Ethics and the Space Shuttle Challenger Launch

Case Background
In January of 1986, seven NASA astronauts lost their lives when the Space
Shuttle Challenger exploded just seconds after takeoff. The Rogers Commission, a
committee responsible for the investigation of the incident, attributed the disaster to the
mechanical malfunction of the solid rocket booster O-rings along with failure from
various levels of contracted management. Although problems with the O-rings had been
apparent as early as two years before the launch; various managerial and political
circumstances led management to ignore these concerns. This report analyzes the ethical
issues surrounding the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger.
O-rings are engineered to prevent scorching combustion gasses from leaking from
the laterals of the solid rocket boosters. The design is simple in nature, and consists of a
polymer-elastomer cross section. Compressed during fabrication, O-rings create a seal at
the interface by forming to a preset groove. The compression factor is determined by a
miniscule gap between the clevis and tang of the booster. Compression presents a very
significant consideration for proper booster operation; O-rings compression must be
flexible enough to withstand the shuttles vibrations but rigid enough to prevent any
combustion gas from escaping. Further strengthening agents include heat-resistant putty
which seals the joint assembly in the inner section. The Space Shuttle Challenger utilized
a primary O-ring and secondary O-ring that worked in parallel to seal the solid rocket
booster joints.

Faulty O-rings allowed searing combustion gases to leak from the laterals of the
rocket booster and burn a hole through the external fuel tank. The Rogers Commission
attributed the malfunction of the O-ring to various factors including flawed design of the
solid rocket boosters, inadequate low-temperature test benching of the O-ring composites
and improperly sealed joints.
A government contracted company by the name of Morton Thiokol was appointed
by NASA to design and fabricate the solid rocket boosters. Morton Thiokol had previous
success in the developments of highly sophisticated rubbers and chemicals, and then
again later with the design of nuclear-tipped Titan missiles. NASA reviewed and
accepted their design for solid rocket boosters in late 1976.
Issues and problems surrounding the operation of the O-rings were evident from
the analysis of prior launches. An examination of the fourth shuttle mission which
launched in November of 1981 revealed significant erosion of the O-ring material. Later
investigation revealed the source of the erosion originated from exposure to ultra-high
temperature gasses escaping past the putty.
During the launch of flight 51-C in January of 1985, similar effects had been
documented. Engineers for Morton Thiokol had discovered a thick-cake of black soot
and deposition of synthetic polymer grease along the interface of the solid rocket
boosters. This finding was startling in the fact that it pointed out that hot gas had actually
escaped from the booster during launch. It appeared as though the O-rings were further
weakened during the low temperature launch in Florida that day. This prompted Morton
Thiokol to undertake research and testing of O-ring behavior in low temperature
environments. Design modifications were proposed for the O-rings, but would fail to be

available for many more months because of corporate restructuring and re-tooling
operations. Morton Thiokol continued to employ the faulty O-rings in numerous
launches preceding the design modifications.
With problems evident and the increasing probability of catastrophic failure,
Morton Thiokol engineers voiced their concerns. Roger Boisjoly, a senior-level staff
engineer, was seen as the most vocal opponent to launches utilizing compromised Orings. Boisjoly recognized the failure of both the primary and secondary seals within the
joints of the solid rocket boosters from prior launches. Boisjoly also recognized the
possibility for catastrophic failure if the situation was not immediately remedied. Data
and statistics illustrated how low temperature launches rendered the operation of the Orings inefficient and hazardous. Although Morton Thiokol recognized the O-rings as
acceptable, Boisjoly and others felt this interpretation to be inaccurate. Boisjoly tried
desperately to convince management of the severity of the problem. Several memos and
phone calls were placed to Robert Lund, an engineering vice president at Morton
Thiokol, regarding the issue. The reception of the news was greeted with mere
annoyance and inactivity.
Continued pressure from Thiokol engineers resulted in the development of a
taskforce with the purpose of solving the O-ring problem in both the short and long term.
The taskforce, assembled in late July of 1985, had little effect on the policies and
procedures of the parent company. The taskforce lacked the appropriate managerial
approval, resources, and power to make any difference. Bureaucratic red tape hindered
every attempt to arrive at a working solution. Team members recognized this and made

