Anda di halaman 1dari 25

CO V.

HRET
FACTS:
Antonio Co come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET
declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised
on the following grounds:
a)
b)

Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines?
RULING:

Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.


Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy.
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This
domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established
In the year 1895, the Jose Ongs grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in
1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the
court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In
1984, Jose Ong Jr. married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as
natural born citizens.
Besides, private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the Philippines.
On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in
order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in
the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require
him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who


were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said
islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a
Filipino citizen.
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered
Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
Persons born in Spanish territory.
Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of
Spain.

AZNAR vs COMELEC

COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for


not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

FACTS:

Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the


COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in
the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (CebuPDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on
the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of
the United States of America.
Aznar submited a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that
private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of
Registration issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958.
Aznar filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from
tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and
proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order


the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.

Osmena maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the


legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late
President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987;
that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and
has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he
has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.

The COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to


proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number
of votes, Osmena was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Osmena, the private respondent herein, is a Filipino


citizen and thus entitled to run in the local election.

RULING:

The petition is not meritorious.

Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and,


therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing
evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present


direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any
of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1)
by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of
the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine
citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the


United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private
respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given
clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the
foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private
respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by
the U.S. Naturalization Laws." Philippine courts are only allowed to determine
who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered
an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that
private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner
to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier
stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

OH HEK HOW V. REPUBLIC


FACTS:
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition
filed a motion alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic
Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as
such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order
authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same date, petitioner took it and the
certificate of naturalization was issued to him. The Government seasonably gave
notice of its intention to appeal from said order of February 9, 1966 and filed its
record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment
having been final and executory.
ISSUE:

Private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance


of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this
country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate .
Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine
citizenship cannot be presumed.

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of


citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even
before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept
of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further
that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or
allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been
enacted.

Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from


the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China?
RULING:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the
naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively
by such laws and cannot be controlled by any foreign law.
However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status
is necessarily governed pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code by
the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese
national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he has
complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its
Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the


Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

only Lichtenstein. Under this circumstance, Guatemala was not forced to


recognize it. The court agreed and thus stopped the case from continuing.

NOTTEBOHM CASE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CABANSAG

FACTS:
Nottebohm, born September 16, 1881, in Hamburg, Germany, possessed
German citizenship. Although he lived in Guatemala from 1905 until 1943 he
never became a citizen of Guatemala. On October 9, 1939, Nottebohm applied
to become a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein. The application was approved
and he became a citizen of Liechtenstein. He then returned to Guatemala on his
Liechtenstein passport and informed the local government of his change of
nationality. When he tried to return to Guatemala once again in 1943 he was
refused entry as an enemy alien since the Guatemalan authorities did not
recognize his naturalisation and regarded him as still German. It has been
suggested that the timing of the event was due to the recent entry of the United
States and Guatemala into the Second World War.
He was later extradited to the United States, where he was held at an internment
camp until the end of the war. All his possessions in Guatemala were
confiscated. After his release, he lived out the rest of his life in Liechtenstein.
The Government of Liechtenstein granted Nottebohm protection against unjust
treatment by the government of Guatemala and petitioned the International
Court of Justice. However, the government of Guatemala argued that Nottebohm
did not gain Liechtenstein citizenship for the purposes of international law. The
court agreed and thus stopped the case from continuing.
ISSUE:

BANK, vs.

FLORENCE

O.

The Court reiterates the basic policy that all Filipino workers, whether
employed locally or overseas, enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and
social legislations. Our labor statutes may not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or stipulations agreed upon, in a foreign country.
FACTS:
Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist and applied for employment,
with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank, a private banking
corporation organized and existing in the Philippines. PNB Singapore offered her
a temporary appointment that she will be on probation for 3 consecutive months.
Florence O. Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. She was
issued an Overseas Employment Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide
contract worker.
However, for about three (3) months of working she was advice to resign from
her job for the reason that the PNB Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed
into a remittance office. Florence O. Cabansag did not submit any letter of
resignation.

Who then have the power to grant Nottebohm diplomatic protection?


