Durkheim's Concept of Anomie as Drglement

Author(s): Stjepan G. Metrovi and Hlne M. Brown

Source: Social Problems, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Dec., 1985), pp. 81-99
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social
Problems

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/800554 .

Accessed: 21/06/2014 10:34
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of California Press and Society for the Study of Social Problems are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Problems.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIALPROBLEMS,Vol. 33, No. 2, December1985

OFANOMIE
AS DEREGLEMENT*
CONCEPT
DURKHEIM'S
STJEPAN
G. MESTROVI(
M. BROWN
HELENE
Lander College
We contrastthe functionalists'
depictionof anomie as normlessnesswith Durkheim's
explicitclaimthatanomieis a stateof painfuldireglement (derangement).Weexamine
Durkheim'sterms for anomie, analyzing his vocabulary both etymologicallyand
throughouthis majorwritings.Weconcludethatthe notionof anomieas normlessness
is incorrect.Anomieas deriglement impliesthatit is a painfulconditionforsocietyand
focus
its members.Ourunderstandingof anomieis also commensuratewithDurkheim's
on morality,particularly
his understandingof a "scienceof moralfacts'
Anomie is undoubtedly among the most important concepts in the sociological vocabulary.
Nevertheless, most English translations render "anomie" as a state of "normlessness,""deregulation" or "normative confusion" (Dohrenwend, 1959:472; La Capra, 1972:159;Merton, 1957:161;
Oxford English Dictionary Supplement, 1972:95; Parsons, 1937:377; Wallwork, 1972:49), thus
obscuring the exact French words and meanings that Durkheim and his contemporaries used to
designate this condition. The one and only explicit synonym for anomie that Durkheim ever used
is djr~glement. This fact is noted by Andre Lalande, Durkheim's colleague in the French
Philosophical Society:
Anomie. ... Absenced'organisation,de coordination."L'6tatde d6riglementou d'anomie..." DURKHEIM, Le Suicide,p. 281 (Lalande,[1926]1980:61).
Normlessness and deregulation are poor translations of ddrWglement
for several reasons. They did
not enter into common English usage until the 1960s and certainly did not exist in Durkheim's
time. Direglement is difficult to render in English. It carries with it in French the connotations
of immorality and suffering, but it is perhaps best translated as derangement. Anomie as direglement implies a condition of madness or something akin to sin. This coincides with the observation
that over 20 words denoting sin were translated as anomia when the Bible was translated by St.
Jerome and others (Lyonnet and Sabourin, 1970; Me'trovid, 1985a).
Our aim is to expose the misinterpretation of Durkheim's concept of anomie as "normlessness"
that is widespread among sociologists. We shall argue that anomie as understood by Durkheim
connotes a painful state or condition felt by individuals as well as by society. The support for
reading anomie in this way is historical, linguistic, and contextual. Thus, we will trace the etymological roots of "anomie," examine the meanings of ddrkglementfrom its historical context, and
trace the context in which Durkheim used both words by perusing his main works.
Our analysis should not be perceived as just a linguistic exercise, but as a sociological inquiry
into the meanings of anomie and ddraglementregarded as social facts. We think that this strategy
is justified in the context of Durkheim's sensitivity to the collective meanings of words, and
because Durkheim thought of language as a system of collective representations which can be
treated as social facts: "The ideas which correspond to the diverse elements of language [langue]

* We are gratefulto ElaineSmith,the anonymousreviewersof this journal,and manycolleaguesfor their

helpfulcritiques.ThesecolleaguesincludeLeeArchie,PhilippeBesnard,BarryGlassner,JohnHare,Donald
Nielsen,EphraimMizruchi,JeanEmilePin andEugenSchoenfeld.Wearealsogratefulto the LanderCollege
reference librarians who obtained all the materials we needed, Betty Williams, Ann Hare, and Susan Going.
We would also like to thank our departmental secretaries, Sharon McIntyre and Grace Young. Correspondence
to: Metrovid, Division of Behavioral Science, Lander College, Greenwood, SC 29646.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

82

AND BROWN
MESTROVIC

are thus collective representations"(Durkiheim,[1912] 1965:482).' Indeed, even Saussure'sfamous

distinction in linguistics among langue, langage, and parole rests on the Durkheimian insight that
"language is a social fact" (Saussure, [1916]1959:6).For Durkheim, the written words which constitute la langue carry within them a resume of the "wisdom and science which the group has accumulated in the course of centuries" ([1912] 1965:484). Thus, "a concept is not my concept; I hold it
in common with other men ... it is the work of the community" ([1912] 1965:481).To treat a word
as a social fact is to regard it as an "impersonal representation"([1912] 1965:482). Like any other
social fact (see Durkheim, [1895] 1982:59), langue exerts constraint, is general, and exists independently of its individual manifestations in speech. As Durkheim put it:
Thereare scarcelyany wordsamongthose whichwe usuallyemploywhose meaningdoes not pass, to a
greateror less extent,the limitsof our personalexperience.. . . Thus thereis a greatdeal of knowledge
condensedin the wordwhichI nevercollected,and whichis not individual;it evensurpassesme to such
an extentthat I cannoteven completelyappropriateall its results([1912]1965:483).
In the conclusion of The Evolution of Educational Thought Durkheim asserted that:
It is wordsthat introducedistinctionsinto the threadof our thinking.Forthe wordis a discreteentity;it
limits.. .. In a sense,languagedoes violenceto thought;
has a definiteindividualityand sharply-defined
it denaturesit andmutilatesit sinceit expressesin discontinuoustermswhatis essentiallycontinuous([1938]
1977:344).
Thus, "weowe to language [langue] the introduction into our mind of distinctness and logical organization" ([1938] 1977:345). Durkheim emphasizes the tremendous importance of learning the
etymology of words, and of instituting such a discipline into education. In sum, the words of
langue, as social facts, carry within them impersonal meanings and force one to be logical.
We will demonstrate that the receivedview of anomie as normlessness is incorrect by citing standard, orthodox meanings which pertain to anomie and d6r~glementand by comparing the English
translations of Durkheimian texts with the original Frenchversions. How self-conscious Durkheim
was about the connections among anomie, sin, and derangement is a question that will be left
open.
THEETYMOLOGICAL
ROOTSOF ANOMIE
The etymology of anomie has been obscured by sociologists. The origin and spelling of anomie
are typically attributed to Durkheim in The Division of Labor in 1893. In fact, Guyau used the
term anomie in 1885: "C'estl'absence de foi fixe, qu'on peut designer sous le terme d'anomie, pour
l'opposer Al'autonomie des Kantiens"(Guyau, [1885] 1907:165).Guyau used the term again in 1887
in his Irreligion of the Future to describe moral anomie, the emancipation of the individual from
religious dogmatism (Guyau, [1887] 1909:323; see also Orru, 1983; Pickering, 1975:24-38). But
Durkheim felt that anomie could never be moral: "Nous croyons au contraire [to Guyau] que
l'anomie est la negation de toute morale" (Durkheim, [1893] 1976:282).
Theologians agree that when "anomia" is translated as "sin,""sin" is not the equivalent of the
willful transgression of norms or divine law. Rather, "anomia" includes within its definition
thoughts, attitudes, and omissions - voluntary or involuntary- which focus on defilement, moral

1. Dinneen(1967:194)
citesDurkheim'sinfluenceon Saussurein this regard:"Languagecan be considereda
'thing'[socialfact] separatefrom our use of it as individuals,becauseit is inheritedentirefrom the other
speakerswho teach it to us and is not our product."Thoughthe numberof linguistsamong Durkheim's
and linguisticswere
discipleswas small(cf. Besnard,1983;Lukes,1972),theircontributionsto structuralism
substantial.For example,AntoineMeillet,a linguistin Durkheim'sgroupas well as a discipleof Saussure,
wrotein L4nn'e sociologique(1906:1):"Dansla definitionqu'aproposeeM. Durkheim,une langueexiste
de chacundes individusqui la parlent."See also Gernet(1981),Godel (1969)and Meillet
independamm6nt
(1982).

