International Phenomenological Society

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

E. Husserl and J. Joyce or Theory and Practice of the Phenomenological Attitude
Author(s): Juan David Garca Bacca
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 9, No. 3, "Second Inter-American
Congress of Philosophy" (Mar., 1949), pp. 588-594
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2104066
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E. HUSSERL AND J. JOYCE

OR
THEORY

AND

PRACTICE

OF

THE

PHENOMENOLOGICAL

ATTITUDE'
Foreword:The comparisonwhichwe are going to establishwill use as
characteristictexts one of Husserl, taken fromhis Ideen zu einerreiner
Phaenomenologie
(pp. 130-132), and anotherof J. Joyce,taken fromhis
Ulysses (finalmonologue,Modern LibraryEdition, p. 723).

I
Texts to be Compared
FromHusserl
There are reasons why, in phenomenologyas in all eidetic sciences
representations,
or to speak moreaccurately,freefancies,assume a priviledgedpositionoveragainstperceptions,and that,even in the phenomenology of perception,itself,exceptingof coursethat of the sensorydata.2
Hence, if anyoneloves a paradox,he can reallysay, and say withstrict
truthif he will allow forthe ambiguity,that the elementwhichmakes up
the lifeofphenomenology
as of all eideticalscienceis "fiction,"that is the
sourcewhencethe knowledgeof "eternaltruths"draws its sustenance.3
From"Ulysses"
Yes because he neverdid a thinglike that beforeas ask to get his breakfastin bed witha couple ofeggs sincethe CityArmshotelwhenhe used to
be pretendingto be laid up with a sick voice doing his highnessto made
interesting
to that old faggotMrs. Riordan that he thoughthe has a great
leg of and she neverleftus a farthingall formassesforherselfand hersoul
greatestmiserever was actually afraid to lay out 4 for her methylated
spirittellingme all herailmentsshe had too muchchat in herabout politics
and earthquakesand the end ofthe wold let us have a bit of funfirstGod
help the wold if all the womenwere her sort down on bathing-suitsand
lownecksof course nobody wanted her to wear I suppose she was pious
because no man would look at her twice I hope I'll never be like her a
1 TranslatedbyPedroGilbert.
E. Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by

W. R. Boyce (1931),p. 199.

3 Ibid., ?70, p. 201.

588

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E.

HUSSERL

AND J. JOYCE

589

wondershe didn't want us to cover our faces but she was a well-educated
woman certainlyand hergabby talk about Mr. Riordan. ..
II
PhilosophicComparisonofBothTexts
Let us now comparethe Husserl text withthat of Joyce.
1.1) The generaltoneofthetexts:positionalor thesistone,in affirmations
as well as in negations,in the Husserl text, which definitely
affirmsthe
and definitely
affirmative,
deniesthe negative;non-thesis
or non-positional
tone, in Joyce,who appears not to state anythingdefinitely,
neitherthe
nor the negative.
affirmative
1.2) Husserlspeaks in naturalattitude(Einstellung),even whenspeaking
of transcendentalphenomenology;Joyce, on the other hand, speaks
in thetranscendental
attitudeofepoche(E-rox'i),
inasmuch
phenomenological
as he places outside of action (ausser Aktion) affirmations,
negations,
deductions, reasons.... It seems as though Joyce were practicing or
realizingthe programoutlinedby Husserl in the text quoted,whereJoyce
to an attitudeofthinkingin a transcenspeaks in a mannercorresponding
dental phenomenological
state. Joycewriteswiththat quality so characteristicof phenomenology,
expressedin the everydayphrase "to listento
who
to the rain" (i.e. inattentively);"I don't
like
one
listens
something
care a fig" ("I shouldworry");or "to tell (tall) stories"....
from others,employingthe
1.3) Husserl separates some affirmations
traditionalsymbolicmethod of periods and commas,initial capitals....
whichis to employan elementalformofmodusponens,previousto theform
which appears in symbolic logical systems or in axiomatizedlogistics.
Cf. Russell,Whitehead,Hilbert,Carnap, etc. The sign of assertion(H),
employed originallyin Logistics,is another formof position or modus
ponens; subsequentlyit has been agreed to omit it, leaving it implicit.
(Cf. Carnap, Abriss der Logistik,p. 9, ed. 1929.) Inasmuch as in the
attitude of transcendentalphenomenologythere is not to be made any
positingwhatsoeverof any content,whetheror not it be a propositionor
conjunct of a proposition,H-p,or, H (p-*q), etc.; Joyceis, precisely,the
one who practicesin what he says and in the formin whichhe says it,without periods or commas, without propositionsseparated one from
attitude
another,each one in itself,-thetranscendentalphenomenological
and mannerof speakingand understanding;he does not put in anything,
not even periodsor commas,by whicheach sentenceis putin itself,against
the methodoftranscendental
phenomenology.
1.4) Hence the phraseologyof Husserl, like that of symboliclogic or
logistics,turns out to be discontinuous,-a distinctionassured by the
modusponens, Hp, H (p-*q), H q-; whereasJoyce's text gives the imThis content downloaded from 130.130.37.85 on Wed, 30 Dec 2015 01:03:22 UTC
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590