RULING:
Although the Court stated that it is the sovereign right of all states to determine
its own citizens and criteria for becoming one in municipal law. But it does not
mean that other states will automatically accept the conferring states
designation unless it has acted in conformity with the general aim of forging a
genuine bond between it and its national aim. Such a process would have to be
scrutinized on the international plane where the question is of diplomatic
protection. In this case, there was no relationship between Liechtenstein and
Nottebohm, the change of nationality was merely a scheme mandated by the
war.
The
Court
upheld
the
principle
of effective
nationality,
(the Nottebohm principle) where the national must prove a meaningful
connection to the state in question. This principle was previously applied only in
cases of dual nationality to determine which nationality should be used in a
given case. However Nottebohm had forfeited his German nationality and thus

She was warned that, unless she submitted her letter of resignation, her
employment record will be blemished with the notation DISMISSED spread
thereon.
She was ordered to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. Thereafter, she
received a letter terminating her employment with the Bank.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of her.
PNB appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC.
The CA ruled that petitioner bank had failed to adduce in evidence the
Singaporean law supposedly governing the latters employment Contract with
respondent.

According to the CA, even though respondent secured an employment pass


from the Singapore Ministry of Employment, she did not thereby waive Philippine
labor laws, or the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter or the NLRC over her Complaint
for illegal dismissal. Neither did she submit herself solely to the Ministry of
Manpower of Singapores jurisdiction over disputes arising from her
employment.

and processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo that she was
considered at the start of her employment as a direct hire governed by and
subject to the laws, common practices and customs prevailing in
Singapore[17] she subsequently became a contract worker or an OFW who was
covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. At
the time her employment was illegally terminated, she already possessed the
POEA employment Certificate.

ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction;

2.

W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper venue

RULINGS:
The Petition has no merit.
1.

Labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over


claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination
disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino
workers (OFW).[15]

We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent was directly hired, while
on a tourist status in Singapore, by the PNB branch in that city state. Prior to
employing respondent, petitioner had to obtain an employment pass for her from
the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory
requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country.[16]
Similarly, the Philippine government requires non-Filipinos working in the
country to first obtain a local work permit in order to be legally employed here.
That permit, however, does not automatically mean that the non-citizen is
thereby bound by local laws only, as averred by petitioner. It does not at all imply
a waiver of ones national laws on labor. Absent any clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, such permit simply means that its holder has a legal
status as a worker in the issuing country.
Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an
Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine
Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared her a
bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this document
authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits

Moreover, petitioner admits that it is a Philippine corporation doing


business through a branch office in Singapore. [18] Significantly, respondents
employment by the Singapore branch office had to be approved by Benjamin P.
Palma Gil,[19] the president of the bank whose principal offices were in Manila.
This circumstance militates against petitioners contention that respondent was
locally hired; and totally governed by and subject to the laws, common practices
and customs of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with more reason
does this fact reinforce the presumption that respondent falls under the legal
definition of migrant worker, in this case one deployed in Singapore. Hence,
petitioner cannot escape the application of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of
the NLRC and the labor arbiter.
In any event, we recall the following policy pronouncement of the Court
in Royal Crown Internationale v. NLRC:[20]
x x x. Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the
protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations
to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic
public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. For the State assures the basic
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure,
and just and humane conditions of work [Article 3 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines; See also Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII, 1987
Constitution]. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil
Code which states that laws which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determination or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
2.

Proper Venue

Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure reads:

Section 1. Venue (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and
decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over
the workplace of the complainant/petitioner; Provided, however that cases of
Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) shall be filed before the Regional Arbitration
Branch where the complainant resides or where the principal office of the
respondent/employer is situated, at the option of the complainant.
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality
where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It
shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a
temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as
ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly
assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages
or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to their
employers.
Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042),
a migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has
been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a
legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.
[21]
Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch office in
Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She
thus falls within the category of migrant worker or overseas Filipino worker.
As such, it is her option to choose the venue of her Complaint against
petitioner for illegal dismissal. The law gives her two choices: (1) at the Regional
Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or (2) at the RAB where the
principal office of her employer is situated. Since her dismissal by petitioner,
respondent has returned to the Philippines -- specifically to her residence at
Filinvest II, Quezon City. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in
Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