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Anomie as Dereglement

83

pollution, and the profaning of the sacred, in short, on variations of sacrilege (Foulqui', 1978:520;
Hastings, 1961:528-71; Hertz, 1922; Lalande, [1926] 1980:748; Lyonnet and Sabourin, 1970;
Metrovid, 1985a; Miller, 1954; Spencer, 1967:180-94; Znaniecki, 1967:353). Thus Lyonnet and
Sabourin (1970:43) claim that "nowhere in the New Testament is anomia related to nomos, 'law'."
At times, the Biblical anomia is translated as "lawlessness";but even then, it refers to "a frame
of mind" or deeds which originate in this frame of mind (Arndt and Gingrich, 1957:71). Thus,
in the Old Testament the Gentiles are considered a-nomos ("lawless")because they are "without
[the Mosaic] Law and therefore without God" (Liddell and Scott, 1966:147), and the Antichrist
is always "the lawless one" because he is completely outside the law of God (Arndt and Gingrich,
1957:71). Strictly speaking, then, the "lawlessness"of Biblical anomia does not represent a quantitative relation to norms or laws; more properly it is "a general state of hostility against God"
(Lyonnet and Sabourin, 1970:30). Therefore, "to commit sin is not only to make a bad action, it
means to commit also 'iniquity,'to reveal, that is, the sinner in his innermost, as a son of the devil,
as he who opposes God and Christ, as he who accepts Satan's rule" (Lyonnet and Sabourin,
1970:43).
The ancient Greeks used a-nomos as an adjective translated as "lawless, impious" (Liddell and
Scott, 1966:147)but their definition of law is not the same as ours today. Nomos was derived from
Moira, meaning destiny, fate, and "that which is right" (Liddell and Scott, 1966:1140-42).As Cornford (1957:29) put it: "The notion of 'dispensation' links together Moira and Nomos." At first,
nomos meant the dispensation of land by Zeus; later it referredto the dispensation of edicts once
and for all by Pericles or other great lawgiver; and, finally, it denoted the impersonal ordering
principle of philosophy-reason (Cornford, 1957:20-39; Hastings, 1961:545-55; White and
Riddle, 1869:526). Thus "reason" as it is used by philosophers is linked to Moira (Cornford,
1957:35). One of Durkheim's most obscure disciples, Louis Gernet, a linguist who specialized in
ancient Greek, emphasized in his writings that the ancient Greeks condemned pride (hubris) and
that for them "nomos is imperative rule derived from a collectivity that represents [etymologically]
the principle of distribution" (Gernet, 1981:329). The idea in the Greek word "nomos" is found
in the Latin word "dispensatio," which is translated into English as "economical management,
charge, direction, superintendence"(White and Riddle, 1869:526). The point is that for Cornford
(1957:30-35), Durkheim ([1950] 1983c:121-70), Gernet (1981:322-29) and other scholars familiar
with classical languages (cf. Frazer, 1890; Pickering, 1984:156-62), the dispensation of land, law,
and reason are all conceived as sacred tasks; thus, the "mismanagement"of any of these is understood as a form of sacrilege.
The English definitions of anomy are not related to normlessness. Merton notes (in Clinard,
1964:226) that the Oxford English Dictionary (1933:347) lists several usages of anomy as
"lawlessness"- among them, works by Lambarde, Hooker, and Samuel Johnson - but he does not
pursue these leads. It is true that in his famous dictionary, Samuel Johnson (1785) defined anomy
as "breach of law." But Johnson defined "law" as "a rule of action" that includes decrees, edicts,
statutes or customs, and includes also "the rules or axioms of science: as, the laws of mechanicks,"
jurisprudence, and the Bible. "Lawlessness" used in the context intended by Johnson is unlike
Merton's understanding of "lawlessness" as a synonym for "normlessness" and is closer to the
French meanings of dir~glement. For example, Johnson's only example of the use of the word
"anomy" is: "If sin be good, and just, and lawful, it is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy."
Clearly Johnson used anomy as a synonym for sin. In addition, one of Johnson's definitions of
sin - "habitual negligence of religion"- is similar to how he defines "Deraignment"and "Derainment," namely, "departure out of religion" and "disordering." He links "Deraignment" and
"Derainment"to the Latin Dirationare, which is the Latin infinitive for "derain"which, in turn,
is the root of the French ddrangement.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

84

AND BROWN
MESTROVIC

In sum, the connotations of "normlessness" and "lawlessness" as used by Merton are overly
secular compared to the clearly theological implications of the various versions of anomie. Even
Guyau was fighting tradition in trying to speak of "moral anomie," a move that Durkheim would
not allow. If one regards anomie as a social fact, one must understand it as implying immorality.
THEHISTORICAL
MEANINGSOF DERE'GLEMENT
The two principal words Durkheim uses in his discussions concerning anomie are regle and
djr~glement.2 According to Lalande's Vocabulairetechnique et critique de la philosophie ([1926]
1980:906), regle is a formula indicating or prescribing what must or should be done, a precept that
is moral or logical, a formula for doing something systematically. Lalande emphasizes that regle
carries a prescriptive not a descriptive connotation.
The Littr3 - the rough equivalent of the Oxford English Dictionary, authored by a disciple of
Comte - supports the understanding of regle found in Lalande (Littr6, [1863] 1963b:1127-32).The
Littrd also lists many authors - most of them theologians - who used the word ddr&glementin the
seventeenth century.4The first definition offered by the Littre ([1863] 1963a:1671-72passim) is a
state of being dirigld, no longer regular [rigulier], as in Richelet: "Diseases develop from nothing
else but a djr~glement of the humors." A second meaning given is that of intestinal disorder, not
relevant to this discussion. The third meaning is "dissolute conduct." Littr6 quotes Richelet again:
"It takes many a year of deirglement and of leading a libertine life for such utmost infamy to
result." Corneille wrote: "And if the people want to see some djr~glements [debaucheries, intemperance] in it [among the nobility], it is because their sentiments are corrupted by others'
opinions." Bossuet wrote: "When the exercise of reason tends to be more perfect, the well known
djr&glementsappear concomitantly." Bourdaloue wrote: "Don't we hear it being said all the time
that everything is upside down [renversel in this world, also that a general djr&glementprevails
. ." Bourdaloue also referred to "the djr&glementthat is exhibited by the ecclesiastic order and
by the priests [which] does harm to Christiandom, when they are supposed to provide guidance
and exemplify good conduct." There is an interesting remark by Rollin: "Scipion had no part in
the djr?glements and debaucheries that were the rule [regle] among the young Roman people.
R6gnardwrote: "It is the ddrkglementamong your nations that prompts my speech" (cf. Biblical
references to the sins of nations). The Littrd provides many other examples. The fourth meaning
given is "violation against the poetic rules." In sum, according to the Littrd ([1863] 1963b:1672)
the principal meaning of djriglement is derangement:
Dir'glement,dirangementare wordsexpressingtwo nuancesof moraldisorder:Whatis ddrangeis disarranged[horsde son rang]or is withoutplace.Whatis ddrigldis out of rule [horsde la regle].The state
of djrkglementis moreseriousthan that of derangement.
We consulted other French dictionaries concerning ddraglement, and in the interest of space,
will cite only two in addition to the Littrd. In Le Dictionnaire de Robert (1985:388) the second
2. Durkheim distinguished sharply among the terms loi, droit, regle and norme, which is true of the French
language in general. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize these distinctions to make clear that the term "normlessness" is completely alien to Durkheim's thought, even the French language. Durkheim prefers to refer to

regleand its derivativesin his discussionsof anomie.

3. Emile Littr6wrote the Dictionnaire de la languefrangaise and it is referredto not by its title but as the Littrd.
4. These include the following: Frangois Maucroix (1619-1708); C6sar-PierreRichelet (1635-1708), author of
Dictionnaire Franpais (1680); Nicolas-Perrot D'Ablancourt (1616-1664), translator of Greek and Latin texts;
Jean Massillon (1663-1742), author of Petit Careme; BernardFontenelle (1657-1757), author of Entretiens sur
la pluralitd des mondes (1686); Madame de S6vign6 (1626-1696); Olivier Patru (1604-1681), lawyer; Jacques
Bossuet (1627-1704), priest, author of Traite sur la concupiscence; Louis Bourdaloue (1632-1704), Jesuit
theologian; Charles Rollin (1661-1741),rector, author of Traitddes itudes; Jean-Frangois R6gnard(1655-1741),
author of Le lIgataire universel (1708); Frangois F6nelon (1651-1715), author of Maximes des saints; and
Philippe Buchez (1797-1865), philosopher and socialist, author of L'Histoireparlementaire de la rdvolution.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Anomie as D6reglement