attempts to alert managers in other areas but failed due to the corporate hierarchal
structure.
The days prior to the Challenger launch brought an unprecedented sense of
urgency due to the forecasted low temperatures. Low-temperature launches increased the
likelihood of failure within the O-ring joints. Although the previous launches
documented temperatures as low as 53 degrees Fahrenheit, temperatures during the
Challenger launch would be almost 30 cooler. Engineers were understandably concerned
regarding the lack of data and statistics for such a low-temperature launch. A
teleconference was scheduled the night before the launch to discuss the low temperature
performance of the solid rocket boosters.
Engineers presented their findings and offered their recommendations regarding
the launch. Robert Lund argued in favor of delaying the mission due to the advice from
company engineers and the lack of low-temperature data present on O-ring operation. He
argued that the launch should only commence at ambient temperatures of 53 degrees or
greater. This recommendation was greeted with inqugility and skepticism from Project
Manager Larry Mulloy. He regarded the data as questionable and challenged the
engineers findings. Jerald Mason, a senior executive for Morton Thiokol, called for a
revised recommendation which favored the launch. By doing this, management was
circumventing the original proposals called for by middle managers and engineers for the
project. The revised recommendation surprised NASA management, and despite
reservations, the decision was made to go ahead with the launch the next morning. The
decision to launch can undoubtedly be traced back to various situational pressures which
comprised human safety in the interests of other parties.

The actual launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger had been delayed a record
number of times. Numerous postponements had occurred due to inclement weather,
defective equipment, political influences, and managerial decisions. Although the
mounting number of delays added considerable pressure on NASA officials to launch,
various other factors contributed to the urgency. The Space Shuttle Challenger was
carrying NASAs first civilian astronaut; a New Hampshire school teacher. Ronald
Reagans State of the Union Address was expected to focus on sweeping national reforms
in education. With the Space Shuttle Challenger expected to be in orbit during this
timeframe, Reagan would have undoubtedly illustrated this example to support his
agenda. With unforeseen competition from the ESA (European Space Agency), NASA
set out to prove the reliability and dependability of the space shuttle with an incredibly
ambitious schedule. This would also serve to model the agencys economic efficiency
and investment potential. In addition to these pressures, the mission proceeding
Challenger was of great importance and couldnt be delayed. If successful, the following
mission would sample and collect data on Halleys Comet several days before the
Russians. NASA also had to consider the interests of their number one client. Without
efficient, quickly refurbish able launches, NASA might have been in jeopardy of losing
satellite contracts from the United States military. Although these factors had no
contribution in the actual mechanical failure of the shuttle, they served as a catalyst for
poor decision making prior to the launch.
The question now becomes whether or not the launch was justified in the face of
severe opposition and conflicting statistics. Both sides of the story will be presented

along with facts and statistics that support both stances. Should Morton Thiokol and
NASA have approved the launch with the information available at the time?

The Launch should have been postponed

Research and analysis indicates that the necessary data was available to stop this horrible
tragedy. Engineers at Morton Thiokol recognized the potential for disaster several years
before the actual incident occurred. Furthermore, various attempts were made to
postpone the shuttle launch or ground the fleet altogether. Engineers such as Roger
Boisjoly raised concerns time and time again only to find an attitude of indifference
towards the problem at hand. Internal memos quote Roger Boisjoly as saying:
"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to
dedicate a team to solve the problem, with the field joint having the number one
priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad
facilities."
This quote is taken from a memo addressed to a senior company executive nearly six
months before the actual disaster occurred. The urgency of the situation is quite clear
lacking any vague terminology or definitions. After several more memos, a taskforce
coalesced with the clear mission of solving the O-ring problem. The taskforce was given
little resources, authority, and support to achieve their primary objective. Frustration and
dissatisfaction grew within the taskforce as members began to realize what little power
they had. The dissatisfaction is evident through this quote obtained from a senior
engineer on the taskforce:

Our team has been given no resources, power, or management support. Every
attempt to arrive at a workable solution is met with red tape and bureaucratic
nonsense. I have the distinct feeling that we only reason we have a team is to shut
us up.

Data and statistics were marginalized in favor of supporting a company agenda.

Low-temperature launches indicated increased failure in O-rings operation. Memos sent
from Morton Thiokol to NASA constantly downplayed the situation and lacked vital
information. Vague terminology was constantly used so that the company would remain
contracted to its very large client. Only a handful of memos were sent to NASA
regarding the problems with the O-rings regarding the joint seal. Of the ten previous
shuttle missions, eight had exhibited severe O-ring damage. The O-rings should have
been regarded as a high priority with all parties notified of their importance.
Data and statistics in the Morton Thiokols database also contained erroneous
data. Reports show that a number of temperature dependent tests were highly suspect
and considered doctored in some ways. Although company executives maintain that
recorded data supported the credible facts and figures, many internal engineers had their
doubts. The Rogers Commission also had their doubts and recognized this as a
contributing factor to the accident. Whether data and statistics were purposely skewed to
support company objectives or absent due to human error remains a mystery.
Research also reveals that during this time Morton Thiokol was in discussions
with NASA over a new contract. Given the scope contract, its quite possible that it
would have been the biggest in Morton Thiokols history with an estimated worth of over

one billion dollars. This raises several issues in regards to how this circumstance affected
Morton Thiokols decision to launch. One might argue that this company was placing
finance before functionality to suit its own best interest. This raises significant issues in
regards to ethicality and morality when one places profits above human life.

