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Sps. Rodrigo Imperial, Jr. and Jocelyn Imperial, and Fe Imperial Versus Sps.

Rogelio and Asuncion


Pinigat
GR No. 193554
FACTS:
The instant petition stemmed from civil case no. 627 for quieting of title, Recovery of Possession
and damages filed by Rodrigo Imperial, Sr. against Betty Imperial involving a residential lot with
improvements.
Rodrigo Imperial, Jr. claimed that the subject property was sold by his grandfather to his father as
evidenced by an absolute deed of sale. Isabelo, Rodrigo Jrs grandfather, allowed Juan and Betty to stay
with him in the house with the agreement that they will leave upon demand. When Isabelo died, herein
respondents, who were the son-in-law and daughter of Juand and Betty were also allowed to move in to
the house.
The MTC of Baal, Cam Sur rendered decision recognizing the respondents ownership of onehalf portion of the subject property. The RTC dismissed the appeal of Rodrigo Sr. Respondents
demanded that the petitioners vacate the encroached portions. The petitioners acceded to the demand and
started demolishing walls of their houses but later ceased from doing so notwithstanding the respondents
repeated demands.
The respondents filed a complaint for Unlawful detainer with damages against the petitioners.
The MTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents which was later reversed by the RTC but was
also reversed by the CA reinstating the decision of the MTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
WON CA erred in reinstating MTCs decision declaring petitioners as unlawful detainees.
WON MTCs decision in civil case no. 627 apply to petitioners as they were not parties thereto.
RULING:
1. NO. CAs decision was correct in reinstating the decision of the MTC of Baao, Cam Sur that the
respondents are the recognized owners of the one-half portion of the subject property therefore
they have the right to demand petitioners to vacate the encroached portions and because
petitioners unjustifiably refused to vacate the subject property, the unlawful detainer case
prospered.
2. YES. The court held that a final and executory decision however is not only applicable to the
parties thereto but also to their successors-in-interest. Rodrigo Jr. Having merely stepped into the
shoes of his predecessor, cannot claim that the decision does not apply to him.

Gina Endaya Petitioner vs. Ernesto V.Villaos Respondent G-R.No.202416


Facts:
Petitioner and the other heirs of Atilano Villaos filed before the RTC.The complaint sought the recovery
of several lots, including that on which the PVH and wooden Summer Homes are located.
The complaint in the main said that the purported sale of the affected lots, from Atilano to respondent was
spurious. According to respondent, he bought from Atilano eight (8) parcels of land, including those
where PVH and WSH stood. Respondent then took the possession of the lots and started to manage and
operate the said hotels. Respondent then told the petitioners to vacate the premises, through an ejectment
case with preliminary mandatory injunction, giving them a period of six (6) months to do so.

Instead of living, petitioner even participated in a violent and unlawful take-over of PVH and WSH.
Petitioner argued that during the alleged execution of said deeds, Atillano was no longer ambulatory and
could no longer talk and give assent to the deeds of sale. Finally, petitioner questioned the priority of the
ejectment case since according to her, they already have filed Civil Case No.4162 precisely to nullify the
deeds of sale.
In its decision, the MTCC held that the action questioning the ownership does not bar the filing of an
ejectment case since the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material
possession of the property independent of any claim of ownership.
On appeal. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC, holding that the pendency of Civil Case
No.4162 could not be considered as ground for dismissal of the present ejectment case under the principle
of litis pendentia because the parties their assert contrasting rights and prayed for different reliefs .
Aggrieved by the decision, the petitioner filed the petition for review. An amended petition states that the
RTC erred in affirming the MTCC; that the MTCC and RTC erred in not passing upon the issue of
validity of the deeds of sale executed by Atilano in favour of respondent and declaring that said issue
should be resolved in Civil Case No. 4162 for declaration of the sale.
The CA denied the petition .It affirmed the decision of the RTC when it ruled that the deeds of sale are
presumed to be valid because these were notarized.
Issue:
Who has the better right over the said property?
Ruling:
The petitioner has a better right over the assailed property.
In resolving the petition for review, the CA lost sight of the legal principle that in resolving the issue of
possession in an ejectment case, the registered owner of the property is preferred over the transferee under
an unregistered deed of sale.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the entire Lot
83. Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their claim of
ownership. Thus, even if respondents proof of ownership has in its favour of juris tantum presumption of
authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over petitioners Torrens tittle.
While respondent has in his favour deeds of sale over the eight parcels of land, these deeds were not
registered; thus, tittle remained in the name of the owner and seller Atalino. Under the article 777 of the
Civil Code, the rights of the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Thus, petitioners and her coheirs should have been favoured on the question of possession, being heirs
who succeeded the registered owner of the properties in dispute. Clearly, the MTCC, RTCC and CA erred
in ruling in favour of respondent.

Spouses Roberto and Adelaida Pen v. Spouses Santos and Linda Julian
January 11, 2016

G.R. No. 160408

Facts:
A petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.
On April 9, 1968, the appellees obtained a P60, 000-loan from appellant Adelaida Pena and
followed by extended loans on May 13, 1986 and May 27, 1986 amounting P50, 000 and P10, 000. Both
loans were charged interest at 6% per month. As security, on May 23, 1986, the appellees executed a real

estate mortgage over their property covered TCT no. 32733 registered under the name of Santos Julian Jr.
The Owners duplicate of TCT was delivered to the appellants.
On July 1989, appellants alleged appellee Linda that she offered to repurchase the property to
which the former agreed at the repurchase price of P436, 115 payable in cash due July 31, 1989. The
appellees failed to repurchase on the agreed date and offered again to repurchase on Feb. 1990 with the
same amount but still failed.
Appellants allege that instead paying the balance, the appellees instituted a civil complaint
against the on Sept. 8, 1994 and filed an adverse claim and lis pendens which were annotated at the back
of the title of the property.
On the other hand, the appellees aver the following: at the time the mortgage was executed, they
were likewise required by the appellant Adelaida to sign a 1-page document purportedly an Absolute
Deed of Sale. Said document did not contain any consideration and was undated, unfilled and not
notarized. They allege that their total payment amounted to P115, 400 and their last payment was made
on June 28 1990 in the amount of P100,000.
In Dec. 1992, Linda offered to pay Adelaida the amount of P150, 000 but the latter refused the
offer. Linda then wanted to see the land title but Adelaida refused. She later discovered in the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City that the said title to the mortgaged property was already registered to Adelaida.
August 12, 1994, Linda and her spouse formally demanded the reconveyance of the title and for
the property to them but the appellants refused. The appellees also discovered several Declaration of Real
Property and a Deed of Sale consisting of 2 pages which was notarized by Atty. Cezar Chung.
September 8, 1994, appellees filed a suit for the Cancellation of the Sale and Cancellation of Title
issued to the appellants, Recovery of Possession; Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction.
RTC ruled in favour of the respondents that the sale of the said agreement lacked one of the
essential requisites of a valid contract; that the promissory notes and the real estate mortgage in favour of
the petitioners were nonetheless valid, rendering the respondents to still pay their outstanding obligation
with interest.
On the appeal of the petitioners to the Court of Appeals, the court affirmed the RTC with
modification under assailed decision on October 20, 2003. The CA pronounced the Deed of Sale as void
but not because if the supposed lack of consideration as the RTC indicated, but because of the Deed of
Sale having been executed at the same time as the Real Estate Mortgage which rendered as details would
filled out upon the default by the respondents; that the promissory notes contained no stipulation on the
payment of the interest on the obligation for which reason no monetary interest could be imposed for the
use of money; and that compensatory interest should instead be imposed as a form of damages arising
from Lindas failure to pay the outstanding obligations.
ISSUE:
i.
ii.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the ruling against the validity of the Deed of
Sale; and
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the ruling that no monetary interest was due
for Lindas use of Adelaidas money.

Ruling:
Article 2088 of the Civil Code of the Philippines prohibits the creditor from appropriating the
things given by way of pledge or mortgage or from disposing of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is
null and void. The elements for pactum commisorium to exist are as follows. To wit: a.) that there should
be a pledge or mortgage wherein property is pledged and mortgaged by way of security for the payment
of the principal obligation; and b.) that there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the
creditor of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation within

the stipulation period. The first element is present in the case at bar and the second element was implied
from Lindas having signed the blank Deed of Sale with her signing the Real Estate Mortgage.
The haste with which the transfer of property was made upon tge default by Linda on her
obligation, and the eventual transfer of the property in a manner not in the form of a valid Dacion en Pago
ultimately confirmed the nature of the transaction as a Pactum Commissorium.
IN the given facts, the Court should not disturb or undo CAs conclusion in absence of the clear
showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of the CA.
The petitioners have theorized that their transaction with the respondent was a
valid Dacion En
Pago. Yet, the debt of the respondents subsisted despite the transfer of the property in favour of Adelaida.
Article 1318 of the Civil Code states that the requisites for any contract to be valid are namely: a)
the consent of the contracting parties, b) the object, and c) the consideration. There is a perfection of
contract when there is meeting of the minds of the parties on each of these requisites. The absence from
Lindas copy of the Deed of Sale was credible proof of the lack of an essential requisites for the sale.
In the issue of monetary interest from the judgement, Article 1956 of the Civil Code states that no
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Hence, in the case at bar, monetary
interest cannot be validly imposed.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of CA with modification.

Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk, Inc represented by Bishop Prudencio Andaya, Jr.,petitioner Versus
Spouses Ernesto and Elizabeth Sison and Venacio Wadas,respondents
GR No 191132, January 27,2016

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the November 23, 2009 and January 26, 2010 Civil
Case No. 2-2009 of Branch 26, RTC of Luna, Apayao. The RTC dismissed the petitioner's Rule 47
petition for annulment of judgment addressing the decision of the 6th MCTC of Kabugao Conner in SPLCivil Case No.32-2005-Cr.
Antecedents: February 16,2005 - respondents spouses Wadas filed a forcible entry complaint against the
petitioner represented by Fr. Gerry Gudmalin. August 29,2004- respondents alleged that Fr. Gudmalin,
priest of St. Anthony Church of the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province, ordered the forcible
demolition of their respective parameter fences in order to expand the area of the Church. Priest
dispossessed them of their land and began constructing a building that encroached on portions of their
respective lots. March 11, 2005 MCTC Junior Process Server Raul Abad executed an officer's return
wherein defendant went to Manila, thus summons was only received by the secretary. July 13, 2005 case was submitted for decision due to defendant's failure to file its answer despite of summons. August
12, 2005 - MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents.Ordered Petitioner to (1) refrain from
any further construction within the respondent's property (2) remove their constructions (3) vacate the
property (4) pay damages.
September 19, 2005 - petitioner filed an urgent manifestation and motion beforethe MCTC that (1)
land subject is owned and possessed by petitioner represented by Rev. Monsignor Prudencio Andaya Jr.,
not by Fr. Gudmalin as alleged in the complaint (2) it had been denied due process because it was neither
impleaded nor served summons.
August 28, 2006 - MCTC denied petitioner's urgent motion for it was prohibited pleading under
Section 19 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. It stressed that in ejectment cases, basic issue is
possession de facto, not ownership; the proper defendant is the person who actually disturbed the
complainant's possession over the property.

September 7, 2007 - petitioner filed an appeal but was subsequently dismissed due to failure to file
an appellant's memorandum within reglementary period.
November 23, 2009 - RTC reconsidered its denial and dismissed the petition got failure to state the
cause of action. The RTC reasoned that the petitioner's filing of a notice of appeal and subsequent failure
to file its appeal memorandum precluded its resort to annulment of judgment; the remedy is not available
to a party who lost his right to appeal due to his own fault.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are the actual occupants if the subject property and that the named
defendant is the real party-in-interest.
Ruling:
In an ejectment suit (accion interdictal) the sole issue is the right of physical or material possession over
the subject real property independent of any claim of ownership by the parties involved. Ownership over
the property is immaterial and is only passed on provisionally got the limited purpose of determining
which party has better right to possession. Purpose of an ejectment suit for Forcible Entry (detention) is
to protect the person who had prior physical possession against another who unlawfully entered the
property and usurped his possession. The suit is filed against the possessor(s) of the property at the
commencement of action and not against one who does not in fact occupy the land. In the present case, it
was alleged that it was Fr. Gudmalin, acting for the church, who forcibly entered the property previously
held by the respondent's and who remains in possession. Hence, they were correctly impleaded as
defendant. Therefore, Vicariate of Mt. Province have no legal personality to ask for the annulment of the
MCTC judgment and that respondents are the actual occupants of the subject matter.

CAMILO SIBAL, Petitioner, v. PEDRO BUQUEL, SANTIAGO BUQUEL, JR., ROSALINDA


BUQUEL, REPRESENTED BY FRANCISCO BUQUEL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 197825, January 11, 2016
Facts:
A parcel of land consisting of 81, 022 square meters with Original Certificate of Title No. 0-725 was
inherited by respondents Pedro, Santiago Jr., Rosalinda and Francisca Buquel from their parents, Santiago
Sr. and FaustinaBuquel. Petitioner Camilo Sibal and Tobi Mangoba took a portion of Santiago Buquel
Sr.s property.
With this, the respondents demanded the petitioners to vacate and turn over the property, but the latter
refused to do so. Hence, a complaint was filed before the Tuguegarao RTC for recovery of possession and
damages.
The Tuguegarao RTC ruled in favour of the Buquels on January 5, 2007. About a year after, Sibal filed a
petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision before the CA but it was later dismissed on March 16, 2011.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Thus, he filed the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Whether or not the respondents were guilty of extrinsic fraud
Ruling:
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA dated March 16, 2011 and its Resolution
dated July 7, 2011 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Petitioner admitted that he attended only one stage of the proceeding, Hence, he was not able to prove the
negligence of his former counsel in handling his defense that allegedly violated his right to due process.
There was also no indication that his counsel was in cahoots with the respondents to obtain the assailed
judgment.
Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available without fault on
the part of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot
prosper. Furthermore the RTS has jurisdiction over the case contrary to petitioners allegation. Upon
review of the records, the Court notes that the Real Property was truly assessed according to its real value
which the petitioner failed to refute.

Rogelio Rosario, Rudy Rosario, Mary Ann Gutierrez, Sylvia Castillo, Lourdes Jose, Lorena Estepa,
Virgina Estepa and Remedios Sabado vs Rizalito F. Alba
Decided: April 18, 2016
GR no. 199464
Facts:
The subject properties were adjudged as shares of Luz Florendo Alba, one of the heirs to the estate
belonging to the late Urbano Rosario and Vicenta Zarate The respondent is the son and only surviving
legal heir of Luz while the petitioners are fellow heirs to the estate of Urbano and Vicenta. The petitioners
introduced residential dwellings and other improvements on the subject properties even before the death
of Luz. The respondent sent out notices to vacate upon the petitioners after Luz died. Because of the
petitioners refusal to leave, an action for ejectment was instituted by the respondent. The MTC ruled in
favor of the respondent stating that the petitioners possession was merely tolerated, which became
unlawful after the respondent demanded them to vacate subject properties. The RTC ordered in its
Decision setting aside the decision of the MTC and ruled that the complaint cannot give rise to an
unlawful detainer action. The CA rendered the assailed decision and setting aside the decision of the RTC
and reinstated the MTC judgment. Hence this petition
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents complaint is constitutive of the forms od cases for ejectment.
Ruling:
After a careful perusal of the complaint, the court agrees with the RTC that the respondents complaint is
not the constitutive of any of the forms of cases for ejectment. The complaint cannot be considered as one
for forcible entry, neither can the court consider the complaint as one for unlawful detainer. It has been
held in a catena for cases that in actions fir unlawful detainer, a complaint sufficiently alleges said cause
of action if it states the following elements, to wit: (1) the possession of the property by the defendant was
by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) such possession became illegal upon notice by the
plaintiff to the defendant of the terminations of the latters right of possession; (3) the defendant remained
in the possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (4) within one year from
the making of the last demand to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would
substantiate respondents claim that he permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by the
petitioners. Nothing has been said on how petitioners entry was effected or how and dispossession
started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
case. Accordingly, the appellate court committed riverside error when it reinstated the MTC decision

which took cognizance of the case, dealt upon its merits, and conducted summary proceedings as id the
subject matter is, indeed, one of the ejectment. Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is granted.

Heirs of the late Gerry Ecarma namely: Avelina Suiza-Ecarma, Dennis Ecrma, Jerry Lyn Ecrma
Pena, Antonia Ecarma, and Natalia Ecarma Sangalang, Petitioners Vs Court of Appeals and
Renato Ecarma,
June 8, 2016

Gr No. 193374

Facts:
The case involves the heirs quarrelling each other over inherited properties and disagreement on
how the properties shall be partitioned. This prompted the petitioners to file petition for certiorari citing
the Rules 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner contend that the court of appeals committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion due to the two resolutions it issued.
The petitioners appealed the two orders of the RTC that approved the project partition proposed
by respondent Renato Ecarma, the administrator of the estate of decedent Arminda vda de Ecarma,
covering four properties. But the appeal to the appellate court did not favor the petitioners in fact
dismissed the petition due to the procedural defects for not having complied with the section 13, Rule 44
of the Rules of Court.
The properties were owned by Arminda and Natalio Ecarma. The properties were acquired during
the marriage. They have seven children. Upon the death of natalio, the heirs executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of four properties namely: Kintalad, Cuyapa and two properties in Lala. The half of
Lala property was intended for the decedent Arminda share. The four properties will be divided as
follows: two ninth will be that of Arminda, and the rest of the children will have one-ninth each. The
method of partitioning as agreed and signed by all of the heirs. This was stipulated in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate. But the properties were not divided. The heir continue to co-owned the
properties even until the death of their mother Arminda on April 17, 1983.
Renato Ecarma, upon the death of his mother, petitioned for the probate of Armindas will but
was dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City. He then filed for intestate proceedings before the Quezon City
RTC last May 18, 1990. He was then appointed as Special Administrator by the RTC. The conflict among
the heirs continue to persist thereby prompting Renato to move to terminate the co-ownership and filed or
Partition of the Kitanlad property by March 9, 2005. This was followed by project of partition of the LAla
and Cuyapo properties through the Omnibus Motion filed by Renato Ecarma dated April 7, 2005. The
RTC approved the proposed partition through the Order issued sated July 28, 2005.
The decision was opposed by heirs of Gerry and Rodolfo Ecarma. Then Renato filed a comment
on opposition to motion for reconsideration filed by Gerry and Rodolfo Ecarma. The RTC denied the
motion. Gerry Ecarma filed an appeal to the CA. The CA ordered the petitioner to file an appellatebrief.
On the pendency of the appeal, Gerry died. He was replaced by his heirs. Renato filed a motion to dismiss
the appellees brief.
The CA finding the brief devoid of merit due to the procedural defects, and violation of Section
13 Rule 44 of the Rules of Court of Civil Procedure. The CA dismissed the petition. The Petitioner filed
motion for reconsideration attaching the Supplemental Appellants brief which was dismissed by CA.
The petitioners thereby filed petition for certiorari under rule 65 of Rules of Court.
Issue
1. Whether or not the Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by dismissing the motion filed by the petitioners Gerry and Rodolfo
Ecarma?