PHILOSOPHY

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

RESEARCH

by periods,commas,by deductions
uninterrupted
pressionof continuity,
placed apart, separated by functionsor types of connection,placed in
themselvese.g. with "therefore,""or else," "either," "and" . ;and if
such elementsare presentin Joyce,theyare not placed in themselves,nor
positionaltone, with the
indeed can they even be read in an affirmative,
forceof intonationwhicha logicalmodernclassicwould give to them.
1.5) The Husserl text seems to go straightto the idea; that is: to use
extremalexpressions,or better,minimalexpressions;whereasJoycefollows
no deductiveline orline ofminimumthought,no logicalorder'(whichtends
always to go by order,drawingby theirorder consequences(conclusions)
or theorems,that is: followingmental minimumdistances). Joyce asby probasociates ratherthan deduces; and-he associates by occurrences,
whichis nearthelimitof ordinary
bilitylessthanthemaximumprobability,
deduction.
All ofwhich,plus otherpoints,stemsfromthe fact that Joyce,however
strangeit may appear at firstglance,writes,-that is, thinks-, in a transcendental phenomenologicalattitude, one of total abstention (epoche)
negation, deduction, truth, falsity, necessary logical
from affirmation,
connection... , all of it definitelyput in; whereas Husserl and logic,
deny, distinguishbetween
even logistics,and even logical syntax,affirm,
postingthem (thesis),that is to
truthand falsity,takingthingsdefinitely,
say: they are workingin a natural attitude,even though,like Husserl,
they may be speaking of transcendentalphenomenology. He outlines
the program,but he fails to show with his facts that he fulfilsit. With
thingsotherthan those whichhe says, and with a thoughtotherthan the
one which he employs when he thinks,perhaps what he says,may be
demonstrated.
Therefore:
attitude,-moldedin thepopularphrase
1.1) The purephenomenological
"I heard everythinglike one who hears the rain," "to speak as one who
tells (tall) stories"-has real effects,a styleof its own; and it leads to one
similarto Joyce's,and not to Husserl's or to that of any logic whether
attitude
classic or not; and in general,the practiceofthe phenomenological
leads, as to a minimumcondition,to the literalstyle,to the style "uninnegation,truth,falsity),wherewithI
terestedin reality" (in affirmation,
am recallingcertainideas ofKant's concerningEsthetics.
attitudewould be reallyuse1.2) The transcendentalphenomenological
ifit onlyconsistedin and wereonlylimitedto keeping
less and inefficacious,
beforeconsciousnessthe same contentsas the sciencesof naturallife,only
negation (general position), systematic
disconnectedfrom affirmation,
doubt ... , with whichthey are affectedin the natural attitude,whether
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E.

