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C O M P A R A T IAVNEA L Y S I S
A R A BA N D I S R A E L IC O M B APTE R F O R M A N C E
1967 AND 1973 I,|ARS
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A Report Preparedfor
Secretary of Defense
Assistant
0ffice,
June 1976
Undercontract No. DNA001-76-A-0089
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ORGA}IIZATIO}I
ANDRTSTARCH
EYAIUATIOil
HISTORICAT
L+r6. I
ERRATA
Comparative Analysis
Arab and Israeli CombatPerformance
1957 and 1973 V'lars
d+
.J
.:.lcture
Chanqe
1/8 Div
L/24 Bde
-0
10
23
33
23
33
24
35
26
last
para,
to read
and
CEV
Change first
line to read: In 1970, following an
equally dismal performance against Jordan, there
led this time by
had been one more coup dtetat,
the then Ministen of Vrlar, Aln Force General
Hafez aI Assad.
TABLEOF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
O b j e c t iv e
Data Sounces
P a r t i c i o a n ts
3
?
3
A
t
COMBAT
IN THE1967 I,'|AR
PERFORMANCES
The Data
D a t aA n a l y s i s
COMBAT
PERFORMANCE
IN THE 1973 WAR
TheData
D a t aA n a l y s i s
C a m p a ' igAnn a l yse s
5
5
15
15
15
15
EVALUATION
OVERALL
COMPARATIVE
(J
IONS
CONCLUS
28
List of Fjgures
F o rceS tre n g ths, Sjx- DayW ar , 1967
1 . A p p ro xi ma te
1967
Summ ar ies,
? . Es t ima te dIsra e l i A rma ment
1967
Summ ar ies,
3 . Es t ima te dE g yp ti a nA rma ment
1967
Summ ar ies,
4 . Es t ima te dJo rd a n i a nA rma ment
1967
Summ ar ies,
5 . Es t ima te dS yri a n A rma ment
6. EngagemenS
t si,x - D a yW a r , J u n e 1 9 6 7
, inai Front,
7 . E s t i m a t eA
d l l o c a t i o no f B a t t l e C a s u a l t i e s S
J u n e5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
8 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t i o n o f T a n kL o s s e s ,S i n a i F r o n t ,
J u n e5 - 8 , 1 . 9 6 7I,n c ] u s i v e
e ro r t i e s
9 . E s t j m a t e dC l o s eA i r S u p p o r tF i g h t e r - B o m b S
S u e z - S i n aFi r o n t , J u n e5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c ] u s i v e
1 0 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t i o n o f B a t t l e C a s u a l t ' i e sJ, o r d a nF r o n t ,
J u n e5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
1 1 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t i o n o f T a n kL o s s e s ,J o r d a nF r o n t
J u n e5 - 7 , L 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
e ro r t i e s ,
L 2 . E s t i m a t e dC l o s eA i r S u p p o r tF i g h t e r - B o m b S
J o r d a n i a nF r o n t , J u n e5 - 7, L 9 6 7 , I n c ' l u s i v e
, o l a nF r o n t ,
1 3 . E s t j m a t eA
d l l o c a t i o no f B a t t l e C a s u a l t j e s G
J u n e9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c ] u s i v e
1 4 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t ' i o no f T a n kL o s s e s ,S y r j a n F r o n t ,
J u n e9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
Sro r t i e s ,
1 5 . E s t i m a t e dC l o s eA i r S u p p o r tF i g h t e r - B o m b e
G o l a nF r o n t , J u n e9 - 1 0 , L 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
1 6 . E n g a g e m eDnat t a C a l c u l a t i o nI n p u t S h e e t
1 7 . M o d e l( E n g a g e m e nCt a) l c u l a t i o nF o r m
1 8 . P r e l i m i n a r y1 9 6 7A r a b - I s r a e l i W a rA n a l y s i s
1 9 . 1 9 6 7A r a b - I s r a ei l W a rA n a l y s i s - R e f i n e d
7
7
7
8
B
9
10
10
t0
10
11
11
11
11
11
L2
13
t4
14
(continued)
0F C0NTENTS
TABLE
Page
L i s t o f F i g u r e s( c o n t i n u e d )
2 0 - A . E sti ma te dGro u n dS trengths,0ctober 1973
B . E sti ma te dL o sse s,October1973
z L - A . A i r F o rceS tre n g th s,October1973
B . E sti ma te dA i r L o sse s,0ctober 1973
1973
Summ ar ies,
2 2 . E sti ma te dIsra e l i A rma m ent
1.973
Surmaries,
23. EstimatedEgyptianArmament
1973
Summaries,
24. EstimatedSyrian Arrnament
October1973
2 5 . S i n a i F ro n t E n g a g e ments,
B
a t t l e C a s u a l t i e s ,S i n a i F r o n t n
o
f
26, Estimated
Allocation
0 c t o b e r6 - 2 4 , L 9 7 3 ,I n c l u s i v e
A l l o c a t i o no f T a n kL o s s e s ,S i n a i F r o n t ,
27. Estimated
0ctoberr6-24, Incl usi ve
Sor ties,
2 8 . Esti ma te dC l o seA i r S u ppor tFighter - Bomber
S u e z-S i n a F
i ro n t, October6- 24, L973
0ctober 1973
, .
29. Golan Front Engagements,
30. Estimated
A l l o c a t i o no f B a t t l e C a s u a l t j e s ,G o l a nF r o n t ,
0 c t o b e r6 - 2 2 , 1 9 7 3 ,I n c l u s i v e
31. Estimated
A ] l o c a t i o no f T a n kL o s s e s ,G o l a nF r o n t ,
Octo b e r6 -2 2 , 1 .9 7 3
Sor ties,
3 2 . E sti ma te dC l o seA i r S u ppor tFighter Bomber
Go 'l a nF ro n t, 0 cto b er 6- 22, L973
3 3 . P r e l i m i n a r y1 9 7 3A r a b - I s r a e l iW a rA n a l y s i s
3 4 . 1 97 3A ra b -Isra e li l ,l a rAnalysis- Ref i ned
3 5 . C omp a ra ti ve
C a mp a 'i gAnnalyses,1967, 1973
16
16
t7
L7
18
18
19
19
20
20
21
2t
22
22
23
23
24
24
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS,ARABANDISRAELI COMBAT
PERFORMANCE
1967AND1973WARS
A HER0Report
INTRODUCTION
OBJ
ECT
IVE
T h e p u r p o s eo f t h i s s t u d y b y t h e H i s t o r j c a l E v a l u a t i o na n d R e s e a r c 0h r g a n i z a , a s s t a t e d i n t h e T a s k0 r d e r t o b e a s f o l l o w s :
t i o n ( H E R 0 )w
U t i I i zi n g d a ta a 1re a d y a va i' ab]
l e to HERO,
with such additions and
r e f i n e m e ntsa s a re mu tu a l l y a g r eedby HERO
and OASD( I)to be necessar y
a n d f e a s i b l e w i t h i n b u d g e t a r yl i m i t s o f t h e s t u d' level
Oi l l a n a l y z e
y , H E Rw
a p p r o x i m a te 'lte
y n e n g a g e me n ts,
each, at br igade
or higher , for the
1 9 6 7Si x Da yWa r, a n d th e 1 9 7 3OctoberW ar , em ployingboth the Quantified
J u d g m e nMt e t h o do f A n a l y s i so f H i s t o r i c a l C o m b aDt a t a ( Q J M Aa) n d q u a l i t a t i v e h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y t i c a l t e c h n i q u e s ,i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i nt h e f o l l o w i n g :
a . Re l a ti ve co mb a e
t ffe cti v enessof the opposedfor ces in each
e ng a g e me n t;
b . P a t t e r n so r d i f f e r e n c e si n r e l a t i v e c o m b aet f f e c t i v e n e s so f
d j f f e r e n t A r a bu n i t s a n d a r m i e s ;
c . P a t t e r n so r d i f f e r e n c e sb e t w e e nr e l a t i v e A r a b - I s r a e l i c o m b a t
p e r f o r m a n cien 1 9 6 7a n d i n 1 9 7 3 ;
d . T h e e x t e n t t o w h i c hA r a b a n d I s r a e l i r e l a t i v e p e r f o r m a n c e
c ha n g e db e tw e e no ffe n sive and defensivepostur es;
e . T he e xte n t to w h i ch th e pr esenceor lack of air powerappear s
t o h a ve i n fl u e n ce dco mbatout om es;
t . T he e xte n t to w h i ch o u tcom es
wer e jnfluencedb.yany other
v a r i a b ] e so f c o m b a t .
Th e t a s k s t o b e p e rfo rme da n d th e pr ocedur esto be followed, accor dingto the T as k
0rder, were:
C o m p i l a t ' i oonf d a t a ; t o i n c l u d e s u c ha d d i t i o n so r r e f i n e m'el n t so f
e x is t i n g H E R O
d a ta a s ma ybe necessar y,assur ing compati
b' i i ty,
t o t h e e x t e n t p o s s i b l e nw i t h d a t a u s e di n o n g o i n ga n a l y s e so f t h e
M id d ]e E a s t B a la n c e ;
2 . Q u a n t i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f t h e 1 9 6 7W a rd a t a b y 0 J M ;
3 . Q u a l i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f 1 9 6 7W a rd a t a ;
4 . Q u a n t i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f 1 9 7 3W a rd a t a b y Q J M ;
5 . Q u a l i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f 1 9 7 3W a rd a t a ;
6 . C o m p a r a t i veev a l u a t i o no f r e s u l t s o f s t e p s 2 - 5 , i n c l u s i v e ;
7 . P r e p a r a t i o no f R e p o r t .
1.
DATASOURCES
I n t h e p e r f o r m a n coef S t e p 1 , d a t a o n t h e 1 9 7 3w a r a l r e a d ya v a i l a b l e t o H E R w
0 as
re v i e w e da n d re fi n e d o n th e b a si s of infor mation collected for a r epor t on "The
M i d d l eE a s t W a ri n H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e , "p r e p a r e df o r t h e D i r e c t o r o f N e t A s s e s s m e n t , D e p a r t m e notf D e f e n s e a, n d a d d j t ' i o n a li n f o r m a t i o nr e c e i v e di n c o n v e r s a t i o n s
w i t h M a j o rG e n e r a A
l vraham
A d a n ,I s r a e l ' i A r m y ,a n d C o l o n e lA v r a h a m
A y a ' l o n ,I s r a e l i
Army.
D u n nL o r i n g , V i r g i n i a
1 5 J u n e1 9 7 6
T.N. Dupuy
ExecutiveDir ector
COMBAT
PERFORMANCES
IN THE1967 t^lAR
THEDATA
nsix DayW a r ,"
f i g u r e 1 i :_ a su rma ryo f ma j or statistical data of the 1967
in c l u d i n g o v era l l stre n g th s a n d i osses of per sonneland selectedm ajor iiem s ot
! 9 u l R m e nfto r a ' l l ^ m a i o rp a r t i c i p a n t s . F i g u r e s2 , 3 , 4 , a n d 5 p r e s e n tm o r ed e t a i l e d l i s t i n g s o f th e p ri n ci p a l var ietiei of weiponsind combbtequipmentes ti m a t e dt o b e o n h a n di n th e Isra e l i , Egyptian,Jor danianand Syr ian' ar m iesas of
f . J g n e L 9 6 7 , sh o w i n gp re su mead'l l ocationsto m ajor combatfor m ations, such as
divisions andbrigades.
F i g u r e6 i s a ' l i s t i n g o f a l l m a j o r e n g a g e m e notns a l l t h r e e f r o n t s , b e t w e e n
_
J u n e 5 a n d J u n e 1 0 . F i g u re 7 i s an estim atedbr eakdown
of the pr esum ed
total
I s r a e l i a n d F g y p t i a nc a i u a ' l t i e so n t h e S i n a i f r o n t , w i t h a l l o c a t i o n s t o d a y s a n d
e n g a g e m e nba
ts se du p o np ro fe ssi o nalhistor ical and m ilitar y judgm entin coir s i der at io n o f t h e Du p u yd e ta i l e d n a rra ti v e of oper ationscited uir aerr Data sour ces"i n
t h e I n t r o d u cti o n to th i s re p o rt. Figur e 8 is a com par able
br eakdown
of pr esu m ed
I s r a e ' l i ^ a n dEg yp ti a nta n k l o sse s on the Sinai fr ont, by day and by engagem ent.
Fig u r e 9 i s a co mp a ra b l be re a kd o wn
of estim ateddir ect air - suppor i alioiations by
t h e I s r a e l i an d E g yp ti a na i r fo rces, also r elated to engagem ehls
and dates.
F i g u r e s1 0 , 1 1 , a n d 1 2 p r o v i d ec o m p a r a b ldea t a e s t i m a t e sf o r t h e J o r d a n ,W e s t
B a n k ,F r o n t , J u n e5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 . F i g u r e s1 3 , 1 4 , a n d 1 5 p r o v i d ec o m p a r a b ldea t a e s t i ma t e sf o r t h e S yri a n , Go l a n , F ro n t, June 9- 10, 1967.
Av a i l a b l e re so u rce so f ti me and funds per mitted analysis of onl,ytwelve engagements
of the 1967War-four on each front. This was a total of two more 1967
wa r e n g a g e m e a
nn
t a 'l yse sth a n w a s pr ovidedfor in the Task 0r der .
DATAANALYSIS
F i g u r e 1 6 !s_ a sa mp l ee n g a g ement
data sheet for Engagem ent
67- L, the Bat tl e of
R a f a , J u n e6 , 1 9 6 7 . F i g u r e 1 7 i s a s a m p l ee n g a g e m ecnitl i u l a t i o n s h e e t f o r t h e
e n g a g e m e nst ,h o w i n g .th ea p p l i ca ti on of the data to the for m ulaeof the Quant i fi ed
J u d g m e nMt o de l(QJM). T h e e n tri e s for Figur e 18, "Pr eliminar y1967Ar ab- Isr ael i
W a rA n a l y s i s , " a r e d e r i v e df r o m t h e s e a n d - c o m p a r a bd' a
l et a a n d - c a l c u l a t i o ns h e e t s
f o r t h e o t h e r e 'l e ve ne n g a g e me n ts.That figur e pr ovidesa sur nm ation
of the QJ M
a n a l y s e so f t h e s e _ q l g a g e m e nat sn ,d i s t h e e s s e n c eo f t h i s s t u d y ' s q u a n t i t a t i v e
a n a l y s i so f t h e 1 9 6 7W a r .