2. Whether or not there is a merit on the decision of the RTC granting the order of partition on
the subject properties.
Ruling
First, the appeal by certiorari under the Rule 45 of Rules of Court is different from the petition for
certiorari under the Rule 65. Hence, these two rules cannot be used interchangeably in order to seek
remedy for the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, if indeed there is, on
the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Special civil Action or certiorari can be availed if the lower
tribunal has acted without or excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. If the petition filed was to review the ruling if it is marred with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction the petition will not automatically transform into
special civil action for certiorari. The dismissal of the CA of the appeal was final. But then it can be
appealed and be questioned in the Supreme Court by invoking the Rule 65.
The action of dismissal by the CA is allowed under section1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. It is
apparent that the CA did not act in capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner. Hence, the petitioners
should have filed for review on certiorari under Rule45 and not under Rule 65. The error of judgement is
different from grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. While errors of
judgement can be remedied by appeal, the jurisdictional questions are reviewable by certiorari.
On the other hand, the CA is correct in dismissing the petitioners Appellants Brief for failure to
comply with the requirements under Section13 of Rule 44. The review of the Appellants Brief by
Supreme Court upheld earlier ruling of the CA. According to the Supreme Court, the Appellants Brief is
devoid of the legal basis. Hence, the Supreme Court cannot establish the legal basis of the petition to
withhold the partitioning of the properties.
Lastly, the Supreme Court sustained the appellate courts dismissal of the petitioners appeal. The
Supreme Court found merit on the Order of Partition issued by the RTC Branch 220. It emphasized that
no further delay shall be incurred in the settlement of the decedent Armindas estate.
There is no objection on the parties involve that the properties are part of the conjugal partnership
of gains of spouses Natalio and Arminda. The Extrajudicial Settlement has stipulated the share of the
heirs. After the death of Arminda, the heirs right to the succession is vested and their co-ownership over
the properties is governed by operation of law. In the absence of a will, all the parties involved co-owned
the properties as compulsory heirs to Arminda and Natalio. The opposition of Gerry and Rodolfo Ecarma
on the proposal of partitioning the properties is not feasible, impractical and detrimental to the property.
The Article 495 of the Civil Code provided for the remedy of termination of the co-ownership. The parties
who petitioned cannot deprive the other co-owners to exercise all the rights to full ownership.
The court ordered the dismissal of the petition.

SPOUSES ROLANDO AND SUSIE GOLEZ vs HEIRS OF DOMINGO BERTULDO


G.R. NO. 201289, MAY 30, 2016
Facts:
The case involves two neighboring unregistered parcels of land located at Roxas City, designated as
lots 1024 and 1025. In 1976, Benito Bertuldo sold lot 1024 to Susie Golez. The metes and bounds of the
lot were clearly indicated in the executed Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, the petitioners began the
construction of their house on lot 1025 instead of 1024. Domingo Bertuldo claimed ownership over said
lot and objected against the house construction. After Domingos death, the relocation survey conducted
by the respondents revealed that the petitioners house is constructed on lot 1025. Spouses Golez asserted
that Benito clearly pointed the boundaries of the lot which covered the entire area. They executed an

Amended Deed of Absolute Sale in 1993 to change the stated property sold as lot 1024 to lot 1025
along with the specification of the metes and bounds to correct the error.
In 2009, the respondents filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the petitioners with the
MCTC court ruled in favor of the former, ordering the latter to vacate and remove their house built on lot
1025. The RTC and CA likewise affirmed the MCTC decision. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for Unlawful Detainer is the proper remedy.
Held:
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court defines two entirely distinct causes of action for a person
deprived of possession of land by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth: 1. action to recover
possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning - Forcible Entry; and 2. action founded on
Unlawful Detention by a person who originally acquired possession legally - Unlawful Detainer. The test
in determining the cause of action is the nature of entry into the land by the defendant. If the entry is
illegal, the proper cause of action against the intruder is forcible entry. If the entry is legal and becomes
illegal thereafter, the cause f action is unlawful detainer.
In the case at bar, the facts clearly show that the petitioners possession of the land was unlawful
from the start. There was no tolerance nor permission from Domingo of such possession. In an unlawful
detainer, the defendants possession of the land must be permitted by the owner through an express or
implied contract. The proper cause of action should have been one for forcible entry. However, such
action prescribes one year reckoned from the date of the defendants actual entry into the land. One of the
remedies available for the respondents to recover possession of the lot is Accion Publiciana. Such remedy
is the plenary action to recover right of possession filed in the RTC when dispossession has lasted for
more than a year. Hence, in the present case, the action will not be one of forcible entry nor unlawful
detainer.
Petition for review on certiorari is granted. The complaint for unlawful detainer is dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines et al. vs. Spouses Ildefonso B. Regulto and Francia R. Regulto
Facts:
Spouses Regulto own a parcel of land which they acquired by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. The
subject property originated from a Free Patent property. Sometime in April 2011, DPWH apprised the
spouses that the construction of its road project will traverse their property. DPWH offered them just
compensation. However, DPWH withdrew its offer because the title of their land originated from a Free
Patent title, which contained a reservation in favour of the government of an easement of right of way to
60 meters for public highways and similar works that the government or any public or quasi-public
service enterprise may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with payment of damages for the
improvements only. The spouses filed a complaint for payment of proper just compensation, damages
with prayer for issuance of TPO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners. Petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the spouses do not have cause of action, however the RTC
denied it. Petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of possession of the subject property in
their favour, which the RTC affirmed. The RTC dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration of the spouses
and ordered the petitioners to pay the spouses just compensation for the affected portion.
Issue:

Whether the petitioners are liable for just compensation in enforcing the Governments legal
easement of right-of- way on the subject property, which originated from the 7,159 sq. m. of public land
awarded by free patent to the predecessor-in- interest of the Spouses Regulto.
Held:
Partially Granted. The Court held that a legal easement of right-of- way exists in favour of the
Government over the land that was originally a public land awarded by free patent even if the land is
subsequently sold to another. Lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of- way not exceeding
60m. in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts and other similar works of the
government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvement existing
thereon that may be affected. The reservation contained in the OCT of lands granted by free patent is not
limited by any time period, thus, the same is subsisting. This belies the supposition that the Government
waived the enforcement of its legal easement of right-of- way on the subject property when it did not
oppose the subdivision of the property in 1995. Although petitioners are not obliged to pay just
compensation, they are not free from any liability as to the consequences of enforcing the said right-ofway, considering that more than half of the property shall be devoted to the bypass road. They are liable
to pay just compensation for the remaining area.

REX DACLISON vs. EDUARDO BAYTION


G.R. No. 219811, April 06, 2016
FACTS:
Eduardo Baytion, together with his siblings, co-owned a parcel of land consisting of 1,500 sq. m which is
bounded by a creek. Erected on the said land is a building which Baytion, as administrator, leased to third
persons. In 1978, Baytion leased the property Antonio dela Cruz who started a business therein. Ten or
fifteen years later, the government erected a stone walling called riprap at the creek, leaving a deep downsloping area between the property and the riprap. Antonio negotiated with a certain engineer so that he
will have the possession of the said down-sloping area. After paying the right to possess the area, Antonio
had it filled up such that it would be level with the property of Baytion. Ernanie dela Cruz succeeded
Leonida dela Cruz who had assumed the business upon Antonios death. On February, 2008, Ernanie
entered in a business venture with Rex Daclison.
On May 2008, the lease expired and Baytion made oral and written demands for Daclison to vacate the
property. Despite negotiations to continue with the lease, Baytion still demanded that Daclison and De la
Cruz vacate his property. As such, Daclison and De la Cruz moved to the filled-up area. Baytion then
instituted a complaint for forcible entry and damages claiming that the said filled-up area is still part of
his property by virtue of accretion, construction, or improvement on the property. Daclison contends that
he owns the filled-up area by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession and use of the
property
The MTC dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground that Baytion failed to include his siblings as
plaintiffs. On appeal, the RTC ruled that MeTC had no jurisdiction on the ground that Baytions
allegations failed to constitute a case of forcible entry. It then took cognizance of the case and ruled that
Baytion had a better right to possess the property because the filled-up area was an improvement of the
land. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Baytion has the right to possess the filled-up property by virtue of accretion
2. Whether or not Baytion has the right to possess the filled-up property by virtue of improvement or
accession

Ruling:
1. No. Accretion occurs when:
a. the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
b. it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,
c. the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
In the case at bar, the filled-up area was not a result of a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits
were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current from the creek adjacent to his
property. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention. As such,
no accretion to the land was involved.
2. No. In order for accession to happen, Art. 445 of the Civil Code provides that the improvement should
be made, introduced or constructed within or on the property. In the case at bar, the improvement was
made in the creek outside of Baytions property. Hence, the land could not be owned by Baytion through
accession.