Another factor to consider in this ethics case is the failure of communication that
occurred within both agencies (NASA, Morton Thiokol). Both institutions were
organized in a standard hierarchal structure similar to those in the public sector.
Engineers would report to a group manager who would then later report to a project
manager. This strict chain-of-command structure made it extremely difficult for
engineers to voice their concerns to the upper echelons of the company. Communication
failure also occurred between the two agencies on various levels. There was no
distinction placed on the type of data distributed versus the importance. Minor problems
received just as much attention as chief concerns.
With pressure continually raining down from third party interests, efficiency took
precedence over safety. There were a significant number of pressures to launch, even
under suboptimal conditions. With a total of 6 launch cancellations that year and
Challenger launch delays numbering 5, NASA found itself in a precarious position.
Launch delays are pricey due to refurbishing costs along with the costs associated with
contracted labor. NASA recognizes the urgency in launching shuttles on a timely
schedule due to the limited amount of funding received each year. Other political and
economical interests obviously influenced the decision to launch. The State of the Union
Address was expected to mention the shuttle in orbit resulting in additional publicity to

the launch. With the first civilian astronaut participating in the launch, the eyes of the
nation would undoubtedly be fixed upon NASA. Lucrative military contracts should also
be considered. Morton Thiokol also received pressure from NASA to approve the launch.
When concerns were raised regarding the temperature on the launch date Lawrence
Mulloy, NASA III manager, was quoted as saying:
"My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?"
This example illustrates how Thiokol also had pressures and influences to deal with.
Through these examples, one can firmly believe that outside interests contributed to the
launch decision.
One must also consider the communication dynamics that took place on the night
prior to the launch. The original decision not to launch came from experienced engineers
and management such as Roger Boisjoly and Bob Lund. The solid rocket booster
program manager Larry Mulloy expressed his doubts and concerns regarding the original
decision and subsequent data that supported it. Mulloy then actively tried to circumvent
the original decision through consultation with an engineer manager by the name of
Joseph Kilminster, but all attempts were futile as Kilminster sided with the original
decision. An essence, every attempt to circumvent the no-launch decision was being
called into play. With firm stances on both sides of the fence, Jerold Mason asked others
to exit the room so that a 5 minute management meeting could take place. This approach
was obviously flawed from initiation as only selected personnel could participate and
express their opinions accordingly. During this meeting Jerold Mason tried to persuade
Bob Lund to re-evaluate his decision and was quoted as saying:
"Take off your engineering hat and put on your management cap."

Bob Lund, an experienced engineer turned executive, eventually reevaluated his decision
for the launch the next morning. This example illustrates how the decision prioritized
business interests instead of safety concerns. Engineering and safety considerations
yielded to company goals and objectives.
With the examples illustrated above, its quite clear that organizational interests
took priority over safety. Pressures and influences from various parties also contributed
to the decision to launch. Individuals with invaluable expertise were ignored and
marginalized if they deviated from the desired objective. Data and statistics should
remain unbiased so that they might serve the greater good. Clearly, the decision to
launch was a regrettable mistake that could have been avoided.

Launch the Shuttle

With NASA being a government funded entity through taxpayer money, one must
expect that they hold certain obligations and accountabilities to the public. Just as
corporations operate in the best interest of its shareholders, NASA must also operate with
the interests of the public in mind. With that being said, constant delays resulting from
trivial problems tend to interfere with obligations held by NASA. The year of the shuttle
disaster, 1986, brought unprecedented cancellations and delays. As previously stated, a
total of 6 cancellations and 5 postponements for the Space Shuttle Challenger alone had
been recorded. Public disapproval and lack of confidence in the program were two very
real concerns. Without public approval, NASA would fail to receive support and funding
through Congress. Cancellations and delays resulting from inconclusive evidence serve
as an inefficient foundation for business.

