11/15/2016

G.R.No.L23638

TodayisTuesday,November15,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L23638October12,1967
DIONISIOFERNANDEZ,EUSEBIOREYESandLUISAREYES,petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELADIMAGIBA,respondent.

G.R.No.L23662October12,1967
MARIANOREYES,CESARREYES,LEONORREYESandPACIENCIAREYES,petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELADIMAGIBA,respondent.
JoseD.Villenaforpetitioners.
AntonioBarredoandExequielM.Zaballeroforrespondent.
REYES,J.B.L.,Actg.C.J.:
TheheirsintestateofthelateBenedictadelosReyeshavepetitionedforareviewofthedecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals(inCAG.R.No.31221R)affirmingthatoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofBulacan,inSpecialProceeding
No.831ofsaidCourt,admittingtoprobatetheallegedlastwillandtestamentofthedeceased,andoverrulingthe
oppositiontotheprobate.
ItappearsfromtherecordthatonJanuary19,1955,IsmaelaDimagiba,nowrespondent,submittedtotheCourt
ofFirstInstanceapetitionfortheprobateofthepurportedwillofthelateBenedictadelosReyes,executedon
October22,1930,andannexedtothepetition.Thewillinstitutedthepetitionerasthesoleheiroftheestateofthe
deceased.Thepetitionwassetforhearing,andinduetime,DionisioFernandez,EusebioReyesandLuisaReyes
andonemonthlater,Mariano,Cesar,LeonorandPaciencia,allsurnamedReyes,allclaimingtobeheirsintestate
ofthedecedent,filedoppositionstotheprobateasked.Groundsadvancedfortheoppositionwereforgery,vices
of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of
conveyanceofthemajorportionoftheestatemadebythetestatrixinfavoroftheproponentin1943and1944,
butwhichconveyanceswerefinallysetasidebythisSupremeCourtinadecisionpromulgatedonAugust3,1954,
incasesG.R.Nos.L5618andL5620(unpublished).
Aftertrialontheformulatedissues,theCourtofFirstInstance,bydecisionofJune20,1958,foundthatthewill
was genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until
such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of
adjudicationofthepropertiesisopportunelypresented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of
estoppelandrevocationbeconsideredandresolvedwhereupon,onJuly27,1959,theCourtoverruledtheclaim
thatproponentwasinestoppeltoaskfortheprobateofthewill,but"reservinguntothepartiestherighttoraise
theissueofimpliedrevocationattheopportunetime."
OnJanuary11,1960,theCourtofFirstInstanceappointedRicardoCruzasadministratorforthesolepurposeof
submittinganinventoryoftheestate,andthiswasdoneonFebruary9,1960.
On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the testatrix of
deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944,
subsequenttotheexecutionofher1930testament,hadrevokedthelatterunderArticle957(2)ofthe1950Civil
Code(Art.869oftheCivilCodeof1889),thetrialCourtresolvedagainsttheoppositorsandheldthewillofthe
late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors
elevatedthecasetotheCourtofAppeals.
TheappellateCourtheldthatthedecreeofJune20,1958,admittingthewilltoprobate,hadbecomefinalforlack
ofopportuneappealthatthesamewasappealableindependentlyoftheissueofimpliedrevocationthatcontrary
totheclaimofoppositorsappellants,therehadbeennolegalrevocationbytheexecutionofthe1943and1944
deedsofsale,becausethelatterhadbeenmadeinfavorofthelegateeherself,andaffirmedthedecisionofthe
CourtofFirstInstance.
OppositorsthenappealedtothisCourt.
Inthisinstance,bothsetsofoppositorsappellantsposethreemainissues:(a)whetherornotthedecreeofthe
Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal (b) whether or not the
order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositorsappellants had
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likewisebecomefinaland(c)whetherornotthe1930willofBenedictadelosReyeshadbeenimpliedlyrevoked
byherexecutionofdeedsofconveyanceinfavoroftheproponentonMarch26,1943andApril3,1944.
Astothefirstpoint,oppositorsappellantscontendthattheorderallowingthewilltoprobateshouldbeconsidered
interlocutory,becauseitfailstoresolvetheissuesofestoppelandrevocationpropoundedintheiropposition.We
agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree
finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or
otherwise.(Montaanovs.Suesa,14Phil.676Mercadovs.Santos,66Phil.215Trillanavs.Crisostomo,89Phil.
710).Assuch,theprobateorderisfinalandappealableanditissorecognizedbyexpressprovisionsofSection
1ofRule109,thatspecificallyprescribesthat"anyinterestedpersonmayappealinspecialproceedingsfroman
orderorjudgment...wheresuchorderorjudgment:(a)allowsordisallowsawill."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of their
oppositionbeforetakinganappeal,asotherwisetherewouldbeamultiplicityofrecoursestothehigherCourts.
This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six different instances when
appealmaybetakeninspecialproceedings.
TherebeingnocontroversythattheprobatedecreeoftheCourtbelowwasnotappealedontime,thesamehad
become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the
evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly
dismissed.
Theallegedrevocationimpliedfromtheexecutionofthedeedsofconveyanceinfavorofthetestamentaryheiris
plainlyirrelevanttoandseparatefromthequestionofwhetherthetestamentwasdulyexecuted.Forone,ifthe