Milagros Diaz et. al. VS Spouses Punzalan


G.R. No. 203075
March 16, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that their mother, Rufina Vda. De Catacutan, who died on November 17, 2005,
had acquired a parcel of land in Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga, consisting of 3, 272 square meters.
They contended that respondent spouses Punzalan constructed their house on a portion of said lot without
their consent and knowledge. But petitioners allowed them to stay, thinking that they would vacate once
their need for the property arises. However, when they made a demand, the Spouses Punzalan refused to
vacate. Thus, on April 9, 2008, petitioners wrote the spouses a formal demand letter to vacate. Still they
refused to leave the property. On August 22, 2008, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
with the MCTC.
The MCTC then rendered a Decision on June 22, 2009, in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants
were ordered to vacate and surrender its possession to the plaintiffs.
The Spouses Punzalan brought the case to the RTC. The RTC also then affirmed the MCTC
Decision in toto. Aggrieved, the Spouses Punzalan forwarded the cases to the Court of Appeals. On
February 17, 2012, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied hence this petition. The
petitioners insist that their complaint causes an action for unlawful detainer which therefore gives the
MCTC jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners claim or cause of action is one for unlawful detainer and not for
forcible entry.
HELD:
The Supreme Court disagrees. A complaint for unlawful detainer should have the following: 1)
the defendants initial possession of the property was lawful; 2) that such possession became illegal; 3)

because they refused to vacate and as a result deprived the plaintiff of the property; and 4) the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate the property.
Despite the petitioners contention, the Supreme Court finds that the allegations make up a case
for forcible entry and not unlawful detainer. The evidence clearly reveal that the spouses possession was
illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated. The Spouses Punzalan started to occupy the lot and built
a house in it without the permission and consent of petitioners. This is categorized as possession by
stealth which is forcible entry.
In the similar case of Zacarias vs Anacay, the fact that petitioners actually tolerated the spouses
continued occupation after discovery of their entry into the subject premises will not and cannot
automatically create an action for unlawful detainer. It must be stressed that the defendants possession in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but simply became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess. The plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
possession. Otherwise, if it was unlawful from the start it is actionable for forcible entry. Filing for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
In this instant case, the failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of
unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer was
not met, the MCTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. A void judgment for lack of jurisdiction is
no judgment at all. Petitioners may be the lawful possessors of the subject property, but they
unfortunately availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession. Nevertheless, they may still opt to file
an accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with the proper RTC.
This petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals; dated February 17, 2012, and
Resolution dated July 25, 2012, are AFFIRMED.

Melicio Domingo vs Spouses Genaro Molina and Elina Molina, substituted by Ester Molina
GR No. 200274, 20 April 2016

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Melecio Domingo assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 9, 2011.
FACTS:
Spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a parcel of land in Tarlac. During his lifetime Anastatcio
borrowed money from the respondents. After the death of Flora, Anastacio sold his interest over the lad to
spouses Molina to pay his debts. The sale was annotated at the OCT of the property. Anastacio died in
1986.
In 1995 the one half of the undivided portion of the land was transferred to the spouses Molina. Melecio,
one of the children of Anastacio learned about the transfer and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Ownership. He claims that the land was given to the spouses Molina as collateral for the
money borrowed by Anastacio. Anastaco could not validly sell his interest over the land without the
approval of Flora because Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property to spouses Molina is valid.
RULING:

Yes, the sale is valid. An implied co-ownership among Floras heirs governed the conjugal properties
pending litigation and partition. Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his art and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co ownership.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest of co-owners.
Consequently, Anastacios sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not
totally void, for Anastacios rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the
spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacios interest. This result
conforms with the well-established principle that the binding of a contract must be recognized as far as it
is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valerepotest).

Filomena Cabling vs. Rodrigo Dangcalan G.R. No. 187696


FACTS:
Filomena Cabling owned a 125 sq. m. parcel of land located at San Vicente, Malitbog, Southern Leyte. It
was denominated as Lot No. 5056 and had an assessed value of P 2,100. Adjoining her property was a
parcel of land that respondent had bought from her brother, GeradoMontajes. Respondent, despite
knowing the boundaries of their respective properties, constructed a perimeter fence that encroached on
petitioners land. After several unheeded demands for respondent to remove the encroachment and a
failed conference before the LupongTagapamayapa, petitioner filed the Complaint before the MCTC in
May 2001.
The encroachment on petitioners property was denied by the respondent and raised prescription as an
affirmative defense. He asserted that in 1987, he constructed the perimeter fence together with his house,
with the knowledge of the petitioner.
The petitioner even observed some phases of the construction to ensure that it would not exceed their
property boundaries. Albeit, petitioner filed her Complaint only in 2001, which was beyond the 10-year
period for acquisitive prescription under Art. 1134 of the New Civil Code.
The rendered judgment of the MCTC was I favor of the petitioner. It ruled that the perimeter fence of the
respondent had indeed encroached the property of the petitioner. Respondent had the lot titled under his
name, however he only had it surveyed in August 2001. Thus, the respondent was a builder in bad faith,
because he did not verify the actual boundaries of the lot.
The respondent appealed in the RTC, and its ruling differed from the MCTC. The RTC noted that the
survey sketch of the lot where the MCTC relied on its ruling, had no accompanying Commissioners
Report and the basis was not clear.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the Court of Appeals.
The CA denied the Petition and annulled both the RTC and MCTC Decisions for lack of jurisdiction. The
appellate court did not ruled on the issues presented by the petitioner, but on the question of the
jurisdiction of the MCTC over the petitioners complaint. The CA ruled that the Complaint was an
accionpubliciana, therefore, the MCTC had no jurisdiction, the action for the recovery of the real right of
possession properly fell under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC
invalidated the petitioners Complaint, including her appeal to the RTC.
The CA then again denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, this Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the RTC and the MCTC Decisions.

RULING:
Yes. The CA erred in nullifying the RTC and MCTC Decisions. Regardless of the value of the property,
not all cases for recovery of possession or accionpublicianalie with the RTC, as it is not practical. In
2001, the Court had already declared that the municipal trial court will have the original jurisdiction over
cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less that P 20,000 outside
of Metro Manila. As provided by Republic Act. No. 7691. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, as well as by the character of the
reliefs sought. The MCTC correctly exercised its exclusive and original jurisdiction in finding for
petitioner as the plaintiff. The respondents appeal properly fell under the appellate jurisdiction of the
RTC. Hence, neither decision can be struck down for being a total nullity.
The Petition for Certiorari is Granted. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the prompt
resolution of the case on the merits.

REBECCA FULLIDO VS. GINO GRILLI


FEBRUARY 29, 2016 G.R NO. 215014
FACTS:
Gino Grilli (Italian) and Rebecca Fullido (Filipino) had a common-law relationship for sixteen years.
Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot located in Bikibg I, Dauis, Bohol which was
registered in her name under TCT No. 30626. On the said property, they built a residential house, which
was also funded by Grilli.
In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, a memorandum of agreement and a special power
of attorney. In the contract of lease, it was stipulated that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot in the
name of Fullido, for a period of fifty years and to be automatically renewed for another fifty years upon
its expiration in the amount of P 10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease contract. Also, Fullido, as the
lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of
Grilli. On the other hand, it was stated in the MOA that the ownership of the house and lot belongs to
Grilli since he paid for the purchase price. Moreover, if their common-law relationship be terminated,
Fullido could only sell the property to whomever Grilli so desired. Lastly, the SPA allowed Grilli to
administer, manage, and transfer the house and lot on behalf of Fullido.
Unfortunately, their common-law relationship ended due to infidelity. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer with a prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction against Fullido
before the MCTC which was later on dismissed. Grilli elevated the decision to the RTC which ruled in
his favor by virtue of the contract of lease executed by the parties.
Aggrieved, Fullido instituted an appeal before the CA alleging that her land was unlawfully transferred by
Grilli to Jacqueline Guibone by virtue of the SPA earlier executed by Fullido. On May 31, 2013, the CA
upheld the decision of the RTC, emphasizing that both the MOA and the contract of lease gave Grilli the
possession and use of the house and lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rebecca Fullido may be ejected from the property?
HELD:

The Court rules that Grilli has no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Fullido. Section 1 of Rule
70 of the Rules of Court provides that the complainant must either be a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld. In other words, the
complainant in unlawful detainer case must have some right of possession over the property.
In the present case, the lease contract and the MOA, from which Grilli purportedly drew his right of
possession, were found to be null and void for being unconstitutional. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligation. It
produces no legal effect at all. Hence, as void contracts could not be the source of rights, Grilli had no
possessory right over the subject land. A person who does not have any right over a property from the
beginning cannot eject another person possessing the same. Consequently, Grillis complaint for unlawful
detainer must be dismissed for failure to prove his cause of action.
The petition is granted. The May 31, 2013 decision of the CA and its September 24, 2014 resolution are
reversed and set aside.