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Data and statistics were questionable and inconclusive at best. Although data had
shown O-ring erosion during prior launches for temperatures in the mid-fifties, Thiokol
and NASA lacked any concrete statistics for cooler temperatures. One cannot reasonable
deduct that similar effects would be present for a much colder launch. Previous
documentation illustrates how records were only kept for temperatures of 53 degrees and
higher. Engineers also failed to develop a causal relationship between temperature and
O-ring erosion. Engineering is considered to be an exact science. With that being said,
assumptions and suppositions take no priority over concrete facts and statistics. And
while engineers could theoretically predict performance through mathematical modeling
and computer simulation, there was no way to verify the shuttles capability under all
opera table conditions. Engineers recognized that multiple missions had experienced seal
degradation and O-ring erosion without complications. Furthermore, both engineering
and management from Morton Thiokol acknowledged that the O-rings would still
function properly even if 1/3 of the composite material had been eroded away. Its quite
easy to visualize how the problem might have been interpreted as miniscule or an
acceptable risk.
One must also recognize that the space program itself carries an inherent risk. All
possible contingencies from utilizing experimental technologies cannot be predicted.
When management was faced with uncertainty, they proceeded through time-tested
policies and regulations. By the end of 1985, 19 shuttle missions had flown successfully,
with the majority of these launches experiencing minor problems. Since the disaster,
thousands of studies have been conducted to determine the dynamics of the accident.

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Scholars and researchers agree that with a piece of engineering as complicated as the
space shuttle there remains an inherent risk during every launch. Diane Vaughan,
professor of sociology studies at Harvard University, has thoroughly researched every
aspect of the accident. Upon being called for comment, she had this to say:
"Because the space shuttle program involves experimental technology, we can
never predict the outcome with certainty, and we cannot make rules for all
possible conditions either."

With the evidence presented in this section, the decision to launch obviously
resulted from engineering and safety considerations as opposed to business interests.
NASA recognizes that every mission carries an inherent risk that cannot be eliminated.
The best approach then becomes the reliance on hard data and statistics and margin
ability of assumptions and suppositions. Although the 1986 launch of the Space Shuttle
Challenger ended in disaster, the approach to solving the issues at hand were correct and
should be utilized in future endeavors.

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Ten Questions
1. Did Morton Thiokol and NASA allow outside interests to influence their decision
to launch?
2. What else should have Morton Thiokol engineers have done to raise awareness of
the problem?
3. To what degree should management rely on assumptions or suppositions when it
pertains to human life?
4. Did Morton Thiokol have an obligation to modify the SRB design?
5. How could the communication structure (organizational structure) of both
companies be improved?
6. With the available information at the time, was the decision to launch the shuttle
correct? Explain your case.
7. What obligations does NASA owe to the public? Should government funded
companies be held at a higher standard then publicly operated firms?
8. When does a lack of information in management become grounds for an action?
9. In discounting the low temperature for the Challenger launch, did management at
NASA comprise the astronauts safety?
10. In terms of the accident, who do you think is the responsible party (engineers at
Morton Thiokol, NASA, management, third-party interests)?

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Challenger Disaster Report 2004. Northern Kentucky University. 2004.
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%20CHALLENGER%20SHUTTLE%20DISASTER
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7. Barbree, Jay. Chapter 8: Beyond the tragedy. Online MSNBC. 2006.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078056
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17. Space Shuttle Challenger Case. The Knowing Organization, Chapter 5.

http://choo.fis.utoronto.ca/mgt/DM.case.html
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Astronauts. The New York Times Online. January 29, 2006.
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Additional Information
The space shuttle represents Americas effort to design an economically efficient,
reusable spacecraft. While theoretical calculations predicted over 50 missions per year,
complications and refurbishing costs quickly dropped that number to around 8 missions.
The shuttle itself is one of the worlds most complicated pieces of engineering with over
two million moving parts. With that being said, theres always a certain degree of risk to
each launch. At this point the focus shifts away from eliminating all problems to safely
managing them.
Research indicates that the O-ring erosion problem was known for quite some
time before the actual accident occurred. Since the shuttle utilizes dual O-rings and
sealants, erosion is tolerated and accepted to a certain degree. All prior missions had
exhibited some form of O-ring degradation. Furthermore, low-temperature launches had
exhibited the same phenomena, but to a much higher degree. Morton Thiokol conducted
research and statistical studies to analyze this problem. The results conclusively pointed
towards failure under low-temperature launches.
Although evidence pointed towards an eventual failure, management thought the
analysis to be inconclusive and technically weak. This notion was further enforced due to
the lack of data from launch pad conditions. With this being said, Morton Thiokol and
NASA fell back on a rigorous set of rules and regulations to determine if the launch
would commence the next morning. With the technically weak argument, management

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interpreted the situation as an acceptable risk. Its a matter of how you interpret the data
available and how much significance you place on it.

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