HUSSERL

AND J. JOYCE

591

of the phenomenological
scientificor not. The positiveand newefficiency
especiallyin the sytleofthe textquoted,
attitudeis discoveredin literature,
takenfromthefinalmonologueofUlysses;and even thetypeofspellingis a
not somethingarbitrary,of the originalpotencyof
real and originaleffect,
attitude.
the transcendentalphenomenological
1.3) Inversely,the fact of the existence of literature,and above all,
and
of a certaintype of literature,is the foundationwhich demonstrates
of
the
efficiency
real
and
original
guaranteesthe real possibilityand the
the
original
the
study
of
so
that
phenomenology,
methodoftranscendental
structuresof the content obtainable by the transcendentalphenomenologicalattitudeis not to-be takenfromthe contentofany scienceornatural
negation,systematic
attitude,even eliminatingall position(affirmation,
but
fromthe content
of
action,
outside
everything
doubt. . .), or placing
form,
especiallyfrom
with
a
literary
characteristicofliterature,or content
of
Joyce.
quoted
to
the
text
form
similar
that whichhas a
(Ausschalten)the naturalworldand the
The simplefactofdisconnecting
lead to a duplication,similar to
from
all
would
simply
eidetic
position,
that of realityin its image in a mirror,and would not discovernew types
factwithits peculiarorderand characof consciousacts; onlythe literary
teristic attitude demonstratesthe possibility,the reality, the original
methodor attitude.
ofthetranscendental
phenomenological
efficiency
What conclusionsmay be drawnfromthe study ofliterature,especially
fromcertaintypes of literature,in orderto discover,and even produce
new structuresof consciousness,placed in disconnectionfrom real or
eideticobjects,is a pointto whichI shall devote a fewtechnicalallusions,
followingthis generalpreparation.
III
ExplicitPositionof theProblem
The characteristicof the verb (k-,ga, to flow,flux, apk), already discoveredby Aristotle(Peri Hermeneias,Chap. III), is that it is a function
of time, or that it explicitysignifiestime (7rpoo-o-naltvov xp'oz'o), which is
to say that the verbalways signifiesa kind ofmovement. Let us say that
the signification
(s) of the verb includesan expressindicationof time (t);
the verb is a functionof time, s(t); and as everyverb not only signifies
time (present,past,future. . ), but also indicatesanotheraspect or content
inasmuchas it is subjected to time-to run,to love, to fear,to say ...
we shall say that everyverb is a functionofits own meaning,whichin its
turn is expressedas a functionof time. We shall write symbolically,
V[s(t)].
On the otherhand, the significant
functionof the noun (ovoua) consists,
accordingto Aristotle(ibid.), in designatingstability"One who hears a
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592

PHILOSOPHY

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Aywz' Tr'7 b&di'otaP Kat 6

(lo-Z77t 6 Xc'
even thoughthe noun, inasmuchas it is a word,
is somethingfluentor movable-a propertysharedwithverbs.
Therefore,we can symbolizethe logicalfunctionofthe noun by N[s(c)],
since every noun has its own signification(s)-man, animal, two, elipse
. . .-; however,thissignification,
characteristic
ofeach one,is the function
of a constancyor permanence(c). Nouns are the constantsin the domain
of meaningdominonosignificacional").
In any case, whetherit be a questionof nouns or of verbs,the word in
its reality-whetherornot it signifies
time.. .-is itselffluentor a function
of time,whichfunctionwe shall designateby P(T).
noun, notices that his thought stops"
1Pieu7go-feaKJVcaa) (ibid.)

IV
Groupsof Problems
1. Is a purely"nominal" type of thoughtpossible, that is, a thought
made up wholly of functionsN[s(c)], of significantfunctionswhich are
signifying
onlythingsin a permanent
state?
2. Is a purely "verbal" type of thoughtpossible,that is, (a thought)
made up whollyof wordsand conceptsof the formV[s(t)], of significant
functionswhichare signifying
only time?.
3. Since the wordis necessarilyfluent,what influencedoes or can such
fluency,or functionP(T), exertupon the functionsV[s(t)] and N[s(c)]?
Withregardto theseproblems,explicitlystated,1.1), classiclogicgave
spontaneously,withoutproposingso to do explicitly-thefollowing
answer:
a) theremustbe stable elements,nouns;and fluentelements,verbs;meanings in a state of permanencyand othersin a state of fluency. b) All
verbs can be givena certainstate of constancyor permanency,
in the form
of "is," by puttingthemin a kind ofinvariablepresent,so that the general
formulaV[s(t)] takes that of V[s(p)], fromthe present(p). And this is
the preferredor philosophicstate. Instead of "man dies" one will say
"man is mortal," etc.; wherebythe verb approaches the noun, and the
proposition(approaches)a complexnoun,so that the propositionwith"is"
becomesa nominalizedverb. c) The fluencyofthewordhas no philosophic
importancewhatever. d) To this preference,
grantedimplicitlyand unconsciouslyto thenounand to the moststable formoftheverb,nominaloid
formof the proposition,correspondsthe preferencegiven to the assertion
(classic sign F-), to the assertionofan affirmation
(F-p), to the assertionof
a negation(-a-p), to the aspect of truthor falsity,to the modusponens
(or modus tollens) (F-p, F-(p-*q), F-q), which allows of arrangingthe
propositionsin disconnectedgroups,of punctuatinglogicallythe propositions and theirgroupswithouttheirforminga continuousand unbroken
thread.
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E.

