Ang Yu Asuncion Vs.

CA
Facts:

July 29, 1987: An amended Complaint for Specific Performance was filed by petitioners
Ang Yu Asuncion and others against Bobby Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan
before RTC.

Petitioners (Ang Yu) alleged that:

- they are the tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by Bobby
Unijeng and others located in Binondo, Manila (since 1935)
that on several occasions before October 9, 1986, the lessors informed the lessees
(petitioners) that they are offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority to acquire
the same;
- that during the negotiations, Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6-million while they made
a counter offer of P5-million;
- that they wrote them on October 24, 1986 asking that they specify the terms and conditions
of the offer to sell; that when plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter dated
January 28, 1987 with the same request;

The RTC found that Cu Unjiengs offer to sell was never accepted by the petitioners
(Ang Yu) for the reason that they did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the
proposed sale, hence, there was no contract of sale at all. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the lower court. This decision was brought to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari which subsequently denied the appeal on May 6, 1991
for insufficiency in form and substance. (Referring to the first case filed by Ang Yu)

November 15, 1990: While the case was pending consideration by this Court, the Cu
Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of Sale transferring the subject petitioner to petitioner
Buen Realty and Development Corporation.

Petitioner Buen Realty and Development Corporation, as the new owner of the subject
property, wrote a letter to the lessees demanding that the latter vacate the premises.

August 30, 1991: the RTC ordered the Cu Unjiengs to execute the necessary Deed of
Sale of the property in litigation in favor of plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and
Arthur Go for the consideration of P15 Million pesos in recognition of petitioners right of
first refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the buyer.
The court also set aside the title issued to Buen Realty Corporation for having been
executed in bad faith. On September 22, 1991, the Judge issued a writ of execution.

The CA reversed the RTC ruling.

Issue: WON Buen Realty can be bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis
pendens, carried over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of the
latters purchase of the property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs. NO
Held:
Right of first refusal is not a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the
Civil Code
In the law on sales, the so-called right of first refusal is an innovative juridical relation.
Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of
the Civil Code.
In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right,
however, would be dependent not only on the grantors eventual intention to enter into a
binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are
yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a
class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the essential elements
to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and inconclusive) but by, among other
laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human
conduct.
The proper action for violation of the right of first refysal is to file an action for
damages and NOT writ of execution
The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed, has merely accorded a
right of first refusal in favor of petitioners (Ang Yu et. al). The consequence of such a
declaration entails no more than what has heretofore been said. In fine, if, as it is here so
conveyed to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor the
right of first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the judgment, since there is none
to execute, but an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.
Unconditional mutual promise to buy vs. Accepted unilateral promise
An unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell, as long as the object is made determinate
and the price is fixed, can be obligatory on the parties, and compliance therewith may
accordingly be exacted.

An accepted unilateral promise which specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be paid,
when coupled with a valuable consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may
properly be termed a perfected contract of option. This contract is legally binding, and in sales,
it conforms with the second paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1479. . . .
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the
price. (1451a)
Observe, however, that the option is not the contract of sale itself. The optionee has the right,
but not the obligation, to buy. Once the option is exercised timely, i.e., the offer is accepted
before a breach of the option, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues and both parties
are then reciprocally bound to comply with their respective undertakings.
Buen Realty cannot be ousted from the ownership and possession of the property
Furthermore, whether private respondent Buen Realty Development Corporation, the alleged
purchaser of the property, has acted in good faith or bad faith and whether or not it should, in
any case, be considered bound to respect the registration of the lis pendens in Civil Case No.
87-41058 are matters that must be independently addressed in appropriate proceedings. Buen
Realty, not having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 87-41058, cannot be held subject to the
writ of execution issued by respondent Judge, let alone ousted from the ownership and
possession of the property, without first being duly afforded its day in court.

1) DELA RAMA vs. MENDIOLA and TITAN CONSTRUCTION (ObliCon)

Subject matter(or Object)
A subject matter is the item with respect to which the controversy has arisen, or concerning
which the wrong has been done, and it is ordinarily the right, the thing, or the contract under
dispute. In the case at bar, both the first and second actions involve the same real property.
Facts:
Petitioner sold to the government on expropriation a parcel of land, for use in the construction
of the EDSA Extension Project.
Then, undertook to sell to respondent Titan Construction Corporation a parcel of land adjacent
to the one expropriated. Then petitioner failed to comply with his obligations, prompting
respondent to file for rescission of contract. Then, a compromise agreement between the
parties was effected with an Agreement to Sell and Buy, stipulating that the respondent is
waiving all his rights with the parcel of land within which the government may return in the
course of the completion of the EDSA Extension Project.
Petitioner sought the reconveyance of the unused portion of the property from the
government.
Titan filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary
Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order. RTC denied for lack of merit. Titan appealed to CA.
Meanwhile, Titan filed a action for specific performance based on the compromise judgment to
the RTC. This prompted petitioner to file with the CA a Motion for Direct Contempt and to
Dismiss based on Forum Shopping. It was however dismissed by RTC, and his MR also denied.
Respondent filed a motion to withdraw the petition in CA, which was granted. Thus, the case
was dismissed with finality.
The RTC held that the violation the rule on non-forum-shopping was cured when the CA
dismissed with finality the motion for declaratory relief.
Issue:
WON the specific performance case is barred by the petition for declaratory relief case on the
ground of res judicata? YES
Held:

