QUEZON CITY V DACARA

Petition for review of a decision of the Court of

Appeals

FACTS

On February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M.,

Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., owner of 87 Toyota
Corolla 4-door Sedan, while driving the
said vehicle, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings found at Matahimik
St., Quezon City,
which was then being repaired by the
Quezon City government.
As a result, Dacara, Jr. allegedly sustained
bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered
extensive damage for it turned turtle when
it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the city
government, which however, yielded
negative results.
Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of
his minor son, filed a Complaint for
damages against Quezon City and Engr.
Ramir Tiamzon.
Defendants admitted the occurrence of the
incident but alleged that the subject
diggings was provided with a mound of soil
and barricaded with reflectorized traffic
paint with sticks placed before or after it
which was visible during the incident.
In short, defendants claimed that they
exercised due care by providing the area of
the diggings all necessary measures to
avoid accident, and that the reason why
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings
was precisely because of the latters
negligence and failure to exercise due
care.
RTC ruled in favor of Dacara, ordering the
defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the
sum of twenty thousand pesos as
actual/compensatory damages, P10,000.00
as moral damages, P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees and other costs of suit.
Upon appeal, CA agreed with the RTCs
finding that petitioners negligence was the
proximate cause of the damage suffered by
respondent.

ISSUES
1. WON petitioners negligence is the proximate
cause of the incident2. WON moral damages are
recoverable3. WON exemplary damages and
attorneys fees are recoverable
HELD
1. Yes.
Proximate cause is defined as:

any cause that produces injury in a natural

and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening

cause, such that the result would not have

occurred otherwise.
Proximate cause is determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense,
policy and precedent.

What really caused the subject vehicle to turn

turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass
upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise
of judgment by the lower courts or an ample
showing that they lacked any basis for their
conclusions.

The unanimity of the CA and the trial court

in their factual ascertainment that
petitioners negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident bars us from
supplanting their findings and substituting
these with our own.
That the negligence of petitioners was the
proximate cause of the accident was aptly
discussed in the lower courts finding:
Facts obtaining in this case are crystal
clear that the accident of February 28,
1988 which caused almost the life and limb
of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car
turned turtle was the existence of a pile of
earth from a digging done relative to the
base failure at Matahimik Street nary a
lighting device or a reflectorized barricade
or sign perhaps which could have served
as an adequate warning to motorists
especially during the thick of the night
where darkness is pervasive.
Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses
for the defense that there were signs,
gasera which was buried so that its light
could not be blown off by the wind and
barricade, none was ever presented to
stress the point that sufficient and
adequate precautionary signs were placed.
If indeed signs were placed thereat, how
then could it be explained that according to
the report even of the policeman, none was
found at the scene of the accident.

-The provisions of Article 21899 of the New Civil

Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads
and bridges since it exercises the control and
supervision over the same. Failure of the
defendant to comply with the statutory provision is
tantamount to negligence which renders the City
government liable
-Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr.
was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour
(kph) when he met the accident. This speed was
allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph
allowed on city streets with light traffic, as
provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr.,
having violated a traffic regulation, should be
presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the
Civil Code.
-These matters were, however, not raised by

petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident

from the records that they brought up for the first
time in their Motion for Reconsideration.
-It is too late in the day for them to raise this new
issue.
To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this
stage of the proceedings would trample on the
basic principles of fair play, justice, and due
process.
-Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts
findings, which are amply substantiated by the
evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners
negligence as the proximate cause of the
damages suffered by respondents car.
No adequate reason has been given to overturn
this factual conclusion. Decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed, with the modification that the
award of moral damages is deleted.
9

. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be

liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.

unfortunately retained his seat, and after

the runaway horse had proceeded up the
street to a point in front of the Mission
Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell
from the rig, and in so doing received
injuries from which he soon died.

GABETO V. ARANETA
42 Phil 252. October 17, 1921 Street
Facts:

Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a

carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of
Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on
Calle Ledesma in the same City.
When the driver of the carromata had
turned his horse and started in the direction
indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta,
stepped out into the street, and laying his
hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at
the same time protesting to the driver that
he himself had called this carromata first.
The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to
the effect that he had not heard or seen the
call of Araneta, and that he had taken up
the two passengers then in the carromata
as the first who had offered employment.
At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled
on the reins of the bridle to free the horse
from the control of Agaton Araneta, in order
that the vehicle might pass on.
Owing, however, to the looseness of the
bridle on the horse's head or to the
rottenness of the material of which it was
made, the bit came out of the horse's
mouth;

and it became necessary for the driver to

get out, which he did, in order to fix the
bridle.