85

meaning of ddreglement, and the one relevant to our discussion, is given as "le fait de s'6carter
des regles de la morale, de l'6quilibreet de la mesure."Several synonyms for djr&glementare listed,
among them: ddbauche, desordre, dissolution, egarement, libertinage, licence, vice, and perversion. Similarly, in Le Trdsorde la Langue Frangaise (Quemada, 1974:1206)djr&glementis defined
as "action de s'6carter des regles" and is linked to the fifteenth century use of desriglement:
1458desriglement(ArnoulGreban,Le Mystbrede la Passion,ed. O. Jodogne,1546);1538desreiglement
"d6sordredans la conduite."
If we examine just one of Littr6's sources, we can gain understanding of the connotative
meanings of "ddrkglement"from the context of its use. Consider Bossuet's ([1731] 1836:43-79
passim) treatise on concupiscence. Bossuet describes the state of dir&glementin terms of affliction,
mal, 6garement, corruption, piche, agitation, tourments, agitations, infini de miseres, troubles,
tourmenter, maladie, disordre, dangereux, souffrir, impidtd, intemperance, dessechement, miserable captiviti. Both Bossuet and Durkheim focus on the themes of evil, impatience and above
all, suffering, in their discussions of direglement.
We have noted that the only synonym for anomie that Durkheim ever used is dir&glement,and
we explored briefly the etymology and history of both words. We propose that Durkheim used
anomie as the secular equivalent of sin - literally, as a derangement or disarrangement of collective
representations.5Such derangement would be entailed in treating sacred representations as if they
were profane, and vice versa. For example, we will show that Durkheim accuses socialism and
capitalism of trying to establish moral rule from economic matter (the former sacred, the latter
profane), an operation he suggests is a form of sacrilege. He focuses on the "cult of the individual"
as the replacement for the collective conscience in modern societies and on the "cult of truth"- two
important modern systems of sacred representations. Under these systems anomie becomes a
contradiction within modern society at large that is a sacrilege against the dignity of a human
person and the sacrosanct quality of truth. There are many varieties of anomie in Durkheim's
thought (economic, domestic, conjugal, intellectual, religious, and so on) and all of them may be
better understood as forms of sacrilege than normlessness.6
We shall begin our analysis of Durkheim's work with Suicide, because its themes are the most
familiar to sociologists, and move to the least familiar themes, such as those found in Pragmatism
and Sociology. The order of the other works chosen is based on this continuum. The readershould
be able to discern a movement from Durkheim's early preoccupation with the culte de l'homme
to his obsession with the culte de vdritein his last years. We believe that these two "cults"constitute
a major portion of the morality which anomie offends. Our strategy is to focus on the word
dereglement and the vocabulary that accompanies it across all of Durkheim's major works, thereby
showing the extent of his concern with this topic and emphasizing the theme of pain and suffering
that anomie entails. We conclude by pointing out how Durkheim's understanding of anomie as
is commensurate with his concern for establishing within sociology a "science des faits
deir&glement
moraux" (Durkheim, [1893] 1976:330).
5. Wedo not meanto implythat Durkheim'suse of "representation"
hasanythingin commonwiththe Parsonian "norm."We also disagree with the depiction of "representation"by Lukes (1972, 1982). For a fuller discussion, refer to Meitrovid (1985b). It must also be kept in mind that for Durkheim, "repr6sentations"may be
unconscious wholly or in part (see Durkheim, 1908, 1924; Meitrovid, 1984).
6. Durkheim's vocabulary, in addition to the terms we are discussing, includes crucial terms such as "repr6sentation," "conscience," "sacr6," "l'inconscient," and "culte." The interested reader will find most of them
discussed in several of our other analyses of Durkheim's thought (Meitrovid, 1982, 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c),
in Foulqui6 (1978), Lalande (1926), Pickering (1984), and Strikwerda (1982). In addition, we do not mean to
imply that djrkglement should be read only from a theological point of view. For example, it is proper to say
in French that one's wristwatch is djrkglje, and djrkglement carries medical connotations as well. However,
even most of these other meanings do seem to imply sin (see Meitrovid, 1985c). Finally, we would refer the
reader to Volume 2 of Karady's (1976) Textes, devoted to anomie and morality in Durkheim's more obscure
writings, as a check on our analysis of Durkheim's vocabulary.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

86

AND BROWN
MESTROVIC

ANOMIEAND SUICIDE
In Suicide, Durkheim writes: "L'6tatde djrcglement ou d'anomie est donc encore renforc6 par
ce fait que les passions sont moins disciplin6es au moment meme oui elles auraient besoin d'une
forte discipline" (Durkheim, [1897] 1983b:281, emphasis added). This statement is part of the
frequently cited section of Suicide devoted to anomie ([1897] 1951:246-54) wherein ddrkglement
has been mistranslated as de-regulation. Durkheim claims that anomie is most prevalent in the
business world because business has made d&rkglementinto a regle:
La passionde l'infiniest journellementpr6sent6ecommeune marquede distinctionmorale,alorsqu'elle
ne peut se produirequ'ausein de consciencesddrjgl6eset qui erigenten reglele ddrkglement
dont elles
souffrent..... Et commec'est dansle monde6conomiqueque ce d6sarroiest a son apogee,c'estl1 aussi
qu'il fait le plus de victimes(Durkheim,[1897]1983b:287,emphasisadded).
Spaulding and Simpson's translation ([1897] 1951:257)of "regle de d6reglement"as "a rule that
is a lack of rule"is awkwardthough it is far better than the translation "normlessness."By contrast,
the notion of establishing a regle that is derkglementmay be found in the Littre'and in theological
analyses of sin. Because this is an important passage, we venture to offer our translation based
on the preceding analysis:
The passionfor infinityis commonlypresentedas a markof moraldistinction,eventhoughit cannotso
appearexceptin derangedconscienceswhichestablishas a rulethe derangementfrom whichthey suffer.
Sincethis disorderis at its apex in the economicworld,it has most victimsthere.
Durkheim goes on to argue that government is to blame for this state of affairs because it "has
become its tool and servant"instead of being the rdgulateurof economic life ([1897] 1983b:283).
Durkheim's accusation rests on the assumption that a government's failure to moderate the
profane desires of infinite economic acquisition is something like sin.
Another important passage that has been given a consistently misleading translation concerns
the alleged "non-regulation" of egoists (Durkheim, [1897] 1951:288):
Twofactorsof suicide,especially,havea peculiaraffinityfor one another:namely,egoismandanomy...
It is indeed,almostinevitablethat the egoist shouldhavesome tendencyto non-regulation;for, sincehe
is detachedfromsociety,it has not sufficienthold uponhim to regulatehim. .... Inversely,an unregulated
does not lacka sparkof egoism;for if one werehighlysocializedone wouldnot rebelat every
temperament
social restraint.
In French, the passage reads:
Il est notammentdeux facteursdu suicidequi ont l'unpour l'autreune affinit6speciale,c'estl'6goismeet
l'anomie.... II est memepresqueinevitableque l'6goisteait quelqueaptitudeau deirglement;car,comme
le ddrkglement
il est d6tach6de la soci6t6,elle n'apas assezde prisesurlui pourle rigler.... Inversement,
'
ne va pas sans un germed'6goisme;car on ne seraitpas rebelle tout frein social (Durkheim,[1897]
1983b:325,emphasisadded).
In this passage, Durkheim is saying that egoism and derkglement exhibit an affinity for one
another, not that egoists and anomics are "unregulated."Spaulding and Simpson's phrase "for
if one were highly socialized" was apparently added gratuitously to the text. In addition, we repeat
that the notions of non- or-de-regulation did not exist even in English until very recently.
Though Durkheim is frequently read from the "over-socialized"point of view (cf. Wrong, 1961)
in which it is assumed that anomie is the obverse of social integration (cf. Parsons, 1937:377-407
passim), one must account for the fact that Durkheim regarded too much integration as pathogenic (Durkheim, [1897] 1951:217).In the famous section of Suicide devoted to anomie, Durkheim
refers to anomie as a violation of a "law of justice," ([1897] 1951:249)not as lack of integration
or normative control. We infer from his other writings that this "justice"refersto the reconciliation
of "the necessities of social cohesion with the principle of individualism" in the division of labor

