G.R. No.

L-5275

August 25, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUANITO DASIG, BALBINO GABUNI and MARCELINO
DAYAO, defendants-appellants.
Domingo L. Vergara for appellants Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao.
Perfecta E. de Vera for appellant Balbino Gabuni.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Ramon L.
Avancea for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Defendants in the above-entitled case appeal from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela, finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide, and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of Norberto Ramil, in the sum of P4,000, and the
complainant, Jacinta Galasinao, in the sum of P190, and to pay the costs of
the prosecution.
The record discloses that in the evening of December 23, 1949, at about
midnight, while Norberto Ramil and his wife, Jacinta Galasinao, and their
daughter and son, Segunda and Domingo, respectively, were sleeping in their
house situated not far away from the municipal building of Antatet (now
Luna), Province of Isabela, the said spouses were suddenly awakened by the
barking of dogs and the grunting of pigs. Ramil got up and walked quietly
towards a window, to find out what the dogs were barking at, but just then two
persons who had entered the house faced him. The wife heard these persons
talking in whispers and saw them in front. She lighted a lamp, and as she did
so the two intruders levelled their guns at her husband and demanded from
him to produce his pistol. As the husband could not produce any pistol and
said he had none at all, they fired at him. He used his two hands to protect
himself, but to no avail. As he received the shots, he fell down in a stooping
position and then slumped on the floor, face downwards. The wife and her
two children, who had already been awakened, cried for help, but the
intruders levelled their guns at them, commanding them to keep quiet and
threatening to kill if they did not do so. For fear, they had to stop. The
intruders then went inside the bedroom and ran-sacked the contents of the

trunk which contained their valuables. P10 in cash and jewels worth P180
were taken away.
The Chief of Police of Antatet, who lived around twenty meters away from the
house of Ramil, heard three pistol shots, so he repaired to the municipal
building to fetch one of his policemen, then they passed by the house of the
Mayor, and together with him they proceeded to the house of Ramil. When
they reached it the robbers were already gone. They found Ramil already
dead with gun-shots wounds on the left eye, in the right breast, at the back,
and at the left index finger. They questioned the wife, who recounted, to them
what had happened. The chief of police found a fired bullet, caliber .32, inside
the truck, four empty .22 caliber cartridges near the dead body, three
empty .32 caliber shells, one near the broken box inside the bedroom and the
other two five meters from the house of the deceased, and three .45 caliber
empty shells under the house just below the body the dead body. The
following day, a physician of Antatet performed an autopsy on the dead body
of Ramil and he found four gunshot wounds in the places already indicated
above. When he opened the chest cavity, he discovered a .22 caliber slug
right at the heart.
The above facts are not contradicted. The evidence, upon which the judgment
of conviction is based, consists of the testimony on one, Jose Mallillin, that of
Andres Bumanglag, which in part corroborates Mallillin's testimony, and the
findings of a ballistic expert of the Philippine Constabulary to the effect that
the empty .32 caliber cartridges found under the house of Ramil had been
fired from the Llama auto-pistol possessed by, and licensed in the name of,
Mallillin, and that the .32 caliber slug, Exhibit C, which was found inside the
trunk, had also been fired therefrom. These findings were based on the fact
that the striations found in the said bullet are identical with and congruent to
those which he fired from the same Llama auto-pistol, and the pin marks at
the empty .32 caliber cartridges are identical with and congruent to that found
at an empty cartridge fired from the same pistol.
Mallillin was formerly a school teacher of Antatet and had resided there, but
on the date of the robbery he was living in a contiguous town, Cauayan. He
testified as follows: On the evening in question, while he was on his way
home, he saw four persons near a checkpoint, and as he passed by, two of
them got hold of him and a third snatched his pistol away and compelled him
to follow them. The four were later recognized by him to be the defendants

Balbino Gabuni, Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao, and Sergio Eduardo.
They boarded a jeep, which was parked near the road and in which there
were two others whom Mallillin did not recognize, and then they drove to the
junction of the Cabatuan-Antatet roads. Here they all went down and walked
towards Antatet.
When the party was around 100 meters from the municipal building, he saw
his companions talking to Andres Bumanglag. Taking Bumanglag aside, he
informed the latter that he had been held up. Upon Mallillin' suggestion, his
companions asked Bumanglag how the house of Ramil could be entered, and
the latter answered that it could be done through a window near the well.
They also asked further information from him, and thereafter he was allowed
to go away, but with the warning that if he would squeal, he would be put to
death.
After Bumanglag had left, they went to a place around fifty meters from the
House of Ramil, the intended victim. Here they waited till about midnight
when they approached the house. Gabuni then ordered Mallillin to stay in a
place beside the road. Dasig and Eduardo then gave him their shoes for him
to keep, while the five, including the two unknown persons, approached the
house. Dasig and Eduardo entered the house through the window, while
Gabuni stayed at the door in front. Gabuni gave his carbine to Dayao and
Mallillin's Llama pistol to Dasig, while Eduardo held a .22 caliber pistol.
Five minutes after the three had gone up the house, Mallillin heard three
shots. Then he heard a voice calling for help. He got frightened, so he
hurriedly went away bound for Cauayan. While still in Antatet, he heard the
policemen of Antatet exchange shots with his companions. He arrived in
Cauayan at about one o'clock. At around 4:30 that morning, Sergio Eduardo
called at his house and asked for their shoes, and as he went away, he
warned Mallillin not to squeal, otherwise he would be killed. Mallillin asked for
his pistol and was informed that it was with Marcelino Dayao. That same
morning he went to Dayao and got it from the latter. Juanito Dasig also called
at his house that same morning, warning him that if he would squeal, he
would be in a bad fix, informing him further that their two companions, whom
Mallillin had not recognized, had gone to Manila to fetch some more of their
companions until they reach as many as twenty.

The above is Mallillin's version. He was apprehended by the authorities on

December 31, 1949. Four days before his arrest, he further said, he had
decided, after consultation with his wife, to go to the chief of police of
Cauayan to ask him to accompany him to Cabatuan, where he was going to
relate all that had happened, but that it so happened that when he saw the
chief of police, the latter had no time to hear him as he was going away and
was then ready with his baggage to go to Manila.
When Mallillin was taken to Constabulary barracks on December 31, 1949, he
had a talk with Lieutenant Panis of the Constabulary. Panis promised him that
he would be used as a state witness if he would disclose all that he knew
about the robbery. With this promise Mallillin made a complete disclosure of
the above facts to Lieutenant Panis. His statement was put in writing,
although it was not sworn to before the justice of the peace until January 3,
1950. His affidavit was introduced at the trial as Exhibit 4-Gabuni, Exhibit 3Dasig-Dayao, and contains substantially the same facts testified to by him
during the trial.
The testimony of Andres Bumanglag is to the effect that that same evening,
he had been playing guitar with two companions at the house of one Labog,
and that when they went home and as they were approaching his house, he
was suddenly held up by two persons. When brought to a group to which the
two belonged, he recognized Mallillin, Gabuni, chief of police of Cauayan, and
Dasig. He was asked about the number of policemen of Antatet, the arms that
they had, the caliber of the arms, and the persons who had firearms. Finally,
they asked him to draw a sketch of the house of Norberto Ramil and its
position in relation to the house of the mayor, as well as the position of the
window through which entrance could be gained into the house. Bumanglag
was very much frightened because, at the beginning when he re-fused to
answer the questions that they asked him, he was kicked and threatened by
the group. Besides, Mallillin had informed him that he himself had been heldup, and that he should tell what they asked him, he was kicked and
threatened by the group. Besides, Mallillin had informed him that he himself
had been held-up, and that he should tell what they asked him, other-wise
both of them would be killed. After getting all the information they desired,
Bumanglag was allowed to go home. A few minutes after he went to bed he
heard some shots, and stray bullets hit his house and a kapok three nearby,
so he and his family had to go down the house to seek shelter from stray
bullets.

On January 3, 1950, Andres Bumanglag also made an affidavit before

Lieutenant Panis, which was sworn to by him before the justice of the peace
of Antatet. In this affidavit, Exhibit 5-Gabuni, he mentions the fact that before
the robbery a group of persons, four of whom were armed, came and asked
information from him about the house of Norberto Ramil, and that on that
occasion he also saw Mallillin with them, who told him that he was held saw
held up by the group.
The trial court gave credit to the testimonies of Mallillin and Bumanglag as
above outlined, and together with the identification made by the wife of Ramil
of one of the appellants by the latter's stature, and on the further ground that
the cartridges and some of the bullets found in the premises had been fired
from the Llama pistol of Mallillin, held that the crime of robbery with homicide
had been committed by the accused-appellants herein, and sentenced them
as above indicated.
In this court the attorneys for the appellants contend that inasmuch as
Mallillin's confession was obtained by a promise made by the Constabulary
Lieutenant Panis that Mallillin would be excluded from the information and
made a state witness, Mallillin's confession is not admissible against him and
neither should it be admissible against the appellants herein. It is evident that
counsel misunderstands the application of the principle in evidence that a
confession secured through promise of immunity is not admissible. The
evidence submitted against the appellants is not the confession made by
Mallillin; it is his testimony given in open court. There is, therefore, no
occasion to invoke the principle of evidence in question.
The most important claim of the defendants-appellants is that inasmuch as
Mallillin was an accomplice in the crime and his testimony contains flaws in
many particulars, the maxim Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus should be
applied to the whole of his testimony, and the judgment of conviction would
then have no leg to stand on. There are certainly many points or particulars in
Mallillin's testimony which can not stand careful scrutiny. First of all, we have
the supposed compulsion or hold-up which he claims he was subjected to.
Mallillin admits that the defendants-appellants had been his companions in
various games, like poker, "pekyo", etc. Then there is the circumstance that
the supposed hold-up took place in the center of the town. According to some
defense witnesses, Mallillin had also been telling of robberies that might take

place in town. It is unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that Mallillin was not

an unwilling companion in the commission of the crime.
But, on the other hand, we find that his testimony is corroborated by evidence
worthy of credit. That he was present on the occasion of the robbery can not
be denied, because his Llama pistol was proven to have been fired at the
scene of the robbery, as cartridges and bullets proved to have been fired from
the said pistol had been found in the house where the robbery was
committed. And the fact that appellants had been companions of Mallillin in
many gambling games points to the close acquaintance between them and
them unity of purpose as well. While his story that it was not he who furnished
the data about the climbing of the house and its surroundings, his statement
that Juanito Dasig and Sergio Eduardo were the ones who went inside the
house is corroborated by the inmates of the house to the effect that only two
of the robbery entered the house.
Again, the testimony about the different arms used, a carbine in the
possession of Dayao, a pistol given Eduardo by Gabuni these facts are
corroborated by the finding of .22 caliber slugs and empty shells in the heart
of the victim and in the house and in the premises. The testimony of Mallillin
that Gabuni carried a .45 caliber pistol, which was his service pistol as chief of
police, is also untrue because the examination of the .45 caliber bullet found
in the premises shows that it was not fired from the service pistol of Gabuni.
But Mallillin's assertion may be due to innocent error on his part. He perhaps
thought that the pistol that Gabuni carried was his service pistol. But Gabuni
may have planned to avoid identification by using a firearm different from that
which he used as member of the police force.
Then there is the corroboration of the testimony of Mallillin given by Andres
Bumanglag, whom the trial court considered as a trustworthy witness. We find
nothing from the record which would justify us in reversing the appraisal of the
above testimony and the credit given this corroborating witness by the trial
court.
It has been stated that the rule (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus) invoked is
not a mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a permissible one, which allows
the jury or the court to draw the inference or not to draw it as circumstances
may best warrant. (70 C.J. 783.) The unbelievable allegation of Mallillin, that
he was forced into joining the band against his will, arises from the natural

desire of an accomplice to shift the blame to his co-conspirators and

exculpate himself; while his assertion that the gun Gabuni carried was his
service pistol maybe an innocent mistake on Mallillin's part. His claim that it
was Bumanglag who indicated where access to the victim's house may be
had may also be untrue, be-cause Mallillin had been said to have been in the
house. Do these flaws and defects render his testimony wholly inadmissible
under the rule invoked?
We take advantage of this opportunity to explain the true scope of this much
invoked and abused rule of (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus.) Professor
Wigmore states that this rule ceased to be the rule in England as early as the
beginning of the eighteenth century. He criticizes the board rule as unsound,
because not true to human nature; that because a person tells a single lie, he
is lying throughout his whole testimony, or that there is strong possibility that
he is so lying. The reason for it is that once a person knowingly and
deliberately states a falsehood in one material aspect, he must have done so
as to the rest. But it is also clear that the rule has its limitations, for when the
mistaken statement is consistent with good faith and is not conclusively
indicative of a deliberate perversion, the believable portion of the testimony
should be admitted. Because though a person may err in memory or in
observation in one or more respects, he may have told the truth as to others.
(III Wigmore, Secs. 1009-1015, pp. 674-683.) There are, therefor, these
requirements for the application of the rule, i.e., that the false testimony is as
to a material point, and that there should be a conscious and deliberate
intention to falsify. (Lyric Film Exchange, Inc. vs. Cowper, 1937, 36 Off. Gaz.,
1642.)
The rule is also carefully considered in the case of the Santisima Trinidad, 7
Wheat. 283, 5 Law. Ed. 454, thus:
Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be
presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or
his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular
place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt
him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice,
under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and
morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party