Heirs of Jose Extremadura, represented by Elena H. Extremadura, Vs. Manuel Extremadura and
Marlon Extremadura G.R. No. 211065
Facts:
Jose, now deceased, filed a civil action for quieting of title with recovery of possession, rendition of
accounting and damages, against his brother Manuel and his nephew Marlon.
Jose purchased three parcels of agricultural land located in Casiguran, Sorsogon from his Aunt Corazon
through a deed of sale. Since Jose resided in Manila, he placed one parcel, the subject land, in Manuels
care and that together with his son Marlon, religiously delivered the produce of said land from 1984 until
1995.
Unfortunately, respondents refused to deliver and vacate the land despite of repeated demands.
Respondents defense is that they have been in an open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, and uninterrupted
for 50 years and that the deed of sale presented by Jose is not legal or beneficial title contemplated by
Article 476 of the Civil Code.
The RTC ruled in favor of Jose. They ruled that Jose had a better right over the land as proven by the deed
of sale. Respondents elevated it to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents. It held
that Jose failed to establish legal and equitable title over the subject land.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
WON the CA correctly dismissed the civil case filed by Jose.
Ruling:
No, the CA was wrong in dismissing the case. In order for an action for quieting of title to prosper, it is
essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to the property. The court finds that Jose
satisfactorily established his equitable title over the subject land entitling him-and now petitioners as his
successors-in-interest-to the removal of the cloud or doubt thereon, particularly, the claim over the land
that the respondents are claiming for themselves. Joses claim was supported by a notarized document
denominated as Deed of Absolute sale dated Dec. 18, 1984, whereby the previous owners transferred the
subject land to Jose for and in consideration of P6,000.00, for which Jose duly paid the required capital
gains tax. In regards to respondents argument that they acquired the said land through prescription is
untenable. Under Article 524 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land
should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the
owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or
when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy.
Therefore, the action for quieting of title in Civil Case No. 2005-7552 should prosper to the benefit of his
heirs, herein petitioners.

MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., v. DIANA P. ALIBUDBUD,


[G.R. No. 209011. April 20, 2016.]
Facts:
As senior vice president for Malayan's Sales Department, Alibudbud was issued a 2004 honda
Civic sedan under the company's car financing plan, with the following conditions: 1) she must
continuously stay and serve Malayan for at least 3 full years from the date of availment of the car
financing plan; 2) that in case of resignation, retirement or termination before the 3-year period, she shall
pay in full 100% share of Malayan and the outstanding balance of his/her share of the cost of the motor
vehicle. Diana also executed a promissory note and a deed of chattel mortgage in favor of Malayan.
Alibudbud was dismissed from employment due to redundancy in July 2005. The company
demanded that she surrender possession of the car, but she refused. Malayan filed a complaint for replevin
and/or sum of money before the RTC of Manila. In the meantime, Alibudbud filed a case of illegal
dismissal with the NLRC, and in her Answer with Counterclaim in the civil case, asked for suspension of
the proceedings in view of the pendency of the labor case. She also argued that a reasonable depreciation
should be deducted from the book value of the car.
The RTC denied Alibudbud's Motion to Suspend Proceedings, wherein she asseverated that the
labor case she filed presented a prejudicial question to the instant case. The RTC ruled that the replevin
case shall be determined only on the basis of the promissory note and the chattel mortgage. Trial on the
merits ensued. In the meantime, the labor case was dismissed.
The RTC granted the complaint for replevin. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC's decision,
explaining that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the replevin action because of the employer-employee
relations between the parties which Malayan never denied.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to rule on the complaint for replevin.
Decision
Yes. Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or
chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who
wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having the right to possession to
recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may
refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally
associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained
during the pendency of the action. The present action involves the parties' relationship as debtor and
creditor, not their "employer-employee" relationship, thus, the issue in the replevin action is separate and
distinct from the illegal dismissal case. Malayan's demand for Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity
over the car or, to surrender its possession, is civil in nature. The trial court's ruling also aptly noted the
Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily signed by Alibudbud to secure her financial
obligation to avail of the car being offered under Malayan's Car Financing Plan. Clearly, the issue in the
replevin action is separate and distinct from the illegal dismissal case. The Court further considers it
justified for Malayan to refuse to accept her offer to settle her car obligation for not being in accordance
with the Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage she executed.
The Decision and Resolution of the CA are reversed and set aside.

ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION Versus CARDLINE INC., MARY C.
CALUBAD, SONY M. CALUBAD AND NG BENG SHENG

GR. NO. 201417, JANUARY 13, 2016


FACTS:
Cardline Inc., through its principal stockholders and respondents as their officers signed the
surety agreements in their personal capacities to guarantee the companies obligation under each lease
agreement when the latter leased four (4) machines from Orix.
Orix formally demanded payment from Cardline when it failed to pay its rent amounting to P 9,
369, 657.00 as of July 12, 2007, but Cardline refused to pay the unpaid obligations.
Consequently, Orix formally filed a complaint for replevin, sum of money and damages with an
application of writ of seizure against Cardline and the individual respondents. The RTC then issued the
same allowing Orix to recover the machines from Cardline. On May 6, 2008, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Orix.
The respondents filed an appeal and argued that RTC erred declaring them default. Orix then filed
a motion for issuance of a writ of execution which the RTC granted and then issued the same
commanding the sheriff to enforce the order. The respondents filed a motion for a status quo order but the
RTC denied it.
The CA ruled granting the petition for prohibition executed by the respondents under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assailed December 1, 2010 order. CA granted the petition and annulled the RTCs
order and prohibits the sheriff from executing the previous order dated May 6, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly prohibited the RTC from enforcing the writ of execution.
HELD:
The CA cited Sections 19. 2 (d) and 19.3 of the lease agreements in interpreting the judgment. It
was erroneously decided by the CA when they erred in deducting the guarantee deposit from the
outstanding debt, which contradicts to the provisions of the lease agreements.
Two points were identified for review under the lease agreements: first, the machines market
values were not intended to reduce much less offset, Cardlines debt; and second, the guaranty deposit
was intended to be automatically forfeited to serve as penalty for Cardlines default.
Wherefore, it ruled that the RTCs judgment that the return or recovery of the machined does not
reduce Cardlines outstanding obligation unless the returned machines are sold. No sale transpired
pursuant to the lease agreements.
Furthermore, the guaranty deposit was not meant to reduce Cardlines unpaid obligation. Thus,
the latters actual damages remain at Php 9, 369, 651.00.
Hence, CA erroneously interpreted the RTCs judgment, in which it erred in preventing the RTC
from enforcing the writ of execution.
Petition granted in favor of Orix. The January 6, 2012 decision and April 16, 2016 resolution of
the Court of Appeals are hereby revered and set aside under CA. GR SP No. 11826 with the costs against
the respondents.

HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO and LIBY P. CALIMOSO vs AXEL D.


ROULLO

FACTS:
In respondents complaint for Easement of Right of Way, he alleged: that he is the owner of the
lot that is isolated by several surrounding estates, including owned by petitioners; that he needs a right-ofway in order to have access to a public road; and that the shortest and most convenient access to the
nearest public road passes through the petitioners lot.
The petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement because it would cause substantial damage
to the two (2) houses already standing on their property. They alleged that the respondent has other rightof-way alternatives.
RTC granted the respondents complaint and ordered the petitioners to provide the respondent an
easement of right-of-way.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTCs decision and held that all the requisites for the establishment
of a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way were present in the respondents case: first, that the
subject lot is indeed surrounded by estates owned by different individuals and the respondent has no
access to any existing public road; second, that the respondent has offered to compensate the petitioners
for the establishment of the right-of-way through the latters property; third, that the isolation of the
subject lot was not caused by the respondent as he purchased the lot without any adequate ingress or
egress to a public highway; and, fourth and last, given the available options for the right-of-way, the route
that passes through the petitioners lot requires the shortest distance to a public road and can be
established at a point least prejudicial to the petitioners property.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the CAs decision arguing that, while the establishment of the
easement through their lot provided for the shortest route, the adjudged right-of-way would cause severe
damage not only to the nipa hut situated at the corner of the petitioners lot, but also to the bedroom
portion of the other concrete house that stood on the property. The CA, however, did not consider the
petitioners arguments on the ground that the matters alleged were not raised or proven before the trial
court, thus, it denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the right of way passing through petitioners lot satisfies the fourth requirement of being
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
RULING:
Provided under Article 650 of the Civil Code, whenever there are several tenements surrounding
the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement where the distance to the public
road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest
distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the past that the least
prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance criterion.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners lot would cause the
destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners property. Although this right-of-way has the
shortest distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and
that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is available.
It was held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the
basis of setting up a compulsory easement;" that "a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to the
servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about
way."
Petition granted