There is res judicata where the following four essential conditions concur, viz: (1) there must
be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must
be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
No doubt, all the first three elements are satisfied. As regards the fourth condition, it is clear
that there is identity of parties in the two cases. Although the public respondents in the
declaratory relief case were not impleaded in the specific performance case, only a substantial
identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition or elimination of
some parties does not alter the situation.
The subject matters and causes of action of the two cases are likewise identical. In the case at
bar, both the first and second actions involve the same real property. It is true that the first
case was a special civil action for declaratory relief while the second case was a civil action for
specific performance. However, the difference in form and nature of the two actions is
immaterial. The philosophy behind the rule on res judicata prohibits the parties from litigating
the same issue more than once.
Respondents alleged right in both cases depends on one and the same instrument, the
Agreement to Sell and Buy. Clearly, respondents ultimate objective in instituting the two
actions was to have the property reconveyed in its favor.
The principle of res judicata requires that stability be accorded to judgments. Controversies
once decided on the merits shall remain in repose for there should be an end to litigation
which, without the doctrine, would be endless.
DECISION: Petition granted. RTC ordered to dismiss case on action for specific performance on
the ground of res judicata.
CASE 21:

BACHRACH CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and PHILIPPINES PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner and the Republic entered into a lease agreement for a term of ninetynine years covering 2 specified area, Block 180 and Block 185, located at the Manila Port Area.
It was then under the control and management of the Director of Lands. When the control and
management of the Port Area was transferred to the respondents, through Executive Order No.
321, the rental rates of the petitioner was increased by 1,500%. However, the petitioner
refused to pay.
The respondent initiated unlawful detainer proceeding against the petitioner. The lower
court rendered the decision ordering the eviction of the petitioner and was affirmed in toto
when appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for review, however the court affirmed the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, still it was put on hold due to the pending submission of a
compromise agreement. The parties failed to submit the compromise agreement, thus the
denial of the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the decision of the appellate court became
final and executory.
Meanwhile, while the motion for reconsideration is pending, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent for refusing to honor a compromise agreement perfected
between the parties during their conference that superseded the ejectment case. Thus, the
prayer for specific performance.
The respondent filed a motion for a writ of execution in the ejectment case. The
petitioner filed an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the issuance of the writ of execution. The respondent
countered by filing a motion for preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses along with a
motion to dismiss. However, the trial court issued an order granting the application of the
petitioner.
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, however it was dismissed. The court ruled that it was insufficient if form and
substance for it fail to attach a certified to copy of each of the assailed order of the trial court.
Undaunted, the respondent filed a new petition alleging that since it had only received a copy
of the assailed resolution of the trial court, the refiling if the petition with the Court of Appeals

within a period of less than two months from the date of such receipt was well within the
reasonable time requirement under the Rules for a special civil action for certiorari. In the
meantime, the resolution which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the
respondent became final.
In the newly filed petition, the respondent invoked that the respondent Judge acted
without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance,
abide and acknowledge the final judgement of the Court of Appeals which is enough
justification for the dismissal of the case grounded on res judicata. The Court of Appeals
rendered the decision nullifying and setting aside the orders of the RTC and ordering the
dismissal of the complaint of the petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the specific performance case should be held barred by the unlawful
detainer case on the ground of res judicata.
HELD:
NO. There are four (4) essential conditions which must concur in order that res
judicata may effectively apply, viz: (1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the
merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity
of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the case at bar, There is no question
about the fact that all the first three elements of res judicata are here extant; it is the final
condition requiring an identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action, particularly
the last two, i.e., subject matter and cause of action, that presents a problem.
According to the Supreme Court, the ultimate test in ascertaining the identity of causes
of action is said to be to look into whether or not the same evidence fully supports and
establishes both the present cause of action and the former cause of action. In the affirmative,
the former judgment would be a bar; if otherwise, then that prior judgment would not serve as
such a bar to the second. The evidence needed to establish the cause of action in the unlawful
detainer case would be the lease contract and the violation of that lease by Bachrach. In the
specific performance case, what would be consequential is evidence of the alleged
compromise agreement and its breach by PPA.
Furthermore, on the issue of issuance of writ of preliminary injunction as an improper
interference with the judgment in the unlawful detainer suit. The Supreme Court ruled that
after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its
execution. No court, necessarily, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such
execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and
circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested
party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a
change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief. Evidently, in issuing its
orders assailed by PPA in the latters petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, the trial court in the case at bar would want to preserve status quo pending its
disposition of the specific performance case and to prevent the case from being mooted by an
early implementation of the ejectment writ. In holding differently and ascribing to the trial
court grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the appellate court,
in our considered view, has committed reversible error.
Arturo Pelayo vs Marcelo Lauron, et al
G.r. no. L-4089 January 12, 1909
Facts:
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a
complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella on the ground that sometime in October
13, 1906, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas,
Pelayo was requested to render assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth
to a child. He then rendered medical services to the defendants. He even visited the patient
several times and wanted to be paid for the medical services he rendered but the defendants
refused to pay 500 php to do so without alleging any good reason.
In an answer to the complaint, the defendants denied all the allegations made by the
plaintiff. The defendants even told that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the
childbirth and while she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate
house.
The defendants were absolved from the complaint on account of lack of sufficient
evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants.
Issue:

Whether or not the defendants Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella liable to pay 500 Php
for the medical services rendered by Pelayo.
Held:
Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from
law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the
only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the
contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and
1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If
every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are
mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them
by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the
unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health
may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized;
the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees
of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability originates from the above-cited
mutual obligation which the law has expressly established between the married couple.
In case at bar, the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional
services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact
that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is
no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent
danger, to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical
assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the
law, as has been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who
believes that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who
is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the
obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing
of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it
does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for
which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are
under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves.
DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NORTHERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES INC.,
ET AL, defendants-appellees.
FACTS
- Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc., operated a movie house in Laoag and plaintiff DOMINGO
DE LA
CRUZ, hired as a special guard whose duties were to guard the main entrance of the cine, to
maintain
peace and order and to report the commission of disorders within the premises.
- One Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the gate or entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by
the refusal
of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in without first providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked
him with
a bolo. De la Cruz defended himself as best he could until he was cornered, at which moment
to save
himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in the latter's death.
- De la Cruz was charged with homicide, after a re-investigation conducted by the Provincial
Fiscal the
latter filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the court in January 1943.
On July 8,
1947, De la Cruz was again accused of the same crime of homicide, of the same Court.
- After trial, he was finally acquitted of the charge on January 31, 1948. In both criminal cases
De la Cruz

employed a lawyer to defend him. He demanded from his former employer reimbursement of
his
expenses but was refused. He filed the present action against the movie corporation and the
three
members of its board of directors, to recover amounts he had paid his lawyers and also moral
damages
said to have been suffered, a total of P15,000.
- Court of First Instance after rejecting the theory of the plaintiff that he was an agent of the
defendants
and that as such agent he was entitled to reimbursement of the expenses incurred by him in
connection
with the agency found that plaintiff had no cause of action and dismissed the complaint
without costs.
ISSUE
Whether an employee or servant who in line of duty and while in the performance of the task
assigned to
him, performs an act which eventually results in his incurring in expenses, caused not directly
by his
master or employer or his fellow servants or by reason of his performance of his duty, but
rather by a
third party or stranger not in the employ of his employer, may recover said damages against
his employer.
HELD
We agree with the trial court that the relationship between the movie corporation and the
plaintiff was not
that of principal and agent because the principle of representation was in no way involved.
-Plaintiff was not employed to represent the defendant corporation in its dealings with third
parties. He
was a mere employee hired to perform a certain specific duty or task, that of acting as special
guard and
staying at the main entrance of the movie house to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace
and order
within the premises.

Manzano vs Lazaro

effective ratification on voidable contracts.Vitiated consent does not make the contract
unenforceable but merely voidable;remedy is to file a case to annul the contract; voidable and
annullable contracts haveproduces legal effect until annulled by a proper
court(art.1390);voidable contractssusceptible of ratification.
Facts:MAnzano and petitioner entered a professional services contract. Outline in thecontract is
their corresponding duties which includes the award of bonuses in theevent that the petitioner
would win the elections. Indeed, petitioner won the vicemayoralty. Thus, respondent sent a
letter to petitioner demanding payment ofservices and the bonus. Petitioner replied that there
must be first an inventorywhi
ch accdg to petitioners knowledge, is to be prepared by the respondent.
Respondent denied it and argued that preparing liquidation papers was not one ofthe duties
outlined for him. Due to non-payment of the petitioner, respondent filed acase for collection of
sum of money. Petitioner alleges that there wasmisrepresentation on the part of respondent
and his consent to the contract wasvitiated by fraud. Thus there was no perfected contract at
all. The RTC renderedjudgment in favor of respondent and affirmed by CA.
Issue: WON consent vitiated by fraud annuls the contract.
Ruling: No. Vitiated consent does not itself makes the contract unenforceable butmerely
voidable and annullable and it produces legal effect until annulled by aproper court and
voidable contracts are susceptible of ratification. In this case, theacts of petitioner is consistent
with ratification

amounting to an effectiveratification.