willisnotentitledtoprobate,oritsprobateisdenied,allquestionsofrevocationbecomesuperfluousinlaw,there
is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the
oppositorsappellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly
evidencinganabandonmentoftheoriginalintentiontobequeathordevisethepropertiesconcerned.Assuch,the
revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute
revocationcanprecludeprobateoftherevokedtestament(Trillanavs.Crisostomo,supra.).
Astotheissueofestoppel,wehavealreadyruledinGuevaravs.Guevara,98Phil.249,thatthepresentationand
probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed
wishes,whichareentitledtorespectasaconsequenceofthedecedent'sownershipandrightofdispositionwithin
legallimits.EvidenceofitisthedutyimposedonacustodianofawilltodeliverthesametotheCourt,andthe
fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a nonsequitur to allow public
policytobeevadedonthepretextofestoppel.Whetherornottheorderoverrulingtheallegationofestoppelis
stillappealableornot,thedefenseispatentlyunmeritoriousandtheCourtofAppealscorrectlysoruled.
Thelastissue,thatofrevocation,ispredicatedonparagraph2ofArticle957oftheCivilCodeof1950(Art.869of
theCodeof1889),whichrecites:
Art.957.Thelegacyordeviseshallbewithouteffect:
(1)....
(2)Ifthetestatorbyanytitleorforanycausealienatesthethingbequeathedoranypartthereof,itbeing
understoodthatinthelattercasethelegacyordeviseshallbewithouteffectonlywithrespecttothepart
thusalienated.Ifafterthealienationthethingshouldagainbelongtothetestator,evenifitbebyreasonof
nullityofthecontract,thelegacyordeviseshallnotthereafterbevalid,unlessthereacquisitionshallhave
beeneffectedbyvirtueoftheexerciseoftherightofrepurchase
xxxxxxxxx
It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of the quoted provision is a presumed
changeofintentiononthepartofthetestator.AspointedoutbyManresainhisCommentariesonArticle869of
theCivilCode(Vol.6,7thEd.,p.743)
Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. Si este, despues de legar, se desprende de la
cosaportitulolucrativouoneroso,hacedesaparecersuderechosobraella,dandolugaralapresuncion
dequehacambiadodevoluntad,ynoquierequeellegadosecumpla.Masparaquepuedapresumirse
esavoluntad,esnecesarioquemedienactosdeltestadorquelaindiquen.Silaperdidadelderechosobre
la cosa ha sido independiente de la voluntad del testador, el legado podraquedar sin efecto, mas no en
virtud del numero 2 del articulo 869, que exige siempre actos voluntarios de enajenacion por parte del
mismotestador.
AsobservedbytheCourtofAppeals,theexistenceofanysuchchangeordeparturefromtheoriginalintentof
the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent
alienationsin1943and1944wereexecutedinfavorofthelegateeherself,appelleeDimagiba.Infact,asfound
bytheCourtofAppealsinitsdecisionannullingtheseconveyances(affirmedinthatpointbythisSupremeCourt
in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L5618 and L5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no
considerationwhateverwaspaidbyrespondentDimagiba"onaccountofthetransfers,therebyrenderingiteven
more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in
advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.1
Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular
case,Article957oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,doesnotapplytothecaseatbar.
Notonlythat,butevenifitwereapplicable,theannulmentoftheconveyanceswouldnotnecessarilyresultinthe
revocationofthelegacies,ifwebearinmindthatthefindingsmadeinthedecisiondecreeingtheannulmentof
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thesubsequent1943and1944deedsofsalewerealsothat
itwasthemoralinfluence,originatingfromtheirconfidentialrelationship,whichwastheonlycauseforthe
executionofExhs.AandB(the1943and1944conveyances).(Decision,L5618andL5620).
If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor was not
expressingherownfreewillandintentinmakingtheconveyances.Hence,itcannotbeconcluded,either,that
suchconveyancesestablishedadecisiononherparttoabandontheoriginallegacy.
True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by
reasonofthenullityofthecontract"doesnotrevivethelegacybutaspointedoutbyScaevola(CodigoCivil,Vol.
XV,4thEd.,pp.324325)the"nullityofthecontract"cannotbetakeninanabsolutesense.2 Certainly, it could
notbemaintained,forexample,thatifatestator'ssubsequentalienationwereavoidedbecausethetestatorwas
mentallyderangedatthetime,therevocatoryeffectordainedbythearticleshouldstillensue.Andthesamething
couldbesaidifthealienation(posteriortothewill)wereavoidedonaccountofphysicalormentalduress.Yet,an
alienation through undue influence in no way differs from one made through violence or intimidation. In either
case,thetransferorisnotexpressinghisrealintent,3anditcannotbeheldthattherewasinfactanalienation
thatcouldproducearevocationoftheanteriorbequest.
Inviewoftheforegoingconsiderations,theappealeddecisionoftheCourtofAppealsisherebyaffirmed.Costs
againstappellantsReyesandFernandez.Soordered.
Dizon,Makalintal,Zaldivar,Sanchez,Castro,AngelesandFernando,JJ.,concur.
Concepcion,C.J.andBengzon,J.P.,J.,areonleave,tooknopart.