LAZARO B. RAYRAY, vs. CHAE KYUNG LEE


FACTS:
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to
defendant Chae Kyung Lee. He testified that he met Lee in Pusan
Korea, where she was operating a night club, and they lived together
and got married in Pusan, Korea. Before the wedding Lee obtained the
police clearance, written in Korean language which was necessary to
contract marriage. Thereafter, he went to India and left Lee in who is in
advance pregnancy at that time. A couple of months later Lee joined him
in India, bringing with her the police clearance with translation into
English and noticed that she was already married and confronted her.
Lee said that it is not unusual that a Korean girl can marry twice in Korea
and she admitted that she had lived with two Americans and a Korean.
Rayray said that they got separated after and her wherabots are
unknown to him. The summons was served by publication in Pusan,
Korea, as she was a formerly resident and her whereabouts is unknown.
The court dismissed the petition on the ground that, it could not nullify a
marriage contracted and solemnized abroad. A reconsideration of this
decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals,

which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the
lower court being in issue in the appeal.
ISSUE:
Wether or not the Philippine Courts can have jurisdiction over
the instant case.
RULING:.
YES. In order that a given case could be validly decided by a
court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over (1) the subject-matter of
the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in
rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.1
The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's
marriage to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of
first instance,2 and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations.3
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission
thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint herein. 4 Defendant
was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of
summons by publication.5
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein,
and status affects or binds the whole word. The res in the present case
is the relation between said parties, or their marriage tie. 6 Jurisdiction
over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties,
not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus
celebrationis.7 Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled
therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both
counts. True that defendant was and under plaintiff's theory still is
a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status
therein involves and affects two persons. One is married, never in
abstract or a vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a judicial

decree on the marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the


status of another and the relation between them. The prevailing rule is,
accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for
annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled
in, or a national of, the forum. 8 Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in
the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over
the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the
marriage between the parties herein.
As to the substantial validity of said marriage, the lower court considered
plaintiffs evidence insufficient to establish that defendant was married to
another person prior to their marriage, and we agree with this
conclusion. To begin with, the police clearance is not signed. It merely
purports to bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan National Police.
Secondly, the record does not show who prepared it, much less that he
had personal knowledge of the truth of the entry therein. It should be
noted, that defendant was a native, not of Pusan but of Seoul, Korea.
Hence, the police clearance could, at best, be no more than hearsay
evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly confronted the defendant with
the contents of English translation of the police clearance, defendant
did not say that she had been married before. Plaintiff declared that she
admitted having previously lived with several other men, adding,
however, that she had no impediment, thus, in effect, negating the
alleged previous marriage.
Thirdly, if the police clearance was obtained, in order to establish
defendant's qualification to contract marriage, why is it that the wedding
took place, despite the entry in said document to the effect that
defendant was married already? There is no competent evidence to the
effect that Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy. Moreover, the
presumption is that the foreign law is identical to the lex fori, or, in
the case at bar, the Philippine Law.9 In fact, the statement, imputed by
plaintiff to the defendant, to the effect that, although she had cohabited
before with other men, there was no impediment to her marrying him,
clearly suggests that a previous marriage on her part would have been,
in her opinion, a legal obstacle to her marriage with the plaintiffs. Then
too, the marriage certificate contains spaces for the entry of data on
whether any of the contracting parties had been previously married;
whether the prior marriage had been dissolved by a decree of divorce;

and, if there had been such decree, the date thereof. Surely, these data
would be absolutely irrelevant if polygamy were sanctioned in Korea.
And, again, why is it that the marriage contract states that defendant had
had no previous marriage?
Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for
unless full faith and credence are given to his testimony, but we cannot
believe him for the records show that he would not hesitate to lie when it
suits his purpose. Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted marriage
with the defendant, he said that he was single, although, he admitted,
this was a lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in Baguio, one
Adelaida Melecio or Valdez.10 But, then he would, also, have us believe
that his marriage with the latter was illegal or fictitious, because Adelaida
and he did no more than sign, on a small window in the City Hall of
Baguio, certain documents the contents of which he did not read.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against plaintiff-appellant. It is so
ordered.