CASE 21:

BACHRACH CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINES PORTS AUTHORITY,
respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner and the Republic entered into a lease agreement for a term of
ninety-nine years covering 2 specified area, Block 180 and Block 185, located at the
Manila Port Area. It was then under the control and management of the Director of
Lands. When the control and management of the Port Area was transferred to the
respondents, through Executive Order No. 321, the rental rates of the petitioner was
increased by 1,500%. However, the petitioner refused to pay.
The respondent initiated unlawful detainer proceeding against the petitioner. The
lower court rendered the decision ordering the eviction of the petitioner and was affirmed
in toto when appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was elevated to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review, however the court affirmed the decision of the
RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed, still it was put on hold due to the pending
submission of a compromise agreement. The parties failed to submit the compromise
agreement, thus the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the decision of the
appellate court became final and executory.
Meanwhile, while the motion for reconsideration is pending, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent for refusing to honor a compromise agreement
perfected between the parties during their conference that superseded the ejectment case.
Thus, the prayer for specific performance.
The respondent filed a motion for a writ of execution in the ejectment case. The
petitioner filed an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the issuance of the writ of execution. The respondent
countered by filing a motion for preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses along
with a motion to dismiss. However, the trial court issued an order granting the application
of the petitioner.
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, however it was dismissed. The court ruled that it was insufficient if form and
substance for it fail to attach a certified to copy of each of the assailed order of the trial
court. Undaunted, the respondent filed a new petition alleging that since it had only
received a copy of the assailed resolution of the trial court, the refiling if the petition with
the Court of Appeals within a period of less than two months from the date of such
receipt was well within the reasonable time requirement under the Rules for a special
civil action for certiorari. In the meantime, the resolution which dismissed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent became final.
In the newly filed petition, the respondent invoked that the respondent Judge
acted without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with abuse of discretion in refusing to take
cognizance, abide and acknowledge the final judgement of the Court of Appeals which is
enough justification for the dismissal of the case grounded on res judicata. The Court of
Appeals rendered the decision nullifying and setting aside the orders of the RTC and
ordering the dismissal of the complaint of the petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the specific performance case should be held barred by the
unlawful detainer case on the ground of res judicata.
HELD:
NO. There are four (4) essential conditions which must concur in order that res
judicata may effectively apply, viz: (1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must
be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order
on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of
parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the case at bar,
There is no question about the fact that all the first three elements of res judicata are here
extant; it is the final condition requiring an identity of parties, of subject matter and of
causes of action, particularly the last two, i.e., subject matter and cause of action, that
presents a problem.
According to the Supreme Court, the ultimate test in ascertaining the identity of
causes of action is said to be to look into whether or not the same evidence fully supports
and establishes both the present cause of action and the former cause of action. In the
affirmative, the former judgment would be a bar; if otherwise, then that prior judgment
would not serve as such a bar to the second. The evidence needed to establish the cause
of action in the unlawful detainer case would be the lease contract and the violation of
that lease by Bachrach. In the specific performance case, what would be consequential is
evidence of the alleged compromise agreement and its breach by PPA.
Furthermore, on the issue of issuance of writ of preliminary injunction as an
improper interference with the judgment in the unlawful detainer suit. The Supreme
Court ruled that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of
the court to order its execution. No court, necessarily, should interfere by injunction or
otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of
exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render
execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its
execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can
warrant an injunctive relief. Evidently, in issuing its orders assailed by PPA in the latters
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, the trial court in the
case at bar would want to preserve status quo pending its disposition of the specific
performance case and to prevent the case from being mooted by an early implementation
of the ejectment writ. In holding differently and ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the appellate court, in our
considered view, has committed reversible error.
CASE 21:
BACHRACH CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINES PORTS AUTHORITY,
respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner and the Republic entered into a lease agreement for a term of
ninety-nine years covering 2 specified area, Block 180 and Block 185, located at the
Manila Port Area. It was then under the control and management of the Director of
Lands. When the control and management of the Port Area was transferred to the

respondents, through Executive Order No. 321, the rental rates of the petitioner was
increased by 1,500%. However, the petitioner refused to pay.
The respondent initiated unlawful detainer proceeding against the petitioner. The
lower court rendered the decision ordering the eviction of the petitioner and was affirmed
in toto when appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was elevated to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review, however the court affirmed the decision of the
RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed, still it was put on hold due to the pending
submission of a compromise agreement. The parties failed to submit the compromise
agreement, thus the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the decision of the
appellate court became final and executory.
Meanwhile, while the motion for reconsideration is pending, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent for refusing to honor a compromise agreement
perfected between the parties during their conference that superseded the ejectment case.
Thus, the prayer for specific performance.
The respondent filed a motion for a writ of execution in the ejectment case. The
petitioner filed an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the issuance of the writ of execution. The respondent
countered by filing a motion for preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses along
with a motion to dismiss. However, the trial court issued an order granting the application
of the petitioner.
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, however it was dismissed. The court ruled that it was insufficient if form and
substance for it fail to attach a certified to copy of each of the assailed order of the trial
court. Undaunted, the respondent filed a new petition alleging that since it had only
received a copy of the assailed resolution of the trial court, the refiling if the petition with
the Court of Appeals within a period of less than two months from the date of such
receipt was well within the reasonable time requirement under the Rules for a special
civil action for certiorari. In the meantime, the resolution which dismissed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent became final.
In the newly filed petition, the respondent invoked that the respondent Judge
acted without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with abuse of discretion in refusing to take
cognizance, abide and acknowledge the final judgement of the Court of Appeals which is
enough justification for the dismissal of the case grounded on res judicata. The Court of
Appeals rendered the decision nullifying and setting aside the orders of the RTC and
ordering the dismissal of the complaint of the petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the specific performance case should be held barred by the
unlawful detainer case on the ground of res judicata.
HELD:
NO. There are four (4) essential conditions which must concur in order that res
judicata may effectively apply, viz: (1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must
be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order
on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of
parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the case at bar,

There is no question about the fact that all the first three elements of res judicata are here
extant; it is the final condition requiring an identity of parties, of subject matter and of
causes of action, particularly the last two, i.e., subject matter and cause of action, that
presents a problem.
According to the Supreme Court, the ultimate test in ascertaining the identity of
causes of action is said to be to look into whether or not the same evidence fully supports
and establishes both the present cause of action and the former cause of action. In the
affirmative, the former judgment would be a bar; if otherwise, then that prior judgment
would not serve as such a bar to the second. The evidence needed to establish the cause
of action in the unlawful detainer case would be the lease contract and the violation of
that lease by Bachrach. In the specific performance case, what would be consequential is
evidence of the alleged compromise agreement and its breach by PPA.
Furthermore, on the issue of issuance of writ of preliminary injunction as an
improper interference with the judgment in the unlawful detainer suit. The Supreme
Court ruled that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of
the court to order its execution. No court, necessarily, should interfere by injunction or
otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of
exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render
execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its
execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can
warrant an injunctive relief. Evidently, in issuing its orders assailed by PPA in the latters
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, the trial court in the
case at bar would want to preserve status quo pending its disposition of the specific
performance case and to prevent the case from being mooted by an early implementation
of the ejectment writ. In holding differently and ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the appellate court, in our
considered view, has committed reversible error.
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. VS MIGUEL CAMPOS
G.R. NO. 138814, APRIL 26, 2009
FACTS:
SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 was instituted on 10 February 1994 by
respondent Miguel V. Campos with the Securities, Investigation and Clearing
Department (SICD) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a
Petition against herein petitioners Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MKSE).
The Petition, sought: (1) the nullification of the Resolution dated 3 June
1993 of the MKSE Board of Directors, which allegedly deprived him of his right to
participate equally in the allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of corporations
registered with MKSE; (2) the delivery of the IPO shares he was allegedly
deprived of, for which he would pay IPO prices; and (3) the payment of P2 million
as moral damages, P1 million as exemplary damages, and P500,000.00 as
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
The SICD issued an Order granting respondents prayer for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin petitioners from implementing or
enforcing the Resolution of the MKSE Board of Directors. Subsequently issued
another Order on 10 March 1994 granting respondents application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, to continuously enjoin, during the pendency of SEC Case

No. 02-94-4678, the implementation or enforcement of the MKSE Board

Resolution in question.
On 11 March 1994, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss respondents
Petition based on the following grounds: (1) the Petition became moot due to the
cancellation of the license of MKSE; (2) the SICD had no jurisdiction over the
Petition; and (3) the Petition failed to state a cause of action. The SICD denied
petitioners Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners again challenged Order of SICD before
the SEC en banc through another Petition for Certiorari.
The SEC en banc nullified the Order of SICD granting a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in favour of respondent. SEC en banc annulled the Order
of SICD in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss, and
accordingly ordered the dismissal of respondents Petition before the SICD.
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FAILED TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION.

RULING:
The petition filled by the respondent, Miguel Campos should be dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. A complaint states a cause of action where it contains three essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.
However, the terms right and obligation are not magic words that would
automatically lead to the conclusion that such Petition sufficiently states a cause
of
action. Right and obligation are
legal
terms
with
specific
legal
meaning. A right is a claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever that is
enforceable by law while an obligation is defined in the Civil Code as a juridical
necessity to give, to do or not to do. Justice J.B.L. Reyes offers the definition
given by Arias Ramos as a more complete definition:
An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person (called
the creditor) may demand from another (called the debtor) the
observance of a determinative conduct (the giving, doing or not

doing), and in case of breach, may demand satisfaction from the

assets of the latter.
Art. 1157 of the Civil Code provides that Obligations arise from (1) Law;
(2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5)
Quasi-delicts.
The mere assertion of a right and claim of an obligation in an initiatory
pleading, whether a Complaint or Petition, without identifying the basis or source
thereof, is merely a conclusion of fact and law. (In the case at bar, although the
Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 does allege respondents right to subscribe
to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their offering prices, and
petitioners obligation to continue respecting and observing such right, the
Petition utterly failed to lay down the source or basis of respondents right and/or
petitioners obligation.)
Respondent merely quoted in his Petition the MKSE Board Resolution,
passed sometime in 1989, granting him the position of Chairman Emeritus of
MKSE for life. However, there is nothing in the said Petition from which the Court
can deduce that respondent, by virtue of his position as Chairman Emeritus of
MKSE, was granted by law, contract, or any other legal source, the right to
subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their offering
prices. (allocation of IPO shares was merely alleged to have been done in accord
with a practice normally observed by the members of the stock exchange)
A practice or custom is, as a general rule, not a source of a legally demandable
or enforceable right.
Ang Yu Asuncion Vs. CA
Facts:

July 29, 1987: An amended Complaint for Specific Performance was filed by petitioners
Ang Yu Asuncion and others against Bobby Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan
before RTC.

Petitioners (Ang Yu) alleged that:

- they are the tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by Bobby
Unijeng and others located in Binondo, Manila (since 1935)
that on several occasions before October 9, 1986, the lessors informed the lessees
(petitioners) that they are offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority to acquire
the same;
- that during the negotiations, Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6-million while they made
a counter offer of P5-million;
- that they wrote them on October 24, 1986 asking that they specify the terms and conditions
of the offer to sell; that when plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter dated
January 28, 1987 with the same request;

The RTC found that Cu Unjiengs offer to sell was never accepted by the petitioners
(Ang Yu) for the reason that they did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the
proposed sale, hence, there was no contract of sale at all. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the lower court. This decision was brought to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari which subsequently denied the appeal on May 6, 1991
for insufficiency in form and substance. (Referring to the first case filed by Ang Yu)

November 15, 1990: While the case was pending consideration by this Court, the Cu
Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of Sale transferring the subject petitioner to petitioner
Buen Realty and Development Corporation.

Petitioner Buen Realty and Development Corporation, as the new owner of the subject
property, wrote a letter to the lessees demanding that the latter vacate the premises.

August 30, 1991: the RTC ordered the Cu Unjiengs to execute the necessary Deed of
Sale of the property in litigation in favor of plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and
Arthur Go for the consideration of P15 Million pesos in recognition of petitioners right of
first refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the buyer.
The court also set aside the title issued to Buen Realty Corporation for having been
executed in bad faith. On September 22, 1991, the Judge issued a writ of execution.

The CA reversed the RTC ruling.

Issue: WON Buen Realty can be bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis
pendens, carried over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of the
latters purchase of the property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs. NO
Held:
Right of first refusal is not a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the
Civil Code
In the law on sales, the so-called right of first refusal is an innovative juridical relation.
Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of
the Civil Code.
In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right,
however, would be dependent not only on the grantors eventual intention to enter into a
binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are
yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a
class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the essential elements
to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and inconclusive) but by, among other
laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human
conduct.
The proper action for violation of the right of first refysal is to file an action for
damages and NOT writ of execution
The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed, has merely accorded a
right of first refusal in favor of petitioners (Ang Yu et. al). The consequence of such a
declaration entails no more than what has heretofore been said. In fine, if, as it is here so
conveyed to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor the
right of first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the judgment, since there is none
to execute, but an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.
Unconditional mutual promise to buy vs. Accepted unilateral promise
An unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell, as long as the object is made determinate
and the price is fixed, can be obligatory on the parties, and compliance therewith may
accordingly be exacted.
An accepted unilateral promise which specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be paid,
when coupled with a valuable consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may
properly be termed a perfected contract of option. This contract is legally binding, and in sales,
it conforms with the second paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1479. . . .
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the
price. (1451a)
Observe, however, that the option is not the contract of sale itself. The optionee has the right,
but not the obligation, to buy. Once the option is exercised timely, i.e., the offer is accepted
before a breach of the option, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues and both parties
are then reciprocally bound to comply with their respective undertakings.
Buen Realty cannot be ousted from the ownership and possession of the property
Furthermore, whether private respondent Buen Realty Development Corporation, the alleged
purchaser of the property, has acted in good faith or bad faith and whether or not it should, in
any case, be considered bound to respect the registration of the lis pendens in Civil Case No.
87-41058 are matters that must be independently addressed in appropriate proceedings. Buen
Realty, not having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 87-41058, cannot be held subject to the
writ of execution issued by respondent Judge, let alone ousted from the ownership and
possession of the property, without first being duly afforded its day in court.

2) DELA RAMA vs. MENDIOLA and TITAN CONSTRUCTION (ObliCon)

Subject matter(or Object)
A subject matter is the item with respect to which the controversy has arisen, or concerning
which the wrong has been done, and it is ordinarily the right, the thing, or the contract under
dispute. In the case at bar, both the first and second actions involve the same real property.
Facts:

Petitioner sold to the government on expropriation a parcel of land, for use in the construction
of the EDSA Extension Project.
Then, undertook to sell to respondent Titan Construction Corporation a parcel of land adjacent
to the one expropriated. Then petitioner failed to comply with his obligations, prompting
respondent to file for rescission of contract. Then, a compromise agreement between the
parties was effected with an Agreement to Sell and Buy, stipulating that the respondent is
waiving all his rights with the parcel of land within which the government may return in the
course of the completion of the EDSA Extension Project.
Petitioner sought the reconveyance of the unused portion of the property from the
government.
Titan filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary
Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order. RTC denied for lack of merit. Titan appealed to CA.
Meanwhile, Titan filed a action for specific performance based on the compromise judgment to
the RTC. This prompted petitioner to file with the CA a Motion for Direct Contempt and to
Dismiss based on Forum Shopping. It was however dismissed by RTC, and his MR also denied.
Respondent filed a motion to withdraw the petition in CA, which was granted. Thus, the case
was dismissed with finality.
The RTC held that the violation the rule on non-forum-shopping was cured when the CA
dismissed with finality the motion for declaratory relief.
Issue:
WON the specific performance case is barred by the petition for declaratory relief case on the
ground of res judicata? YES
Held:
There is res judicata where the following four essential conditions concur, viz: (1) there must
be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must
be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
No doubt, all the first three elements are satisfied. As regards the fourth condition, it is clear
that there is identity of parties in the two cases. Although the public respondents in the
declaratory relief case were not impleaded in the specific performance case, only a substantial
identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition or elimination of
some parties does not alter the situation.
The subject matters and causes of action of the two cases are likewise identical. In the case at
bar, both the first and second actions involve the same real property. It is true that the first
case was a special civil action for declaratory relief while the second case was a civil action for
specific performance. However, the difference in form and nature of the two actions is
immaterial. The philosophy behind the rule on res judicata prohibits the parties from litigating
the same issue more than once.
Respondents alleged right in both cases depends on one and the same instrument, the
Agreement to Sell and Buy. Clearly, respondents ultimate objective in instituting the two
actions was to have the property reconveyed in its favor.
The principle of res judicata requires that stability be accorded to judgments. Controversies
once decided on the merits shall remain in repose for there should be an end to litigation
which, without the doctrine, would be endless.
DECISION: Petition granted. RTC ordered to dismiss case on action for specific performance on
the ground of res judicata.
CASE 21:

BACHRACH CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and PHILIPPINES PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner and the Republic entered into a lease agreement for a term of ninetynine years covering 2 specified area, Block 180 and Block 185, located at the Manila Port Area.
It was then under the control and management of the Director of Lands. When the control and
management of the Port Area was transferred to the respondents, through Executive Order No.
321, the rental rates of the petitioner was increased by 1,500%. However, the petitioner
refused to pay.
The respondent initiated unlawful detainer proceeding against the petitioner. The lower
court rendered the decision ordering the eviction of the petitioner and was affirmed in toto
when appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for review, however the court affirmed the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, still it was put on hold due to the pending submission of a
compromise agreement. The parties failed to submit the compromise agreement, thus the
denial of the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the decision of the appellate court became
final and executory.
Meanwhile, while the motion for reconsideration is pending, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent for refusing to honor a compromise agreement perfected
between the parties during their conference that superseded the ejectment case. Thus, the
prayer for specific performance.
The respondent filed a motion for a writ of execution in the ejectment case. The
petitioner filed an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the issuance of the writ of execution. The respondent
countered by filing a motion for preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses along with a
motion to dismiss. However, the trial court issued an order granting the application of the
petitioner.
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, however it was dismissed. The court ruled that it was insufficient if form and
substance for it fail to attach a certified to copy of each of the assailed order of the trial court.
Undaunted, the respondent filed a new petition alleging that since it had only received a copy
of the assailed resolution of the trial court, the refiling if the petition with the Court of Appeals
within a period of less than two months from the date of such receipt was well within the
reasonable time requirement under the Rules for a special civil action for certiorari. In the
meantime, the resolution which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the
respondent became final.
In the newly filed petition, the respondent invoked that the respondent Judge acted
without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance,
abide and acknowledge the final judgement of the Court of Appeals which is enough
justification for the dismissal of the case grounded on res judicata. The Court of Appeals
rendered the decision nullifying and setting aside the orders of the RTC and ordering the
dismissal of the complaint of the petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the specific performance case should be held barred by the unlawful
detainer case on the ground of res judicata.
HELD:
NO. There are four (4) essential conditions which must concur in order that res
judicata may effectively apply, viz: (1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the
merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity
of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the case at bar, There is no question
about the fact that all the first three elements of res judicata are here extant; it is the final
condition requiring an identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action, particularly
the last two, i.e., subject matter and cause of action, that presents a problem.
According to the Supreme Court, the ultimate test in ascertaining the identity of causes
of action is said to be to look into whether or not the same evidence fully supports and
establishes both the present cause of action and the former cause of action. In the affirmative,
the former judgment would be a bar; if otherwise, then that prior judgment would not serve as
such a bar to the second. The evidence needed to establish the cause of action in the unlawful
detainer case would be the lease contract and the violation of that lease by Bachrach. In the

specific performance case, what would be consequential is evidence of the alleged

compromise agreement and its breach by PPA.
Furthermore, on the issue of issuance of writ of preliminary injunction as an improper
interference with the judgment in the unlawful detainer suit. The Supreme Court ruled that
after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its
execution. No court, necessarily, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such
execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and
circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested
party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a
change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief. Evidently, in issuing its
orders assailed by PPA in the latters petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, the trial court in the case at bar would want to preserve status quo pending its
disposition of the specific performance case and to prevent the case from being mooted by an
early implementation of the ejectment writ. In holding differently and ascribing to the trial
court grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the appellate court,
in our considered view, has committed reversible error.
Arturo Pelayo vs Marcelo Lauron, et al
G.r. no. L-4089 January 12, 1909
Facts:
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a
complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella on the ground that sometime in October
13, 1906, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas,
Pelayo was requested to render assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth
to a child. He then rendered medical services to the defendants. He even visited the patient
several times and wanted to be paid for the medical services he rendered but the defendants
refused to pay 500 php to do so without alleging any good reason.
In an answer to the complaint, the defendants denied all the allegations made by the
plaintiff. The defendants even told that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the
childbirth and while she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate
house.
The defendants were absolved from the complaint on account of lack of sufficient
evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella liable to pay 500 Php
for the medical services rendered by Pelayo.
Held:
Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from
law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the
only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the
contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and
1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If
every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are
mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them
by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the
unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health
may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized;
the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees
of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability originates from the above-cited
mutual obligation which the law has expressly established between the married couple.
In case at bar, the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional
services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact
that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is
no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent
danger, to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical
assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the
law, as has been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who
believes that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who
is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the
obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing
of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it

does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for
which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are
under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves.
DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NORTHERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES INC.,
ET AL, defendants-appellees.
FACTS
- Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc., operated a movie house in Laoag and plaintiff DOMINGO
DE LA
CRUZ, hired as a special guard whose duties were to guard the main entrance of the cine, to
maintain
peace and order and to report the commission of disorders within the premises.
- One Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the gate or entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by
the refusal
of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in without first providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked
him with
a bolo. De la Cruz defended himself as best he could until he was cornered, at which moment
to save
himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in the latter's death.
- De la Cruz was charged with homicide, after a re-investigation conducted by the Provincial
Fiscal the
latter filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the court in January 1943.
On July 8,
1947, De la Cruz was again accused of the same crime of homicide, of the same Court.
- After trial, he was finally acquitted of the charge on January 31, 1948. In both criminal cases
De la Cruz
employed a lawyer to defend him. He demanded from his former employer reimbursement of
his
expenses but was refused. He filed the present action against the movie corporation and the
three
members of its board of directors, to recover amounts he had paid his lawyers and also moral
damages
said to have been suffered, a total of P15,000.
- Court of First Instance after rejecting the theory of the plaintiff that he was an agent of the
defendants
and that as such agent he was entitled to reimbursement of the expenses incurred by him in
connection
with the agency found that plaintiff had no cause of action and dismissed the complaint
without costs.
ISSUE
Whether an employee or servant who in line of duty and while in the performance of the task
assigned to
him, performs an act which eventually results in his incurring in expenses, caused not directly
by his
master or employer or his fellow servants or by reason of his performance of his duty, but
rather by a
third party or stranger not in the employ of his employer, may recover said damages against
his employer.
HELD
We agree with the trial court that the relationship between the movie corporation and the
plaintiff was not
that of principal and agent because the principle of representation was in no way involved.

-Plaintiff was not employed to represent the defendant corporation in its dealings with third
parties. He
was a mere employee hired to perform a certain specific duty or task, that of acting as special
guard and
staying at the main entrance of the movie house to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace
and order
within the premises.

Manzano vs Lazaro

effective ratification on voidable contracts.Vitiated consent does not make the contract
unenforceable but merely voidable;remedy is to file a case to annul the contract; voidable and
annullable contracts haveproduces legal effect until annulled by a proper
court(art.1390);voidable contractssusceptible of ratification.
Facts:MAnzano and petitioner entered a professional services contract. Outline in thecontract is
their corresponding duties which includes the award of bonuses in theevent that the petitioner
would win the elections. Indeed, petitioner won the vicemayoralty. Thus, respondent sent a
letter to petitioner demanding payment ofservices and the bonus. Petitioner replied that there
must be first an inventorywhi
ch accdg to petitioners knowledge, is to be prepared by the respondent.
Respondent denied it and argued that preparing liquidation papers was not one ofthe duties
outlined for him. Due to non-payment of the petitioner, respondent filed acase for collection of
sum of money. Petitioner alleges that there wasmisrepresentation on the part of respondent
and his consent to the contract wasvitiated by fraud. Thus there was no perfected contract at
all. The RTC renderedjudgment in favor of respondent and affirmed by CA.
Issue: WON consent vitiated by fraud annuls the contract.
Ruling: No. Vitiated consent does not itself makes the contract unenforceable butmerely
voidable and annullable and it produces legal effect until annulled by aproper court and
voidable contracts are susceptible of ratification. In this case, theacts of petitioner is consistent
with ratification

amounting to an effectiveratification.