T h e c o l u m n so f F i g u r e 1 8 a r e d e s c r i b e da s f o l l o w s :
1 . E n g a g e mennut mb e r(se e Figur e 6)
2 . N u me ri cama
l n p o w eco
r mpar ison( Ar abwith r espect to Isr aeli)
3 . F i re p o w e rco mp a ri so n
ratio
4 . R e l a t i v ec o m b aP
t o w e r ,b a s i c c a l c u l a t i o n , i n w h i c ha l r r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e c o m b avt a r i a b l e s h a v eb e e nc o n s i d e r e d i
5 . T h e e ffe cts o f su rp ri se, r eflecting effects of sur pr ise on r elativ e
m o b i l i t y a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s o f t h e o p p o n e n tas s c a l c u l a t e df o r
W o r l dW a rI I e n g a g e m e n t s . l
6 . M o d i fi e d co mb a tP o w e rRatio ( to r eflect effects of sur pr ise)
7 . Engagement
outcomes
8 . E ffe cti ve C o mb aPt o w erRatioi the r atio that would have been
r e q u i r e df o r a v e r a g er a t i o - r e s u l t r e l a t i o n s h i p i n w o r l d w a r I I
e n g a g e me d
na
t ta b a se ( ( n - n) /S + t )
9 . A r a b C o m b aEt f f e c t i v e n e s sV a l u e ( C f V 1 ;c a l c u ' l a t e db y d i v i d i n g e n t r y
i n c o l u m n8 b y t h a t i n c o l u m n6 .
1 0 . I sra e l i C E V(re cr'p ro calof Ar ab CEV)
l s e e , T . N . D u p u y,T h e Qu a n ti ,!ied
M ethodof Analysis of Histor ica l
llg4gment
Co m b aDt a t a . H E R 0 D
, un
D u p in gth e p ro ce sso f a n a l y sis of the data in F' igur eLB, and that of Fi gur e 34
( c o n t a i n in gs'i mi l a r a n a l yti ca l data fr om 1973W arengagement
analyses) ,thr e e anal y t i c a l h y po th e sehsa veb e e nfo rmulated:
in whichthey wer e fol l ow i n si tuations and ci' r cumstances
1 . A ra b p e rfo rma n ce
i n g c a r e f ul l y p re p a re dp re -w a rplans was substantially better than whencop i ngw i th
u n a n t i c i pa te dco mb asi
t tu a ti o n s ; this ability is est' imate{at abouta 30%im pr ov eoper ations.z
in pr e- planned
m e n to v e r sta n d a rdp e rfo rma n ce
2 . Th e e ffe cts o f su rp ri s e in 1967and 1973com batsituations wasclear l y m or e
and the W ester nAl l i es i n
the Ger m ans
s i g n i f i c a nt th a n i t h a d b e e ni n com batbetween
l the gr eater ave r agedi s 1 9 4 3a n d 19 4 4 ;th i s i n cre a sea p pear ed
to be pr opor tiona'to
p e r s i o no f tro o p s i n th e sew a rs ( about4,000 squar emeter sper m an)than in W or l d
W a rI I ( a b o u t3 , 0 0 0s q u a r em e t e r sp e r m a n ) . T h i s e n h a n c evda l u eo f s u r p r i s ei n a n
t ith Soviet
i n c r e a s i n g ' lsyc i e n t i f i c - t e c h n i c a e
l n v i r o n m e ns te e m tso b e c o n s i s t e n w
a s s e s s m en ts,
a s re p re se n te d
b y the following quotationfr om ScientificlTeqln!!q]ProgressaqlIdt1eRbvo.|utionjirMiljtar.vAffijrsbyCo1onelGffis.
S c i e n t i f i c - t e c h n i c apl r o g r e s si s t h e m a t e r i a lb a s i s o f t h o s er e v o l u t i o n a r y
c h a n g ew
s h i chh a veo ccu rre din the Soviet Ar medFor cesin r ecent year s.
. . / T n i s Z r e v o l u t i o ni n m j ' l i t a r ya f f a i r s t o a s i g n i f i c a n td e q r e eh a s
r a i s - e dt-h ei mp o rta n ce
o f sur pr ise. High combatr eadinessof the Soviet
Ar m e dF o rce si s ca u se db y the m ost impor tantof all the tasks confr ont' i ng
t h e m -th a t i s, to th w a rt th e intentions and pr ovidea decisiveand comp l e t e d e fe a t to a n y a g g re ssor . The pr esentcapabilities of the Soviet
Ar m e dF o rce sma kei t p o ssi bleto solve th' is pr ob' lem .
3 . Th ed i sru p ti ve e ffe cts of sur pr ise evidently continuefor at least tw o day s
a f t e r t h e s u r p r i s ei s a c h i e v e d . F o r t h e f j r s t d a y i t i s a b o u tt w o - t h i r d st h e d i s r u p t i v e e ffe ct o f th e su rp ri se as calculatedfor the day it occur s, and abo utonet h i r d t h e ' i n i t i a l s u r p r i s ed i s r u p t i v ee f f e c t o n t h e s e c o n d a y a f t e r s u r p r i s ej s
a c he
i ved.
T h ea p p l i c a t j o no f t h e s eh y p o t h e s et so t h e a n a l y t i c a l r e s u l t s o f F i g u r e1 8 p r o v ' i d e ss o me w h a
ret fi n e d va l u e sfor com bateffectiveness,as shownin Figur e 19.
T h e re fi n e d a n a l ysi s re fl e cted by the values in Figur e 19 showsr emar kabl cy ons i s t e n t v a l u e s ' i n r e l a t i v e c o m b aet f f e c t i v e n e s so f t h e o p p o n e n tws i t h i n e a c ho f t h e
t h r e e s e t s o f fo u r e n g a g e me non
ts the thr ee separ atefr onts. It showsthat the
I s r a e ' l j c o mb aet ffe cti ve n e sssu per ior ity over the Egyptianswason the average96% ,
,r a
s a so n t h e a v e r a g e5 3 % o
o r a C E Vo f 1 . 9 6 ;t h e i r s u p e r i o r i t yo v e r t h e J o r d a n i a nw
a
CEV
o
r
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
w
a
s
o
n
t
h
e
S
y
r
i
a
n
s
3
1
3
%
,
C E V0 f 1 . 6 3 ; I s r a e l i s u p e r i o r i t yo v e r t h e
4
.
1
3
.
of
pr ovidesthe fol l ow N o r ma l i zi n gth e se re l a t'i o nshipson the Syr ian per for m ance
i n g i n t e r e s t i n gc o m p a r i s o n :
(1.63) (1.96)
4.13
Israeljs
(1.20)
(i.00)
Jordanian 2.53
(1.00) (t.oo)
Esyptian 2.11
Syrian
1.00
Figure 1.
APPR0XIMATE
F0RCESTRENGTHS,
SIX-0AY t{AR, 1967
I s rael
Mobilized Manpower
Tanks
APC
Arrtti l l e r y P i e c e s
SAM
AA Guns
Combat
C
ombaA
t ircraft
totraI
Arahs
EqvDt
Jordan
Svria
4 2 0 0 M - 4 8 , 2 5 0 C e n t u r i o n s , 1 5 0 A M X - 1 3 ,4 0 0 S h e r m a n - S u p eSr h e m a n .
u H aI t t r a c k s .
clncludes 92 Mirage, 24 Superli|ystere, 72 Mystere, 55 ouragan, 24
light bombers.
d l n c l u d e s 4 0 0 T - 3 4 , 4 5 0 T - 5 4 l 5 5 , 1 O OS u - 1 0 0 . l O 0 J S - 3 .
e l n c l u d e s 5 5 5 u - 7 , 1 6 3 M i G - 2 1 ,4 0 M i G - 1 9 ,1 0 0 M i G - i 5 / 1 7 , 3 0 T u - 1 6 ,
4 J l t - l d : s n o r f ,0 t o l t o t s .
rlncludes 200 M-48. 80 Centurions.
9 I n c l u d e s4 0 s u p e r s o n l c ,6 8 M i c - 1 5 / 1 7 , 1 5 T u - 1 6 , 4 I t - 2 8 .
Figure 2.
Inf Bde
Personnel
P is t o l
Rifle
l ' 4 a c hnie G u n , I t
l ' l a c h i n eG u n , h v y
l4ortar, 81m
llortar, 4.2"
Bazooka
A T M i s s il e 5 5 - 1 0 / 1 1
RR, 106m
APC,Halftrack
A A ,, l t , 2 0 m
AA
A,, l t , 4 0 m
Hawk
How, 105m
How
w,, 1 5 5 m
G un, 155m
G uu nn,, 1 7 5 m
Tanks
AI1X113
M-48 (90)
Super Sherman
Centuri on
A
AP
PC
C,,H a l f t r a c k
TI rruucc k s
sP
S PM
ti o u n t s
4,300
430
3,870
120
80
20
I2
20
6
50
16
Fleczd
Bde
Armd
Bde
Armd
Rgt
Arty
Rst
4,300
430
3,870
80
60
10
I
10
4
3,600
360
3,240
40
40
2,000
200
I,800
30
I,000
100
900
10
200
T2
?0
30
10
l0
io t g otis o l
150
30
ziro
150
30
Personnel
Pisto l
Rif'le
M a c h i n eG u n , l t
M a c h i n eG u n , h v y
Mortar,2"
Mortar, Sarn
l',!ortar, 120m
RL, 40nn
GAT, B5mn
S c h m eA
l TMissile
RR, 107m
AMGZPU-2
AMG ZPU-4
AA,37mn
M, 57mn
AA, 85mm
Mortar, 240m
ilow, 122m
Gun How, 15 nn
uunr lJUm
AT Su-100SP
JS-3
PT-76
T-34
T-54155
A P CB T R - 5 0
A P C3
8TR-152
Truck
Motor
lilotorcycl e
SP l4o
l4ount
10,000
1,000
9,000
360
?40
2A
50
12
50
48
24
24
9
9
6
12
T2
;^
I'
io
tio
20
800
60
36
Tank
Dlv
10,000
1,000
9,000
270
160
10
'io
150
38
Tank
Bde
3,500
350
3,150
85
55
12
io
?4
T2
t2
9
9
. :
90
40
( 3 0 ) ( 4 0 )( 1 0 )
Figure 3.
Inf u1v
:o
l0
so
ESTIMATED
ISRAELIARI'lAlrtENT
SUI4MARIES,
1967
'tiol
' :"
75
19
'.'
3
2
4
Ll 12 Div
1/36 Bde
l'1isc Unlts
9
Arty
Rgts
2
Amd
Rgts
l4
2
I n f , / P a r a Meczd
Bde
Bde
25,000
2,500
22,500
250
420
9,000
900
8 ,1 0 0
270
270
4,000
400
3,600
60
6 0 , 2 0 0 I 600
6,020
860
5 4 , 1 8 0 7 740
1, 6 8 0
160
1, 1 2 0
1?0
280
20
168
16
280
20
168
8
84
8
700
400
224
24
45
78
.:tlo
140
76
50
: :
24
18
36
3
100
iol
' ) q
125
2,500
200
2 aan
?7
900
225
160 I
96 |
I
i
150
38
I40
i40
'i6o
2,100
420
:
oo
Totals
1? qf,n
?5,920 1122,040
320 | 2,740
320 | 2.310
loo
I
i84
I
3eo
|
254
|I
O?
't
: :
Bde
28,800 | 135,600
ti lgo
80
(80)(20)
'-
1,437
514
'::
t l ?
| 1 "
:: |
I
tzo |
(z+01
?0
1
|
io 720)(480)|
I
400
160|
300
1 , 2 0 0I
304i
,i
1,ooo
150
200
400
z5o
1,436
8,586
1,263
ESTIMATED
EGYPTIAN
ARMAMENT
SUMMARIES,
1967
Inf
boe
4,000
400
3 ,6 0 0
T?O
80
10
16
16
24
I
8
6
Arty
Rgt
I,000
100
900
75
75
10
1 / 1 0D i v
illsc Unit
:o
'roo
: :
.':'
100
t00
50
50
4
4
90
(5)120
(4) s6
(3) 72
(2) 48
(1)24
5
tnt
Divs
50,000
5,000
45,000
1,800
I,200
100
250
60
250
240
120
120
45
45
30
60
270
60
'oo
60
30
zio
roo
iz
20
10
15
Arty
Rgts
1 5, 0 0 0 I 5 , 0 0 0
I,500
1,500
1 3 , 5 0 0 13,500
200
I,ta)
i50
trLa)
so
10
30
50
10
?
200
?0
it
(31,72
(t)24
(i)12
: :
o
6
10
10
30
100
150
30
i0
600
50
30
1u
:'
8
l
Armd I
100
'ooo
45
500
30
50
r,soo
'reo
100
4,000
300
180
2
Tank
u 1v s
Inf
Bdes
20,000 20,000
2,000 2,000
18,000 18,000
540
600
320
400
20
50
80
20
20
80
48
r20
24
40
24
40
18
30
18
12
72
20
20
60
200
300
60
2A
I,800
100
60
20
20
t50
I,250
100
50
7
Tank
Bdes
Tota l s
2 4 , 5 0 0 1 4 4, 5 0 0
2,450 14,450
22,050 130,050
595
4,860
385
3,580
84
304
330
80
500
408
184
184
42
Jaa
163
92
122
120
96
414
108
24
100
100
70
130
?LO
510
350
650
70
925
14
134
I,400
10,450
140
670
520
F i g u T e4 .
E S T I M A T JEO
DR D A N I A R
N M A M ESNUTM M A R I E
1S
9 6. 7
Armd
Bde
INT
Bde
Personnel
P is t ol
Rifle
M a c h i n eG u n ,1 t
M a c h i n eG u n ,h v y
Mortar, 8lmm
M o r t a r4 . 2 "
B a z okoa
RR, 106mm
AA, 1t, 20nrm
AA,1t,40mm
G u n ,2 5 p d r
How,105mm
How,155mm
Gun,155mm
Tanks
M-48
C e n t u roi n
T r u c ks
S PM o u n t s
A r L , r v tI .Jr, ) a r a c e n
500
450
050
t20
BO
20
4,0oo
400
3,600
40
40
i0
L2
20
6
16
Fiqure 5.
P e r s o n nI e
P is t o l
Rifle
M a c h i nGe u n , 1 t
M a c h i n eG u n ,h v y
Mortar, B2mm
Mortar,120mm
RL, 40mm
GAT,85mm
RR, lo7mm
AAMG
ZPU-2
AAMG
ZPU-4
AA, 37mm
M, 57mm
AA, B5mm
Mortar,240nun
Katus hya
How, 1Z2rrun
G u nH o w ,1 5 2 n m
Gun, 130nrn
A T S u - 1 0 0S P
J S -3
PI 76
T-34
T- 54/55
A P CB T R - 5 0
A P CB T R - 1 5 2
Truck
Motorcycle
S PM o u n t
I2
10
6
90
30
150
20
20
4,000
400
3, 6 0 0
270
160
20
4
4,500
450
4, 0 5 0
300
180
?0
4
16
3?