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Anomie as D6r6glement

87

(Durkheim, [1904] 1980:102;see also [1893] 1933:395). In this context of "justice,"consider Durkheim's claim in Suicide that in modern times "man has become a god for men" ([1897] 1951:334)
but that "this cult of man is something accordingly very different from the egoistic individualism
above referred to, which leads to suicide" ([1897] 1951:336). Durkheim implies that anomie is a
sacrilege against the culte de l'homme ([1897] 1983b:382) resulting in injustice, not that all
individualism is harmful.
Consider the scattered sections of Suicide devoted to conjugal anomie in the context of this
understanding of "justice."Normlessness is a quantitative expression denoting external controls,
while Durkheim describes a qualitative state. Had Durkheim truly possessed the strong normative
streak often ascribed to him, surely he would have agreed that "the only way to reduce the number
of suicides due to conjugal anomy is to make marriage more indissoluble" ([1897] 1951:384).But
having offered stricter divorce laws as a "solution," he rejects this authoritarian move because he
believes that "for man and woman to be equally protected by the same institution [marriage], they
must first of all be creaturesof the same nature"([1897] 1951:386).There must be genuine equality,
a genuine raising of the dignity of females in marriage, not just "juridical equality." In general,
Durkheim feels that marriage must ensure the "r6glementationdes rapports"of husband and wife,
but in a footnote he explains, "Ce qui importe, en effet, ce n'est pas seulement que la r6glementation existe, mais qu'elle soit accept6e par les consciences" ([1897] 1983b:306).7 His vocabulary
describing the varieties of anomie pertaining to the family emphasizes the pain and suffering that
the lack of justice and parity in marriage causes ([1897] 1983b:304-5 passim): le mal de l'infini,
I'incertitude, inditermination, disenchantement, itat de trouble, d'agitation, de m contentement,
d'inquidtude. Divorce expresses a weakening of this riglementation, not de-regulation in the quantitative sense of a lack of norms ([1897] 1983b:307; see also the text of Durkheim's debate on
divorce in Karady, 1976:212).
The other French words Durkheim uses to describe this state of anomie as djrkglement ([1897]
1983b:271-326 passim)8 constitute a vocabulary that was used by seventeenth-century theologians
when they wrote about sin and madness. We do not think that this is a coincidence, but stems
from the fact that Durkheim was accusing many diverse social institutions of attacking the dignity
of the person considered as a collective representation. He described Western society as being in
effervescence, pain, and in feverish, futile frenzy:
Wemustnot be dazzledby the brilliantdevelopmentof sciences,the artsand industryof whichwe arethe
witnesses;this developmentis altogethercertainlytakingplacein the midstof a morbideffervescence,the
grievousrepercussionsof whicheach one of us feels (Durkheim,[1897]1951:368).
Moreover, this morbid restlessness, a symptom of derangement, has been made into a rule, and
is regarded as normal:
7. We hesitateto translateriglementationby "regulation"
becausethe latterdoes not connotejustice and
morality,while the formerdoes. Justiceand moralitywerecentralto Durkheim'sdiscussionof anomie.We
wouldalso liketo drawthe reader'sattentionto Durkheim'scommenton divorcein a debatein whichhe participatedin 1909:"Noussommesici plusieursa penserque les expressionsde re'gle,de discipline,ne sont pas
de vains mots, mais exprimentdes r6alit6smoralesdont l'hommene peut se passer.Nous pensonsqu'il est
dans la naturede l'hommeque ses d6sirs,ses passionssoient contenusdans de certaineslimites..... Faute
de quoi ses appetitsse djrkglent,s'exasperent, s'enfi~vrentne peuventplus &tresatisfaitsen raisonde cette
exacerbation,et, parsuite,ne peuventplus&trepourlui qu'uneoccasionde souffrances"(in Karady,1976:212,
and "regulation,"
in English,do not necessarilyentail
emphasisadded).Clearly,lack of "rule,""discipline"
suffering.Derkglement,by contrast,does.
8. These include the following:crise douloureuse,6tat de crise constant, coup du sort, crise, jours de
fatigue,impatiencefi6vreuse,fievre,enfi6vr6es,d6sastre6conomique,6branlecontrari6t6,
d6sanchantement,
ment, 6r6thisme,surexciter,crisedu veuvage,mal 6quilibr6s,irr6guliers,mal pond6r6s,tar6spathologiques,
pertubationsmorales,6tat de trouble,d'agitation,de m6contentement,dangermoral,mal,
d6s6quilibr6es,
malaise,crise maladive,esprit de rebellion,malheur,d6tresse,misere,tourments,effervescence,intensit6,
d6r6gl6e,d6sordre,d6classement,soci6t6d6sagr6g6e,l'affolementexasp6r6.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

88

AND BROWN
MESTROVIC

Yetthesedispositions[towardanomie]areso inbredthatsocietyhasgrownto acceptthemandis accustomed

to thinkthem normal.It is everlastinglyrepeatedthat it is man'snatureto be eternallydissatisfied,constantlyto advance,withoutrelief or rest,towardan indefinitegoal (Durkheim,[1897]1951:257).
ANOMIEIN LECONSDE SOCIOLOGIE
de
Legons
sociologie: physique des moeurs et du droit, published in English as Professional
Ethics and Civic Morals, is a compilation of lectures Durkheim gave at Bordeaux from 1890 to
1900 and repeated at the Sorbonne in 1904 and 1912. The subtitle in French makes it clear that
this book is about a science of moral facts, which is how Durkheim referred to these lectures
shortly before he died (Durkheim, [1920] 1976:330). Indeed, Durkheim begins the book with the
claim that:
The scienceof morals[laphysiquedes moeurs]andrightsshouldbe basedon the studyof moralandjuridicalfacts. These facts consist of rulesof conductthat havereceivedsanction([1950]1983c:1,in French,
1950:5;emphasisadded).
Continuities in Durkheim's thought are apparent in this book. It resembles the introduction to
The Division of Labor (1893), where Durkheim focused on the problem of how one can recognize
moral facts. This and other questions about morality preoccupied him up to his last, albeit
unfinished manuscript, La Morale (begun in 1917). In Legons, Durkheim attacks classical
economic theory, the lack of ethics in the business profession, and problems in democracy; in
short, it is a book about anomie. Anomie is the explicit focus of this work, as Durkheim declared
in summing up his discussion of the social problems mentioned above:
Elle [lavie publique]tient' un 6tatanomiquequ'ilfaut,non pas subir,maistravaillera fairecesser(Durkheim, 1950:130,emphasisadded).
In short, anomie is the cause of these problems. The focus of this work indicates that anomie
engaged Durkheim's interest for most of his academic career (1890 to 1912). As he states in the
passage above, the task is not to submit to this anomic condition, but to endeavor to bring it to
an end ([1950] 1983c:108). Durkheim's explicit use of anomique in this book was translated into
English as "lawless," thus obscuring the continuities in this thought, especially the relationship
between his concerns for anomie and a science of moral facts.
In this complex work, one will find other themes Durkheim pursued in his major works. He
argues that "the cult of the individual" is the only one destined to survive into the future, replacing
the religious cults of former times (1950:84), and that no law governing social life is more firmly
established ("il n'est pas de loi mieux 6tablie," 1950:70). Durkheim perceived classical economic
theory - which emphasizes self-interest as opposed to the cosmopolitan religion of humanity - to
be an anachronism in modern times, a sacrilege against the cult of the individual, and therefore
a fertile source of anomie.
Referring to business as "les fonctions 6conomiques, aussi bien l'industrie que le commerce"
(1950:14),Durkheim writes that all the professions except business have their code of ethics. These
ethics are outside the realm of the "common conscience." He maintains that in commerce, there
are no professional ethics:
C'estque dans toute cetter6gion[le commerce]de la vie sociale,il n'existepas de moraleprofessionnelle
(Durkheim,1950:15).
He asks whether this state is normal and answers that, according to classical economic theory,
it is. However, this is only because both capitalism and socialism "do no more than raise a defacto
state of affairs which is unhealthy, to the level of a de jure state of affairs" (Durkheim, [1950]
1983c:10). In French, Durkheim writes (1950:16):"Or, I'une et I'autrethborie ne fait qu'drigeren
6tat de droit, un 6tat de fait qui est morbide." All the major social functions have been made

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Anomie as Dereglement

89

secondary to economic functions (1950:16). The only regle in economics is that of self-interest,
which is insufficient for morality (1950:18). The results are: crise, souffrance, anarchie, mal,
desagre'gation,disorganisation, troubles, desarroi, l'aspect cahotique, le caract~reanomal (Durkheim, 1950:16-20, 113-19passim). In short, anomie as it is exhibited in business is an amoral condition that amounts to a public danger: "Ce caractere amoral de la vie 6conomique constitue un
danger public" (1950:18).
The solution does not lie in merely imposing norms in or upon the business profession unrestrainedgreed is a norm - but in rearrangingthe entire structure,changing its nature (1950:17).
He castigates the utilitarians for deluding themselves (s'abuser) by thinking that the desires of the
masses shall be calmed through laissez-faire capitalism, when, on the contrary, it only rouses their
impatience for gain (1950:22). Durkheim then links his discussion of economic anomie to political
anomie ([1950] 1983c:96), arguing that democracy understood as government ruled by the will of
the people leads to anomie ([1950] 1983c:108).This is because the individual's desires in the political arena are as subject to the "mal de l'infini" as they are in economics so that "the primary duty
is to work out something that can relieve us by degrees of a role for which the individual is not
cast" ([1950] 1983c:108).