SPOUSES ROMULO H. ESPIRITU & EVELYN ESPIRITU VS SPOUSES NICANOR SAZON


&ANALIZA G. SAZON
GR NO.204965

MARCH 2, 2016

FACTS:
Sps. Espiritu are the registered owners of an 8,268 square meter parcel of land situated in the
Barangays of Bundagul and Paralayunan, Mabalacat, Pampanga. On October 5, 2006, Sps. Sazon filed on
the RTC of Angeles City an application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Sps. Espiritu,
enjoining them from committing acts of possession and constructing a factory and warehouse over the
property. Sps. Sazon claimed to be the lawful owners of the parcel of land when they purchased the land
to Sps. Diaz, the latter surrendered the physical possession to Sps. Sazon on December 27, 1996, the same
day the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed. On August 2003, Sps. Espiritu occupied and fenced the
land, invoking that they purchased the land to Sps. Peco on October 4, 2002. However, during an
investigation, it was found out that there has been a cancellation of sale when Sps. Peco purchased the
parcel of land from Sps. Diaz on December 4, 2002. Sps Sazon alleged that the title that Sps. Espiritu
have is null and void since Leticia Diaz died on March 2001, thereby making the said sale impossible.
The RTC granted the application, provided that Sps. Sazon will post a bond of 1 million pesos in favour
of the defendant. The CA affirmed the same when it was appealed to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in finding that the RTC did not abuse its discretion
when it granted the writ of preliminary injunction in favour of Sps. Sazon.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC did not abuse its discretion since a writ of preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order
requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. The reason
behind this judicial power is to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the
parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. The petition is
denied. However, the act of possession by the Sps. Espiritu to the land cannot be stopped because
injunctive reliefs are not granted for the purpose of taking the property.

National Housing Authority v Manila Seedling Bank Foundation Inc.


G.R. No. 183543

June 20 , 2016

FACTS:
NHA owned a 120-hectare of government property in Diliman, Quezon City. Through
Proclamation No. 1670 issued by President Marcos, he ordered to reserve a 7 hectare area and granted
usufructuary rights over it. However, respondent occupied a total of 16 hectares which exceeded the 7hectare area granted to it. The excess of the land was leased to private tenants.
On 15 Febuary 1993, President Ramos issued E.O. 58 creating an inter-agency Executive
Committee to inspect the 50 hectare of the North Triangle Property issued by former President Aquino. A
portion of the same was occupied by the former to vacate the area.
Respondent filed a writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioner. The latter answered that
the former vacate the area with the excess hectare, and to pay rent, with exemplary damage, attorneys
fees and litigation expenses.
On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The RTC ruled that the turnover of only the excess
hectare to petitioner, but disallowed the recovery of rent, damages, fees and litigation expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover rent, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses from respondent.

RULING:
Yes. The petitioner is only entitled to recover rent. Respondent is a possessor in bad faith as to the
excess, the former had no right to act beyond the confines of 7-hectare area granted to it.
Under Article 549 in relation to Art. 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a possessor in bad faith has to
reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything that the former received and that the latter could have
received had its possession not been interrupted. Respondent shall be made to account for the fruits it
received from the time it took possession until the time it surrendered the excess to petitioner. However,
respondent is entitled to a refund of the necessary expenses it incurred for the preservation of the land.

ROSARIO VICTORIA and ELMA PIDLAOAN vs. NORMITA JACOB PIDLAOAN,


HERMINIGILDA PIDLAOAN and EUFEMIA PIDLAOAN
Facts:
In 1984, Elma bought a parcel of land with in Lucena City, where Rosario caused the construction of a
house but she left again after the house was built the latter left for Saudi Arabia.
Elma allegedly mortgaged the house and lot in 1989 and when the properties were about to be foreclosed,
Elma allegedly asked for help from her sister-in-law, Eufemia to redeem the property and the latter's
daughter, Normita, agreed to provide the funds.
Elma offered the sale of the parcel of land to Eufemia and her daughter, and was accepted. Hence, Elma
executed a deed of sale entitled transferring the ownership of the lot to Normita. The last provision in the
said instrument provides that Elma shall eject the person who erected the house and deliver the lot to
Normita.
When Elma and Normita were about to have the document notarized, the notary public advised them to
donate the lot instead to avoid capital gains tax. Hence, a deed of donation was executed by Elma in
favour of Normita and since then the latter had been paying the real property taxes over the lot but Elma
continued to occupy the house.
Rosario found out about the donation when she returned to the country a year or two after the transaction
and in 1997, herein petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of contract, cancellation of Transfer of
Certificate Title, and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against the respondents.
The petitioners argued that: first, they co-owned the lot because both of them contributed the money used
to purchase it; second, Elma and Normita entered into an equitable mortgage to secure Elmas loan but
they executed a deed of sale instead; and third, the deed of donation was simulated.
In their answer, the respondents admitted that the deed of donation was simulated and that the original
transaction was a sale, however, there was no agreement to constitute a real estate mortgage on the lot.
The RTC ruled that Rosario and Elma co-owned the lot and the house. Thus, Elma could only donate her
one-half share in the lot. Hence, the respondents appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the RTCs decision
and dismissed the petitioners complaint. Hence the case was brought before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Rosario is a co-owner of the parcel of land.
2. Whether or not the deed of donation was simulated and that the transaction between Elma and Normita
was a mere equitable mortgage.
Ruling:

On the first issue, the court ruled that the land under consideration is solely owned by Elma, and
not under the claim of co-ownership. Petitioners failed to present proof of Rosarios contributions in
purchasing the lot from its previous owners. The execution of the transfer documents solely in Elmas
name alone militate against their claim of co-ownership. Thus, the court finds no merit in the petitioners
claim of co-ownership over the lot.
Neither does the mere construction of house in a parcel of land create a co-ownership. Article 448
of the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on anothers land in good faith, the land owner may
either: (a) appropriate the works as his own after paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder to pay the
price of the land. Thus, Rosarios construction of a house on the lot did not create a co-ownership,
regardless of the value of the house. Rosario, however, is not without recourse in retrieving the house or
its value.
As for the second issue, the court ruled that the deed of donation was simulated and the parties
real intent was to enter into a sale. In the present case, Elma and Normitas contemporaneous and
subsequent acts show that they were about to have the contract of sale notarized but the notary public illadvised them to execute a deed of donation instead. Following this advice, they returned the next day to
have a deed of donation notarized. Clearly, Elma and Normita intended to enter into a sale that would
transfer the ownership of the subject matter of their contract but disguised it as a donation. Thus, the deed
of donation subsequently executed by them was only relatively simulated.
Article 1346 of the New Civil Code provides that:
An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not
prejudice a
third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
A review of the sale contract shows that the parties intended no equitable mortgage. The contract
even contains Elma's undertaking to remove Rosario's house on the property. This undertaking supports
the conclusion that the parties executed the contract with the end view of transferring full ownership over
the lot to Normita.
In sum, we rule that based on the records of the case, Elma and Normita entered in a sale contract,
not a donation. Elma sold the entire property to Normita. Accordingly, TCT was validly issued in
Normita's name.

Tan Siok Kuan and Pute Ching vs Felicismo Boy Ho, Rodolfo C. Returta, Vicente Salas and
Lolita Malonzo
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari for a civil case in which the petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a
parcel of land and its improvements which the defendants were possessing. It was stated that there were
separate complaints for unlawful detainer and that the petitioner alleged the defendants were leasing their
land from the year 1973 and the defendants failed to pay in 1997 and in 2003 the petitioners notified the
defendants that for their failure to pay rentals. The defendants were given 10 days to pay or else vacate
the premises which was ignored and as such prompted the petitioners to file a civil case. Two of the
respondents contended that they could not have been subjected to lease because of the reason that the
petitioners were not Filipino citizens which do not allow them to own land here in the Philippines while
the other 5 contended that there is no existing contract between them and the petitioners and that they
already possess the land for 37 years. The defendants also added that if the titles of the petitioners are
authentic the case that should have been filed is accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer because they
have been in possession of the land. After trial in Metropolitan Trial Court, it ruled in favor of the
petitioners which said that the defendants impliedly admitted the existence of the lease. Upon appeal the

Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. However when appealed to the Court of
Appeals it was reversed in favor of the defendants.
Issue:
Whether or not the action that should have been filed is accion publiciana?
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that accion publiciana should have been filed considering the fact that the
petitioners failed to show evidence that there is an existing tenancy relationship between them and the
defendants which suggests that unlawful detainer will not apply. Although defendants and respondents
were made party to the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the petitioner, it is clear that they do not
have the same defenses. Contrary to defendants positions, respondents, as early filing for their response to
petitioners demand letter, firmly and consistently denied the existence of any lease contract between them
and petitioners over the subject land. Wherefore finding no reversible error in the assailed ruling, the
court resolves to deny the present petition.