I
3, 5 0 0
350
3,150
B5
LI
l2
B
50
Arty
Rgt
800
BO
720
75
r28
tafiz
250
20
10
1,200
160
400
10
tJ
?
1/11Bde
M i s cU n i t s
4 ,000
400
3, 6 0 0
50
10
:
b
25
: :
25
?5
20
20
(2)48
10
Arty
Bde
2,000
200
I,800
40
BO
io
24
(t)rz
180
60
300
40
40
20
Total s
48,000
4,900
43,200
1, 1 0 5
842
180
T12
2t0
56
188
t2
7?
36
24
8
240
180
60
r,770
220
540
6
Inf
Bde
(r)24
( 4) e 6
(3)72
(r)24
.':.0
II
1n
?n
60
..r..,
JO
roo
T2
30
720
10
12
I ,000
't)o
JO
24
30
240
60
I ,500
t20
60
180
180
30
825
60
60
T o t a ls
10,500 60,000
1, 0 5 0 6 , 0 0 0
9,450 54,000
2Eq
? q7q
i;; I r:;i;
|I
l
30 |
I
241
el
el
12l
1
1
1
l
|
180
10
tanK I
Hatp
72
48
72
24
20
5
250
20
10
3
Meczd
Bde
(1) R
60
60
10
275
20
20
4
Arty
Bns
(2)24
(l) I
72
L2
B
10
8,000
800
7,200
80
BO
20
16
?0
8
24
(2)24
.10
:u
30
40
i0
250
20
10
3 6, 0 0 0
3,600
32,400
960
640
160
96
160
48
Armd
Bdes
..:,
t+
;,.
B
Inf
Bdes
ESTIMATE
SD
YRIAN
A R M A M ESNUTM M A R I E1 S
96
,7
Tank
Bde
'
T2
1.2
(tzt.
Meczd
Bde
32
B
6
6
2,000
200
1, 8 0 0
25
:o
10
Inf
Bde
IO
500
50
450
10
1/10 Bde
M i s cU n i t s
1.2
150
20
50
Arty
Bn
36 |
72 |
teo
^.
o
299
288
e6
148
88
68
5 6
4 8
2 4
8
204
7
144
L44
3ol
60
e0 |
270
180 I
360
60 |
520
15 |
107
7 5 0| 4 , 1 9 5
60 I
250
30 I
282
F i g u re 6 .
EngNo
E n g a g e meD
ne
t sig n a ti o n
Ra fa h
5/6
5-7
Ab y A g e i l a -U mK a te f
Ga zaS tri p
2 Inf Div
P L AD i v
5/6
El Arish
7 Inf Div
5/6
Bi r L a h fa n
3 Inf Div
June
6 7- 2
67- 3
67- 4
67- 5
67- 6
67- 7
67- 8
67- 9
7/B
8
Arab Forces
Egyptian
PLA&TInfDiv
S'inai
6 7- I
6 7 -1 0
67-10.1
E N GAGEM ENTS,
t,lAR,JUNE1967
SIX- DAY
7
7
JebelLibni
3 Inf Div
B i r H a m a - B iG
3 I n f D i v & 2 1 T a n kD i v
r ifgafa
B i r H a s s n a - B iTr h a m a d a 3 I n f D i v & 4 T a n kD i v
Mitla Pass
Bir Gifgafa
Nakhl
Isr aeli F or c es
T a l' s D i v
S h a r o n ' sD i v
T a l' s D iv
T a l' s D i v
Y o f f e ' s D iv
Yoffe'sDiv
T a l' s D i v
Y o f f e 's D iv
Yoffe'sDiv
Tal'sDiv
S h a r o n 'D
s iv
Jor danian
5-7
J e ru sael m
5/a J e n in
6/7
6/t
7
9
9
9
10
10
10
Kabat'iya
T i I fi t-Z a b a b i d a
N a bul s
Za o u ra -K a l
Tel Fahar
Rawiya
B a nai s - M a s a a d a
Ku n etra
i
Boutmi.ya
J e r u s a ' l eB
md e ( + )
25 Inf Bde
40 Ar m dBde, 25 Inf Bde
40 Ar m dBde, 25 Inf Bde
Br i gadeequ' iv
Syri an
11 Inf Bde
11 Inf Bde
8 Inf Bde
11 Inf Bde
Syri an MeczdBde
Syrian ArmdBde
Central Command
P e le d' s D iv
P ee
l d's D'iv
R a m ' sB d e
R a m ' sB d e , K o c h v a ' Bde
s
M e n delr ' s B d e
G o l a n iB d e
R a m ' sB d e
G o l a n iB d e
M e n delr ' s B d e
P e l e d ' sD i v
JU
' N E5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C I U S I V E
SS
I N, A IF R O N T
E S T I M A TAELDL O C A T 0
I 0FNB A T T LCEA S U A L T I E
F i q u r e7 .
Date
E n g a g e m e n t s
Israel
Egypt
June
( 1 )3 , o o o ( l ) 5 o o
5
b
I
( 2 )l , o o o| ( z ) z o o
( 5 ) 5 0 0i ( 5 ) 5 0
(6).
(6).40
.5oo
( 1 0 ) 5 o o ( 1 0 )4 0
7
8
E qy p t
I srael
lSyLt
(7).
(t].ou
. 6 0 0i
(11) uroi (rr) ro
F i q u T e8 ,
Date
(3)
Israel
(3) soo
(3) 45
(3) 20
(8)
(8)
250
600
Eqypt
(4)
30
I sr a e l
(e)
(e)
600
60
(1)
(1) 15
lzj
.70
6
7
(sj
':o
(6)
'
(6) 10
li\
o).
,rt,t
( 1 1 )4
.30
I
( 1 o )l o o ( 1 0 ) 1 1
Israpl
(2) 19
t s ji r
(3) 60
(3) 30
/?\
,ui1 0
(8) 30
(4) 13
( 4 ) 80
( e ) 1 o o( 9 ) 1 6
LOSS
i
I
|
|
I
L 0 ss
70r 70
180 250
30 2Bo
30 310
so 4oo
100 500
200 700
JUf,
18
.
377
477
27
10
650
640
(1)51
,r]
()\
t:j is
t'i
(B) 40
245
( 1 0 )o
( 1 0 ) 1 2 3( 1 1 )o
(1r)12
1,105
r ,794
11
i5
5t
5 5
t q
i
a
uu
2J
i o q
o l 8 3
25 | e1
16
i07
|
15 | 722
i e e
s lros
44 I or
(4) 38
r sjio
E S T I M A T EADL L O C A T I O
ON
F BATTLE
C A S U A L T I E JSO
, R D AFNR O N TJ, U N E5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E
E n g a g e m e n t s
;-f
J o r d a n ia n
CumuJordan
880
.. I e3o
ro i r,045
.lsrae
.rt (2) 0
(5) 76
(6) 52 (7) 0
(' 1
- -1').1. , 5- 0 0 (' 1
- '1-)-6l 0 0
.. i
E n q a q e m e n t s
(5) 20
(6) 0
oate
I
500
860
Israeli
r52
t5?
FiquTe10.
.. i
30 i
115
60 . .
64 15
I cum
D a li y
Net
Dai1yI
R e t u r n 'L o s s L o s s i
. 7 0
ls I
.
250
36
|
J
I I J
4 1
20
0
'I
ati ve
M is c
ESTII'IATE
CD
L 0 5 EA I R S U P P 0 RFTI G H T E R - B 0 l 1 S
B0
ER
RT I E S
S U E Z - S I N AFI R O N TJ, U N E5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E
tl
ul
(3)
Israel
E q v pt
ffirir" *"*
une
500
300
20
50
Egyptian
Israel
Fovnt
Fisure 9.
D at e
M is c
Ua
Enq
ESTII4ATE
AD
LLOCATIO
ON
F T A N KL O S S E SS, I N A ] F R O N TJ, U N E5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E
D a i l y Cum
n+
s r a el
Israel i
LUnUI ati ve
3,000
3,000
4,500
1, 5 0 0
500
u:o 5 , 5 0 0
500 .
6,000
1 , 7 0 0 t:ulo 9 , 2 0 0
600
9,800
1,184 I ,900 t2,884
( 4 ) 85
250
E n g a g e m e n t
June
'
E g y p t ia n
UA
Enq
Israel
Jordan I
( 1 2 : 8) 0 0 ( 1 2 ) 4 o o
\ r'
(n)l,ooo (il)8ool
( r 1 ) 1 , o o o( 1 r ) 3 5| 0 ( t 5 ) 1 , o o ot ri luoo
..
(14) 500
10
Israel
I,500
800
( 1 4 ) 2 5 3 2 , 5 0 0I
.
r
2,000
Iati
Israel i
Daily
M is c
1 , 0 0 0 3 , 0 0 0 600
I , 2 0 0 4 , 5 0 0 400
I
1 , 0 0 0I B , 0 0 0 I , 6 0 3
1 , 0 0 01 9 , 0 0 0
l
z , o o oi 1 3 , 0 0 0
100
100
tu-mu'l
ati ve
700
I ,100
'lul'
FiguTe 11.
Date r
E n g a g e m e n t
June
J o r d a ni a n
Dailyl
Loss I
50
40
100
rael
( 1 1 ) 5 0 ( 1 1) 2 0
( 1 1) 2 0 ( 1 11) o
( 1 1 ) 2 0 ( 1 11) 0
6
7
tril+o trzlie
(1s)18
( 1 5) 4 6
bb
Israeli
C u mi D a i l y N e t
LossI Return Los
50
50
eoi
190
256
Net
20
38
78
96
56
eo
6
12
t0
184
238
228
SORTIES
FIGHTER-BOMBER
F i g u r e1 2 , ESTIMATED
CLOSEAIR SUPPORT
FRONT,
JUNE5-7, 1967, INCLUSIVE
JORDANIAN
te
E n g a g e m e n t s
A v a iI a b e S o r t i e
Jordan I s r a e
f,
ln
'1
'l
11
trz
,.,
104
) o
srael
( 1 1 )J d
38
{ r 1 )40
1n
( 1 1 )A L
,J0rdan
Jordan
I s r a eI
( 12\
(12) 0
lsraeI
ir "
l
( 1 3 )2 1i ( 1 4 ) 0 i ( 1 4 )2 1
a1?\
f1q\
I J o r dl n
t
r
( 1 5 ) 52
l
l
E n q a q e m e n t s
S y r ia
Israel
June
Syria
S y r ia
i Israel
( 2 1) 1 , 0 0 0 ( 2 1 ) 1 o o ( 2 2 ) 1 , 5 0 0 ( 2 2 . ) 1 . 5 0
I
(22) 600
(24) 500 ( 2 4 )5 0 ( 2 5 ) 5 0 0 ( 2 5 ) 5 0 (26) 500
10
Syri an
I srael
S y n ia
Israel
Israeli
r Lumuu a rl y
Eno t Misc lative
I
I
D a 1l - y
L
i Tumu::E n o r M i s cI I t i v e
0 ,15 0 0 2 5 0 1
| 2,500i1,003
600 400 4.500 ur
|
l
| 1 . 5 0 0| 6 0 0 6 . 6 0 0 1 5 0|
(23)68
(26)50
tat)
3i8
468
F i g u r e1 4 . E S T I M A TAELDL o C A T I0oFNT A N K
t o S S E SS, Y R I AFNR o N TJ,U N E
9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I N C L U S I V E
D a t e l
June
J
l0
E n g a g e m e n t
Syria I s n a e l
(21)15 (21\40
(24)15
Svri a
(?2\10
(22) s
I Srae |
r r o l r u ( 2 5 ) 2 0l 2 C \ ? q
\vr] a
Syrian
Israel
Israel
Syri a
(23)10 tzilio
r26\?n
Israel i
i uum
luur'l
Daily Cum Daily I Net
D a i 1 y C u m D a i 1 vI N e t
L 0 5S
L o s s R e t u r nI L o s s L o s s I L o s s R e t u r n il o s
(26)35
za
2 5
10
Jf,
of,
i 2 5
Jf,
tnn
i
I
07
$ , 9 2
F i g u r e1 5 . ESTIMATED
CLOSEAIR SUPPORT
FIGHTER.BOMBER
SORTIES
G O L AFNR O N TJ ,U N E
9-10, 1967.INCLUSIVE
Date
Available Sorties
5yrr a
10
E n g a q e m e n t s
lsrael
Svri a
Israel
238
(21\ 0
( 2 1 ) 1 1 e(22) 0
(22)1le
( 2 3 )o
tirj o
231
(24) 0
(24) 77
(25) 77 ( 2 6 )o
(26) 77
l1
Svrla
I s r a el
5rvt a
4 5 1 4 5
1 0 ' 5 5
'
105
160
1 4 5
i 5 5
o
I rf,c
74 i
80
INPUTSHEET
ENGAGEMENT
DATACALCULATION
Fiqure 16.
E n g a g e m e nDt a t e : 5 J u n e
Terrain:
Posture:
Weather:
Season:
17 May '76
Date of Calc:
E n g a g e m e nNt o : 6 7 - I
EngagementNo:
.l967
67-1
Dateof Calc:
17 Mav '76
E n g a g e m e nDt a t e : 5 J u n e 1 9 6 7
Flat l4ixed/Desert
F o r t / P r e p a r e dD e f e n s e
Hot, Dry
S p r in g
Terrain:
Posture:
Weather:
S e as o n:
Flat Mixed/Desert
Attack
Hot, Dry
S p r in g
7 t h D i v ( - ) & P L AD i v ( - ) , E g y p l
D e p t h : B .B
Q: -45
Unit:
P e r s o n nl e L o s s e s : 3 , 0 0 0
T a n kL o s s e s : 7 0
P e r s o n n e lL o s s e s : 5 0 0
T a n kL o s s e s : 1 5
MissionFactor: 2
MissionFactor: 9
Unit:
Depth: B.B
Q: 45
Total
Number OLI
N Personnel
l,ls Pistol, Beretta
Rifle, AK-47
t ^ l mM
g GL t . , S G M
7.62
M GH v y ., D K1 2 . 7
W6*Mortar, 50mm
Mortar, B2mm
Mortar, 120mm
A P C ,B T R - 5 0
A P C ,B T R - 1 5 2
Wgi RL, 40rnm
S c h m eAl T M i s s i l e
RR, 107rnm
GunAT, D-48, B5nrn
Gun, 100rnm
H o w ,M - 3 8 , 1 2 2 n r n
G u nH o w ,D - 2 0 , 1 5 2 m m
wgyMMG,ZPU-2
AAMG,
ZPU-4
AAG,37nn
GunAA 5-60, 57nm
Wi G u n , A T , S P , S U - 1 0 0( T D )
Tank Hvy, T-10/JS-3
Tank Lt, PT-76
Tank, T-34
Tank, Sherman
Tank, T-54 )
Tank, T-55 )
wy
MiG-17
Trucks
Motorcycle
He1i copters
Personnel
l,'ls Pistol, cal .45
R i f 1 e ,G a 1 i 1
W r nM a c h i n eg u n , c a l 7 . 6 2 n n
M a c h i n ge u n , c a l 1 , 2 . 7 n n
W 6 *M o r t a r , 8 l m m
Mortar,4.2" (107nrm)
0 . 0 3 I ,950
59
0 . 2 6 1 7 , 5 5 0 4, 5 6 3
0 .5 8
485
281
0 .8 9
323
287
1 )OA
?7
48
44
47
2,068
5B
696
L2
5B
a5
?o
34
101
192
229
159
231
27
5t
66
168
388
281
2t?