ANOMIEAND THEDIVISIONOF LABOR

The original introduction to the first edition of The Division of Labor, dropped in subsequent
editions, was devoted to defining morality and anomie in the context of Kant and Guyau (see
Durkheim, [1893] 1976:257-88). It may be that this book is really about anomie, not the themes
usually cited by sociologists. This is evident even from his constant references to the themes of
"contract" and "justice" in his discussion of society's evolution from mechanical to organic
solidarity: "Just as ancient peoples needed, above all, a common faith to live by, so we need justice"
([1893] 1933:388). Anomie is the obverse of justice.
Thus, in the now classic second preface to The Division of Labor, Durkheim writes ([1902]
1933:1):"We repeatedly insist in the course of this book upon the state of juridical and moral
anomy in which economic life actually is found." Apparently, Durkheim viewed anomie as the
major theme of The Division of Labor. He continues ([1902] 1933:2, emphasis added):
It is this anomic statethat is the cause,as we shall show,of the incessantlyrecurrentconflicts,and the
multifariousdisordersof whichthe economicworldexhibitsso sad a spectacle.
Durkheim calls anomie "anarchy"([1902] 1933:3) and an "evil" ([1902] 1933:5). He explains:
Si I'anomieest un mal, c'est avanttout parceque la societ6en souffre, ne pouvantse passer,pour vivre,
de cohesionet de r6gularit6([1902]1967:vi,emphasisadded).
Durkheim considers anomie evil because it causes suffering.
In The Division of Labor Durkheim concludes that "The collective conscience is becoming more
of a cult of the individual" ([1893] 1933:407). Durkheim devotes chapter 1 of Book 2 to the question of whether the progress of the division of labor is linked to increased happiness, and answers
in the negative. This is because the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity engenders
suffering, so that with the advance of the division of labor, "the general happiness of society is
decreasing" ([1893] 1933:249). Durkheim illustrates this point with reference to suicide. Altruistic
suicide in primitive societies was normal because the individual was not held in high regard by
society. It was not the result of unhappiness. But "the true suicide, the sad suicide, is in the endemic
state with civilized peoples" ([1893] 1933:247). Anomie is linked to suffering and pain (douleur,
souffrance, tourment). It follows that the abnormal, anomic suicide will be sad.
Intellectual anomie is also a theme in this work: scientists are in a state of anomie when they

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

90

AND BROWN
MEtTROVIC

follow the letter but not the spirit of science ([1893] 1933:354-59).' But in this section of The Division of Labor ([1893] 1933:354-68 passim), intellectual anomie is discussed in the context of
general anomie. Because this section is rarely cited, we emphasize Durkheim's conclusion ([1893]
1933:367-68):
Methodologicalrulesarefor sciencewhatrulesof law [droit]and customarefor conduct;they directthe
thoughtof the scholarjust as the othersgovernthe actionsof men. . . . This is wherethe anarchicalstate
of sciencein generalcomesfrom,a statethat has beennotednot withoutexaggeration..... Theyoffer the
spectacleof an aggregateof disjointedpartswhichdo not concur.. . . Thesedifferentexamples[science,
industryetc.],are,then, varietiesof the samespecies.If the divisionof labordoes not producesolidarity
becausethey
in all these cases, it is becausethe relationsof the organsare not regulated[reiglementies],
are in a stateof anomy(in French,[1893]1967:359-60,emphasisadded).
The themes of the cult of the individual and the cult of truth should be given as much emphasis
in the reading of this work as are the more popular themes of mechanical and organic solidarity.
ANOMIEIN LE SOCIALISME
Le Socialisme was completed in 1896, though it was not published in its entirety until 1928. In
this neglected work, Durkheim writes of the necessity to set "a limit on the state of disarrangement,
excitement, frenzied agitation, which do not spring from social activity and which even make it
suffer" (Durkheim, [1928] 1958b:204). This rich passage needs to be read in French:
Maiselle [Durkheim's
desunset desautres[thetwosocialclasses],la n6cessit6
theory]affirme,dansl'int6r&t
d'unfreinquicontienned'enhautlesapp6titsdansles consciences,et metteainsiun termea l'~tatde djrkglement,d'effervescence,
d'agitationmaniaquequine provientpasde l'activit6sociale,et qui faitmemesouffrir
(Durkheim,[1928]1978:218,emphasisadded).
Durkheim lays the blame for this state of djr~glement on classical economic theory: "la faute en
est a la science economique" ([1928] 1978:41).Along with the classical economists, Saint-Simon
and his followers are all accused of promoting dirfglement:
is that Saint-Simonand his discipleswantedto get the most
Whatcausedthe failureof Saint-Simonianism
fromtheleast,the superiorfromtheinferior,moralrulefromeconomicmatter[lareglemoralede la matiere
economique](Durkheim,[1928]1958b:240;in French,[1928]1978:253).
According to Durkheim, such aspirations are "impossible" and sacrilegious. The economic structure itself is profane. It emphasizes egoism and materialism, while society, with its moral rules,
transcends egoism and is sacred. Thus, according to Durkheim, "it could not be a question of
building one to the other - still less of mingling them" so that "the very idea of such fusion was
revolting-like sacrilege" (Durkheim, [1928] 1958b:41).
Anomie is presented in terms very similar to its depiction in Suicide, Division of Labor, and
Professional Ethics. Durkheim begins with the claim that, however skillfully ordered, economic
functions cannot co-operate harmoniously nor be maintained in a state of equilibrium unless
subjected to moral forces which surpass and contain them (Durkheim, [1928] 1958b:197).This is
because it is a general law of all living things that needs and appetites are normal only when
contained:
Et, en effet, c'estune loi g6n6ralecheztous les vivantsque les besoinset les app6titsne sont normauxqu'd
se contredit.([1928]1978:211,emphasisadded).
conditiond'etreborn6s.Un besoin illimitde
Durkheim continues ([1928] 1958b:199):
As thereis nothingwithinan individualwhichconstrainsthese appetites,they must surelybe contained
by someforceexteriorto him,or elsetheywouldbecomeinsatiable-thatis, morbid... . Thisis whatseems
to haveescapedSaint-Simon.Tohimit appearsthatthe wayto realizesocialpeaceis to freeeconomicappe9. Montgomery(1984)offers a fine discussionof scientificbias as sin.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Anomie as Dereglement

91

titesof all restraint[frein]on the one hand,and on the otherto satisfythem by fulfillingthem. But such
an undertakingis contradictory(emphasisadded;in French,[1928]1978:213).
The result of enfranchising the "app6tits 6conomiques" is that "les app6tits se derkglent et l'ordre
6conomique se d6sorganise" ([1928] 1978:215, emphasis added).
The similarity between this section of Le Socialisme and the famous discourse on anomie in
Suicide is unmistakable. Again, Durkheim's argument rests on the now familiar claim that insatiability is a sign of disease ("l'insatiabilit6est un signe de morbidit6" [1928] 1978:212).His solution,
therefore, "is to know, under the present conditions of social life, what moderating functions are
necessary and what forces are capable of executing them" ([1928] 1958b:199). This solution is
repeated on the last page of the manuscript in a more complete form, worth citing in French:
Le problme doit donc se poser ainsi: chercherpar la sciencequels sont les freinsmorauxqui peuvent
r6glementerla vie 6conomique,et, par cette r6glementation,contenirles 6goismes,et par consequent
permettrede satisfaireles besoins(Durkheim,[1928]1978:253,emphasisadded).
Again, Durkheim implies that the solution to anomie lies in a scientific study of morals. Note
also that when discussing djr~glement in Le Socialisme, he uses the now familiar vocabulary of
anomie (1978:27-39, 217-47 passim).10Durkheim refers to Marx and the socialists as giving the
world a "shriek of pain" that can be traced to the collective malaise that interests Durkheim.
Socialism, in general, is "un cri de douleur pouss6 par les hommes qui sentent le plus vivement
notre malaise collectif" ([1928] 1978:27, emphasis added).
ANOMIEAND EDUCATION
Moral Education - the translation of lectures Durkheim gave between 1902 and 1907- includes
a long discussion on rules and morality. The "impuissance a se contenir" ([1925] 1963:33) that is
characteristic of anomie is a sign of disease (morbidite): "If such sentiments [impatience] develop
to the detriment of other feelings it is a sign of derangement [d&r?glement],the pathological
character of which is well known to clinicians" ([1925] 1961:38).He gives an example of anomie
that is similar to Suicide:
Shouldtherulesof conjugalmoralitylosetheirauthority,shouldhusband-wife
obligationsbe lessrespected,
shouldpassionsand appetitesruledby this sectorof moralityunleashthemselves,beingeven exacerbated
bythis samerelease[seddrkgleront,
par ce dirkglementmeme]. .. suchpassionswouldentail
s'exaspireront
in French,[1925]
a disillusionment
whichtranslatesitselfgraphicallyintostatisticsof suicide([1925]1961:33;
1963:37).
In economic life, too, ambitions for gain become over-excited [surexciteront] and inflamed
[s'enfi&vreront]and result in a rise in the annual quota of suicides. These are all examples of the
"mal de l'infini qui travaille notre temps" ([1925] 1963:37). In Suicide Durkheim refers also to "ce
mal de l'infini, que l'anomie apporte partout avec elle" ([1897] 1983b:304). The summary of this
discussion in Moral Education is reminiscent of The Rules ([1895] 1982:95)in suggesting how one
shall recognize the abnormal. Thus Durkheim writes in Moral Education:
The notionof the infinite,then, appearsonly at those timeswhenmoraldisciplinehas lost its ascendancy
overman'swill. It is the sign of attritionthat emergesduringperiodswhen the moralsystem,prevailing
for severalcenturies,is shaken,failingto respondto newconditionsof humanlife, and withoutany new
systemyet contrivedto replacethat whichhas disappeared([1925]1961:43).