REPUBLIC vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III


Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce
decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City on
May 24, 1981. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley and that her wife, Stanley and her child currently live in
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
The Solicitor General assails the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, and its Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration. The lower court a quo had declared that
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a
valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file
a petition for annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG
posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
Orbecido admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his
case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce
decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES?
RULING:
On its face, Art 26, par 2 of the Family Code does not appear to
govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply
only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the

parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in
the U.S.A.
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge
Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita
v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino
citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American
citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court
therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.
There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2.

A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the


alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at


the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano,
the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree
and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare
that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now

capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly


upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its Japan branch, entered into an
International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, authorizing SHARP
to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the
ticket sales Northwest Airlines sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for
collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for
damages.
A writ of summons was issued and the attempt to serve the summons
was unsuccessful. After the two unsuccessful attempts of service, the
Tokyo District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of
summons served at the head office of the defendant in Manila. The
Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of
Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels upon the
defendant's head office in Manila.
Sharp received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of
summons. Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court rendered judgment in favor of
Northwest Airlines.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, a suit for
enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. vs. CA

Defendant averred that the judgment of the Japanese Court sought to


be enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having
been rendered without due and proper notice to the defendant and/or
with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact
The trial rendered a Decision in favor of Sharp stating that:

FACTS:
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter NORTHWEST), a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to
enforce a Judgment by a Japanese Court in their favor against Sharp &
Company, a corporation incorporated in the Philippines.

The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this


action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant considering that this is an action in personam; the
Japanese Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant because jurisprudence requires that the
defendant be served with summons in Japan in order for the
Japanese Court to acquire jurisdiction over it, the process of the
Court in Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese

10

jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in the


case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar. This Court
agrees that if the defendant in a foreign court is a resident in the
court of that foreign court such court could acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant but it must be served upon the
defendant in the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court.
CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a
Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons
through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its principal
office in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had
failed?
RULING:
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country
from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to
presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice
therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an
action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the
Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in
the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official
duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging

the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to
demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those
relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed
by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the
procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on
SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not
be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any
other fact. 9Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide
that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or
authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to
present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to
show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did
not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service
of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court
must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding
Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the socalled processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the
Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine
law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no
such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that
effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons,
the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without force
and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the
government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance
Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the
Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation;

11

and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other
foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or
official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other
legal proccess to the corporation at its home or principal office. The
sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service.
The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was
incorporated. In a strict technical sense, such domicile as a corporation
may have is single in its essence and a corporation can have only one
domicile which is the state of its creation.
Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one-state may, for certain
purposes, be regarded a resident in another state in which it has offices
and transacts business.
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through
its four duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it
was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may
be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the
jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented
to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. 27

FACTS:
Raul R. Lee filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not
yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
canceled. Comelec 2nd division promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
Frivaldos candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held
on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the Resolution of
the Second Division.
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed petition praying for his proclamation as the dulyelected Governor of Sorsogon. Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the
proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation
under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
September 1994 had been granted and there was no more legal impediment to
the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor.
The proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon was annulled, being
contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant
his proclamation and proclaimed Frivaldo as Governor instead.
Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en
banc and present petition was filed.
ISSUE:

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the


Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption
but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty.

Whether or not the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal to qualify him
to hold the Office of Governor?

Private respondent C.F. SHARP L COMPANY, INC. is ordered to pay to


NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of
said case, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.

YES. We rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government


Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected.
repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and
effective.

FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the very day the
term of office of governor began, he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. It is thus clear that Frivaldo is
a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17, 1994.

RULING:

12

The repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made
to take effect as of date of his application. There is nothing in the law that would
bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority;
and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust
or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has
Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty. Thus,
repatriation has been properly granted and thus valid and effective.

FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia to a Filipino father and to an
Australian mother. She left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. She
was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church
in Manila.
The citizenship of private respondent was raised as an issue when she ran for
re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her
candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles. The
COMELECs First Division dismissed the petition.
Petitioners MR was also denied. Hence, this instant petition questioned the
citizenship of Lopez.
ISSUE:
Wether or not Ybasco is a Filipino citizen?
RULING:
YES. Ybaco is a Filipino citizen. The Philippine law on citizenship
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.
The private respondent's application for an Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988,
and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988 does not
tantamount to renunciation of his Filipino citizenship.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration
are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not
militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship.