280
210
av.505
109
9
60
23
23
__2W
1,200
782
oa
11,904
T2
2 , 74 8
8, 2 6 8
924
972
592
528
I,680
4, 6 5 6
aa
4
Jb
16
B
10
tl
T2
13
10 qrn
0.02 1 0(2
0.22 17,568
0.82
283
1. 0 4
292
50
20
90
t2
Halftrack, ltl3
W g iB a z o o k a
A T MS S 1 0 / 1 1
R R - S P1, 0 6 r m
lr.lg HowSP, 105rm
H o wS P , 1 5 5 r m
G u nS P , 1 5 5 m m
W o ,G u nA A , S P , L t 2 0 m m
GunAA, SP, Lt 40nun
S A MH
. awk
lili T a n k ,M 4 ( l O S n r n 1
Tank, M4B(90rnm)
lt,ly
1 77t
T a n k ,C e n t u r i o n
T a n k ,A M X - 1 (39 0 m )
MystereIV
Super-Mystere
18
6
48
24
T2
67
20
4
45
45
45
105
23/2
1 2, 6 0 0
10,500
65
?2 A2q
Trucks
APCT
, r a c k ,H a fl t r a c k
He1
i copters
7
120,988
1, 2 0 9
155
BB
2?
t?
?q
3,865
232
304
I,000
I,080
3,375
574
ota
798
7,690
5,640
? 6?6
9,308
2 q2n
1, 2 0 0
2 1, 1 5 0
21,330
24,r20
3 3, 7 0 5
17,963
Total 0LI
50
Total OLI
A P C ,T a c k , H a l f t r a c k
19,500
175,677
I ,105
361
39
Figure
Engagement:
tEyptian
Engagenent
No,
Date:
Unit:
POStufe:
Mission Factor
17.
F^rf/DrAh
calculation
Israeli
naf
Mi-ssion Factor
( r f ? , / or a z 7 2 ) ( r x I ( , x , g )
30.3n
l ' t ,r ' l l
w i x r w i x \ i
6 G 7 0 1x . 1 5 / l
t o 5 7 J > - xI l x l x , &
sf
"
G;/St
(tota1)
63,373
d,263
ue)lL6
Fdctor
(Nf
l2J
+ Wi )
x tr\,,/N
vF =
=
x o x b x u" x ru X h, x zu X vf
t.l? x I x I t,.7El2
lt3 ilto * I xt x ' xlx lxl,13(
o.E10b
1,q66'l
t,2890
31 loi Y-lx I x I x l, I
3 7 ,5 2 o
i 73,21)o
,1202
Factor
ma = Ma -
( 1 _- r .
x \)(Mu
le x t
x o xb
M-
r/res.zb
1)
185,qoo'
P"/P1=
0,?2
of
v,25 tb
i, 2 7.{t'
x us x ru x hu x zu x ve
t T g , z o o \l , 2 7 1 6 N l ( | x l r l x I x l r | * l x , 4 z o z -
202, t'2Y
t,O?
Surprise
s = 2.2326
(2 x .1094)= O.7AI2
ma = 2,1?ro
ve = 1 -
Pf = 153,063
Pe = 364'655
Pg/Pg = 6.4472
Ps/P" = 2.2363
Result
Q = 45, Df = 8.8,
(S. x us.)/pg
x u"g)
calculat
(4Q + De)/3Df
l , z E 9- ( l - . c t ( r ) ( , z e i )
Pe = S. x mx
lra = fiIZEG-r
Efcas =
a9,lc5
qr,29o
Effects
Er.. --
Mobility
x t
Pf/Pe =
vf = 1 -
tt)?gt
lOo,3O5 x.9l x I
wY*tu{Yxh*x'*Y"*YY
V. = N. x 5,/ru ",EJ% x vy x vr
ie'zOx r/r x.60S3x.?xl
v"=I-Ve,/se = l-,O79t
x vy x vr
wixrwix\i
wytt"y*h"y*""y*"yy
Nf x ur,/r,
Attack
!'f
Posture I
r7 MaY 1976
Date:
Unit:
Rf= F f+E fs p +E fc a s
Rf - Re =
lAQ + Df)/}De
v
E e c a s=
- 2,5534
u"",/S6) - Vloocasf/Nfl
lV(cu". x u"6,/S")/(Cast x
,qobsiffi
x u.")
= -3. /qO3
, f- "
^
l
T|
- V]00crc../'t1,,
lVtcast x use,/sf)/(casu x u"6/5.)
I
. ctoz 765
fi@t7;te __E4t_
'15,93
Re-Rf =
1J
= I,b66
= 1 +2,1o7+,5A
+t5,13
i2,tL,_
o
Ct)
(IJ
'> lrl
c) -o
ro
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rd
IN THE1973 }{AR
COMBAT
PERFOMANCE
THEDATA
"October
Figure 20 is a sumnaryof the major statistical grounddata of the 1973
h lar , " i n c l u d i n g o ve ra l l stre n g th s a nd losses of per sonneland se' lecteditems of
air str ength
equi p m e nfto r a l l ma Jo rp a rti ci p a n ts.' Figur e 21 pr ovidescom par able
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
l
i
s
t
i
n
g
s
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
of the princimore
a n d l o s s d a t a . F i g u r e s2 2 , 2 3 , ' a n d 2 4
pal varieties of giound weaponsand combatequipmentestimated to be on hand in the
allo showingpr esum ed
I s ra e l i , Eg y p ti a n ,a n d S yri a n a rrn i esas of 6 October ' 1,973,
br
igades.
c at io n s t o m a j o r co mb a fo
t rma ti o n s, such as divisions and
on the Suez- Sinaiand Gola n
F i g u r e 2 5 i s a l i sti n g o f a l 'l m ajor engagem ents
of the preFronts from October6 through 25. Figure 26 is an estimatedbreakdown
s u m e dt o t a l o f Isra e l i a n d E g yp ti a ncasualties on that fr ont, with allocations to
day s a n d e n g a g e me nbtsa se du p o np ro fessionalhistor ical and m ilitar y judgm entin
nar r ative of oper ationscited under "Data Sour c es "
c o n s i d e r a t i o n -o fth e d e ta i l e d H E R O
of pr es um ed
br eakdown
in t h e I n t r o d u cti o n to th i s re p o rt. Figur e 27 is a compar able
I s ra e l i a n d Eg yp ti a nta n k l o sse s o n the Suez- Sinaifr ont, by day and by engage m ent.
Figu r e . 2 8i s a co mp a ra b l b
of estimateddir ect air suppor tallocations by
e re a kd o wn
and dates. Fi gur e
t he I s r a e l i a n d E g yp ti a na i r fo rce s, also r elated to engagements
2 9 i s a l i s t i n g o f e n g a g e m e notns t h e G o l a nF r o n t . F i g u r e s3 0 , 3 1 , a n d 3 2 g i v e c o m para b l e b r e a k d o w nosf e sti ma te dca sualties, tank losses and dir ect air suppor t s or t i e s o n t h e G o l a nF r o n t .
As i n t h e ca se o f a n a 'l ysi so f the 1967W ardata, available r esour cesper mi tted
on
analysesof only twe'lveengagements
on the Suez-SinaiFront and four engagements
than pr ovid ed
t h e G o l a nf r o n t. T h i s w a s a to ta l of six m or e1973W arengagements
over all than pr ovid ed
f or i n t h e T a sk 0 rd e r, o r a to ta l o f eight m or eengagements
f or i n t h e T a sk 0 rd e r.
DATAANALYSIS
F i g u r ^ e3 3 , " P re l i mi n a ry1 9 7 3A rab- Isr aeli W arAnalysis," pr ovidesthe samek i nd
of o v e r a l l s u m ma ry
o f th i s stu d y's quantitative analysis of the 1973war as is found
in F i g u r e 1 8 f or th e 1 9 6 7Wa ra n a l yses. Figur e 34 pr ovidesa fur ther r efinem entof
t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l ysi s a fte r a p p lication to the 1973ldardata of the samethr ee
h y p o t h e s e st h a t w e re re fl e cte d i n F i gur e 19 for the 1967W ar .
A s w i t h t h e 1 9 6 7Wa r, th e re fi n ed analysis shownin Figur e 26 showsr em ark abl y
c o n s i s t e n t v a l ue s i n re l a ti ve co mb ateffectivenessof the opponentsin eachof the
t wo s e t s o f d a ta : th a t fo r th e S u ez- Sinaifr ont, and that for the Golanfr ont. It
s how st h a t t h e Isra e l i co mb a te ffe ctivenesssuper ior ity over the Egyptianswas on
t he a v e r a g eL L 6 %,o r a C E Vo f 2 .1 6 ; Isr aeli super ior ity over the Syr ianswas 17 5%
o r a C E Vo f 2 . 7 5 .
A n o r m a l ize dco mp a ri so nsi
, mi l ar to that for the 1967W ar , is shownbelow:
(2.16)
2.75
I s r a e il s
(1.00)
Egyptians 1.27
1.00
Syrians
ANALYSES
CAMPAIGN
per for mance,and of air p ow er ,
I n o r d e r t o se e k p o ssi b l e e ffe cts of high comm and
on t h e o v e r a l l ca mp a i g n
re su l ts a n d on calculated CEVs- asopposedto the indiv i dual
results-QJM analyseswere performedon the overall campaigndata and
engagement
and the two 1973l^|arcampaigns.The res ul ts
re s u l t s f o r t h e th re e 1 9 6 7Wa rca mpaigns
i n Figur e 35.
of t h e s e a n a l y se sa re su mn a ri ze d
15
ED
ROUN
SD
TRENGTH
0C
ST
, 0 B E1R9 7 3
F i q u r e Z 0 - A . E S T I M A TG
Total
Arab
Potentia l
Arabs ll Total
Avajl able ArmyManpowerl
T a n k / A r m o r eDdi v i s i o n s
I n f a n t r y / M e c h a n i z eDd i v s
S e p a r a t eB r i g a d e s
M e d i u mT a n k s
APCs
Arti l I ery (over 100nm)
M u l t i p l e R o c k e tL a u n c h e r s
Mortars (over 100nm)
S S ML a u n c h e r s
SAMLaunchers
S t r e lI a
M Guns
A TM i s s i l e s
AT Rockets
AT Guns
N o t e s : 1 0 n t y t i e t d a r m ya n d d i r e c t s u p p o r tm a n p o w e rf ;o r i n s t a n c e , t o t a l
I s r a e l i m o b i l i z e ds t r e n g t hw a so v e r 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 ,E g y p t i a no v e r 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .
2 I n c l u d e s 1 5 0 c a p t u r e dI - 5 4 / 5 5 , m o d i f i e d .
3 I n c l u d e s3 , 5 0 0 +h a l f - t r a c k s , 5 0 0 M - 1 1 3 .
4 I n c l u d e sS S - 1 0a n d S S - 1 1 ,a p p a r e n t l yn o t u s e d .
5 I n c lu d e sT - 6 2 .
6 I n c l u d e s8 0 5 A - 6 .
5 , 0 0 0 2 5 , 0 0 0 9 5 , 0 0 07 5 , 0 0 0 6 5 0 , 0 0 0
I
2
I
4
18
?
46
1
5t L
540
6,131
150
1,200
550
1,500
5,870
?00
720
320
36
100
600
2,885
90
:
650+
I
4?
:
20
1, 2 8 0
?
;
3,000
7
?
3,650+
:
?
?
P e r s o n nl e
Killed
l^lounded
P r i s o n e r so r M i s s i n q
Tanks**
APCs
ArtiIIery Pieces
S A MB a t t e r i e s
Ai rcraft
H e 1i c o p t e r s
N a v a l V e s s esl
2 9?R*
B, 8 0 0 *
508
840
400
-10,
/ I n c ' l u d e s1 5 0 Z S U - 2 3 - 4 .
S M o s t l yS a g g e r ,s o m eS n a p p e r .
9 I n c lu d e s T - 6 2 .
l 0 I n c l u d e s6 0 s A - 6 .
l l l n c l u d e s 1 0 0Z S U - 2 3 - 4 .
l 2 M o s t l y S a g g e r ,s o m eS n a p p e r .
I srae'l
Arab
Total
8,528
19,549
2,554
850+
550+
47
JOU
55
1
5,000 3,100
12,0006,000
8 , 0 3 1 500
1, 1 0 0 1 , 2 0 0
400
450
250
300
3
44
223
rt7
'l?
42
5
10
28
49
300
1,000
20
200
?
?
20
:.
* A b o u t 1 0 %h a s b e e na d d e dt o o f f i c i a l l y r e p o r t e d I s r a e l i c a s u a l t i e s t o r e p r e d h od i e d o f t h e i r i n i u r i e s , a n d t h e f a c t t h a t
s e n t a p p r o x i m a t e l yt h e w o u n d e w
o f f i c i a l I s r a e l i f i g u r e s a p p a r e n t l yd o n o t i n c l u d e t h o s ew o u n d endo t e v a u c a t e d
f r o m a i d s t a t i o n sa n d f i e l d h o s p i t a l s .
* * T a n k sd e s t r o y e do r p u t o u t o f a c t i o n f o r o n e o r m o r ed a y s . F o r i n s t a n c e ,
t h e I s r a e l i s s e e mt o h a v er e n a i r e da n d r e t u r n e dt o o p e r a t i o na b o u t 4 0 0 o f t h e t a n k
l o s s e s s h o w nh e r e . T h e ya l s o r e c o v e r e da b o u t 3 0 0 r e p a i r a b l e A r a b t a n k s .
16
1, 2 0 0
5, 3 0 0 +
2,200+
F i g u r e2 1 - A .
A I R F 0 R CS
E T R E N G T H0SC, T 0 B E1R9 7 3
I S R A E L I S
Fi qhters
-fiidzl
160
60
200
M ic - l 9
Mic- 17
Su-7
Hunter
Mirage
Total Fighters
t':
-n
t8
30
--Tg
Il -28
Total Bombers
Total Combat
'ri
30
Il-14
Il-18
H el i c o p t e r s
--Tr-:6l'1i-8
V a u t o u r ,l t b o m b e r
L2
70
6
30
c-130
c-47
c-97
N o r a tal s
---36
6Z
50
S u p e rF r e lo n
18
1
LN-f,J
AB 205
-130'
Total Helicopters
Total Non-combat
taL
750
265
648
21,6
327
131
|,254
M7
288
321
9,000
nnn
6
12
10
30
66
I
12
30
f,U
52
LZa
,?