The horse was then pulled over to near the

curb, by one or the other it makes no
difference which and Pagnaya tried to fix
the bridle.

While he was thus engaged, the horse,

being free from the control of the bit,
became disturbed and moved forward, in
doing which he pulled one of the wheels of
the carromata up on the sidewalk and
pushed Julio Pagnaya over.

After going a few yards further the side of

the carromata struck a police telephone
box which was fixed to a post on the
sidewalk, upon which the box came down
with a crash and frightened the horse to
such an extent that he set out at full speed
up the street.

Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit.

Basilio Ilano, had alighted while the
carromata was as yet alongside the
sidewalk;

but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had

This action was brought by Consolacion

Gabeto, in her own right as widow of
Proceso Gayetano,

and as guardian ad litem of the three

children, Conchita Gayetano, Rosita
Gayetano, and Fermin Gayetano, for the
purpose of recovering damages incurred by
the plaintiff as a result of the death of the
said Proceso Gayetano, supposedly
caused by the wrongful act of the
defendant Agaton Araneta.

Judge awarded damages to the widow to which

decision Araneta appealed.
Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton
Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote
from the accident that presently ensued to be
considered the legal or proximate cause thereof
Held: NO.

The evidence indicates that the bridle was

old, and the leather of which it was made
was probably so weak as to be easily
broken.

it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby

causing the bit to come out of the horse's
mouth;

and Julio, after alighting, led the horse over

to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle;

and that in so doing the bridle was slipped

entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself
free from control, started to go away.

Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED.

Kavankov and the crew members. When

Gavino inquired what was all the
commotion about, Kavankov assured
Gavino that there was nothing to it.

After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not

take hold, he ordered the engines halfastern.

Abellana, who was then on the pier apron

noticed that the vessel was approaching
the pier fast.

Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor

did not take hold.

Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern"

code.

Before the right anchor and additional

shackles could be dropped, the bow of the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier
causing considerable damage to the pier.

The vessel sustained damage too.

Kavankov filed his sea protest.

Gavino submitted his report to the Chief

Pilot who referred the report to the
Philippine Ports Authority.

Abellana likewise submitted his report of

the incident.

FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA)

Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC
decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable
FACTS

On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR,

flying under the flagship of the USSR,
owned and operated by the Far Eastern
Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the
Port of Manila from Vancouver, British
Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning.
The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the
Manila International Port, as its berthing
space. Captain Roberto Abellana was
tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to
supervise the berthing of the vessel.
Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by
the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association
(MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for
the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No.
4.
Gavino boarded the vessel at the
quarantine anchorage and stationed
himself in the bridge, with the master of the
vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him.

After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of

the particulars of the vessel and its cargo,
the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine
anchorage and proceeded to the Manila
International Port.

The sea was calm and the wind was ideal

for docking maneuvers.

When the vessel reached the landmark

(the big church by the Tondo North Harbor)
one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered
the engine stopped.

When the vessel was already about 2,000

feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the
anchor dropped.

Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of

the vessel on the bow.

The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were

dropped. However, the anchor did not take
hold as expected. The speed of the vessel
did not slacken.

A commotion ensued between the crew

members.

A brief conference ensued between

- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the

Philippine Ports Authority the amount of
P1,126,132.25. PERTINENT RULES on
PILOTAGE- The Port of Manila is within the Manila
Pilotage District which is under compulsory
pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of
Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No.
03-85:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a
harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or
straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and
undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or
another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade
shall be under compulsory pilotage.
- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and
responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have
been specified by the same regulation:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On
compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the
service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage
caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his
negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if
the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities
provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to
prevent or minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even
on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule
the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such
event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property
at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master
shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner

of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against

said Master
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots
shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate
proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of
each particular case.
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots'
Association. The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor
Pilot shall be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel
from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he
leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that
his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master
neglects or refuses to carry out his order.
- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty
years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the
responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the
direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof
until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his
responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects
or refuses to carry out his instructions.

any such happenings.

MASTER- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot
momentarily becomes the master of the vessel.
The master, however may intervene or
countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger
to the vessel because of the incompetence of the
pilot or if the pilot is drunk.
Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never
sensed the any danger even when the anchor
didnt hold and they were approaching the dock
too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot.
This is negligence on his part. He was right beside
the pilot during the docking, so he could see and
hear everything that the pilot was seeing and
hearing.
The masters negligence translates to
unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means
negligence on the part of FESC.CONCURRENT
TORTFEASORS
-

As a general rule, that negligence in order

to render a person liable need not be the
sole cause of an injury.