VALLES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

The fact also that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the

13

herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact
alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati.
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on
the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position.
The respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that
he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California,
September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is
born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office
in the Philippines?

RULING:

MERCADO vs. MANZANO

No, The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result
of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the
other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."

14

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which
he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States
of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. An Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
was issued in his favor.
Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte
Respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition
to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the May 2010 local
and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American."To further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record indicating
that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines.
The petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado was granted. The comelec en banc reverses the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made?

RULING:
YES. The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run
for an elective position.

MAQUILING vs. COMELEC


15

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American


citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

Moy ya lim vs Comm. Of Immigration

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino


citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country.

Petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the


Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines
and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon
her failure to do so."

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel
in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy,
thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute
and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport
does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is
fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.

FACTS:

On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that
she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take
a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping
for a period of one month.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was
permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period
of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner
of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After
repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to February 13, 1962.
On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen, Because of the contemplated
action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action
for injunction with preliminary injunction.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was
admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog.
She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
The court denied the issuance of the writ of injunction which was then appealed
by the petitioner to the higher court.
ISSUE:
Wether or not the petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as
a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and

16

thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay


permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised?
Wether or not the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does
not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must
possess all the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization and none of the disqualifications?
RULINGS:
On the First Issue at hand, Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to
aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately
become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of
nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines
permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the
immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds.
The applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien
visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him
ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to
permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature
and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is
inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines.

In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when
citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship
status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be
required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in
order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status
commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is established as a
fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be
lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a
Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven
fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no
difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of
the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself
be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former
becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.
In summation, it is not needed that the person who married a Filipino citizen
must go through the naturalization process before he/she could be considered
as a Filipino citizen. The writ must be issued and the commission of immigration
is barred from deporting and giving up the bond given by the petitioner.

We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for
disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant
of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any
of those specified causes may not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law.
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very
phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife
should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she
might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms
that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or
acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to
establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and
proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies
that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had
(the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. That
she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at
her marriage, she became a citizen.

17

KOOKOORITCHKIN VS THE SOLICITOR GENERAL


FACTS:
Eremes Kookooritchkin applies for Philippine citizenship naturalization under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 473, as amended by Act 535.
In August, 1941, he filed his petition for naturalization supported by the affidavits
of ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano, both residents of
Camarines Sur. In the preceding year, in July, 1940 to be precise, he filed his
declaration of intention to become a citizen of this country.
It was established at the hearing that the petitioner is a native-born Russian,
having first seen the light of day on November 4, 1897 in the old City of St.
Petersburg, Russia. He grew up as a citizen of the defunct Imperial Russian
Government under the Czars. World War I found him in the military service of
this Government. In 1915 he volunteered for the Imperial Russian navy and was
sent to the Navy Aviation School.
He fought with the Allies in the Baltic Sea, was later transferred to the eastern
front in Poland, and much later was sent as a navy flier to Asia Minor. In the
latter part of the war, but before the Russian capitulation, he was transferred to
the British Air Force under which he served for fourteen months. When the
revolution broke out in Russia in 1917, he joined the White Russian Army at
Vladivostok and fought against the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the White
Russian Army was overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he refused to join the
Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai and from this
Chinese port he found his way to Manila, arriving at this port as a member of a
group of White Russians under Admiral Stark in March, 1923.
He stayed in Manila for about seven months, then moved to Olongapo,
Zambales, where he resided for about a year, and from this place he went to
Iriga, Camarines Sur, where he established his permanent residence since May,
1925. He has remained a resident of this municipality, except for a brief period
from 1942 to July, 1945, when by reason of his underground activities he
roamed mountains of Caramoan as a guerrilla officer. After liberation he returned
to Iriga where again he resides up to the present time.
The applicant is married to a Filipino by the name of Concepcion Segovia, with
whom he has one son named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is at present studying
in Saint Agnes Academy, at Legaspi, Albay, a school duly recognized by the
Government.
The applicant is shop superintendent of A. L. Ammen Transportation Company,
with about eighty Filipino employees working under him. He receives an annual
salary of P13,200 with free quarters and house allowance. He also owns stocks
and bonds of this and other companies.