B
o
30
-16
150
140
50
12
360
.Z
.o:
-7d
Total Transports
A-4, Skyhawk
F-4 Phantom
M ir a g e
SuperMystere
18
30
48
1,038
598
Transports
-In-If-
5L
3f,U
Bombers
-T[:16'
311
60
3s1
219
21
28
-9m.
ld
I lo
476
109
56+
423+
I,095
32,000+
17,000
* 0 c t o b e r9 - 2 3 . i n c l u s i v e .
F i g u r e 2 1 - 8 . E S T I M A TA
EIDR L 0 S S E S0,C T 0 8 E1R9 7 3
|
|
|
l o t n e r l A r a ib
i E q y p It S y r i aI l r a o I A r a b sI r o t u t i I s r a e t
A. By Type
Fi ghter
Bomber
Transport
H e li c o o t e r
222
Totals
265
rt7
I
'q)
2t
30
390
1
--q
IJ
1':
109
B. By Cause
Ai r"-to-Air
To SAl4
To AAA
Miscor Unknown
Friendly Forces
287
77
19
58
2l
40
31
15
2
447
109
bb
TotaI s
C.
Damage
Damaged
R e p a i r e di n O n eW e e k
r25
,2
17
(50
215
Figure 22.
Arty
Rgt
4 , 3 0 0 I 4, o o o 3 , 6 0 0
l ,700
3,870 i
1,000
100
900
10
20
t'leczd
1.20
80
20
Armd
Bde
360
3,600 3,240
BO
40
60
40
10
170
400
30
30
10
50
20
)o
200
10
10
20
SA-6
G u nA T - S u - 1 0 0 ,S P
Tank, lt, PT76
Tank, med,T54l55
Tank, hvy, T62
A P CB T R 6 O
A P CB T R s O
A P CB R D M 1
APC BRDI42
A P CB M P
B M PS/ ag g e r
T r u ck
It4otorcyc'le
SP l"lounts
16
I nf/ Para
Bde
3 0 , 0 0 0 a Enn
3,000
850
27,000
300
150
I f,U
600
')s
5
10
3
5
go
I5I
55
30
150
YO
t2
6o
172
11
|
f4eczd j
Bde i
10
Anmd
Bde
Total s
6 8 , 8 0 0 4 4 , 0 0 0 | 3 6 , 0 0 0 2 7 7, 3 0 0
6 ,880
4,400 i 3,600 27,730
I
67,920 3 9 , 6 0 0 3 2 , 4 0 0 1 9 5 , 5 7 0
i
1, 9 2 0
880 I
400
3,9s0
660
1, 2 8 0
400
3 ,590
320
11 0
430
192
88 I
280
64
44 I
204
'roo
1
(
220 I
100
505
800
2,200
200
3,471
320
11 0
635
96
256
lo
120
192
770
212
75
216
rio
tiz
I J
( e) 2 1 6
(e)21,6
(4) e6
(3) 72
\L I
20
360
240
50
T2
100
40
?0
l0
30
L J ' IV
9. 0 0 0
270
':o
20
16
24
lo
8
g
9
T2
T2
T2
54
zio
240
5
10
t a
19
I2
9
9
I2
I L
4
36
3
100
25
360
240
50
t2
100
40
20
10
30
16
8
9
9
T2
T2
!2
54
'rir
'so
3, 0 0 0
300
3, 0 0 0
750
160
800
2,400
608
sia
'zio
2,200
I,650
418
96
72
12
goo 2 , 0 4 8
100
600
600
400
200
148
505
100
200
3,491
1 , s oIo 11, 9 2 5
380|
NU
T M M A R I E1S9, 7 3
E S T I I 4 A T ETDG Y P T I AA
NR M A I 4 ES
1 / 1 0D i v
Army Spt
Units
l4eczd
Div
12,000
1. 2 0 0
9.000
ato
L'
48
10
20
I50
38
I n f D iv
s A2 / 3
5
Armd
Rgts
( 4 ) 96
: .
6
IO
Armd
f 4 G ,l t , s c r , r7 . 6 2
M G ,h v v , D K 1 2 . 7
Mortar,82mm
t4ortar,12Omm
R P G - 7 ,8 2 m m
S ag g e r
Inf RR, 82mm
Inf RR, 107mm
SPG-9
RR,73mm
G A TD - 4 8 , 8 5 m m
G A TM - 5 5 , 1 0 0 m m
AAI4G
ZPU.4
A A M GZ U - 2 3
AAMG
ZSU-23-4
A A M GS - 6 0 , 5 7 m m
l4RL,l22mm
How,122mm
G u nH o w , 1 2 2 r n m
GunHow, 152rnm
Gun, 180mm
S c u dF
/ rog
brat | )A-l
30,000
3,000
27,000
300
500
30
Arty
Rgts
L '
Fiqure 23.
P e r so n n eI
P i s t o l , g m mB e r e t t a
I A-47
Rifle )^,,.,
1/1.2Div
1 / 3 6B d e
Misc tJnits
Armd
R9t
P e r so n ne l
Pistol, Cal .45
( G a ] i 15 . 5 6
Krrre
]FN
l , l a c h i n eG u n , l t , C a l
r v i a c h i nG
e u n , h v y ,C a l
l'lortar, 81mm
Yortar, 4.2", 107nrn
t4ortan, 120mm
\4ortar, 160mm
A P CM - 1 1 3
H a lf t r a c k 1 4 3
B az o ok a/ L A W
R E C G8, 4 m m
RRSP,106nrn
AA,lt,20mm
AA, lt, 40mm
S A MH a w k
H o w ,S P , 1 0 S m m
H o w ,S P , 1 5 5 m m
G u n ,S P , 1 5 5 m m
G u n ,S P , 1 7 5 m m
H o w ,S P , 8 "
Tanks
T a n k s , | \ 4 4 8( 9 0 m m )
T a n k s , | \ 4 4 8( 1 0 5 n r m )
T a n k s, C e n t u r jo n
Tanks, 1,460
Tanks, T54l55 (105mm)
Tanks,M4 (105mm)
A P C ,M l 1 3
H a lf t r a c k s
Trucks
SP t'lts
E S T I M A T EID
NU
T M M A R I E1S9, 7 3
S R A E L IA R M A M E S
4, 0 0 0
400
3, 6 0 0
1.20
80
3, 5 0 0
350
6 4, 0 0 0
6,400
5 7, 6 0 0
lo
206
100
l5
4
30
L2
6
3
10
50
'zio
3
3
4
300
300
100
350
20
224
'sq
5
Inf
D iv s
Armd I
Divsl
5 0, 0 0 0 2 0, 0 0 0
5, 0 0 0 2, 0 0 0
45,000
540
1,800
32.0
1, 2 0 0
250
60
40
s00
200
100
50
qs
150
BO
40
)q
45
1B
45
18
60
24
24
60
I
60
t2
270
l'leczd I
Divsl
Inf
Bdes
36,000 4 8, 0 0 0
3, 6 0 0 4 , 8 0 0
3 2 , 4 0 0 4 3, 2 0 0
1,080 1,440
720
960
150
192
48
360
144
12
36
Jb
300
120
60
30
90
4B
24
27
27
36
36
JO
I
Armd
Bdes
T o t a ls
2 8 , 0 0 0 2 4 6, 0 0 0
2 , 8 0 0 2 4, 6 0 0
25,200 221,400
680
7,340
olo
.
'ie
32
4,840
592
350
1, 3 4 8
543
232
116
2(a
' ;-
'iq
JO
36
4B
4B
''riq
24
5a
J'
ro(
125
298
450
450
300
550
124
872
'rso
'io
, a
-Jb
20/10
100
800
80
so
T2
10
80
30
110
720
120
60
10
80
30
I'
7T
46
36
4
6
800
60
44
:'
'250
' r o o 60
520
'zis 140
'ie
'rso
tf,
10
lf,
zoo
20
10
l8
2, 0 0 0
100
200
4,000
300
220
r,zoo
100
68
36
30
240
90
330
360
360
18
72
18
2,400
180
LJ'
48
'tio
'
t44
'iz
12
' 7 2
3, 0 0 0
240
168
80
640
?40
:.
vb
48
r,ooo
160
80
36
20/10
920
800
80
r44
170
1, 6 2 0
470
820
550
720
45
44
45
14,200
1,080
868
Figure 24.
Inf Div
Personnel
Pistol, Markarov
Rifle, AK-47
M G ,I t , 7 . 6 2
M g ,h v y , 1 2 . 7
Mortar, S2mm
Mortar, l20mm
RPG-7,82rnm
Sagger
SPG-9,73mm
GATM-55, 100mm
AAMGZPU-4
AAMG
ZU-23
AAMG
ZSU.23-4
AAMG
5-60, 57mm
M R L ,1 2 2 m m
How, 122mm
Gun How, 152nrn
Gun, lBOrm
Frog
GraiI SA-7
Armd
Div
1 0, 0 0 0 l 0 , 0 0 0
1 , 0 0 0 1, 0 0 0
9 ,000 9, 0 0 0
300
200
200
160
50
t2
100
30
50
20
60
24
24
t2
J
9
J
9
L2
I2
t?
t2
12
JO
54
io
sA2/3
sA-6
GAT
SU-1OO
,,,
Tank,lt, PT76
T a n k , m e d ,T 5 4 l 5 5
T a n k , m e d ,T 6 2
T a n k ,h v y , J S 1 1 1 / 1 1 0
T a n k , m e d ,T - 3 4
APCBTR6O
APCBRDM1
APCBRDMz
APCBMP
Trucks
Motorcycles
SP Mounts
20
50
30
l q
20
800
50
44
Armd
Bde
Inf
Bde
4
36
000
400
600
90
60
500
?6n
150
80
50
lo
30
1?
20
l0
b
4
4
L2
t2
L2
t2
30
180
90
?0
10
ARMAMENT
SUMMARIES,
1973*
ESTIMATED
SYRIAN
10
60
30
10
10
E
10
5
20
600
40
34
5
ZJU
20
14
5
200
?0
10
1/10Div
Army Spt
Units
1
Meczd
Div
Inf
D iv s
2 5 , 0 0 0 1 3 , 0 0 02 0 , 0 0 0
2 ,500
I ,300 2 , 0 0 0
2 2 , 5 0 0 11, 7 0 0 1 B , 0 0 0
100
300
600
200
200
400
50
100
50
24
12
J5U
200
120
EN
100
30
60
120
?4
48
150
9
18
150
9
-td
40
tz
24
l.+
150
L2
10
1Z
24
54
50
110
24
12
24
t2
L2
100
72
300
:u
60
t2
tq
10
60
20
30
40
200
150
100
100
100
60 1
10
50
30
45
20
40
500
800 I , 6 0 0 I
20
100 I
50
100
44
8B
Armd
D iv s
1 1 1 1 0
S e pI n f l S e pA r m d
BdesI Bdes Totals
20,000 4 4 , 0 0 0| 3 5 , 0 0 0i s 7 , 0 0 0
2,000 4 , 4 0 0| 3 , 5 0 0 1 5 , 7 0 0
1 8 , 0 0 0 3 9 , 6 0 0| 3 1 , 5 0 0, 1 4 1 , 3 o o
400
990|
800 3,190
JLV
660 I
s00 2,280
1 7 6I
326
^^ |
rto
eo
. - l
24
24
3 3 0|
132 |
220 |
I
33 |
33 I
44 i
44 i
iz
t32
72
I
i
132 i
i
40
4B
24
i8
l6
oo
20j
10
40'
1 , 2 0 0,
80 1
68l
120
44
I
I
i
110
1 1 0r
55 ;
44 i
55
? , 7 5 0|
?201
154r
538
60
. .
1 2
l
z
r20
532
..
300
60
B0
100
170
5Bo 1,ooo
250
450
. .
3 0
70
220
100
700
50
385
40
184
50
250
2,000 B,Bso
2001 670
100'
554
* P l u s 1 M o r r o c a ni n f a n t r y b r i g a d e , I J o r d a n i a na r m o r e db r i q a d e , a n d 1 I r a q i a r m o r e dd i v i s i o n .
Figure 25.
n te s i g n a t i o n
Eng No D a t e I E n g a g e m eD
1a
73- 2
6
6
/J-
73- 4
t5-
73- 6
/J-
ti
73- 9
| S u e zC a n a lA s s a u l t ( N )
| S u e zC a n a lA s s a u l t ( S )
| SecondArmyBuildup
| T h i r d A r m yB u i l d u p
8 | Kantara-Firdan
1 4 I E g y p tO f f e n s i v e ( N )
1 4 | E g y p t0 f f e n s i v e ( S N )
l 5 l 1 6 I D e v e r s o i r ( C h i n e s eF a r m
1 6 / 1 7| C h i n e s eF a r m( I I )
SINAI FR0NTENGAGEMENTS,
OCT0BER
1973
Egyptian Forces
SecondArmy
Third Arrny
SecondArmy
I s r a e li F o r c e s
E l e m e n t s1 a r m d& 1 i n f b d e
ElementsI armd & I Inf bde
Third Army
M e n d l e rD i v ( - ) & e l m s A d a n& S h a r o n
M e n d l e rD i v ( - )
SecondArmy
A d a n& S h a r o nD i v s ( - )
SecondArmy
S a s s o o nA
, d a n& S h a r o nD i v s
(
+
Magen )
Third Army
1 / 7 7 6 D i v , 1 / 2 2 1 .D i v
1/2 16 Div. 1/2 ?1 Div(+)
Sharon
Adan( +)
7 3 -1 0
1 8 | D e v e r s o i rW e s t
73-11 l9-21 | Jebel Geneifa
73-t2 l9-22 | Ismailia
73-13
SecondArmy elms
Third Army elms
Adan(+)
SecondArmy elms
Sharon
Magen
73-14
Adan
Adan
Adan(-)
22 | ShallufaI
73-15
/J-IO
2 4 | S h a l l u f aI I
19
1,160
382
sSB
246
258
258
184
294
+o
360
180
'ioi
100
60
80
..