It is sufficient that his negligence,

concurring with one or more efficient
causes other than plaintiff's, is the
proximate cause of the injury.

Accordingly, where several causes

combine to produce injuries, person is not
relieved from liability because he is
responsible for only one of them,

it being sufficient that the negligence of the

person charged with injury is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not
have resulted to as great an extent, and
that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured.

It is no defense to one of the concurrent

tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without
the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent tortfeasor.

Where several causes producing an injury

are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not
have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of
the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear
that one of them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same.

No actor's negligence ceases to be a

proximate cause merely because it does
not exceed the negligence of other actors.

Each wrongdoer is responsible for the

entire result and is liable as though his acts

xxx xxx xxx

Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor
vessels under their control when requested to do so by the
master of such vessels.

ISSUE
WON both the pilot and the master were negligent
HELD
YES.
The SC started by saying that in a collision
between a stationary object and a moving object,
there is a presumption of fault against the moving
object (based on common sense and logic). It then
went on to determine who between the pilot and
the master was negligent.
PILOT- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly
qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or
out of ports, or in certain waters.
He is an expert whos supposed to know the
seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know
because the pilot is familiar with the port.
He is charged to perform his duties with
extraordinary care because the safety of people
and property on the vessel and on the dock are at
stake.
Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court
found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the
anchor not holding ground and the vessel still
going too fast was too slow.
As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to

were the sole cause of the injury.

-

There is no contribution between joint

tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since
both of them are liable for the total
damage.

Where the concurrent or successive

negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently,
are in combination the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, it
is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury
and either of them is responsible for the
whole injury.

Where their concurring negligence resulted

in injury or damage to a third party,

they become joint tortfeasors and are

solidarily liable for the resulting damage
under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt.

Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable.

SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET

Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals
FACTS

Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance

of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that
the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. hereinafter
referred to as the carrier and its driver Mudales
(none of whom has appealed), had violated the
contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio,
whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were
guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of
them were held solidarity liable.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence

In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven

by Mudales and belonging to LagunaTayabas Bus Company, and the other
driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero
Sabido, going in opposite directions met
each other in a road curve.

Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was

riding on the running board as truck was
full of passengers, was sideswiped by the
truck driven by Lagunda.

As a result, Custodio was injured and died.

2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily

liable with the carrier and its driver
HELD
1. YES.

The views of the Court of Appeals on the

speed of the truck and its location at the
time of the accident are in the nature of
findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in
a petition for review by certiorari, such as
the one at bar.

At any rate, the correctness of said findings

is borne out by the very testimony of
petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw
the passengers riding on the running board
of the bus while the same was still five or
seven meters away from the truck driven
by him.

By simply swerving to the right side of the road,

the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting
Custodio.

Indeed, the distance between the two

vehicles was such that he could have
avoided sideswiping said passengers if his
truck were not running at a great speed.

The sideswiping of the deceased and his two

fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at
about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when
the LTB bus with full load to passengers was
negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding
downward a slope,

Although the negligence of the carrier and

its driver is independent, in its execution, of
the negligence of the truck driver and its
owner, both acts of negligence are the
proximate cause of the death of Agripino
Custodio.

In fact, the negligence of the first two would

not have produced this result without the
negligence of petitioners' herein.

What is more, petitioners' negligence was

the last, in point of time, for Custodio was
on the running board of the carrier's bus
sometime before petitioners' truck came
from the opposite direction, so that, in this
sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear
chance.

To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw

all the blame on Mudales.
However, Makabuhay, widoy of Custodio, testified
that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met
the LTB Bus.
And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid
the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and
cautious because the two trucks never collided
with each other.

whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with

no cargoes or passengers on board but for three
helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn.
308-309, Mendoza).
LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the
6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of
speed.
Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers
rode on the running board of the bus when his
vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from
the bus.
Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the
right side of the road which he could pass over
with ease, Lagunda did not avert the accident
simply because to use his own language the canal
"is not a passage of trucks.

2. YES.

Where the carrier bus and its driver were

clearly guilty of contributory negligence for
having allowed a passenger to ride on the
running board of the bus,

and where the driver of the other vehicle

was also guilty of contributory negligence,

because that vehicle was running at a

considerable speed despite the fact that it
was negotiating a sharp curve,

and, instead of being close to its right side

of the road, it was driven on its middle
portion thereof and so near the passenger
bus coming from the opposite as to
sideswipe a passenger on its running
board,

the owners of the two vehicles are liable

solidarily for the death of the passenger,
although the liability of one arises from a
breach of contract, whereas that of the
other springs from a quasi-delict.