The applicant speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect. Socially he
intermingles with the Filipinos, attending parties, dances and other social
functions with his wife. He has a good moral character and believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. He has never been accused of
any crime. On the other hand, he has always conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire period of residence in Camarines Sur, in
his relations with the constituted authorities as well as with the community.
Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims
allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a
stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State, much less to the present
Government of the land of his birth to which he is uncompromisingly opposed.
He is not against organized government or affiliated with any association which
upholds and teaches doctrine opposing all organized governments. He does not
believe in the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a
polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy. He is not suffering from any
mental alienation or incurable contagious disease.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding that the declaration
of intention to become a Filipino citizen filed by appellee is invalid and
insufficient as a basis for the petition of naturalization?
Whether or not he cannot speak and write any of the principal
Philippine languages?
Whether or not appellee is a stateless or a Russian citizen and he has
failed to establish that he is not disqualified for Philippine citizenship under
section 4 (h) of the Revised Naturalization Law?
RULINGS:
We conclude that petitioner's declaration is valid under section 5 of the
Naturalization Law, failure to reconstitute the certificate of arrival
notwithstanding. What an unreconstituted document intended to prove may be
shown by other competent evidence.
Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law:
No declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been
established and a certificate showing the date, place and manner of his arrival
has been issued.

18

The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been continuously residing in the
Philippines for about 25 years, without having been molested by the authorities,
who are presumed to have been regularly performing their duties and would
have arrested petitioner if his residence is illegal, as rightly contended by
appellee, can be taken as evidence that he is enjoying permanent residence
legally. That a certificate of arrival has been issued is a fact that should be
accepted upon the petitioner's undisputed statement in his declaration of July,
1940, that the certificate cannot be supposed that the receiving official would
have accepted the declaration without the certificate mentioned therein as
attached thereto.
There is a reason to believe that the lower court's pronouncement is well taken
considering the fact that, after he was liberated in 1942 from the Japanese in the
Naga prison, petitioner joined the guerrilla in the Bicol region, took part in
encounters and skirmishes against the Japanese, and remained with the
guerrilla until the Americans liberated the Bicol provinces. If appellee with his
smattering of Bicol was able to get along with his Bicol comrades in the
hazardous life of the resistance movement, we believe that his knowledge of the
language satisfies the requirement of the law.
We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing appellee stateless.
Appellee's testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the wellknown fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered
throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons,
without country and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships
toward all opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration
camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate ones
who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of
attachment to the hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs
to that group of stateless refugees.
Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history,
nature and character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to
humanity and civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further
evidence of petitioner's claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes
no allegiance to the Russian Communist Government and, is because he has
been at war with it, he fled from Russia to permanently reside in the Philippines.
After finding in this country economic security in a remunerative job, establishing
a family by marrying a Filipina with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25
years the freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after
showing his resolution to retain the happiness he found in our political system to
the extent of refusing to claim Russian citizenship even to secure his release
from the Japanese and of casting his lot with that of our people by joining the
fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond comprehension to
support that the petitioner could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet
dictatorship.

REPUBLIC vs LI YAO
FACTS:
> William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization with the
Court of First Instance.
> Court hereby declares William Li Yao, for all intents and purposes a
naturalized Filipino citizen, it appearing that he possesses all the qualifications to
become a naturalized Filipino and none of the disqualifications provided for by
the law.
> About fifteen years later, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of naturalization on
the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained.
- He was not a person of good moral character, having had illicit amorous
relationship with several women other than his lawfully wedded wife, by whom
he fathered illegitimate children.
- In contracting marriage, he used the name Fransisco Li Yao without prior
judicial authority to use the aforesaid first name Fransisco, the same not
appearing to be his baptismal name.
- He evaded the payment of lawful taxes due to the government by
underdeclaration of income as reflected in his income tax returns.
- He committed violations of the Constitution and Anti-Dummy laws.
> William Li Yao opposed the forgoing motion but the lower court cancelled his
Certificate of Naturalization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of the
deceased petitioner-appellant William Li Yao made by the government through
the Office of the Solicitor General is valid?
RULING:
YES. It is indisputable that a certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant therefore obtained it
by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even
authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds had
conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. Moreover, a
naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision
rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any matter that would
support a judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of
illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof.
In ordering the cancellation of the naturalization certificate previously issued to
appellant, the lower court sustained the government's motion for cancellation on

