LORENZ B.

PUNTEL

TRUTH, SENTENTIAL NON-COMPOSITIONALITY, AND

ONTOLOGY

ABSTRACT. The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanation

of the concept of truth which is neither deflationary nor substantive. The main aspect
examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world
connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not
make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as
the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined.
In particular, it is shown that generally an objectual ontology is often only implicitly
presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting objects (substances), properties, relations,
sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology
derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle
should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality
(or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of primary
states of affairs. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth
to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible.

One of the most significant features of the so-called substantive theories

of truth is the linkage they establish between the concept of truth and
the mind/language-world problem. Notoriously, this line of inquiry agrees
with traditional approaches to the notion of truth. Non-substantive (deflationary) theories of truth, however, reject the claim that this connection
provides the explicans or definiens for the concept of truth. But the deflationary thesis does not imply that there are no mind/language-world
connections or that this topic is of no philosophical importance. More
readily, however, the deflationist contends that ontological considerations
are neither necessary nor relevant to the understanding of the concept of
truth.
The present essay poses and tries to answer the question as to whether
there is a relatedness between the concept of truth and the areas of semantics and ontology and, if a positive answer were to be given, how this
relatedness should be worked out. The answer, if at all possible, will turn
out to be the more specific component in developing a semantics as the
basis for an ontology conducive to the understanding of the concept of

Synthese 126: 221259, 2001.

2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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LORENZ B. PUNTEL

truth. The central point of this enterprise concerns the further question
whether semantics is compositional or non-compositional.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 deals with the problem
posed by linking the main terms occurring in the title truth, noncompositionality, and ontology. Furthermore, the thesis advanced and
defended in the course of these discussions is worked out in detail. Section
2 illustrates the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and the
Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality and sketches the kind of
ontology deriving from them. Based on the considerations presented in
the previous sections, Section 3 offers an explanation of the concept of
truth (applied to single sentences and propositions only) with a marked
emphasis on the correlation between the concept of truth and ontology.
Pursuing this line of inquiry hitherto delineated, Section 4 endeavors to
answer the question whether a general theory of truth should be construed
as a definition of truth or as an axiomatic theory.1
A preliminary remark is in order here. The concept of truth will be
dealt with on the level of single or particular (atomic) sentences (and propositions), in which true does not occur. No general theory of truth will
be presented in this paper; rather, only some fundamental prolegomena to
such a theory will be worked out. The restricted purpose of the paper can
be best illustrated by comparing it with what Tarski calls partial definitions of the term true. In his Truth and Proof (1969) he considers the
formulations (1) Snow is white is true if and only if snow is white and
(1) Snow is white is false if and only if snow is not white and claims
that . . . (1) and (1) provide satisfactory explanations of the meaning of
the terms true and false when these terms are referred to the sentence
snow is white. We can regard (1) and (1) as partial definitions of the
terms true and false, in fact, as definitions of these terms with respect
to a particular sentence (Tarski 1969, 64; emphasis added). Accordingly,
the treatment of the Principle of Semantic (Non)-Compositionality will
also be restricted to the level of singular (atomic) sentences.

1. THE INADEQUACY OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN

SUBSTANTIVE

AND DEFLATIONARY THEORIES OF TRUTH

[1] The main motivation for developing a deflationary conception of truth

has been well described by P. Horwich in the following passage of his book
Truth:
The common-sense notion that truth is a kind of correspondence with the facts has never
been worked out to anyones satisfaction. Even its advocates would concede that it remains

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little more than a vague, guiding intuition. (. . . ) Hence the peculiarly enigmatic character of
truth: a conception of its underlying nature appears to be at once necessary and impossible.
I believe that this impression is wholly wrong and that it grows out of two related
misconceptions: first, that truth has some hidden structure awaiting our discovery; and
secondly, that hinging on this discovery is our ability to explain central philosophical
principles such as those just mentioned,2 and thereby to solve a host of problems in logic,
semantics, and epistemology. (Horwich [1990] 1998, 12: Horwichs emphasis)

Horwich does not even mention ontology in this text. But this does
not come as a surprise since traditional (substantive) as well as deflationary theories of truth have almost entirely neglected the central role
ontology plays in the elucidation of the concept of truth. To be sure, the
perspectives guiding both kinds of theory have been and are very different.
Undoubtedly, traditional theories have explicitly accepted an ontology, but
the ontology remained mostly unexplained. Even though a correspondence with the world, with entities in the world, with facts and the
like has been posited, the exact meaning of these ontological notions is
not clarified. This is the primary reason that justifies Horwichs poignant
affirmation that the notion of truth as correspondence with the facts, even
in the opinion of its most passionate advocates, remains little more than a
vague, guiding intuition.
Deflationisms stance with respect to ontology is more ambiguous. A
telling example is Horwichs position. In chapter 7 of his Truth he extensively examines The correspondence intuition. And again, not
surprisingly he asserts:
Admittedly minimalism [i.e., Horwichs brand of deflationism] does not explain what
truth is in any such way [i.e., by deriving the truth of a sentence or proposition from
the existence of whatever fact it depicts or alternatively by stating that the truth
of a whole sentence or proposition is built directly out of the relations of reference and
satisfaction between its parts and various external objects]. But it does not deny that truths
do correspond in some sense to the facts; it acknowledges that statements owe their truth
to the nature of reality; and it does not dispute the existence of relationships between truth,
reference, and predicate satisfaction. Thus we might hope to accommodate much of what
the correspondence theorist wishes to say without retreating an inch from our deflationary
position. (Ibid., 104)

Clearly, Horwich seems to have taken ontology seriously; but how seriously? His strategy consists in introducing the predicate is explained by
and then the because-clause in connection with truth:
It is indeed undeniable that whenever a proposition or an utterance is true, it is true because
something in the world is a certain way something typically external to the proposition
or utterance. (Ibid.)

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For instance, the sentence

(1)

hSnow is whiteis being true is explained by snows being

white3

is, according to Horwich, equivalent to the sentence

(2)

hSnow is whitei is true because snow is white.

But this strategy is not convincing, since it suffers from ambiguity. Surely,
with is explained by and/or because Why-questions are answered. But
what does it mean to ask: Why is hSnow is whitei true? The question
is not clear by itself. It admits of purely epistemic answers like the following: . . . because we see that snow is white; or . . . because all people
say that snow is white; or . . . because science says so; or . . . or . . . But it
admits also of ontological answers: . . . because there is a fact in the world,
namely the fact that snow is white. Stating the matter in these terms gives
rise to a further question: What has something in the world to do with a
true sentence/proposition? If a truth has something to do with a fact in
the world, how are they connected? There must be indeed a connection
between truth of and the acceptance of a correlated fact in the world.
And this connection concerns our understanding of the truth of and,
thus, also the meaning of true. So, the explication of the meaning of
true cannot be articulated without explicitly taking into account the kind
of connection mentioned, i.e., the connection between the truth of and
a correlated fact in the world.
[2] Much more convincing and significant is the reading of the biconditional Snow is white is true if and only if snow is white proposed
by Quine. Though Quine may be considered a deflationist in some respect,
he nevertheless appreciates what really matters for an explication of the
concept of truth. In his Philosophy of Logic he says:
No sentence is true but reality makes it so. The sentence Snow is white is true, as Tarski
has taught us, if and only if real snow is really white. (Quine 1970, 10; emphasis added)

Quine expresses fundamentally the same intuition underlying Horwichs attempt to take ontology seriously, i.e., to make clear that statements owe their truth to the nature of reality (Horwich [1990] 1998, 104);
but Quine does not resort to something like a because-clause, rather he
adequately grasps and articulates the very central point: to say that the
sentence snow is white is true is to say that real snow is really white. The
reality of white snow is what matters for the concept of truth; from
this it follows that this factor, contrary to what Horwich asserts, cannot

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be disassociated from the concept of truth. This factor is what makes the
difference between the singly given sentence (Quine 1970, 11) Snow
is white and the sentence Snow is white is true. Between the two
sentences there is literally! all the difference in the world.
Although Quine is perfectly correct in reading the biconditional
Snow is white is true if and only if snow is white as meaning Snow
is white is true if and only if real snow is really white (but see footnote
24), he is not coherent. Indeed, in the passage quoted above he adds the
comment:
In speaking of the truth of a sentence there is only indirection; we do better simply to
say the sentence and so speak not about language but about the world. So long as we are
speaking only of the truth of singly given sentences, the perfect theory of truth is what
Wilfrid Sellars has called the disappearance theory of truth. (Ibid., 11)

But to this one should remark that Quines own reading or interpretation of the sentence on the right-hand side of the equivalence relation
is not to be understood as capturing what is already articulated in the
sentence taken as such, i.e., taken as a simple standing sentence, without
any (explicit or contextual) qualification; rather, the reading or interpretation dictates how one should understand the sentence in order to
make sense of the biconditionals. Now, the interesting fact is that the way
one should understand the sentence on the right-hand side of the equivalence is not articulated or made explicit in the biconditionals. As will be
shown below, this is the fundamental ambiguity pervading all theories of
truth deriving from Tarskis famous truth schema:
x is true if and only if p.
The sentence p is to be taken as having what might be called a fully
determinate semantic status, i.e., as belonging to a semantically perfect language, whose expressions do indeed have a definite and definitive
status. In this case, the sentence Snow is white would be taken as expressing a piece of reality, namely (the fact) that real snow is really white. It is
doubtful whether Quine simply presupposes this fundamental feature or
whether he does not even realize it. Why is this important? As a matter of
fact, the sentence Snow is white, taken as such, i.e., without any (explicit
or implicit, for instance, contextual) qualification, does not express a piece
of reality. What Quines highly significant reading of this sentence in
reality reveals is the fact that the sentence p itself is attributed a fully
determinate semantic status, but this status is in no way made explicit. The
very task of a theory of truth on the basis of the acceptance of Tarskis
schema is this: to make explicit how the sentence p on the right-hand