30
30
40
40
F i 9 U T C2 6 . E S T I M A TA
ELDL O C A T IO
OFNB A T T LC
E A S U A L T I ESSI N
, A IF R O N TO, C T O B 6E-R2 4 , T 9 7 3 ,I N C L U S I V E
Da
E n g a g e m e n t s
0ct
6
Egvpt
Israel
Eqypt
(1) 3oo / 1 \
I sr a e l
200 ( 2 \ t 3
a a u ( 4 ) 300
1rE (?\
(3)
B
9
I srael
E qv p t
500
I
600
|
r , 0 0 0j
I
10
11
|
/
L2
13
16
T7
18
19
20
2L
22
23
24
200
|
700
|
100 2,200 1,000
|
500 2 , 7 O O
|
:oo 3 , 0 0 0
|
:oo 3 , 3 0 0
I
300 3 , 6 0 0
?7q
e00
|
70e
I
708
I
708 |
400
100
1,200
200
200
2,400
2,600
100
2,700
r00 2,8oo
|
400I 150 3 , 5 0 0
I rso
3 0 0 .1 .
400 100
|
400 100
|
300 1oo
I
200 11, 7 0 0
let 12,600
rez 1 3, 5 0 0
2oo
I
200
2,900
I roo
100 3 , 0 0 0
eoo 2oo 1 0 , 6 0 0
|
( 1 2 )1 0 0 1 1 ) ? ? 4 ( 1 1 ) 1 o o
l 1t\
?7q
( 1 2 )1 0 0 1 1 ) 3 3 3 ( t t ) t o o
( 1 2 ) . 3 7 5 ( 1 2 )l o o 1 1 ) ? ? ? ( 1 1 ) 1 0 0
( 1 3 ) 2 o o( 1 3 ) 5 0
(tzl 37s ( 1 2 )t o o r q i r , s o (o1 4 )1 5 0
(15) 400 r 1 5 l l q n 16) 5oo (16) 50
(l5) 400 ( 1 5 )1 5 0 16) 500 (16) 50
( 12\
500
1, 1 0 0
3,800
1 0 0 7,500
200 7 , 7 0 0
8,400
200 g , 5 0 0
3,600
|
|
700
|
e00
|
uuiltuu a rl y
'|
E n q I M is c ati ve
200
( 6 ) 1 , 6 0 0 ( 6 ) 1 5 0 ( 7 ) 2 , 0 0 0 ( 7 ) 250
l4
l5
I s r a e li
Egyptian
u a rl y
uumu'I
Enq I Misc
ati ve
200 100
|
200 100
|
200| 100
501
192 1 4 , 4 0 0
14,600
3,600
3,900
4,400
4,900
5, 3 0 0
5,600
5, 9 0 0
6, 2 0 0
6,250
zso
roo 6 , 6 0 0
I
200 50 6 , 8 5 0
- ^ - - l
/ 1 5 L7,200
I
9 0 0 2 , 3 0 0 2 0, 4 0 0
e o o 2 , 3 0 02 3 , 6 0 0
I,6/5 |
|
200
|
s0
7, 1 0 0
F i q u T e2 7 . E S T I M A TA
ELDL O C A T IO
OFNT A N KL O S S E S
S,I N A IF R O N TO, C T O B 6E.R
24,1973, INcLUsIVE
E n q a g e m e n t s
0ct
7
9
10
11
72
13
l4
15
16
17
18
19
20
2l
22
IJ
24
Eqyot
D a il y
E q y D t I s r a e l Loss
5 0 i ( 2 ) 3 0 ( 2 ) 50
40
40j (4) 10 ( 4 ) 50
20
Israel
( 1 )r o
l(r)
(3)
1 0l ( 3 )
(5) ro (s)
i
25i
10I
10
25
10r
251 t o i
,UI tnl
251
(6)
25
(e) eo (e) : : l
|
( e )r 5 0 ( e ) l' o: ll
I
( 1 0 )7 0 ( 1 0 )1 5
|
1
( 1 2 )3 0| ( 1 2 )1 5 ( 1 1 ) 3 0 / 1 1 \ t u l
|
( r 2 ) 3 0 ( 1 2 ) 8 ( 1 1 ) 3 0 r ' 1 1) B l
|
|
( 1 2 )3 0 ( 1 2 ) 8 | ( 1 1 ) 3 0 ( t t 1 8 l
I
( r : 12 e
I IJ /
tol
l \ r v l
40
5B
f,
D a il y
Loss L o ss
100
90
Cum
L o ss
100
190
D a i l y Net
Return Loss
l0
100
180
ao3
LY
tJb
10
275
r02
10
285
26
28
220
202
64
B4
25
145
11
116
10
295
a6
184
25
170
133
t74
190
450
10
143
392
305
315
20
20
260
10
10
40
355
t2
5
172
207
10
50
460
510
LO
376
426
10
30
365
395
B
8
209
90
600
24
492
l6
411
l0
t5l
150
750
34
608
IO
427
11
?42
70
60
60
60
20
60
820
BBO
940
38
40
25
25
640
660
695
730
728
77r
814
442
472
4BB
11
11
9
10
B
246
268
273
280
280
292
307
( 1 2 )3 0 ( 1 2 )1 0 ( 1 4 ) 3 0 ( 1 4 ) t o l
|
|
( 1 5 )2 s ( 1 5 )1 2 l r 1 6 \ ? E ( 1 6) T ' I 6 0
|
( l s ) 2 5I ( l s ) r z | ( r o )s s ( 1 6 ) t 2 l 6 0
^ L
40
60
70
v5
Daily
Return
1.20
aa
2
- -0 ll
101
( 6 ) 1 1 0 ( 6 ) .- ,-.l r' ^- l' -, .-n"
|
1 01
( 8 ) 5 0 ( 8 ) 191
I
Cum
L o ss
Israel
LUm
Net
v v
2A
1, 0 0 0
r,020
1, 0 8 0
I ,140
I ,200
11
ta
17
t7
17
857
800
15
30
IO
16
10
20
504
514
24
558
582
24
B
5t
a3L
323
29r
FiguTe 28.
Date
ESTIMATED
AIR SUPPORT
FIGHTER-BOMBER
SORTIES
CLOSE
SUEZ.SINAIFRONT,OCTOBER
6-24, T973
A v a il a b l e T h i s
Front for CAS
Eqypt
6
7
8
o
10
11
t2
13
I4
l5
16
L7
1B
l9
20
2t
22
a5
24
208
20r
200
195
191
187
180
179
tto
175
167
160
I f,Y
148
l3l
L?3
113
IIz
115
E n g a g e m e n t s
I srael
EqvDt
141
135
t32
66**
65**
62**
60**
60**
289
116**
229
305
305
240
302
239
248
309
309
I srael
EqvDt
ISrae I
sra
Lovot
( 5 ) 1 o o ( s ) 6 6I
(6)
44 ( 6 ) 7 2 ( 7 )
l7\
( e ) 1 6 7 (s) 22s . :
( e ) l 6 0 ( e ) 3 0 5 r. .
( 1 0 ) 1 5 e( 10)30s
( 1 2 ) 7 4 ( 1 2 ) r 2 o( 1 1 )7 4
(12)l1s(12\1q1 1rrl11c
( 1 2 )6 1 / 1 2 ) 1 1 0 l / 1 1 \ A 1
( 1 2 ) 3 8 ( 1 2 )8 3 ( 1 3 ) 3 7
( 1 5 ) s 6 ( 1 5 ) 1 5 4( 1 6 ) s 6
( 1 s ) 5 7 ( l s ) 1 5 4 (' 1 6 ) s 7
\ - ^ /
v r
72
(ll)120
/rr\1R1
1111110
r 1 ? \e 2
( t +1
( 1 4 )8 2
(l 6 )1 5 4
(16)154
*0ctober 6-13, inclusive, one-third Israe'li air effort allocated to this front,
two-thirds to Golan; thereafter two-thirds to this front, one-third to Golan.
* * 0 n d a t e s w h e r e n o e n g a g e m e n tasr e s h o w no n t h i s f r o n t , h a l f a v a i l a b l e I s r a e l i
C A Ss o r t i e s a r e a l l o c a t e d t o o t h e r f r o n t . a n d v i c e v e r s a .
Figure 29.
GOLAN
FRONT
ENGAGEMENTS,
0CTOBER
1973
Arab Forces
Israel i Forces
ucf,
73-21
73-22
73-23
73-24
73-25
6/7
6/7
7-9
7/8
8
I5-tO
B/g
73-27 t0-12
1?
73-28
73-29 l 5
Ahmadiye
R a f id
7 I n f D i v ( + ), 1 / 2 9 I n f D i v
5 M e c z dD i v ( + ) , 1 / 2 9 I n f D i v
7 A r m dB d e , 1 / 2 G o l a n iB d e
Hushniya
1 B BA r m dB d e , 1 / 2 G o l a n i B d e
7 I n f D i v ( + ), t / Z 9 I n f D i v , 3 d T a n k D i v 7 A r m dB d e ( - ) , l / 3 c o l a n i B d e
5 M e c z dD i v , 1 , / 2 9 I n f D i v , 1 s t T a n k D i v L a n e r & P e l e d D i v s ( - )
M o r o c c a nB d e ( + )
G o l a n iB d e ( - )
5 M e c z d ,L / 2 9 l n f , l s t T a n k
Laner & Peled
Mt. Hermonit
Nafekh
Mt HermonI
S a a s s a0 f f e n s i v e
l,3,5,7,9
Tel el Hara
Kfar Sharms
I r a q i 3 d T a n kD i v ( + )
Laner
Naba
J o r d a n i a n4 0 B d e ( + )
L a n e r( - )
Divs(+)
Eytan& Laner
Laner
/J-JU
16
7 3 - 3I
73-32
7 3 -3 3
19
A r a b C o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e I r a q i 3 d , J o r d a n i a n4 0 ( + )
Peled
at
Mt HermonII
M o r r o c a nB d e ( + )
Golani Bde
lt
M t H e r m o nI I I
M o r r o c a nB d e ( + )
Golani Bde(+)
21
-22,7973' INCLUSIVE
F i s u r e 3 0 . E S T I M A TAELDL Q C A T I00FNB A T T LCEA S U A L T I E
F R 0 N T0,C T 0 B E6R
GS0,L A N
Date
I s r a e li
E n g a q e m e n t s
7
8
Y
10
11
12
13
i4
15
16
t7
18
19
20
21.
22
'|
at ive
Arab
0ct
6
(2t)2oo ( 2 1 ) 1 0 0(2?)4oo( 2 2 ) 3 o o
(22)400 ( 2 2 ) 3 0 0
( 2 1 ) 2 0 0( 2 1 ) 1 o o( 2 4 ) 3 o o( 2 4 ) 2 0 0
( 2 3 ) e o o( 2 3 ) 3 s o
( 2 4 ) 3 0 0(24)200 I r F \ 1 n n
( z : ) g o o t z i t i s o( 2 6 ) s o o( 2 6 ) 2 0 0
( 2 6 ) 5 o o( ? 6 ) 2 0 0
(27) 600 (27)3oo
( 2 7 ) 5 o o(27)2oo
( 2 7 ) 5 o o( 2 7 ) 1 o o
( 2 8 ) 6 0 0( 2 8 ) i 5 0
/2q\1nn
600
400
500
900
400
1, 4 0 0
500
600
500
500
600
( 2 e ) 6 0 0( 2 e ) 1 0 0
( 3 0 ) 4 0 0( 3 0 ) 1 o o
ooo
rslt6oo
ooo
400
( 3 2 ) 2 0 0t r z l i s o
( 3 3 ) 2 0 0( 3 3 ) 2 0 0
200
200
uive
Mi
400
: : I r,ooo 300
: :
,:400
2oo | 3,000
I 4,4oo
2oo I s,100
tnn
E Ann
200 | 6,500
200 | 7,200
300
350
300
550
200
300
200
100
400
700
1,000
: :
1 ?Rn
100
1,750
2,300
2,600
3,000
3, 3 0 0
100
100
100
100
100
50
50
50
100
3,500
3, 7 0 0
3,800
4,000
4,150
4,200
4,?50
4,550
50
50
50
4,600
4,800
5,050
100
2oo I B,0oo 1 5 0 1 0 0
200
200
200
200
200
200
|
I
|
I
|
|
200 |
150 |
100 |
8,200
9,000 1 0 0
9,600 100
9,800
10,000
10,800 ,oo
11,000
11,350 150
1 1 , 6 5 0 200
F i q u r e3 1 . E S T I T ' I A T
G,O L AFNR 0 N T , 0 C T 0 B6E- 2R2 , 1 9 7 3
AE
LL
D0 C A T I0 F
NT A N K
LOSSES
0ct
6
7
.J
Arab
I sr a e l
(21) 75 ( 2 1 ) B
(21) 75 ( 2 1 ) o
( 2 3 ) 1 o s( 2 3 ) 25
( z i l i o s( 2 3 )25
9
10
11
t2
13
L4
15
IO
l7
1B
l9
20
2l
22
Arab
E n g a q e m e n t
Date
()7\
( 2 4 ) 3 8 (241' 8
(26) 75 (26) l 5
( 2 6 ) 1 o o( 2 6 ) 1 4
qn
(27) 7
(27) 40 (?7\ 7
( ? 7 ) 4 0 ( 2 7) 7
(28)roo (28) 7
25
(2e) 60 ( 2A\ 7
" : ' . u u ,r:, 1 0
( 3 1 ) 1 0 0( 3 1 ) t 1
(7)\
Arab
Israel
( ? ? \ 50 ( 2 ? \ 35
J5
50
( 2 4 ) 3B ( 2 4 ) I
rs2l0
( 3 3 ) o | ??'l 0
n
t2
l2
L2
?0
1B
20
30
2o
18
3
3
4
4
Arab
()r,\
D a il y Cum D a i l y
I s r a e l L o s s Loss Return
t25
L2s
50
t75
B
288
t?
113
393
20
105
()q\ n
5d
431
25
6 1 1 30
180
711 31
100
37
50
761
801
30
40
29
40
841
a6
941
100
37
978
23
7? 1,050 16
19
7 B 1, 1 2 8
20 1 , 1 4 8 20
1B I , 1 6 6 20
15
r20 1 , 2 8 6
30 I , 3 1 6 2 I
19
2 0 1, 3 3 6
16
I
.
3
5
4
1B
34
22
I srael
LUm
Net
D a i l y Cum
I ncc
ln<c
167
ao6
J3J
366
516
585
598
608
619
693
700
749
802
802
820
925
934
935
937
903
43
35
16
25
8
40
14
7
7
7
7
3
7
1n
1t
4
4
I ncs
43
7B
94
119
t27
t67
181
188
195
202
209
212
219
229
232
235
?46
?50
254
258
Daily
Return
q
B
9
t?
t2
13
10
11
7
9
?