Where the concurrent or successive

negligent acts or omission of two or more
persons, although acting independently of
each other, are, in combination,

the direct and proximate cause of a single

injury to a third person, and it is impossible
to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury,

either is responsible for the whole injury,

even though his act alone might not have
caused the entire injury, or the same
damage might have resulted from the acts
of the other tort-feasor.

Dispositive Judgment affirmed.

burned the bus.

HELD

VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA

Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite
FACTS
- Shortly after midnight, a bus of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner defendant
Mariano Medina under a certificate of public
convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on
its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular
chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about 18
passengers, including the driver and conductor.
- At about 2am, while the bus was running within
the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front
tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the
road and turned turtle.
- the three passengers Bataclan, Lara and the
Visayan and the woman behind them named
Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the
overturned bus.- Some of the passengers, after
they had clambered up to the road, heard groans
and moans from inside the bus. Calls or shouts for
help were made to the houses in the
neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of
bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled
with petroleum. These men presumably approach
the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a
fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the 4 passengers trapped inside
it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gasoline tank.
- That same day, the charred bodies of the four
deemed passengers inside the bus were removed
and duly identified that of Bataclan. His widow,
Salud Villanueva brought the present suit to
recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees in the total amount of P87,150.
- the CFI awarded P1,000 plus P600 as attorney's
fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being
carried by Bataclan
prof. casis
ISSUES
1. WON there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon,
thus making him liable.2. WON the the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that

1. NO.Ratio There is evidence to show that at the

time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as
testified to by one of the passengers, and as
shown by the fact that according to the testimony
of the witnesses, including that of the defense,
from the point where one of the front tires burst up
to the canal where the bus overturned after zigzaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters.
The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have
applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have
been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal
and turned turtle.Reasoning Our new Civil Code
amply provides for the responsibility of common
carrier to its passengers and their goods.112. YES
Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom. Reasoning under the
circumstances obtaining in the case, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that
when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was
in response to the call for help, made not only by
the passengers, but most probably, by the driver
and the conductor themselves, and that because it
was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them, and coming as they
did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights
were not available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently approach
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. Neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or
taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus.
- According to the evidence, one of the passengers
who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was
hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was
visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in
the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking
to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector
to have the tires of the bus changed immediately
because they were already old, and that as a
matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to
change the said tires, but that the driver did not
follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to
prove that the driver had not been diligent and had
not taken the necessary precautions to insure the

safety of his passengers

- The trial court was of the opinion that the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not
the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that
burned the bus, including himself and his copassengers who were unable to leave it; that at
the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must
have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious,
was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not
for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered
by him.
- In the public interest the prosecution of said
erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a
matter of justice, but for the promotion of the
safety of passengers on public utility buses.
Note: This case was under the heading but
for.
I dont know if the italicized phrases are
pertinent, but these were the only ones that
contained but for.
DISPOSITION
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that
the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased to P6,000 and P800, for the death of
Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively.

ART. 1733 ART. 1755

ART. 1759 ART. 1763

- Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses

Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their
contractual liability.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v.

IAC & CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., 189 SCRA
158 MEDIALDEA/August 30, 1990
NATURE: CERTIORARI FACTS:
A2010 - 66 - This case is for recovery of damages for the 3
jeepney passengers who died as a result of the
collision between the Phil. Rabbits bus driven by
Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by
Tranquilino Manalo.
- Other passengers of the jeepney sustained
physical injuries.
- It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio,
the jeepneys right rear wheel detached which
caused it to run in an unbalanced position.
-Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of
which, the jeepney which was then running on the
eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn,
invading and eventually stopping on the western
lane of the road in such a manner that the
jeepney's front faced the south (from where it
came) and its rear faced the north (towards where
it was going).
-The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the
greater portion of the western lane, which is the
right of way of vehicles coming from the north,
among which was Bus No. 753 of Rabbit
- Almost at the time when the jeepney made a
sudden U-turn and encroached on the western
lane of the highway, or after stopping for a couple
of minutes, the bus bumped from behind the right
rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the
said deaths and injuries.
- At the time and in the vicinity of the accident,
there were no vehicles following the jeepney,
neither were there oncoming vehicles except the
bus. The weather condition of that day was fair.
- A criminal complaint against the two drivers for
Multiple Homicide.
- Manalo was eventually convicted and was
imprisoned. The case against delos Reyes was
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
***As regards the damages.
- Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses
(owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon,
(jeepney driver) Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbits
driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as
defendants.