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side of the biconditional is to be exactly understood. If one takes it as a

fully determinate sentence, as Quine does, then the theory of truth should
make explicit or explain the connection between p on the right-hand side
and the occurrence of true on the left-hand side of the biconditionals.
It appears to be quite plain that the fully determinate status of the
sentence p on the right-hand side should not be explained as deriving
either from some pragmatic context (the context of the utterance of the
sentence) or from some suitable speech act (like: I assert that . . . ), since
such external factors are not explicitly given and since such an explanation would render the occurrence of true simply senseless. Rather, the
fully determinate status of p on the right-hand side of the biconditionals
derives from the semantic role of true itself: the determination of p
is brought about from within language itself.
This basic mistake must be traced back to Tarski. The worked out
ambiguity (and even incoherence) underlying the truth schema and its
instantiations is to be found in Tarski himself, as is shown in another paper
(see Puntel forthcoming c).
[3] In one of the above quoted passages from his book Truth Horwich is
referring to a version of the principle of semantic sentential compositionality, when he says that minimalism does not explain truth of a sentence or
proposition by stating that . . . the truth of a whole sentence or proposition
is built directly out of the relations of reference and satisfaction between
its parts and various external objects (Horwich [1990] 1998, 104). Indeed,
in one of its formulations the principle reads:
(PCP) The meaning of a compound expression is a function of the
meanings of its parts.
In order to avoid the ambiguities of the expression meaning it is advisable to say instead semantic value. In the next section the Principle
of (semantic) Sentential Compositionality, as applied to single (atomic)
sentences,
(PSCP) The semantic value [meaning] of a sentence is a function of the
semantic values [meanings] of its subsentential constituents
will be examined and ultimately rejected. But note that Horwich also mentions another (alternative) way of explaining what truth is a way he also
rejects namely by deriving the truth of a sentence or proposition from
the existence of whatever fact it depicts. But how to conceive of facts?
Is the assumption of facts compatible with acceptance of PSCP? Or do they
presuppose the acceptance of another semantic principle? There is such a

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principle, the Principle of Sentential Contextuality (often called Context

Principle), which has been formulated by Frege. One of his best known
formulations reads:
(PSCT)

Only in the context of a sentence do words have any meaning. (Frege (1884) 1953, 62)

(Instead of meaning it is preferable to say semantic value.)

It will be shown in the next section that PSCT should be considered
the articulation of the positive content of the rejection of PSCP. Is there
any deep relationship between those semantic principles, ontology, and the
concept of truth? In opposition to what Quine, Horwich and others suggest,
this question is claimed to be a fundamental question any philosophically
interesting theory of truth should address.

2. ELEMENTARY SENTENTIAL ( NON -) COMPOSITIONALITY AND

ONTOLOGY

2.1. Two Restrictions

Treatment of the just formulated question in this section and in Section 3
will be restricted in two important respects.
[1] First, PSCP and PSCT will be examined as applied only to what is
generally taken as a single or individual atomic sentence and its structure.
This may be called elementary sentential (non-)compositionality. Other
linguistic compound expressions will not be considered here. As will become clear at the end of this section, this restriction does not carry with it
any decisive consequence concerning the main theses to be articulated in
this paper.
To explain the importance ot this restriction, a brief hint at a problem
raised by the application of the Principle of Compositionality to the truth
topic in recent years may be in order here. In several writings J. Hintikka
has attempted to show that Tarskis recursive approach to a truth definition relies on the Compositionality Principle. Hintikka and Sandu claim
that
the openness and irregularity of natural languages which according to Tarski make it
impossible to define truth for them unmistakably amount essentially to the failure of compositionality in natural languages. It is this failure of compositionality in natural languages
that according to Tarski makes them immune to truth-definitions. (Hintikka and Sandu
1999, 222).

And Hintikka stresses that

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where he [Tarski] (or was it Lesniewski?) erred was in assuming that one cannot give a
perfectly good noncompositional semantics, including a noncompositional truth-definition
for a language. In fact, IF [i.e., independence-friendly] first-order logic constitutes a
counter-example to Tarskis opinion. (Hintikka forthcoming, 11)

IF first-order logic according to Hintikka is simply the general unrestricted logic of quantifiers. He considers ordinary first-order languages
to be dependence-handicapped first-order languages. One of the consequences Hintikka draws from his approach is that a truth predicate is
almost trivially definable for a language in the same language as soon as
this language is of a certain minimal strength (ibid., 16). It is apparent
that Hintikka treats the compositionality issue in an absolutely unrestricted
sense. This means in the present context that he is considering the impact
of compositionality on a general theory of truth. Compared with Hintikkas
treatment of the compositionality issue and the truth topic, the restricted
purpose of the present paper is a very modest or elementary one. The
question whether Hintikkas approach to the truth topic and the approach
pursued in this paper are mutually exclusive cannot be adequately dealt
with in this paper. Suffice it to say that the question raised by Hintikka
is also central for a general theory of truth developed on the basis of
the present (restricted) approach. But the thesis as understood and propounded in this paper that the relatedness of truth to the ontological
dimension is an essential feature of truth does not seem to square well
with Hintikkas general position.4
[2] The second restriction concerns the core of the thesis to be propounded
and has, thus, much more far-reaching consequences. The language whose
structure is claimed to be non-compositional, i.e., contextual, is not just
natural language, but philosophical language (as it should be understood).
This paper is not concerned with resolving the question whether natural
languages can or should be understood or explained on the basis of the
Principle of Compositionality. So, many probably most problems discussed in this context, especially the linguistic arguments, are not a topic to
be dealt with in this paper. Most philosophers do not distinguish at least
not explicitly between natural language and philosophical language; and
if they make a distinction between both languages, they do not consider it
to be a central one. In this paper, this distinction is considered of the utmost
importance. In a first approach a philosophical language can be characterized as a language suitable for pursuing theoretical aims. Therefore, it
should at least be required to be clear, unambiguous, devoid of natural
(in the sense of non-examined) assumptions in all areas of philosophical
interest. As will be shown below, the ontological dimension in contrast

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to positions maintained, for instance, by Horwich will turn out to be the

most important area of concern.
In this paper the just introduced distinction between natural language
and philosophical language is not understood in an absolute sense, i.e., in
the sense of a complete disjunction. Nothing prevents the philosopher to
start from natural language and to avail himself of its resources provided
that natural language appears to fulfill the intelligibility and expressibility requirements suitable for attaining philosophical purposes. In this
perspective philosophical language can be considered an extension of natural language. But according to the view developed below, this extension
cannot be taken as something like a smooth quantitative prolongation or
enrichment of natural language; on the contrary, philosophical language
will be the result of profound corrections and modifications of natural
language.
2.2. Sentential Compositionality vs. Sentential Contextuality
In order to understand the exact meaning and the great importance of the
issue of semantic sentential (non-)compositionality it may be useful to first
consider the contrast between the holistic and the molecular account of
meaning described by M. Dummett:
[O]n a molecular account, one knows the language by knowing the meaning of each
sentence of the language taken separately, whereas on a Quinean account to understand
a sentence is to understand the language to which it belongs, as Wittgenstein also said.
(Dummett 1987, 378)

According to the holistic view language forms an articulated structure,

with some sentences lying at the periphery and others at varying levels
within the interior (ibid., 376). Dummett is convinced that this contrast
can be overdrawn.
A further distinction must be introduced. Normal atomic sentences
of natural language are of the logical subject-predicate form; they are
considered to be complex linguistic expressions built up from their subsentential constituents. Do those constituents have meaning (or semantic value) on their own? That they do, is common opinion, since
singular terms are understood as denoting objects, predicates are taken
to designate attributes or interpreted extensionally to designate (in
the wide sense of this term) the class of objects to which they apply, and
the like. If subsentential linguistic expressions are taken to have their own
semantic value, then they are attributed the fundamental or primary semantic role; this means that the semantic primacy of sentences (Quine
1981, 20) is rejected. This position may be dubbed the atomistic account
(of meaning). On this account, one knows (the meaning [or the semantic

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value] of) a sentence by knowing the meaning (or the semantic value) of
each subsentential constituent of the sentence taken separately.
How are PSCP and PSCT to be seen on the basis of the atomistic, the
molecular and the holistic account of meaning? It seems quite plain that
PSCP presupposes the atomistic account of meaning. Likewise what may
be called the Principle of General Linguistic Compositionality, according
to which language is not an articulated structure in the holistic sense, is
the result or the expression of the molecular account of meaning. But this
principle does not necessarily presuppose an atomistic account of meaning, since even sentences taken separately, i.e., understood according to
the molecular view of meaning, do not necessarily presuppose a sentential
compositionality (in the sense of PSCP). Correspondingly, one would very
naturally assume that PSCT and the Atomistic Account of meaning are mutually exclusive. But without further assumptions PSCT does not appear to
be incompatible with the Molecular Account. Finally, if language is taken
as a whole in the sense of an articulated structure as explained above,
then the Principle of General Linguistic Non-Compositionality or Contextuality says that language cannot be explained in terms of the molecular
and/or atomistic account of meaning.
Since this paper is restricted to considerations on Sentential Compositionality/Contextuality, it is important to make explicit from the outset
what this restriction exactly amounts to, i.e., what it does presuppose
and what it does not presuppose. Sentential Non-Compositionality or
Contextuality is not incompatible with General Linguistic Compositionality as explained above, although the author of the present paper is
inclined to defend the thesis of General Linguistic Non-Compositionality
or Contextuality. Indeed PSCT claims only this: sentences taken
either separately or holistically do not have a compositional structure
in the sense that their meaning or semantic value is not a function
of the meanings or semantic values of their subsentential constituents.
In this respect sentential non-compositionality is neutral with respect to
the question of whether language as a whole has a compositional or a
non-compositional structure. But this point will not be dealt with in the
paper.
The question to be treated in the remainder of this section can now be
stated thus: Is the structure of the single or individual sentence to be explained compositionally, i.e., in terms of the atomistic account of meaning,
or non-compositionally, i.e., contextually? If so, how to exactly understand the non-compositional character of the (single) sentence? It will be
shown that the atomistic account (of meaning) should be rejected. The
alternative solution is to accept contextuality in accordance with PSCT.

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But what does sentential contextuality mean exactly in this context?

Pelletier has rightly remarked that the Principle of Semantic Compositionality is vague or unspecified at a number of points such as what counts
as a part, what is a meaning, what kind of function is allowed and the
like (Pelletier 1994, 11; see also Janssen 1997).
Likewise, PSCT, as stated by Frege and other philosophers, must be
considered vague and unspecified in many respects. The most important
but also the most problematic point is the question whether PSCP
and PSCT are compatible. Several authors simply accept both principles
without further scrutinizing them. They seem to have only a very loose
understanding of the semantic primacy of the sentence. Other authors
endeavour to show that both principles held together correctly and adequately articulate the primacy and the structure of the (descriptive) sentence.
For instance, Dummett asserts:
Freges theory was not that we may ascribe sense only to sentences, not to the words which
compose them: it was, rather, that the grasp of the sense of a word involves essentially an
understanding of the way in which the word contributes to determining the sense of a
sentence in which it may occur. (Dummett 1978, 382; see also Dummett 1991, 202204)

So understood, PSCT excludes only the view that there are meaningful
extra-sentential uses of words;5 it does not preclude the thesis that the
meaning or the semantic value of the sentence is compositionally
structured. Such an understanding of PSCT will be dubbed the weak version of PSCT (or for short PSCT) which is not incompatible with PSCP;
rather, they are mutually inclusive.
The proposal presented in this paper rejects PSCT; instead, it aims at
developing what may be called the strong version of PSCT (or for short
PSCT+ ) which demonstrates the mutual exclusiveness of compositionality
and contextuality.
2.3. Two Arguments Against Semantic Sentential Compositionality
Before exposing the positive meaning of PSCT+ two arguments for rejecting compositionality and for accepting contextuality will be briefly
delineated. To be sure, more reasons can be given, but in the context of the
topic of this paper the ontological and the truth theoretical perspective from
which the arguments are taken are to be preferred to other perspectives.
[1] The first argument aims at showing that PSCP and PSCT+ yield the
semantic basis for two completely different ontologies and that the ontology deriving from PSCT+ is to be preferred to the ontology deriving from
PSCP. This argument can only be sketched in this paper.6

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PSCP induces an ontology of objects that have properties standing in

relations to other objects. Each (non-syncategorematic) subsentential constituent of sentences, according to this principle, has its own semantic
value, i.e., its own ontological import: singular terms (or proper names)
denote objects, predicates designate attributes, and so on.
With respect to the sentence itself, there are different positions. One
position claims that the sentence expresses a proposition, which is
understood as a composed entity, more exactly: as a function of the semantic values of the subsentential constituents of the sentence; but philosophers who accept propositions do not agree upon their ontological status.
Some take propositions to be purely intensional entities which, if true, are
correlated or even identified with facts (see below, Section 3). But facts,
too, are controversial entities.7 Taken in the robust sense, they are worldly
entities.8 On the basis of this understanding of facts two different views
about the relationship between (true) propositions and facts have been
developed. According to the first view there is a genuine correspondence
relation between a true proposition and a worldly fact. According to the
second a true proposition and a worldly fact are simply identical. This will
be examined in detail below in Subsection 3.2.
According to other authors propositions (more exactly: singular propositions) are complex entities that reflect the structure of the sentences
expressing them. Simple propositions, expressed by simple sentences,
are made up of real objects corresponding to singular terms and of real
properties corresponding to predicates. A sentence like Pt1 , . . . ,tn expresses the proposition hho1 , . . . , on i, P i, whereby o1 , . . . , on are the
(real) referents of the referential terms t1 , . . . , tn and P the property
expressed by the predicate P (see Soames 1987a, b).
When propositions are rejected, most authors simply state that the referent of the sentence is the truth value. As is well known, Frege claimed
that the reference (Bedeutung) of the sentence (taken as statement) is
the True (das Wahre). Whatever that may exactly mean, at any rate
the sentence is taken to have ontological import only if it is understood
compositionally.
However the ontological import of the sentence compositionally understood is explained in detail, the basic ontological tenet remains the same:
objects (individuals) and attributes (properties and relations) are taken to
be the fundamental ontological items. But what is an object? Suffice
it to say in this context that the eminently popular expression object
disguises the real ontology underlying the compositional understanding
of sentences. This ontology is known as the substance ontology. An object
is understood as a substance, as something capable of having properties

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and relations. To be sure, several specific meanings have been attached to

this expression in the past, and contemporary philosophers even increase
this semantic diversity. But it seems to be possible to work out one fundamental meaning beneath the many specific meanings associated with this
expression.
On reasons that the author has presented elsewhere,9 this kind of ontology should not be accepted. Those reasons cannot be detailed or even
recapitulated in the present context. Only in few passages some hints at
central reasons are given. Thus, the proposal propounded in this paper
should be understood as the presentation of a first attempt to make explicit
the central idea underlying the envisaged explanation of the concept of
truth. To be sure, there are alternative ontological conceptions, for instance
the bundle theory (more exactly: theories), the theory (more exactly: theories) of tropes, and the like. But it does not seem clear how those alternative
ontological conceptions are to be adequately understood. The main reason
lies in the fact that their semantic basis has not yet been developed. Are
they compatible with acceptance of PSCP or are they based on this principle? The author of the present paper thinks that the hitherto propounded
bundle and trope theories in some way or other are derivative of a compositional semantics. Since this kind of ontology is rejected in this paper,
PSCP must be rejected, too.
[2] The second argument will be only briefly sketched. In a nutshell: PSCP
should not be accepted because it does not provide a basis for an adequate
explication of the concept of truth. This will be shown in detail in Section
3.10 In this context suffice it to say that the ontology deriving from the
Compositionality Principle is to be made responsible for the well-known
problems associated not only with the correspondence theory of truth but
with every theory of truth that endeavours to make explicit the ontological
dimension of the concept of truth. How to conceive of the relationship
between objects (substances), attributes (properties and relations),
facts, states of affairs, propositions, and the like? If one accepts
correspondence between a true (linguistic) item and something ontological, how is this relation to be explained exactly? The fundamental
problem does not so much lay in the correspondence relation as such but
rather in the ontological relatum of this relation.11 ,12
2.4. Sketch of a Non-compositional (Contextual) Semantics and
Ontology
[1] Since the motivation for rejecting the sentential compositionality is
mainly an ontological one, the task will be to sketch a semantics on the

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basis of sentential contextuality in such a way as to avoid the problems

pervading objectual or compositional ontologies. The general strategy
for doing that is to remove the causes of the ontological worries mentioned
above. As has been already made clear, those worries derive mainly from
the subject-predicate structure of the sentence, i.e., of the sentence understood compositionally. Thus, the first step in an effort to delineate a new
semantics is to eliminate the sentence structure underlying the compositional ontology, i.e., to eliminate singular terms and predicates. Doing
this leads to the thesis that the fundamental or central sentence form is
not what is usually called atomic sentence (i.e., sentences of the form
Peter is sleeping, Socrates is a philosopher, and the like), but sentences
without singular terms (subjects) and predicates proper, i.e., sentences of
the form Its raining, Its great, Milk (i.e., the abbreviated form of the
sentence Its milk), and the like. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein writes:
Die allgemeine Form des Satzes ist: Es verhlt sich so und so (4.5). The
English translation by C. K. Ogden reads: The general form of sentence
is: Such and such is the case (Ogden translates Satz as proposition,
which is ambiguous). The English formulation is somewhat inadequate,
since it seems to reduce Wittgensteins Satz to a sentence of the subjectpredicate form, whereas Wittgensteins German formulation clearly does
not have this form. But in English one would adequately say: Its F-ing,
It F-s, and the like. In German it would be adequate to say: Es verhlt
sich F. Sentences of this form will be called primary sentences.
Certainly, for many philosophers this shift from the well-known
atomic sentences to the primary sentences sounds strange and radical and indeed it is. But this shift is not entirely unprecedented in the
philosophical literature. As is well known, Quine has long ago devised
an interesting technique for eliminating singular terms in order to cope
with the problem posed by the fact that many singular terms (for instance,
Pegasus) are not referential terms. The technique consists essentially in
manoeuvering singular terms into a standard position = a, which, taken as
a whole, is a predicate or general term; but general terms are not affected by
the problems that singular terms raise. It is worth quoting Quines detailed
explanation:
The equation x = a is reparsed in effect as a predication x = a where = a is the verb,
the F of F x. Or look at it as follows. What was in words x is Socrates and in symbols
x = Socrates is now in words still x is Socrates, but the is ceases to be treated as a
separate relative term =. The is is now treated as a copula which, as in is mortal and is
a man, serves merely to give a general term the form of a verb and so suit it to predicative
position. Socrates becomes a general term that is true of just one object, but general in
being treated henceforward as grammatically admissible in predicative position and not in

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235

positions suitable for variables. It comes to play the role of the F of F a and ceases to
play that of the a. (Quine 1960, 37, 179)

But Quine does not draw any ontological consequences from his highly
interesting technique (Quine 1960, 177); on the contrary, in another passage of his Word and Object Quine stresses that the elimination technique
described above does not eliminate the objects themselves: . . . the objects
stay on as values of the variables though the singular terms be swept away
(ibid., 192, fn. 1).
What Quine is concerned with, is regimentation of scientific language
by means of the standard predicate logic which he takes to be the adopted form, for better or worse, of scientific theory (Quine 1985, 170).
And he thinks that predicate logic gains the required strength through
reification (ibid.). What this amounts to can be illustrated by an example.
Primary sentences, as described above, are considered by Quine as sentences without any referential import; indeed, he thinks we utter such
sentences without meaning to refer to any object (ibid., 169). He shows
this by working out the semantics and ontology induced by an observation
sentence like this:
A white cat is facing a dog and bristling.
Quine distinguishes two rephrasings of this sentence. The first is a nonreferential one: it has the effect to mask its [i.e., the sentences] referential
function. According to Quine the non-referential rephrasing amounts to
saying in the sensible presence of a cat Its catting and to parsing the
whole sentence thus:
Its catting whitely, bristlingly, and dogwardly.
Plainly, if one maintains that the world is populated by objects having
properties and staying in relations to other objects, this first rephrasing
is undoubtedly non-referential. Now, Quine seems to take it as obvious
that the world is featured this way. Thus, without the slightest hesitancy
he sticks to what might be called the dogma of objectual ontology.13
In perfect accordance with that ontological preconception, he presents
a second rephrasing that aims at articulating reference; this is obtained by
regimenting the sentence to fit predicate logic, which is the chosen mold
of our scientific theory (Quine 1985, 169):
(5)

x (x is a cat and x is white and x is bristling and x is dogward).

Quines technique for eliminating singular terms turns out to be a purely

logico-semantic device without any significant ontological import. Instead

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of considering the old objects to be the Denotata of the singular terms,

they are understood as being the values of bound (first-order) variables.
In a fundamental ontological perspective nothing really has changed. To
be sure, Quine sketches a twofold revision or reinterpretation of ontology
(see Quine 1981, ch. 1). The first has reductive character: it consists in
interpreting or reinterpreting one domain of objects by identifying it with
another domain (or a part of another domain). Quine describes four cases:
numbers are identified with classes; physical objects are identified with
full place-times; place-times are identified with classes of quadruples of
numbers; finally, mind-body dualism is reduced to physical monism. In all
four cases the fundamental ontological category object is maintained;
only the domain (or part of a domain) is changed in the sense that it
is reduced to another (part of a) domain. But what does object mean
exactly? Is it to be understood in some way or another still in the sense
of something like a substance, as was hinted at above? Quine does not ask
such a question. Suffice it in this context to make a remark about the second
case of reductive ontological revision: the identification of physical objects
to place-times. What are place-times? As the debate between substantialist and relationist theories of space and time shows,14 the usage of such
expressions as object and the like poses a serious ontological problem
with wide implications especially in the area of semantics and ontology.
Quine describes a second sort of ontological reinterpretation,
the sort where we save nothing but merely change or seem to change our objects without
disturbing either the structure or the empirical support of a scientific theory in the slightest.
All that is needed in either case, clearly, is a rule whereby a unique object of the supposedly
new sort is assigned to each of the old objects. I call such a rule a proxy function. (Quine
1981, 19)

This sort of reinterpretation yields a twofold change: a revision of ontology and a revision of ideology: The original objects have been supplanted
and the general terms reinterpreted (Ibid.). The conclusion Quine draws
is the inscrutability of reference. But this second sort of reinterpretation
of ontology (and ideology, in Quines term) is by no means a genuine
ontological revision, since the presupposed ontological basis remains the
same. He expresses this by stating:
Structure is what matters to a theory, and not the choice of its objects. (. . . ) The objects,
or values of variables, serve merely as indices along the way, and we may permute or
supplant them as we please as long as the sentence-to-sentence structure is preserved. The
scientific system, ontology and all, is a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking
sensory stimulation to sensory stimulation. (Ibid., 20)

Quine himself calls what he depicts a barren scene. But he hastens

to reaffirm his unswerving belief in external things people, nerve end-

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237

ings, sticks, stones . . . And he asks how this robust realism is to be

reconciled with the depicted barren scene:
The answer is naturalism: the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some
prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described. (Ibid., 21)

Surprisingly, Quine stresses that his

semantical considerations . . . were concerned not with assessing reality but with analyzing
method and evidence. They belong not to ontology but to the methodology of ontology, and
thus to epistemology . . . All ascription of reality must come . . . from within ones theory
of the world; it is incoherent otherwise. (. . . ) [I]t is a confusion to suppose that we can
stand aloof and recognize all the alternative ontologies as true in their several ways, all
the envisaged worlds as real. It is a confusion of truth with evidential support. Truth is
immanent, and there is no higher . . . (Ibid., 212)

At first glance Quines position seems to give rise to a coherence problem

in at least two respects. First, granted that semantical considerations
about ontology do not belong to the ontology but to the methodology of
ontology; but does this mean that they belong to epistemology? Quines
claim raises a serious question concerning his understanding of epistemology and, consequently, the status of his considerations. Furthermore, it
appears difficult to see how Quines alleged semantical/epistemological
considerations can be taken as being compatible with his naturalism.
Second, if naturalism was able to provide an answer to all worries, then
all semantical/epistemological considerations would turn out to be absolutely insignificant. Indeed, if it is within science itself that reality is to
be identified, then science itself has its credentials of its own, independently of all semantical/epistemological considerations of the kind
Quine has presented. Moreover and this is the more important point if
it is within science itself that reality is to be identified, then such a claim
precludes any semantical/epistemological considerations about science
implying that within science it is impossible to identify reality. But just
this seems to be the implication of Quines semantical/epistemological
considerations. Indeed, Quines statement that all ascription of reality
must come . . . from within ones theory of the world is ambiguous and
in the light of other statements to be found in Quine even incoherent.
This can be shown by taking Quines statements seriously. For instance:
Those [semantical] considerations showed that I could indeed turn my back on my external
things and classes and ride the proxy functions to something strange and different without
doing violence to any evidence. (Ibid., 21; emphasis added)

Who is I according to Quine? Is it the speaker of natural language

and/or the philosopher of science? Is it the scientist himself who develops a theory? Quine must say that all of those persons (the scientist

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included!) could ride the proxy functions to something strange and different without doing violence to any evidence. But if so, then the claim
that all ascription of reality must come from within ones theory of the
world or that it is within science itself that reality is to be identified
evaporates: the ascriber of reality within science itself is in no privileged
position; he, too, could turn his back to his external things and classes
and ride the proxy functions to something strange and different without
doing violence to any evidence. If the scientist as ascriber of reality
within science itself were in a privileged position, then Quine should have
worked out this privileged position. The consequence would have been that
his semantical/epistemological considerations would be devoid of any
real significance, since, then, I (everyone) would simply rely on what is
being done and stated within science itself without caring about what
philosophers, semanticists, epistemologists, and the like would say.
This is the place where the topic of Compositionality and Contextuality enters the scene in Quines semantic considerations. Quine stresses
that he sees all objects as theoretical and that this is a consequence
of taking seriously . . . the semantic primacy of sentences (ibid., 20). But
what does semantic primacy of sentences mean exactly? In the light
of other statements made by Quine, it appears that according to him the
semantic primacy of sentences is perfectly compatible with PSCP. If we
take the semantic primacy of the sentence as the Principle of Sentential
Contextuality, then it is clear that Quine is defending a very special (a very
weak) version of this principle, namely PSCT. Indeed, the passage from
which the last quotation was taken makes clear that Quine understands the
semantical primacy of the sentence in a purely epistemological sense and
perspective. He is concerned (only) with the question of evidence, not with
the very semantical status and the ontological import of sentences.
What these long considerations on Quines position from the technique
of elimination of singular terms to the proxy functions show is this: Nothing really has changed (Quine 1981, 19), i.e., nothing as regards the
ontological dimension has really changed. The only ontology Quine in
whatever way admits is the old objectual or compositional ontology, and
he claims that even this ontology is not what matters to a theory (ibid.,
20).
[2] Although Quines position is not accepted, its significant inspirational potential must be fully recognized. In this respect his idea and
technique of eliminating singular terms is no doubt of the utmost importance. The approach being developed in this section should be taken as a
radicalization of Quines elimination technique. As was already pointed

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239

out above, Quines strategy does not go beyond the limits of a purely
logico-semantical device in order to come to grips with the problem of
non-referentiality of some singular terms.
Since an objectual ontology is rejected, Quines reification program
is not the right task. Rather, what Quine considers to be the non-referential
paraphrasing of a normal atomic sentence turns out to be in a basic
perspective the right way of carrying out the envisaged new semanticoontological program. But this program must rely on a deeper motivation as
that underlying Quines elimination technique. The central aspect of such
a deeper motivation is the need for carrying out a profound revision of
ontology. This revision in its turn can be conceived of only as the result
of a stringent understanding and application of a strong version of the
Context Principle. A significant detail of Quines application of his elimination technique is suitable for illustrating the difference between Quines
strategy and the strategy followed in this paper. According to Quine the
sentence A white cat is facing a dog and bristling which he takes to
be an observation sentence goes into adverbs: Its catting whitely,
bristlingly, and dogwardly. But adverbs pose a new problem as regards the
Principle of Sentential Non-Compositionality. How should adverbs, taken
at face value, be understood in an ontological perspective? If the problems
traditional objectual ontology is confronted with are to be resolved, then
adverbs must also be eliminated on the semantic level of a conspicuous
philosophical language.
[3] The upshot of these considerations can be summarized by quoting a famous sentence from Wittgensteins Tractatus which articulates a
profound intuition:
The world is the totality of facts, not of things. (Tractatus 1.1)15

There is only one ontological category admitted: the entity expressed

by primary sentences which not without ambiguity can be called proposition whose ontological status, speaking very loosely, can be called a
fact. But the expression fact has the connotation of something given
or something empirical (in opposition to something necessary, something a priori, and the like), although an expression like logical fact is not
unusual. On this reason it would be more appropriate to speak with F. B.
Fitch of Propositions as the Only Realities (this is the title of Fitchs 1971
paper). To be sure, what Fitch calls proposition is not identical with the
concept of proposition worked out in the present paper. But the expression proposition usually does not have a clear ontological connotation,
contrary to the expression state of affairs that would be more suitable for
articulating the connection between language and the world. But questions

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of terminology will not be of concern in this paper. Suffice it to say that

the expressions proposition and states of affairs will undistinguishably
be used in the sense of what primary sentences do express.
The envisaged ontology is a one-category ontology (see Campbell
1990). The main task of this ontology is to work out the fine-grained
structure of the world. So-called individuals or particulars or, more naturally speaking, all kinds of things or, more philosophically speaking,
all kinds of entities must be conceived of as being constituted by primary
propositions/states of affairs: they are bundles or, more appropriately,
configurations16 of propositions/states of affairs. Accordingly, singular
terms occurring in natural language would be reinterpreted as abbreviations of primary sentences, each of which expresses a proposition/state
of affairs. Following Quines rephrasing technique one would reinterpret
Socrates as It Socratizes whereby this sentence should be considered
as a highly complex sentence built up from primary sentences. For the
purposes of this paper it is not necessary to enter into this matter in more
detail. What has been sketched might be sufficient in order to explain
the meaning of truth by seriously taking into account the ontological
dimension of the concept of truth.

3. THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH AND NON - COMPOSITIONAL ONTOLOGY

In this section the results of the preceding considerations will be put

together. It emerges from these considerations that two tasks must be
tackled in the remainder of this paper: first, the task of articulating in
more exact terms the explanation of the concept of truth (for particular
sentences/propositions) already propounded in more general and intuitive
terms in the first two sections; second, the task of showing how this concept
involves the ontological dimension.
3.1. Truth as a Composite Function
The ensuing explanation of the concept of truth has turned out to be neither
purely deflationary nor purely substantive in the sense those expressions is
usually attributed in the literature. Rather, in one respect the explanation
can be taken as deflationary, in another perspective it can be considered
substantive. What this shows is that the contemporary theories of truth,
which are susceptible of being classified in either category, have really
missed the central point. In this subsection only a brief account of the
concept of truth will be given. A more detailed presentation is to be found
in several other writings.17

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241

[1] The starting point of the account to be delineated is the claim that
language without semantic vocabulary (simple language or L0 ) is to be
considered as internally indeterminate. This, of course, does not preclude
L0 from being a concrete language in the sense that it is externally
determinate. In order to explain the concept of internal indeterminacy of
simple language the question how language is made determinate should
be briefly addressed.
There are three dimensions which afford determination of language.
The first is a dimension purely external to language, from outside language: the dimension of external contexts in which the speaker of a
language is situated and in which he utters sentences of the language.
In real life such contexts are implicitly presupposed without being made
linguistically explicit. Spoken natural language is mostly determined by
such contexts. Speaking the natural language doesnt in general explicitly
qualify the way it should be understood or interpreted; in other words, it
does not explicitly fix the interpretation and, thus, the determination of
language.
The second dimension is a mixed one: Sentences are uttered in a determinate context and just this circumstance is also made linguistically
explicit. Here the context is something non-linguistic, for instance an action and the like; making this external circumstance linguistically explicit
is an internal factor of language. We have, thus, an external-internal dimension, a mixed one. This is the locus originarius of the speech acts.
Pragmatic vocabulary is that segment of language which verbally expresses the fact that language is being made determinate from outside
language, for instance by uttering I assert that . . . .
There is a third dimension affording the determination of language,
a purely internal dimension, a kind of self-determination of language.
This dimension is constituted by the semantic vocabulary in the strong
sense; that is, the vocabulary not confused with, for instance, the pragmatic
vocabulary. The main expressions belonging to this vocabulary are meaning, reference, and, above all, truth (true). It is of utmost importance
not to confuse this semantic vocabulary with any other vocabulary. This
can be made clear by comparing semantic and pragmatic vocabularies.
Pragmatic locutions like to utter, to assert, to state, to claim etc.
appear to be meaningful only if we are prepared to answer a question
included or presupposed by these locutions: Who utters, asserts, states,
claims etc.? The relation to a factor external to language, to a speaker or
user of the language, is an essential feature of pragmatic locutions. By
contrast, there is no relation of the purely semantic locutions to a factor
external to language. To say It is true that snow is white doesnt contain

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or imply any relation to a speaker or subject or user of language. Language

itself, as it were, is saying that snow is white. Indeed, our language contains
purely semantic formulations like the following: The sentence S says (or
expresses) that . . . Thus, the function of semantic vocabulary is to make
language fully determinate from within language itself.
If we take seriously the indeterminacy of simple language, of language as such in the sense explained, and if we understand the semantic
vocabulary as having the function of making language determinate from
within language itself, then the concept of truth must be understood as
being the central factor which determines language internally. That is, to
say it-is-true-that S presupposes that S as such (i.e., taken in isolation
in the sense of not being qualified by any factor external or internal to
language and understood as a sentence or as a proposition expressed by
this sentence) is indeterminate. It is further assumed that the application of
the operator it-is-true-that to S yields in the syntactical perspective a
new sentence, It-is-true-that S. In the semantic perspective it is assumed
that the application of it-is-true-that to S (taken as entence and/or proposition) makes S the same from within language fully qualified or
fully determined.
The point reached so far is of the utmost importance for the question
concerning the meaning of truth (true). One can legitimately claim
that the just sketched account of the concept of truth is an adequate explanation, i.e., that there is nothing more to say about truth. In a strongly
definitional perspective this is surely correct: the definitional explanation
of the truth of a sentence/proposition S would be given by the definiens
fully determinate semantical status. Thus considered, the proposed explanation should be considered in one respect a substantive, since it
presents a well-articulated feature as the explanans or definiens of truth.
But in another respect the explanation can be seen as deflationary, since
the feature in question is not a metaphysical or hidden property like
the famous correspondence relation. But as will be shown at the end of the
paper, this strong definitional perspective raises important questions which
cannot be ignored by a fully adequate philosophical theory of truth.
This very peculiar character of the proposed explanation can be expressed by Tarskis T-biconditionals reinterpreted in the way indicated in
Section 1 [2]. The reinterpretation can be articulated thus:
It-is-true-that p if and only if p,
where p is an undetermined sentence and/or undetermined proposition
expressed by a sentence and p is the same sentence, but now taken as
a fully determinate sentence and/or the same proposition, but now taken
as a fully determinate proposition.

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Since this explanation of truth resorts to the concept fully determinate (status of a sentence/proposition), the question arises ineluctably:
How to understand this last concept? In Section 1 a general answer to this
question is hinted at. But this general answer is by no means sufficient
and convincing. One has to tackle the task of showing, in some detail,
how the fully determinate status of a sentence/proposition is to be exactly
understood. The central aspect of this question concerns the ontological
dimension of the concept of truth to be dealt with in Subsection 3.2.
[2] In order to take all factors and aspects relevant to the explanation of
the concept of truth into account, it is best to conceive of this concept
as a composite function. The starting point is that segment of language
which does not contain semantic vocabulary, i.e., L0 . The first function,
T , takes a sentence p of L0 as argument and maps it into the new sentence It-is-true-that p built up from the sentence p and the operator
it-is-true-that. Since p is a sentence in which no semantic expression
occurs, it is a sentence with an indeterminate semantic status, i.e., p is
not endowed with a language-internal determination. Sentences in which
the operator it-is-true-that occurs will be interpreted as PERsentences
(PPER ) (PER being formed from PERfect or PERform). It-is-truethat is, thus, a PERsentence-forming operator, in opposition, for instance,
to R. Brandoms revised version of the Prosentence Theory of Truth according to which It is true is to be taken as a PROsentence-forming
operator.18 We, then, obtain:
T : p 7 pPER .
But it-is-true-that expresses more than T . A second function articulates what a PERsentence means or is. A PROsentence has an
anaphoric status or structure, i.e., it refers to an antecedent (a token of
p):
Its function is just to pick out the antecedent on which the whole prosentence formed
using true is anaphorically dependent, and from which it accordingly inherits its content.
(Brandom 1994, 304)

A PERsentence has exactly the opposite status or structure: a cataphoric

status or structure. This means that the PERsentence (and/or the PERproposition) relates the sentence (proposition), to which it-is-true-that
has been applied, to a consequent, i.e., to the same sentence, but now
taken as being endowed with a fully determinate status (this status of p
is indicated by the notation in bold character). This second function is T+ :
T+ : pPER 7 p.

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Thus, the Truth-operator it-is-true-that does express neither T alone

nor T+ alone; rather, it expresses the composite function T:
T: T+ T .
3.2. Truth and the Ontological Dimension
The value of the composite function truth has been established as
the fully determinate status of sentences/propositions.19 As was pointed
out in Section 2, the (concept of the) fully determinate status of sentences/propositions concerns mainly the semantico-ontological dimension.
In this subsection this will be explained in more detail.
On the basis of the concept of truth explained above two different
views of the connection between the concept of truth and the (semantico-)
ontological dimension can be envisaged. The first view appears at first
sight as very simple, but in reality it is highly problematic; it might be
called the simple view. The second view is the result of seriously taking into account the problems posed by resorting to certain ontological
concepts and assumptions, for instance, the concept of a fact; this view,
which will be pursued in the remainder of this paper, might be called the
accurate view.
[1] The simple view just accepts the ontology expressed by the fully determinate sentences without caring to examine this ontology in detail and,
thus, without handling the problems posed by the ontology presupposed.
Most generally, the ontology presupposed is an objectual ontology: an ontology of objects, properties and relations; often an ontology of facts is also
(additionally) accepted. Contrary to all versions of the correspondence theory, the simple view as understood in this paper does not accept an explicit
relation of correspondence as the definiens of truth; rather, it takes what the
fully determinate sentences express or say as the ontological dimension of
truth. According to this view it would be correct to say: It is true that snow
is white iff snow is white. Snow is white would be a fully determinate
sentence expressing: Real snow is really white. For this conception of
truth it would not matter whether one takes this last (fully determinate)
sentence as saying that the object snow has the property whiteness or
as expressing a fact: the fact that snow is white, or as being interpreted in
another way. Every ontological interpretation of the sentence would do.
It is not asked and not clarified what kind of entity or entities are being
assumed, whether it is intelligible to attribute a property or a relation to
an object (that is to say, to a substance). and, if facts are admitted, what
those entities are and how they are correlated to objects, properties

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and relations. The weakness of the simple view is that it appeals to an

ontological dimension which is left completely in the dark.20
Thus understood, the difference between the proposed new explanation of the concept of truth and deflationist positions would fundamentally
reduce to the following point: whereas the simple view takes the sentence (and the proposition) to which it-is-true-that applies as having
only an indeterminate status in such a way that the function of it is
true that consists in transforming this indeterminate status into a fully
determinate status, the deflationist position takes the sentence to which
the qualification true is attributed as having already a fully determinate
status with the consequence that true does not afford anything new, thus
being completely redundant. But both positions agree in simply accepting the ontology expressed by the sentence qualified as true as well as in
considering this ontology as not being an ingredient of the concept of truth.
[2] The accurate view results from a completely different attitude as
regards the relationship between the concept of truth and the ontological
dimension. It relies on two insights (or convictions). First, it makes no
sense to talk or to admit of a relationship between truth and ontology unless
the kind of ontology envisaged or presupposed is made explicit. Second,
the ontological dimension cannot be considered as being completely external to the concept of truth, as all versions of deflationism implicitly
or explicitly assume. Even if one countenances the possibility of defining
truth in such a way that the ontological dimension will not appear as an
explicit (partial) definiens, this dimension cannot be considered as simply
absent; on the contrary, it is in some way or another always involved at
least as a background ingredient of (the definition or explanation of) the
concept of truth. At the end of the paper this last point will be broached
again.
What the accurate view aims at can be worked out by examining what
is now known as the identity theory of truth.21 But it should first be
remarked that in the light of what has been shown in this paper this expression articulates only one central feature of the (explanation of the) concept
of truth, being therefore inadequate for a complete exact characterization
of the view propounded in this paper. But the important questions to be
treated in this context are not questions about terminology and the like. The
real questions concern the exact sense, the coherence and the consequences
of the identity claim in semantical and ontological perspective.
According to Baldwin, Bradley was not a coherence theorist but held
the identity theory of truth, which he characterizes in the following terms:

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It is basically the thesis that the truth of a judgement consists in the identity of the judgments content with a fact. (. . . ) What the identity theorist holds is that the only relationship
[between the truth of a judgment and reality] good enough for truth is identity. In this
way, therefore, the identity theory can be seen as a limiting case of the correspondence
theory. . . (Baldwin 1991, 356)

Perhaps the most famous and trenchant formulation is to be found in Frege:

In his The Thought Frege asks What is a fact? and he tersely answers:
A fact is a thought that is true (Frege 1967, 35). There is a significant
controversy on the exact interpretation of this famous statement, as will be
shown in a moment. And R. Brandom states that
[T]rue claims do correspond to facts, and understanding claims does require grasp of what
the facts must be for those claims to be true. (. . . ) If claim is understood as what is
claimed, true claimable contents just are facts; the relation of correspondence is just that
of identity. (Brandom 1994, 330)

Let us first observe that the statement according to which the identity
of a true proposition (or of a true claim in the sense of what is claimed to
be true or of a true judgement) with a fact can be seen as a limiting case
of the correspondence theory is fundamentally correct. But, as Dodd and
Hornsby (1992, 320) rightly remark, the term correspondence (theory of
truth) is generally not taken as referring to this limiting case, i.e., to identity; on the contrary, what characterizes (all variants of) the correspondence
theory is the general assumption that in order to explain the concept of
truth something distinct from that which may be true is required; i.e., it is
presupposed that the correspondence relation is not the identity relation.
Frege is a case in point. Since according to Dodd and Hornsby, Frege employed the expression correspondence (theory) as designating a relation
of non-identity, they are right in stressing that his identity theory cannot
be considered a case of a correspondence theory (in the usual sense!). And
Freges rejection of the correspondence theory, so understood, is a plain
consequence of his acceptance (countenancing) of the identity theory. At
first sight the identity theory seems to contain a clear statement, since the
concept of identity is generally considered a clear concept. But of course,
from the circumstance that the concept of identity taken as such is a clear
concept it doesnt follow that the Relata are clear concepts, too. As regards
the topic in question quite the contrary is the case. What are propositions
([the content of] judgements, claims [what is claimed]), what are
facts? There is absolutely no consensus not even in a minimal sense
in contemporary philosophy about these topics. A telling illustration is a
highly significant controversy in contemporary philosophy about the exact
interpretation of Freges statement quoted above.

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247

As was already remarked in Section 2, there are mainly two interpretations of what facts are: According to a robust understanding, facts are
worldly entities, ingredients of the world. According to a modest understanding facts are not worldly entities, but belong to another realm, the
realm of senses, being themselves compounds of senses, i.e., having
senses, and not objects and properties (and relations), as constituents. The
distinction between a robust and a modest (or truistic) identity theory of truth was introduced by Dodd (1995). According to Dodd, Frege
defended the modest position. Freges famous statement quoted above
is interpreted by him as saying that facts are true Thoughts rather than
occupants of the world (Dodd 1995, 161162) And Dodd himself accepts
and defends the modest identity theory (see ibid., 164).22
[3] According to the accurate view defended in this paper the modest version of the identity theory raises insurmountable problems, whereas the
robust version remains unclear and unconvincing so long as the ontological
status of facts has not been clarified. This will be shown in detail in the
remainder of the present section.
[3.1] There are mainly two problems the modest theory raises. The first
problem is this: It is difficult, not to say impossible, to see how facts in
the modest sense differ from Fregean thoughts (propositions) taken as
purely intensional entities, i.e., as senses. Put differently, using Freges
terminology: It appears to be inconceivable to establish any significant
difference between thoughts, true thoughts and facts, if facts are
understood in the modest sense. If facts as true thoughts remain within
the realm of sense, then the difference, if a difference can be admitted at all,
would be a difference within the realm of sense. But how to characterize
such a kind of sense-immanent difference? Even if such a difference
could be envisaged and articulated, it would be of no importance at all,
since the point at stake concerns the relationship between the realm of
sense and another realm (or other realms). Moreover, such a view is highly
counterintuitive and vacuous, since it seems undeniable that talk of facts
intends to refer to something real, at least in the sense that it aims at
going beyond or at transcending the realm of sense.
The second problem emerges from the fact that the task of explaining
the mind/language-world connection is eschewed, being left completely
unresolved. If truth, facts and the like are situated purely and entirely
in the immanence of the realm of senses, a gap between the realm of senses
and the ontological realm is created which appears to be insurmountable.
It is highly symptomatic that Dodd feels compelled to declare:

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Of course, someone who holds a modest identity theory of truth need not commit herself
to the view that there is nothing substantial to be said about mind-world relations, only that
the theory of truth is not the place for it. (Dodd 1995, 164, fn. 5)

But if the theory of truth is not the place for saying something substantial
about mind/language-world relations, what would be the right place for it?
It is of no fundamental importance to assume or not to assume that the
theory about language/mind-relations should be called theory of truth
or that it constitutes a central aspect of such a theory. The only important
point is to show how to develop a coherent, intelligible and adequate theory
of language/mind-relations. To this Dodd has nothing interesting to say. In
the quoted paper he is only concerned with criticizing McDowells claim
(McDowell 1996, 27) that there exists no ontological gap between a true
proposition and a fact. And Dodd adds:
[M]y main point stands: the only plausible abolition of the ontological gap between true
propositions and facts has nothing to say about mind-world relations because it does not
hold facts to be in the world. (Ibid., 164, fn 5)

But this clearly shows that the question of the language/mind-relations

remains unbroached and unanswered. At any rate, this question cannot
be meaningfully asked, let alone be answered, unless one shows what the
world looks like, i.e., how to conceive of the ontological structure of the
world.
[3.2] The robust theory, globally understood, is the right theory, since it
tackles the task of articulating the ontological dimension of the concept
of truth. But the theory, as it stands, is in need of a profound revision.
The central point or problem is this: If the robust theory presupposes or
envisages an ontology deriving from the Principle of Sentential Compositionality, it will be affected by a lack of intelligibility to a large extent,
giving rise to problems for which it is difficult to envisage coherent solutions. Indeed, such an ontology will be a compositional ontology that
accepts as basic entities objects (i.e., substances), properties and relations,
and, in some sense or another, facts.23 But how to characterize the relationship between those entities, especially between facts on the one
hand and objects/properties/relations on the other? What exactly would it
mean to state that a true proposition is just a fact? If according to the robust
theory it is said that facts are worldly entities, how then is the connection between facts and other ontological entities to be conceived?
Are there only facts in the world? If so, the compositional ontology
would imply that objects (substances) are real entities only as constituents
of facts. But this assumption is ambiguous, as was shown in Section 2.
Indeed, this would be intelligible only if one would be prepared to accept

TRUTH, NON-COMPOSITIONALITY, AND ONTOLOGY

249

facts as the basic entities in the strong sense. But if one accepts objects
(substances), properties, relations and facts at all, it seems plain that facts
presuppose objects/properties/relations and not the other way round. But
then the concept of truth, according to the robust identity theory, appears to
become increasingly obscure: among other things it would follow that (talk
of) truth would refer only to facts, to the fact-dimension of the world,
not to the (presupposed) dimension of objects, properties and relations,
and, thus, not to the world as a whole.24
Things change completely if one accepts a non-compositional (a contextual) ontology in accordance with the strong version of the Principle of
Sentential Contextuality as delineated in Section 2. In this case only one
category of entities are admitted: (existing) primary propositions or states
of affairs or facts. (As regards the terminology, no difference between
propositions and states of affairs is introduced or accepted.) To say
that a true proposition is just (identical to) a worldly fact (an existing state
of affairs) is to formulate a clear, intelligible and coherent claim. Since the
world according to the accurate view is the totality of facts (of existing
propositions or states of affairs) in the strongest sense, the realm of truth
and the world would be coextensional.25

4. TRUTH THEORY AS TRUTH DEFINITION OR AS AXIOMATIC

THEORY ?

The considerations presented in this paper were restricted in several respects. The most important respect concerned the extension of truth
(true): only the concept of truth as applied to single or individual
sentences/propositions was the topic treated. Undoubtedly, the results obtained are basic for the development of a general theory of truth, but such
theory is a task that could not be tackled in this paper. As the contemporary
discussions about theories of truth clearly show, the difficulty of this task
should not be underestimated. In this conclusion some hints will be given
to only one aspect of this task.
Truth (it-is-true-that), as applied to single sentences/propositions,
has been explained as being a cataphoric operator that takes indeterminate sentences/propositions as arguments and yields the same sentences/propositions endowed with a fully determinate status. The most
simple way of presenting this explanation is to resort to Tarskis biconditionals profoundly reinterpreted:
It-is-true-that p if and only if p

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LORENZ B. PUNTEL

(where p is an indeterminate sentence expressing an indeterminate proposition and p is the same sentence/proposition, except that now it has
a fully determinate status).
So presented, the explanation looks half-deflationary and halfsubstantive. Against substantivism and (in some sense) with deflationism
it holds that the sentence/proposition qualified as true says (or in the
case of the proposition: is) the same or says (is) nothing more than
the sentence/proposition occurring or taken without this qualification. But
against deflationism and with substantivism it claims that both (kinds of)
sentences/propositions say/are the same, but not in the same way or manner or not with the same status. In other words: it articulates the central
feature that characterizes truth, namely, the feature of determination:
the role of truth is to make sentences/propositions fully determinate, or
put another way: to transform the indeterminate semantic status of sentences/propositions into a fully determinate one. But perhaps one should
say that the characterizations half-deflationary and half-substantive
are simply not suitable for articulating the specific status of the proposed
explanation of truth.
Now, the concept of fully determinate status (of sentences/propositions)
is in its turn in need of explanation and this circumstance creates a very
interesting and important tension with respect to the explanation of truth.
It has been stressed that the semantico-ontological dimension on which
the explanation of the concept of fully determinate status must rely constitutes something like a background explanans or definiens of the concept of
truth. It has been shown that an adequate ontology must be elaborated as a
precondition for understanding truth. The tension, then, can be articulated
by saying: for directly explaining or defining truth it is not required
to make explicit the ontology implied or presupposed; but for an adequate
and coherent understanding (and making sense) of the concept of truth
explained or defined in the indicated way it is required that a suitable
ontology be made explicit. To deny or to ignore this tension would have
considerable consequences in philosophy. One can see a confirmation of
this claim in the case of deflationism: this position is exclusively interested
in presenting a minimal formulation in order to cope with minimally
interpreted linguistic items. The consequence of this stance is the undeniable fact that truth looses almost completely its (traditional) central
place in philosophy, logic, science etc. This consequence comes as no surprise since under minimalist or deflationist conditions the concept of
truth becomes increasingly devoid of any philosophical intelligibility and
applicability.

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251

An interesting proposal to take seriously the tension just described is

to point to two different possibilities of treating the topic of truth. One
possibility is to present an explanation in the sense of a definition (in the
strong sense) of the concept of truth; it has the advantage of being clear,
exact and concise, for short: the advantage well defined concepts have in
the theoretical area. But there is also a patent disadvantage: it lies in the
obvious fact that the explanans/definiens of truth in its turn remains in
need of clarification, especially as regards the ontological dimension presupposed or implied. This disadvantage has disastrous consequences when
the ontology presupposed or implied is not made explicit at all. This leads
to the acceptance of a concept of truth whose status remains uncertain,
indeterminate and vague.26
The other possibility is to develop an axiomatic theory of truth. In this
case no explicit definition of truth will be presented; only axioms will be
formulated which, taken as a whole, can be considered an implicit definition. Now, the axioms of an axiomatic theory of truth can be conceived
of as containing an adequate articulation of a view of truth embodying
features of different areas directly or indirectly connected with truth. One
such area an absolutely central one is ontology.27 In this way it would
be easy to overcome the problems mentioned above which derive from the
fact that the ontology presupposed or envisaged by the concept of truth is
not made explicit by a definition of truth.28

NOTES
1 In order to avoid misunderstanding, it may be useful to explain the usage of quotation

marks in the paper. Simple quotation marks ( ) are employed: (i) to mark a quotation
within a quotation; (ii) to indicate that the expression put into quotation marks is mentioned, i.e., is taken as a linguistic expression. Double quotation marks ( ) are used: (i) to
mark a normal quotation for which a reference is given; (ii) to indicate that the expression in
quotation marks belongs to a passage that has been already quoted or otherwise referred to;
(iii) to highlight a special, unusual or very important meaning attributed to the expression
in quotation marks.
2 Horwich is referring to principles concerning the basic nature and norms of thought
and action e.g., truth is the aim of science; true beliefs facilitate successful behaviour;
truth is preserved in valid reasoning . . . (Horwich [1990] 1998, 1).
3 The angle brackets h and i are employed by Horwich to indicate that surrounding any
expression, e, with them produces an expression referring to the propositional constituent
expressed by e.
4 See footnote 12 and Puntel (forthcoming d).

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5 An example of such a view is to be found in B. Rundle who states that it is clearly

wrong to say that a word has a meaning only in a sentence. I have not written down a
meaningless mark if I write tiger and nothing else (Rundle (1990, 126). For a criticism
of this position see Morris (1994).
6 The semantico-ontological approach alluded to in the text has been worked out in other
writings of the author. See especially Puntel (1990; 1993; 1997a, b; 1999).
7 Dodd (1999) says Farewell to States of Affairs. He summarizes his arguments thus:
States of affairs are not needed to unify the world. (The instantiation of universals by
particulars is sufficient in this regard.) Neither are they required to serve as the relata of the
causal relation. (Events and true propositions will do just as well.) The existence of states
of affairs is also unnecessary for the truth of realism. These facts, together with the failure
of the truthmaker argument, seem to leave the proponent of states of affairs with nowhere
to go. We have not found a single theoretical need which states of affairs alone can meet.
(Ibid., 159)
Dodd works out some interesting aspects of the problems facing the concept of a fact
within an objectual ontology. But he does not seem to be aware of this fact (at least
he does not explicitly hint at it). What Dodds (otherwise excellent) paper shows is this:
The most momentous question concerning states of affairs/facts is not whether states of
affairs do exist or not, but the question how to conceive of states of affairs/facts. At the
end of the paper Dodd gives a somewhat enigmatic hint at another possibility: Having
said this, it is possible that more ingenious defences of an ontology of states of affairs may
be concocted in future; but I dare to predict that they will fare no better than those I have
considered (Ibid.) As the last sentence seems to indicate, Dodd is thinking of other more
ingenious defenses of an ontology of states of affairs within the general framework of
objectual ontology rather than of other (non-objectual) ontological frameworks which
would give rise to other completely different concepts of states of affairs. Just this last
possibility will be explored in the present paper. As regards the expressions state of
affairs, proposition, fact, and the like, one might ask whether their meaning should not
be considered relative only to a certain ontology (or to certain ontologies) with the consequence that these expressions could or should not be applied to entities accepted in other
ontological frameworks. But to this question a straightforward answer can be given: The
most fundamental feature of the concept associated with the expressions mentioned seems
to be that they designate that which is expressed by indicative sentences, for short: the expressum of indicative sentences. This feature must be presupposed in order to meaningfully
employ the expressions in question in different ontologies or ontological frameworks. The
differences in meaning alluded to concern the more detailed and precise understanding and
explanation of the concept of an expressum. It should be added that in the present paper
the expressions proposition and state of affairs are employed synonymously.
8 On the distinction between the robust and the modest sense of facts see below
Subsection 3.2.
9 See Puntel (1990, ch. 3; 1993 1997b; 1999; forthcoming a).
10 Dodd (1999) argues against the truthmaker argument presented and defended by
Armstrong (1997), 1139, which he reconstructs in the following way: (1) Every truth
must have a truthmaker . . . (2) The obvious candidates to occupy the role of truthmakers
are states of affairs . . . So (3) States of affairs exist (Ibid., 146). The second argument
presented in the text does not rely on the concept of a truthmaker. The introduction and
acceptance of (primary!) states of affairs in the next sections of the paper is motivated

TRUTH, NON-COMPOSITIONALITY, AND ONTOLOGY

253

by considerations and reasons completely distinct from something like the truthmaker
argument. But the fundamental distinction concerns the concept of state of affairs. The
concept of state of affairs that Armstrong countenances and Dodd criticizes is simply a
product of the objectual ontology rejected in this paper. See footnote 7.
11 The problems alluded to in the text have led many authors to defend the correspondence
theory of truth on the basis of a metaphysically thin notion of facts. An example in point
is J. Searles attempt to formulate a substantive correspondence theory (see Searle 1966,
ch. 9) which evades the problems mentioned. According to him such a substantive theory
states that sentences are made true by standing in relations of correspondence to facts. But
although he takes facts to be non-linguistic entities, he asserts that the correspondence
theory does not require a thick metaphysical notion of fact ; rather, it is perfectly sufficient to take facts as conditions in the world that satisfy the truth-conditions expressed
by statements (ibid., 2112). And so he concludes that for every true statement there is a
corresponding fact, because that is how these words are defined (ibid., 214). By the same
token Searle introduces an equally thin notion of correspondence:
Correspondence to facts is just a shorthand for the variety of ways in which a statement
can accurately represent how things are, and that variety is the same as the variety of
statements, or more strictly speaking, the variety of assertive speech acts. (Ibid., 213)
To this one should object that such a thin ontological (or metaphysical) conception is
devoid of any explanatory significance. Indeed, if facts are taken to be conditions in the
world, one would like to know how those conditions are exactly conceived. Are they a
kind of entities distinct from other kinds of entities? If so, how are we to characterize
the difference? Searles attempt is not suited for establishing an understandable and coherent view of truth. It turns out that a convincing and coherent theory of truth cannot
eschew treating ontological questions in the most explicit and accurate way. For a criticism
of Searles attempt to defend his correspondence theory from the so-called Slingshot
Argument see Rodriguez-Pereyra (1998).
12 Hintikka defines truth in the framework of game-theoretical semantics as the existence of a winning strategy (in the strict sense of game theory) for the initial verifier in
the correlated game G(S) (Hintikka forthcoming, 23). He sharply distinguishes between
semantical games, which are constitutive of truth, and epistemic games (or activities of
verification and falsification in ordinary usage and in the usage of constructivist theoreticians of language), which are means to coming to know the truth of sentences (ibid., 22).
Relying on the framework of semantical games, Hintikka thinks that there is no problem
about speaking of truth as corresponding with facts (Hintikka forthcoming, 17; emphasis
added). And he justifies this claim thus:
For such a correspondence is what the T-schema can be taken to express. The only novelty
is that the correspondences in question are not mediated by naturalistic relations but by
relations defined by reference to certain rule-governed activities which Wittgenstein would
have called language-games. This dependence should not come as a surprise to any reader
of intuitionistic or constructivist philosophers of logic who see the mode of existence of
the notion of truth in certain human activities of verification and falsification. (Ibid.)
Hintikka goes so far as to claim that there is little motivation left for the other so-called
theories of truth other than the correspondence theory. For our naive ordinary-discourse
notion of truth is unmistakably one of correspondence (ibid.) But such a claim remains

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unconvincing since this kind of fact-talk is hardly intelligible, as was initially shown in
footnotes 7, 10, 11 and as will be elaborated in Subsections 2.4 and 3.2.
13 The expression objectual is employed by Quine to characterize a reading or interpretation of the quantifiers (objectual reading in opposition to substitutional reading; see,
for instance, Quine 1987, 34).
14 See, for instance , Earman (1989), Teller (1991), and Rynasiewicz (1996).
15 This is not to say that Wittgenstein developed a coherent ontology on the basis of this
principle. Quite the contrary, further down, in the text he states: What is the case, the
fact, is the existence of states of affairs. A state of affairs is a combination of objects
(entities [Sachen], things) (2 and 2.01). (The translation quoted has been modified, since
it erroneously translates Sachverhalt by atomic fact and, accordingly, das Bestehen
von Sachverhalten by the existence of atomic facts. But this is unacceptable since it
makes no sense to speak of non-existent facts.) Moreover, Wittgenstein explicitly uses
the concept of substance: Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot
be compound (2.021). In the opinion of the author, no philosopher or Wittgenstein scholar
has yet accurately analyzed this profound unclarity or ambiguity or even incoherence in the
Tractatus.
16 The expression configuration is used by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus: The configuration of the objects forms the states of affairs (2.0272; translation modified).
17 See especially Puntel (1990, 1993, 1998, forthcoming b, c, d). The present subsection
draws heavily on the two last papers.
18 See Puntel (forthcoming b).
19 For the purposes of this paper the only truth bearers explicitly considered are sentences and propositions. That is not to say that other truth bearers, for instance, utterances,
are excluded. See Puntel (1990, section 4.3).
20 What is called in this paper the simple view derives from an attitude concerning the
ontological dimension of truth that can be found also among some contemporary defenders
of the correspondence theory of truth. A case in point is J. Searle. See footnote 11.
21 It seems that this expression in the context of contemporary discussions on the truth
topic has been introduced by S. Candlish (1989, 338), to characterize a commitment to a
position which according to him is shared by Moore and Russell (at least in their early
writings) as well as by Bradley (see Baldwin 1991, 35). But it should be noted that J. N.
Findlay had used this expression in his book Meinongs Theory of Objects and Values (first
published 1933) in the following passage: Meinongs theory of truth is therefore a theory
of identity or coincidence (Findlay 1963, 88). (Thanks to Peter Simons for drawing the
authors attention to this passage.) The question as to whether Meinongs theory can be
meaningfully compared with contemporary identity theories cannot be dealt with in this
paper.
22 But note that there are other interpretations of Freges conception of facts, according
to which they are worldly entities. See, among others, Kemp (1995, 32, 39, 40), Greimann
(1999, 1902, 211ff).
23 To be sure, there are ontologies that accept also events, processes and other kinds of
entities.
24 It is revealing that the problems described have been formulated by some strong critics
of facts on the basis of an objectual or compositional ontology which they seem to take for
granted. A case in point is Quine who argues that

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the correspondence theory, as thus far stated, is vague or vacuous. What on the part of true
sentences is meant to correspond to what on the part of reality? If we seek a correspondence
word by word, we find ourselves eking reality out with a complement of abstract objects
fabricated for the sake of the correspondence. Or perhaps we settle for a correspondence
of whole sentences with facts: a sentence is true if it reports a fact. But here again we have
fabricated substance for an empty doctrine. The world is full of things, variously related,
but what, in addition to all that, are facts? (Quine 1987, entry Truth, 213; emphasis in
the last sentence added)
The world: full of things, variously related: this is one of the many formulations of
an objectual/compositional ontology. On the basis of such an ontology Quine is right in
critically asking: What, in addition to all that, are facts? But Quines critique is not
incisive enough: he doesnt envisage the possibility and still less the necessity of radically
revising the objectual/compositional ontology.
Quine presents another argument against facts that is thoroughly independent of any
ontology presupposed by fact-talk. This argument deserves to be examined because it
is also formulated (or repeated) by many deflationists or minimalists (for instance, by
Horwich on p. 113 of the first edition of his Truth; but the passage has been dropped in the
second edition):
The truth of Snow is white is due, we are told, to the fact that snow is white. The true
sentence Snow is white corresponds to the fact that snow is white. The sentence Snow
is white is true if and only if it is a fact that snow is white. Now we have worked the
fact, factitious fiction that it is, into a corner where we can deal it the coup de grace. The
combination it is a fact that is vacuous and can be dropped; It is a fact that snow is
white reduces to Snow is white. Our account of the truth of Snow is white in terms of
facts has now come down to this: Snow is white is true if and only if snow is white. (Ibid.;
emphasis added)
Quines argument formulates a characteristic linguistic maneuver (ibid.) that at first sight
looks quite plausible, but on closer examination turns out to be a maneuver with disastrous philosophical consequences, which, therefore, makes it unacceptable. The claim
that the combination It is a fact that is vacuous and can be dropped with the consequence that It is a fact that snow is white reduces to Snow is white is unsustainable
since it completely misses the point of introducing the operator It is a fact that: the
function of this operator is precisely to make intelligible what is meant by Snow is white.
To say that It is a fact that snow is white reduces to Snow is white is to commit
the mistake of confusing explicans and explicandum or intelligibile and intelligendum or
determinans and determinandum. Indeed, It is a fact that snow is white is a formulation
expressing an (ontologically oriented) answer to the question: How are we to understand
determinately in the ontological perspective Snow is white ? To perform the reduction
Quine describes and countenances is, therefore, to renounce and even to reject the intelligibility requirement. Far from being redundant, the operator It is a fact that must be
taken as the result of making explicit the ontological dimension involved in the sentence
Snow is white. If we really were to seriously perform Quines reduction (and similar
reductions), this would have the consequence that most philosophical questions would
be reduced to the zero-level of language, to the level of simply used or spoken language,
i.e., of language devoid of any real possibility of making explicit its own intelligibility.
But what would be such a language? In the final analysis it would be a language devoid

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even of intelligibility. As a last consequence, this would amount to renouncing philosophy

altogether.
It should be added that Quines considerations in the quoted passage are all the more
surprising because in other writings he explicitly says that the sentence Snow is white
on the right-hand side of the biconditional Snow is white is true if and only if snow is
white has to be understood as real snow is really white, as has been shown above in
Section 1 [2].
25 As is well known, there is a famous argument, often called Slingshot Argument or
FregeGdelChurch(Davidson. . . ) Argument, against facts and correspondence theories of truth (for a comprehensive treatment see especially Garcia-Carpintero and Otero
1998; see also Barwise and Perry 1981, Neale 1995, Oppy 1997, Neale and Dever 1997;
Rodriguez-Pereyra 1998). This argument does not apply to the conception of propositions/facts propounded in this paper. One of the main assumptions (premises) of the
argument reads as follows: The truth of S corresponds to the fact that S is preserved
under substitution of co-referring singular terms. But the delineated conception eliminates
singular terms; the premise, therefore, does not apply. To be sure, the sketched view must be
worked out in detail; for instance, identity conditions for primary facts must be carefully
formulated, and the like. So far as the slingshot argument is directed against correspondence theories of truth, it must be remarked that the theory presented in this paper is not a
correspondence theory that can be considered a target of the argument.
26 Of course, if the ontology presupposed or implied is made explicit independently of the
definition of truth, then the disadvantage disappears.
27 On the tension between definition of truth and axiomatic theory of truth in Tarski see
Heck (1997). On axiomatic theories of truth in general see Halbach (1996).
28 The author is indebted to many people for helpful conversations and comments on this
paper, notably to Robert B. Brandom, Jrgen Dmont, Dirk Greimann, John McDowell,
Frank Mau, Nicholas Rescher, Christina Schneider, Johanna Seibt, and to the participants
in the authors Oberseminar at the University of Munich. Special thanks are due to Peter
Karam who generously helped improve the English version of the paper.

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Universitt Muenchen
Institut fr Philosophie
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
80539 Mnchen
Germany
E-mail: puntel@lrz.uni-muenchen.de