3
3
Net
73
tJI
97
93
721
r22
119
11s
115
113
113
L17
124
124
724
r32
IJJ
134
lJ5
LIJ
FiguTe32. ESTIMATEIJ
CLOSE
AIR SUPPORT
FIGHTER
SORTIES
BOMBER
GoLAN
FRoNT,oCToBER
6-22, L973
Date
A v a il a b l e T h i s
Front for CAS
Arab
6
1
B
9
10
l1
12
l3
14
l5
16
17
18
19
20
2l
22
E n g a g e m e n t s
Arab
ISrae I
143
139
132
tzB
t28
tL7
113
103
100
97
140
87
Rq
87
88
85
79
I srael
lsrael
Arab
(21\ 71
( 2 1 ) 1 4 0( ? ? \ 7 1
( 2 1 )6 e ( 2 1 ) 1 3 4(24) 6s
( 2 3 )6 6 (23)r32 (24) 66
( 2 3 )6 4 (23)174 ( 2 5 )6 4
(27)r28 (27)32s
(27)rr7 ( 2 7 ) 3 1 0
(27)rL3 ( 2 7 ) 3 o o
2Bl
269
264
349
3?5
310
300
299
5B**
232
lls
61**
61**
120
61**
119
t24
srae
I Arab
(22)140
(24)r34
(24)r32
(26)17
4
( 2 8 ) 1 0 3(28)zee
( 2q\
9 7 (2e)232
( 3 0 ) l40
":'l'u
, a rt ' 87 ( 3 1 ) 1 2 0
(v\
/l?\
85 r s z l i r s
7 9 ( 3 3 )1 2 4
F i g u r e3 3 . P R E L I M I N A1R
Y3A R A B - I S R A W
97
E LAI R
ANALYSTS
Engagement
N./N1
Fi repower
7.68
7.92
q.ZZ
3.90
Z.48
1.98
Z.l9
1.20
t.zs
O.gS
t. og
1.40
4.07
4.76
2.33
2.42
1.79
1.41
t.64
0 .9 3
0 .9 4
0.92
0.85
1.09
1.01
1.29
0 .9 4
0.99
?,OB
0.71
l,.tu
I g.c0
I S.qO
I t. te
t.74
3.03
1.01
0 .3 0
0.68
0.72
t.75
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
I2.
C a n aC
l r o s s i n gN
, |
CanaC
l r o s s i n gS, |
E g y p tB u i l d u p ,N
I
E g y p tB u i l d u p ,S
|
A d a nC o u n t e r a t t a c kI
E g y p tO f f e n s i v e ,N |
E g y p t0 f f e n s . i v e S
, I
0 p G a z e l l e( C a n a l )|
ChinesF
earm
I
D e v e r s o i r ,W e s t
I
G e n ef ai
I
I s m alii a
|
21.
22.
23.
24.
Ahmadiye
Rafid
Mt. Hermonit
Nafekh
1q
Surpri se
P/P
?.57
2.40
n a ?
1.31
0.86
1.49
l. 14
1.45
23
P/P
2.60
3 .1 0
0 .9 4
0.99
2.08
0.71
0 .' 9l ? 3
I
I .49
1.14
1.45
1.80
2.17
Effect
P/P
Arab
cEv
Israel i
CEV
- 0 .4 0
2.27
2.45
I .54
1.58
2.LL
0.35
0 .3 8
0. 4 6
0. 4 3
0 .6 0
0.39
0.93
0 .8 5
0.79
1. 5 4
1.59
1.01
0. 4 9
0.41
0. 4 5
0 .3 0
0 .4 0
0 .3 9
0 .5 4
1.18
1.27
0.61
0 .6 3
0.99
2.04
2.44
2.22
3.09
2.50
2.9?
1. 5 6
-o.5v
0.44
7. 5 7
-4.46
- 6 .t 4
a.ar
0.81
0 .5 9
1.36
3 .8 5
1.23
I .70
0.73
0.26
(s&D)R
0.54
I .48
0.72
r./5
- R
6.03
7. 2 7
2.68
2.92
5 .5 4
-9.34
-6.45
-J.64
- 6 .5 0
-3.35
- t . 1 3
R?
0.45
Figure 34.
1 9 7 3 A R A B - I S R A E lL, lI A RA N A L Y S I S - R E F I N E D
Arab
Engagement
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
B.
9.
10.
11 .
12.
C a n a lC r o s sni g , N |
C a n a lC r o s s n
i g, S |
E g y p tB u i l d u p , N
|
E g y p tB u i 1 d u o .S
|
AdanCounterattack |
E g y p t0 f f e n s i v e , N |
E q y o t0 f f e n s i v e , S |
0 p G a z e l l e( C a n a l )|
C h i n e s eF a r m
I
Deversoir,West
|
G e n efia
I
I s m a li i a
|
zL. Ahmadiye
22. Rafid
23. Mt. Hermonit
7-4. Nafekh
Na/Ni
7.68
7. 9 2
4.22
3.90
2.48
1.98
2.I9
1.20
l.?5
0.95
1. 0 9
1.40
I ,. ru
|
I
I
3.46
5.40
t.ta
Fi re- S e t - Pe
i ce
power F a c t o r
P/P
4.07
4.76
3
3
4.55
2. 4 2
1.79
1.41
\.64
3
:
Surp r is e
1.31
1 .6 8
D is r u p - P / P
(s&D)
tion
J. +J
3.20
2.61
2.47
r. aa
r.29
2.33
0. 7 1
0.93
n o?
0.94
0.92
0.86
1.09
1.49
1 .1 4
1. 4 5
i:'
o .i o
?1
0.80
0.90
1. JJ
1 .1 9
1.74
9
J
J. UJ
1.01
0.57
1.29
0.72
1.75
2.40
2.90
: :
1.15
4.49
5.38
3 .1 8
3 .1 9
4.22
0 .7 1
0.93
0.92
1. 0 6
1. 3 4
1 .1 4
1.45
1. 3 7
3 . 74
t.17
2.0t
R - R
O.UJ
7. 2 7
2.68
2.92
5.54
-v.J+
-8.23
- 5 .B 2
- 6 .5 0
-3.35
-7.75
-0.40
Effect
P/P
?.2r
2.45
- t. 3 +
1.58
2.11
0.35
0.38
0.46
0.43
0.60
0 .3 9
0.93
0 .4 4
-O.JL
7. 5 7
-+. JU
- 5 .1 4
L . 1 l
0 .5 3
0.49
CEVs
A r a b I I s r a e li
Average
0.4e |
0.45 |
0.4e |
0.s0 |
0.50|
o.4e I
2.03 |
2,20 I
2.06 |
2.02 i
2 . 0 0|
z.o+ |
o : 5 0|
z . o oI
o . z 4|
q.v I
n 4 1
? L L
0.40 |
2.47 |
0.45 |
2.23 I
0.34 I
2.92 |
0 . 6 4 t 1 . 5 6 t 2 . L 6
t half average: 2.06
h a 1f a v e r a g e : 2 . 2 7
0 . 3 2I
3.i1 |
0.67 |
1.4eI
0.45|
2.21I
t half average:
2 half average:
z.7s
2.30
3.19
F i g u r e 3 5 . C 0 M P A R A TCI V
AE
M P A IA
GN
NA L Y S E1S9,6 7 ,1 9 7 3
Nu/Ni
1 9 6 7- S i n a i
1967- WestBank
1 9 6 7- G o l a n
1 9 7 3- S i n a i
1 9 7 3- G o l a n
1.82
0.95
1. 4 8
2.37
2.86
Firepower*
Calc
P/P
1.37
0 .6 5
2.28
1 .1 4
2 .1 0
1.41
1. 9 3
1 ? ?
3 .0 3
2.23
Arab
Revised
S e t - P ei c e C a lc
S ur P/P
pri se** ( s & D ) R - R
F act o r
P/P
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1
4.40
t.25
L . J T
1 .5 5
?.t2
0 .3 9
0.64
0 .8 3 * * *
I .04
1.04
0.96
0 .B 0
1.92
1.61
?.20
-t2.t4
- 7. 3 1
- 1 1. 4 6
-3.08
-4.65
* I n c l u d e s a c t u a l d a i ' l y a i r e f f o r t s o f o p p o s i n gs i d e s , n o t a i r s t r e n g t h s p r i o r
to war.
* * A s s u m e sf u l l e f f e c t f o r f i r s t t h r e e d a y s ; t h e r e a f t e r p r o r a t e d .
***Reflects Israeli surprise night attacks, June9-10.
Z4
Effect I
CEVs
P / P I A r a b t I s r a e li
0.2e
1 0 . 3 0I
0 . 4 1 1 0 . 3
0 . 3 0 0 .1 4
I
I
0.62
l0.3Bl
0 .s 2 | 0 .2 3 |
3.31
8 1 2 . 1 0
6.40
2.60
4.23
OVERALL
COMPARATIVE
EVALUATION
0 f a l l o f t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s , t h e m o s ts i g n i f i c a n t a r e
t h e r e l a t i v e I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a nC E V sf o r 1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 7 3 . I n b o t h i n s t a n c e st h e
opponentw
s e re re p re se n ta ti veo f the best militar y for ce the r espectivenat i ons
c o u l d a t t h a t t i m e p u t i n t h e f i e l d , w i t h e x p e r i e n c eodf f i c e r c o r p s , a n d w i t h w e a p o n so f c o m p a r a b lqeu a l i t y a n d s o p h i s t i c a t ' i o n . I n t h e 1 9 6 7W a rt h e E g y p t i a n s
s u f f e r e dt h e d i s r u p t i o n r e s u l t i n g f r o m m o d e r a t e
o r s u b s t a n t i a ls u r p r i i L ; i n t h e
1 9 7 3W a rt h e I s r a e l i s s u f f e r e dd i s r u p t i o n f r o m p r a c t i c a l l y c o m p l e t es u r p r i s e .
A f t e r a l l o w i n g f o r t h e s u r p r i s e d i s r u p t i o n b y i d e n t i c a ' lp r o c e d u r e isn b o t h
c a s e s ,a n d c o n s i s t e n t l ya p p l y i n gt h e o t h e r v a r i a b l e so f c o m b atto t h e f o r c e s c o m mi t t e d i n a n u mb eor f b a ttl e s, the aver ageIsr aelj CEVwith r espect to the E' gy
F bpttians was1.96 (a'lthough
a p p a r e n t l yi n c r e a s i n qa s t i m e w e n t o n ; s e e b e l o w ) .
l o w i n g t h e ' i d e n t i c a l p r o c e d u r ef o r t h e 1 9 7 3W i r t h e a v e r a g eI s r a e l i C E Vw i t h
r e s p e c tt o t h e E g y p t i a n sf o r t h e w a r w a s 2 . 1 6 , a l t h o u g hi t w a sa p p a r e n t l yo n l y
2 . 0 6 a f t e r f o u r d a y so f c o m b a t . W h i c h e v evra l u e w e u a e ( 2 . t 6 f o r t h e w a i a s i
w h o l e , o r 2 . 0 6 f o r a c o m p a r a b 'pl ee r i o d o f f o u r d a y so f c o m b a t )t h e c o n c l u s ' i o ins
t h e s a m e . I n t h e o n e i n s t a n c et h e n u m b e r su g g e s t h a t t h e I s r a e l i c o m b aet f f e c t i v e n e s ss u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e E g y p t i a n sh a d i n i r e a s e db y a b o u t l 0 % i n t h e ' i n t e r v e n i n gs i x y e a r s , i n t h e o t h e r c a s et h a t t h e g a p h a d w i d e n e db y s % .
T h e s i g n i f i c a n t t h i n g i s t h a t , a l t h o u g ht h e d i f f e r e n t i a l w a s s t ' i l l c l o s e t o
t h e s a m e - ab o u ttw o -to -o n efa cto r in favor of the Isr aelis- the qap had not nar ro w e dl e t w e e n 1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 2 3 ; i f anythinq it had widened. Th@t r a d i c t o r y t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n arl e a s o n i n g , . w h i chha s s u g g e s t e tdh a t t h e A r a b sd i d
s o m u c hb e t t e r i n 1 9 7 3t h a n i n 1 9 6 7b e c a u s e
t h e y h a d l e a r n e df r o m t h e i r 1 9 6 7l e s s o n s , a n d h a d u t i l i z e d t h e t i m e t o i m p r o v et h e m s e l v e sw, h i l e t h e I s r a e l i s , a r r o g a n t
a n d o v e r c o n fi d e n t,h a d n o t ma d ecom par able
effor ts.
Se r i o u sstu d y o f th e ma tte r , however ,r .evealsnot o n l y t h a t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l
r e a s o n i n gi s w r o n g ,i t a l s o r e v e a l sw h y i t i s w r o n g .
D e m o nstra t'i othn a t th e 1 9 7 3per for m ance
is not an i n d j c a t o r o f i m p r o v e d
Arab
p e r f o r m a n cies a s f o l l o w s :
1 . l n 1 9 6 7 ,t h e I s r a e l i s s t a r t e d w i t h s u r p r i s e ; t h e A r a b sn e v e rr e c o v e r e d ,
in f a c t n e v e r h a d a ch a n ceto re cover :
2 . I n 1 9 7 3t h e A r a b ss t a r t e d w i t h g r e a t e r s u r p r i s e t h a n t h e I s r a e l i s a c h i e v e d
i n 1 9 6 7 . Y e t w i t h i n t h r e e d a y st h e I s r a e l i s h a d r e c o v e r e d a
, n d w e r ef i g h t i n g o n
e q u a l t e r m s w i th th e A ra b s. T h i s i s o n e o f t h e m o s tr e m a r k a b lree c o v e r i e si n m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y.
3 . O n er e a s o nt h e i n i t i a l I s r a e l i f r o n t i e r v i c t o r i e s ' i n 1 9 6 7w e r ef o l l o w e ds o
q u i c k l y b y A r a bc o l l a p s ei s t h a t t h e I s r a e l i s h a d e l i m i n a t e dt h e A r a ba i r a r m , a n d
w e r e a b l e t o u s e t h e i r o w na i r i n u n c h a l l e n g e dm, a s s i v ea t t a c k s t h a t c o m D l e t etdh e
demoralization
o f t h e A r a b g r o u n df o r c e s . T h a n k st o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f S o v j e t a j r
d e f e n s ew e a p o n s ' i ng r e a t n u m b e rbs e t w e e n1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 7 3 ,j n t h e l a t e s t w a r t h e A r a b s
w e r e a b l e t o p r e v e n tt h e I s r a e l i a i r f r o m h a v i n ga c o m p a r a b lfei e l d d a y .
4 . I n 1 9 6 7t h e o v e r a l l A r a b c o m m a n dienr c h i e f , a n d t h e m a nd ' i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e S i n a j f r o n t , w a sa p o l i t i c a l a p p o i n t e ea, d r u n ka n d a d r u gi d d i c t ,
w h o s e e m st o h a ve b e e nu n d e r b o th of the lattelinfluences shor tl.y aftei he l ear ned
o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o no f h i s a i r f o r c e . I n 1 9 7 3t h e E g y o t i a n s( a n d ' i t s o t h e S y r i a n s )
w e r e l.e d b y m e nw h o , i f n o t t h e e q u a l o f t h e i r I s r a e l i o p p o n e n t (sI s m a i t p r i l U a b l y
q q ! b e c o m p a r endo t u n f a v o r a b l yw i t h t h e m ) ,w e r ea t l e a s t c o m p e t e nsto l d i e r s w h o
d i d n o t l o s e t h e i r h e a d se i t h e r i n v i c t o r y o r i n a d v e r s i t y .
B e c a u so
e f t h e a s s u m p t i o ni sn v o l v e d , t h e o v e r a l l c a m p a i gann a l y s e ss h o w n ' i n
F i g u r e 3 5 a r e n o t s o r e l i a b l e a s t h o s e f o r t h e e n g a g e m e n t sH. o w e v e rt,h e y s u g g e s t
25
a n i n t e r e s t i n g q u a n t i t a t i v e c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f t h e q u a l i t a t ' i v e a r g u m e n t sp r e s e n t e d
above.
n e r f o r m a n c ea n a l y s i s s u g g e s t sa n I s r a e l i C E Vw i t h
T h e i 9 6 7 J o r d a n i a nc a r n p a i g p
r e s p e c t t o t h e J o r d a nA r m yo f 2 . 1 , 0 ,w h i c h i s 2 9 %h ' i g h e rt h a n t h e a v e r a g eC E Vf o r
t h e f o u r b a t t l e s a n a l y z e d . S i n c e t h e J o r d a n i a nh i g h c o r n m a nddo e s n o t s e e mt o h a v e
m a d ea n . ys e r i o u s b l u n d e r s d u r i n g t h e c a m p a ' i g ni,t c a n b e h y p o t h e s i z e dt h a t m o s t o f
t h e 2 9 %d i f f e r e n c e i s d u e p r i m a r i l y t o t h e e f f e c t s o f a i r p o w e r o n t h e o v e r a l l o u t come.
T h e 1 9 6 7 E g y p t ' i a nc a m p a i g np e r f o r m a n c ea n a l y s i s p r o v i d e s a n I s r a e l i / E g y p t i a n
C E Vo f 3 . 3 1 , w h i c h i s 6 9 %h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g eC E Vf o r t h e f o u r b a t t ' l e s a n a l y z e d .
I f w e a c c e p t t h e s a m eh y p o t h e s i sf o r t h e d e m o r a l j z i n ga n d c a s u a l t y - p r o d u c i n ge f f e c t
o f t h e v i g o r o u sa p p l i c a t i o n o f u n c h a l l e n g e a
d i r p o w e r , t h i s l e a v e s 4 0 %a t t r i b u t a b l e
t o t h e i n e p t l e a d e r s h i po f F i e l d M a r s h a lA m e r .
T h e 1 9 6 7S y r i a n c a m p a i g np e r f o r m a n c ea n a l y s i s i n d ' i c a t e s a n I s r a e l i C E Vw i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h e S y r i a n A r m yo f 6 . 4 0 , w h i c h i s 5 5 %h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g eI s r a e ' l i
C E Vf o r t h e f o u r b a t t l e s a n a l y z e d . A g a i n h y p o t h e s i z i n gt h a t 2 9 %o f t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l j s d u e t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f I s r a e l i a i r p o w e r , t h ' i s l e a v e s 2 6 %a t t r i b u t a b l e t o
t h e e x t r e m ei n e p t i t u d e o f t h e S y r i a n h j g h c o m m a n dw, h i c h f a i l e d t o e m p l o yi t s
f o r c e s a d e q u a t e l y ,o r t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h o s e u n i t s t h a t w e r e e n g a g e d .
I n t h e S u e z - S i n a i1 9 7 3c a m p a i g a
n n a l y s i s , h o w e v e r ,t h e r e l a t i v e I s r a e l i E g y p t i a n C E Vf o r t h e c a m p a i g ni s 2 0 %h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g ec a l c u l a t e d f o r t h e
b a t t l e s a n a l y z e do n t h a t f r o n t . T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n tw i t h a q u a l i t a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t
t h a t I s r a e l i a i r p o w e rd i d n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e o v e r a l l o u t c o m eo f t h e s e l a n d
c a m p a i g n s a, n d t h a t t h e h i g h - 1 e v e l A r a b l e a d e r s h i p w a s s o m e w h al te s s c o m p e t e n ti n
p e r f o r m a n c et h a n w e r e t h e s u b o r d i n a t eu n i t s . T h e o v e r a l l a n a l y s i s f o r t h e S y r i a n
f r o n t s h o w sa n I s r a e l i - A r a b C E U5 4 %h i g h e r t h a n f o r t h e e n g a g e m e n a
t sn a l . y z e d . T h i s
s u g g e s t st h a t t h e E g y p t i a nh i g h c o m m a nwda s a b o u t 3 4 %m o r e c o m p e t e n t h a n t h a t o f
the Syrians.
A c o m p a n i s o on f t h e I s r a e l i v s . S y r i a n p e r f o r m a n c ei n t h e t w o w a r s m i g h t , a t
f i r s t g l a n c e , a p p e a rt o c o n t r a d i c t t h e a r g u m e n t sp r e s e n t e da b o v e . I n f a c t , h o w e v e r ,
t h e S y r i a n s i t u a t i o n w a s u n i q u e , a n d c a n n o t b e t h e b a s j s f o r a n y c o m p a r i s o on f t h i s
sort.
T h e S y r i a n p e r f o r m a n c ei n 1 9 6 7v l a s o n e o f t h e m o s t a b y s m a li n t h e h i s t o r y o f
c o n v e n t i o n a lw a r f a r e . l , J h i l et h e I s r a e ' l ' i p e r f o r m a n c eo n J u n e 9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 , w a s c o n m e n d a b l e , t h e r e s u l t s a c h i e v e dw o u l d h a v e b e e n i m p o s s i b l ea g a i n s t e v e n a m o d e r a t e l y
c o m p e t e nm
t i l i t a r y p e r f o r m a n c e . I t i s a l m o s t j n c r e d i b l e t o a m i l i t a r y o b s e r v e rt h a t
a n y m i l i t a r y f o r c e c o u l d h a v e s c a l e d t h e e s c a r p m e nf tr o m t h e H u l e hV a l l e y t o t h e
G o l a n P l a t e a u i n a f e w h o u r s a g a i n s t a f o r c e w j t h t h e w e a l t h o f w e a p o n sa n d e q u i p m e n t a v a i ' l a b l et o t h e S y r i a n s . O n em u s t d r a w t h e c o n c l u s i o nt h a t , w i t h a f e w j n d j v i d u a l e x c e p t i o n s , t h e S y r i a n A r m yw a s h a r d l y b e t t e r t h a n a m o bi n u n i f o r m , c o m m a n d e d
b y i n d i v i d u a l s w h o c o u l d n o t c o o p e r a t ew i t h e a c h o t h e r , o r c o o r d i n a t es u b o r d i n a t e s .
T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s e v i d e n t j n t h e h i s t o r y o f S y r i a b e t w e e n1 9 4 9a n d 1 9 6 7 .
T h e r e h a d b e e n n i n e m i ' l i t a r y c o u p sd ' e t a t , a n d a f t e r e a c h c o u p t h e s u c c e s s f u l u p s t a r t
h a d c l e a r e d o u t a l l p o t e n t i a ' l r i v a l s o r e n e m i e si n t h e o f f i c e r c o r p s . T h e r e s u l t w a s
t u r m o i l i n t h e a r m e df o r c e s , w i t h ' i n e v i t a b l e i n c o m p e t e n coef t h e s o r t d e m o n s t r a t ejdn
t h e 1 9 6 7W a r .
D u r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g w i n t e r , h o w e v e r ,t h e r e h a d b e e no n e m o r ec o u p d ' e t a t , l e d
this time by the then Mjnister of War, Air Force General Hafezal Assad. The new
P r e s i d e n t a g a i n s w e p t t h e s e n i o r c o n u n a n d ear sw a y ( t h e e v i d e n c eo f t h e r e c e n t w a r
s u g g e s t st h a t t h i s c o u l d n o t h a v e d o n e s e r j o u s h a r m ) , a n d p u t ' i n h ' i s o w nm e n ,w h o
h a v e r e m a i n e da s t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e c o u n t r y e v e r s j n c e . T h u s a n i m p r o v e m e n t i n S y r i a n p e r f o r m a n c ea
, m a j o r i m p r o v e m e n tw, a s i n e v j t a b l e , n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e
I s r a e l i s , t h e E g y p t i a n s ,o r a n y o n ee l s e h a d a l s o d o n e i n t h e m e a n t i m e . I t w o u l d
s e e ms u r p r i s i n g , i n f a c t , i f t h e i m p r o v e m e n w
t ,i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e I s r a e l i s , h a d n o t
b e e n a t l e a s t f r o m a C E Vo f 0 . 2 4 t o o n e o f 0 . 4 0 . T h e r e i s n o k n o w ni n f o r m a t i o n o r
t e c h n i q u ea v a i l a b l e w h i c h c a n t e l l u s w h e t h e r i t w o u l d h a v e b e e n g r e a t e r i f t h e
I s r a e l i s h a d n o t a l s o i m p r o v e d ,a s i s e v i d e n c e df r o m t h e a n a l y s i s o f o p e r a t ' i o n s
against the Egyptians.
26
The Israelis had not only not fallen behindin the years between1967and 1973
but in fact had continuedto widenthe combateffectivenessgap betweenthemselves
as follows:
a n d t h e E g yp ti a n sfo r ma n yre asons,whichcan be sur nmar ized
at all l ev el s
s e l i e ffor ts to im pr ovem ilitar y per for m ance
a . C o n ti n u o uIsra
p
r
a c t i c e s ,e t c . ;
p
l
a
n
s
a
n
d
m
o
b
i
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
c
h
o
o
'
l
i
n
g
,
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
s
:
a n di n a l l
a mor einten s i v eR &D
b . A su b sta n t'i a 1 lhyi g h er R&Dcapability, and appar ent' ly
effort;
l i l i t a r y a n a l y s i so f h j s t o r i c a l
c . S o u n do, b j e c t i v e , I s r a e l i p r o f e s s i o n am
t o t h e A r a bc u l t u r a l t e n e x p e r i e n caen d c u r i e n t c a p a b i l ' i t i e s ,i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n
, l a n n i n ga n d
d e i r c yt o a l l o w e m o t i o na n dw i s h f u l t h i n k i n g t o i n f l u e n c ee v a l u a t i o n p
o p e r a t i o n alle a d e r s h i p .
F i r s t - h a n do b s e r v a t i o on f M i d d l eE a s ta r m i e ss u g g e stth a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n h a s
n o t c h a n g esdi n c e 1 9 7 3 .
r ecognition,is the fac t
so consistentas to dem and
An i n te re sti n g p h e n o menonn
t h a t i n 1 9 7 3 ,a s i n i g O Z ,a s e r i e s o f A r a bd e f e a t si s j n v a r i a b l yf o l l o w e db y d e c l i n evidentas a r esult of the
i n g c o m b aet ffe cti ve n e ss. T her eis no suchphenom enon
f e w I s r a e l i d e fe a tsi n e a rl y 0ctober 1973,in fact quite the contr ar y. It i s bey ond
t h e s c op eo f th i s stu d y to i n i tiate any attem ptto quant' ifywhat' is almos tc er tai nl y
to the obiecti v esof the
It is quite ger m ane
a m o r a lba n d /o rd i sru p ti o n p h enomenon.
be given cons i der ati on
must
exists, and
s t u d y , h o w e ve r,to n o te th a t the phenom enon
of futur e confl i c t.
in
event
the
i n a n y effo rts to a sse ssA ra bcom bateffectiveness
27
CONCLUS
IONS
1 . C o mb apt e rfo rma n ce
o f the Isr aelis with r espect to the opposingAr a b
a r m i e si n 1 96 7 , a n d th e p e n fo rmance
of the Ar ab ar m ieswith r espect to eachother ,
c a n b e r e p r e se n te db y th e fo l l o w 'ingnumer icalCEVcompar isons:
Israelis
J o r d a nai n s
Egyptians
S y r ia n s
or, in percentages:
4.13
2.53
2.LI
1.00
(1.63)
(r.oo1
(1.e6)
(1.20)
(t'oo1 )1'oo)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
I s r a e l i 6 3 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e J o r d a n i a n s ;
I s r a e l i 9 6 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e E g y p t i a n s ;
Isra e l i 3 1 ,3 %
su p e ri or ity over the Syr ians;
J o r d a n i a n2 0 %s u p e r i o r j t y o v e r t h e E g y p t i a n s ;
J o r d a n i a n1 5 3 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S y r i a n s ;
E g yp tia n l .L 7 %su p e rior ityover the Syr ians.
2 . C o mb apt e rfo rma n ce
o f the Isr aelis with r espect to the opposingAr a b ar m i es
in 1 9 7 3 , a n d th e p e rfo rma n ce
o f the Ar ab ar mieswith r espect to eachother , c an be
re p r e s e n t e db y th e fo l l o w i n g n u m er icalCEVcom par isons:
Israeljs
Z.7S (2.16)
(t.OO1
Egyptians 1.27
Syrians
1.00
0r, in percentages:
a . I s r a e l i 1 1 6 %s u p e r i o r i t yo v e r t h e E g y p t i a n s ;
b . I s r a e l i 7 7 5 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S y r i a n s ;
c . E g y p t i a n2 7 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S y r i a n s .
3 . S p e c i a ' cl i r c u m s t a n c erse l a t i n g t o t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i po f
S y r i a j n 1 9 6 7a n d i n 1 9 7 3d o n o t p e r m i t t h e d r a w i n go f a n y f i r m c o n c l u s i o n sf r o m
t h e c o m p a r a ti veIsra e 'l i vs. S yri an com par isons
in 1967and 1973.
4 . B e tw e e n1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 7 3th e gap in com bateffectivenessbetweenthe Is r ael i
a n d Eg y p t i ana rmi e sw i d e n e d .
5 . S a v ef o r t h e S y r i a n s , t h e r e i s n o r e a s o nt o b e l i e v e t h a t a n y o t h e r A r a b
a r m e df o r c e s i m p r o v e dt h e i r m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s sr e l a t i v e t o t h e I s r a e l i s a n y m o r e
t h a n t h e E g y p t i a n s ;t h e S y r i a n i m p r o v e m e sn t i l l l e a v e st h e mc o n s i d e r a b l yb e h i n dt h e
Egyptians.
6 . T h e re i s n o re a so nto b elieve that the Ar abshave impr ovedtheir r el ati v e
e f f e c t i v e n e s sw i t h r e s p e c tt o t h e I s r a e l i s s j n c e 1 9 4 3 ;r a t h e r i t i s 1 i k e 1 yt h a t t h e
q u a l j t a t i v e g a p h a s w i d e n e df u r t h e r .
?8