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extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil
and political rights. After failing to win during the presidential election, Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of the City of Manila. Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
Estrada before the COMELEC stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute
disqualification. Risos-Vidal relied on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas right to seek
public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race.

Issue:


Whether Estrada may run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder
which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

Ruling:


YES. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action as provided under
Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C. Moreover, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
RPC, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Section 12 of the OEC allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public
office, whether local or national position. Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of
the pardon, neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President
Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. The whereas clause at issue
is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.


JAMAR M. KULAYAN, ET. AL V. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN
GR. NO.187298, JUY 3, 2012, SERENO. J.


It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section
7, Article VII thereof.

Facts:


Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in Sulu. A
task force was created by the ICRC and the PNP. The local group convened under the leadership of Governor
Abdusakur Mahail Tan. He organized the Civilian Emergency Force, a group of armed male civilians coming
from different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. Later on, Governor Tan
issued Proclamation 1-09 declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. In the same Proclamation,
respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general
search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Jamar M. Kulayan,
et. al filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

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Whether Governor Tan can exercise the calling out powers of a President.

Ruling:


NO. A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over
the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations. Moreover, in the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission, the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled
control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units
in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day
situations. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes
within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.


Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at
his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared
a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation
of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.


DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ET. AL V. HON. RONALDO PUNO
G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011, ABAD, J.


The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that
the Constitution directly vests in the President. It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the
determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.

Facts:


After the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in the named places. Consequently, President Arroyo also issued AO 273 transferring
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. But, due to issues raised over the
terminology used in AO 273, the President issued AO 273-A amending the former, by delegating instead of
transferring supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.C laiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the
ARMMs autonomy, Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et. al filed a petition for prohibition under Rule 65. ARMM
officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in
the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the Presidents
emergency powers. Ampatuan, et. al asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing
them.

Issue:

1.
Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and
the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City.
2.
Whether the President had factual bases for her actions.

Ruling:

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I. Short title: Kulayan vs Tan

II. Full Title:
JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his
capacity as Governor of Sulu, et al G.R. No. 187298, 03 July
2012, (Sereno, J.)
III. Topic: Delegation of Emergency Powers
IV. Statement of Facts:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter,
Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water
sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three
armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident.
The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur
Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping
incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial
Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and
natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the
Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force
(CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and
seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.
V. Statement of the case:
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued
ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the
Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces

VI. Issue
Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President
VII.

Ruling

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive

powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as
Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the
calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military,
making the civilian president the nations supreme military leader. The net
effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that
a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed
forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed
of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to
direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be
expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military
experts; but the ultimate power is his.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor
Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called
upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is
ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code.

G.R. No. 187298.July 3, 2012.*

JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI.

MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1
SATTAL H. JADJULI, petitioners, vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR
M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu GEN.
JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO CLEMEN PN,
P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO
G. LATAG, in their capacity as officers of the Phil. Marines
and Phil. National Police, respectively, respondents.
Civil Procedure Courts Hierarchy of Courts The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts provides that where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals (CA) or the Regional Trial Court (RTC), it is in either of
these courts and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action
for the issuance of such writ must be sought unless special and
important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the petition.
We first dispose of respondents invocation of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts which allegedly prevents judicial review by
this Court in the present case, citing for this specific purpose,
Montes v. Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA 382 (2006), and Purok
Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco, 384 SCRA 152 (2002),
Simply put, the doctrine provides that where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the
RTC, it is in either of these courts and not in the Supreme Court,
that the specific action for the issuance of such writ must be
sought unless special and important laws are clearly and
specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this is that
this Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to
perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition. It cannot be burdened with deciding cases
in the first instance. xxx The instant case stems from a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, over which the Supreme Court
possesses original jurisdiction. More crucially, this case involves
acts of a public official which pertain to restrictive custody, and is
thus impressed with transcendental public importance that would
warrant the relaxation of the general rule. The Court would be
remiss in its constitutional

_______________
*EN BANC.

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duties were it to dismiss the present petition solely due to claims

of judicial hierarchy.
Presidency There is one repository of executive powers, and
that is the President of the Republicthis means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power,
it is granted to the President and no one else.As early as Villena
v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939), it has already been
established that there is one repository of executive powers, and
that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As
emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:
With reference to the Executive Department of the government,
there is one purpose which is crystalclear and is readily visible
without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section
of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive
Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that
The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines. This means that the President of the Philippines is
the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the callingout powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof.
Same CallingOut Powers By constitutional fiat, the calling
out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare
martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone.The power to
declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Courts
authority to review the factual basis thereof. By constitutional
fiat, the callingout powers, which is of lesser gravity than the
power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President
alone. As noted in Villena, (t)here are certain constitutional

powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation

which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those
powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law xxx.
484

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Kulayan vs. Tan

Same While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section

3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the
nations supreme military leader The Constitution does not
require that the President must be possessed of military training
and talents, but as CommanderinChief, he has the power to
direct military operations and to determine military strategy.
Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3
of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president
the nations supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II,
Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian
President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the
armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the
President must be possessed of military training and talents, but
as CommanderinChief, he has the power to direct military
operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he
would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed
forces to military experts but the ultimate power is his. As
CommanderinChief, he is authorized to direct the movements of
the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and
to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.
Same Philippine National Police Regarding the countrys
police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that:
the State shall establish and maintain one police force, which
shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission A
local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises
operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control
only in daytoday operations.In addition to being the
commanderinchief of the armed forces, the President also acts as
the leader of the countrys police forces, under the mandate of

Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that,

The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed. During the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on the framing of this provision, Fr.
Bernas defended the retention of the word control, employing
the same rationale of singularity of the office of the president, as
the only Executive under the presidential form of government.
Regarding the countrys police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the
Constitution states that: The State shall establish and maintain
one police
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force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to

be administered and controlled by a national police commission.
The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law. A local chief executive, such
as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over
the police, and may exercise control only in daytoday operations
Same CallingOut Powers Respondent provincial governor is
not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his
own bidding the callingout powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President.Respondent
provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the
assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his
authority when he declared a state of emergency and
called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The callingout powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
Same A kidnapping incident cannot be considered as a
calamity or a disaster.Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1,
subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said provision
expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether manmade
or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province,
is certainly empowered to enact and implement emergency

measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident

in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster.
Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision
to justify their actions.
Local Government Units The intent behind the powers
granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and
administrative in nature.The Local Government Code does not
involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the
National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely
granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of
security and defense. The intent behind the powers granted to
local government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in
nature. The Code is concerned only with powers that would make
the delivery of basic services more effective to the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Kulayan vs. Tan

constituents, and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling

out powers on local executives.
Philippine National Police Private Armies Pursuant to the
national policy to establish one police force, the organization of
private citizen armies is proscribed.Pursuant to the national
policy to establish one police force, the organization of private
citizen armies is proscribed. Section 24 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution mandates that: Private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be
dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home
Defense Forces (CHDF) not consistent with the citizen armed
force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where
appropriate, converted into the regular force. Additionally,
Section 21 of Article XI states that, The preservation of peace
and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the
local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The
defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of
the National Government.

PETITION for review on certiorari to question the power of

the Governor to Declare State of Emergency and to Issue
Proclamation No. 109.