- As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs

based their suits on their culpability for a quasidelict.
- Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc.
(the insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as
additional defendant in the civil case filed by the
Pascuas.
- Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases
were for medical expenses, burial expenses, loss
of wages, for exemplary damages, moral damages
and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
- Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
- On the other hand, spouses Mangune and
Carreon filed a cross-claim for the repair of the
jeepney and for its non-use during the period of
repairs.
- TC: found the couple and Manalo to be
NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of
the contract of carriage with their passengers;
ordered them to pay the damages.
Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it was
the jeepneys insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by the
jeepney party for actual damages.
- IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found
delos Reyes to be negligent; ordered to pay jointly
and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs; Applied
primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2)
the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of
another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident unless contradicted by other evidence,
and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that
delos Reyes was negligent.
ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS
DRIVER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND
DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF
THE JEEPNEY
HELD: YES. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND
FILRITERS ARE LIABLE.
REASONING:TC WAS CORRECT IN
APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS CONCERNING
MANALOS NEGLIGENCE.
(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger
Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was
"running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver
Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning
(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police
Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac)
Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran
on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete
paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at
a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the
(imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into

the western lane where the collision took place as

evidenced by the point of impact;
(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal
Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the
path of the jeepney they found on the road \was
shown by skid marks which he described as
"scratches on the road caused by the iron of the
jeep, after its wheel was removed;"
(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries
with Damage to Property thru Reckless
Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac, as a result of the
collision, and his commitment to prison and service
of his sentence
(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa
loquitar attesting to the circumstance that the
collision occured on the right of way of the Phil.
Rabbit Bus.
SC:
-The principle about "the last clear" chance would
call for application in a suit between the owners
and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt
the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners
on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence. (Anuran, et al. v. Buo et al.)
-On the presumption that drivers who bump the
rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence:
would have been correct were it not for the
undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the
jeepney was abrupt. Delos Reyes could not have
anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by
Manalo.
***With regard to the substantial factor test: The IAC held that
. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test
that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor
in bringing about harm to another, the fact that
the actor neither foresaw nor should have
foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner
in which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d).
Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast
speed when the accident occurred and did not
even make the slightest effort to avoid the
accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to the
passengers of the jeepney, not only because he
was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid
the mishap but also because it was the bus which
was the physical force which brought about the
injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney.
-The speed of the bus was even calculated by the
IAC. But the SC was not convinced. It cannot be
said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed
when the accident occurred because the speed of
80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such

calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed

limit allowed in highways.- Delos Reyes cannot be
faulted for not having avoided the collision
because as was shown, the jeepney left a skid
mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time
its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of
collision.- Delos Reyes admitted that he was
running more or less 50 kph at the time of the
accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered
the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We
adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos
Reyes would have covered that
distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little
time to react to the situation.- To require delos
Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much
from him. Aside from the time element involved,
there were no options available to him.
- Also, It was shown by the pictures that driver
delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right
attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney.
That it was not successful in fully clearing the
Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said
jeepney must have been due to limitations of
space and time.
- That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also
have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid
bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on
the western lane: Under such a situation, he would
run the greater risk of running smack in the
Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as
the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn.
-SC: The proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of Manalo and spouses
Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to
exercise the precautions that are needed
precisely pro hac vice.
- In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger
dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this
disputable presumption may only be overcome by
evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and
1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or
injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous
event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
- To escape liability, defendants Mangune and
Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio
Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically
checks and maintains the jeepney of said
defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before the
collision, which included the tightening of the bolts.
This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the
vehicle was detached while in transit. As to the
cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said
defendant did not even attempt to explain, much
less establish, it to be one caused by a caso
fortuito. . . .
-In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against
the carrier for his failure to safely carry his
passenger to his destination, an accident caused
either by defects in the automobile or through the

negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which

would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son
v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing
Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito,
etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).
***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners
(excluding Manalo)
-the contract of carriage is between the carrier and
the passenger, and in the event of contractual
liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible
therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be
due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. CA, et
al., April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742).
- if the driver is to be held jointly and severally
liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's
liability personal, contradictory to the explicit
provision of A 2181 of the NCC.
DISPOSITION: TC S DECISION WAS
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED BUT
MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND
THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE
CORP. INC WERE LIABLE. AFFIRMED TOO THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE
INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS
PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K.