Footnotes
1Scaevola(CodigoCivil,Vol.XV,4thEd.,p.378)aptlyremarks:

"Cuandoeltestador,asabiendasdeladisposicioncontenidaensuultimavoluntad,enajenaallegatariola
cosa legada, si bien esta sale del poder de aquel, va a parar al del legatario, acto que no puede
interpretarsecomomudanzadelavoluntad,puestoquetransmitslacosaalapersonaalaquedeseaba
favoreerconella.Porestacircunstanciayporladenorevocarellegado,masbienparecequepersisteen
suintenciondebeneficiarallegatario,yaquenoconlapropiacosa,conelderechoqueleconcedeelart.
878. Si al donar el testador al futuro legatario la cosa que le dejaba en el testamento, indica solo una
realizacionanticipadadelaultimavoluntad,elvenderiasinderogarladisposiciondellegadopareceindicae
tambien que no ha habido idea modificadora de la intencion, sino que porsigue en la de favorecer al
instituido, y ya que no es posible conseguirlo con la cosa misma,se impone el verificarlo en la manera
determinadaporelarticulo,oseamediantelaentregadelprecio."
2"Deciamosanteriormentequenecesitabaalgunaexplicacionlafrasedelnum.20.odelart.869,"aunque

sea por la nulidad del contrato," para no apartarla de sus verdaderos y prudentes limites. Literalmente
entendida,autorizariaelquefueserevocadounlegadoporenajenacionquehubieserealizadoeltestador
con vicio en el consentimiento. Dice con razon eljurisconsulto frances Demante, "quese llegaria a
consecuenciascontrariasalosprincipiosmaselementalesdelDerechoydelarazonsi,exagerandodicha
doctrina, se diese efecto revocatorio a una enajenacion nulapor vicio de consentimiento." Como una
voluntad impotente para transferirla propiedad podria tener la fuerza de revocar un legado? Si la
enajenacionlleva el vicio de violencia o de error, sera posible artibuir algun efectoa acto semejante? Es
logico deducir entonces que el testador se arrepintio, como dicen las partidas del otorgamento de la
manda?"(Scaevola,op.cit.)
3Cf.Torresvs.Lopez,48Phil.772Cosovs.Deza,42Phil.
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