19

the sole finding that Li Yao had committed underdeclaration of income and
underpayment of income tax.
It was held that the concealment of applicant's income to evade payment of
lawful taxes shows that his moral character is not irreproachable, thus
disqualifying him for naturalization.
Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax
liability under P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a
sufficient ground for lifting the order of the lower court cancelling his certificate of
naturalization. The legal effect of payment under the decree is merely the
removal of any civil, criminal or administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer,
only insofar as his tax case is concerned.
In other words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack
of good moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for
denaturalization.
Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant, this Court has
repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant failed to meet the
qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino
citizenship. More specifically, the Court has had occasion to state: "Admission to
citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines
can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except
upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law."
Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price which should be cherished and not
taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not stained
by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground for divesting one of said
citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the law must be
proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

SOBEJANA-CONDON vs COMELEC
FACTS:
> The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino
parents. She became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
> She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003." The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of
allegiance.
> The petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia - that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
> She ran for Mayor but lost the candidacy. Ran for Vice Mayor and won.
> Private respondents - all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate
petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC
on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225.
> Trial court held that the petitioners failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office.
> The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed.
Appealed to COMELEC en banc which concurred to the decision of the lower
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified fromrunning for elective
office forfailure to renounce her Australiancitizenship in accordance withSection
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225?
RULING:
YES. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to

20

have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of


allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly reacquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e.,
Australian and Philippine.
A year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of
Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was
not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.

(2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that
evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition
of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be
allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the
circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof
offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese
Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a
competent proof of that law.
The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any
of the above methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the
petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the
letter issued by the Australian government showing that petitioner already
renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a
quo acted judiciously in disregarding the same.

An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a


revered person or thing, that ones statement is true or that one will be bound to
a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the
statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to
subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false.

The petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has
previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign
citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of
R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of
a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath
ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officers abandonment of his
adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines.

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of
a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for
ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary
allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the legislature
clearly demand otherwise.

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who reacquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized
public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all
those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without
regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite
imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.

Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she
is already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We
disagree.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she
executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to
run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the
existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony
under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where
the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and
states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and

21

VIVO vs CLORIBEL
FACTS:
This is a case of Chinese nationals who came to the Philippines for a visit but
who refused to leave. And one where the improvident issuance of an ex-parte
preliminary injunction, followed by judicial inaction, actually extended the stay of
aliens beyond the period authorized by law, and even beyond what the visitors
had asked for.
Private respondents are a Chinese mother, and her 2 minor children.
They arrived from Hongkong and were admitted in the Philippines as temporary
visitors on October 1960, with an initial authorized stay of three (3) months.
The husband and father of these aliens applied for naturalization, and CFI
granted his petition in 1961.
The said temporary visitors petitioned for an indefinite extension of their stay.
By virtue of a Cabinet Resolution granting aliens concurrent jurisdiction to act on
petitions for extension of stay of temporary visitors, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs authorized (in 1961) the change in category from temporary visitors to
that of special non-immigrants under the Immigration Law for a period of stay
extending up to 11 April 1963.
The Secretary of Justice approved the extension thus authorized, subject to the
condition that the said aliens shall secure reentry permits to Hongkong valid at
least two months over and beyond their extended stay, and maintain their cash
bonds filed with the Bureau of Immigration and to pay the corresponding fees.
But the petitioner, Commissioner of Immigration, refused to recognize the said
extension further than 16 June 1962, and denied acceptance of payment of the
extension fees.
The respondents requested the President to extend their stay up to April 1963 in
order to coincide with their hope for and forthcoming oath-taking of allegiance
of the husband/father.
The request was referred to the Immigration Commissioner.
The commissioner informed the respondents that the new Secretary of Justice
ruled in that the Cabinet Resolution had no force and effect, and denied the
request for extension of stay of the respondents and advised them to leave the
country voluntarily not later than June 1962; otherwise, they would be proceeded
against, in accordance with law.