has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and
wrong, between truth and falsehood.
In the case of Godair vs. Ham National Bank, 80 N.E., 407, the Supreme
Court of Illinois made the following very illuminating expression of the scope
of the rule:
As to the second criticism, it has uniformly been held by this Court that
the maxim, "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," should only be applied in
cases where a witness has knowingly and willfully given false
testimony.Chittenden vs. Evans, 41 Ill. 251; City of Chicago vs. Smith,
48 Ill. 107; United States Express Co. vs. Hutchings, 58 Ill. 44; Pope
vs. Dodson, Id. 360; Guliher vs. People, 82 Ill. 145; Swan vs. People,
98 Ill. 610;Hoge vs. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N.E. 796; Freeman vs. Easly,
117 Ill. 317, 7 N.E. 856; Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois
Railroad Co., 181 Ill. 323, 54 N.E. 898; Matthews vs. Granger, 196 Ill.
164, 63 N.E. 658.
In City of Chicago vs. Smith, supra, on page 108 of 48 Ill., it was said:
"As to the eight instructions asked by the defendant and refused, we
are of opinion, under the authority of the case of Brenman vs. People,
15 Ill. 511, it should not have been given. There the court say it does
not follow, merely because a witness makes an untrue statement, that
his entire testimony is to be disregarded. This must depend on the
motive of the witness. If he intentionally swears falsely as to one
matter, the jury may properly reject his whole testimony as unworthy of
credit. But, if he makes a false statement through mistake or
misapprehension, they ought not to disregard his testimony altogether.
The maxim, 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,' should only be applied in
cases where a witness wilfully and knowingly gives false testimony.
And in Pope vs. Dodson, supra, on page 365 of 58 Ill.: "The tenth
instruction in the series given for appellee is palpably erroneous. It told
the jury that, if the witness Lovely, "has sworn falsely in any material
statement," the jury might disregard her entire statement except so far
as it was corroborated. A witness cannot be discredited simply on the
ground of an erroneous statement. It is only where the statements of a
witness are willfully and corruptly false in contradicted on a material
point," then the jury had the right to disregard his whole testimony

unless corroborated by other testimony. The court said (page 146 of 82

Ill.): 'The instruction was clearly erroneous. When analyzed, it plainly
tells the jury that "if they believe, from the evidence, that Alfred F.
Foote has been contradicted on a material point, then the jury have a
right to disregard his whole testimony unless corroborated by other
testimony." This is not the law. . . If the witness, whether defendant or
otherwise, is shown, by proof, to have sworn wilfully and knowingly
false on any material matter, his evidence may be rejected so far as it
is not corroborated. . . The mere fact, however, that he is contradicted
as to some material matter is not enough to warrant the rejection of his
evidence altogether.
In Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., supra, the
court instructed the jury that "if they believe any witness has testified
falsely, then the jury may disregard such witness' testimony except in
so far as it may have been corroborated." In disposing of this
instruction the court said (page 330 of 181 Ill., page 901 of 54 N.E.): "A
witness may have testified falsely upon some matter inquired about
from forgetfulness or honest mistake, and in such case the jury would
not be authorized to disregard his entire testimony, whether
corroborated or not. It is the corrupt motive, or the giving of false
testimony knowing it to be false, that authorizes a jury to disregard the
testimony of a witness and the court to so instruct them."
With the above limitations of the rule in mind, it is clear that the maxim should
not apply in the case at bar for three reasons. First, there is sufficient
corroboration on many grounds of the testimony. Second, the mistakes are
not on the very material points. Third, the errors do not arise from an apparent
desire to pervert the truth, but from innocent mistakes and the desire of the
witness to exculpate himself though not completely.
The next legal question to decide is whether the credible evidence submitted,
together with that adduced on behalf of the defendants, prove beyond
reasonable doubt that it was the three appellants who participated in the
commission of the crime. The evidence submitted by the appellants of their
defenses of alibi are not satisfactory to us. That presented by appellant
Juanito Dasig, which consists of the testimony of the nurse, that on the night
in question Dasig was in his house because his wife was suffering from
stomach-ache, is not satisfactory for the reason that the nurse did not

positively state that the date when she went to attend Dasig's wife was
December 23, 1949. This date was included in the leading questions
propounded by counsel for appellants, where the date is insiduously joined
with another fact and witness' affirmative answer may refer to the more
important fact contained in the answer, not to the date. Thus, the first
question asked was as follows:
"Q: Do you remember having attended to the wife of Juanito Dasig
sometime or around December 23, 1949? A. yes, sir." (t.s.n., p.174)
The affirmative answer may well mean that she did actually attend, and may
not imply that she did so on December 23, 1949. Another question was:
Q. How many days previous to that trip of yours on December 24,
1949? Was it the day previous? A. Previous. (t.s.n. p. 176)
This question is a leading question. The witness also connects the night of
the robbery with a trip supposedly made by her with one Dr. Modales. But as
to this occasion of the trip, her answer as to the date is also ambiguous, thus:
Q. Do you remember the date of that trip of yours with Dr. Modales
when you left him in Antatet? A. It seems to me it was on December
24, 1949. (t.s.n., p. 175; Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, however, this witness testified that she never keeps a
record of the cases that she attends to every day, and on being asked what
cases she attended in December, 1949, she answered that she can not tell
unless she saw her record. Its date, therefore, December 23, 1949, was not
remembered by her but put into her mind by the leading questions of the
counsel. To convince the court that the attendance took place on December
23rd, it was necessary for her to have shown that that date appeared in the
record she kept.
The alibi presented by Gabuni is to the effect that on December 23, he and
Sergeant Tamani were together the whole day and evening, and during the
evening Gabuni stayed at home. That Gabuni and Sergeant Tamani should
stay in a barrio two kilometers away, on patrol, from nine in the morning to six
in the evening, of fully nine hours, is hard to understand. For them to spend
four more hours drinking and eating together in a restaurant, evidently without

their returning to their offices to report the results of their supposed mission, is
still harder to believe. But for them to eat again at the home of Gabuni, after
they had already eaten in a restaurant, is the height of improbability. Gabuni
must have been on vacation that day, not on duty. If Gabuni was really and
actually on patrol on hat day, why was not the police blotter submitted? But
even if the above story, improbable as it is, were assumed to be true, and his
claim that he was at his house at ten in the evening and woke up at six in the
morning, also true, it is still not impossible for him to have gone down the
house after ten o'clock in the evening to join the commission of the robbery,
and come back at home in time to be there and wake up at six o'clock in the
following morning.
Neither can the defense of alibi presented by appellant Marcelino Dayao
stand the test of careful scrutiny. That Dayao was with his witnesses on
certain days and on the occasions mentioned, in the case of witnesses
Silverio Anies and Jauna Molina on the presentation of the latter's claim, and
in the case of witness Daniel Yuson on the occasion of a night of gambling,
may be assumed to be true. But their assertion that it was on the precise
date, December 23, 1949, that they saw or were with Dayao is difficult to
believe. Human memory on dates or days is frail, and unless the day is an
extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable
assurance of its correctness. Dayao's witnesses did not prove that some
extraordinary or unusual thing had happened on that day, that would have
made them remember it. As to Anies, the presentation of the claim is admitted
by him to be a common occurrence, such that he had to admit he can not
remember the dates when other similar applicants saw him. As to witness
Yuson, the playing of mahjong was also a common pastime. Neither Anies
nor Yuson presented any writing or book entry where the event or occasion
they mentioned took place. The trial court did not believe their testimony, and
we are unable to find that its conclusion is not borne out by human
experience.
Having found that sufficient admissible evidence, worthy of credit, has been
adduced to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants-appellants
were the ones who perpetrated the robbery in question, and the evidence with
which they sought to prove their defenses of alibi having been found to be
unsatisfactory, we must affirm, as we hereby affirm, the judgment appealed
from, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGILIO LUCENA

y SANTIAGO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For the fatal hacking of Urbano U. Dulay and Lazaro U. Dulay, Sr.,
accused-appellant Virgilio Lucena y Santiago was charged with Double Murder
in an Information[1] which alleges:
That on or about the 18th day of July 1995 in the Municipality of Aringay,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and being armed with a
bolo, did then and there, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of his superior strength, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on one
URBANO DULAY y ULAT and LAZARO DULAY, Sr. y ULAT, by hacking
them to death with the said bolo and inflicting upon them mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths, to the damage
and prejudice of their heirs.
Contrary to law.
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. [2] The case
thereafter proceeded to trial. Subsequently, the court a quo rendered judgment
as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused VIRGILIO LUCENA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER for killing Lazaro Dulay and
Urbano Dulay on July 18, 1995. This Court appreciated the presence
of alevosia as an aggravating circumstance in the killing of Lazaro Dulay. This
court could have appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling but it
was not alleged in the Information.Evident premeditation qualified the killings
to Murder. Taking advantage of his superior strength was also present
considering the ages of the victims and the perpetrator.

Evidently, the Prosecution is of the view that this incident presents a

continuous offense on the theory that there was only one criminal resolution
on the part of the accused. Hence, the charge is double murder.
This is a heinous crime.
This Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of death (Art. 63, par. 1,
Revised Penal Code).
He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Lazaro Dulay, a civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00 for expenses in connection with his
death. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Urbano Dulay a civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and P15,000.00 for expenses in connection with his
death.[3]
On automatic review before this Court, accused-appellant alleges that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF ROSALINA DULAY AND DISBELIEVING THE
THEORY OF THE DEFENSE.
II
EVEN ASSUMING THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY FOR THE DEATHS
OF URBANO DULAY AND LAZARO DULAY, THE COURT
NONETHELESS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST HIM THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH.
The prosecutions version of the incident is summarized thus in the Peoples
Brief:
At about 2:00 in the afternoon of July 18, 1995, Rosalina Dulay was inside her
house in Barrio Sta. Cecilia, Aringay, La Union. She was washing clothes
near the entrance of the kitchen. Her brother-in-law Lazaro Dulay, also known
as Saroy, was sleeping on the kitchen table while her husband, Urbano

Dulay, was sleeping in the second storey of the house with their two
children.[4]
Appellant arrived inside the house and said something to Rosalina. Appellant
who was carrying a long and straight bolo, suddenly hacked the sleeping
Lazaro. After hacking Lazaro, appellant went upstairs, awakened Urbano and
hacked him. Rosalina brought her two children to the corn field to
hide. Urbano later ran towards the corn field where he died due to his
wounds. Lazaro died inside the house.[5]
Dr. Armando Avena, Municipal Health Officer of Aringay, La Union, conducted
the autopsy on the remains of Urbano and prepared a Post-Mortem
Examination Report[6] stating that the cause of death of Urbano was the
massive loss of blood secondary to multiple hacked and stab wounds. The
weapon used in the killing of Urbano could have been a bolo which
penetrated six (6) centimeters (cm) and hit the heart. Another wound, a hack
wound, measuring seven (7) cms. in length was found at the right scapular
region with the depth of about three (3) cms. at the posterior aspect.
Dr. Avena also conducted the autopsy on Lazaro or Pertolino Dulay. He
prepared a Post-Mortem Examination Report[7] on the death of Lazaro stating
the following findings:
There is a wound hacked 14 cm. linear hitting the anterior neck down to the
left lower breast about 6 cm. in depth hitting the ribs and anterior lower
pillars.[8]
Accused-appellant had a different story. He testified that in the morning of
July 18, 1995, he was at his house in Sta. Cecilia, Aringay, La Union, repairing
its roof since 7:00 oclock.[9] At noon, he went to the house of Rosalina Dulay,
which was about 100 meters away, to have lunch.[10] He usually ate lunch at
Rosalinas house.[11] He reached the house at around 1:30 oclock in the
afternoon.[12] Rosalina was outside the house.[13] When accused-appellant
entered the house, he found the brothers, Urbano and Lazaro Dulay, hacking
each other with bolos.[14] Since Urbano, who was older, was being attacked by
the younger Lazaro, accused-appellant intervened to restrain the
latter.[15] While accused-appellant was pacifying Lazaro, Urbano was able to
run away.[16] Lazaro, however, turned to accused-appellant and hacked him
with the bolo five (5) times, hitting him in the head and on his left foot above the

ankle.[17] Accused-appellant ran away but was pursued by Lazaro. In order to

defend himself, accused-appellant picked up Urbanos bolo and hacked Lazaro
with it.[18] Accused-appellant then left the Dulay residence,[19] leaving Lazaro
lying on the floor, and went home. He brought with him the bolo which he used
to defend himself.[20] Accused-appellant was seen by his brother and was
brought to the Health Center in Agoo to have his bloodied head treated.[21]
In sum, accused-appellant insists that it was Lazaro Dulay who hacked
Urbano Dulay and that when he intervened, Lazaro turned to him, thus forcing
him to defend himself. Furthermore, accused-appellant attempts to destroy the
credibility of prosecution eyewitness, Rosalina Dulay, pointing to material and
notable points which engender serious doubts in the truthfulness of the
prosecutions version and evidence,[22] to wit: (1) Rosalina was threatened by
the relatives of her husband to testify against accused-appellant; (2) Rosalinas
testimony that her husband was hacked by accused-appellant was not
indicated in the testimony of the doctor who conducted the autopsy on the
cadaver of her husband; (3) She testified on direct examination that when
Lazaro was attacked he was downstairs near the table, but on crossexamination she declared that he was sleeping on top of the table; and (4) The
prosecution failed to establish any motive for the accused to kill the two victims.
The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to a question of
credibility. In this connection, it has been consistently held by this Court that
the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and
most competently performed by the trial judge,[23] who had the unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the
various indicia available but not reflected in the record. The demeanor of the
person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The forthright
answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the
flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch these
can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth. [24]
For the reasons stated above, findings of the trial court on matters of
credibility are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted.[25] In the case at bar, the trial court, which
had the unique opportunity to directly hear the testimony of the prosecution
eyewitness Rosalina Dulay, gave credence to her assertion that she saw
accused-appellant hacking the victims. Accused-appellant has not shown
sufficient grounds to deviate from the aforesaid doctrine.

Accused-appellant asserts that Rosalina Dulays testimony was not

voluntarily given. He points to a statement elicited during cross-examination
that the relatives of her deceased husband threatened to kill her if she was
going to testify on (sic) the other party.[26] Accused-appellant also makes capital
of the fact that Rosalina admits to have never been threatened by his relatives,
while at the same time acknowledging that she stayed twice in the house of the
same relatives when she went to Aringay, La Union sometime after the incident.
This lone discordant note in the testimonial declarations of Rosalina, as
adverted to by accused-appellant, will not extricate accused-appellant from his
predicament. The controlling rule in this regard is that the testimony of a
witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part depending upon the
corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the
case.[27] By itself, prejudice against an accused cannot warrant the
disqualification of a witness or the total disregard of the witnesss
testimony.[28] Indeed:
The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of
evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of
universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility
when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved
depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. Thus, where
the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or
where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent
desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither
absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or
reject portions of the witness testimony based on its inherent credibility or on
the corroborative evidence in the case.[29]
There is, furthermore, no standard of human behavior for a person
confronted with a shocking incident. One may immediately report the incident
to the proper authorities while another, in fear and/or avoiding involvement in a
criminal investigation, may keep to himself what he had witnessed. [30] Others
may come forward to reveal the identity of the perpetrators of the crime only
after the lapse of a considerable length of time.[31]
In this case, it should be noted that right after the incident, Rosalina
voluntarily executed a sworn statement implicating accused-appellant. That
she later showed some hesitation should not be taken against her, because the
reluctance of a witness to testify in criminal actions due to reprisal is of judicial

notice,[32] and does not impair the witnesss credibility.[33] The pertinent excerpts
of Rosalinas testimony reveal that while her husbands relatives did threaten
her to take the witness stand, it was not for the purpose of falsely testifying
against the accused-appellant, viz:
Q. While you were in Tarlac, Tarlac you were visited by the relatives of
your husband, Urbano Dulay?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And they were asking you to testify against the accused Virgilio Lucena,
is that correct?
A. They did not tell that, sir.
Q. And when they visited you in Tarlac, Tarlac, what was then the reason
for their visit?
A. They delivered to me the subpoena, sir.
Q. And they asked you also to testify?
ATTY. CALOZA:
Already answered, Your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
ATTY. GAYMAN:
Is it not a fact that you were also threatened by them to come and testify
against Virgilio Lucena?
ATTY. CALOZA:
Objection. No basis, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
Yes, sir. They were threatening to kill me if I am going to testify on the
other party.
ATTY. CALOZA:

May we move to strike out the answer of the witness, on the other party,
Your Honor.
COURT:
Remain on record the answer of the witness, on the other party.
Q. Were the relatives of your husband threatening you to testify?
A. They were not telling me that, sir.[34]
Accused-appellant further contends that Rosalinas testimony as to his
having attacked Urbano many times was contrary to the medical findings. This
is likewise bereft of merit. On the contrary, her assertion is consistent with the
findings of Dr. Armando Avena that the cause of death was the massive loss
of blood secondary to multiple hacked wounds and stab wounds.[35] It must be
remembered in this regard that the detailed testimony of a witness in a murder
or homicide case acquires greater weight and credibility if it corresponds with
the autopsy report.[36]
So, too, must fall accused-appellants argument as to the alleged
inconsistency in Rosalinas testimony on direct examination that Lazaro Dulay
was near the table downstairs, which concededly conflicts with her claim on
cross-examination that he was sleeping on top of the table at the time he was
attacked by accused-appellant. While indeed these statements are
contradictory, the alleged conflict is more apparent than real and refers to minor
or trivial matters which, in fact, serve to strengthen rather than destroy the
credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is, as in this
case, shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses. [37]
These supposed inconsistencies hardly dent the credibility of Rosalina who
remained steadfast and unwavering in relating the principal occurrence and
positively identifying the accused-appellant as the assailant of the victims.[38] In
other words, as long as the mass of the testimony jibes on material points, the
slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesss credibility nor the
veracity of the testimony variations in the testimony of witnesses on the same
side in respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight
of their united testimony to the prominent facts.[39]
For the foregoing considerations, accused-appellants argument with
regard to his supposed lack of motive to kill the victims becomes a moot
point. Suffice it to state in this regard that proof of ill motive to commit the crime

becomes irrelevant with the positive identification of the accused.[40] Indeed,

positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing
of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
alibi and denial.[41]
In the second assigned error, accused-appellant takes the trial court to task
for imposing the death penalty on him contending that treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not attendant in the
commission of the felonies.
With regard to treachery, accused-appellant insists that there was no
evidence to show that he deliberately hacked the victims in such manner as to
avoid risk to himself. In the case of Lazaro Dulay, accused argues that he
merely chanced upon Lazaro and there was nothing to show that he planned
to kill him while he was sleeping. Accused-appellant also points out that he had
no grudge sufficient to motivate him to plan the killing of Lazaro.
There is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. [42] What is decisive in
treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate.[43] In this case, Lazaro Dulay was asleep when
he was hacked to death by accused-appellant. It has been repeatedly held by
this Court that there exists the qualifying circumstance of alevosiawhen one
takes the life of a person who is asleep.[44]
As regards the slaying of Urbano, however, treachery can not be
appreciated because it is not clear if he was also asleep when he was
assaulted. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Urbano was initially asleep
when accused-appellant entered his house and attacked the sleeping Lazaro
on the first floor of his house, but that he woke up when accused-appellant,
after hacking Lazaro, went upstairs and hacked him. In fact, Urbano was even
able to run towards the cornfield where he expired because of the severity of
his wounds.[45]
The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength vis--vis the circumstances surrounding the slaying of
Lazaro. When treachery qualifies the crime of murder, the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength in necessarily included in the

former.[46] In other words, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of

superior strength is absorbed in treachery.[47]
This aggravating circumstance cannot also be appreciated in the killing of
Urbano because to take advantage of superior strength means to use
purposely excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked.[48] There has been no showing in this case that
accused-appellant purposely employed superior strength to consummate his
nefarious deed, hence, it can not be appreciated against him.
It, likewise, is unnecessary to consider evident premeditation in the twin
killings although this was also alleged in the information. For evident
premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence
of the crime itself, of the following elements thereof, to wit: (1) the time the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that
he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequence of his act.[49] The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the crime is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a
resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment.[50]
In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence of any of the above
requisites of evident premeditation. There is absolutely no proof of the time
when accused-appellant decided to commit the crime.Neither is there any
showing of how accused-appellant planned the killings, nor of how much time
elapsed before he executed his plan. Absent all these, evident premeditation
can not be appreciated.[51]
The resolution of the issues raised in this case will not be complete without
a word being made on the defectively crafted Information indicting accusedappellant for the twin killings of the Dulay brothers. It bears stressing that an
indictment for multiple offenses in a single complaint or information
transgresses Rule 110, Section 13[52] of the Rules of Court, which states that a
complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
Be that as it may, this Court held in People v. Ramon[53] that:
Regrettably for accused-appellant, however, he has failed to timely
question the above defect, and he may thus be deemed to have waived

this objection to the multiplicity of charges. In People vs. Conte,[54] this

Court has ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Under Sections 1 and 3 (e) of Rule 117, the appellant before entering
his plea, should have moved to quash the complaint for being
duplicitous. For his failure to do so, he is deemed to have waived this
defect (Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court; People vs. Dulay, 217 SCRA
132 [1993]; People vs. Basay, 219 SCRA 404 [1993]; People vs.
Ducay, 225 SCRA 1 [1993]). Hence, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 120,
the court could convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of
them.[55]
Given the foregoing factual backdrop, the penalties imposed on accusedappellant must be modified. In the case of the killing of Lazaro U. Dulay,
treachery qualified the offense to Murder, punishable byreclusion perpetua to
death.[56] While the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
alleged, this is absorbed in alevosia. Evident premeditation was likewise
alleged but it cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence that the
execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time to arrive at
a calm judgment.[57] In the absence of any other aggravating circumstance to
justify the imposition of the death penalty, only reclusion perpetua, the lesser
penalty, should be imposed.[58]
On the other hand, the killing of Urbano U. Dulay was not attended by any
qualifying aggravating circumstance, thus, accused-appellant should be
convicted of the lesser offense of Homicide, which is punishable by reclusion
temporal.[59] In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the imposable
penalty shall be in the medium period.[60] Since accused-appellant is entitled to
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum must be within the range of prision
mayor, the penalty next lower in degree, and whose maximum shall be within
the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period. Taken in the light of the
prevailing facts of the case, this Court deems it proper to impose upon the
accused-appellant an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months

of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties prescribed

by law.[61]
It appearing that civil indemnity awarded is in accordance with controlling
case law on the matter and that the other damages awarded are borne out by
the evidence on record, the same are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union,
Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. A-3036, is MODIFIED as follows:
Accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder for the killing of Lazaro U. Dulay, Sr., and is sentenced to serve the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused-appellant is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide for the killing of Urbano U. Dulay, and is sentenced to
serve an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum.
The Decision under review, insofar as it orders accused-appellant to pay
the heirs of Lazaro Dulay the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P25,000.00 for expenses in connection with this death, and to pay the heirs of
Urbano Dulay the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 for
expenses in connection with his death, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176389

December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A.
GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Brief Background
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen
years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque
City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court
smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the
identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public
whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody
referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI
announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M.
Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She
pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez,
Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She
also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the

fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. 1
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by
Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio
Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro
as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the
Webbs household, police officer Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G.
Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime
and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared
the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the
United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well
as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the
incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events
surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged
by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by
significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995
affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her
former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that
no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her
prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support
and security she needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb,
Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled,
according to the court, compared to Alfaros testimony that other witnesses
and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four
years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the
accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on
Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one

day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro
Vizconde.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying
the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years
maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.4 The
appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that
the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that
rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with
those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her
mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special
Division of five members voted three against two to deny the motion,5 hence,
the present appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis
the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was
then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the
request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the
accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might
want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer
has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial
court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the
object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on
the ground that the governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has
resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not
the Court should acquit him outright, given the governments failure to
produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus
depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb,
acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and
sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the
crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled
to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi
and rebut Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the
crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up
the crime after its commission.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal
on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the States failure
to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression
the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and,
consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro
identified Webb in her testimony as Carmelas rapist and killer but serious
questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists
a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen
taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a
promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA
fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA
of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape
Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine
that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the
semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v.

Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v.

Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not
require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful
to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the
prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who
testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have
the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for
conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen
secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not
come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing,
he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions
gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged
arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused. 11 They raised the
DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by
the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a
motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication
of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime
passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accuseds lack of
interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on
reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at
some future time.

Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart.

Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Paraaque in
January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December
1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a
message for him to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde.
Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmelas house
at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City.
Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a
Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who
were on a Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street,
alighted, and approached Carmelas house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a
woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela
twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her
Webbs message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she
could not go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return
after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to
drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

Alfaros Story

The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they
drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived.
The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked
somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She
approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to
leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before
midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to
the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink
her cars headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so
Carmela would know that she had arrived.

Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening,
Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as
passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu
from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging"

Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in
her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped
off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaro looked for
her group, found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions to Webb. They
then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking
lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of

Now, to the merit of the case.

Carmelas male companion, Webbs mood changed for the rest of the
evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After
about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He
said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako
ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the
parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan
Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at Carmelas house shortly before
midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting
for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a
suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizcondes residence
to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). But
Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo."
When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told
the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first.
The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left
open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage,
Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes Nissan Sentra and
loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small group
went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela
opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb
looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the
dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano
asked her where she was going and she replied that she was going out to
smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura
pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After
about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a womans voice ask, "Sino
yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her
other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her,
"Okay ba?"

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde
house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but some
light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a
ladys bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was
looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him
what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main
door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the
bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not
find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was
at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television
that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she
approached the masters bedroom from where the noise came, opened the
door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she
walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on
the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the
bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears
while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She
met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na
tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the
others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She
entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go.
Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly
picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he
forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in
anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and
drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel
at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down.
Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence,
steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the
compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place.
It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house

learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then
Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit
naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him
molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair.
Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly
stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the
house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered
him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang
katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions
and told them, "We dont know each other. We havent seen each
otherbaka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers
house.12

Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI
to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press
her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.
Sacaguing testified thus:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the
Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
xxxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to
her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the
Vizconde family. Thats what she told me, Your Honor.

1. The quality of the witness

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four
years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to
come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed
her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned
her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her
NBI handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for
her subsistence and vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI AntiKidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section,
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December
1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug
pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the
capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando
Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that
killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very
special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of
spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

Q. And what did you say?

xxxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me
that man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to me the
man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state
witness and help us in the solution of the case.
xxxx
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her
about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that
she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre.

Q. Why not?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise
to bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not and the
man does not like to testify.

A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.

(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguings above testimony.

Q. All right, and what happened after that?

2. The suspicious details

WITNESS SACAGUING:

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which
even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt,
yes.

A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir,
huwag kayong"

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying
details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene
and there were lots of speculations about them.

COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na
lang yan."
xxxx
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that
"papapelan ko na lang yan?"
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?

Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Paraaque

and charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the
men they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of
the crime scene provided. Alfaros NBI handlers who were doing their own
investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI
offices and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of
these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.
Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat
bahay" gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to
pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could make a
confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical
evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:
a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmelas house by
breaking the glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to
deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story
was that Webb was Carmelas boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her
front door to get to see her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming
that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the
blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His
action really made no sense. From Alfaros narration, Webb appeared rational
in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to
get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and
causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected
confessions of the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried
to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one
point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going
through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the frontdoor key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaros story appears tortured to accommodate the
physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura
having taken some valuables with him when they left Carmelas house. And
why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling
the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made
to fit in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason
Webb and his companions entered that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that
the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the
Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked cars hood to
reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob
the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front
door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage
light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the cars hood, using a chair, to
turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his
friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly
knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It
did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the cars hood and be
seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.

And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent
investigative work.lavvphil After claiming that they had solved the crime of the
decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and,
obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of
becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset.
And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI,
a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial
court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong
effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI
found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and
showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking
Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a
disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." As it turned
out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate
to settle some score with him but it was too late to change the name she
already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what
they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers
from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and
the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant
presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
and Filart, who were supposed to be Webbs co-principals in the crime, Alfaro
made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gangrape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one believes
Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But
when they got to Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro
entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around

Alfaros car, which was parked on the street between Carmelas house and
the next. Some of these men sat on top of the cars lid while others milled on
the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to watch
them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby
house. Obviously, the behavior of Webbs companions out on the street did
not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her
life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she
agree to act as Webbs messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to
Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out
the whole night with Webb and his friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it
came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela,
clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a
police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she
was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked
in drugs to think clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how
could she remember so much details that only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time,
Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends
should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for
Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue
where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmelas
boyfriend. Alfaros trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did
not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness,
Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with
his friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third
time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the
pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the
gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and his
friends agreed with him to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape her. Why
would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously
with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into

her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to
feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty
minutes, a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately
walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this
because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became
conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked
away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential
confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved
in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge
of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one
of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She
went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the
masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and
her young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now,
Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got
out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did
not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and
turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This
woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the
house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was
suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing
indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution
presented six additional witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied
the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and
the presence of semen in Carmelas genitalia,15 indicating that she had been
raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan
Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a
report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the
Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the masters
bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating
from a television set.16

June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in

the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the
subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb.
Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he
pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided there.
Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom
he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them
along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a threecar convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used
or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did
not notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of
Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb
grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan
returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their
Standard Operating Procedure required.18

But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be
inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan
Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro
testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the
direction of Carmelas house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed
the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that
guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the
subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned
up" Vizconde residence on Webbs orders. What is more, White did not notice
Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaros first visit that night. Carmela
supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but
White did not notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision.
White actually discredited Alfaros testimony about the movements of the
persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart
that led the three-vehicle convoy,17White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with
Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in
without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard
White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony.1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision
testified that he saw Webb around the last week of May or the first week of

But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not
common for a security guard to challenge a Congressmans son with such
vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor
did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitors entry into the
subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of
seeing Webbs ID but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at
BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents
house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from
the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him
again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt
and shorts, passing through a secret door near the maids quarters on the
way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished
June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb
household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one
of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the
details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have
a selective photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30,
1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the
attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have been a
point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May
1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that
Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso
further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the
2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with
cleaning the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there
for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of
her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they
were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that
Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the
Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his
group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed
habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde
massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong
from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when
Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer,
to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him
up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood
from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She
also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and hid
it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator
flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in at
the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also
remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up
the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning
there on the following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the
presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he
steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours
later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?

At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items from
the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity
of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime.
Birrers testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other
accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her
wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called
"Bagyo," because he was a Paraaque politicians son. Unfortunately, Lauro
did not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow
was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that
Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be
believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She
even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.
5. The missing corroboration
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core
theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been
unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends
to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young
Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not around town.
But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came
forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her
favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if
they had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her
testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her
friends friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing
them together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or Makati. Alfaros
claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly
inserted into Webb and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle
trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it
clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor
concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite
unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house
with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was
also Carmelas lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly
had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas relatives, friends, or
people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life.
Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And
despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role
in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend
normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the
imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.

have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand

Sampol checked Webbs visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him
pass through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flights Passenger
Manifest.27

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where
his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration
Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System,
confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at
the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS
indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification
dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30

a. The travel preparations

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife,
Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of
independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied
him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines.
Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their
plane tickets.

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latters daughter,
Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Glorias house in Daly City,
California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi
Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain
Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In
the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake
Tahoe to return the Webbs hospitality when she was in the Philippines. 32

Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his
basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even
invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along
Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend
Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His
basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by
Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's
despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay
Ortega.24

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to

Anaheim Hills, California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself with
playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler34 and working at
his cousin-in-laws pest control company.35 Webb presented the companys
logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other
employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license 38 and
wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39

Webbs U.S. Alibi

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California,
with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his
plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to

On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with
the Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his
son when he came to visit.40 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the
company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a
car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the
Brottmans, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new

car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of

California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In
using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and
Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center issued
Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day,
the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic. 49
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less
than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with
the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez
with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies,
and playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary
Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the
Rodriguezs house.52 He left the Rodriguezs home in August 1992, returned
to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until
he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and
Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S.
was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his
entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with
enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records
Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the Certification
dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he
boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No.
103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine
Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his
return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita
Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webbs reentry.56 Upon his
return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael
Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball
court.

e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs
alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros
positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and,
apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of
this, to the lower courts, Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the
accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi.
So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by
the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in
the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to
fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how
else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of
prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard
against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly
finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he
saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the
accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an
identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as
forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two
criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on
past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in
gold.
And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something
she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet
the above criteria.

nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite
inexplicable.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her
conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a
stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them.
Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecutions
worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she
volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she
could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.

Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently

unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that
jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the
details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her
familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even
when they were trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this
crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining
table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical
evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura
climbing the cars hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position,
when they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front door
just so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping
Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining
outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and
passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house,
like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed to serve
as Webbs messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till
the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.
To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to
the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And,
inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she
claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape
Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on
personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke
up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she

f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory
evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in
Paraaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from
March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he
actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact
of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine
Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and
returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically
makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only
acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and
inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that
Webb, with his fathers connections, can arrange for the local immigration to
put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27,
1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had
been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could
Webb fix a foreign airlines passenger manifest, officially filed in the
Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How
could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record system those two dates in
its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in
secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return
there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these
questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did
not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best
evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited
in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of
Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59 the practice when a party does
not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a
photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a
faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs
arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than
the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the
Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that
Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the
same. But this was unnecessary. Webbs passport is a document issued by
the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official
record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that
passport are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official
certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the
U.S. Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same evidentiary
value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in
court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official
duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine and
disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record. 61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier
certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had no record of
Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply
explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated
it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on
August 16, 1995 finding "no evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was
already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials.
As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of

the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass
through proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules
on protocol and standard procedure governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who
directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA,
bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol
procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services
Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler,
Philippine Desk Officer, State Department, declared the earlier Certification
as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all
available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of
Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal
raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS
normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the
country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning
the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system.
Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the
initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the
data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of
IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the
accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and
foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it
would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines
after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the
U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel
between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about
twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well
tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions,
surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that
official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are
immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by
evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence
to impeach the entries in Webbs passport and the certifications of the
Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and

back. The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it
planted in the lower courts minds.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. WEBB

7. Effect of Webbs alibi to others

Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only
with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez,
Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition
that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will
not hold together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without
it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court
entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is
willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable,
lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being,
like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on
the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the
role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the
crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED
from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court
within five days from receipt of this Decision.

G.R. No. 176389

G.R. No. 176864
December 14, 2010

APPELLEE: People of the Philippines

APPELLANTS:Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Machael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and
Gerardo Biong

Abad, J.:

CASE:

On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and
Jennifer were brutally murdered in their home in Paraaque. In an intense
investigation, a group of suspects were initially arrested by the police, but
were eventually discharged due to suspicions of frame up. Later in 1995, The
National Bureau of Investigation announced the resolution of the crime as
they presented a star witness Jessica M. Alfaro who pointed at the accused
(herein appellants) Webb et.al. as the main culprits. She also included police
officer Gerardo Biong as an accessory to the crime. Relying on Alfaros
testimony, information for rape with homicide was filed by the public
prosecutors against appellants.

Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City Branch 274 presided over by

Judge Tolentino took over the case. With Alfaros detailed narration of the
events of the crime, the court found her testimony credible, noting that her
delivery are spontaneous and straightforward. On January 4, 2000, trial court
rendered judgment finding accused (herein appellants) guilty as charged,
imposing them the penalty of reclusion perpetua while Biong, as an accessory
to the crime, was given an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four
months and one day to twelve years. Damages were also awarded to Lauro
Vizconde.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision,

with a modification on Biongs penalty to six years minimum and twelve years
maximum, plus increased awards of damages to Lauro Vizconde. A motion
for reconsideration on the same court was also denied, hence the present
appeal on the Supreme Court.

On April 20, 2010, the Court granted the request of Webb to submit
the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver on DNA analysis,
believing it is under the safekeeping of the NBI. The NBI, however, denied
that the specimen is under their custody and that it was turned over to the trial
court. The trial court on the other hand, denied the claim that the specimen
was under their care. This prompted Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit
denying Webb of his right to due process.

3.) WON Webbs evidences are proven sufficient enough to rebut Alfaros
testimony? NO.

4.) WON Biong acted to cover up the crime after its commission, thus making
himself an accessory to the crime? NO.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SET ASIDE the Decision dated
December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 0336 and Acquits accused-appellants Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which
they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guild beyond
reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASEDfrom detention
unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

1.)

Webb cited Brady v. Maryland, and claimed that he is entitled to

outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process
given the States failure to produce on order of the Court either by
negligence or willfull suppression the semen specimen taken from
Carmela. Webb is not entitled to acquittal for failure to produce the
semen specimen at such stage. Brady v. Maryland was overtaken by
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Youngblood which held
that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen
specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is
able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police.
Further, during the previous appeals made on CA, the appellants
expressed lack of interest in having a DNA test done, and so the State
cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it may be required to
be produced some future time.

2.)

Alfaros testimony, was found doubtful. Testified by Atty. Sacaguing,

he claimed that Alfaro was an asset of the NBI since 1994. When the

ISSUE/HELD:

1.) Whether or not Webb was indeed denied of due process on the premise
that the semen specimen was lost under the care of the government and
must immediately be acquitted? NO.

2.) WON Alfaros testimony is entitled to belief? NO.

officers one day teased her about being dormant, she became piqued
and suddenly claimed that she know someone who knows about the
massacre. But when the said someone was not presented, she told
Sacaguing that she might as well assume the role of her informant.
Alfraro never refuted such testimony. It is possible for Alfaro to lie even
with such intricate details, given that she practically lived in the NBI
office. Moreover, the media is all over the case that everything is
thoroughly reported. Generally, her story lacks sense or suffers from
inherent inconsistencies.

G.R. Nos. 138874-75

January 31, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR;
ROWEN ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERT CAO alias "ALLAN
PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias 'TISOY
TAGALOG;" JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG;" and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias "MM," Appellants.
RESOLUTION

3.)

Among the accused, it was Webb who presented the strongest alibi.
His travel preparations were confirmed by Rajah Tours and the
Philippine immigration, confirming that he indeed left for San
Francisco, California with his Aunt Gloria on March 9, 1991 on board
United Airlines Flight 808. His passport was stamped and his name
was listed on the United Airlines Flights Passenger Manifest. Upon
reaching US, the US Immigration recorded his entry to the country.
Moreover, details of his stay there, including his logs and paychecks
when he worked, documents when he purchased a car and his license
are presented as additional evidence, and he left for Philippines on
October 26, 1992. Supreme Court accused the trial and court of
appeals as having a mind that is made cynical by the rule drilled into
his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the faces of a
witness sweaking I saw him do it. A judge, according to the SC, must
keep an open mind, and must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a
case. For positive identification to be credible, two criteria must be met;
1.) the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness 2.) the witness story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived. For alibi to be credible and
established on the other hand, it must be positive, clear, and
documented. It must show that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime. Webb was able to establish his alibis
credibility with his documents. It is impossible for Webb, despite his so
called power and connections to fix a foreign airlines passenger
manifest. Webbs departure and arrival were authenticated by the
Office of the USAttorney General and the State Department.

PER CURIAM:
Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over
ones action.1 Our legal system, for instance, does not punish a youth as it
would an adult, and it sees youthful misconduct as evidence of unreasoned or
impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad of cases, we have applied the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code -- the rationale of which is to show mercy and some extent of
leniency in favor of an accused who, by reason of his age, is presumed to
have acted with less discernment. The case at bar is another instance when
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority must apply.
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration2 filed by brothers James
Anthony and James Andrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of
the penalties we imposed upon the latter on the ground that he was a minor
at the time the crimes were committed.
A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.
On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the Uy brothers,
together with Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan,
Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape;
and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City
in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN
PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM,
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN
PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM,
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible
exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for reconsideration
anchored on the following grounds:
I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER
JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT
BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY

who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of TWELVE (12) years ofprision mayor in its maximum period,
as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00
as civil indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages; (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages; and (d) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TANAWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING.4
The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with those raised by
Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and Balansag in their separate motions for
reconsideration, we deemed it appropriate to consolidate the motions. After a
painstaking evaluation of every piece and specie of evidence presented
before the trial court in response to the movants plea for the reversal of their
conviction, still we are convinced that the movants guilt has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we
denied all the motions. However, left unresolved is the issue of James
Andrews minority.
Hence, this disquisition.

Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they

In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only seventeen
(17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes
were committed. To substantiate such claim, he begs leave and pleads that
we admit at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth
issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. In the
ultimate, he prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother
James Anthony.

Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of
age. When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one
coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of
this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx

Considering that the entry of James Andrews birth in the proffered Certificate
of Live Birth is not legible, we required the Solicitor General (a) to secure from
the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato, as well as the National Statistics Office, a
clear and legible copy of James Certificate of Live Birth, and thereafter, (b) to
file an extensive comment on the Uy brothers motion, solely on the issue of
James Andrews minority.
On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his
comment.1wphi1 Attached therewith are clear and legible copies of James
Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of
Cotobato and the National Statistics Office. Both documents bear the entry
October 27, 1979 as the date of his birth, thus, showing that he was indeed
only 17 years and 262 days old when the crimes were committed on July 16,
1997.
Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the penalty imposed
on James Andrew be modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, the death penalty should
be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be reduced
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum, similar to the penalty imposed on his brother James Anthony in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.
The motion is meritorious.

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is
one degree lower than the statutory penalty. The penalty for the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua.5 On the
other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion
temporal.6 There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed on James Andrew is reclusion temporal in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum.7
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed upon James Andrew; while in Criminal Case No.
CBU-45304, the imposable penalty upon him is twelve (12) years of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our
Decision dated February 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, James Andrew Uy is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37945 May 28, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADRIANO CAETE and JOSE BILOG alias BOY, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Benjamin L. Bargas and Teresita Cruz Sison for defendants-appellants.

Through the intercession of Mr. Aniceto Gamo, a Chief of

Section in the Inagawan-Sub Colony, Jose Bilog had allowed
his farm to be worked by Nicasio Dayao, a prisoner at the
Colony (pp. 4-5, 13, tsn, Duero). Sometime in May, 1971 while
Dayao was working in the ricefield, Jose Bilog offered him
P300.00 if he (Dayao) would kill Douglas. Dayao asked Jose
Bilog why he wanted his brother liquidated. Jose replied that
Douglas poisoned their mother and if Douglas would not be
liquidated he (Douglas) would eventually kill all of them in the
family (p. 7, tsn., Duero). Dayao rejected the proposal and offer
of reward. He explained to Jose that he could not kill Douglas
because he has many children to think about (p. 8, tsn., Duero).

RELOVA, J.:
Charged and convicted of the crime of murder by the then Court of First
Instance of Palawan the two (2) accused, Adriano Caete and Jose Bilog,
were both sentenced to the maximum penalty of death and to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased, Douglas Bilog, in the sum of P12,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay proportional
costs.
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Accused Jose Bilog and Douglas Bilog were brothers. They
were owners of adjoining ricelands adjacent to the InagawanSub Colony at Puerto Princess, Palawan (p. 10, tsn, Jan. 4,
1973, Anonas). They were not in good terms and always
quarrelled because Jose resented the fact that Douglas has
received a bigger share of the lands inherited from their parents.
(pp. 12, 20, tsn., Anonas).
The ire of Jose against his brother became unbearable that on
or about April 28, 1971, he got his father's shotgun and waylaid
Douglas at the bridge leading their house. A tragic incident was
averted only when Concepcion the wife of Douglas, informed
her uncle, Cervancia, of Jose's evil scheme. Cervancia
immediately went after Jose and succeeded in retrieving the
gun from the latter and tried to settle their differences (p. 10, tsn,
Anonas).

On April 19, 1972, at about 5:00 p.m., Concepcion Bilog saw

from the window of their house in the ricefield, Jose Bilog riding
on a bicycle going towards the ricefield. On that occasion she
saw Jose Bilog converse with two colonists (pp. 6-7, 10, tsn.,
Jan. 4, 1973, Anonas).
Almost at the same time on that day, Angel Rebong, a prisoner
of the colony was sent by Aniceto Gamo to get some palay from
Roming who lived near the ricefield of Jose Bilog (p. 53, tsn.,
Duero). On the highway, Angel Rebong met Jose Bilog who was
then riding a bicycle. Jose told him not to mention to anybody
what he might see in the ricefield (pp. 35, 49, 53, tsn., Duero).
Angel however, did not see anything unusual in the ricefield so
he went directly to the house of Roming. He left Roming's place
at about 6:00 p.m. and reported to Mr. Gamo that he failed to
get the palay. Thereafter, he returned to the General Services
Barracks in the colony's compound. He reached his hut at about
7:00 p.m. (pp. 36-37, tsn., Duero).
At about 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Antonio Cabig, an
inmate of the Colony was on his way from the Colony's PX to
the Coconut Division (pp. 64-66, tsn, Duero). He passed the
ricefield of Jose Bilog and saw Douglas and Jose drinking wine
in the latter's hut. They were seated in front of a table with about
five bottles of 'Cuatro Cantos' gin on it (p. 92, tsn., Duero).
When Cabig was 3 or 4 meters from the hut, Douglas saw him

and offered him a drink. He accepted the drink but stayed

outside the hut (pp. 68, 93, tsn., Duero). Not long thereafter, two
persons arrived and joined the drinking party. Appellant Adriano
Caete also arrived and joined the group. He sat beside Jose
Bilog (pp. 90, 93, tsn., Id.).
When those around the table were already drunk, Jose (Boy)
Bilog stood up and drew from his waist a "laring," a bladed
instrument about 1-1/2 feet long. Suddenly, Jose stabbed
Douglas at the front part of his body (pp. 75, 77, 114, tsn., Id.).
Cabig witnessed the incident, but could not tell how many stab
blows Jose Bilog delivered. He noticed that the knife embedded
in Douglas' body. At this juncture, Caete got hold of the knife
and stabbed Douglas on the stomach (p. 144, tsn., Id.). Douglas
stood up and fought his assailants with karate blows (p. 118,
tsn., Id.). The two persons who had arrived earlier helped Jose
and Caete by hitting Douglas with a piece of wood. When Boy
Bilog caned for assistance, a colonist, one Roming, came and
helped them until Douglas fell dead. The victim was then
dumped in a nearby canal. Caete got the 'laring' and
proceeded to the Colony's brigade with it (p. 140, tsn., Duero).
When Angel Rebong arrived in his hut, Dugguan Abao, his hutmate, informed him that appellant Adriano Caete came to their
hut with blooded clothes. Caete got Angel's clothes and wore
them and left his blooded clothes (pp. 37-38, tsn., Duero). Angel
then left for the General Services Barracks because he was to
perform guard duty at 8:00 p.m. There he saw appellant Caete
wearing his black pants and Vonnel T-Shirt. The latter told him
that he got his (Angel's) clothes because he had no clothes to
wear (pp. 39, 44, 59, tsn., Duero).
On April 27, 1972, police investigators received information
about the persons seen at the scene of the crime prior to its
commission. They took into custody Adriano Caete and Angel
Rebong and brought them to Puerto Princess for interrogation.
When they reached Puerto Princess, Adriano Caete informed
Angel Rebong that he killed Douglas Bilog (p. 57, tsn., Duero).
Upon investigation, appellant Caete readily admitted that he

together with Jose Bilog, Pedro Macabihag and Ramon Dealogo

killed Douglas Bilog. Caete then voluntarily gave a written
statement. (Exhibit "C"; pp. 157, 158-159, tsn. Duero). Later, he
led Sgt. Maduro to his quarters in the Colony and surrendered
the fatal knife (pp. 162, 180, tsn., Id.). On June 22, 1972 Caete
gave another statement. This time he stated that only he and
Jose Bilog had a hand in the killing of Douglas (p. 177, tsn.,
Duero).
Dr. Oscar Magtang, Rural Health Physician at Puerto Princess,
Palawan conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Douglas
Bilog. He found 26 injuries, twenty-four (24) of which were
incised and stab wounds scattered all over the body, particularly
on the face, head, chest, abdomen, back, arms, and fingers of
both hands. There were abrasions on the neck and lower
abdomen. Death was due to severe hemorrhage (pp. 55-58, tsn.
Anonas). Dr. Magtang made a written report, Exhibit "F" (p. 53,
tsn. Id.). According to said doctor, the most severe of these
wounds were those inflicted on the left mammary region of the
chest going vertically downward and injuring the heart, and the
stab wound on the abdomen (pp. 60-61, tsn., Anonas).
Adela Pereyna, Chief, Record and Document Section and
Parcel Investigation, of the Iwahig Penal Colony testified that
per records in her custody Adriano Caete was convicted by the
Court of First Instance of Cebu of robbery on September 7,
1960; that he transferred to Davao Penal Colony for work
assignment bearing Serial No. 34831-P; that he escaped while
serving sentence on January 10, 1963, but was captured and
recommitted to prison on the following day; that he escaped
again on April 7, 1964; that on August 6, 1966, he was
committed to the Iwahig Penal Colony after having been
convicted of robbery by the Court of First Instance of Ormoc
City; that because he did not reveal his Identity, he was included
in the list of new arrivals and given serial No. 55791-P; that at
the Verification and Identification Section, his Identity was
established as the same Adriano Caete who was previously
given Serial No. 34831-P and who escaped from the Davao
Penal Colony or, April 7, 1964; that he was prosecuted for

evasion of sentence in the. Davao Court of First Instance with

the aggravating circumstance of recidivism; and, that his term of
sentence was due to expire on August 23, 1975 (pp. 41-43, tsn.
April 16,1973, Anonas; Exh. "D", p. 109, Rec). (pp. 4-10,
Appellee's Brief).
Appellant Adriano Caete assails the decision against him and submits that
the lower court erred (1) in not rejecting his extra-judicial confession, Exhibit
"C", notwithstanding that the case was merely concocted, incredible and in
conflict with the People's evidence; (2) in not finding that there were at least
seven (7) possibilities or versions as to who committed the crime and in not
acquitting him on reasonable doubt; (3) in finding that the crime was
committed in conspiracy with the attendance of evident premeditation, price,
treachery and in not finding that Caete should have been found guilty only of
physical injuries or at most homicide.

investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct facts narrated in

said confession.
Besides, even with the exclusion of said Exhibit "C", there is the testimony of
Antonio Cabig who witnessed the incident from the time Jose Bilog stabbed
his brother on his breast up to the time Douglas fell after receiving the thrust
of Caete. Hereunder is Cabig's testimony regarding the horrifying incident:
Q You said that Douglas Bilog was killed, do you
know the persons who killed ...
Q Do you know how Douglas was killed?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what way was he killed'?

On the other hand, appellant Jose Bilog claims that the lower court erred (1)
in giving credit to the testimony of prosecution witness Antonio Cabig,
notwithstanding that said witness is "known to be a confirmed degenerate and
an admitted perjurer"; (2) in disregarding his defense of alibi; and (3) in not
acquitting him on reasonable doubt.

A Douglas was drunk and he was stabbed by Boy

Bilog.
Q Where?

Appellant Caete subjects that the extra-judicial admission, Exhibit "C",

should have been disregarded, not due to violence in the taking thereof, but
on the ground that the same had been successfully explained by him; that the
contents thereof were merely concocted and this is supported by the
evidence of the prosecution; that aside from the irreconciliable conflict
between what' is contained in his extra-judicial confession and what
prosecution witness Antonio Cabig testified in court, said extra-judicial
confession contains statements which are strikingly incredible; and that the
credibility of prosecution witness Cabig as to the participation of appellant
Caete in the killing of Douglas Bilog is doubtful.

WITNESS:

The contention is utterly without merit. The findings of the trial court is entitled
to great weight that Caete's retraction was merely a last minute effort at
exculpation, considering that his extra-judicial confession, Exhibit "C", given in
April 1972, was freely and voluntarily given. The fact is, there was no
evidence presented that said confession was obtained as a result of violence,
torture, intimidation or promise of reward or leniency, nor that the

FISCAL DILIG:

A He was stabbed near the hut and near the river.

COURT: (To Witness)
Q Did you see by your own eyes when that
incident happened?
A Yes, sir.

Q Who was the companion of Boy Bilog when he

hit Douglas Bilog?

A Caete.

Q By whom?

Q When you said Caete, was he the same

person whom you have just pointed to?

A He was hit again by Cenete.

FISCAL DILIG:

A Yes, sir.
Q You said that Douglas Bilog was hit by Adriano
Caete. What instrument did Caete stab
Douglas?

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL DILIG:

A The same knife used by Boy Bilog.

Q You said that Boy Bilog hit with this bladed
instrument marked as Exh. "B" Douglas Bilog was
Douglas Bilog hit?

Q And in what particular part of the body of

Douglas was stabbed by Caete with the same
weapon marked as Exh. "B"?

A Yes, sir.
A At the left side and on the breast.
FISCAL DILIG:
Q In what part of the body of Douglas Bilog was
hit?
A At the back of the body and here at the front.
Q After Boy Bilog hit his brother Douglas, do you
know what happened to the knife marked as Exh.
"B"?

Q And after Douglas was hit and stabbed by

Caete on the side and breast, do you know what
happened to Douglas?
A Douglas stood up and the two civilians helped in
clubbing Douglas.
Q After that, what happened?
A Douglas fell down.

A Yes, sir.
Q What happened to that weapon marked as Exh.
"B"?

Q And after Douglas Bilog had fallen down, what

did you do, if any?
A I went home already to the Coconut Section.

A The knife dropped in the hand of Boy Bilog.

After the knife was dropped, Douglas Bilog stood
up and he was hit again.

Q Prior to that incident, did you already personally

know Jose Bilog.

COURT: (To witness)

A Yes, sir.

(TSN, pp. 77-78, January 8, 1973 hearing)

Likewise, appellant Jose Bilog's alibi cannot prevail over the positive
Identification of Cabig. He points out that on the day of the incident, April 19,
1972, he was in his house doing household chores as his wife was in Puerto
Princess doing some marketing. On this score, the lower court rightfully
observed:
Jose Bilog's alibi has no merit. His house is but three kilometers
away from the place of the incident and he was seen by the
widow of the deceased leaving his house on a bicycle about
4:00 o'clock that afternoon. At 5:00 o'clock, he was met by
Angel Rebong at the highway while riding his bicycle and at
6:00 o'clock late in the afternoon, Antonio Cabig saw him
drinking liquor with the deceased in his hut in the banana
plantation (pp. 154-155, Rec.).
The defense of alibi cannot be believed where the distance
between two barrios is only eight kilometers and can be
traversed by walking one and one-half hour (People vs.
Manangan, L-32733, Sept. 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 31). (pp. 9-10,
Appellee's Brief).
Aside from the fact that courts exercise great caution in accepting alibi
because it is easily concocted, it may be proper to repeat what one author
said about alibi as a defense: "it is a reason with a bad reputation."
Again, We agree with the findings of the trial court that "while Jose Bilog tried
to shift the blame at Caete, Caete too wanted the Court to believe that it
was Jose Bilog who did the heinous act. Repudiating his confession, Caete
tried to convince the Court that he was simply offered P1,000.00 in
consideration of his admission of the crime. On cross- examination, however,
Caete slipped and admitted that the P1,000.00 consideration was offered for
him to execute the killing. It is therefore evident that Caete's testimony
disowning the crime is but a last minute attempt at exculpation."
The killing of Douglas Bilog was qualified by treachery because the attack
was unexpected and sudden, and the victim had no chance to defend himself.
Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of price was present in the

commission of the crime and this affects not only the person who received the
money or the reward but also the person who gave it. (People vs. Talledo, 58
Phil. 539).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED but, for lack of
necessary votes, the sentence is modified in that both appellants shall each
suffer Reclusion Perpetua only, and shall indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Douglas Bilog in the sum of P30,000.00. Costs against both
appellants.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERNIE BARO, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. It must avoid pushing the judge to the pitfall of either convicting the
innocent or acquitting the guilty. The hornbook rule is that where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted. It would be far more
acceptable to acquit the guilty erroneously than to convict the innocent wrongly.

The Case
Decision[1]

Ernie Baro appeals the

dated October 30, 2000 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 86), finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua for each count. The decretal portion of the Decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
finding the accused Ernie Baro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of rape committed against Roda Ongatan and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the offense charged and
to indemnify the victim Roda Ongotan the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs.[2]
Three Complaints, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-76279, Q-9876280 and Q-98-76282 were filed against appellant for raping Roda Ongotan
on January 5, 1995, March 5, 1995 and April 16, 1996. Except for the dates of
the commission of the offense, the three Complaints were similarly worded as
follows:
That on or about the 5th day of January, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the room where the undersigned complainant

was sleeping, and covered her mouth, poked a knife at her neck, undressed
her and removed her panty, and thereafter have carnal knowledge of her
against her will and without her consent.[3]
During his arraignment on August 3, 1998,[4] appellant, with the assistance
of his counsel de oficio,[5] pleaded not guilty to all three charges. After trial in
due course, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[6] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecutions
version of the facts as follows:
Roda Ongotan was an adopted daughter of Rodrigo and Leticia
Ongotan. Rodrigo and Leticia have eight (8) other children, namely: Ricardo,
21 years old; Ronald, 20 years old; Rogelio, 19 years old; Roberto, 18 years
old; Rose, 16 years old; Rochelle, 13 years old; Rodel, 10 years old and
Racquel, 8 years old. They lived in a two-storey house at 104 Zusuaregui, Old
Balara, Quezon City. Rodas family occupied the second floor of the house,
which had three (3) bedrooms. The first bedroom was occupied by Roda s
parents and three (3) sisters. The second bedroom was occupied by the
brother of Rodas mother, Vivencio Padora, while the third bedroom was
occupied by Roda. Rodas five (5) brothers sleep in the sala. Rodas bedroom
was adjacent to the kitchen. Her room was about two armslength wide and
one-and-a-half armslength long. It had no door and only a curtain covered
and separated it from the rest of the house. Appellant, who was the uncle of
Rodas mother, slept just outside Rodas bedroom. When the rape incidents
occurred in 1995 and 1996, the ground floor of the Ongotan house was
rented by Teresita Ongotans (the sister of Rodas father) family.
On January 5, 1995, around 5:00 a.m., Roda had just awakened and was still
lying down when appellant entered her room. Appellant immediately covered
her mouth with a handkerchief and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Using
his left hand, appellant poked a knife (balisong) at her. Appellant was then
wearing a white shirt and black short pants while Roda was wearing an
orange-colored short pants and a pink dress. Appellant took off his short

pants and removed Rodas short pants and underwear. He forcibly spread her
legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. Roda could not remember how
long was appellants penis remained inserted in her vagina. After raping her,
appellant dressed up and left her room.
On March 5, 1995, Roda went to bed around 8:00 p.m. Around 5:00 a.m. the
following day, Roda was awakened by the presence of appellant inside her
bedroom. Upon seeing appellant, Roda asked him what he wanted from
her. Appellant told her to be quiet and immediately covered her mouth with a
handkerchief. Appellant wound the handkerchief around Rodas
head. Appellant then told her that should she shout or report what was
happening to anyone, he would kill her. Thereupon, appellant raised her
duster. Roda resisted, but her strength was no match for
appellants. Appellant told her not to resist and to make her immobile,
appellant poked a knife (balisong) at the left side of her neck. Roda started to
cry when she realized the futility of her resistance to appellants lustful
intention. Thereupon, appellant removed her underwear. When this was
removed, appellant lowered his maong pants and underwear. Then, using his
knees which were placed between Rodas legs, appellant forced her legs
apart. Appellant inserted his penis into Rodas vagina. Roda could not do
anything but cry as she felt weak. When appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina, Roda felt pain. She could not remember how long appellants penis
stayed inside her vagina. When appellant was finished with her, he dressed
up and removed the handkerchief around her head. When morning came,
Roda did not tell her mother of the incident out of fear of appellant.
On April 16, 1996, around midnight, Roda was at the kitchen preparing the
food to be brought by her parents and five (5) siblings on their trip to the
province. After she had prepared their baon, her parents, four (4) brothers
and one (1) sister left the house. Only Roda, Rochelle, Rodel and appellant
were left in the house. Thereafter, she put to sleep Rochelle and Rodel who
slept at their parents bedroom. Roda did not sleep because she was afraid of
appellant who was with them in the house. Before her parents left, Roda had
pleaded with them not to leave. She could not tell them the reason out of fear
of appellant.She could not ask them either to bring them all because no one
would be left at the house. Neither could she go with them because no one
would look after her young brother and sister.

Thereupon, Roda saw appellant already inside her room and appellant, upon
seeing her immediately covered her mouth to prevent her from making any
noise. Appellant used a handkerchief to cover her mouth and poked a knife at
her neck. Roda resisted but appellant was stronger. As they were still
standing, appellant ordered her to lie down. Appellant told her not to report
the incident to anyone. Thereupon, appellant took off his short pants, and
followed that by removing Rodas short pants and underwear. When this was
done, appellant forced her legs open and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Roda could not do anything but cry. She could not remember how
long appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. After appellant raped her, he
ordered her to dress up and threatened her that should she report what had
happened to anyone, he would kill her.
On December 17, 1997, Roda summoned enough courage to file a complaint
against appellant. She first confided in her aunt, Antonia Espos, about her
unfortunate ordeal in the hands of appellant. Her aunt assured her that she
would help her file charges against appellant.
Dr. Cristina Freyra, a Medico-Legal Officer at the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory, EDSA, Q.C., stated that she performed a genital
examination on Roda Ongotan on December 16, 1997. At the time of Rodas
examination, Roda was fifteen (15) years old. Dr. Freyras examination
revealed that Rodas hymen had deep-healed lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00
oclock positions and a healed laceration at 5:00 oclock position. Dr. Freyra
opined that these lacerations could have been caused by a hard blunt object
like an erect male organ. Dr. Freyra concluded that Roda was in a non-virgin
state physically.[7](Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellant narrates in his Brief [8] his version of the facts
as follows:
Accused-appellant, Ernie Baro, was a former resident of Catubig, Northern
Samar. He was engaged in copra farming from the plantation of his parents
prior to November 15, 1996, when he came to Manila with his wife and three

(3) children to find work upon the request and invitation of his niece, Leticia
Ongotan.
In Manila, accused-appellant Ernie Baro and his wife, with their three (3)
children, the eldest being 3 years old and the youngest at 1 year old, stayed
at the place located at Orocoy St., Montessorie, Manila.Later on, they
transferred to the house of his niece, Leticia Ongotan at 104 Scout
Zuzuarigue St., Old Balara, Quezon City, where they stayed for about 1
year. Th[e]reat, accused, Ernie Baro met herein complainant Roda Ongot[a]n,
who later on charged him of three (3) counts of rape on December 17, 1997,
allegedly committed by him on January 5; March 5, 1995 and April 16,
1996. The herein accused vehemently denied the charges despite his denial,
the trial court nonetheless found him guilty of the charge.[9] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC gave credence to complainants testimony, citing the principle that
when a woman says she has been raped, she says all that is necessary to
prove her accusation. It also held that her delay in reporting the incidents did
not at all affect her credibility, for the delay had satisfactorily been
explained. Furthermore, it ruled that the Medico-legal Report and the testimony
of the examining physician bolstered her claim that she had experienced violent
sexual intercourse at a young age.[10]
The RTC did not give credence to the alibi and the denial interposed by the
accused. It ruled that neither would prevail over the positive testimony of
complainant and that, as between a positive identification of the accused by the
victim herself and an alibi, the former is to be given greater weight, especially
when the victim has no motive to testify falsely against the accused. [11]
Hence, this appeal.[12]

Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo with the following alleged errors:
I

The lower court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of
complainant, Roda Ongotan y Padora, despite its inherent incredibility,
contradictions and implausibility.
II
The lower court likewise erred in disregarding accused-appellants defense of
alibi despite having clearly satisfied the legal criteria for its being, and
supported by the attendant milieu and circumstances of the case. [13]

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. This Court believes that the guilt of appellant
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

First Issue:
Credibility of Complainants Testimony
Appellant submits that the RTC erred in according full faith and credence
to complainants testimony despite its inherent incredibility, contradictions and
implausibility.
We agree. While it is true that it may be the sole basis for convicting the
accused in a rape case,[14] the complaining witness testimony must be
credible.[15] In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by the
following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility -- while
it may be difficult for the prosecution to prove, it is usually more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature
of the crime in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits -- it cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[16]
After a painstaking review of the records of the case, this Court finds
several circumstances creating reasonable doubt as to appellants guilt. These
are: (1) delay in filing the Complaint, (2) failure of the prosecution to prove

appellants moral ascendancy over complainant, (3) lack of support from the
records for the RTCs finding of violent sexual intercourse between appellant
and complainant, and (4) discrepancies in the complainants testimony.

after a period of two long years from the time first rape supposedly took place
and to disregard the threats allegedly made by appellant.

Proof of Moral Ascendancy

Delay in Filing the Complaint
In rape, the complainants delayed disclosure of the crime to kith or kin or
persons of authority does not always warrant the conclusion that the woman
was not sexually molested or that her charges against the accused are
baseless and fabricated.[17] However, the delay must be adequately and
satisfactorily explained; otherwise, it would generate doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.[18]
In the present case, the first rape was allegedly committed by appellant on
January 5, 1995. After two months, on March 5, 1995, he purportedly raped
complainant again. More than a year after the second rape, on April 16, 1996,
the third rape supposedly occurred. Complainant reported the alleged crimes
only on December 17, 1997, or more than two years after the first rape and
more than a year after the third one allegedly occurred.
Her explanation for the delay was the threat of appellant to kill her if she
reported the incident to anyone. Note that at the time she reported the incident,
he was still residing with her family. She herself testified that he left their
residence only on December 16, 1997,[19] after she had confided the alleged
rapes to her aunt and had herself examined by a doctor. Hence, the threat of
death, if any, was still hanging precariously over her at the time. She merely
said that she no longer wanted to ruin her life, so she decided to reveal the
rapes to her aunt. The relevant portion of her testimony reads thus:

The RTC erred in stating that appellant had exercised moral ascendancy
over complainant. This was not proven during the trial. Neither do the records
show that he exercised moral ascendancy over her.He is in fact not much older
than her brothers. It was not shown whether he was her benefactor -- a source
of financial support -- or whether he exercised discipline over her. In other
words, there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that it was his moral
ascendancy that prevented her from putting up a resistance. [21] Presumptions
of moral ascendancy cannot and should not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

Violent Sexual Intercourse Not Borne by the Records

The trial court likewise erred when it held that the Medico-legal Report and
the testimony of Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime Laboratory indicated
that the lacerations in the vagina of complainant showed that she had
experienced violent sexual intercourse during her younger years, and that such
experience caused those lacerations. The Report merely indicated that healed
lacerations were found in her hymen at the 5, the 3, and the 9 oclock
positions. We reproduce pertinent portions of the Report as follows:
FINDINGS:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What prompted you to tell the story to your auntie despite the fact that
one year has lapsed already?
A: Because I dont want to ruin my life anymore because it [is] already
ruined.[20]
The above quote does not, however, explain the gaps between the dates
of the three instances of the alleged rapes. The prosecution failed to show
satisfactorily what finally prompted complainant to report the purported crime

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are
hemispherical with pale brown areola and nipples from which no secretion
could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:

There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
coadapted with pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On
separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with shallow,
sealed laceration at 5 and deep-healed lacerations at 3 and 9 oclock
positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the
introduction of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with
prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in a non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the
time of the examination.[22]
Furthermore, during her testimony, Dr. Freyra admitted that such
lacerations[23] could have been caused by any hard blunt object or even by a
finger or a vibrator.[24] She never mentioned violent sexual intercourse. This
fact is clear from the Transcript of Stenographic Notes, which we quote:
Q: What was [sic] your findings if any in connection with your examination?
A: On examination, there were deep-healed lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00
oclock positions and there was healed laceration at 5:00 oclock position.
Q: Could you tell us what could have caused the lacerations?
A: Any hard blunt object could produce the lacerations.
Q: Could you mention any?
A: An erect male organ.
Q: Could you tell us the size of that male organ that caused the laceration?
Atty Venturanza:
The question of the prosecutor is quite misleading. What was stated by
the witness is any hard blunt object and she just mentioned as one of
the objects is an erect male organ and now he [is] asking the size.
Court:
Lay the basis.

Fiscal Jamolin:
If you said that one of the causes of the laceration is an erect male
organ. On the basis of this possibility, could you tell us the size of that
male organ that caused the lacerations?
A: It could be any size but it should be bigger. [B]y 1 cm. [i]norder to produce
laceration, the diameter of the hard thing that entered the hymen should
be bigger by 1 cm.[25]
It must be noted that the healed lacerations found in complainants hymen
were not proven to have been caused by rapes that supposedly happened two
years earlier. Such lacerations may simply mean that, depending on the
changes observed in the affected tissues, a period ranging from four days to
one month passed from the time they had been inflicted up to the time they
were examined.[26]

Discrepancies in the Testimony of Complainant

More damaging to the prosecution, the discrepancies in the testimony of
complainant cast doubts on appellants guilt.
First, during her testimony on September 17, 1998, complainant said that
she was surprised when appellant entered her room on the night of March 5,
1995.[27] On January 22, 1999, she again testified that she was shocked to see
appellant inside her room on the night of January 5, 1995.[28]
For reasons known only to the prosecution, complainant testified on the
second rape before she testified on the first one. Stranger still is her statement
that she asked him what he wanted from her when she saw him in her room
the second time.[29] We note that she had allegedly been raped by him already
prior to that date. Thus, she need not have asked him what he wanted from
her. By then, she should have at the very least been able to guess his evil
intentions and felt alarmed accordingly.
Second, the house where the rapes allegedly took place was described
during the trial as not bigger than one half of the courtroom. [30] It was occupied
by at least twelve people, most of whom were members of her immediate
family. At any given night, at least ten people would be asleep there. We cannot
help but wonder why she allowed appellant to commit such dastardly act three

times, with her parents and four fully grown brothers within shouting
distance. Considering the cramped space and the quietness of the night, the
faintest cry from her would have been heard by one or more of her family
members who were in that same house.
Third, complainant described each rape in a very uniform and even
seemingly systematic manner. Each rape always started with appellant
entering the room and complainant asking what he wanted from her. It always
began with appellant covering her mouth with a handkerchief and pulling down
her underwear. There was no difference at all in the way the rapes were
committed. The manner in which she described them engenders the suspicion
that her testimony had been coached, rehearsed, or contrived.

Second Issue:
Alibi as a Defense

Appellant's Alibi a Plausible Excuse

Alibi, the plea of having been somewhere other than at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission, is a plausible excuse for the
accused. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is not always a weak
defense. Sometimes, the fact that the accused was somewhere else may just
be the plain and unvarnished truth.
But to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the
defense of alibi must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. [31] The
rule is well-settled that in order for it to prosper, it must be demonstrated that
the person charged with the crime was not only somewhere else when the
offense was committed, but was so far away that it would have been physically
impossible to have been at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission.[32] The reason is that no person can be in two places
at the same time.
This Court has ruled in numerous cases that where the accused was only
thirty minutes[33] or just a few kilometers from the place where the crime was
committed,[34] the defense of alibi will not prosper.

Complainant alleges that appellant raped her three times -- one on each of
the following dates: January 5, 1995, March 5, 1995, and April 16, 1996. During
his testimony, appellant stated that he was in Catubig, Northern Samar until
November 15, 1996, when he came to Manila upon the invitation of
complainants mother.[35] He likewise testified that it would take twenty-four
hours for a bus to travel from Catubig, Northern Samar, to Manila.[36] It would
have been highly unlikely for him to take the 24-hour bus ride to Manila, commit
the dastardly act upon complainant, and then return to Catubig, Samar, by
taking another 24-hour bus ride. He would have had to do so three times in
order to commit the three alleged rapes on the dates given.
No evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove that appellant was
indeed in Manila when the alleged rapes were committed. It would have been
a simple matter for it to present the testimony of complainants mother, Leticia
Ongotan, to contradict his testimony. It would also have been a simple matter
for it to present the testimony of any of the brothers or the sisters of complainant
to establish exactly on what date he had arrived in Manila.
Truly, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits. It cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of that for the
defense. In the present case, the testimony of appellant that he was in Catubig,
Northern Samar, on the dates when the alleged rapes were committed remain
uncontradicted by the prosecution. Moreover, he testified that it was upon the
invitation of complainants mother, his niece, that he moved his family to Manila
in November 1996 or seven months after the last rape allegedly occurred.

The Constitutional Presumption of Innocence

Indeed, when a woman says she was raped, she in effect says all that is
necessary to prove her accusation.[37] Still, the presumption of innocence of the
accused should not be thrown out of the window and forgotten altogether. Such
presumption holds until the contrary is proven. Every circumstance favoring it
must be taken into account in a criminal case. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, then the evidence does not
pass the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. [38]

In order to convict the accused of a crime, the prosecution must produce

evidence showing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[39] A person charged with a
serious crime stands to lose not only reputation, but also liberty and maybe
even life. Because of the gravity of the charge and the great loss involved in
the present case, the prosecution should not have rested easy on haphazard
facts and hastily thrown-in principles, forgetting in the process their duty of
overcoming the presumption of innocence of the accused in a criminal action.
The prosecution should take an active and direct part in the trial of the case,
since it has the onus probandi of showing the guilt of the accused.[40] Even if it
is, perhaps, the inadequacy of details in the prosecutions evidence rather than
the actual facts themselves that makes it difficult for this Court to arrive at
definite conclusions, still we cannot pin responsibility on appellant. The moral
conviction that may serve as basis for a finding of guilt in a criminal case should
be that which is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record,
exclusive of any other consideration. Short of this minimum requirement, it is
not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is, even more, this Courts
constitutional duty to acquit them. Only then may there be fealty to the
constitutional presumption of innocence.[41]
The innocence of a defendant in a criminal case is always presumed until
the contrary is proven.[42] Where two probabilities arise from the evidence, the
one compatible with the presumption of innocence will be adopted.[43] Mere
suspicion is not enough to take away ones liberty and destroy ones
reputation. Guilt must be proven by proof as clear as daylight, by evidence so
airtight that no room is left for any reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision issued
on October 30, 2000 by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86, is
hereby REVERSED and appellantACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 180870

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
January 22, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In order to safeguard its citizenry from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their
physical and mental well-being, the State pursued an intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar
substances.[1] However, in our desire to totally eradicate this social ill, we must adhere
to the constitutional pronouncement that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.[2] This case illustrates once more
our faithful adherence to said constitutional requirement.
Factual Antecedents
For review is the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 dated

November 25, 2005 finding herein petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto (Cacao) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No.
9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and one day to 15 years
and ordering him to pay a fine of P400,000.00. Also assailed is the Resolution[5] of the
CA dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration.
On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y
Naguit[6] and Cacao[7] indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
before the RTC of Laoag City. Insofar as pertinent to this petition, we shall quote the
information only against Cacao in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 which reads:
That on or about the 14th day of October, 2004, at Laoag City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously [sic] have in his possession, control and custody 1 plastic
sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu containing a total
of 1.6 grams including plastic sachets [sic] without any license or
authority, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
When arraigned on November 30, 2004, Cacao pleaded not guilty.[9] Thereafter trial
on the merits followed.
The inculpatory facts, as unveiled by the prosecution in its evidence given during the
trial, were briefly synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz:
On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3
(PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the
Laoag City Police Station received a telephone call from an informant
about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel
located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.
Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel
Mangapit, went immediately to the Starlight Hotel to determine the

veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Pang-ag and
PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information
counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session
at Room 5 of the hotel.
The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the
roomboy of the hotel was about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and
they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy
knocked at the door and a woman, later identified as Mylene, opened
the door wide enough to enable the police officers to look inside.
PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the
bed sniffing shabu while Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting
petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them
the drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic
sachets.
PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic
sachet containing shabu.
After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police
Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty while the
confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.
The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an
examination on the specimen recovered from appellant and his
companion which tested positive for shabu.[10]
Cacao professed his innocence and presented his defense in this wise:
In the afternoon of 14 October 2004, petitioner was waiting for a ride
going home along the National Road at the rotunda of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. Joseph Canlas [who was on his way
to] Laoag City aboard his motorcycle x x x pulled over and asked the
petitioner if the latter could spare a moment to estimate a work he

wanted to be done in his house. Admittedly, the petitioner is a

contractor. Petitioner agreed and they both boarded Canlas
motorcycle for Laoag City.

Barely a moment after entering Room 5, the two then heard a knock
on the door from the outside. Mylene Daquiaog immediately stood up
and told the petitioner and Canlas that they are (her) companions.

While in Laoag City, petitioner and Canlas stopped at the public

market for the latter to collect [loan payment] as he is also a money
lender. Petitioner stayed [by] Canlas motorcycle. When Canlas
returned, it was then that they decided to have chicks (or
womanize). They then proceeded to Starlight Hotel located
along Ablan Ave., Laoag City on board Canlas motorcycle.

As soon as the door was unlocked by Mylene Daquioag, several

policemen barged inside the room with their guns drawn out. Petitioner
was shoved to the bed by one of the police. He was later bodily
searched but nothing was found from [sic] him except his wallet
containing cash of about P 7,000.00. The wallet was later turned over
to the petitioners wife at the Police Station of Laoag, City.
The P7,000.00 was never seen again.

x x x at the Starlight Hotel, petitioner asked for a room and [was given]
Room 5 x x x. Thereafter, Canlas stayed inside Room 5 while
petitioner went out to the hotels counter to wait for the woman they
[had] contacted. Present at the counter at the time was the lady cashier
[named] Cherry Corpuz.
In about thirty (30) minutes, a tricycle-for-hire arrived with a man and a
woman on board as passengers. The tricycle went inside the hotel and
stopped right in front of the counter where the petitioner and the lady
cashier were. After alighting from the tricycle, the woman companion
inquired where Room 5 is [and was directed] by the lady cashier. The
woman [who] alighted from the tricycle in the company of another male
person was later on identified to be Mylene Daquioag. Thereafter,
Mylene Daquioag proceeded to Room 5 while the male companion
stayed behind with the petitioner at the hotels counter. When petitioner
could not wait [any] longer because there was only one woman who
arrived, he x x x asked the male companion of Mylene Daquioag if
another woman is coming. The male companion answered in the
negative. A couple of minutes [later], petitioner followed to Room 5 so
he could [sic] go home instead because it was then getting late.
Upon entering the room, petitioner saw Mylene Daquioag and Canlas
seated at the table inside the room. He also saw Mylene Daquioag
offer something contained in plastic x x x to Canlas. The latter refused
as he said it is a woman that he was asking [for].

As petitioner was made to sit at [sic] the bed, one of the police officers
pointed to a plastic sachet on the floor. It was about two (2) meters
away from him and about a meter from the police pointing [to] it. The
same police then explained that the plastic sachet belongs to the
petitioner. Immediately, petitioner cried foul on the assertion.
Due to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as
able to notice what the other police did to Canlas.
Without much ado, the petitioner and Canlas were apprehended,
handcuffed and brought to the Laoag City Police Station. Charges
were later on filed against them.[11]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On November 25, 2005, the trial court rendered its judgment finding Cacao guilty of
the offense charged and sentenced him accordingly, viz:
WHEREFORE x x x
The accused Julius Cacao is likewise found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged of illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 1.3987 grams in Criminal
Case No. 11489 and is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate

penalty of imprisonment from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)

DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and to pay the fine of Four hundred
thousand (P400,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency.
The sachets of shabu confiscated from the accused are all confiscated
in favor of the Government, the same to be disposed as the law
prescribes. Cost de oficio.

considering the myriad material inconsistencies, discrepancies,

and incredible statements in the prosecution evidence.[15]
II.

The lower court gravely erred in failing to lend

credence to the critical testimony of Benedict Villanueva.[16]

III.

The lower court erred in not finding that the crucial

first link in the chain of custody of the specimen subjected for
examination was not proven.[17]

IV.

The lower court gravely erred in declaring that the

defense of frame-up cannot be given weight.[18]

V.

The lower court gravely erred in relying on the

weakness of the defense.[19]

VI.

The lower court gravely erred in failing to find that

the presumption of innocence of the petitioner stands
unrebutted, hence, his conviction is erroneous.[20]

SO ORDERED.[12]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the
CA. On July 27, 2007, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming Cacaos
conviction. It held that the circumstances obtaining in this case validly cloaked the
arresting officers with the authority to search and seize any contraband or prohibited
material which may be used as proof of the offense of which Cacao is charged. It also
ruled that there is no proof that the police officers compelled Cacao to admit a
crime. As to the alleged contradictory statements, the appellate court ruled that they
refer only to minor details which are not sufficient to overthrow the probative value
accorded them by the trial court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[13] but the motion was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution[14] dated on December 11, 2007.
Issues
In this petition, Cacao ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I.

The lower court gravely erred in ruling that

the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt

Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are
entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if
there is any indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances
which would substantially affect the disposition of the case,[21] we will not hesitate to
review the same. In this case, we find it imperative to review the factual findings of the
trial court because of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses on material points.
Jurisprudence holds that in prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of
prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish with moral certainty the elemental
act of possession of a prohibited substance coupled with the fact that such

possession is not authorized by law. Essential, however, in a drug-related case is that

the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt.[22] Since
the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its

Mangapit corroborated Pang-ags testimony that it was he who delivered to Ancheta

the item he seized from Cacao. Thus:

existence is vital to a judgment of conviction,[23] it behooves upon the prosecution to

establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from his possession.

Q: How about the one big plastic sachet you were able to seize from
the right front pocket of accused Cacao, what did you do?
A: I turned it over to the evidence custodian, Sir.

We have scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found
not only glaring inconsistencies on material points but more importantly a failure to
identify indubitably the prohibited drug allegedly confiscated from Cacao.
The
testimonies
of
the
prosecutions principal witnesses
are inconsistent as to who
delivered the prohibited drug to
the evidence custodian.

PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified
that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence
custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). Thus:

Q: Who was that evidence custodian to whom you turned over that
plastic sachet?
A: SP02 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[25]
The foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the
evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was Mangapit who delivered the item
allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically declared
that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic sachet
of shabu.
Q: Who delivered to you the specimen allegedly confiscated from the
possession of Cacao?
A: SP03 Balolong, Sir.[26]
During his cross-examination, Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was

Q: What about the two plastic sachets you confiscated from the
possession of the accused Joseph and the one plastic sachet
which Jonel Mangapit confiscated from the possession of
Julius Cacao as well as the drug paraphernalia you mentioned,
what did you do with them?
A: We turned over the confiscated drug paraphernalia and the one I
confiscated to the evidence custodian, SP03 Loreto Ancheta
and the one confiscated by P02 Mangapit was also turned over
by him to the evidence custodian, sir.
Q: Who was the evidence custodian whom you and Jonel Mangapit
turned over the items you said?
A: SPO3 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[24]

Balolong and definitely not Mangapit who handed to him the plastic sachet
of shabu. Ancheta testified thus:
Q: You said that it was officer Balolong who handed to you the plastic
sachet of shabu which was allegedly taken from the
possession of accused Julius Cacao, did I hear you right?
A: Julius Cacao, yes sir.
Q: It was not officer Mangapit who handed to you the plastic sachet of
shabu?
A: Balolong, sir.

Q: It was not Mangapit?

A: No sir.[27]
When confronted with the afore-quoted testimony of Ancheta, Mangapit cannot
explain the variance. He just gave a sweeping answer I do not know.[28]
We cannot understand why the courts below did not doubt or suspect the patently
inconsistent and contradictory testimonies of the principal witnesses of the
prosecution. Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, we are of the considered
view that this contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy
touching on substantial and significant matter which could well affect the credibility of
the witnesses.
The prosecution failed to
satisfactorily establish that the
item presented in court was the
same item confiscated from
Cacao.

The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one
hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt
that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly
seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed,
then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with
certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the most competent person to make the proper
identification being the officer who confiscated the item from Cacao, never actually
identified the same:
Q: If shown to you again that one big plastic sachet where you put
markings would you be able to recognize and identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Giving to you an already opened brown envelope with several

contents, will you please sort out [the] contents and bring out
that big plastic sachet you claimed you confiscated from the
custody of accused Cacao?
A: (Witness sorting out the contents of the plastic bag containing
several items). (Witness examining the plastic sachet mounted
on the bond paper marked as Exhibit B-1).
Q: Are the markings you claimed which were placed in the plastic
sachet still visible and readable?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please read for record purposes the markings?
A: Initial JPC and my signature, sir.
(Witness pointing to the initials and signature written on a darker
masking tape on the plastic sachet).[29]
Verily, there was no actual and effective identification of the subject specimen. After
sorting out the contents of the plastic bag, witness Mangapit merely pointed to the
initial and signature written on a masking tape attached to the plastic sachet. At no
instance did he make a categorical and accurate declaration that the sachet
contained the shabu allegedly confiscated from Cacao.
The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pangag. However, we cannot lend credence to his supposed identification, the same not
being also positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing that this
witness actually saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In
fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to make the identification since from all indications,
he has never been in possession of it.
Be that as it may, any identification made by these witnesses on the item allegedly
seized from petitioner is rendered meaningless and bereft of probative value in view
of the categorical denial of the evidence custodian that he received the same from

Mangapit. It is now clearly evident from the records that the sachet of shabu which

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases

the evidence custodian received, marked and submitted for examination and later
presented in court is not the same sachet of shabu which Mangapit claimed to have

constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
identity of the prohibited drug is essential.[35]

confiscated from petitioner and subsequently transmitted to the evidence custodian.

Likewise, our ruling in People v. Gutierrez[36] on chain of custody rule is
Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the
seized item. It is quite strange that Ancheta would point to Balolong as the sender of
the seized items if he had no basis in saying so. However, our own scrutiny of the
records failed to show the role of Balolong in the operation since admittedly, the only
lawmen who participated therein were Mangapit and Pang-ag. In fact, as testified to
by Mangapit, Balolong proceeded to the hotel after the operation.[30] How then was
Balolong able to get hold of the confiscated substance when he was neither a party
to nor present during the operation? Who entrusted the substance to him assuming
that somebody requested him to submit it for safekeeping? These are only some of
the lingering questions which must be answered convincingly and satisfactorily so as
to ensure that there had been no substitution, contamination or tampering with the
sachet of shabu allegedly taken from petitioner. It must be noted that Balolong was
never presented to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what
was turned over to the evidence custodian by Balolong and later presented in court
was the same substance recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish the chain
of custody is fatal to the prosecutions case. There can be no crime of illegal
possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited
drug.[31] In People v. Casimiro,[32] citing People v. Mapa,[33] we acquitted the accused
for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which
constitutes the corpus delicti. Equally true in Zarraga v. People,[34] we also acquitted
the accused in view of the prosecutions failure to indubitably show the identity of
the shabu.

instructive. Thus:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires the presentation of the seized prohibited drugs as an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would ideally
cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the
prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way
that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description
of the condition in which it was delivered to the next in the chain.
Finally, petitioners defenses of denial and frame-up are concededly inherently weak
and commonly used in drug-related cases. However, it must be stressed that
conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution.
Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence
needed to convict, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately
established by the prosecution. While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings
and conclusions of the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses,
we must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt because the law presumes that the accused is
innocent unless and until proven otherwise. Presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 11489-13,
and its Resolution dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration,
are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Petitioner
Julius
Cacao
y
Prieto
is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.