G.R. No. 217694, January 27, 2016


FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ARTURO LOO PO, Respondent.
The Antecedents
Fairland brought an action before the MTC for unlawful detainer against Arturo Loo Po, alleging nonpayment of rent. Petitioner further alleged that he was the owner of Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar
Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City which was leased to Po by verbal agreement with a rental
fee of P20,000.00 a month, to be paid by Po at the beginning of each month. Fairland did not renew lease
agreement with Po for continuously failing to pay for rent.
Instead, it demanded Po to pay his rental arrears amounting to 220,000 and ordered that he vacate the
leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the letter. Po neither complied, tendered
payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the premises.
Po belatedly filed an answer and denied the allegations against him. He averred that there was no
supporting document that would show that Fairland owned the property; that there was no lease contract
between them; that there were no documents attached to the complaint which would show that previous
demands had been made and received by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was P220,000.00, but the
amount of damages being prayed for was P440,000.00; that the issue in the case was one of ownership;
and that it was the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case. Considering, however, that the case fell
under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the motion was
denied.11
The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
the MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland's failure to prove that it was entitled
to the possession of the subject property. There was no evidence presented to support its claim against Po
either.
Fairland argued that an unlawful detainer case was a special civil action governed by summary procedure.
That in such cases, judgment should be based on the "facts alleged in the complaint," 13 and that there was
no requirement that judgment must be based on facts proved by preponderance of evidence.
Fairland continued that the failure to file an answer in an ejectment case was tantamount to an admission
by the defendant of all the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling and agreed that Fairland failed to establish its
case by preponderance of evidence
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
CA dismissed the petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer would not lie against Po. the
Rules on Summary Procedure did not relax the rules on evidence. In order for an action for recovery of
possession to prosper, it was indispensable that he who brought the action should prove not only his
ownership but also the identity of the property claimed. The CA concluded, however, that Fairland failed
to discharge such bounden duty.
Fairland filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution, dated
March 6, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Complaint has a valid cause of action for Unlawful Detainer
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
WON the Complaint has a valid cause of action for Unlawful Detainer
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may be
filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person from whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. The defendant's
possession, however, became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the defendant
refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful
withholding of possession.22
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1)
initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property, and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year from the last
demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 23
the complaint sufficiently alleged that Fairland was the owner of the subject property being leased to Po
by virtue of an oral agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po to pay rent and vacate before the
complaint for unlawful detainer was instituted. The complaint was seasonably filed within the one-year
period prescribed by law. With all the elements present, there was clearly a cause of action in the
complaint for unlawful detainer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arturo Loo Po is ORDERED TO
VACATE Condominium Unit No. 205 located in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.
Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears, as well as the rentals accruing in the
interim until he vacates the property. The unpaid rentals shall incur a legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from January 30, 2012, when the demand to pay and to vacate was made, up to the finality of this
decision. Thereafter, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on the total amount due
until full payment is made.
SO ORDERED.c

MILAGROSA JOCSON v NELSON SAN MIGUEL


G.R. No. 206941
FACTS:
Jocson alleged that she is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 60,241
square meters, located in Magalang, Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4 73856-R.
She asserted that 56,000 sq m thereof became the subject of an Agricultural Leasehold Contract5
(Contract) between her and San Miguel, with the latter as tenant-lessee. As part of the contract, they
agreed that the subject landholding shall be devoted to sugar and rice production.
According to Jocson, San Miguel, however, occupied the entire landholding and refused to vacate the
portion not covered by their Contract despite repeated demands. On December 15, 2009, Jocson filed a
Supplemental Complaint alleging that, during the pendency of the present suit, San Miguel commenced to
plant corn on the, subject landholding which violated their Contract.
In his Answer, San Miguel maintained that he had religiously complied with all the terms and conditions
of their Contract and that Jocson has no valid ground to eject him from the disputed landholding.
On January 26, 2011, PARAD Provincial Adjudicator Vicente Aselo S. Sicat (PA Sicat) rendered a
Decision in favour of Jocson.
On July 27, 2011, PA Sicat issued an Order denying due course to San Miguel's Notice of Appeal and
thereafter declared the case final and executory. Aside from failure to pay the required appeal fee and to
attach the required certification, the PARAD held that the Notice of Appeal was likewise filed out of time.
The PARAD held that under Section 12, Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, "[t]he filing of
the Motion for Reconsideration shall interrupt the period to perfect an appeal. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party shall have the remaining period within which to perfect his appeal. Said period shall not
be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from the receipt of the notice of denial."
The P ARAD found that San Miguel, through his counsel, received his copy of Decision dated January
26, 2011 on February 3, 2011 and thereafter filed his MR on February 15, 2011, thus, he could have only
three (3) days within which to file his Notice of Appeal upon its denial. The MR was denied on May 31,
2011 and San Miguel, through his counsel, received his copy of the Order on June 2, 2011 and he filed his
Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2011 or after twelve (12) days, which, following the rules abovementioned,
is already beyond the period allowed.
San Miguel argued that the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure adopted the "fresh period rule" enunciated
by this Court in Neypes v. CA to the effect that it allows litigants a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file a notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration as provided for under Section 1, Rule IV of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
On October 29, 2012, the CA issued a Decision granting San Miguel's petition and remanding the case to
the DARAB-PARAD for further proceedings. The CA held that the "fresh period rule" enunciated in
Neypes should be applied in the instant case.
Issues:
I. IN REJECTING THE APPLICATION OF THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE TO THE
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY SAN MIGUEL AND UPHOLDING THE APPLICATION OF THE
"FRESH PERIOD RULE" PROVIDED UNDER THE NEW 2009 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE
WHICH TOOK EFFECT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THIS SUIT BEFORE THE PARAD, IN THE
CASE AT BAR.
II. IN APPLYING THE NEYPES RULING IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE RULING IN
PANOLJNO V TAJALA32 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS WERE NOT
ISSUED BY A COURT.

Ruling:
This Court finds the petition to be meritorious.
In the present case, the Complaint was filed on September 10, 2008 prior to the date of effectivity of the
2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure on September 1, 2009. Thus, pursuant to the above-cited rule, the
applicable rule in the counting of the period for filing a Notice of Appeal with the Board is governed by
Section 12, Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
This Court likewise finds no merit to San Miguel's contention that the "fresh period rule" laid down in
Neypes is applicable in the instant case. In Panolino, this Court held that the "fresh period rule" only
covers judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts
to the [CA]; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the [CA]; and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
Court reiterated that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals.
In the present case, the appeal from a decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB as provided
for under Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, is not judicial but administrative
in nature. As such, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes finds no application therein. As correctly observed by
PA Sicat, San Miguel should perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period of appeal, but not less
than five (5) days, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial of his MR or until June 7, 2011.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is hereby GRANTED

Gr. No. 172352


Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Hababag Sr. substituted by his wife, Consolacion, and
Children, namely: Manuel, Salvador, Wilson, Jimmy, Alfredo Jr., and Judith, all surnamed
Hababag
Gr. No. 172387-88
Alfredo Hababag Sr. substituted by his wife, Consolacion, and Children, namely: Manuel, Salvador,
Wilson, Jimmy, Alfredo Jr., and Judith, all surnamed Hababag vs. Land Bank of the Philippines
and the Department of Agrarian Reform
Promulgated: September 16, 2016
FACTS:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are the decision dated November 15, 2005
and the Resolution dated April 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) G.R. SP Nos. 86066 and 86167,

which set aside the Amended Decision dated March 22, 2004 and the Order dated August 10, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Barnch 52 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 96-6217, fixing the amount of
just compensation at P2,398,487.24, with interest at 12% per annum, in view of the expropriation of
certain parcels of land owned by the heirs of Alfredo Hababag Sr.
Alfredo Hababag Sr. was the owner of several parcels of land with an agricultural land with an aggregate
area of 82.4927 has. situated in Brgy. Ca Carriedo, Manapao, and Casili, in the Municipality of Gubat
Sorsogon, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12107. The aforesaid land holdings were
voluntarily offered for sale to the government under R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, but only 69.3857 has. Thereof were acquired in 1990.
The Land Bank of the Philippines initially valued the subject lands at P1,237,850.00, but Alfredo rejected
the valuation. After summary administrative proceedings for the determination of the amount of just
compensation, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Adjudication Board (DARAB) fixed the value of the subject lands at
P1,292,553.20. Dissatisfied Alfredo filed a complaint for the determination of the amount of just
compensation before the RTC.
The RTC Ruling on March 22,2004, the RTC rendered an amendment to the Decision, fixing the amount
of the subject lands at P40,423,400.00 with their motion for reconsideration having been denied in an
Order dated August 10, 2004, the LBP and the DAR filed separate petitions for review with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 86066 and 86167, respectively. For its part, the LBP averred that the RTC
gravely erred in disregarding the factors under case of LBP vs. Banal. On the other hand, the DAR
contended that the RTC erred in including in its computation the estimated income of the coconut trees
for their remaining economic life (computed at 20 years) and in adjudging a just compensation award
which is higher than the offered valuation of the landowner. Pending appeal, Alfredo passed away and
was substituted by his heirs, i.e., the Hababag heirs.
The CA Ruling, In the assailed Decision dated November 15, 2005, the CA set aside the RTCs valuation
for failure to give due consideration the factors enumerated in Sectoin 17 of RA 6657 and the formula
under DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94. Moreover , contrary to the limitation imposed by
DAR AO 6-92-i.e., that the applicable formula shall not exceed the landowners offered to sell-the CA
found that the amount as recomputed by the RTC was may beyond the landowners offer of
P1,750,000.00 as stated in the Claims Valuation and Process Form. Consequently, it gave more credence
to the report submitted by Commissioner Concuera which made use of the DAR formula derived from the
factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657. The CA likewise considered the governments
obligation to pay just compensation to be in the nature of a forbearance of money and, as such
additionally imposed interest on the just compensation award at 12% p.a., to be reckoned from the time of
the taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever is earlier. The LBP and the Hababag Heirs filed their
respective motions for partial reconsideration which were both denied in a Resolution dated April 19,
2006; hence the instant petitions for review on certiorari.
Issues
1. Whether or not LBP has no obligation in paying interest to Hababag Heirs since there could be no
delay as of yet in the payment of just compensation upon of judgement.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the just compensation fixed by the RTC which was
in accordance with the provisions of Section 17 of RA 6657 and the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
66824 directing its re-computaion
Ruling
In keeping with these considerations, the Court finds the CAs valuation which made use of the
DAR formula as reflective of the factors set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657. Records disclose that the
CAs computation, as adopted from the LBPs own computation, is based on: (a) actual production data;
(b) the appropriate industry selling prices of the products from the Philippines Coconut Authority and the
Bureau of Agricultural Statistics of Sorsogon; and (c) The actual uses of the property. Likewise, the (a)
income from the coconut fruit-bearing trees, as well as the unirrigated rice land (b) cumulative cost of the

non-fruit bearing trees; and (c) market value of the cogonal land have been duly considered. The Court
observes that the holistic data gathered therrfrom adequately consider the factors set forth in Section 17 of
RA 6657, as well as the DAR formula. As such, the CAs computation, which was derived from the same,
must be sustained. Lest it be misunderstood, the ascertainment of just compensation on the basis of the
land holdings nature, location, and market value, as well as the volume and value of the produce is valid
and accords with Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR formula, as in this case.
With respect tto the rate of the interests, the Court observes that from the time of the taking up
until June 30, 2013, the interests must be pegged at the rate of 12% per annum pursuant to Section 2 of
Central Bank Circular No. 905, series of 1982,which was the prevailing rule on interests rates during such
period, From July 1,2013 onwards and until full payment, the interest rate should then be pegged at the
rate of 6% per annum pursuant to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799, series of 2013, which
accordingly amended the old 12% per annum interest rate.
Wherefore, the petitions are denied. Accordingly, the decision dated November 15, 2005 anf thr
Resolution dated April 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 86066 and 86167are hereby
Affirmed with modification imposing interest on the unpaid balance of the just compensation due to the
heirs of Alfredo Hababag Sr. at the rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the taking of the expropriated
property until June 30, 2013, and thereafter at 6% per annum until full payment.

G.R. No. 170004, January 13, 2016


ILONA HAPITAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JIMMY LAGRADILLA AND WARLILY
LAGRADILLA AND ESMERALDA BLACER, Respondents.
The Facts
Between September to December 1994, respondent Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan (Esmeralda) issued thirtyone (31) United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks in various amounts in the total amount of
P510,463.98, payable to the order of respondent Warlily Lagradilla (Warlily). The checks were
dishonored by UCPB for reasons of "account closed" when presented for payment by
Warlily.anroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 6, 1995, Warlily, with her husband Jimmy Lagradilla (Jimmy), filed a civil case for sum of
money against Nolan (Nolan) and Esmeralda Hapitan, Ilona Hapitan (llona), and Spouses Jessie and Ruth
Terosa (Spouses Terosa), with a prayer that a writ for preliminary attachment be issued against the real
property of Esmeralda and Nolan, consisting of a house and lot, as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that might be recovered.
In their complaint, Jimmy and Warlily alleged that they made several demands on Nolan and Esmeralda
for the latter to settle their outstanding obligations. The latter spouses promised to convey and transfer to
Jimmy and Warlily the title of their house and lot, located at Barangay M. V. Hechanova, Jaro, Iloilo City.
Jimmy and Warlily later found out that Nolan and Esmeralda separately executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) designating Ilona, Nolan's sister, as their attorney-in-fact for the sale of the same
property.10 Jimmy and Warlily alleged that the property was fraudulently sold to Spouses Terosa, 11 and
that Nolan and Esmeralda were about to depart from the Philippines with the intent to defraud their
creditors; thus, the prayer for the issuance of preliminary attachment of the house and lot.
Esmeralda filed an Answer with Cross-Claim, admitting her indebtedness to Warlily. She alleged that due
to the failure of Nolan, who was a seaman at that time, to send her substantial amounts and on account of
the losses she sustained in her jewelry business, she failed to fund the checks she issued. 14 Also, although
she executed an SPA in favor of Ilona authorizing the latter to sell the house and lot owned by her and
Nolan, she subsequently revoked the said SPA.anroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Nolan and Ilona denied the allegations of Jimmy and Warlily.16 They argued that the debts were incurred
solely by Esmeralda and were not intended to benefit the conjugal partnership.
The RTC rendered its Decision, ruling in favor of Jimmy and Warlily.
The RTC ruled that the house and lot is part of Nolan and Esmeralda's conjugal property, having
been built from the amounts sent by Nolan to Esmeralda as well as the income from Esmeralda's business.
As regards the sale of the house and lot to the Spouses Terosa, the RTC noted that the property was sold
through an attorney-in-fact, Ilona. The SPA provided that the proceeds of the sale of Esmeralda's share in
the property shall be applied specifically in payment of her obligations. This limited authority was
acknowledged by Nolan in his SPA to Ilona.
The RTC also found that the SPA was revoked after Esmeralda knew that the consideration was
unconscionably low and that Nolan and his relatives became antagonistic to her. Further, Ilona turned
over the payment to Nolan, but Ilona or Nolan did not pay Esmeralda's obligations.
On the liability of the Spouses Terosa, the RTC ruled that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove
that they connived and cooperated with their co-defendants Nolan and Ilona to defraud Esmeralda, and
also Jimmy and Warlily. The RTC noted that the Spouses Terosa chose to remain silent because whatever
the outcome of the case, they will not stand to lose anything. In addition, before the sale was
consummated, they were informed of the revocation of the SPA in favor of Ilona.
The parties filed separate Notices of Appeal.ua
In its Decision dated October 14, 2003, the CA agreed with the RTC ruling.
On November 6, 2003, Nolan and Ilona filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Modification 26 based mainly
on the Affidavit of Waiver, Quitclaim and Satisfaction of Claim (Waiver).
Jimmy and Warlily filed a Manifestation and Motion30 dated December 19, 2003. They alleged that on
October 28, 2003, Warlily was approached by Nolan who offered money to settle the case amicably.
Considering that she was not assisted by her counsel, who had died earlier that year, and that she was in
difficult financial constraints then, she accepted the deal of P 125,000.00 for her and her husband to sign a
quitclaim or waiver. Further, at that moment, she was not aware of the fact that the CA had already
rendered a decision dated October 14, 2003 as she only knew of the decision on October 30, 2003. She
said that she felt somehow deprived of her rights when Nolan willfully failed to disclose the fact that the
case was already decided by the CA and taking undue advantage of her counsel's absence, hurriedly
closed the deal with her. She further averred that perhaps Nolan was bothered by his conscience when he
gave her P300,000.00 on November 19, 2003.
The Issue
We decide whether the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement can modify the Decision of the CA.
The Courts Ruling
The Waiver is invalid
Petitioners anchored their Motion for Reconsideration/Modification on the Affidavit of Waiver, Quitclaim
and Satisfaction of Claim40 executed by Warlily, which they aver to have rendered the issue of the validity
of the transfer of the property moot and academic. We are not persuaded.
The Amicable Settlement is not valid
The Amicable Settlement, intending to put an end to the controversy between jimmy and Warlily and
Nolan and Ilona, partakes the nature of a compromise agreement. The Amicable Settlement involves two
subjects: 1) the payment of the principal obligation of P510,463.98 to Jimmy and Warlily; and 2) the
cancellation of the sale of the house and lot to the Spouses Terosa.

A compromise agreement is defined as a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in
order to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. 43 To have the force of law
between the parties, a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites and principles of contracts.
Such disposal or waiver by Nolan is not allowed by law. Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse;
otherwise, such disposition is void. Further, under Article 89 of the Family Code, no waiver of rights,
interests, shares, and effects of the conjugal partnership of gains during the marriage can be made except
in case of judicial separation of property. Clearly, Esmeralda did not consent to Nolan disposing or
waiving their rights over the house and lot through the Amicable Settlement. In fact, she even objected to
the Amicable Settlement, as evidenced by her pleadings filed before the courts. She further expressed
disbelief that Nolan would want the CA to reverse its decision when its ruling, saving Nolan and
Esmeralda's conjugal property, is favorable to him.
The invalidity of the Amicable Settlement notwithstanding, we find that it still is evidence of payment by
Nolan and Ilona of P425,000.00. Even Jimmy and Warlily do not deny that they received the said amount.
In fact, in their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration/ Modification and Comment to the Answer
to the Manifestation and Motion51 filed with the CA, they admitted that they received the amount, 52 and
even attached a copy of the receipt53 as annex to the said pleading. The amount of P425,000.00 should
therefore be deducted from the total amount due to Jimmy and Warlily.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

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