The respondents did not leave the country on the date specified, but instead
filed a petition for mandamus with injunction, to restrain the Commissioner of
Immigration from issuing a warrant for their arrest and from confiscating their
bond for their temporary stay and to order the Commissioner to implement the
extension.
The court then denied the prayer for preliminary injunction for lack of a prima
facie showing and set the case for hearing on 13 July 1962.
On July 1962, respondents re-filed the same petition with the same court. The
petition alleged three grounds therefor, namely: (1) the extension of their stay
was authorized and approved by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of
Justice; (2) they were due for eventual conversion into Filipino citizens by virtue
of the granting of the husband/fathers petition for naturalization, which had not
been appealed, and he was due to take his oath of allegiance on 11 April 1963;
and (3) their departure from the Philippines would work great injury and injustice
to themselves.
The judge issued ex-parte and without hearing an order granting preliminary
injunction, and, on a bond of P3,000.00.
The Immigration Commissioner filed his answer stating that: the visitors
authorized stay expired on June 1962; their change in category from temporary
visitors to special non-immigrants and the extension of their authorized by the
Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice was invalid as it is the
Commissioner of Immigration who is vested by law with power to grant
extensions of stay; the petition filed was not the proper remedy;
The Solicitor General will oppose the oath-taking of the father/husband
and even if he will become a Filipino citizen, his wife would not
automatically become a Filipino citizen, as she has yet to show that she,
herself, can be lawfully naturalized.
On 1965, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for the
unreasonable length of time that the petitioners had failed to prosecute their
case.
But the court denied the motion to dismiss for being not well taken.
On December 1965, the Commissioner filed with the SCan action of certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondent court.
ISSUE:
WON Chua (the mother/wife) automatically became a naturalized
Filipino?

22

RULING:

TECSON vs COMELEC

The court ruled that the wife, Chua Pic Luan, does not, under Section 15 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, automatically become a Filipino citizen on
account of her marriage to a naturalized Filipino citizen, since she must
first prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization.

FACTS:

By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and administrative


authorities that she came to the country for only a temporary visit when, in
fact, her intention was to stay permanently; and for having intentionally
delayed court processes the better to prolong her stay, respondent Chua
Pic Luan demonstrated her incapacity to satisfy the qualifications exacted
by the third paragraph of Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, that she
must be of good moral character and must have conducted herself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her
residence in the Philippines in her relation with the constituted
government.
And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines only from her arrival on 16
October 1960 to 16 June 1962, she (Chua Pick Luan) also failed to meet the
required qualification of continuous residence in the Philippines for ten
(10) years,her stay beyond 16 June 1962 being illegal. As to the foreign born
minors, Uy Koc Siong and Uy Tian Siong, our pronouncement in Vivo vs.
Cloribel, L-23239, 23 November 1966, 18 SCRA 713, applies to them:
As to foreign born minor children, they are extended citizenship if
dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalzation of the parent.
Dwelling means lawful residence. Since prior to the time the father of
respondents visitors was supposed to have taken his oath of citizenship their
lawful period of stay had already expired and they had already been
required to leave, they were no longer lawfully residing here.
Nor can these temporary visitors claim any right to a stay coterminous with the
result of the naturalization proceeding of their husband and father, Uy Pick Tuy,
because their authorized stay was for a definite period, up to a fixed day, a
circumstance incompatible with the termination of the naturalization proceeding,
which is uncertain and can not be set at a definite date.

Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential


elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes)
certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his
parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe
was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec,
contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction?
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen?
RULING:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification
of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by
the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship
was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84,
Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence,
Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the
place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.

23

Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an
American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by
the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

LABO vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect
who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took
an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be
bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization
made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine
citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship?
RULING:
YES. Because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine
citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express
renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of
which are applicable to the petitioner.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his
status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred
other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he
must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that
may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own
country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit
and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But
having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his
taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an
undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered
after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes
a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly
affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

24

25