Reasoning
We fail to see how the Company could be held
guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence.

MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO

Review by certiorari of a CA decision
FACTS
-

Efren Magno went to his stepbrothers 3story house to fix a leaking media agua,
(downspout). He climbed up to the media
agua which was just below the 3rd floor
window and stood on it to receive a
galvanized iron sheet through the said
window.

After grabbing hold of the sheet, he turned

around and a portion of the iron sheet he
was holding came into contact with an
electric wire of Manila Electric Company
(the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel to the
edge of the media agua, electrocuting him
and killing him.
His widow and children filed a suit to
recover damages from the company and
the TC rendered judgment in their favor.
The Company appealed to the CA, which
affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision
the Company now seeks to appeal.

ISSUE
WON the Companys negligence in the installation
and maintenance of its wires was the proximate
cause of the death
HELD
No. It merely provided the condition from which the
cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the
injury to occur).
Ratio
A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the
condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an
injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of
an action if a distinct, successive,
unrelated and efficient cause of the injury
intervenes between such prior and remote cause
and the injury.
If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances
which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.

To us it is clear that the principal and proximate

cause of the electrocution was not the electric
wire, evidently a remote cause,
but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno
in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron
sheet without taking any precaution, such as
looking back toward the street and at the wire to
avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering
the latter's length of 6 feet.
-

The real cause of the accident or death

was the reckless or negligent act of Magno
himself.

When he was called by his stepbrother to

repair the media agua just below the third
story window, it is to be presumed that due
to his age and experience he was qualified
to do so.

Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter

and had had training and experience for
the job.

So, he could not have been entirely a

stranger to electric wires and the danger
lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the
instant case, his training and experience
failed him, and forgetting where he was
standing, holding the 6-ft iron sheet with
both hands and at arms length, evidently
without looking, and throwing all prudence
and discretion to the winds, he turned
around swinging his arms with the motion
of his body, thereby causing his own
electrocution.

Disposition CA decision reversed. Complaint

against company dismissed

be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY

NEGLIGENCE because

RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD

COMPANY
Appeal from judgment of CFI
FACTS

Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire

kindled by sparks fr a locomotive engine.

The fire was communicated to four houses

nearby.

All of these houses were of light

construction, except that of Rodrigueza
which was of strong materials.

Plaintiffs say that the company failed to

supervise their employees properly and
was negligent in allowing locomotive to
operate without smokestack protection for
arresting sparks.

They also say that the sparks were

produced by an inferior fuel used by the
company Bataan coal.

Defense said Rodiguezas house stood partly

within limits of land owned by company.
Rodrigueza didnt mind the warnings from the
company. His houses materials included nipa and
cogon, this indicates contributory negligence on
his part.
Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad, which
appealed.
ISSUE
WON damage was caused by Rodriguezas
contributory negligence
HELD
Yes.
- Manila Railroads defense is not a bar to recovery
by the other plaintiffs.- There was no proof that
Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon companys
property. His house was there before the railroad
companys property. He may be at risk for fire, but
should not bear loss if the fire resulted from the
companys negligence.
-

The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of

the damage was the negligent act of the
company.

That Rodriguezas house was near was an

ANTECEDENT CONDITION but that cant

that condition was not created by himself

and because his house remained by the
toleration and consent of company and
because even if the house was improperly
there, company had no right to negligently
destroy it.

The company could have removed the

house through its power of eminent
domain.

The appellate court further said that the law

presumes negligence on the part of the
defendants, as employers of Galang, in the
selection and supervision of the latter;
MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG
Appeal from decision of the IAC
FACTS
-

A head-on-collision took place between a

cargo truck owned by private respondents,
and driven by Ruben Galang,
and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh.
The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose
Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc,
and physical injuries to George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the
Ford Escort.
When the northbound Ford Escort was
about 10 meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge,

two boys suddenly darted from the right

side of the road and into the lane of the car.

Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved

to the left and entered the lane of the truck;

he then switched on the headlights of the

car, applied the brakes and thereafter
attempted to return to his lane.

Before he could do so, his car collided with

the truck.

it was further asserted that these defendants did

not allege in their Answers the defense of having
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in selecting and supervising the said employee.
- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil
cases was reversed. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged
resolution are supported by evidence or are based
on mere speculations, conjectures and
presumptions.
HELD
YES
Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of
Appeals may be set aside when such findings are
not supported by the evidence or when the trial
court failed to consider the material facts which
would have led to a conclusion different from what
was stated in its judgment.
-

The respondent Court held that the fact

that the car improperly invaded the lane of
the truck and that the collision occurred in
said lane gave rise to the presumption that
the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was
negligent.