HUSSERL

AND J. JOYCE

593

These postulatesare commonto all logic, whetherAristotelianor not,

and theycorrespondto the type V[s(p)], functionsof the present.
1.2) In principle,a logic is possiblein whicheffectually
V[s(t)] remains
in a fluentstate, as a real functionof time,whereint is not fixedin the
present,in the formof "is." In thislogic,propositionswould not be convertibleto classic philosophicpropositions:"man dies, has died, and will
die" would not be the equivalentof "man is mortal"; "4 doubles2" would
not be the equivalentof "4 is the double of 2," etc., as in such cases, not
only the presentbut the past and futurehave logical value. I shall not
pointout the importanceof such a type of logic forhistory,as a science.
Characteristics
ofthislogic,whichwe shall call literary,
wouldbe, among
others,the following:a) the assertion (sign I-) cannot be used either
beforea propositionor a groupof propositions;b) neitheraffirmation
nor
negation has logical value; c) the modus ponens (or the modus tollens)
has neithervalue nor use; d) the values of truthor falsitycannot be employed; e) thereis no p, q, r or fixedpropositions,that is, the elemental
law of substitutionhas no value; f) because of the lack of affirmation,
negation,position.. ., all meaningsforma continuum.
In orderto adduce an example of the possibilityof thinking
with sense
accordingto this model, one has only to reread the text of Joyce. The
transcendentalphenomenologicalattitude,if reallypracticed,would lead
to this type of logic,and to no type of formallogic.
g) The type of union or connection,characteristicof this logic is that
of association: the changes are effectedby turns of the meaningin any
is freein thislogic,so similar
direction,as in curves. But not everything
to a significational
topology. I shall only indicate a few invariantsof
such transformations.
V
InvariantsofSignificational
Topology
Foreword:Ordinarlylogic is guided by the systematicuse of minimal
meanings. If I considerthe expressions:"this is new"; "this is unheard
of"; "this is somethingneverseen nor heard of"; "nothinglike it was ever
seen"; "it had never happened before"; "it seems unbelievable,but it
happened"; and innumerableotherslike them which could be invented,
onlythrougha decisionof "postulate"type is the form"this is new" given
preferenceover the others,as far as logic is concerned. The phrases:
''or else," "that is to say," "that is equivalent to"; the expressions"so
then," "therefore,""consequently,""fromwhichit followsthat" . . . are
not the same thing,and the selectionof one of them is a mere postulate.
is wontto take on theconditionofa certainminimum,
The one thatis fitting
as yet undetermined. When we say: "this is new," it seemsas if we were
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594

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH

expressingthe idea of newness,withoutmakingthat detourthroughsight

("never seen") or throughhearing("never heard of"), or throughevents
("it had neverhappenedbefore"),etc.,a detourwhichwe make in theother
phrases. But even as in geometryno preference
is givenforits own sake
to the straightline,whichjoins two points,over the curveswhichmay be
drawn between them, even so it is impossibleto establish a preference
among such typesof expressionof "newness."
Well, then; literarylogic employsany one of the above forms,and not
the minimal,as does classic logic,whichlends itselfto classic or axiomatic
deductivetreatment.
We nowask: What invariantsare thereas opposed to such transformations?
I shallmentionthefollowing,
although,in view ofthelimitationimposed
upon this work, I shall only be able to indicate them, not demonstrate
them.
1. In any transformation
whatever,propernoumsremainas invariants,
eitherin an explicitform,or in the formof singulardescriptivefunction.
Such invariancyrefersto the number of propernouns. (This invariant
is akin to the well knowntheoremof Euler forconvexpolyhedrons.)
2. In expressionsin whichpropernounsdo not intervene,the numberof
functionsV[s(t)] and the number of functionsN[s(c)] can change, but
theremust always be at least,one functionN[s(c)] that remainsconstant
(analogous to the theoremof invariancyof a fixedpoint in certaintransof Brouwer).
formations,
3. Even as, givena mathematicalfunction,it is, in general,possible to
investigateits extremalvalues (maximumor minimum)by means of the
application in sufficientnumber of certain operations (differentiating),
(so) the formofminimum(or classic logic) will be obtained by an ordered
and sufficient
application (yet to be determined)of the basic operationof
"position" (in the formof assertion,of modusponens,etc.).
Withtheseindications,I leave the questionas statedto the consideration
ofthoseinterestedin thesematters,whichpertainso closelyto theliterature
of the presentday.
JUAN DAVID GARCIA BACCA.
UNIVERSITIES

OF MEXICO AND CARACAS.

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