10. Theseincludethe following:d6sorganisation,d6sarroi,d6membrement,

destruction,d6chain6,d6route,
anarchie,6goisme,
d6sordre,d6sespoir,d6composition,discordance,d6tresse,diffusion, irr6glementation,
souffrance,douleurs, mistre, trouble, malaise collectif, mal, tourmentent,detressecollective,la mistre
humaine,mal chronique,les mis6rables,inquietude.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

92

ME9TROVI(AND BROWN

Another passage in Moral Education brings home the theme of unhappiness in relation to suicide:
Whenevermoralruleslack the necessaryauthorityto exert,to a desirabledegree,a regulatoryinfluence
[leuraction regulatrice]on our behavior,we see societygrippedby a dejection[tristesse]and pessimism
reflectedin the curveof suicides([1925]1961:68).
[disenchantement]
Durkheim distinguishes anomie from other forms of deviance remarking that Christ was not
an irregulier(deviant), nor was Socrates, even though they broke rules, because they both upheld
the truly moral rules of their societies ([1925] 1961:53).He adds that the challenging of traditional
rules based on progress is healthy and vital. By contrast, with anomie, there is "l'impatience de
toute r6glementation, I'horreur de toute discipline" ([1925] 1963:46) that degenerates into a
"tendance anarchique" and "douleur."He uses the example of Socrates to make a similar point
in Sociology and Philosophy:
Socratesexpressed,moreclearlythanhis judges,the moralitysuitedto his time.It wouldbe easyto show
that as a resultof the transformation
of the old society. .. a newmoralityand religiousfaithhadbecome
necessaryin Athens([1924]1974:64).
In other words, Christ and Socrates exhibited some "normlessness,"but Durkheim did not regard
them as anomic.
An excellent illustration of Durkheim's understanding of anomie as a form of sacrilege occurs
in his discussion of the corporal punishment of children. He notes that this practice does not exist
in primitive societies, but is rampant in modern, "civilized" societies. He continues:
As a matterof fact,suchpunishmentsconstitutetodayquitea seriousmoralhandicap.Theyaffronta feeling
that is at the bottomof all our morality,the religiousrespectin whichthe humanpersonis held. By virtue
of this respect,all violenceexercisedon a personseemsto us, in principle,like sacrilege.In beating,in
brutalityof all kinds,thereis somethingwe find repugnant,somethingthat revoltsour conscience- in a
word,somethingimmoral([1925]1961:182,emphasisadded).
Again, Durkheim's vocabulary in Moral Education is the same language of pain and agitation
that he used in other discussions of anomie ([1925] 1963:6-61 passim).11
The Evolution of Educational Thought, a translation of lectures he gave in 1904 and 1905, takes
anomie as its basic theme. According to Durkheim,
fromtheiroriginsthe schoolscarriedwithinthemselvesthe germof the greatstrugglebetweenthe sacred
and the profane, the secularand the religious,whose historywe shall have to retrace([1938]1977:26,
emphasisadded;in French,1938:34).
The secularization of education-literally a form of sacrilege, given the religious origin of
schools - became most intense in the "moral crisis" of the Renaissance ([1938] 1977:225),a period
Durkheim describes by using the vocabulary of anomie ([1938] 1977:88). He characterizes the
Renaissance as a period in which aspirations tended toward "l'infini," marked by intemperance
and immorality, and "un fl6chissement g6n6ral du sentiment moral" ([1938:218-43 passim)-"Le
XVIe siecle est donc une 6poque de crise p6dagogique et morale" (1938:260). The humanism of
the Renaissance is understood by Durkheim in the context of "our whole present-daymoral system
[which] is dominated by the cult of the individual person" ([1938] 1977:325). But the problem
posed by the Renaissance has not yet been solved, namely, how should one pursue humanism in
education without succumbing to egoism ([1938] 1977:228)?

11. Theseincludethe following:p6ch6,mauvaise,mal, impatience,I'app6titde l'infini,sentimentde l'infini,

troublent,violenter,maniaque,souffrances,tourments,agitation,les aspirationsillimit6es,irr6glementation,
d6sint6gr6e.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Anomie as Dereglement

93

ON INTELLECTUAL
ANOMIEAND THEPAINFULNATUREOF SOCIALIZATION
In his introduction to Durkheim's Pragmatism and Sociology, Allcock observes
what [Durkheim]... finds in pragmatismis no less than intellectualanomie,in that thereis insufficient
regulationof that whichpasses for truthin society.This point is the fulcrumof his entirediscussionof
pragmatismand incidentallyit pointsthe wayto a reappraisalof the generaldriftof Durkheim'ssociology
(in Durkheim,[1955]1983d:xxxvii).
We agree. In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life Durkheim claims that:
This dualityof our naturehas as its consequencein the practicalorderthe irreducibility
of a moralideal
to a utilitarianmotiveand in the orderof thought,the irreducibilityof reasonto individualexperience
([1912]1965:29;in French,[1912]1979:23).
In this statement Durkheim summarizes the two forms of anomie that most concerned him. He
found "the economic life" in Western societies the most obvious example of the reduction of a
moral ideal to a utilitarian motive, and pragmatism an example of the reduction of reason to
individual experience. In Pragmatism and Sociology, he makes it clear that he regardspragmatism
as a public "danger"([1955] 1983d:1),which is how he referredto economic anomie in Professional
Ethics. On the opening page, Durkheim describes pragmatism as "an attack on reason which is
truly militant and determined," as an "irrationalism"that is "a total negation of rationalism" and
as a reversalof "the entire philosophical tradition" ([1955] 1983d: 1). Pragmatism seeks to destroy
"the cult of truth" much as sophism did in the time of Socrates ([1955] 1983d:2).
Pragmatism never poses the problem of truth ([1955] 1983d:6)and, because it emphasizes action
based on the appearance of truth, it is nothing but a "logical utilitarianism" ([1955] 1983d:6)that
denies the sacrosanct quality of truth, profaning it and degrading it ([1955] 1983d:66-7). Its criteria
for "truth" are subjectivist ([1955] 1983d:48); pragmatism denies the need for rules ([1955]
1983d:57);and it supports moral subjectivism ([1955] 1983d:74).It is therefore anti-scientific: "The
essence of the scientific mind is that the scientist takes up a point of view which is sharply opposed
to that of the pragmatist"([1955] 1983d:78).The similarity of Durkheim's critique of pragmatism
to his description of intellectual anomie in The Division of Labor is unmistakable.
Anomie is implicitly woven into the main thesis of The Forms. It is a book about homo duplex,
the dualism of human nature that informs Durkheim's sociology of knowledge, the essence of
religion, and human culture. Lukes (1972:22) regardsthe concept of homo duplex as the keystone
of Durkheim's thought (though Lukes does not link this concept to anomie). But homo duplex
carries with it the attendant idea that pain and suffering are the sacrifice and price individuals
must pay to society. Durkheim is explicit: "If there is any one belief which is believed to be peculiar
to the most recent and idealistic religions, it is the one attributing a sanctifying power to sorrow
[douleur] ([1912] 1965:354; in French, [1912] 1979:450). Similarly, "society itself is possible only
at this price" ([1912] 1965:356). Durkheim continues:
Thoughexaltingthe strengthof man, it [society]is frequentlyrudeto individuals;it necessarilydemands
perpetualsacrificesfromthem;it is constantlydoingviolenceto our naturalappetites,just becauseit raises
us aboveourselves.If we aregoingto fulfill our dutiestowardsit, then we mustbe preparedto do violence
to our instincts... it is ... inherentin all social life ([1912]1965:356;in French,[1912]1979:452).
One could characterize the implicit treatment of anomie in The Forms as the original sin of social
life; after all, many religions teach that suffering and death are the ransom we pay for sin. The
root meaning of "expiation" means "ransom" (Hertz, 1922; Lyonnet and Sabourin, 1970:208).
Fearful that he was misunderstood in The Forms, Durkheim repeated the idea that society is
possible only at the price of douleur in his gloomy, Freudian-like sequel, "The Dualism of Human
Nature and Its Social Conditions" (1914):

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

94

AND BROWN
MESTROVI6

The painful[douloureux]characterof the dualismof humannatureis explainedby this hypothesis.There

is no doubtthat if societywereonlythe naturaland spontaneousdevelopmentof the individual,thesetwo
partsof ourselveswouldharmonize.... In fact,however,societyhas its ownnature.... Therefore,society
cannotbe formedor maintainedwithoutourbeingrequiredto makeperpetualandcostlysacrifices.Because
societysurpassesus, it obligesus to surpassourselves;andto surpassitself, a beingmust,to some degree,
departfromits nature- a departurethatdoes not takeplacewithoutcausingmoreor less painfultensions.
... Wemust, in a word,do violenceto certainof our strongestinclinations.Therefore,since the role of
the social being in our single selveswill grow evermoreimportantas historymovesahead,it is wholly
improbablethat therewill everbe an erain whichman is requiredto resisthimselfto a lesserdegree,an
era in whichhe can live a life that is easierand less full of tension.To the contrary,all evidencecompels
us to expectoureffortin the strugglebetweenthetwobeingswithinus to increasewiththegrowthof civilization (in Bellah, 1973:163;the Frenchversionmay be found in Filloux, 1970:314-32).
Shortly after writing this, Durkheim began writing La Morale and died.

