that it is worth spending large sums to reduce their incidence as long as we can find interventions
that are effective. So what can be done? I have spent a long time on the diagnosis of the problem because different diagnoses lead to radically different policy solutions. If you accept the conventional grievance account of conflict, then the appropriate policy interventions are to address
the possible objective causes of grievance. On this account, countries should reduce inequality and increase political rights. These noble objectives are desirable on many grounds, but if the objective is civil peace, then on my analysis they will be ineffective. A further policy, if you
accept the grievance account, might be to re-draw borders, split countries, and even move populations so as to achieve greater ethnic homogeneity. By contrast, if you accept that diversity makes countries safer, then this is the road to increased civil conflict, and presumably also to
increased international conflict. Perhaps a recent example of such an eventuality is the break-up of Yugoslavia. In the old Yugoslavia there was a sufficiently high degree of diversity that no one group constituted 17 a majority the society was not characterized by ethnic dominance.
First, Slovenia, the richest region of Yugoslavia, seceded in what could be interpreted as an instance of the rage of the rich, although there were most surely other motivations. Then Croatia, the next richest region also seceded. Due to these two secessions, the residual Yugoslavia was
characterized by ethnic dominance. Civil and international war followed. Hence, the policies that follow from the grievance diagnosis are variously ineffective and counter-productive if you accept the predation diagnosis. What policies would work if this alternative interpretation of
conflict is in fact correct? First, we need to distinguish between conflict prevention and post-conflict situations. Prior to conflict, the approach implied by the predation analysis is to work through the major risk factors, identifying how to reduce them. Note that this approach is radically
different from the more traditional approach which attempts to identify grievances and redress them. The new approach is basically one of making it harder for rebel organizations to get established, and addressing objective grievances is not usually an effective way of achieving this
objective. Post-conflict, the problem is rather different. Rebel organizations have forced themselves onto the political landscape and have generated group grievance. Although both the grievances and the groups may be manufactured, they now exist and postconflict policy must
address them. Hence, whereas conflict prevention should not be built around the reduction of objective grievances, the construction of sustainable peace in post-conflict societies will have to address the subjective grievances of the parties to the conflict. I therefore consider the
problems of conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding separately. For a fuller review of policy options see Collier et al. (2003). Policies for Conflict Prevention Each society is different. The overall risk of conflict in a society is built up from a series of risk factors, and the balance
of risk factors will differ from one country to another. Hence, the first step in conflict prevention is to decompose the overall risk into its constituent components and then put most effort into reducing those risks which are the most important and the

most

amenable to policy. I take the potential risk factors in turn .

Economies with around a quarter

of GDP coming from natural resource exports are acutely at risk of civil
conflict. There are four strategies that might reduce this risk. First, the government can facilitate
diversification of the economy away from

dependence upon primary commodities. Better economic policy promotes diversification. In a really poor policy environment, the only export activities which survive are

those with high locationspecific rents. The World Banks annual measure of policy (the `Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) is significant in explaining the extent of primary commodity dependence. Policy improvement, sustained over a five year period, reduces dependence in
the next five year period (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Secondly, a government can try to make loot-seeking rebels unpopular by transparently using the revenue from primary commodity exports to fund effective basic service delivery. If the money is seen to be funding primary
education and rural health centers then the population is going to be more hostile to rebels than if they believe that the money is sent off to Swiss banks. There are, however, limits to the effectiveness of this policy. For example, many of the youths 18 who fought for the rebel
movement in Sierra Leone are so unpopular that they dare not return to their communities, but this unpopularity did not stop them joining a rebellion. The rebels deliberately targeted drug addicts and children for recruitment and so had an unusually dependent laborforce. Third, the
international community can make it more difficult for rebel groups to sell the commodities which they loot. Most of the international markets in commodities are, at some point along the marketing chain, fairly narrow, in the sense that there are not many market participants. Although
primary commodities are more difficult to identify than branded manufactured goods, they differ in quality, and so markets can usually identify the origin of the commodity in the process of determining its quality. For example, at the stage at which diamonds are cut, their provenance
can be established with reasonable accuracy, and diamond cutting is a highly skilled activity which can potentially be subject to a degree of international regulation. Of course, it will never be possible to drive illegal supplies out of the market, but, it should be possible to drive them to
the fringes of the market, where the goods can only be sold at a deep discount. Rebel predation would then become less lucrative. The Kimberley Process, which is a recent initiative to keep looted diamonds off the market, is not only important for the diamonds trade, but provides a

model for other lootable commodities such as timber and oil.

Low income and economic

decline are further risk factors. There is no quick fix to low income. However,
within a single generation it is now possible for most poverty-stricken
societies to lift themselves out of poverty. In a single generation South Korea
managed to grow from a per capita income of $300 a year to $10,000 a year.

Most very poor countries have poor economic policies. Changing these
policies is often politically difficult because in the short term vested interests
lose, but many societies have faced down these interests and transformed
themselves. In such situations international aid has been shown to be effective in accelerating growth.
For example, during the 1990s Uganda has

transformed its economic policies, and with the help of the international donor community, has sustained a 7% annual growth rate. It is on track to realize the

government objective of overcoming poverty within a generation. Within Uganda, a rebel group called the AFL recruits by offering the unemployed sh200,000 per month (around $150). Rapid growth will gradually make recruitment harder. A further risk factor is ethnic dominance. If a
society has a single ethnic group which is large enough to dominate democratic institutions, then democracy itself is not sufficient to reassure minorities. Ethnic dominance is a difficult problem. The most realistic approach is to entrench minority rights into the constitution. This can be
done either by explicitly legislating group rights, or through strong individual rights. If all individuals are secure from discrimination, then individuals in minority groups are secure. The scope for this approach depends upon the credibility of the checks and balances which the state can
erect upon government power. Usually, state institutions are not strong enough for this degree of trust, and so they can usefully be reinforced by international or regional commitments. For example, the European Union is requiring that the many Eastern European countries hoping to
join it, must treat their minorities equally. Latvia moderated its policies towards its Russian minority in response to this requirement. 19 If governments and the international community can defuse the risk from its primary commodity exports, generate rapid growth, and provide credible
guarantees to minorities, then the risk of conflict can be radically reduced. Conflict prevention can be achieved through large effort on a few risk factors. Policies for Post-Conflict Peace-Building All the policies which are appropriate for conflict prevention are also appropriate for postconflict peace-building. However, they are unlikely to be sufficient. In the first decade of post-conflict peace, societies face roughly double the risk of conflict that the pre-conflict risk factors would predict. Post-conflict societies are thus at substantial additional risk because of what has
happened to them during conflict. Several factors may account for this increase in risk. A rebel organization has built an effective military capability, in part by the manufacture of group grievance, and in part by the accumulation of armaments, money and military skills. People have
got used to violence, so that the norms which inhibit political violence in most societies will have been eroded. Peoples political allegiance may have polarized, so that, as in Somalia, ethnic dominance has been created by the conflict even if the society was initially either diverse of
homogenous. Many societies have severe objective group grievances which sustain intense political conflict, without getting close to civil war. Group grievance and intense political conflict are not in themselves dangerous: they are indeed the normal stuff of democratic politics.
However, in post-conflict societies, civil war has first built intense political conflict and then conducted that conflict through violence. Whereas most of the societies which have group grievances have no tradition of conducting their political conflict by means of violence, post-conflict
societies may have no tradition of conducting their political conflict non-violently. The rebel organization usually maintains its effectiveness during the post-conflict period. Compared with a pre-conflict society with the same risk factors, the post-conflict society is therefore much better
prepared for war. The rebel organization has already recruited, motivated, armed and saved. For example, Savimbi the head of the Angolan rebel organization UNITA, was reputed to have accumulated over $4bn in financial assets during the first war, some of which he then used to
finance the start of the second. Peace requires either that the intense political conflict continue but that the military option of conducting it should be made infeasible, or that the political conflict should itself be resolved. Each of these is difficult. To remove the military option requires
demilitarizing the rebel organization, turning it into a conventional political party. This can happen. For example, Renamo, once a rebel military organization in Mozambique is now a successful political party. Renamo was willing to demobilize whereas UNITA was not. Mozambique was a
post-conflict success whereas Angola was a failure, partly because Angola had diamonds whereas Mozambique did not. Aid donors were able to come up with a moderate financial package for Renamo which made peaceful political 20 contest an attractive option. Diamonds had made
UNITA so rich than nothing that donors could offer would matter, while renewed predation offered massive rewards. In the first two years of renewed war UNITA is believed to have earned around $2bn from diamond mining. The massive importance of aid donors to the Mozambique
economy may also have made the maintenance of a democratic system in which Renamo would have a fair chance more credible. In Angola the government did not need the donors, and so had no means of reassuring UNITA that democratic rights of political contest would be
maintained. Even when the rebel group demobilizes, the precedent of violent conflict is fresh in peoples minds. This is perhaps why time itself improves the prospects of peace: the habits of peaceful conflict replace those of violent conflict. The alternative to continuing the political
contest but making the military option infeasible is to resolve the political contest itself. This requires at a minimum that grievances be addressed, even if though on average they are not objectively any more serious than those in peaceful societies. If, indeed, group grievance has been
manufactured by rebel indoctrination, it can potentially be deflated by political gestures. While grievances may need to be addressed objectively, the main purpose of addressing them is probably for their value in changing perceptions. The task of dealing with conflict which lacks
proper boundaries between the political and the violent is difficult whether the approach is to restore boundaries or resolve the political conflict. However, the attitudes of the domestic population appear not to be the main reason why post-conflict societies have a risk of further conflict
which is no much greater than implied by their inherited risk factors. Recall that the main risk comes from diaspora living in rich countries. What can be done to reduce this risk? One approach is to build the diaspora into the peace process. For example, in the conflict in Northern Ireland
it is evident that the Irish American diaspora has played a major part both in financing violence. Both the protestant and catholic rebel military organizations have actively raised funds in North America, and a number of the guns used in shootings turn out to have come, (hopefully
indirectly), from the Boston police department. When the peace faction within the IRA initiated the peace process, its leader went to Boston, and the British and Irish governments chose an American Senator to head the peace negotiations. An extension of this approach is to target
campaigns at the diaspora which emphasize that the domestic population wants to maintain peace because the costs of violence are so high. Diasporas bear none of these costs, and so they need to be reminded that others do. Governments can go much further. Diasporas are
potentially major assets for the development process, with skills and business connections. The diaspora organizations can be given explicit tasks in promoting economic recovery, facing them with a choice between a constructive and a destructive role. A complementary policy is for
the governments of the countries in which these diasporas are resident to put clear limits on the activities of the diaspora organizations. Political support for violent rebel organizations is legitimate, but supplying material aid is not. For example, American efforts to prevent countries
such as Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan from harboring terrorists who have killed US citizens would have greater prospects of success were they to be set in the context of an international policy to set limits on the conduct of diasporas. 21 Dependence upon primary commodity exports
turns out to be even more important as a risk factor in post-conflict societies than in pre-conflict societies: the same level of dependence generates a significantly higher risk. In mitigating the risks from primary commodities, one policy is open to post-conflict governments, that is not
available preconflict: the government might decide to share the revenues peacefully and legally with the rebel organization. The rebels then do not need to fight in order to get what they want. This is, perhaps, what the government of Sierra Leone decided to do by bringing the rebel
leader into government as Minister of Mining. It attempts to give them a greater interest in peace. There are, however, limits to this policy. If it is profitable for one rebel group to be predatory on primary commodity exports, once it has been bought off, it will probably be profitable for
another group to replace it. While a post-conflict government has more options of dealing with primary commodity dependence, it has fewer options of dealing with ethnic dominance. The provision of constitutional guarantees for ethnic minorities is unlikely to cut much ice in the lowtrust environment which follows years of mutual hatred and killing. In such situations one option is for the international community to provide reassurance through an extended phase of military presence and its own guarantees. This is the solution currently being attempted in Bosnia
and Kosovo. A further possibility is to determine that the country as constituted is unviable. However, rather than ethnic cleansing, a better solution may be federation with a neighboring country in which no ethnic group is dominant. As in conflict prevention, rapid growth will assist
peace. However, the task of achieving rapid growth requires somewhat different policies in post-conflict societies. After a long war, economies tend to bounce back: they are so far below their productive potential. For example, in the first five years of peace after a 15 war economies on
average grow at 6% a year (Collier, 1999, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a). Mozambique suffered an even longer war than this and recovered even more rapidly. One of the casualties of civil war is trust. Because life is so uncertain, people shorten their time horizons and are less concerned
to build a reputation for honesty. Some people find it more profitable to behave opportunistically. As this behavior becomes more commonplace, the society switches into a low-level equilibrium of mutual suspicion and widespread opportunism. This raises the cost of all sorts of business
transactions. For example, in Kampala, Uganda, a manufacturer of mattresses sold them wholesale on credit to agents who went up country to sell them retail. One of the agents claimed that his entire consignment had been stolen by northern rebels. The manufacturer had to accept
this alibi and forfeit the money. On the grapevine, he heard that the agent had invented the story, but he could not be sure what to believe. Once a society has suffered a collapse into low trust, it takes concerted action to change expectations, and meanwhile, many functions which
other governments could rely upon simply dont work. The tax collection system, the courts, accountants, and doctors may all have been corrupted by opportunistic behavior. Of course, it is not only societies which have suffered civil war which can experience a breakdown of trust.
However, in post-conflict situations it is the norm. The government can respond to this problem by creating coordinated changes in expectations, institution-by-institution. For example, one quite common approach has been to close the old revenue collecting part of the civil service, and
establish a new, independent institution to which people are freshly 22 recruited. In return for better pay they are subjected to more rigorous checks for honest conduct. Being a new institution it is to some extent able to shed the burden of bad expectations which the old institutions
carry. The combination of primary commodity predation and opportunism implies that some people do well out of war (Collier, 2000a). Although most people lose, others have an interest in war restarting. Hence, when wars do restart, it is not necessarily simply an outpouring of
irrational hatred or deep fears. Indeed, both hatreds and fears can be played upon by those who expect to gain materially. One way in which a post-conflict government can defend the peace against such manipulation is to publicize self-interest for what it is. Society at large needs to
recognize that some groups have an interest in a return to conflict. A corollary of this analysis is that rebel organizations, existing or prospective, can be viewed as rational economic agents. This has both a hopeful and a cautionary implication. The hopeful implication is that rebel
organizations are likely to respond to incentives. For example, were the UN Security Council to introduce sanctions which made the economic and military circumstances of rebellion more difficult, the incidence of rebellion would decline. The cautionary implication is that it may be of
little avail to buy rebel groups off. In countries where the objective conditions make rebellion financially feasible, if one group is bought off, others are likely to occupy the `market opportunity for the generation of grievance. Conclusion Popular perceptions of the causes of civil conflict
take at face value the discourse of the rebel organization. Civil war appears as an intense political contest, fueled by grievances which are so severe as to have burst the banks of normal political channels. Rebellions are thus interpreted as the ultimate protest movements, their cadres
being self-sacrificing heroes struggling against oppression. In fact, most rebellions cannot be like this. When the main grievances - inequality, political repression, and ethnic and religious divisions - are measured objectively, they provide little or no explanatory power in predicting

usually be the cause of such a distinctive

phenomenon as violent conflict. They may well generate intense political conflict, but such conflict does
rebellion. In most low-income societies there are many reasons for grievance, but usually these do not give rise to rebellion. Objective grievances and hatreds simply cannot

By contrast, economic characteristics

dependence on primary commodity exports, low average incomes, slow
growth, and large diasporas are all significant and powerful predictors of
civil war. These characteristics all make rebellion more materially feasible:
they enable rebel leaders to buy the guns and feed the soldiers, and
furthermore to perpetrate large scale killing without themselves being killed
in the process. A viable private army, which is the distinguishing feature of a
civil war, is extremely expensive to maintain over the long periods that such
wars typically last. Where a private army is viable, the agenda of its leadership could potentially
be anything. It may be a public- 23 spirited demand for improved
governance. It may be a megalomaniac with an agenda of sadism. It may be
a mafia-style grab for loot. It may be little more than insanity: Jonestown or
Waco with the violence turned outwards instead of inwards on the devotees.
Over the years of a conflict the agenda is likely to evolve, with any political
objectives eroding and eliding into rebellion-as-business. Hence, it is these
factors that determine viability rather than objective grievances that are the
true root causes which conflict prevention must address if it is to be
successful. Since to date conflict prevention has paid scant attention to these
causes of conflict, there is probably consid
not usually escalate to violent conflict.

ble scope for policy, both domestic and international, to prevent civil conflict
more effectively. While objective grievances do not generate violent conflict,
violent conflict generates subjective grievances. This is not just a by-product
of conflict, but an essential activity of a rebel organization. Rebel military
success depends upon motivating its soldiers to kill the enemy, and this as
in the classic Leninist theory of rebel organizations requires indoctrination.
Hence, by the end of a civil war, there is intense inter-group hatred based

upon perceived grievances. A conflict has been generated which has no

boundaries between political and violent actions. The task in post-conflict
societies is partly, as in pre-conflict societies, to reduce the objective risk
factors. However, post-conflict societies are much more at risk than implied
by the inherited risk factors, because of this legacy of induced polarizing
grievance. Either boundaries must be re-established between the political
contest and violence, or the political contest must be resolved. Neither of
these is easy, which is why, once a civil war has occurred, the chances of
further conflict are so high

ASEAN DA Aff Answers

UQ

Cred low
Their DA is already at play: ASEAN centrality and
credibility has been diminished in the squo and China has
taken advantage of its smaller neighbors by dividing and
ruling them
Jones & Smith 15 (David M. & M.L.R., Visiting Professor, Department of
War Studies, Kings College London, Professor Strategic Theory, Department
of War Studies, Kings College London, co-authors of Asian Security and the
Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility, Can Asean ever
solve the South China Seas dispute through multilateral dialogue?, The
Telegraph, 11/24) JA
The Gala dinner celebrating the event witnessed the ten ASEAN leaders, together with delegates from
China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Russia, dressed in the Malay
national costume which bore a striking resemblance to the Beatles cover for their Sergeant Peppers

The ASEAN states had to

cancel a planned ceremony to sign a common statement on regional security.
The difficulty concerned the question of Chinas claim to the South China
Seas. Singapore's prime minister Lee Hsien Loong cavalierly dismissed this as
merely an issue "where China and the USA did not see eye to eye",
overlooking the fact that for the last two decades ASEAN has invested
enormous time and effort in multilateral forums to promote peace and
security in East Asia. Policymakers continue to voice confidence in ASEANs
inconclusive dialogue mechanisms, even in the wake of the weekends most
recent failure, seeing them as central to resolving disputes in the South China
Seas. In June 2014 US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel declared: "This regional architecture is helping to
Lonely Hearts Club Band album.

Not everybody enjoyed the show.

develop shared solutions to shared challenges, building strong and enduring ASEAN security community,
and ensuring that collective, multilateral operations are the norm, rather than the exception." Australian
Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, in November 2014 called for the "peaceful resolution" of maritime disputes

Despite the plaudits given to ASEAN, its role

seems increasingly marginal. China claims the sea as a Chinese lake. The US contests
in accordance with ASEAN principles.

this, in November 2015 sending naval destroyers within twelve nautical miles of structures built by the

Evaluating ASEANs role

in managing the problem in the South China Seas reveals that far from
addressing this evolving conflict over international rights of free passage on
the high seas, its weak multilateral approach only further stirs already
troubled waters. On the surface, ASEANs softly-softly approach seemed to
bear fruit with an ASEAN-China Free trade agreement and a Declaration of a
Code of Conduct to manage disputes in the South China Sea in 2002. In 1994
ASEAN formed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to manage Chinas regional
ambitions. China, however, has come to find the ARF a highly convenient
vehicle for own ends, ruthlessly exploiting ASEAN's weak state regionalism to
advance its national interest in maritime hegemony. The source of the South China
Chinese in the Paracel island group. Tensions rise. Nothing is resolved.

Seas dispute is traceable to the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, which failed to stipulate possession of the
Spratly islands when Japan lost its title to them after defeat in the Second World War. The chain of 200
islets, coral reefs and sea mounts that constitute the Spratly and its northern extension the Paracel islands
spread across 250,000 square kilometres of the South China Sea, a vast continental shelf that constitutes a
potentially rich source of oil and natural gas. The Spratlys contested ownership developed into an
international conflict when from the mid-1970s a number of claimants began extracting resources from the

seabed contiguous to their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). China, Taiwan, and four ASEAN states Brunei,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam all laid claim and/or occupied part of the islands in the South China

Together with Indonesia, which also contests maritime zones with China,
the parties have failed to resolve their disputes. The dispute assumed its
current form in February 1992, when China laid claim to the entire South
China Sea on the basis of its historical right to the area dating from the Xia dynasty. ARF
workshops involving China and other dialogue partners around the region,
including the US, became central to ASEANs collective diplomacy towards
China, adopting a process of open-ended dialogue aimed largely at deferring
any formal resolution of intractable disputes. Despite attending the ARF meetings, China
Sea.

rejected attempts to multilateralise the issue. Prior to 1997 it had given little indication of a commitment to

China occupied Mischief Reef, challenged the

Philippines EEZ claim, furnishing evidence of its willingness to resort to force
to recover its purportedly lost territory. From the mid-1990s Chinas rising
economic power increased the propensity to assert its claims unilaterally.
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, however, the Chinese began to tone
down their rhetoric and between 1998 and 2008, seemingly, became
acquiescent to ASEANs view that intractable disputes should be peacefully
put to one side. Beijings comfort with the ASEAN process culminated in 2002
in the signing of a non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, which eschewed the use of force and sought to build an
atmosphere of trust and cooperation. That Beijing had apparently shifted its
stance from confrontation to conciliation suggested to many commentators
that, through ARFs good offices, China has moved from unilateralism to
multilateralism. China was becoming a responsible regional player. The
attribution of this shift to ASEANs informal dialogue process is wrong. China
had switched from frown to smile for entirely cold calculations. The
confrontation line China had pursued up to 1998 had raised the possibility of
US involvement in the Spratly dispute. Naturally, China preferred to avoid
such a possibility. Thus, by appearing to adopt ASEANs non-confrontational
approach, China could draw ASEAN into its sphere of influence while
effectively sidelining the US. Any resolution of the South China Sea dispute
remained stuck in the ARFs managerial mode of non-binding consensus, but
the notional commitment to ASEANs multilateral dialogue process was a
cost-free Chinese investment in good public relations. The shift from soft to
hard line always remained an option for China if circumstances appeared
propitious. This became evident as Chinas economy boomed, while the West became distracted by
peaceful

resolution.

In

1995,

events in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and after 2007 by financial crisis. Chinas foreign policy grew in

By 2012, the modernisation of the force

projection capacity of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), enabled the
politburo under Xi Jinping to shift to a more forceful reassertion of claims to
the Spratlys. In April 2012, Chinese navy vessels confronted the Philippine
navy in the Scarborough shoals well within the Philippine EEZ. The growth of
Chinas blue water capacity for controlling the South China Sea exposed
ASEAN's diplomatic limitations.
The weakness of ASEANs multilateral
diplomacy was thoroughly exposed, as the Philippines, and remarkably,
Vietnam, looked increasingly to the US when confronted by Chinas renewed
assertiveness. The ARF process demonstrated impotence rather than
assertiveness, particularly in the maritime sphere.

collective strength. Meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012, ASEAN foreign

ministers could not agree the most cosmetic of joint communiques on
regional security. The ASEAN response remains tepid, still officially, seeking a
code of conduct for the South China Sea, which China refuses. Chinas naval
assertiveness calculates that the weaker states of Southeast Asia will
eventually accede to Chinese claims. It seems clear that China intends to
salami slice its way to control the South China Seas, taking it in small
increments by making the economic costs of resistance too high, sometimes
by restricting Chinese investments and market access on any countries
(Philippines and Vietnam, for example) who contest Chinas maritime claims.
Such
assertiveness has led both to the fragmentation of ASEAN and the growing
involvement of both Japan and the US in the developing conflict. In June 2014,
Defence Secretary Hagel remarked, that "the US policy is clear. We take no position on competing
territorial claims. But we firmly oppose any nations use of intimidation, coercion or the threat of force to
assist those claim." At the same meeting, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would

Yet, during 2015 China has

further escalated tension by its aggressive land reclamation programme in
the South China Sea, with the new US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter
arguing that China is "out of step with the international norms that
underscore the Asia Pacific security architecture". The ASEAN states rather
than driving regional processes seem increasingly trapped between a rock
and a hard place, trying to avoid making a choice between backing a more
assertive US or backing China. The South China Sea dispute ultimately
demonstrates how more powerful actors can manipulate ASEANs weak
multilateral dialogue process to advance grand strategic interests. The
strategic manoeuvring brought about by the ARF process, furthermore, has
complicated the relationship between the US, Japan, and ASEAN. ASEAN
processes have allowed its diplomatic rhetoric to be used against it by China
in a way that practitioners of realpolitik can only admire.
China, in other words, is
successfully engaging ASEAN in a policy of divide and rule. For example, in the wake
provide the Philippines and Vietnam with naval patrol vessels.

of USS Lassens steam through the Spratlys, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, declared that the US must

Wang stated that Beijing

wanted any disputes resolved in negotiations between it and ASEAN on the
basis "of historical facts and in accordance with international law" and that
China and ASEAN were working on a code of conduct. All of which is to say,
peace on Chinese terms.
adjust to "shared" Asian values of the kind that ASEAN often articulates.

Uniqueness overwhelms link ASEAN is resilient and

realism is wrong
Acharya 15(Amitav Acharya, international relations at
American University, Doomed By Dialogue? Will ASEAN
Survive Great Power Rivalry in Asia, The Asan Forum,
http://www.theasanforum.org/doomed-by-dialogue-will-asean-survive-greatpower-rivalry-in-asia/, June 29, 2015) atn

Even these relatively optimistic perspectives still assume great power primacy in maintaining stability.

The concert of powers or its bilateral variant, a two-power condominium,

(such as a G-2 between the United States and China), leaves ASEAN
marginalized. None of the above perspectives recognizes the possibility of smaller and weaker players
influencing great power politics. They are seen as objects. Yet, if the traditional
perspectives are correct, ASEAN would have been doomed from its birth in
1967, as many Western and some Asian analysts had indeed predicted then
and keep predicting. ASEAN is an anomaly in the universe of great power
politics. Not only has it survived, but it has contributed significantly to conflict
reduction and management in Southeast Asia and served as the main anchor
of regional cooperation now involving all the major powers of Asia and indeed
the world. As a result, Asia is the only region in known history where the strong live in the world of the
weak, and the weak lead the strong. ASEANs record has been a mixed one, but ASEAN turns
traditional realism on its head. Great power politics may be a constant
through world history, but it does not reappear in the same way and for the
same reasons. It is unfortunate that pundits keep using nineteenth century
(mainly European) lenses to describe twenty-first century realities in Asia and
the world. The term great power rivalry and competition is a bit misleading because of the significant
and far reaching cooperation that exists among the same great powers both at regional and global levels.
And this cooperation is underpinned by a type of interdependence that simply did not exist a century ago.

ASEAN credibility lowChinese pressure retracts joint

communique
Beech 16 (Hannah Beech, TIME's East Asia and China Bureau Chief, June
15, 2016, "ASEAN Retracts Statement on South China Sea Tensions," TIME,
http://time.com/4369660/asean-south-china-sea-statement) NV
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has withdrawn a communiqu on rising maritime tensions after
reported pressure from Beijing It was there and then it wasnt. On Tuesday evening, Foreign Ministers
from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) performed a diplomatic magic trick. First, after

issued a statement on the

rising tensions in the South China Sea , parts of which are claimed by six regional
governments. The language, for a body that prides itself on consensus-making and group photos of
grinning dignitaries, was stern: We expressed our serious concerns over recent
and ongoing developments, which have eroded trust and confidence,
increased tensions and which may have the potential to undermine peace,
security and stability in the South China Sea. The nation that was eroding trust and
confidence in the strategic waterway was unnamed. But China, which has embarked on an
a meeting with their Chinese counterpart in southwest China, they

ambitious island-building campaign in disputed waters, and has blamed the U.S. formasterminding any

was mentioned elsewhere in the statement. We also cannot ignore what is

the South China Sea, the communiqu read , as it is an important
issue in the relations and cooperation between ASEAN and China . While that sentence
regional conflict,
happening in

might seem anodyne, it implies a repudiation of Chinas preferred approach of negotiating bilaterally with

The ASEAN statement

also cautioned against militarization in the South China Sea, a clear rebuke
against Chinas defense buildup, which includes not only the new islands complete with
each rival claimant, rather than facing the united front of a regional body.

runways that can welcome military jets, but also missile batteries, radar facilities and a coast guard that

But, less than three hours

after the ASEAN statement was released by the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, a
regularly comes into conflict with fishing boats from other littoral nations.

spokeswoman retracted the document, saying that urgent amendments

were needed. By the end of the evening, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had made
his own statement refuting the contention that the South China Sea dispute was a
sticking point between his country and the regional body as a whole. This isnt an
issue between China and ASEAN, he said. Cooperation between China and ASEAN is far greater than any
specific discord, including the South China Sea dispute. That may be.

China, after all, is ASEANs

largest trading partner. One senior regional diplomat told TIME that, in the busy minutes after the
ASEAN statement went out, Beijing had lobbied regional ministers to make the embarrassing backtrack.
Beijings foreign policymakers, he said, had specifically pressured Laos, which is this years ASEAN
chair, to force the statements recall . (ASEAN requires consensus among all of its 10 members
to issue any statement.) When the dragon roars, the little countries need to stay away from the fire
coming out of its mouth, says the diplomat. We have no choice but to acknowledge this political reality.

A day later, and no new ASEAN statement has been issued and it isnt clear
whether one would be forthcoming at all. Instead, individual announcements from various Southeast Asian

The diplomatic mess recalled an incident in 2012 when, for

the group wrapped up a summit without a joint
communiqu because of what was widely perceived to be Chinese pressure on Cambodia
to avoid the sensitive South China Sea issue. This is turning out to be another fiasco
in which ASEANs credibility has been damaged because of a lack of
unity, says Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. It really
looks not only like ASEAN is in disarray but also that it lacks any
backbone.
countries have dribbled out.

the first time in ASEAN history,

ASEAN cred lowAMM failure proves

Ho 12 (Benjamin Ho, Associate Research Fellow in the Multilateralism and
Regionalism Program in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
September 13, 2012, ASEANs centrality in a rising Asia, RSIS Working
Paper, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP249.pdf) NV
During the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)
ASEAN community found itself staring at an
unprecedented diplomatic crisis over a regional issue involving a big power .
For the first time in its history, members of the regional bloc were unable to issue a
joint communiqu following heated political wrangling between the incumbent
Cambodian chair and other ASEAN member states over their South China Sea
disputes involving China. This outcome clearly shocked ASEAN, political leaders and diplomatic
observers. Both the foreign ministers of Singapore and Indonesia also expressed
great disappointment at the outcome, terming it as irresponsible and
having left a severe dent on ASEANs credibility. * A former Singapore diplomat, Tan
Seng Chye, wrote that the outcome of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) was a significant
watershed in ASEANs history and should be taken seriously by ASEAN as a wakeup call.+ ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, a persistent and strident advocate of ASEANs
cohesive capability, admitted that the incident had left the ASEAN community with the need
to do some soul-searchingand be more cohesive among ourselves.#, This
recognition that ASEAN is no longer a political bystander but an
active participant in international affairs was emphasized at the
2011 East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali as Indonesias President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono noted that ASEAN - as a community -had to take proactive steps to
ASEANs Identity and Global Positioning
held in Phnom Penh in July 2012, the

engage and address

the global challenges arising. In this increasingly complex and

interconnected world, ASEAN must truly be at the forefront to address the many challenges that arise.
ASEAN cannot just be a passive audience, a vulnerable victim to problems fromother parts of the
world.## His Singaporean counterpart, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, concurred, while choosing to
emphasize the importance of a tightly knit ASEAN to his countrys interests as it would link the Republic
to a bigger life raft if it were hit by a crisis. Said Mr Lee, If

you have a storm coming in your

direction, you have something to hang onto which is more cohesive and
integrated.

Asean is weak even though Obama champions it now

The Asan Forum 14 (The Asan Forum is an online publication
for in-depth interpretation of rapid changes across the Asia-Pacific
region Introduction: Five Pivots to Asia Comparisons and
Overall Impact, May - June 2016 Vol.4, No.3,
http://www.theasanforum.org/introduction-five-pivots-to-asia-comparisonsand-overall-impact/) atn
Following the APEC summit, the EAS met in Naypyidaw, trying to revive attention to ASEANs centrality in
the reorganization of Asia. While economics were high on the agendaincluding at the separate ASEAN +

After two
years of uncertainty, it was unclear if ASEAN could reassert its role as the
diplomatic focal point to bridge differences in strategic thinking and cultural
claims complicating regional relations. Even as Obama and Abe were
outspoken on behalf of strengthening ASEAN and the EAS under its
management, US differences with host Myanmar cast a feint shadow. Despite
1 meeting with Obama, security in the South China Sea was never far in the background.

Obamas efforts to forge the EAS into an organization that stands for norms of freedom of navigation and

a lack of
consensus keeps the EAS a talk shop. Multilateralism has lost ground, as
the various pivots indicate that ASEAN is weaker.
peaceful resolution of territorial disputes or, ideally, international values more generally,

Centrality Down

Centrality low trade difficulties

Hawke 10 (Gary, Gary Hawke is a Senior Fellow at the New Zealand Institute of Economic
Research, Professor Emeritus and former Head of the School of Government at the Victoria University of
Wellington, New Zealand, Institutional architecture in Asia: Challenges for the US and Russia,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/07/institutional-architecture-in-asia-challenges-for-the-us-andrussia/) RR

They all
express concern to maintain ASEAN centrality. ASEAN has been a remarkably successful
region and institution, both politically and economically, but it is concerned about ensuring it
maintains a voice in international affairs . Its regional affairs attract the interest of several
The first difficulty is revealed in the precise wording of various statements from Hanoi.

major powers all of China, India, Japan, Korea and the US, with Russia being significant in a few specific
areas. The image of ASEAN in the drivers seat provokes thoughts of a driver whose employment will last

while
East Asian economic integration would be greatly facilitated by readier
agreement among China, Japan and Korea, that agreement also carries for
ASEAN the possibility of marginalisation in regional affair s. Additionally, the range of
precisely as long as three diverse passengers are content, but the more important point is that

the current agenda of Asian economic integration is not widely appreciated, and it is certainly different

It will be hard for US officials who are

to join in the intended progression,
because progress has been slow in the four areas of tariff nomenclature ,
customs procedures, rules of origin and economic cooperation. Furthermore, ASEAN and its
partners have established pathways which link trade liberalisation and facilitation
with regulatory reform, and economic integration to narrowing development gaps. This is most
from standard Washington views of trade liberalisation.

wedded to the templates of current US trade agreements

clearly illustrated in the Comprehensive Asian Development Plan and the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan.
More broadly, the EAS is part of a regional alphabet soup with includes other existing and mutuallyreinforcing processes such as the ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defense
Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). This range of overlapping
institutions and processes is unlikely to diminish in the medium-term future. And while the US is
indispensable in traditional security discussions in Asia, it is not indispensable to East Asian integration. Of
course, regional economic developments will proceed in a context of global interdependence, US markets
will remain significant, and US officials and institutions will be important parts of the international financial

Asian economic integration can proceed without US

participation in many of its core processes. The US and Russia must be careful.
The economic agenda in Asia is about regional integration, not trade .
Community building is more than rhetoric . It signals an intention to take account
system. However,

of regional interests as decisions are made in individual economies. It is concerned with establishing
regional rules and processes that give assurance that cross-border business generates regional economic
welfare. While this is very likely to proceed at different paces across different dimensions tariffs, customs
procedures, monetary co-operation and so on American and Russian leaders and officials have to adapt
to this ASEAN led approach to trade and economic integration. If they fail to take heed of this warning,
they may find that EAS is slipping away without them.

Centrality low FTAs

Findlay & Thangavelu 13

(Christopher Findlay is Executive Dean of the Faculty of the

Professions at the University of Adelaide. Shandre Thangavelu is Associate Professor in the Department of
Economics, National University of Singapore, The living noodle bowl: ASEAN trade agreements,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/29/the-living-noodle-bowl-asean-trade-agreements/) RR

Mega-regionalism is a major feature of trade strategies in the Asia

Pacific today. The spaghetti bowl of interwoven bilateral FTAs offers
no real future, a realisation that has led to greater action on multi-

country agreements. These agreements include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), ASEAN+1 agreements, and the
proposed ChinaJapanSouth Korea Free Trade Area (CJK). The ASEAN Free Trade Area
is a longstanding regional initiative that lies at the core of RCEP. The important question now is
whether this work on multi-country agreements will help with global
integration, or whether it will it simply add new noodles , like slabs of lasagne,
to the pasta bowl of Asian trade agreements. East Asian economies have been debating the appropriate
size and makeup of regional arrangements. ASEAN chose the larger RCEP, which is open to all its plus-one
partners, due to recent progress on the TPP in the light of renewed US interest, and a search for new
sources of growth and an increased focus on ASEAN centrality following the global financial crisis. The CJK
would have linked three of the big East Asian economies and could have been a threat to the centrality of
ASEAN in regional trade, but the grouping is not big enough to manage the relationships among its

Japan has been searching for a way to manage the rise of China ,
largely through its relationship with the United States, and has chosen instead to sign up with the
TPP. The tension between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands would make the CJK difficult to
partners.

achieve in any case. South Korea already has an FTA with the United States, meaning the TPP has less to
offer it. The South Koreans may prefer an FTA with China, but have decided to work within RCEP. The
prospect, then, is for an RCEP bloc on one side and a TPP bloc on the other although there will be some
joint members, including a number of ASEAN countries, Australia and most likely Japan. TPP negotiations
will progress slowly new members will be added and talks will be dominated by the US trade

The TPP is open to new members,

but many, such as China and Indonesia, will find it difficult to meet the
agreements expectations. It is also less relevant to East Asian supply chains. RCEP is likely to
representative, whose interests may derail negotiations.

reach a conclusion sooner than the TPP. The agreement is less demanding, and its contribution will depend

A top-down approach would require

new negotiations and would lead to a greater lasagne risk, with many layers
of overlapping multi-country agreements. A bottom-up approach would build on the existing
on whether it adopts a top-down or bottom-up approach.

plus-one agreements between each of the members. This approach would not be easy either because of
the diversity of agreements, but it may offer a more substantial outcome and could strengthen existing
supply chains.

Centrality low perceptions of US pivot & SCS

Emmerson 13 (Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum in
the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University,
Challenging ASEAN: the American pivot in Southeast Asia,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/13/challenging-asean-the-american-pivot-in-southeast-asia/)

RR

In its vaguest sense, the pivot is a turn toward Asia writ large. But it is particularly in Southeast Asia that

The accent on
security was already clear in the concern for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea
expressed by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010. In
November 2011 President Barack Obama stopped in Darwin to announce that 2500 US
marines would eventually be stationed there. And in June 2012 Singapore agreed to host in
the pivots three themes security, economy and democracy are most evident.

rotation as many as four US combat ships. One might have thought that on a spectrum of ASEAN states
from the most to the least deferential toward China, reactions would have run from jeers to cheers. They
did not. No government was willing to denounce the pivot and jeopardise the chance of somehow

The shift in Washingtons attention from Afghanistan to ASEAN

could easily be seen by Southeast Asian policy makers as a way to slow, if not reduce, their
own increasing exposure to Beijings strength . At the same time, the pivots association
benefiting from it.

with security unbalanced the policy itself; assertions of American military power overshadowed the pivots

economic rationale. This imbalance of security over economy tended to legitimate a division of labour that
from an American viewpoint could only seem invidious. By enlarging its profile in the western Pacific, the
US Navy would even more thoroughly underwrite the maritime security that ASEAN economies needed to

The pivot appeared to reinforce a

formula that, crudely put, ran thus: Americans would make the
peace; Asians would make the money. Accordingly, if the actual purpose of Obamas
continue profiting from Chinese trade and investment.

pivot could be summarised in a single word, that word is inclusion, in terms of both security and economy.
Any inclination to portray the pivot as a purely military ploy is unfair. Obama travelled to Darwin and Bali in
November 2011 from Honolulu. In Hawaii he hosted the annual APEC forum, where he claimed progress in
ongoing talks for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In July 2012 in Cambodia, Secretary Clinton co-hosted
the first USASEAN Business Forum, and the USASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement Initiative was
launched in November 2012. On the pivots economic dimension, ASEAN has developed an independent
stance between the United States and China, albeit one that leans modestly in the latters direction. But

ASEAN is divided. Of its member states, only Brunei, Malaysia,

Singapore and Vietnam were among the 11 governments negotiating the USbacked TPP in Auckland in December 2012. Meanwhile, at its summit in Phnom Penh a month before,
ASEAN could have pleased China by supporting Beijings preferred vehicle for regional economic
cooperation, ASEAN+3, which necessarily excludes the United States while limiting the non-ASEAN checks
on Chinese influence to Japan and South Korea. ASEAN agreed instead to launch negotiations toward a new
entity: a 16-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that would augment the
ASEAN+3 grouping by adding three more potential restraints on China Australia, India and New Zealand.
The economic rationale for including these six non-ASEAN states was that they already have FTAs with
ASEAN. But five of the six, all but China, are democracies oriented more or less toward the West. The
potentially China-balancing value of that distribution was not lost on those who proposed RCEP as a
superior alternative to ASEAN+3. The result is a benign race between two vastly different models of
economic integration: the non-American, loosely declarative RCEP that subsumes existing arrangements,
versus the American-promoted, intrusively gold-standard TPP that requires domestic reform.

Democracy distinguishes the pivot least. As a policy priority in Washington,

spreading democracy in Asia has been upstaged by security and economic
concerns, including Chinas naval moves and Americas fiscal woes. Meanwhile in Southeast
Asia, with few exceptions, turning a blind eye remains the ASEAN Way of dealing with the domestic
political failings of the associations members. The United States did quickly move to support the dramatic
political opening of Myanmar. But even in that democratising narrative, security and economics loomed
large. President Thein Seins own reasons to promote reform reflected less a conversion to liberal ideology
than a nationalistic wish to reduce the countrys overdependence on China on the one hand, and a desire
to catch up with the economies of the modern world on the other. While celebrating the democratic
consequences, Washington treated these motivations as opportunities for strategic access. Since its birth
during the Cold War, ASEAN has occupied a political space that external events have successively renewed
by undermining the plausibility of big-power control: the bloody chastening of American ambition in
Vietnam, the turn toward pragmatism in post-Mao China, the Soviet Unions self-shrinkage into Russia and
irrelevance, and the strategic reticence and economic stagnation of Japan. Viewed from Southeast Asia,
the times have now changed in at least two ways. First, Chinas spectacular material ascent and now
military assertion appear to have emboldened its current leaders. Second, to the extent that the American

If SinoAmerican
rivalry escalates, ASEANs members could split into China-deferring
and China-defying camps, ruining the groups ability to lead . In contrast,
a peaceful balancing of power between Beijing and Washington
could refurbish space for ASEAN to operate independently between
the two. But what ASEAN has until now been unprepared to face is the need to rebalance the ASEAN
pivot is a response to this challenge, it appears to open an ambiguous future.

Way by making it somewhat less consensual and correspondingly more effective. On security, ASEANs
habit of catering to the lowest common denominator undercuts its ability to deal with Chinese intimidation.
That encourages ASEAN members to rely on the American pivot as leverage against Beijing. But that
reliance may overestimate the willingness of Washington to become involved, leaving ASEAN worse off. Or,

escalation could badly damage both Southeast

Asian security and ASEANs reputation for maintaining it . These challenges hardly
augur the end of ASEAN. But the groups centrality on matters of security and its
creativity on economic questions are being tested in two very different ways : by Beijings
if the United States does confront China,

the South China Sea, and by the pressure for inclusion

represented by Washingtons pivot toward Southeast Asia. The results are not yet known. For
strategy of assertion in

now, however, the case for optimism is, and is likely to remain, distinctly weaker on regional security than
it is for the re

ASEAN Resilient

ASEAN is too integrally bound up in the asian economy to

simply be wished away
Acharya 15(Amitav Acharya, international relations at
American University, Doomed By Dialogue? Will ASEAN
Survive Great Power Rivalry in Asia, The Asan Forum,
http://www.theasanforum.org/doomed-by-dialogue-will-asean-survive-greatpower-rivalry-in-asia/, June 29, 2015) atn
Although ASEAN is often faulted for its low levels of intra-ASEAN trade , a
situation that might not change much despite the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community this year,

this is offset by the fact that ASEAN is an integral part of East Asian trade,
production, and financial interdependence, which has grown more extensive
with the gradual entry of India into it. That interdependence is not only non-ideological, it is
the most inclusive regional interdependence in the world today, in contrast to European interdependence,
which does not really cover Russia. European multipolarity was also a period of outright colonialismnot
only causing conflict among the powers, contributing to Germanys rejection of the status quo as a
latecomer to the colonial game, but also undercutting the benefits of economic interdependence. Asian
powers today are not colonial powers. Competition for energy and other resources do not amount to
colonial competition.

Not only are such resources available on the market, but the
costs of going to war to obtain them surely outweigh the benefits in todays
increasingly destructive warfare. Although the Chinese economy has diverted
some investment from ASEAN and Chinese manufactured goods pose a threat
to ASEANs industries in some sectors, this is a far cry from a neocolonial
situation. ASEANs openness to the economies of all outside players and to
market- and multinational driven industrialization offsets any such prospect of Chinese colonization or
competition among the great powers such as China, Japan, the United States, EU and India for ASEAN

Not only economic

interdependence, but regional economic and security institutions in Asia are
also more inclusive than Europes. There is no NATO in Asia, a real blessing in
geopolitical terms. China is a member of all East Asian and Asia-Pacific regional bodies, in contrast
resources and markets leading to political dominance by any of them.

to Russias exclusion from NATO and the EU. Asian regional institutions are often disparaged as talk

There is no question that ASEAN needs

to shift gear from dialogue to action and adopt a more problem-solving
approach. It needs to overcome the persisting non-intervention mindset of
its members by emulating not the EU (the wrong role model) but the African Union
(AU), especially when it comes to collective peacekeeping. ASEAN has more resources but
less willpower to do regional peacekeeping than the AU, so it should achieve
more success than the AU if it garners the requisite political will.
shops, and some of that criticism is well-deserved.

ASEAN Fails

ASEAN ineffectiveness is structural, not induced by the aff

Jones 10 (Lee, lecturer in politics at Queen Mary, University of London. His research focuses on
issues of sovereignty, intervention, state-society relations, regionalism, and governance, particularly in
developing countries, Still in the Drivers Seat, But for How Long? ASEANs Capacity for Leadership in
East-Asian International Relations, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 3, 95-113. ISSN: 18684882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print)) RR
Such divergences of interest not only constrict ASEANs capacity to agree on broad general principles, but also create

while the evaporation of most

Singaporean and Malaysian business interests in Myanmar left those
governments free to take a sterner line towards Rangoon after the Depayin incident of
2003, the formulation of a consistent ASEAN policy was frustrated by the
Thaksin government in Thailand, which was more interested in pursuing
investment opportunities in Burma, not least for Thaksins own companies (Jones 2008: 277ff.).
Likewise, despite paper-based progress, any effective response to the annual haze resulting
from illegal land-clearance fires in Indonesia is hampered by the conflictual
interests at stake. The oligarchic nature of Indonesias domestic politics and widespread corruption means that
difficulties in cooperating on highly specific issues. For example,

logging magnates are able to operate with significant impunity, while the parliament refuses to ratify the ASEAN
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution to avoid infringing on powerful corporate interests. Indonesian politicians
complain that Singaporean and Malaysian business interests also contribute to the problem by illegally trading in

Even when ASEAN does generate grand,

cooperative agreements, the nature of state power in the region
means that their implementation is always mediated by prevailing
constellations of power and interests. For example, a study of the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline
Indonesian timber (Tay 2009).

Project found that it was unlikely to ever come close to fulfilling its brief or that of its masters because it actual
implementation was profoundly shaped by interpenetration between parts of ASEAN states and powerful business
interests, within the overall context of capitalist development and the ideological influence of organisations like the World

ASEAN cooperation and

institutions are often weak because powerful socio-political
coalitions want them to be. Contrary to what is often suggested in the literature, they also indicate
that it is not simply the expansion of ASEAN to encompass the less-developed
CLMV states that hampers the achievement of regional cooperation. Effective
consensus is also undermined by divergent strategic priorities. All the ASEAN states
essentially agree on the strategy of omni-enmeshment. Even Myanmar, the state closest to China, recognises the
Bank (Carroll and Sovacool 2008). These examples imply that

necessity of maintaining good relations with India and has tried to improve its relations with the West at times (see
Haacke 2006). However, the interests specific to each state vary. Of greatest salience here is the South China Sea, where
a number of ASEAN states have overlapping territorial claims, some of which also overlap with claims made by China.
Assertive Chinese posturing in the early 1990s prompted a collective response from ASEAN in 1992 calling for the
peaceful settlement of disputes, and negotiations with China led to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, which elaborated norms of interstate practice in the area. This was pushed very strongly by Vietnam,
which is also in dispute with China over its 1975 seizure of the Paracel Islands. Following increased Chinese activity in the
area recently, Vietnam is now pushing for the recently-established ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting to consider
collective measures and is reportedly trying to involve Washington. All ASEAN states have a basic interest in encouraging
Chinese restraint, but not all of them have claims in the South China Sea and many are wary of unduly antagonising
Beijing in a way that might jeopardise their policy of omni-enmeshment.

China coopts ASEAN conspiracy

Cronin & Zhou 14 (Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the AsiaPacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, where Cecilia Zhou is a Joseph S. Nye,
Jr. National Security Intern, US and China's Dueling Visions of ASEAN, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/usand-chinas-dueling-visions-of-asean/) RR

Chinas multi-level strategy includes cultivating

influence within ASEAN in order to keep the member countries from uniting
against Chinas interests. Beijing does not want a united ASEAN calling for arbitration, a binding code of
But in all these ideas there are strings attached.

Its strategy incorporates expanding its influence over

individual ASEAN countries. Infrastructure is a reward for those countries with access to resources to fuel
Chinas economy; trade deals mean reducing tariffs only, which does nothing to level the unfair
advantage of large Chinese state owned enterprises; and lighthouses are but the kinder
conduct, or an infrastructure freeze..

and gentler way of rebuffing the American call for a freeze on infrastructure in disputed areas of the South China Sea.

The weight of Chinese actions suggests that China hopes to push U.S. military
power farther from its near seas while trying to convince Southeast Asian
countries that U.S. power and commitment will be unable to provide enduring
security. The Chinese government has already mandated the Peoples Liberation Army Navy to actively strengthen
maritime control and management, and has pursued this strategy through various provocative maritime actions,
notwithstanding the removal of Haiyang Shiyou 981 oilrig from contested waters with Vietnam. Simultaneously, China has

China has been increasingly vocal in

criticizing American alliances, suggesting instead a vague and exclusive new
order. In Chinas scenario, where it pushes the United States out or domestic and other international crises pull the
United States out, Southeast Asian countries will have no recourse but to
bandwagon with China in the long run.
stated that Asian countries should determine security in Asia.

Even if ASEAN can be useful for small nations, it does not

have the leadership necessary for enough strength to
mitigate conflicts between members
Conklin 15 (Amanda Conklin, currently working on Asian policy issues in
the field of international affairs. She was Fulbright in Macau from 2012-2013,
Why ASEAN cant stand up to China, The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-asean-cant-stand-china-13238.
July 1, 2015) atn
While ASEAN lacks consensus on many political and security issues (China chief
among them), ASEANs growing centrality in the Asia-Pacific demonstrates its
continuing value for regional integration and institutionalization of dialogue.
Through ASEAN, relatively weak states, like Laos and Cambodia, have
aggregated power in the international system. Also, as champions of ASEAN highlight,
the organization can help produce a stable regional order in a contentious
part of the world, such as when it united behind the nonaligned movement during the Cold War.
Nonetheless, China has exploited divisions among ASEAN members and applied
economic pressure, both positive and negative, to keep countries from coming to a
consensus on maritime security in their own backyard . Moreover, weak leadership on
political and security issues has left ASEAN without a united approach on Chinas aggression in the South
China Sea. This is a major reason why ASEAN remains divided on China there is no
leading nation to overcome economic, political, and cultural differences and forge an overarching

Leadership in ASEAN after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis has been
absent or very weak. ASEAN lacks a leader like the EU has in Germany. Singapore and Thailand
consensus.

have provided limited leadership on economic issues, but Thailands ability to perform this role has

The absence of a core leader, especially without

strong internal mechanisms to mitigate differences among members, has
been particularly problematic for security issues.
weakened due to its internal troubles.

ASEAN literally cannot settle disputes and this has gutted

its cred already
Heydarian 15 (Richard Javad Heydarian, Assistant Professor in international
affairs and political science at De La Salle University, and previously served
as a policy advisor at the Philippine House of Representatives, Face-Off:
China vs. ASEAN in the South China Sea and Beyond, National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/face-china-vs-asean-the-south-china-seabeyond-12000?page=3, January 9, 2015) atn
What is at stake is also the credibility of ASEAN as an arbiter of peace in the
region. For decades, the regional body has successfully socialized its
memberscomposed of communist, liberal-democratic and autocratic regimes along the
principles of nonaggression and consensus-driven diplomacy, transforming
Southeast Asia into a de facto security community, where it is almost inconceivable for any member-nation
to wage war against another. Preventive diplomacy and cooperative security is the name of the game in

However, when it comes to the South China Sea disputes, involving

ASEAN members and China, the regional body has yet to craft an optimal
response. ASEAN is yet to finalize the negotiations over the implementation of the DOC and the
guidelines of the COC. More worryingly, ASEAN isnt equipped with the legal
mandate and bureaucratic capacity to enforce compliance with regionally
accepted principles and rules. With respect to maritime disputes, it was only
under the chairmanships of Vietnam (2010) and Indonesia (2011) that we saw a
renewed push for negotiating a COC in the South China Sea. But there was a limited
follow-throughif not outright sabotagein the succeeding chairmanships .
ASEAN.

ASEAN is not a valuable association because it has no

authority over its members bilateral talks with individual
nations are better
Manning 16 (Robert A. Manning, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic
Council. He previously served in the State Department as a senior
advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific,
Does ASEAN Really Matter to America? The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/does-asean-really-matteramerica-15203, February 12, 2016) atn
The February 15-16 meeting is intended to underscore the U.S. rebalance toward Asia, but it
is more political theater than strategy. Yes, the nations of ASEAN total 625 million people.
They also make up an economy of $2.4 trillion and individually are important economic
partners of the United States with a combined bilateral trade of $260 billion and a similar level

With regard to defense, longtime U.S.

allies like the Philippines and Thailand, and burgeoning security partners such
as Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia all alarmed at Chinas assertive
behaviorare important actors helping to undergird the regional security
architecture built from the core of forward-deployed U.S. forces and alliances .
of U.S. FDI in all ASEAN countries in 2015.

But in defense, too, most serious business is done with the United
States bilaterally. Obama is to be commended for his initiative to
elevate Southeast Asia and showcase the importance of the region
to U.S. interests. If he uses the summit to highlight the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
agreement; economic and defense cooperation; and ASEAN support for an open, rules-based

But it is delusional to portray ASEAN as a viable

collective actor that has more than a marginal role in the regional
political/security order. Of course, leaders talking is better than not talking.
But after two decades of such multilateralism, regional security is more at
risk than ever. Ask the question: If ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and EAS (East Asia
order, it may be worth the effort.

Summit) and other such acronyms disappeared tomorrow would Asia be any less secure? The
answer is no. Indeed, viewing ASEAN as more than a loose coalition of disparate nations,
economies and cultures is to buy into its own fantasyland narcissism. ASEAN nations range
from Singapore, a Los Angeles-like dynamic city-state with a GDP per capita at U.S. levels, to
small, backward communist dictatorships like Cambodia and Laos, to democracies like

Culturally, they range from Muslim-majority states

such as Indonesia (the worlds largest Muslim nation) and Malaysia to
Buddhist secular states such as Thailand. Only in geographic proximity does a
concept of community seem plausible.
Indonesia and the Philippines.

ASEAN fails climate change and human rights

Tan 15 (Nor Arlene Tan, Columnist for The Malaysia Insider, Asean in 2015, the good, the
bad and the undecided, http://aseantuc.org/2016/01/asean-in-2015-the-good-the-bad-andthe-undecided-nor-arlene-tan/) jpr

Transboundary smoke and Indonesias forest fires Despite the success of the
Conference of the Parties, or COP21, in Paris, climate change policy has taken
a backseat in Southeast Asia with the looming forest fires in Indonesia and
the transboundary smoke which plagued its neighbours Malaysia, Singapore,
southern Thailand and southern Philippines. Despite all countries in Southeast
Asia ratifying the Asean transboundary haze treaty, the smoke has worsened
and continues to occur on an annual basis. Part of the problem is the
unregulated slash-and-burn forest fires by palm oil and other plantation
concessions. This crisis has been dubbed a crime against humanity by the
global community. Worsening human rights records If there is one area in
which Asean has continuously failed, it is human rights. Most of the Asean
nations collapsed into the bottom pile in most of the global human rights
rankings, such as the US Trafficking in Persons Report. Despite having an
Asean Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, it has not been able
to address significant human rights issues in the region. Indonesia especially
took a blow to its foreign policy when President Jokowi decided to proceed
with the Bali Nine death penalty. Asean was put under international pressure
when it infamously played human ping-pong with boats filled with political
refugees and economic migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh. To top it off,
Asean yet again found itself in the limelight when mass graves of human
trafficking victims were discovered at the border between Thailand and
Malaysia.

ASEAN fails
Rojanaphruk 13

(Pravit Rojanaphruk, Reuters Fellow at the University of the

Philippines and a Chevening Scholar at Oxford, Asean as a grouping is a failure, academic
insists, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Asean-as-a-grouping-is-a-failureacademic-insists-30213347.html) jpr

ASEAN AS a community has been a failure so far, as the notion of national

sovereignty continues to undermine its integration while the identity of the
grouping has yet to crystallise, according to Eduardo C Tadem, an associate
professor of Asian Studies at the University of the Philippines Diliman. Though
many Thais are waiting for the ushering in of the Asean Economic Community
(AEC) in 2015, Tadem reckons the regional grouping needs to come up with a
new model of integration. The professor made his presentation at the twoday third International Conference on International Relations and
Development at Chulalongkorn University, which wrapped up yesterday. The
conference was held by about half a dozen organisations from four
universities, including Chulalongkorn's faculty of political science. Tadem said
countries like Singapore and Thailand considered Asean a conduit to boost
their own exports, leading to clashes between national strategies and the
grouping's own goals. He said 20 per cent of the AEC's trade protocols were
far too tough and might not be agreed upon by 2015. He also cited 2010
statistics showing intra-Asean trade at just 25 per cent of the entire trade in
the 10 member states, compared with 67.3 per cent of intra-trading among
European Union members. Tadem also argued that competition among Asean
manufacturers was fierce and thus undermined the goal of regional
integration. Plus, three countries - Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand dominate intra-Asean trade, accounting for about 70 per cent. Then there's
the free-trade agreements some Asean member states have with countries
outside the regional bloc, such as Thailand's pacts with New Zealand,
Australia and China, which reduces the efficacy of trade agreements within
the grouping. The Asean Secretariat, too, is weak and understaffed compared
with the EU, Tadem said. In addition to Asean leaders' failure to make any
significant joint efforts to tackle the 1997 financial crisis, "in November 2012,
Asean leaders [still] couldn't agree to set up a crisis hotline", he said. The
Asean sceptic went on to cite the failures of the Asean Charter, which he said
brought the regional human-rights standards lower than those stipulated in
the United Nations Charter. "Asean has been silent on the issue of the Muslim
Rohingya," Tadem pointed out, adding that he believes China is also dividing
the grouping into mainland and maritime Asean states - much to the
detriment of the regional bloc itself.

ASEAN fails regional integration

Jones 15 (Lee Jones, senior lecturer in international politics at Queen Mary, University of
London, Explaining the failure of the ASEAN economic community: the primacy of domestic
political economy, pg. 1-2) jpr

In 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) launched the

ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint, the most ambitious regional

economic integration initiative in the world outside of Europe. Building on the

earlier ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the AEC seeks to turn Southeast Asia
into a fully integrated production base for transnational capital by eliminating
intraregional barriers to trade and investment and creating transboundary
infrastructure to connect national markets. The touted benefits are
considerable. Economists project an increase in regional gross domestic
product of 5.3 per cent, or double this if the AEC were to be combined with
extra-regional trade pacts (Petri et al. 2012). However, all indications suggest
that the AEC will not be completed by its putative 2015 deadline. The ASEAN
Secretariats latest AEC Scorecard reported that the four packages of
integration measures creating a single market and production base, a
competitive economic region, equitable economic development, and
integrating into the global economy were only 66, 68, 68 and 86 per cent
complete, respectively (ASEAN Secretariat 2012). Moreover, because these
scorecards are based entirely on member-states self-reporting, academic
and business observers are highly sceptical of even this limited progress
report. The CIMB ASEAN Research Institute, a pro-AEC think tank, found
ample evidence... that actual implementation lags significantly behind the
timelines of stated objectives, noting a fundamental mismatch between
political ambitions and the capacities, capabilities and... [the] political will of
several member states to walk the talk (CARI 2013: 8). Likewise, the
independent Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
found that, while trade tariffs had fallen and ASEAN economies were largely
open to foreign investment, the AEC was still far from completion. Non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) to trade and investment remained significant; trade and
investment facilitation was limited; not one regional infrastructure project
was on track; and regional regulations were frequently either not being
translated into domestic rules or not properly enforced (ERIA 2012). The
Secretariat has subsequently discontinued its scorecards, relying instead on
secret ERIA reports, suggesting that these criticisms are accurate.

ASEAN failed to negotiate SCS conflict

BBC World Wide News 12 ( BBC, Asean nations fail to reach agreement
on South China Sea, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18825148) jpr

The 10-member Association of Southest Asian Nations (Asean) ended a

meeting in Cambodia without issuing a joint statement for the first time in its
45-year history. It had earlier adopted key elements of a code of conduct on
maritime issues. China has overlapping claims with four Asean members in
the South China Sea. Asean foreign ministers and their regional counterparts
from 16 countries, including China, met in Cambodia's capital Phnom Penh for
a regional forum. Tension in the South China Sea topped the agenda. The
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei contest parts of the resource-rich
South China Sea area with China. The Philippines and Vietnam want Asean to
resist Beijing's insistence that the disputes be handled on a bilateral level
only. Asean officials said the two countries wanted the joint statement to
include references to their territorial disputes with China. The Philippines has

accused Cambodia, a close ally of China, of blocking any mention of the

dispute. But Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong said that all Asean
members were responsible for the failure to issue a statement. "I requested
that we issue the joint communique without mention of the South China Sea
dispute ... but some member countries repeatedly insisted to put the issue of
the Scarborough Shoal," he said. "I have told my colleagues that the meeting
of the Asean foreign ministers is not a court, a place to give a verdict about
the dispute." China and the Philippines had a maritime stand-off in the
Scaborough Shoal in April, with China denying reports it was preparing for
war at the height of tensions in May. Both sides accused the other of
trespassing on territorial waters. Vietnam was also angered by a recent call
from China for oil exploration in a disputed territory. Earlier this week, Asean
forum ministers adopted key elements of a code of conduct on rules
governing maritime issues, and presented the proposal for China's
agreement. The Chinese foreign ministry had said that China would consider
the proposals if the conditions were right. Asean was set up in 1967 by
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. Brunei joined in
1984, followed by Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997 and Cambodia in
1999.

ASEAN fails environmental shortcomings

Palatino 15 (Mong Palatino, member of the House of Representatives in the
Philippines, Haze Exposes ASEAN Failure, http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/hazeexposes-asean-failure/) jpr
For what has happened, as President, I say sorry and seek the understanding of our relatives in Singapore and Malaysia.
This was Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono apologizing on national television Monday evening, a week
after forest fires in Sumatra caused a thick blanket of smog to descend on Singapore and many parts of Malaysia.
Indonesia had no intention to cause this. And we will continue to bear responsibility to overcome what has happened,
Yudhoyono added. His apology may be somewhat overdue but at least he said what every suffering citizen in Singapore
and Malaysia has been waiting to hear for many days already. Thankfully, Yudhoyonos apology also superseded the initial
reaction of his subordinates who called Singapore childish for complaining too much about the haze. While it is true that
forest fire is a recurring problem in the region,

this years transboundary haze is worse than in

previous years. It is bigger, blacker, thicker, and harder to clear. It caused air
pollution indexes to soar to record levels in both Singapore and Malaysia. In
fact, a state of emergency has already been declared in Muar and Ledang,
both in the southern Malaysian state of Johor. More than one hundred schools have suspended
classes. In Singapore, the wearing of face masks as protection against the haze has become the new normal in the
prosperous city state. N5 face masks have become ridiculously expensive and many people have had to wait in line for
several hours just to buy them. Workers have been advised to go home, travel has been restricted, and the young and old
have remained indoors. The haze is clearly more than a health hazard, which makes the rising frustration and anger of

all
blame and responsibility on Indonesia alone. What is needed is a regional
intervention; and the only institution capable of fulfilling this crucial task is
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Resolving transboundary
issues is one reason why ASEAN exists. Unfortunately, the current haze
disaster reflects the utter failure of ASEAN as a regional grouping. Indeed,
ASEAN initiated various programs to prevent forest fires and transboundary
haze pollution as early as the 1980s. Regional workshops have been held annually since 1992. The
many Singaporeans understandable. Since the haze involves several countries in Southeast Asia, it is futile to put

1997 haze, which badly affected the region, forced ASEAN to draft the Regional Haze Action Plan. It has three
components: prevention, mitigation, and monitoring. Curiously, it assigned Malaysia to take the lead in prevention,
Indonesia in mitigation, and Singapore in monitoring of haze the three countries that are currently suffering. In 1999,
ASEAN adopted a zero burning policy targeted at plantation companies and timber concessionaires. Further, it enjoined

member countries to develop and promote controlled burning guidelines for small farmers and cultivators. In 2002, the

In the past
decade, ASEAN has spearheaded numerous activities to fight the haze
scourge, which ranged from community level fire-fighting programs to highlevel task force meetings of country ministers. Last October 2012, it even
recognized the substantive efforts of Indonesia to prevent forest fires in the
districts of Riau and West Kalimantan. Clearly, ASEAN has done many things
and used a lot of money to stop the dreaded haze, yet all have been
ineffective. The haze has continued to return and worsen year after year. Today
there are demands for an ASEAN intervention to address the haze pollution. Indeed, ASEAN should act
quickly but it should stop repeating what it has been doing for the past two
decades. Albert Einstein purportedly once quipped that insanity is doing the
same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Instead of
landmark ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was signed by the ten member countries.

organizing another meeting, workshop, or conference, ASEAN should simply review its records, implement the action plan,
enforce the anti-haze agreement, and punish companies that violate environment laws. For Malaysian politician Charles
Santiago, the option is clear for his country: Keep a close watch on Malaysian companies in Sumatra and charge those
that flout laws, for these companies have committed nothing less than a crime against humanity.

All of ASEANs benefits are hype

Manning 16 (Robert Manning, Resident Senior Fellow in the Atlantic Councils
Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Obamas Sunnylands Summit:
Does ASEAN Really Matter?, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/obamas-sunnylandssummit-does-asean-really-matter/) jpr

But it is delusional to portray ASEAN as a viable collective actor that has

more than a marginal role in the regional political/security order. Of course,
leaders talking is better than not talking. But after two decades of such
multilateralism, regional security is more at risk than ever. If you ask the
question: if ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and EAS (East Asia Summit) and
other such acronyms disappeared tomorrow would Asia be any less secure,
the answer is no. Indeed, viewing ASEAN as more than a loose coalition of
disparate nations, economies, and cultures is to buy into its own fantasyland
narcissism. ASEAN nations range from Singapore, a Los Angeles-like dynamic
city state with a GDP per capita at U.S. levels, to small, backward communist
dictatorships like Cambodia and Laos, to democracies like Indonesia and the
Philippines. Culturally, they range from Muslim-majority states such as
Indonesia (the worlds largest Muslim nation) and Malaysia to Buddhist
secular states such as Thailand. Only in geographic proximity does a concept
of community seem plausible. Economically, the integration of ASEAN nations
has been shaped mainly by their role in global supply chains, first in the
1980s by Japanese auto companies, and since then by electronic assembly
and textiles. Intra-ASEAN trade makes up only 30 percent of the blocs total
trade, while intra-Asian trade is 53 percent. Thus, it is no surprise that some
ASEAN states Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam joined the TPP individually.
The ASEAN nations declared themselves the ASEAN Economic Community
(AEC) as of January 1. While ASEAN has eliminated 95 percent of tariffs on its
trade, the elements of its purported community are supposed to include
harmonized regulations, free movement of labor, and a unified market for
goods and services. These elements are non-existent and will continue to be

for years to come. The gap between aspiration and reality is the most
prominent feature of ASEAN. In nearly fifty years of its existence, ASEANs
biggest achievement is avoiding war and a vague sense of collective identity.
ASEAN has a tiny secretariat with a $17 million budget. If you apply Henry
Kissingers famous question about Europe to ASEAN: When I need to
call ASEAN, whom do I ask for, the answer is nobody.

Link

Bilateralism stabilizes great power relations in Asia

forces countries to reconsider rash action
Jones 10 (Lee, lecturer in politics at Queen Mary, University of London. His research focuses on
issues of sovereignty, intervention, state-society relations, regionalism, and governance, particularly in
developing countries, Still in the Drivers Seat, But for How Long? ASEANs Capacity for Leadership in
East-Asian International Relations, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 3, 95-113. ISSN: 18684882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print)) RR
In this sense,

ASEANs capacity to stabilise great power relations in Asia

correlates with the incapacity of great powers to successfully mediate their
relationships fully on their own. However, it also depends on the rivalry among the great
powers remaining within tolerable bounds. The current healthy competition yields considerable benefits to

if
this escalated into a more hostile rivalr y (e.g., through China adopting an
aggressive military posture in the South China Seas ), ASEAN would be faced
with its nightmare scenario of having to choose between strategic partner s.5 It
is thus in ASEANs interests and arguably everyone elses to try to moderate this
rivalry, which is why the Association has focused on elaborating peaceful
norms of interstate conduct and enmeshing the great powers in a bewildering web of regional
bodies, dialogue partnerships, cooperative projects, free-trade areas, and so on. Those who
criticise, for example, the bilateralism that characterises trade cooperation in the region as
irrational, since it is less efficient than multilateralism, to some extent miss the point (e.g.,
ASEAN as they are courted with offers of funding, investment and free-trade agreements. However,

Dieter 2009: 89-113). These arrangements are not always about the concrete material benefits they can

sometimes they are simply one more strand through

which to tie-in the great powers, providing one more reason for
these states to think twice before acting rashly. We might visualise this as many
be expected to yield;

Lilliputians tying down a few Gullivers. The ropes may not be very strong, even in combination, but so long
as the Gullivers do not cooperate to help free one another, they have little choice but to play the
Lilliputians game. Great-power relations have improved encouragingly of late, particularly between Japan
and China, but residual conflicts and wariness seem likely to prevail in the short-to-medium term, providing
a continued need for something like the ARF. Speculation that the Six Party Talks could evolve into a
permanent Northeast Asian security institution seem overly optimistic at present.

Theres no unique tradeoff between the aff and ASEAN

cred internal politics ensures compromise between
member states is inevitable
Jones 10 (Lee, lecturer in politics at Queen Mary, University of London. His research focuses on
issues of sovereignty, intervention, state-society relations, regionalism, and governance, particularly in
developing countries, Still in the Drivers Seat, But for How Long? ASEANs Capacity for Leadership in
East-Asian International Relations, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 3, 95-113. ISSN: 18684882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print)) RR

there is no clear consensus among ASEAN states on

exactly how far to go in order to secure their collective credibility in the eyes of
Part of the reason for this is that

external powers. Much has been written about the ASEAN Way of regionalism, which emphasises

some suggesting that this reflects cultural norms

specific to the region, e.g., Malay village practices of mufakat and musyawarah. In fact, because
of the anarchic nature of international relations , the extent of all international
consensual decision-making, with

cooperation is determined by the degree of consensus among states. The EU

may operate through voting rather than consensus, but the decision to adopt this decision-making process
was ultimately based on member-states consent and its continued use depends on it not being so abused
to the detriment of some member-states interests that this consent would be withdrawn. In practice, the
EU spends a great deal of time trying to manufacture consensus among its ruling elites to avoid this
happening. Like other groups of states, the EU is not always successful in reaching consensus, as
disagreements over the EU Constitution/ Lisbon Treaty and over how to respond to the politico-economic
crisis in Greece illustrate. ASEAN is therefore far from unique in being limited by the bounds of consensus

The only thing unique to ASEAN is the specific interests of

the dominant socio-political coalitions within the region, which ultimately set the
possible bounds of consensus among its member-states. At a basic level, the forces ruling all
ASEAN states generally accept the important of presenting a relatively united
front to external powers, and of safeguarding ASEANs collective image
and credibility in order to continue to enjoy a platform from which to
advance their own specific interests. Because ASEAN states are heavily dependent on
among its member-states

extra-regional markets for trade and investment, and many are also dependent in terms of aid, their
leaders understand the necessity of maintaining good relations with external economic partners and
donors by accommodating their agendas to some degree (or at least appearing to).

I/L Defense
ASEAN has Limited Influence in Regional Security
Aisarieva 12 ( Almagul Aisarieva has a Masters in International
Cooperation Policy from Ristumeikan Asia Pacific University, July 2012,
Ristumeikan University, ASEAN and Security Institutions: Focusing on the
ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Political Security Community, Page
13-14)
ASEANs ability to manage regional security in
Southeast Asia is limited by two factors. The first factor is the
interests and actions of great powers. These interests and actions define
the parameters of ASEANs security policies. The second is divergent
security perceptions and interests within ASEAN. They explain the
limits of intra-organizational cooperation and made it difficult to evaluate the
significance of ASEANs stated security objectives . Moreover Narine holds that the
aforementioned factors affecting ASEAN during the Cold War are still at
work even after the Cold War and it significantly limits its ability to
shape the regional environment. Different opinions of ASEAN states
over security perceptions created internal tensions, and ASEAN was
largely dependent on external support in order to be an effective
regional actor. As another factor, ASEAN significantly improved its internal relationships, but a
strong sense of collective identity still eluded the member states . Many political,
Narine (1998) argues that

cultural, and historical barriers were standing in the way of such an identity. For the most part, their

commitment to ASEAN remained limited by a narrow understanding

of their self-interests. In the post-cold war period, regional uncertainty created the impression
that the regions security environment may be amenable to ASEANs corporate influence. Narine (1997) in

the political, economic, and strategic considerations that have

made ASEAN a success within Southeast Asia do not necessarily apply to the more
powerful states of the Asia Pacific region. He explains his argument by emphasizing the
his another article argues that

importance of understanding the context in which ASEAN evolved and secondly, by examining the
limitations of the ASEAN Way. 8 As author contends the qualities accounting for ASEANs success do not
assume the same configuration within the ARF. The ARF includes the worlds militarily powerful states and
encompasses the entire Pacific Rim. ASEANs techniques are unique to the conditions of the time in which
they developed and the nature of its members.

ASEAN Cannot Stabilize the Region

Aisarieva 12 ( Almagul Aisarieva has a Masters in International
Cooperation Policy from Ristumeikan Asia Pacific University, July 2012,
Ristumeikan University, ASEAN and Security Institutions: Focusing on the
ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Political Security Community, Page
43)
If ASEAN could successfully negotiate with China and move the South China Sea disputes
from conflict prevention to meaningful cooperation, it would greatly enhance its prestige as
a regional body (Beckman, 2009: 159-160). Despite aforementioned achievements, it is often argued
that the ARF has lost its momentum. The forum cannot influence the
Taiwan, North Korean, Kashmir and other issues in spite of the fact
that these flashpoints could seriously destabilize the region . Crucial

differences also contrast Northeast Asian from Southeast Asian security

relations as well as other members. The territorial disputes seem to have
increased rather than decreasing. The US, Japan, and China also have
different expectations and strategic perspectives that cannot
implicitly be ignored in the ASEAN Way (Emmers, 2009: 8-9). According to
Katsumata (2006: 195), the ARF was ASEANs attempt to cooperate tactically
with external powers, although it appears to be a mere talking shop with
no strategic significance. In sum, it can be mentioned that in terms of institutional
strength, the ARF has been relatively successful in engaging the great powers and promoting confidence
building; however,

it has generally failed to move toward preventive

diplomacy (Emmers, 2008: 194- 195).

Impact

Defense
ASEAN has Limited Influence in Regional Security
Aisarieva 12 ( Almagul Aisarieva has a Masters in International
Cooperation Policy from Ristumeikan Asia Pacific University, July 2012,
Ristumeikan University, ASEAN and Security Institutions: Focusing on the
ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Political Security Community, Page
13-14)
ASEANs ability to manage regional security in
Southeast Asia is limited by two factors. The first factor is the
interests and actions of great powers. These interests and actions define
the parameters of ASEANs security policies. The second is divergent
security perceptions and interests within ASEAN. They explain the
limits of intra-organizational cooperation and made it difficult to evaluate the
significance of ASEANs stated security objectives . Moreover Narine holds that the
aforementioned factors affecting ASEAN during the Cold War are still at
work even after the Cold War and it significantly limits its ability to
shape the regional environment. Different opinions of ASEAN states
over security perceptions created internal tensions, and ASEAN was
largely dependent on external support in order to be an effective
regional actor. As another factor, ASEAN significantly improved its internal relationships, but a
strong sense of collective identity still eluded the member states . Many political,
Narine (1998) argues that

cultural, and historical barriers were standing in the way of such an identity. For the most part, their

commitment to ASEAN remained limited by a narrow understanding

of their self-interests. In the post-cold war period, regional uncertainty created the impression
that the regions security environment may be amenable to ASEANs corporate influence. Narine (1997) in

the political, economic, and strategic considerations that have

made ASEAN a success within Southeast Asia do not necessarily apply to the more
powerful states of the Asia Pacific region. He explains his argument by emphasizing the
his another article argues that

importance of understanding the context in which ASEAN evolved and secondly, by examining the
limitations of the ASEAN Way. 8 As author contends the qualities accounting for ASEANs success do not
assume the same configuration within the ARF. The ARF includes the worlds militarily powerful states and
encompasses the entire Pacific Rim. ASEANs techniques are unique to the conditions of the time in which
they developed and the nature of its members.

ASEAN Cannot Stabilize the Region

Aisarieva 12 ( Almagul Aisarieva has a Masters in International
Cooperation Policy from Ristumeikan Asia Pacific University, July 2012,
Ristumeikan University, ASEAN and Security Institutions: Focusing on the
ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Political Security Community, Page
43)
If ASEAN could successfully negotiate with China and move the South China Sea disputes
from conflict prevention to meaningful cooperation, it would greatly enhance its prestige as
a regional body (Beckman, 2009: 159-160). Despite aforementioned achievements, it is often argued
that the ARF has lost its momentum. The forum cannot influence the
Taiwan, North Korean, Kashmir and other issues in spite of the fact
that these flashpoints could seriously destabilize the region . Crucial

differences also contrast Northeast Asian from Southeast Asian security

relations as well as other members. The territorial disputes seem to have
increased rather than decreasing. The US, Japan, and China also have
different expectations and strategic perspectives that cannot
implicitly be ignored in the ASEAN Way (Emmers, 2009: 8-9). According to
Katsumata (2006: 195), the ARF was ASEANs attempt to cooperate tactically
with external powers, although it appears to be a mere talking shop with
no strategic significance. In sum, it can be mentioned that in terms of institutional
strength, the ARF has been relatively successful in engaging the great powers and promoting confidence
building; however,

it has generally failed to move toward preventive

diplomacy (Emmers, 2008: 194- 195).

The US has nothing to fear from chinas rise and balance

of power scholarship is wrong about asia
Acharya 15(Amitav Acharya, international relations at
American University, Doomed By Dialogue? Will ASEAN
Survive Great Power Rivalry in Asia, The Asan Forum,
http://www.theasanforum.org/doomed-by-dialogue-will-asean-survive-greatpower-rivalry-in-asia/, June 29, 2015) atn
The conventional wisdom about Asian security today is that the rise of China
is creating an imbalance of power in Asia. This is misleading . There was
never really a balance of power in Asia in the conventional sense .
Asia has always been a region of US primacy, if not outright hegemony,
although the latter term might apply if hegemony is understood in terms of
military power projection. Even today, the United States outspends China by four
and half times in defense. China may be aspiring to anti-access/area denial, but it is nowhere
close to upstaging US military superiority in Asia. The idea of an Asian balance of power an
equilibrium of poweris a myth without much regard for what the term of balance
of power actually means. On the contrary, the relative rise of China may actually be creating
something of a military equilibrium for the first time in Asian history. If realists are right that a
balance of power contributes to stability, this cannot be a bad thing for the
region as well as its smaller states like ASEAN. After all, some proponents of balance of
power claim as one of its virtues the protection of small states by denying hegemony to any single power.
This is not to say that there is no balancing happening between China and the United States and its allies,
but it is defensive, rather than offensive in nature, and it is accompanied by other forces favoring regional

The US rebalancing policy unquestionably responds to Chinas rise, but

there are three important things about it that are often forgotten by analysts.
First, it is an outgrowth of hedging policy and retains many elements of an
open and flexible policy that does not write off peaceful Chinese behavior.
Second, the rebalancing does not represent a dramatic shift in US military
deployment in the region, mainly reversing the 60-40 percent ratio of
deployment between Europe/Middle East and Asia. Finally, it is not a policy of
preemptive containment, even though many Chinese analysts claim it is to
score propaganda points. US-China economic ties , not just trade but a virtual mutual
assured destruction situation in financial links , demonstrate how different it is from the US
containment of the Soviet Union. The US rebalancing policy is not a preemptive strategy of
stability.

containment but a countervailing posture that gives China ample room for rising peacefully, exactly what it

claims to want to do, while preventing it from acquiring a Monroe Doctrine like regional hegemony. Chinese

China is not pursuing, and

is hardly capable of pursuing, a policy of expansionism of the kind a rising
Germany did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries or as Japan did before World War II.
analysts and officials should do well to accept this. At the same time,

This is something for both Western and Asian hyper-realists to acknowledge.

No china war china cares about being taken seriously by

its neighbors as a rising power and as such has no
interest in lashing out
Acharya 15(Amitav Acharya, international relations at
American University, Doomed By Dialogue? Will ASEAN
Survive Great Power Rivalry in Asia, The Asan Forum,
http://www.theasanforum.org/doomed-by-dialogue-will-asean-survive-greatpower-rivalry-in-asia/, June 29, 2015) atn
emerging powers cannot become truly legitimate global powers if
they keep picking quarrels with all (or almost all) their neighbors. For China,
global legitimacy may not be possible without regional legitimacy. One might
point, as John Mearsheimer does, to the United States as an exception, and say that as a rising power, it
could coerce and threaten its immediate neighbors and pursue expansionism in the
form of the Monroe Doctrine, but it did not become alegitimate global power until
after it abandoned the Monroe Doctrine in the late 1920s.
Moreover,

Turns

Generic
Power conflicts make ASEAN stronger but this only
happens if china stays unified but it will not collapse
Acharya 15(Amitav Acharya, international relations at
American University, Doomed By Dialogue? Will ASEAN
Survive Great Power Rivalry in Asia, The Asan Forum,
http://www.theasanforum.org/doomed-by-dialogue-will-asean-survive-greatpower-rivalry-in-asia/, June 29, 2015) atn
These domestic and intra-ASEAN challenges could weaken ASEAN to a
greater degree than great power politics. In dealing with the latter, ASEANs
big advantage is that there is currently no alternative to ASEANs convening
power in the region. The great powers of the Asia Pacific, China, Japan, India and the United States,
are not capable of leading Asian regional institutions because of mutual mistrust and a lack of legitimacy,

Renewed great power competition does

not undermine but supports ASEAN centrality. Recent Chinese
economic and security initiatives such as the AIIB and the Silk Road
Fund are not likely to alter this situation. The AIIB represents one of the first serious
even for countries such as Japan and India.

initiatives coming from China to promote Asian cooperation. China had little to do with the establishment
of APEC in 1989, the ARF in 1994, ASEAN+3 in 1997, and the EAS in 2005. The AIIB challenges the
principle of ASEAN centrality; yet, Chinese initiatives are undermined by Chinas problems in regional
political and security issues. China has proposed the idea of a Conference on Interaction and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Asia (CICA), calling for Asian solutions to Asian problems. But this initiative has
found little traction and has even evoked suspicion. Its prospects are diminished by Chinas territorial
disputes with its neighbors and the mistrust and apprehensions about Chinese geopolitical intentions and

ASEAN cannot take full advantage of this situation if it

becomes a house divided against itself, if the domestic politics in key
member states detract from their engagement in ASEAN, and if it suffers from
a lack of leadership. To revitalize itself, ASEAN should perhaps do what a large
power in the region.

corporation facing declining competitiveness and profitability does: downsize. Not in terms of its
membership, or its staff, which are small anyway, but in terms of issue areas. This does not mean
removing itself from South China Sea issue, as suggested by Cambodia, which forgets that there might not
be an independent Cambodia today had ASEAN not engaged in conflicts outside of its membership
(Neither Cambodia nor Vietnam were ASEAN members when the former occupied the latter ).

But
ASEAN should focus more on issues within Southeast Asia and its immediate
environment, and forget about the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait and IndiaPakistan conflicts. These are now discussed through the ARF and EAS, but as the convener and
agenda-setter, ASEAN should give more focused attention to the South China Sea, no matter what China
says. On transnational and global challenges, ASEAN should share more responsibilities with middle
powers, such as South Korea, Australia, and Canada.

SCS
SCS Turn: red line enforcement results in asean stability
Pongsudhirak 16 (Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Director Institute of Security
and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University, Asean's disunity
undermines its centrality, Strait Times) atn
A ratified party to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos),
China sees no wrong in its sea claims based on where it stands in the
geopolitical mix and its historical rights based on a "nine-dash-line" map. Its
view is that outside meddlers, such as the United States which has not even
ratified Unclos, merely make matters worse by siding with China's opponents.
The Philippines takes the opposite view, arguing that tensions were initiated
by China's aggressive claims in the South China Sea and construction of
artificial islands out of reefs and rocks. Beijing's expansive "nine-dash-line"
map that covers sea areas close to the Philippines is the source of tensions.
Manila, therefore, has to seek recourse wherever it can. First and foremost,
the Philippines has sought Asean's united stance against China's belligerent
posturing. When Asean comes up short and proves disunited, especially its
inability to draft a binding Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea,
Manila then has to opt for other channels, including the UN, and ultimately
turn to the US as a treaty ally. More recently, the Philippines has also
cooperated more closely with other middle powers in the area, particularly
Australia and Japan. Above all, Manila will not accept a bilateral ultimatum
from Beijing. In other words, the Philippines says it will not be bullied by
China, and China maintains it will not be pushed around by what it sees as a
US-backed international order operating by rules which Washington itself has
not fully endorsed. In turn, the Manila-Beijing contest over the South China
Sea has emerged as the most daunting and existential threat to all that
Asean has achieved as the central linchpin of regionalism in Asia.