On the basis of this presumed negligence,

IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose
Koh's negligence that was the immediate
and proximate cause of the collision.

This is an unwarranted deduction as the

evidence for the petitioners convincingly
shows that the car swerved into the truck's
lane because as it approached the
southern end of the bridge, two boys darted
across the road from the right sidewalk into
the lane of the car.

Negligence is the omission to do something

which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do

The test by which to determine the

existence of negligence in a particular
case: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the
same situation?

If not, then he is guilty of negligence.Using the test, no negligence can be

imputed to Jose Koh.

The collision occurred in the lane of the

truck, which was the opposite lane, on the
said bridge.

- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.

- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging
Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was
filed with the trial court.
- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the
criminal charge and ordered him to pay damages.
Galang appealed to IAC.
IAC affirmed decision.- Judge Castaneda
dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private
respondents moral damages and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fee.
Petitioners appealed to IAC. In its consolidated
decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of
the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay
damages.
The decision is anchored principally on the
findings that it was Galang's inattentiveness or
reckless imprudence which caused the accident.

Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man

would have tried to avoid running over the
two boys by swerving the car away from
where they were even if this would mean
entering the opposite lane.

the car an opportunity to go back into its proper

Moreover, under what is known as the

emergency rule,

circumstances, the truck driver continued at full

"one who suddenly finds himself in a place

of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger,

negligence is apparent in the records. He himself

is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to

adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a
better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own
negligence.

Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is

negligent, it cannot be said that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision.

Proximate cause has been defined as: that

cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury,

and without which the result would not

have occurred; the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other
events in motion,

all constituting a natural and continuous

chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first
acted,

under such circumstances that the person

responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result
therefrom.

- Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh,

if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the
actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car
into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in
the collision had the latter heeded the emergency
signals given by the former to slow down and give

lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the

far right of the road, which was the proper
precautionary measure under the given
speed towards the car. - The truck driver's
said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km)
per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person
driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.
- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the
doctrine of last clear chance finds application here.
Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts
which states that the contributory negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the claim for damages
if it is shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care
and prudence, have avoided the consequences of
the negligence of the injured party. In such cases,
the person who had the last clear chance to avoid
the mishap is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences thereof.
- Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where
it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The
doctrine of last clear chance means that even
though a person's own acts may have placed him
in a position of peril, and an injury results, the
injured person is entitled to recovery. a person who
has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding
an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of
his opponent or that of a third person imputed to
the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.
The practical import of the doctrine is that a
negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent
plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of
the plaintiff's peril, or according to some
authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid
an accident.
- As employers of the truck driver, the private
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages. The presumption that they are negligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not
juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of

a family to prevent the damage. The answers of

the private respondents in the civil cases did not
interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to
prove it.
On the separate civil and criminal actions- The
civil cases, which were for the recovery of civil
liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article
2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
were filed ahead of criminal case.
They were eventually consolidated for joint trial.
The records do not indicate any attempt on the
part of the parties, and it may therefore be
reasonably concluded that none was made, to
consolidate criminal case with the civil cases, or
vice-versa.
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear
congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial
court, or in short, attain justice with the least
expense to the parties litigants, would have easily
sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the
unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two judges
appreciating, according to their respective
orientation, perception and perhaps even
prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter
rendering conflicting decisions. Such was what
happened in this case.
-

The responsibility arising from fault or

negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. In the case of independent civil
actions under the new Civil Code, the result
of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to
the civil action. What remains to be the
most important consideration as to why the
decision in the criminal case should not be
considered in this appeal is the fact that
private respondents were not parties
therein.

Dispositive Petition granted. Assailed

decision set aside while its original is
REINSTATED, subject to the modification
that the indemnity for death is increased
from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for
the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee

appealed to the CA, which by a divided

vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five
members having been constituted)
rendered a judgment of reversal and
sentenced the defendant to pay damages
to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000, plus
interest at the legal rate from the date the
complaint was filed.

TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ

51 SCRA 181 MAKALINTAL; June 4, 1973

The CA declared that Teague was

negligent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez.

This finding of negligence is based

primarily on the fact that the provision of
Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of
the City of Manila had not been complied
with in connection with the construction and
use of the Gil-Armi building.

FACTS

The Realistic Institute, owned and operated

by Mercedes M. Teague, was a vocational
school for hair and beauty culture situated
on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building,
a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located
at the comer of Quezon Boulevard and
Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila.
The second floor was unpartitioned, had a
total area of about 400 square meters, and
although it had only one stairway, of about
1.50 meters in width,

it had eight windows, each of which was

provided with two fire-escape ladders, and
the presence of each of the fire exits was
indicated on the wall.

In the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire

broke out in a store for surplus materials
located about ten meters away from the
institute.

Soler Street lay between that store and the

institute.

Upon seeing the fire, some of the students

in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!'
and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four
instructresses and six assistant
instructresses of the institute were present
and they, together with the registrar, tried to
calm down the students, who numbered
about 180 at the time, telling them not to be
afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would
not get burned as it is made of concrete,
and that the fire was anyway, across the
street.

They told the students not to rush out but

just to go down the stairway two by two, or
to use the fire-escapes.
The panic, however, could not be subdued
and the students kept on rushing and
pushing their way through the stairs,
thereby causing stampede.
No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire.
But, after the panic was over, four students,
including Lourdes Fernandez, sister of
plaintiffs, were found dead and several
others injured on account of the stampede.
The CFI of Manila found for the defendant
and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs

This provision reads as follows:

"Sec. 491. Fireproof partitions, exits and stairways - All
buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings
otherwise known as accessorias having less than three
stories, having one or more persons domiciled therein
either temporarily or permanently, and all public or
quasipublic buildings having less than three stories,
such as hospitals, sanitarium, schools, reformatories,
places of human detention, assembly halls, clubs,
restaurants or panciterias, and the like, shall be
provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not
less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width
and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from
the perpendicular, in case of large buildings more than
two stairways shall likewise be provided when required
by the chief of the fire department, said stairways shall
be placed as far apart as possible."

The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted

is that the second storey of the building had only
one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of
at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of
the fire the owner of the building had a second
stairway under construction.
ISSUES
1. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of
the City of Manila refers only to public buildings
and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building
which was of private ownership
2. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners
of the building and therefore it is they and not the
petitioner, who is a mere lessee, who should be
liable for the violation
3. WON the failure to comply with the requirement
of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the
death of Lourdes Fernandez
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio it is not ownership which determines the
character of buildings subject to its requirements,

but rather the use or the purpose for which a

particular building, is utilized.
Reasoning Thus the same may be privately
owned, but if it is devoted to any one of the
purposes mentioned in the ordinance for instance
as a school, which the Realistic Institute precisely
was then the building is within the coverage of the
ordinance.
Indeed the requirement that such a building should
have two (2) separate stairways instead of only
one (1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to
the fact of ownership,
but does have such relation to the use or purpose
for which the building is devoted.
2.) NO.
Reasoning It was the use of the building for
school purposes which brought the same within
the coverage of the ordinance; and it was the
petitioner and not the owners who were
responsible for such use.
3. YES.
Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of
the accident, in the manner in which it happened,
was the very thing which the statute or ordinance
was intended to prevent.
Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by settling other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately affecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result there from.
[Citing Bataclan v Medina]
The petitioner relates the chain of events that
resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as
follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a
neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4)
panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries
and death. The violation of the ordinance, it is
argued, was only a remote cause, and cannot be
the basis of liability since there intervened a
number of independent causes which produced
the injury complained of.
-

A prior and remote cause cannot be made

the basis of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there

intervened between such prior or remote

cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation the circumstances which
result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
[Citing MERALCO v Remoquillo]
- According to the petitioner "the events of fire,
panic and stampede were independent causes
with no causal connection at all with the violation
of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument
springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events
which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It
is true that the petitioner's non- compliance with
the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior
to the other events in point of time, in the sense
that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one,
since the ordinance was a measure of safety
designed to prevent a specific situation which
would pose a danger to the occupants of the
building. That situation was undue overcrowding in
case it should become necessary to evacuate the
building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen,
was bound to happen under emergency conditions
if there was only one stairway available. It is true
that in this particular case there would have been
no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had
not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused
the students to panic and rush headlong for the
stairs in order to go down. But it was precisely
such contingencies or events that the authors of
the ordinance had in mind, for under normal
conditions one stairway would be adequate for the
occupants of the building.
- To consider the violation of the ordinance as the
proximate cause of the injury does not portray the
situation in its true perspective; it would be more
accurate to say that the overcrowding at the
stairway was the proximate cause and that it was
precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent
by requiring that there be two stairways instead of
only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by
the respondents, the principle of proximate cause
applies to such violation. Dispositive Decision
appealed from is affirmed.