CONCLUSIONS
Merton (1957:161) writes that "as initially developed by Durkheim, the concept of anomie
referred to a condition of relative normlessness in a society or group." This understanding of
anomie is not supported by Durkehim's writings. Durkheim never used the term normlessness.
There is no support for reading anomie as normlessness etymologically, historically,or contextually.
We will not dwell on the large body of research that is flawed by an incorrect understanding
of anomie, though it should be noted that investigations have failed to support the proposition
that "status integration" is the obverse of anomie (Dodder and Astle, 1980; Gibbs, 1982; Hong,
1981;Schoenfeld, 1982). It has to be invalid for the simple reason that Durkheim treated anomie
as the regle of derkglement, not as normlessness. The orthodox functionalist interpretation of
anomie is embedded in the over-socialized conception of man that Dahrendorf (1958), Giddens
(1976), Gouldner (in Durkheim, 1958b), Mills (1959) and Wrong (1961) have criticized so
eloquently. Despite these thoughtful critiques, it has miraculously survived. Our point is that
Durkheim was highly critical of Westernculture as a whole and that his version of functionalism
is fundamentally different from the Parsonian-Mertonian version.
We do not wish to end with a list of suggestions as to how der~glement should be operationalized. While it is amenable to scientific investigation, sociologists should proceed cautiously and
attend closely to what Durkheim really said. What Durkheim meant is subject to interpretation
and honest scholarly debate, but it is necessary to be precise about what he wrote. It is also important to try to understand the words he used as social facts, as collective representations that have
impersonal meanings which should exert constraint on the scholar. Our aim here is to make sociologists suspicious of the view that anomie is normlessness and to have them consider what anomie
as d6riglement could mean.
Above all, we want to convey our view that anomie, as Durkheim used it, is one of the most
important ideas in the history of Western thought, rich in history and interrelatedness to other
concepts, particularly sin and madness. Anomie ought to be studied as a collective representation
that has refracted a myriad of other ideas related to justice and morals in humankind's struggle
to grasp the essence of morality. Durkheim's concept of anomie is far removed from Merton's
bland, secular and painless concept of "normlessness."Durkheim was a moralist - albeit a scientific moralist - who was sensitive to the pain and sorrow caused by immorality. He did not think
of anomie as just confusion, but as evil. He launched his career in sociology by inquiring, in his
introduction to The Division of Labor, into the method for studying "moralfacts" scientifically
([1893] 1933:424). He was attempting to move beyond the fact-value distinction that has plagued
philosophers and social scientists since the writings of Kant. The Forms ends his career-long
discussion of morality on the note that sociology is "destined to open a new way to the science
of man" ([1912] 1965:495) precisely because it has the potential to overcome the dualisms posed

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Anomieas D6reglement

95

by Kant. Durkheim died writing the introduction to his next book, entitled La Morale (cf. Pickering, 1979; Traugott, 1978:191-202). In this introduction he claims that "moral facts" can be
studied as "natural things" and that the expression he had used in teaching this new science was
"Physics or Science of Mores [moeurs] and of Law" (in Traugott, 1978:267;in French, Durkheim
[1920] 1976:330). This expression is obviously a reference to Le!ons de sociologie: physique des
moeurs et du droit, the longest-running series of lectures in Durkheim's career. Because the title
had apparently raised some controversy, Durkheim proposed that
Weshallthereforecall it "Scienceof Morality"or "Scienceof MoralFacts,"understanding
therebythat it
dealswithmoralphenomenaor moralrealityas it can be observedeitherin the presentor in the past,just
as physicsor physiologydeal with the facts they study(in Traugott,1978:202).
Durkheim obviously felt that these "moral facts" were as impersonal as "social facts," enabling
the sociologist to move beyond the impasse of pure speculation reached by theologians and
philosophers concerned with ethics.
Our point is that Durkheim's concern with anomie and deriglement bespeaks his concern with
a science of morality. It is not true, as Besnard (1982:46) claims, that anomie ceased to concern
Durkheim after 1902. There is no real break in Durkheim's thought, and Durkheim's sociology
is concerned with the question how one may study morality scientifically.
Durkheim's immediate circle seems to have understood his quest for a "science des faits moraux"
(in Karady, 1976:330). Many of their studies treated topics related to the theological implications
of der~glement:justice and morality emerge as themes in their writings again and again. In addition, they regarded these theological topics as collective representations which could be studied
as social facts. One of Durkheim's closest followers, Paul Fauconnet, is explicit, writing in La
Responsabilite (1922:3-4):
sont 6videmmentdesfaits: ils tombentsous l'observation,on
Lesregleset les jugementsde responsabilit6
desfaits sociaux.... D'ailleursnous
peutles decrire,les raconter,les situer,les dater.Et ce sont assur6ment
C'estlui-memeunfait social. II fait partiedu
pouvonsmaintenantrevenirau conceptde responsabilit6.
collectives(emphasisadded).
systemedes representations
The very title of Levy-Bruhl'sLa Morale et la science des moeurs (1903) bespeaks his faithfulness
to Durkheim's program. Consider also Robert Hertz's works on sin, expiation, the collective
representationof death, and right-handedness as a symbol of the sacred in this context of a science
of morals (Hertz, 1907, 1909, 1922;discussed in Besnard, 1983:152-76and by Nielsen, 1983). Durkheim cited the work on the collective representation of magic by Hubert and Mauss (1904) when
he made his claim in The Forms that "magic takes a sort of professional pleasure in profaning
holy things" (Durkheim, [1912] 1965:58). For Durkheim, magic is always anti-religious (in Karady,
1976:70), and as such belongs in discussions of anomie (see also Me'trovid, 1985d; O'Keefe, 1982).
Consider the conclusion by Mauss in his analysis of gift-giving as a social fact in The Gift: "It
appears that the whole field of industrial and commercial law is in conflict with morality" ([1925]
1967:64).The works by Hubert and Mauss (1899) on sacrifice and Davy (1920) on the relationship
of law to morals - among many others - are also relevant in discussions of anomie and the scientific study of moral facts.
So long as one understands anomie as normlessness, the works of the Durkheimians seem scattered and peripheralto his concerns, which is probably why they are still largely unknown to sociologists. But when one understands anomie as the obverse of morality, it is evident that the Durkheimians were all concerned with anomie, even though they did not always refer to it directly.
In sum, the understanding of Durkheim's concept of anomie as dir~glement is more accurate
than "normlessness,"points to the continuities in his thought, and refers to social problems other
than crime and suicide which could be studied in relation to anomie. It points to a new branch
of sociology Durkheim had apparently hoped to launch: a science of moral facts.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

96

AND BROWN
MESTROVI6
REFERENCES

Arndt, William F. and F. Wilbur Gingrich (eds.)

1957 A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Bellah, Robert N. (ed.)
1973 Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Besnard, Philippe
1982 "L'anomie dais la biographie intellectuelle de Durkheim." Sociologie et Societes 14:45-53.
Besnard, Philippe (ed.)
1983 The Sociological Domain: The Durkheimians and the Founding of French Sociology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Bossuet, Jacques
[1731] Trait6 de la concupiscence. Paris: Editeurs des Portes de France.
1836
Clinard, Marshall B. (ed.)
1964 Anomie and Deviant Behavior. New York: Free Press.
Cornford, F. M.
1957 From Religion to Philosophy. New York: Harper and Row.
Dahrendorf, Ralf
1958 "Out of utopia: toward a reorientation of sociological analysis." American Journal of Sociology
64:115-27.
Davy, Georges
1922 Le Droit, I'id6alisme et l'experience. Paris: Alcan.
Dinneen, Francis P.
1967 An Introduction to General Linguistics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Dodder, Richard A. and Doris J. Astle
1981 "A methodological analysis of Srole's nine item anomia scale." Multivariate Behavioral Research
15:329-34.
Dohrenwend, Bruce P.
1959 "Egoism, altruism, anomie and fatalism: a conceptual analysis of Durkheim's types." American
Sociological Review 24:466-73.
Durkheim, Emile
[1893] The Division of Labor in Society. Translatedby George Simpson. New York: Free Press.
1933
[1893] De la Division du travail social. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1967
[1893] "Definition du fait moral." Pp. 257-87 in V. Karady (ed.), Textes, Volume 2. Paris: Les Editions
1976 de Minuit.
[1895] The Rules of Sociological Method. Translated by Sara Solloway and J. Mueller. New York: Free
1966 Press.
[1895] "The rules of sociological method." Pp. 31-163 in Steven Lukes (ed.), Durkheim: The Rules of Socio1982 logical Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method. Translated by W. D. Halls. New
York: Free Press.
[1895] Les Rbgles de la m6thode sociologique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1983a
[1897] Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson. New York:
1951 Free Press.
[1897] Le Suicide: etude de sociologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1983b
[1902] "Preface to the second edition: some notes on occupational groups." Pp. 1-31 in E. Durkheim, The
1933 Division of Labor in Society. Translated by George Simpson. New York: Free Press.
[1902] "Preface de la seconde edition: quelques remarquessur les groupements professionnels." Pp. i-xxxvi
1967 in E. Durkheim, De la Division du travail social. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
[1904] Review of Lambert's "La fonction du droit civil compare." Pp. 124-27 in Y. Nandan (ed.), Emile
1980 Durkheim: Contributions to L'Ann6e Sociologique. Translatedby John French, Andrew P. Lyons,
John Sweeney, and Kennerly Woody. New York: Free Press.
1908 Remarks in "L'inconnu et l'inconscient en histoire."Bulletin de la Soci6t6 Frangaise de Philosophie
8:217-47.
[1912] The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Joseph Ward Swain. New York: Free
1965 Press.
[1912] Les Formes 61lmentairesde la vie religieuse: le systhmetot6mique en Australie. Paris: Presses Univer1979 sitaires de France.
[1920] "Introduction Ala morale." Pp. 313-31 in V. Karady (ed.), Textes, Volume 2. Paris: Les Editions de
1976 Minuit.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Anomie as Der6glement

97

[1922] Education and Sociology. Translated by Sherwood Fox. Glencoe: Free Press.
1958a
1924 Sociologie et philosophie. Paris: Alcan.
[1924] Sociology and Philosophy. Translated by D. F. Pocock. New York: Free Press.
1974
[1925] Moral Education. Translated by Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer. Glencoe: Free Press.
1961
[1925] L'Education morale. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1963
[1928] Socialism and Saint-Simon. Translated by Charlotte Sattler. Yellow Springs: Antioch Press.
1958b
[1928] Le Socialisme. Paris: Retz.
1978
1938 L'Evolution p6dagogique en France. Paris: Alcan.
[1938] The Evolution of Educational Thought. Translatedby Peter Collins. London: Routledge and Kegan
1977 Paul.
1950 Legons de sociologie: physique des moeurs et du droit. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
[1950] Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. Translated by Cornelia Brookfield. Westport: Greenwood
1983c Press.
[1955] Pragmatism and Sociology. Translated by J. C. Whitehouse. Cambridge: Cambridge University
1983d Press.
Fauconnet, Paul
1920 La Responsabilit6: etude sociologique. Paris: Alcan.
Filloux, Jean-Claude (ed.)
1970 La Science sociale et l'action. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Foulqui6, Paul
1978 Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Frazer, James G.
[1890] The Golden Bough: The Roots of Religion and Folklore. New York: Avenel.
1981
Gernet, Louis
1981 The Antropology of Ancient Greece. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Gibbs, Jack P.
1982 "Testing the theory of status integration and suicide rates." American Sociological Review
47:227-37.
Giddens, Anthony
1976 "Classical social theory and the origins of modern sociology." American Journal of Sociology
81:703-29.
Godel, Robert
1969 A Geneva School Reader in Linguistics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Guyau, Jean Marie
[1885] Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction. Paris: Alcan.
1907
[1887] L'irreligion de l'avenir. Paris: Alcan.
1909
Hastings, James
1961 Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Volume 11. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Hertz, Robert
[1907- Death and the Right Hand. Translated by Rodney and Claudia Needham. Aberdeen: Cohen and
1909] West.
1960
1922 "Le pech6 et l'expiation dans les societes primitives." Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 86:5-60.
Hong, Lawrence K.
1981 "Anomia and religiosity: some evidence for reconceptualization." Review of Religious Research
22:233-44.
Hubert, Henri, and Marcel Mauss
[1899] Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function. Translatedby W. D. Halls. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1964
[1904] A General Theory of Magic. Translated by Robert Brain. New York: W. W. Norton.
1972
Johnson, Samuel
1785 A Dictionary of the English Language. Oxford: Clarendon.
Karady, Victor (ed.)
1976 Textes, Volume 2. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

98

AND BROWN
MESTROVIC

La Capra, Dominick
1972 1EmileDurkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Lalande, Andre
[1926] Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1980
Levy-Bruhl, Lucien
1885 L'Id~e de responsabilit6. Paris: Hachette.
1903 La Morale et la science des moeurs. Paris: Alcan.
Liddell, Henry George and Robert Scott
1966 A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon.

Littr6,Emile

[1863] Dictionnaire de la langue franqaise, Volume 2. Paris: Gallimard.

1963a
[1863] Dictionnaire de la langue franqaise, Volume 6. Paris: Gallimard.
1963b
Lukes, Steven
1972 Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work. New York: Harper and Row.
Lukes, Steven (ed.).
1982 Durkheim: The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method.
Translated by W. D. Halls. New York: Free Press.
Lyonnet, Stanislas and Leopold Sabourin
1970 Sin, Redemption and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic Study. Rome: Biblical Institute Press.
Mauss, Marcel
[1925] The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies. Translatedby Ian Cunnison. New
1967 York: W.W.Norton.
Meillet, A.
1906 "Comment les mots changent de sens." L'Ann6e Sociologique 9:1-39.
1982 Linguistique historique et linguistique g6nerale. Paris: Champion.
Merton, Robert K.
1957 Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
Mestrovid, Stjepan G.
1982 In the Shadow of Plato: Durkheim and Freud on Suicide and Society. Doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University.
1984 "Durkheim's concept of the unconscious." Pp. 267-88 in S. McNall (ed.), Current Perspectives in
Social Theory, Volume 5. Greenwich: JAI Press.
1985a "Anomia and sin in Durkheim's thought." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 24:119-36.
1985b "Durkheim's renovated rationalism and the idea that 'collective life is only made of representations.' " Pp. 199-218 in S. McNall (ed.), Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Volume 6. Greenwich: JAI Press.
1985c "A sociological conceptualization of trauma." Social Science and Medicine 21:835-48.
1985d Review of Stolen Lightning: A Social Theory of Magic. American Anthropologist 87:166-67.
Me'trovid, Stjepan G. and Barry Glassner
1983 "A Durkheimian hypothesis on stress." Social Science and Medicine 17:1315-27.
Mills, C. W.
1959 The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press.
Montgomery, Robert L.
1984 "Bias in interpreting social facts: is it a sin?" Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 23:278-91.
Mucchielli, Roger
1962 Philosophie de I'action: programme de philosophie du baccalaureat et de prop6deutique. Paris:
Bordas.
Nielsen, Donald A.
1983 "Robert Hertz and the sociological study of sin, expiation and religion: a neglected chapter in the
Durkheim school." Paper presented to the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer
Seminar, Duke University.
O'Keefe, Daniel
1982 Stolen Lightning: The Social Theory of Magic. New York: Random House.
Orru, Marco
1983 "The ethics of anomie: Jean Marie Guyau and Emile Durkheim." British Journal of Sociology
34:499-518.
Oxford English Dictionary
1933 The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 1. Oxford: Clarendon.
1972 A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 1. Oxford: Clarendon.
Parsons, Talcott
1937 The Structure of Social Action. Glencoe: Free Press.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Anomie as D6r~glement

99

Partridge, Eric
1966 Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English. New York: Macmillan.
Pickering, W. S. F. (ed.)
1975 Durkheim on Religion. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
1979 Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Pickering, W.S.F.
1984 Durkheim's Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Quemada, B.
1974 Tr6sor de la langue franqaise. Paris: Le Centre National de la Recherche.
Robert, Paul
1985 Dictionnaire alphab6tique et analogique de la langue franqaise. Paris: SNL Le Robert.
Saussure, Ferdinand de
[1916] Course in General Linguistics. Translated by Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library.
1959
Schoenfeld, Eugen
1982 "Integration and anomia: a re-examination." Paper presented to the Southern Sociological Society,
Memphis, Tennessee.
Selye, Hans
1978 The Stress of Life. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Spencer, Herbert
1967 The Evolution of Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Strikwerda, Robert A.
1982 Emile Durkheim's Philosophy of Science: Framework for a New Social Science. Doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame.
Traugott, Mark (ed.)
1978 Emile Durkheim on Institutional Analysis. Translated by Mark Traugott. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Wallwork, Ernest
1972 Durkheim: Morality and Milieu. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
White, John T. and J.E. Riddle
1869 A Latin-English Dictionary, Volume 1. London: Longmans.
Wrong, Dennis
1961 "The over-socialized conception of man in modern sociology." American Sociological Review
26:183-93.
Znaniecki, Florian
1967 Social Actions. New York: Russell and Russell.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 10:34:36 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions