PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. WILLIAM GOTHONG & ABOITIZ (WG&A), INC.

G.R. No. 158401

January 28, 2008
Amended Pleadings
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Philippine Ports Authority
(petitioner) seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated
on October 24, 2002 and its Resolution dated May 15, 2003.

Thereafter, in accordance with the stipulations made in the lease agreement, PPA
surrendered possession of the Marine Slip Way in favor of the petitioner.
However, believing that the said lease already expired on June 30, 2001,
respondent PPA subsequently sent a letter to petitioner WG&A dated November
12, 2001 directing the latter to vacate the contested premises not later than
November 30, 2001 and to turnover the improvements made therein pursuant to
the terms and conditions agreed upon in the contract.

The antecedent facts are accurately narrated by the CA as follows:

Petitioner William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. (WG&A for brevity), is a duly organized
domestic corporation engaged in the shipping industry. Respondent Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA for brevity), upon the other hand, is a government-owned
and controlled company created and existing by virtue of the provisions of P.D.
No. 87 and mandated under its charter to operate and administer the country's
sea port and port facilities.
After the expiration of the lease contract of Veterans Shipping Corporation over
the Marine Slip Way in the North Harbor on December 31, 2000, petitioner WG&A
requested respondent PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the said
facility. Thereafter, then President Estrada issued a memorandum dated
December 18, 2000 addressed to the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the General Manager of PPA,
stating to the effect that in its meeting held on December 13, 2000, the Economic
Coordinating Council (ECC) has approved the request of petitioner WG&A to
lease the Marine Slip Way from January 1 to June 30, 2001 or until such time that
respondent PPA turns over its operations to the winning bidder for the North
Harbor Modernization Project.
Pursuant to the said Memorandum, a Contract of Lease was prepared by
respondent PPA containing the following terms:
1. The lease of the area shall take effect on January 1 to June 30, 2001
or until such time that PPA turns over its operation to the winning bidder
for the North Harbor modernization;
2. You shall pay a monthly rental rate of P12.15 per square meter or an
aggregate monthly rental amount of P886,950.00;
3. All structures/improvements introduced in the leased premises shall
be turned over to PPA;
4. Water, electricity, telephone and other utility expenses shall be for the
account of William, Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc.;
5. Real Estate tax/insurance and other government dues and charges
shall be borne by WG&A.
The said contract was eventually conformed to and signed by the petitioner
company, through its President/Chief Executive Officer Endika Aboitiz, Jr.

In response, petitioner WG&A wrote PPA on November 27, 2001 urging the latter
to reconsider its decision to eject the former. Said request was denied by the PPA
via a letter dated November 29, 2001.
On November 28, 2001, petitioner WG&A commenced an Injunction suit before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner claims that the PPA unjustly, illegally
and prematurely terminated the lease contract. It likewise prayed for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order to arrest the evacuation. In its complaint,
petitioner also sought recovery of damages for breach of contract and attorney's
fees.
On December 11, 2001, petitioner WG&A amended its complaint for the first time.
The complaint was still denominated as one for Injunction with prayer for TRO. In
the said amended pleading, the petitioner incorporated statements to the effect
that PPA is already estopped from denying that the correct period of lease is "until
such time that the North Harbor Modernization Project has been bidded out to and
operations turned over to the winning bidder. It likewise included, as its third cause
of action, the additional relief in its prayer, that should the petitioner be forced to
vacate the said facility, it should be deemed as entitled to be refunded of the value
of the improvements it introduced in the leased property.
Following the first amendment in the petitioner's complaint, respondent PPA
submitted its answer on January 23, 2002. Meanwhile, the TRO sought by the
former was denied by the trial court by way of an order dated January 16, 2002.
Petitioner later moved for the reconsideration of the said Order on February 11,
2002. Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Attached Second
Amended Complaint. This time, however, the complaint was already captioned as
one for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and damages and/or for Reformation of Contract. Also, it
included as its fourth cause of action and additional relief in its prayer, the
reformation of the contract as it failed to express or embody the true intent of the
contracting parties.
The admission of the second amended complaint met strong opposition from the
respondent PPA. It postulated that the reformation sought for by the petitioner
constituted substantial amendment, which if granted, will substantially alter the
latter's cause of action and theory of the case.
On March 22, 2002, the respondent judge issued an Order denying the Admission
of the Second Amended Complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid order but the same was again denied in an order dated April 26,
2002.2
1

Herein respondent WG&A then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the
nullification of the aforementioned RTC orders.

which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."4

In its Decision dated October 24, 2002, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby
setting aside the RTC orders and directing the RTC to admit respondent's second amended
complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied per Resolution dated May 15, 2003.

The application of the old Rules by the RTC almost five years after its amendment by the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure patently constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, the present petition where the only issue raised is whether the CA erred in ruling
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the admission of the
second amended complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on October 24, 2002 and its Resolution dated May 15, 2003 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

The Court finds the petition without merit.

The CA did not err in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the Order dated March 22, 2002 denying the admission of respondent's second amended
complaint.
The RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. after the case is set for hearing,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave
may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to
delay the action or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon
motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to
be heard.
instead of the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amending Section 3, Rule
10, to wit:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next
preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of
court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the
motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters
provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice
to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,3 thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended
the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or
defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new
rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under
the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of
action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a
substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial
justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules
2

RODRIGO QUIRAO, MONICA QUIRAO, ROBERTO QUIRAO, EDILBERTO QUIRAO,

JESUS GOLE, GERARDO QUIRAO, LAMBERTO VALDEZ & FEDERICO QUIRAO v.
LYDIA QUIRAO & LEOPOLDO QUIRAO, JR.
G.R. No. 148120
October 24, 2003
Amended Pleadings
The issue in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court is whether Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambusao, Capiz should admit
the amended answer of petitioners.
Respondents Lydia Quirao and Leopoldo Quirao, Jr. filed before the trial court a complaint
for recovery of possession, ownership and damages against petitioners Rodrigo Quirao,
Monica Quirao, Roberto Quirao, Edilberto Quirao, Gerardo Quirao, Jesus Gole, Lamberto
Valdez, Federico Quirao and Avelino Ngitngit.1Respondents claimed that the late Leopoldo
Quirao was the owner of the sugarland, subject matter of the controversy. Respondent
Lydia is his widow, while Leopoldo, Jr. is his legitimate son and compulsory heir. They
alleged that in 1988, petitioners forcibly took possession of the sugarland and appropriated
for themselves its income. They prayed for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction for petitioners to vacate the property.2
In their Answer, petitioners claimed that the subject property was owned by their
grandfather, Segundo Clarito; that petitioner Rodrigo Quirao had been in possession of the
land even before the Second World War; and that Leopoldo Quirao never possessed it.
They further alleged that petitioners Jesus Gole, Avelino Ngitngit and Lamberto Valdez
were recipients of Emancipation Patents issued by the government. 3
A few months after their Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint citing
a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with Sale of the subject property purportedly executed by
respondents in favor of a certain Carlito de Juan ("de Juan"). Petitioners contended that
since respondents no longer own the property, they lack the standing to file the
complaint.4 They further alleged that it was only after they filed their Answer that they
learned of the existence of the deed. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack
of merit.5
The case underwent pre-trial. Petitioners' second counsel, who took over the case, filed an
amended pre-trial brief which reiterated the allegation that respondents were not the real
parties in interest as they had sold the property to de Juan. Trial ensued and after
respondents rested their case, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Admit
Attached Amended Answer."6 They sought the amendment of their Answer by adding the
alternative defense that even if respondents were the owners of the property by inheritance
from Leopoldo Quirao, they (respondents) executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of
Property with Sale in favor of de Juan. They further claimed that in turn, de Juan sold part
of the property to them.7 The second sale appears to be evidenced by a Deed of
Sale8 involving part of the subject property executed by de Juan and petitioners. It also
appears that Rodrigo made a partial payment of P50,000.00, evidenced by the receipt
signed by de Juan.9
Respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that: (1) it is dilatory and (2) the
amendments are substantial and cannot be allowed as the parties have already undergone
a pre-trial conference.10

The motion was again denied by the trial court. It ratiocinated that the amendments will
prejudice the respondents since they had already rested their case and the alleged facts
were already existing and known to the petitioners when they filed their
answer.11 Petitioners' motion for reconsideration12 was likewise denied.131awphi1.nt
Petitioners repaired to the Court of Appeals which also dismissed their petition for lack of
merit. The appellate court ruled that the amendments are basically the same issues raised
in their motion to dismiss and are substantial ones which may properly be refused. It cited
Batara vs. Court of Appeals,14 where we held that the negligence and ignorance of
petitioners' previous counsels cannot qualify as "transcendental matters" which can
outweigh technicalities.15 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration16 but their efforts
were in vain.17 Thus, this petition based on the following grounds:
A. THE OMISSION AND INACTION SEPARATELY AND INDIVIDUALLY
COMMITTED BY EACH OF PETITIONERS' THREE PREVIOUS LAWYERS
CONSTITUTE MERELY SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE WHICH, AS A GENERAL
RULE, SHOULD BIND THEM. HOWEVER, WHEN PUT AND CONSIDERED
TOGETHER, SUCH OMISSION AND INACTION ARE TRANSFORMED INTO
AND COULD BE RIGHTFULLY CONSIDERED AS GROSS AND RECKLESS
AND, HENCE, SHOULD NOT AND COULD NEVER BIND THEM. IT IS HUMBLY
SUBMITTED THAT EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING, THE
AMENDMENTS SOUGHT TO BE INTRODUCED IN THE ORIGINAL ANSWER
MAY STILL BE LAWFULLY ALLOWED; OTHERWISE, PETITIONERS WOULD
BE DEPRIVED OF THEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
B. IN THE HIGHER INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, THE
AMENDMENTS SOUGHT TO BE INTRODUCED IN THE ORIGINAL ANSWER
SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIBERALLY ALLOWED SINCE THIS COURSE OF
ACTION WOULD RESULT IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE BELOW
BASED ON PURE MERITS, RATHER THAN ON PURE TECHNICALITY.
MOREOVER, THE RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS COULD BE AMPLY
PROTECTED, AND WHATEVER DELAY HAS ALREADY BEEN INCURRED IS
NEVER SOLELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO PETITIONERS;
C. THE COURT A QUO HAS LIBERALLY CONSTRUED THE RULES IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENTS AND STRICTLY CONSTRUED THEM AGAINST
PETITIONERS; and
D. IN ITS DECISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED THE
FOLLOWING ERRORS: 1) IT RULED THAT THE MATTER SOUGHT TO BE
INTRODUCED IN THE ORIGINAL ANSWER IS THE SAME ISSUE ALLEGED IN
PETITIONERS' MOTION TO DISMISS WHICH WAS DENIED BY THE COURT
A QUO; 2) IT FAILED TO DISCUSS THE THIRD GROUND EVEN AS THIS WAS
EXPLICITLY RAISED BEFORE IT; AND 3) IT APPLIED THE JURISPRUDENCE
LAID IN (sic) DOWN IN THE BATARA CASE.18
The Rules of Court allow amendments of pleadings as a matter of right before a responsive
pleading is served;19otherwise, leave of court must first be obtained. 20
Our case law teaches us that amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit,
decreases as it progresses, and changes at times to a strictness amounting to a prohibition.
3

Amendments are likewise subject to the limitation that they are not dilatory. 21 Thus, trial
courts are given the discretion to grant leave of court to file amended pleadings, and their
exercise of this discretion will normally not be disturbed on appeal, unless there is evident
abuse thereof.22
In the case at bar, petitioners filed their motion for leave of court to admit amended answer
only after respondents have rested their case. Petitioners argue that the error was due to
the oversight of the three previous counsels. Petitioners' fourth counsel also claims that he
learned of the alternative defense late as his clients (petitioners herein) did not inform him
of the Deed of Sale.23 Allegedly, they relied on the advice of their previous counsels that
the said deed of sale "was a mere scrap of paper because it was not signed by Carlito de
Juan."24Respondents contend that petitioners' motion is too late in the day.
Petitioners' motion for admission of amended answer may be a little tardy but this by itself
is not a cause for its denial. Their amended answer alleges that respondents no longer own
the subject property having sold the same to de Juan who, in turn, sold the property to
petitioners. These allegations, if correct, are vital to the disposition of the case at bar. The
interest of justice and equity demand that they be considered to avoid a result that is
iniquitous. Truth cannot be barred by technical rules. For this reason, our ruling case law
holds that amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed
in furtherance of justice so that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real
facts and in order to prevent the circuity of action. 25
We should always bear in mind that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on technical matters,
which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts. 26
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mambusao, Capiz is directed to admit the amended answer.
Footnotes
19

Rule 10, Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. - A party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days right after it is
served.
20

Rule 10, Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the

next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave
of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion
was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in
this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

RAFAEL BAUTISTA and LIGAYA ROSEL v. MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES, INC.

G.R. No. 148361
November 29, 2005
Amended Pleadings

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in its
Resolution of May 30, 2001.
Hence, the instant petitioner for review on certiorari.

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 24, 2000 and May 30, 2001,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43574.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting respondents amended complaint.

The facts are:

Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
Spouses Rafael and Ligaya Bautista, petitioners herein, are the registered owners of a
3,856-square meter lot located at Natipuan, Nasugbu, Batangas, as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1436 issued in their names on January 15, 1989 by the
Register of Deeds, same province.
On May 13, 1996, Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc. (MMCI), respondent, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas a complaint for cancellation of petitioners title and
damages, with application for a preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 371.
Respondent alleged inter alia that "without any color of right and through dubious means,"
petitioners were able to obtain OCT No. P-1436 in their names.
On May 29, 1996, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
does not state a cause of action. They averred that respondent is a private corporation,
hence, disqualified under the Constitution2 from acquiring public alienable lands except by
lease. Respondent cannot thus be considered a real party in interest.
In its Order dated August 30, 1996, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding
that since the property is an alienable public land, respondent is not qualified to acquire it
except by lease. Thus, it has no cause of action.
Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for leave to file an amended
complaint for quieting of title. Respondent alleged that the technical description in
petitioners title does not cover the disputed lot.

"SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served."
The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any responsive pleading, a
party has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of
action or change in theory is introduced. It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the
responsive pleading contemplated by the Rule.3 Records show that petitioners had not yet
filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in Civil Case No. 371. What they filed
was a motion to dismiss. It follows that respondent, as a plaintiff, may file an amended
complaint even after the original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order
of dismissal is not yet final,4 as in this case.
Verily, the Court of Appeals correctly held that in issuing the assailed Order admitting the
amended complaint, the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion. Hence,
neither certiorari nor prohibition would lie.
As to petitioners contention that respondent corporation is barred from acquiring the
subject lot, suffice it to say that this is a matter of defense which can only be properly
determined during the full-blown trial of the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43574 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

Thereupon, petitioners filed their opposition, contending that the amended complaint does
not also state a cause of action and if admitted, respondents theory of the case is
substantially modified.
On November 18, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners motion to
dismiss, thus, reversing its Order of August 30, 1996 dismissing the complaint in Civil Case
No. 371.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43574. They alleged that the amended complaint
does not cure the defect in the original complaint which does not state a cause of action.
Clearly, in admitting respondents amended complaint, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On November 24, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
5

LAPRECIOSISIMA CAGUNGUN, REMEDIOS L. CAGUNGUN, JESUS L. CAGUNGUN,

VICENTE L. CAGUNGUN, JR., RICARDO L. CAGUNGUN, EDUARDO L. CAGUNGUN,
ROWENA L. CAGUNGUN, ALVIN L. CAGUNGUN and ALMA L. CAGUNGUN v.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 158674
October 17, 2005
Amended Pleadings Kinds Conform to Evidence

withdrawal of P20,000.00 made on October 8, 1979 from Savings Account No. 12241-16
and the withdrawals of a total of P30,000.00 from several of the other accounts of the
spouses, were placed on time deposits on the same date by Vicente Cagungun in five (5)
accounts held with their children. The other said withdrawals from Savings Account No.
12241-16 were made by Vicente Cagungun in exchange for Managers Checks made in
the names of payees Santiago Lee, Rosita Saldana, Benito Yap and Joaquin Aganda.3

Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure are the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 25 March 2002 that modified
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case
No. 245-0-83, dated 26 June 1997, deleting the awards of moral and exemplary damages
and finding that the mortgaged loan was deemed paid and enjoining foreclosure, as well
as reducing the awards for litigation fees and expenses, and its Resolution2 dated 06 June
2003 denying petitioners Lapreciosisima Cagungun, et al.s motion for reconsideration.

The lower court ruled, among other things, that the withdrawals from Savings Account No.
12241-16 through seven (7) withdrawal slips4 amounting to P220,000.00 were not made
by petitioners as the alleged signatures of Vicente Cagungun, Jr. appearing therein were
falsified as confirmed by the National Bureau of Investigation Handwriting Expert Arcadio
Ramos. It likewise considered petitioners to have paid their mortgage loan in the amount
of P58,297.16 in view of their instruction to respondent to apply their funds in Savings
Account No. 38470-29 thereto which were adequate for this purpose.

The antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals in its decision as follows:

For not applying the savings of petitioners in Savings Account No. 38470-29 as payment
to their loan, thereby causing the threatened foreclosure of the real estate mortgage over
their house and lot, and for allowing the unauthorized withdrawals from Savings Account
No. 12241-16 through falsified withdrawal slips, the lower court held respondent liable to
pay moral damages. For ignoring the two (2) demand letters of petitioners, the demand
letter of petitioners counsel and the representations made by Pampanga Gov. Estelito
Mendoza and Central Bank Governor Jaime Laya, and for the attempt to cover up the
misdeeds of its employees constituting malice and bad faith, respondent was also ordered
to pay exemplary damages as an example to others. On account of these acts, respondent
was also ordered to pay attorneys fees and the cost of suit.

On September 1, 1987, the spouses Vicente Cagungun and Lapreciosisima Cagungun (or
the Cagungun spouses) filed suit with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City against
the Country Development Bank (or COUNTRY), and which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 245-083 and assigned to Branch 74. Vicente Cagungun has since died and was
substituted as plaintiff on August 8, 1984 by their children. On the other hand COUNTRY
has entered into a merger and reflective of this the party defendant has been changed to
Planters Development Bank (or PLANTERS) on September 1, 1987.
COUNTRY had opened an extension office in Olongapo City, and among their first
customers were the Cagungun spouses who had diverse business interests in the locality.
They opened some accounts, and for two (2) of which they were issued Savings Passbook
No. 12241-16 in the name of Purings Dry Goods and Savings Passbook No. 38470-29 in
the names of V/L Cagungun.
It was claimed by the Cagungun spouses and testified to by them and their daughter-inlaw Sarah Cagungun, that because of the exigencies of their businesses that required daily
deposits of the proceeds and of the trust that they have reposed with COUNTRY and its
personnel, they entrusted and left with them their said savings pass books. At least once a
day the Branch manager Ruperto Reyes or a certain Bong and Ding would come to get
their funds and with the agreement that these would be rounded off and deposited to their
account while the odd remainder would be applied to their loan. The arrangement
apparently went well, until March 1981 when the Cagungun spouses received a letter from
COUNTRY telling them that their loan is past due and payment was demanded . . . or else.
This prompted them to investigate, but this was tedious and difficult because of lack of
cooperation and even resistance from COUNTRY. But with the help of friends in high
places the Cagungun spouses were able to access and pry information that in the year
1979 on the dates of October 8, 18, 20 and 31 and November 15, and December 4 and 8,
with the use of withdrawal slips a total of P220,000.00 was withdrawn from their Savings
Passbook No. 12241-16. These withdrawals were invalid for no such withdrawal was
authorized, made or received by the depositors, and the signatures of Vicente Cagungun
on the slips were forgeries. This was confirmed by Arcadio Ramos, Chief of the Questioned
Documents Division of the NBI when these were subjected to examination.
The side of PLANTERS was explicated by its employees, Internal Auditor Lilia Tactay,
Branch Manager Lolita Mendoza and Cashier Bella Lumanog. It was explained that the

In its decision5 dated 26 June 1997, the lower court disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant as follows:
1.) Enjoining the defendant from foreclosing the mortgage of plaintiffs property located at
No. 88 Gordon Avenue, Pag-asa, Olongapo City;
2.) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P220,000.00 actual damages
representing the total amount withdrawn from their accounts plus twelve (12%) per cent
interest per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until it shall have been fully
paid;
3.) Considering plaintiffs mortgaged account in the amount of P58,297.16 to have been
paid;
4.) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P300,000.00 moral damages;
5.) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P300,000.00 exemplary
damages; and
6.) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount
expense, P50,000.00 attorneys fee plus the cost of suit. 6

of P50,000.00 litigation

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.

6

The Court of Appeals agreed that money was withdrawn from the deposits of petitioners
without their authority or knowledge, and that this was done by one or some of the
personnel of respondent. However, it held that petitioners are not free from the obligation
to pay the admitted loan (P58,297.16) for though the same was not paid for failure of
respondent to comply with the instruction to apply the remainder of the sums deposited to
their loan, it remained admittedly an unpaid obligation. It removed the awards for moral and
exemplary damages and reduced the awards for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on 25 March 2002, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, but with these MODIFICATONS (a)
the dispositions in Par. 1 and Par. 3 of the fallo deeming the mortgaged loan paid and
enjoining foreclosure, are DELETED; (b) the disposition in Par. 4 and Par. 5 of the fallo
awarding moral and exemplary damages, are DELETED; and (c) the awards of litigation
fees and expenses are REDUCED to a combined P30,000.00.7

authorized to look into the records of their deposits, that they received copies thereof. They
discovered therein that the sum of P220,000.00 was withdrawn from their accounts by
respondent bank through its employees by falsifying the signatures of Vicente Cagungun,
Jr. in seven withdrawal slips. Despite the forgeries, they refused to acknowledge its liability.
Thus, on 07 September 1983, in order to protect their rights, petitioners were forced to file
the instant case with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure of their property. Petitioners insist that
respondent, in allowing withdrawals in their savings account without their authority or
knowledge, is guilty of gross negligence to which it is liable for moral damages.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that the Court of Appeals was correct in deleting
the award of moral damages.

Respondent filed a Comment10 on 04 September 2003 to which petitioners filed their

Reply11 dated 06 February 2004.

Respondent argues that it should not be faulted if petitioners had to experience

inconveniences in acquiring copies of ledgers of their deposits as well as copies of the
withdrawal slips since certain banking procedures must be observed. It likewise faults
petitioners for not strictly observing security rules of financial institutions in the care and
custody of their passbooks, as well as in the standard operating procedure for deposits and
withdrawals which led to the alleged improper recording of deposits and the alleged losses
they incurred. It stresses that passbooks should be securely kept by the owner but, in the
case of petitioners, they openly entrusted their passbooks to other people leaving them
totally unable to monitor their transactions. It added that there was absence of any actual
injury on the part of the petitioners. It asserts that it neither acted in bad faith nor took
advantage of petitioners deposit for its use and benefit. It claims that petitioners failed to
establish fraud on the part of respondent bank as to make it liable for the alleged improper
recording of deposits. It claims that petitioners failed to present in court the persons (Bong
or Ding) to whom they entrusted their money for deposit and to prove that Ruperto Reyes,
then Officer-In-Charge (O-I-C) of the Extension Office of Country Development Bank,
defrauded them by facilitating withdrawals for the benefit of the bank. No proof was
adduced to show that they verified if the persons to whom they delegated to make the
deposits faithfully performed the tasks in accordance with their intentions. Respondent
insists that it is the negligence of petitioners, not fraud on its part, which was the reason
that petitioners deposits were not applied in accordance with their intentions resulting to
the (threatened) foreclosure of their mortgaged property.

On 06 December 2004, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. 12 Both parties
complied.13

From the foregoing reasons advanced by respondent bank, it is apparent that it is trying to
pass all the blame on petitioners for the unauthorized withdrawals amounting
to P220,000.00 and the non-applications of deposits to their loan.

We first discuss the deletion made by the Court of Appeals of the awards of moral damages
and exemplary damages.

This cannot be. The fact that petitioners left the custody of their passbooks to respondent,
through its employee O-I-C Ruperto Reyes, and that they entrusted to Bong or Ding their
deposits will not excuse respondent from being liable. Petitioners did these things because
they trusted and depended on respondent to take care of their accounts with it. If
respondent bank was really strict in enforcing the banking rule that the passbook must be
kept by the depositor, why did it not do so? For its failure, any anomaly or damage that
might result therefrom should be borne by it.

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution dated 06 June
2003.8
Petitioners are now before us assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
when the latter:
(A) DELETED THE PORTION OF THE RTC DECISION DECLARING THE MORTGAGED
LOAN PAID AND ENJOINING FORECLOSURE;
(B) DELETED THE AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AND
(C) REDUCED THE LITIGATION FEES AND EXPENSES.9

Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in removing the award of moral
damages considering that it is settled jurisprudence that the same should be awarded when
the injured party suffers mental anguish and serious anxiety. They contend that the Court
of Appeals failed to appreciate the torment they suffered from the time they noticed their
deposits were not properly recorded until the receipt of respondents letter threatening the
foreclosure of their residential house and lot for a loan of P58,000.00. They narrated that
respondent bank refused to give them copies of the ledgers of their deposits as well as
copies of the withdrawal slips. Despite the intercession of Pampanga Governor Estelito
Mendoza and Central Bank Governor Jaime Laya, respondent did not give them copies of
the ledgers and withdrawal slips. It was only after the Chief of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary sent two of his investigators, whom they

We, likewise, find untenable respondents contention that petitioners should have
presented O-I-C Ruperto Reyes, Bong or Ding as witnesses to clear the air. On the
contrary, it should have been respondents duty to present these persons they being their
employees. It should have presented these people, especially O-I-C Ruperto Reyes, who
had custody of the passbooks, to explain why unauthorized withdrawals were made and
why the instruction to apply petitioners deposit to their loan was not complied with.
7

The bank was indeed grossly negligent when it allowed the sum of P220,000.00 to be
withdrawn through falsified withdrawal slips without petitioners authority and knowledge
and its failure to comply with petitioners instruction to apply their deposits on their loan. In
so doing, respondent bank breached the trust that petitioners reposed on it.
We agree in the findings of the two courts below that the unauthorized transactions were
committed by one or some of the employees of respondent bank for which it should be
liable. The evidence showed that respondent did not exercise the degree of diligence it
ought to have exercised in dealing with its clients -- diligence higher than that of a good
father of a family. If only respondent exercised such diligence, no anomaly or irregularity
would have happened.
In the case of Philippine National Bank v. Pike,14 we discussed the degree of diligence
imposed on banks as follows:
With banks, the degree of diligence required, contrary to the position of petitioner PNB, is
more than that of a good father of a family considering that the business of banking is
imbued with public interest due to the nature of their functions. The stability of banks largely
depends on the confidence of the people in the honesty and efficiency of banks. Thus, the
law imposes on banks a high degree of obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors
with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 8791, which took effect on 13 June 2000, makes a categorical declaration
that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of
integrity and performance."
Though passed long after the unauthorized withdrawals in this case, the aforequoted
provision is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court decisions already in esse at the time
of such withdrawals. We elucidated in the 1990 case of Simex International, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals that "the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship."
Likewise, in the case of The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
we clarified that said fiduciary relationship means that the banks obligation to observe
"highest standards of integrity and performance" is deemed written into every deposit
agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires
banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Article
1172 of the New Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that
prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a family. In
every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with utmost fidelity, whether
such accounts consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos.
Settled is the rule that gross negligence of a bank in the handling of its clients deposit
amounts to bad faith that calls for an award of moral damages. Moral damages are meant
to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injuries unjustly caused.15
In the case at bar, the failure of the bank to prevent seven unauthorized withdrawals from
the deposits of petitioners and its non-compliance with petitioners instructions regarding
the loan payments constitute gross negligence which justifies the award of moral damages.
As employer, respondent is liable for the negligence or misdeed of its employees which
caused petitioners to have sleepless nights thinking about the threatened foreclosure of

their house and lot. In addition, the way respondent gave petitioners a hard time in securing
copies of their withdrawal slips and ledgers of their deposits is an indication of bad faith.
Respondent could have easily cooperated with petitioners by immediately furnishing the
latter with documents they wanted. This was not to be. Written communications from
petitioners lawyers and from the Central Bank Governor were not sufficient in order that
respondent will provide petitioners with the documents they needed. It was only after two
agents of the CIS of the Philippine Constabulary went to the bank that respondent was
obliged to give petitioners what they were asking for.
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, as in the case16 before us, moral damages are
recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, 17 or is found guilty
of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations.18
In fine, the requisites on award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of
besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained
by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed
or envisioned by Article 221919 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.20
All these elements are present in the instant case.
There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral
damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. The yardstick should
be that it is not palpably and scandalously excessive. 21 We find the sum of P300,000.00
awarded by the lower courts excessive. In our view, the award of P100,000.00 as moral
damages is reasonable and is in accord with our rulings in similar cases involving banks
negligence with regard to the accounts of their depositors. 22
Anent the removal by the Court of Appeals of the award of exemplary damages, we find
the same to be not in order.
The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an example for the public
good.23 The banking system has become an indispensable institution in the modern world
and plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized society. Whether as mere
passive entities for the safe-keeping and saving of money or as active instruments of
business and commerce, banks have attained a ubiquitous presence among the people,
who have come to regard them with respect and even gratitude and most of all,
confidence.24 For this reason, banks should guard against injury attributable to negligence
or bad faith on its part.25 The award of exemplary damages is warranted by the failure of
respondent bank to prevent the unauthorized withdrawals from petitioners deposits and its
failure to properly apply the latters deposits to their loan. We, however, find
the P300,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive and should accordingly be
reduced to P50,000.00.
On the matter of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled that the reasons or
grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court. 26 An award of
attorneys fees, being an exception from the policy of not putting a premium or a penalty
on the right to litigate, has since been limited to the grounds specified by law. 27 Article
220828 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances where attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation can be recovered.
8

In the case at bar, the RTC clearly stated in its decision that petitioners are entitled to
attorneys fees and litigation expenses because they were compelled to litigate in order to
protect their interest. We agree. Moreover, there being an award for exemplary damages,
it follows that there should be an award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses. However,
the awards of P50,000.00 for attorneys fees and P50,000.00 for litigation expenses by the
RTC are too much, while the award of P30,000.00 of the Court of Appeals for both is too
small. In as much as this case has been pending for more than twenty (20) years, the
award of P25,000.00 for each will be sufficient.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in deleting the portions of the RTC
decision declaring their mortgage loan paid and enjoining foreclosure. They insist that they
were able to prove that the amounts of P30,000.00 and P118,000.00 were respectively
withdrawn from their accounts (SA No. 38470-29 and No. 12241-16) and that same were
not applied as payment for their loan. They maintain that by adding together said amounts,
the sum thereof is sufficient to pay their loan and to consider the real estate mortgage as
discharged.
Looking at the complaint filed by petitioners, there is no allegation that said amounts were
withdrawn from their accounts and that same were not applied as payments for their loan.
Petitioners likewise did not ask in their prayer that said amounts be returned to them or that
they be used to off-set their indebtedness to respondent. Moreover, when petitioners tried
to prove this allegation, counsel for respondent objected29 and attempted to have the
testimony thereon stricken off the record on the ground of allegata et probata.30
Under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, 31 if evidence is objected to at the
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the Court may
allow the pleadings to be amended freely when the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and the admission of such evidence would not prejudice the
objecting party in maintaining his action or defense upon the merit. Said section reads:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment but
failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party
to meet such evidence.

As regards respondents right to exercise its right to foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
on petitioners property, we rule that respondent cannot exercise such right under the
circumstances obtaining. It will be the height of inequity if we allow such a thing. The
evidence is clear that the sum of P220,000.00 was withdrawn from petitioners deposits
without their knowledge and authority. This amount is more than sufficient to pay for the
loan had it not been illegally withdrawn. Neither should petitioners be held liable for any
interest on the remaining balance of the loan considering that they could have easily settled
their obligation with respondent if they were not embroiled in the anomaly caused by
respondents employees. Finally, payment for the remaining balance of the loan amounting
to P58,297.16 should be deducted from the actual damages awarded by the court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 25 March
2002 decision of the Court of Appeals modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, respondent Planters
Development Bank is ordered to pay petitioners the following: (1) P220,000.00 as actual
damages representing the total amount withdrawn from petitioners accounts plus interest
of 6% per annum to be computed from the date of the filing of the complaint which interest
rate shall become 12% per annum from the time of finality of this judgment until actual
payment; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(4) P25,000.00 as attorneys fees and P25,000.00 for litigation expenses. Respondent is
enjoined from foreclosing the real estate mortgage on petitioners property located at No.
88 Gordon Avenue, Pag-asa, Olongapo City. Payment for the outstanding loan of
petitioners in the amount of P58,297.16 shall be deducted from the damages awarded by
the Court.
Footnotes
30

A rule of procedure whereby only matters alleged in the pleadings may be

proved (Robles v. Del Rosario, 100 Phil. 891) cited in Philippine Law Dictionary
by Moreno, 2nd Ed., p. 35.
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberally if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment
to be made. (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
31

It is thus clear that when there is an objection on the evidence presented because it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, an amendment must be made before accepting
such evidence. If no amendment is made, the evidence objected to cannot be considered.
In the case before us, the trial court, there being an objection on the evidence being
presented by respondent, failed to order the amendment of the complaint. Thus, we are
constrained not to consider evidence regarding the P30,000.00 and P118,000.00 allegedly
withdrawn from their accounts. With this ruling, it follows that the outstanding loan of
petitioners in the amount of P58,297.16 remains unpaid.

ROSITA ZAFRA BANTILLO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ELSA

MANIQUIS-SUMCAD
G.R. No. 75311 October 18, 1988
Bill of Particulars
The subject of the present Petition for Review is the Decision 1 dated 3 April 1986 of the
then intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV 05774 (entitled "Rosita Zafra Bantillo, for
herself and in representation of the Heirs of Spouses Candida Zafra. and Maria Pimentel
Zafra, plaintiff-appellants, versus Elsa Maniquis-Sumcad, defendant-appellee'). The
appellate court affirmed a 2 August 1983 Order of Branch 2 of the then Court of First
Instance of North Cotabato, ordering (a) the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No.
161; and (b) the striking out of the Amended Complaint filed in the same case.
The case at bar originated from a Complaint for Reconveyance 2 (docketed as Civil Case
No. 161), dated 19 April 1982, filed by petitioner Rosita Zafra Bantillo against respondent
Elsa Maniquis-Sumcad with the Court of First Instance of North Cotabato. The action
involved a 240 square meter parcel of land (Lot No. 63, BSD-11551) situated in the
poblacion of Midsayap, North Cotabato. In the Complaint, it was alleged that petitioner
Bantillo (plaintiff below) "is the surviving heir" of the deceased spouses, Candido Zafra and
Maria Pimental Zafra; that the Zafra spouses had occupied and possessed Lot No. 63
"under claim of ownership since 1950;" that petitioner, as surviving heir and in
representation of the heirs of [the Zafra] spouses," had been in open and continuous
possession and occupation of Lot No. 63 ever since the death of the spouses; that by virtue
of Original Certificate of Title No. P35267 issued in the name of respondent Sumcad,
respondent had claimed ownership of the disputed land and had sought petitioner's
removal therefrom; and that respondent had rejected demands to reconvey the land to
petitioner.

This is a hearing on the motion for bill of particulars and the opposition
thereto. The counsel for the plaintiff agreed to specify the names of the
heirs and to submit a special power of attorney executed by said heirs in
favor of the first-named plaintiff, Rosita Zafra Bantillo. After the
amendments made by the counsel, the counsel is directed to furnish the
counsel for the defendant a copy of the said amendments.
Defendant is given en (15) days from the receipt of the copy of the
amended complaint within which to file the defendant's responsive
pleading.
The pre-trial will be set as soon as the proper amendments [are]
submitted. SO ORDERED. (P. 46, Records)
On September 3, 1982, counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. In
support of the motion, it was pointed out that the plaintiff had not as yet submitted
her amended complaint as directed by the court. Neither had the plaintiff complied
with the July 5, 1982 Order of said court directing her to specify the other Bantillo
heirs and to produce the special power of attorney authorizing her to represent
their heirs in the action.
Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to dismiss. The Opposition stated,
among other things, "that the delay was due to the fact that this Honorable Court
(had) for quite a time no presiding judge, so that even if said pleading be filed, it
still could not be acted upon." Attached to the Opposition was an amended
complaint. 5

Respondent Sumcad (defendant below) filed a "Motion for Bill of Particulars 3 in response
to the complaint. In that motion, respondent Sumcad requested that petitioner Bantillo be
directed by the court: (a) 'to specify what kind of surviving heir she is ...;" and (b) "to specify
by what right or authority she represents the so-called 'heirs of the spouses Candido Zafra
and Maria Pimentel Zafra ... and [to show] the papers under which she is authorized to
represent them in court, and also (to specify and Identify these other heirs by name and
the nature of their heirship.'

Reacting to the Opposition, defendant on July 5, 1983 interposed a Rejoinder with

Motion to Strike Out/Dismiss Plaintiffs Pleadings, pointing out therein that the
plaintiffs compliance with the court's Order was made more than one year from
the issuance of the said Order. Invoking Section l(c), Rule 12 of the Rules of Court
which grants a party only a ten-day period within which to respond to a bill of
particulars, the defendant denounced plaintiffs tardy compliance as an outright
sham and a mere ploy intended to outsmart this Honorable Court and the parties.

On 16 June 1982, petitioner Bantillo questioned the propriety of respondent Sumcad's

motion. 4 Petitioner Bantillo alleged that the matters mentioned in the "Motion for Bill of
Particulars" were not essential to enable respondent Sumcad to file an answer to the
complaint, that such matters are not proper subjects of a motion for bill of particulars.

Not to be outdone, plaintiff through her counsel filed a Rejoinder to the Opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the late compliance to [sic] the lower court's
July 5, 1982 Order was excusable under Section 1, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
which allows amendment of pleadings without regard for mere technicalities.

The subsequent facts, which are stated in the appellate court's decision presently under
review, are not disputed:

On August 2, 1983, the court a quo issued the Order which is the subject of this
present Appeal. In this Order the lower court decreed as follows:

In response to a motion for a bill of particulars, regarding the complaint filed by

the plaintiff, the latter's counsel manifested in open court that she was willing to
specify the names of the heirs allegedly being represented by plaintiff Rosita
Bantillo as well as to submit the special power of attorney executed by said heirs
in plaintiffs favor. Hence, the court a quo issued the following Order dated July 5,
1982:

WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the Motion to Strike Out/ Dismiss Plaintiffs
Pleadings, filed by the Defendant's Counsel meritorious, grants the same and
orders the dismissal of the complaint and the striking out of the amended
complaint, with costs. SO ORDERED. (P. 49, Ibid.)
In her appeal, the plaintiff alleges five (5) errors purportedly committed by the
lower court. However, for purposes of resolving the appeal, We deem it necessary

10

only to consider the first two (2) assignments of error, namely: The court a
quo erred:
I. In striking [out] the amended complaint on the grounds:
A. That it must follow the agreement embodied in the Order of
the Court dated July 5, 1982;
B. That the amended complaint must be filed 'at any time within
ten (10) days after it is served
II. In dismissing the complaint for plaintiffs failure to comply with the
Orders of the court.
The trial and appellate courts both held that dismissal of petitioner Bantillo's complaint in
this case was warranted as she had been "guilty of an unreasonable delay in complying
with the July 5, 1982 Order of the (trial] court.' The appellate court cited in this connection
Section l(c) of Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court under which petitioner Bantillo had
ten (10) days from notice of the trial court's Order of 5 July 1982or until 15 July 1982
within which to comply with the directives contained in that order. In addition, both courts
held that the amended complaint should have been filed, at the very least, within a
"seasonable" time and in a manner consistent with "[petitioner's] agreement as embodied
in the Order of the [trial] court dated July 5, 1982." Finally, it was noted that the alleged
vacancy at Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (which succeeded Branch 2 of the Court
of First Instance) of North Cotabato at Midsayap lasted only from 18 January 1983 until 29
March 1983, or for a period of just a little over two (2) months. This latter circumstance
further convinced the two (2) courts that petitioner Bantillos amended complaint, which was
submitted to the trial court on 22 June 1983, had not been filed seasonably.
The present Petition for Review was received by this Court on 1 August 1986. Respondent
filed an Answer 6 on 28 October 1986, to which petitioner submitted a Reply. 7 In a
Resolutions 8 dated 27 July 1987, the Court, without giving due course to the Petition,
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.
Petitioner Bantillo contests the application in this case of Section 1 of Rule 12 of the
Revised Rules of Court, alleging once more that the matters mentioned in respondent
Sumcads disputed motion are "not within the scope and ambit of a bill of particulars."
Petitioner also alleges that "there was really no bill of particulars required of (petitioner)" by
the trial court. Furthermore, it is contended that Rule 10 of the Rules of Court is the
applicable provision here.
1. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Re Rules of Court reads, in part:
Section 1. Motion for bill of particulars.Before responding to a pleading or, if no
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, within ten (10) days after service
of the pleading upon him, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a
bill of part of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of and the
details desired.

Under this Rule, the remedy available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue or
matter vaguely or obscurely pleaded by the other party, is to file a motion, either for "a more
definite statement" or for a bill of particulars. An order directing the submission of such
statement or bill, further, is proper where it enables the party movant intelligently to prepare
a responsive pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.
The title of the (original) Complaint in Civil Case No. 161 expressly stated that petitioner
Bantillo had then brought suit "for herself and in representation of the Heirs of Spouses
Candido Zafra and Maria Pimentel Zafra." In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint,
petitioner Bantillo alleged her capacity personally to maintain the judicial action for
reconveyance, manifesting that she is the "surviving heir" of the Zafra spouses, the alleged
original owners of the land under litigation. The Court notes, however, the absolute lack of
allegations in the Complaint regarding the petitioner's capacity or authority to bring suit in
behalf of her alleged co-heirs and co-plaintiffs. On this matter, Section 4 of Rule 8 of the
Revised Rules of Court specifically provides:
Section 4. Capacity.Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or
the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal
existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be
averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party
or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall
do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are
peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.
Petitioner Bantillo having failed to allege in her Complaint a factual matter which, under the
Rules, must be alleged or pleaded, respondent Sumcad was not unjustified in moving for
clarification of such matter. Knowledge of the identity or identities of petitioner's alleged coheirs and co-plaintiffs and, more importantly, of the basis of petitioner's claimed authority
to represent the latter, would obviously be useful to respondent in the preparation of a
responsive pleading, respondent Sumcad should be given sufficient opportunity
intelligently to contest these matters and possibly to raise the same as issues in her
Answer. The Court hence believes that the "Motion for Bill of Particulars" filed by
respondent Sumcad was not improper.
2. The first paragraph of the disputed 5 July 1982 Order (quoted supra, pp. 3-4) of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 161 states that petitioner Bantillo, through counsel, had agreed to
specify the names of her alleged co-heirs and to submit a special power of attorney
authorizing her to represent said co-heirs in the action for reconveyance. Petitioner's
counsel was also directed to furnish respondent's counsel with a copy of the corresponding
"amendments." The second paragraph of the Order continued:
Defendant is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of the copy of the amended
complaint within which to file the defendant's responsive pleadings.
As pointed out by petitioner in her Memorandum, the trial court did not in its Order of 5 July
1982 expressly direct petitioner Bantillo to submit a bill of particulars. What was in fact
required of petitioner was an amended complaint, which would incorporate the
"amendments" mentioned in the first paragraph of the Order. This singular circumstance,
however, does not preclude application in this case of Rule 12, Section l(c) of which
provides:

11

(c) Refusal.If an order of the court to make a pleading more definite and certain
or for a bill of particulars is not obeyed within ten (10) days after notice of the order
or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may order the striking out
of the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such other order as it
deems just. It may, upon motion, set aside the order, or modify it in the interest of
justice.

ACCORDINGLY, the appellate court's Decision appealed from is REVERSED and the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of North Cotabato at Midsayap, is DIRECTED to admit
petitioner's Amended Complaint and promptly to resume proceedings in Civil Case No.
161.

Under the above provision, the court may upon motion in appropriate cases direct the
adverse party (a) to file a bill of particulars, or (b) to make the pleading referred to in the
motion more definite and certain, either by amending or supplementing the same. The trial
court's disputed Order of 5 July 1982 falls squarely within the second category. As the
Order itself did not specify the period for compliance with its terms, petitioner Bantillo was
bound to comply therewith within ten (10) days from notice thereof, i.e., on or before 15
July 1982.

Sec. 4. Formal amendments.-A defect in the designation of the parties may be

summarily corrected at any stage of the action provided no prejudice is caused
thereby to the adverse party.

Footnotes

3. Petitioner Bantillo's reliance on Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Courtwhich

allows amendment of pleadings once as a matter of course is served.is misplaced. That
provision does not apply in situations where it is the court itself that orders a party litigant
to amend his or her pleading. Where, as in the case at bar, the trial court orders the
amendment after a motion for a bill of particulars has been filed by the adverse party and
heard by the court, the applicable provision is Section 1 of Rule 12 of the Rules of Court:
the amended pleading must be filed within the time fixed by the court, or absent such a
specification of time, within ten (10) days from notice of the order.
4. The record shows that petitioner Bantillo filed her Amended Complaint with the trial court
only on 22 June 1983, or more than eleven (11) months after the reglementary period of
ten (10) days had expired. The trial judge found no merit in the reasons advanced by
petitioner Bantillo for such delay and dismissed the Complaint, declaring that an
"unreasonable length of time" had already elapsed.
There is of course no question that petitioner's Amended Complaint was filed out of time.
Nonetheless the Court believes that in the interest of substantial and expeditious
justice, 9 the Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed and ordered stricken
from the record. In the first place, the amendment of the original complaint consisted simply
of deletion of any reference to "other heirs" of the Zafra spouses as co-plaintiffs in the
action for reconveyance; petitioner, in other words, clarified that she alone was plaintiff and
heir and therefore was no longer suing also in a representative capacity. This amendment,
in the second place, imposed no substantial prejudice upon respondent Sumcad and was
thus formal in character. 10 As a matter of fact, Sumcad had not yet filed any responsive
pleading at all and had not disclosed the nature and basis of her own claim of ownership
of Lot No. 63. The issues had not yet been joined. Thirdly, the Amended Complaint was
already before the trial court and it could have and should have proceeded with the case.
Alternatively, if it be assumed that the Amended Complaint was properly dismissed, such
dismissal should not, for the same reasons of substantial and expeditious justice, be
deemed as having the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and hence should be
regarded as without prejudice to petitioner's right to re-file her complaint in its amended
form. Under this alternative hypothesis, to require petitioner to re-file her complaint in a
new action, would appear little more than compelling her to go through an Idle ceremony.
Under either view, therefore, the trial court should have admitted the Amended Complaint
instead of striking it off the record. Public policy favors the disposition of claims brought to
court on their merits, rather than on any other basis. 11 The trial court's discretion should
have been exercised conformably with that public policy.
12

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG) v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and FERDINAND R.
MARCOS, JR. (as executor of the estate of FERDINAND E. MARCOS)
G.R. No. 148154
December 17, 2007
Bill of Particulars
The propriety of filing and granting of a motion for a bill of particulars filed for the estate of
a defaulting and deceased defendant is the main issue in this saga of the protracted legal
battle between the Philippine government and the Marcoses on alleged ill-gotten wealth.
This special civil action for certiorari1 assails two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan ("antigraft court" or "court") issued during the preliminary legal skirmishes in this 20-year
case:2 (1) the January 31, 2000 Resolution3 which granted the motion for a bill of
particulars filed by executor Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. (respondent) on behalf of his father's
estate and (2) the March 27, 2001 Resolution4 which denied the government's motion for
reconsideration.

Marcos, et al. v. Garchitorena, et al.,13 this Court upheld the validity of the Marcoses'
default status for failure to file an answer within 60 days from November 10, 1988 when
the alias summonses were validly served in their house address in Hawaii.
On September 29, 1989, former President Marcos died in Hawaii. He was substituted by
his estate, represented by Mrs. Marcos and their three children, upon the motion of the
PCGG.14
On July 13, 1992, Mrs. Marcos filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, 15 which was
granted by the anti-graft court on October 28, 1992.16 In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,17 this
Court affirmed the resolution of the anti-graft court, ruling that Mrs. Marcos had a
meritorious defense, and that failure of a party to properly respond to various complaints
brought about by the occurrence of circumstances which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against, such as being barred from returning to the Philippines, numerous civil
and criminal suits in the United States, deteriorating health of her husband, and the
complexities of her legal battles, is considered as due to fraud, accident and excusable
negligence.18

From the records, the antecedent and pertinent facts in this case are as follows:
The administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino successively sued former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Mrs.
Marcos), and their alleged cronies or dummies before the anti-graft court to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth that they amassed during the former president's 20-year rule.
Roman A. Cruz, Jr. (Cruz), then president and general manager of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS); president of the Philippine Airlines (PAL); chairman and
president of the Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc., owner of Hyatt Regency Manila;
chairman and president of Manila Hotel Corporation; and chairman of the Commercial Bank
of Manila (CBM), is the alleged crony in this case.
On July 21, 1987, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Complaint5 for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages alleging that Cruz and the Marcoses stole public assets and
invested them in several institutions here and abroad. Specifically, Cruz allegedly
purchased, in connivance with the Marcoses, assets whose values are disproportionate to
their legal income, to wit: two residential lots and two condominiums in Baguio City; a
residential building in Makati; a parcel of land and six condominium units in California, USA;
and a residential land in Metro Manila. The PCGG also prayed for the payment of moral
damages of P50 billion and exemplary damages of P1 billion.
On September 18, 1987, Cruz filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, strike out averments in
the complaint, and for a bill of particulars.6
On April 18, 1988, the court ordered that alias summonses be served on the Marcoses who
were then in exile in Hawaii.7 The court likewise admitted the PCGG's Expanded
Complaint8 dated April 25, 1988, then denied Cruz's omnibus motion on July 28, 1988 after
finding that the expanded complaint sufficiently states causes of action and that the matters
alleged are specific enough to allow Cruz to prepare a responsive pleading and for
trial.9 On September 15, 1988, Cruz filed his answer ad cautelam.10
On November 10, 1988, the alias summonses on the Marcoses were served at 2338 Makiki
Heights, Honolulu, Hawaii.11 The Marcoses, however, failed to file an answer and were
accordingly declared in default by the anti-graft court on April 6, 1989.12 In Imelda R.

On September 6, 1995, Mrs. Marcos filed her answer, 19 arguing that the former President
Marcos' wealth is not ill-gotten and that the civil complaints and proceedings are void for
denying them due process. She also questioned the legality of the PCGG's acts and asked
for P20 billion moral and exemplary damages and P10 million attorney's fees.
On January 11, 1999, after pre-trial briefs had been filed by Cruz, the PCGG, and Mrs.
Marcos, the court directed former President Marcos' children to appear before it or it will
proceed with pre-trial and subsequent proceedings.20
On March 16, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File a Responsive Pleading as
executor of his late father's estate. 21 The PCGG opposed the motion, citing as ground the
absence of a motion to set aside the default order or any order lifting the default status of
former President Marcos.22
On May 28, 1999, the court granted respondent's motion:
xxxx
The Court concedes the plausibility of the stance taken by the Solicitor General
that the default Order binds the estate and the executor for they merely derived
their right, if any, from the decedent. Considering however the complexities of this
case, and so that the case as against the other defendants can proceed smoothly
as the stage reached to date is only a continuation of the pre-trial proceedings,
the Court, in the interest of justice and conformably with the discretion granted to
it under Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court hereby accords affirmative relief
to the prayer sought in the motion.
Accordingly, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.[,] as executor of the [estate of] deceased
defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos[,] is granted a period of ten (10) days from receipt
of this Resolution within which to submit his Responsive Pleading.
x x x x23
13

Respondent asked for three extensions totaling 35 days to file an answer. The court
granted the motions and gave him until July 17, 1999 to file an answer. But instead of filing
an answer, respondent filed on July 16, 1999, a Motion For Bill of Particulars, 24 praying for
clearer statements of the allegations which he called "mere conclusions of law, too vague
and general to enable defendants to intelligently answer."

Invoking Section 3,30 Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner argues that
since the default order against former President Marcos has not been lifted by any court
order, respondent cannot file a motion for a bill of particulars. Petitioner stresses that
respondent did not file a motion to lift the default order as executor of his father's estate;
thus, he and the estate cannot take part in the trial.

The PCGG opposed the motion, arguing that the requested particulars were evidentiary
matters; that the motion was dilatory; and that it contravened the May 28, 1999 Resolution
granting respondent's Motion for Leave to File a Responsive Pleading. 25

Petitioner also contends that respondent was granted leave to file an answer to the
expanded complaint, not a motion for a bill of particulars. The anti-graft court should not
have accepted the motion for a bill of particulars after he had filed a motion for leave to file
responsive pleading and three successive motions for extension as the motion for a bill of
particulars is dilatory. Petitioner insists that respondent impliedly admitted that the
complaint sufficiently averred factual matters with definiteness to enable him to properly
prepare a responsive pleading because he was able to prepare a draft answer, as stated
in his second and third motions for extension. Petitioner adds that the factual matters in the
expanded complaint are clear and sufficient as Mrs. Marcos and Cruz had already filed
their respective answers.

The anti-graft court, however, upheld respondent, explaining that the allegations against
former President Marcos were vague, general, and were mere conclusions of law. It
pointed out that the accusations did not specify the ultimate facts of former President
Marcos' participation in Cruz's alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, effectively
preventing respondent from intelligently preparing an answer. It noted that this was not the
first time the same issue was raised before it, and stressed that this Court had consistently
ruled in favor of the motions for bills of particulars of the defendants in the other ill-gotten
wealth cases involving the Marcoses.
The fallo of the assailed January 31, 2000 Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the defendant-movant's motion for bill of particulars is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to amend pars. 9 and Annex "A", 12
(a) to (e), and 19 in relation to par-3 of the PRAYER, of the Expanded Complaint,
to allege the ultimate facts indicating the nature, manner, period and extent of
participation of Ferdinand E. Marcos in the acts referred to therein, and the
amount of damages to be proven during trial, respectively, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this resolution[.]

Petitioner also argues that if the assailed Resolutions are enforced, the People will suffer
irreparable damage because petitioner will be forced to prematurely divulge evidentiary
matters, which is not a function of a bill of particulars. Petitioner maintains that paragraph
12, subparagraphs a to e,31 of the expanded complaint "illustrate the essential acts
pertaining to the conspirational acts" between Cruz and former President Marcos.
Petitioner argues that respondent erroneously took out of context the phrase "unlawful
concert" from the rest of the averments in the complaint.
Respondent, for his part, counters that this Court had compelled petitioner in several illgotten wealth cases involving the same issues and parties to comply with the motions for
bills of particulars filed by other defendants on the ground that most, if not all, of the
allegations in the similarly worded complaints for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth
consisted of mere conclusions of law and were too vague and general to enable the
defendants to intelligently parry them.

SO ORDERED.26
Not convinced by petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, 27 the court ruled in the assailed
March 27, 2001 Resolution that the motion for a bill of particulars was not dilatory
considering that the case was only at its pre-trial stage and that Section 1,28 Rule 12 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allows its filing.
In urging us to nullify now the subject resolutions, petitioner, through the PCGG, relies on
two grounds:
i.
The motion for bill of particulars contravenes section 3, rule 9 of the 1997 rules
[OF] civil procedure.
ii.
The motion for bill of particulars is patently dilatory and bereft of any basis.29

Respondent adds that it is misleading for the Government to argue that the default order
against his father stands because the May 28, 1999 Resolution effectively lifted it;
otherwise, he would not have been called by the court to appear before it and allowed to
file a responsive pleading. He stresses that the May 28, 1999 Resolution remains effective
for all intents and purposes because petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration.
Respondent likewise denies that his motion for a bill of particulars is dilatory as it is
petitioner's continued refusal to submit a bill of particulars which causes the delay and it is
petitioner who is "hedging, flip-flopping and delaying in its prosecution" of Civil Case No.
0006. His draft answer turned out "not an intelligent" one due to the vagueness of the
allegations. He claims that petitioner's actions only mean one thing: it has no specific
information or evidence to show his father's participation in the acts of which petitioner
complains.
In its Reply,32 petitioner adds that the acts imputed to former President Marcos were acts
that Cruz committed in conspiracy with the late dictator, and which Cruz could not have
done without the participation of the latter. Petitioner further argues that conspiracies need
not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged but by a number of indefinite
acts, conditions and circumstances.

14

In a nutshell, the ultimate issue is: Did the court commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting respondent's motion for a bill of
particulars as executor of former President Marcos' estates considering that the deceased
defendant was then a defaulting defendant when the motion was filed?
We rule in the negative, and dismiss the instant petition for utter lack of merit.
Under the Rules of Court, a defending party may be declared in default, upon motion and
notice, for failure to file an answer within the allowable period. As a result, the defaulting
party cannot take part in the trial albeit he is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings. 33
The remedies against a default order are: (1) a motion to set aside the order of default at
any time after discovery thereof and before judgment on the ground that the defendant's
failure to file an answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that
the defendant has a meritorious defense; (2) a motion for new trial within 15 days from
receipt of judgment by default, if judgment had already been rendered before the defendant
discovered the default, but before said judgment has become final and executory; (3) an
appeal within 15 days from receipt of judgment by default; (4) a petition for relief from
judgment within 60 days from notice of judgment and within 6 months from entry thereof;
and (5) a petition for certiorari in exceptional circumstances.34
In this case, former President Marcos was declared in default for failure to file an answer.
He died in Hawaii as an exile while this case was pending, since he and his family fled to
Hawaii in February 1986 during a people-power revolt in Metro Manila. His representatives
failed to file a motion to lift the order of default. Nevertheless, respondent, as executor of
his father's estate, filed a motion for leave to file a responsive pleading, three motions for
extensions to file an answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of which were granted
by the anti-graft court.
Given the existence of the default order then, what is the legal effect of the granting of the
motions to file a responsive pleading and bill of particulars? In our view, the effect is that
the default order against the former president is deemed lifted.
Considering that a motion for extension of time to plead is not a litigated motion but an ex
parte one, the granting of which is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court;
that in some cases we have allowed defendants to file their answers even after the time
fixed for their presentation; that we have set aside orders of default where defendants'
failure to answer on time was excusable; that the pendency of the motion for a bill of
particulars interrupts the period to file a responsive pleading; and considering that no real
injury would result to the interests of petitioner with the granting of the motion for a bill of
particulars, the three motions for extensions of time to file an answer, and the motion with
leave to file a responsive pleading, the anti-graft court has validly clothed respondent with
the authority to represent his deceased father. The only objection to the action of said court
would be on a technicality. But on such flimsy foundation, it would be erroneous to sacrifice
the substantial rights of a litigant. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed to
promote their objective in assisting the parties obtain a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their case.35
While it is true that there was no positive act on the part of the court to lift the default order
because there was no motion nor order to that effect, the anti-graft court's act of granting
respondent the opportunity to file a responsive pleading meant the lifting of the default
order on terms the court deemed proper in the interest of justice. It was the operative act

lifting the default order and thereby reinstating the position of the original defendant whom
respondent is representing, founded on the court's discretionary power to set aside orders
of default.
It is noteworthy that a motion to lift a default order requires no hearing; it need be under
oath only and accompanied by an affidavit of merits showing a meritorious defense. 36 And
it can be filed "at any time after notice thereof and before judgment." Thus, the act of the
court in entertaining the motions to file a responsive pleading during the pre-trial stage of
the proceedings effectively meant that respondent has acquired a locusstandi in this case.
That he filed a motion for a bill of particulars instead of an answer does not pose an issue
because he, as party defendant representing the estate, is allowed to do so under the
Rules of Court to be able to file an intelligent answer. It follows that petitioner's filing of a
bill of particulars in this case is merely a condition precedent to the filing of an answer.
Indeed, failure to file a motion to lift a default order is not procedurally fatal as a defaulted
party can even avail of other remedies mentioned above.
As default judgments are frowned upon, we have been advising the courts below to be
liberal in setting aside default orders to give both parties every chance to present their case
fairly without resort to technicality. 37 Judicial experience shows, however, that resort to
motions for bills of particulars is sometimes intended for delay or, even if not so intended,
actually result in delay since the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading is
suspended and the subsequent proceedings are likewise set back in the meantime. As
understood under Section 1 of Rule 12, mentioned above, a motion for a bill of particulars
must be filed within the reglementary period for the filing of a responsive pleading to the
pleading sought to be clarified. This contemplates pleadings which are required by the
Rules to be answered under pain of procedural sanctions, such as default or implied
admission of the facts not responded to. 38
But as defaulted defendants are not actually thrown out of court because the Rules see to
it that judgments against them must be in accordance with the law and competent
evidence, this Court prefers that the lifting of default orders be effected before trial courts
could receive plaintiffs' evidence and render judgments. This is so since judgments by
default may result in considerable injustice to defendants, necessitating careful and liberal
examination of the grounds in motions seeking to set them aside. The inconvenience and
complications associated with rectifying resultant errors, if defendant justifies his omission
to seasonably answer, far outweigh the gain in time and dispatch of immediately trying the
case.39 The fact that former President Marcos was in exile when he was declared in default,
and that he later died still in exile, makes the belated filing of his answer in this case
understandably excusable.
The anti-graft court required the Marcos siblings through its January 11, 1999 Order 40 to
substitute for their father without informing them that the latter was already declared in
default. They were unaware, therefore, that they had to immediately tackle the matter of
default. Respondent, who stands as the executor of their father's estate, could assume that
everything was in order as far as his standing in court was concerned. That his motion for
leave to file a responsive pleading was granted by the court gave him credible reason not
to doubt the validity of his legal participation in this case. Coupled with his intent to file an
answer, once his motion for a bill of particulars is sufficiently answered by petitioner, the
circumstances abovementioned warrant the affirmation of the anti-graft court's actions now
being assailed.

15

As to the propriety of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, we find for
respondent as the allegations against former President Marcos appear obviously couched
in general terms. They do not cite the ultimate facts to show how the Marcoses acted "in
unlawful concert" with Cruz in illegally amassing assets, property and funds in amounts
disproportionate to Cruz's lawful income, except that the former President Marcos was the
president at the time.

IFC was allowed to service accounts emanating from government agencies like
the Bureau of Buildings, Philippine National Oil Corporation, National Power
Corporation, Ministry of Public Works and Highways which under the laws are
required to insure with and deal directly with the GSIS for their insurance needs.
The intervention of IFC to service these accounts caused the reduction of
premium paid to GSIS as a portion thereof was paid to IFC.

The pertinent allegations in the expanded complaint subject of the motion for a bill of
particulars read as follows:
11. Defendant Roman A. Cruz, Jr. served as public officer during the Marcos
administration. During his . . . incumbency as public officer, he acquired assets,
funds and other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to his salaries,
lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.

(d) Entered into an agreement with the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC)
whereby the GSIS ceded, transferred, and conveyed property consisting of five
(5) adjoining parcels of land situated in Manila covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. 49853, 49854, 49855 and 49856 to AIC in exchange for AIC
property known as the Pinugay Estate located at Tanay, Rizal, covered by TCT
No. 271378, under terms and conditions grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.

12. . . . Cruz, Jr., in blatant abuse of his position as Chairman and General
Manager of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), and as
Executive Officer of the Commercial Bank of Manila, by himself and/or in unlawful
concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, among
others:

The appraised value of the GSIS parcels of land was P14,585,600.00 as of June
25, 1971 while the value of the Pinugay Estate was P2.00 per square meter or a
total amount of P15,219,264.00. But in the barter agreement, the Pinugay Estate
was valued at P5.50 per square meter or a total of P41,852,976.00, thus GSIS
had to pay AIC P27,287,976.00, when it was GSIS which was entitled to payment
from AIC for its failure to pay the rentals of the GSIS property then occupied by it.

(a) purchased through Arconal N.V., a Netherland-Antilles Corporation, a lot and

building located at 212 Stockton St., San Francisco, California, for an amount
much more than the value of the property at the time of the sale to the gross and
manifest disadvantageous (sic) to plaintiff.

(e) purchased three (4) (sic) additional Airbus 300 in an amount much more than
the market price at the time when PAL was in deep financial strain, to the gross
and manifest disadvantage of Plaintiff.

GSIS funds in the amount of $10,653,350.00 were used for the purchase when
under the right of first refusal by PAL contained in the lease agreement with Kevin
Hsu and his wife, the owners of the building, a much lower amount should have
been paid.
For the purchase of the building, defendant Cruz allowed the intervention of Sylvia
Lichauco as broker despite the fact that the services of such broker were not
necessary and even contrary to existing policies of PAL to deal directly with the
seller. The broker was paid the amount of $300,000.00 resulting to the prejudice
of GSIS and PAL.
(b) Converted and appropriated to . . . own use and benefit funds of the
Commercial Bank of Manila, of which he was Executive Officer at the time.
He caused the disbursement from the funds of the bank of among others, the
amount of P81,152.00 for personal services rendered to him by one Brenda
Tuazon.
(c) Entered into an agency agreement on behalf of the Government Service
Insurance System with the Integral Factors Corporation (IFC), to solicit insurance,
and effect reinsurance on behalf of the GSIS, pursuant to which agreement, IFC
effected a great part of its reinsurance with INRE Corporation, which, was a noninsurance company registered in London[,] with defendant . . . Cruz, Jr., as one
of its directors.

On October 29, 1979, defendant Cruz, as President and Chairman of the Board
of Directors of . . . (PAL) authorized the payment of non-refundable deposit of U.S.
$200,000.00 even before a meeting of the Board of Directors of PAL could
deliberate and approve the purchase.41
In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specific nature,
manner and extent of participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets cited above
under Cruz; particularly whether former President Marcos was a beneficial owner of these
properties; and the specific manner in which he acquired such beneficial control.
Also, respondent wanted to know the specific nature, manner, time and extent of support,
participation and collaboration of his father in (1) Cruz's alleged "blatant abuse" as GSIS
president and general manager, PAL president and chairman of the board, and executive
officer of the CBM; (2) the purchase of a lot and building in California using GSIS funds
and Cruz's allowing Lichauco as broker in the sale of the lot and building contrary to PAL
policies; (3) Cruz's appropriating to himself CBM funds; (4) Cruz's disbursement of P81,152
CBM funds for personal services rendered to him by Tuazon; (5) Cruz's entering into an
agency agreement for GSIS with IFC to solicit, insure, and effect reinsurance of GSIS, as
result of which IFC effected a great part of its reinsurance with INRE Corporation, a
London-registered non-insurance company, of which Cruz was one of the directors; (6)
Cruz's allowing IFC to service the accounts emanating from government agencies which
were required under the law to insure and deal directly with the GSIS for their insurance
needs; (7) the GSIS-AIC agreement wherein GSIS ceded and conveyed to AIC five parcels
of land in Manila in exchange for AIC's Pinugay Estate in Tanay, Rizal; (8) PAL's purchase
of three Airbus 300 jets for a higher price than the market price; and (9) if former President

16

Marcos was connected in any way to IFC and INRE Corporation. Respondent likewise
asked, what is the specific amount of damages demanded?
The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine42 prescribes a motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion
to dismiss, as the remedy for perceived ambiguity or vagueness of a complaint for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth,43 which was similarly worded as the complaint in this case.
That doctrine provided protective precedent in favor of respondent when he filed his motion
for a bill of particulars.
While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were vague
and unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly "in unlawful concert
with" the former. There was no factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints
on the collaboration of or on the kind of support extended by former President Marcos to
Cruz in the commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the
allegations against the Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched in
general terms. The alleged acts, conditions and circumstances that could show the
conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently set forth by
petitioner.
That the late president's co-defendants were able to file their respective answers to the
complaint does not necessarily mean that his estate's executor will be able to file an equally
intelligent answer, since the answering defendants' defense might be personal to them.
In dismissing this petition, Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic44 also provides us a cogent
jurisprudential guide. There, the allegations against former President Marcos were also
conclusions of law unsupported by factual premises. The particulars prayed for in the
motion for a bill of particulars were also not evidentiary in nature. In that case, we ruled that
the anti-graft court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying an alleged crony's motion for a bill of particulars on a complaint with
similar tenor and wordings as in the case at bar.
Likewise we have ruled in Virata v. Sandiganbayan45 (1993) that Tantuico's applicability to
that case was "ineluctable," and the propriety of the motion for a bill of particulars under
Section 1, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court was beyond dispute. 46

the start, one of the protagonists enters the arena with one arm tied to his back. 50 We must
stress anew that the administration of justice entails a painstaking, not haphazard,
preparation of pleadings.
The facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation
of excesses against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill
of particulars, so that respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading
and so that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously as possible. To avoid a situation
where its pleadings may be found defective, thereby amounting to a failure to state a cause
of action, petitioner for its part must be given the opportunity to file a bill of particulars.
Thus, we are hereby allowing it to supplement its pleadings now, considering that
amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed especially before trial.
Lastly, the allowance of the motion for a more definite statement rests with the sound
discretion of the court. As usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial
court will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly
erroneous order.51 This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude
of discretion in setting aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle.
Plain justice demands and the law requires no less that defendants must know what the
complaint against them is all about.52
What is important is that this case against the Marcoses and their alleged crony and dummy
be decided by the anti-graft court on the merits, not merely on some procedural faux pas.
In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual respondents'
minds that they are being railroaded out of their rights and properties without due process
of law.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in
granting respondent's Motion for Bill of Particulars, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 and March 27, 2001 in Civil
Case No. 0006 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ordered to prepare and file a bill of particulars
containing the ultimate facts as prayed for by respondent within twenty (20) days from
notice.
Footnotes

47

In 1996, in the similar case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), we also

affirmed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan granting the motion for a bill of particulars
of Marcos' alleged crony, business tycoon Lucio Tan. 48

28

Phrases like "in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers with grave and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the
Constitution and laws," "unjust enrichment," "embarked upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth," "arrogated unto himself all powers of government," are easy
and easy to read; they have potential media quotability and they evoke passion with literary
flair, not to mention that it was populist to flaunt those statements in the late 1980s. But
they are just that, accusations by generalization. Motherhood statements they are,
although now they might be a politically incorrect expression and an affront to mothers
everywhere, although they best describe the accusations against the Marcoses in the case
at bar.

30

In Justice Laurel's words, "the administration of justice is not a matter of guesswork."49 The
name of the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal skirmish where, from

SECTION 1. When applied for; purpose. Before responding to a pleading, a

party may move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him
properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion
must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point
out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and
the details desired.
Sec 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice
to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be
delegated to the clerk of court.
17

(a) Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice

of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any
time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to
set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and
that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may
be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in
the interest of justice. . . . x x x x
36

Rules Of Court, Rule 9, Sec. 3, par. (b).

42

Virata v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86926 & 86949, October 15, 1991, 202
SCRA 680; Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. dissented, saying the motion to dismiss
should have been granted because the complaint consisted of mere inferences
and general conclusions, with no statement of ultimate facts to support the
sweeping and polemical charges, which cannot substitute for a cause of action.

18

RODOLFO ALARILLA, SR., ROSARIO G. ALARILLA, RODOLFO G. ALARILLA, JR.,

RODERICK G. ALARILLA, RAINIER G. ALARILLA, RANDY G. ALARILLA, MA. ROSELLE
G. ALARILLA-PARAYNO and ALEJANDRO PARAYNO, JR. v. REYNALDO C. OCAMPO
G.R. No. 144697
December 10, 2003
When to File Responsive Pleading

The plaintiffs prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff
from implementing the writ of possession issued by the RTC, Branch 4. The plaintiffs, thus,
prayed that after due proceedings:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 53559 affirming the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4, dated
February 8, 1996 and May 20, 1996 in LRC Cad. Record No. 291.

A. Judgment be rendered declaring the Certificate of Sale and any Deed for that
matter that is subsequently issued as null and void;

The Antecedents
Spouses Isidro de Guzman and Andrea E. Enriquez were the owners in fee simple of a
parcel of land, with an area of 128.40 square meters located in Fabie Street, Pedro Gil,
Paco, Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 94754 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila. The Spouses De Guzman thereafter constructed a house thereon, with
postal address at No. 1526 1st Street, Fabie Estate, Pedro Gil, Paco, Manila.
On March 17, 1982, Andrea died intestate and was survived by Isidro and their daughter
Rosario de Guzman, married to Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. They executed a real estate mortgage
over the property in favor of Spouses Reynaldo C. Ocampo and Josephine C. Llave as
security for the payment of their loan. On July 15, 1995, Isidro de Guzman died intestate
and was survived by Rosario de Guzman and her children by Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. When
the mortgagors-debtors failed to pay the loan despite demands, the Spouses Ocampo filed
a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage with the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who was also the Ex-Officio City Sheriff. The property
was sold at public auction on July 13, 1994 with the Spouses Ocampo as the highest bidder
for P515,430.76. The Ex-Officio Sheriff executed a certificate of sale over the property also
on the said date. The certificate of sale was registered with the Office of the City Register
of Deeds on September 2, 1994. Upon the failure to redeem the property, the Spouses
Ocampo executed an affidavit of consolidation of title. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
224439 was issued to and under their names on October 3, 1995.
On October 17, 1995, Spouses Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. and their children: Spouses Alejandro
Parayno, Jr. and Ma. Roselle Alarilla, Rodolfo Alarilla, Jr., Roderick G. Alarilla, Rainier
Alarilla and Randy Alarilla filed a complaint against the Spouses Ocampo and the Ex-Officio
Sheriff with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
95-75769, alleged inter alia that (a) by virtue of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
property sold at public auction was constituted as a family home; (b) Isidro de Guzman
failed to liquidate the family home after the death of Andrea as required by the Family Code
of the Philippines, which rendered the real estate mortgage executed in favor of the
Spouses Ocampo null and void; (c) upon the demise of Isidro de Guzman on July 15, 1995,
the plaintiffs depended on their parents, the Spouses Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. for support; (d)
the plaintiffs offered to redeem the property for P356,427.91 to the Spouses Reynaldo
Ocampo before the lapse of the one-year redemption period, but the latter refused to
accept the same; (e) the Sheriff sold the property for an amount in excess of P401,162.96,
the correct amount owed the plaintiffs, thus rendering the sale null and void; (f) the plaintiffs
offered to redeem the property for the correct amount due on September 1, 1995, but the
defendants refused to accept the same; hence, the period for redemption had not yet
expired.

WHEREFORE, and based on the foregoing premises, plaintiffs most respectfully pray that:

B. The defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos, Philippine currency, plus the additional sum of P45,000.00 to
answer for exemplary damage and actual expenses incurred in maintaining the
suit, respectively;
C. In said judgment, an order be issued making the injunction earlier issued
permanent;
D. Declaring also that the Family Home comprised of Lot 21 and plaintiffs
residence thereat be declared free from any encumbrances, foreclosure sale,
Certificate of Sale and Definite Deed of Sale.2
On November 27, 1995, Reynaldo Ocampo filed a petition for a writ of possession in LRC
Cad. No. 291 with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4. There was no opposition
to the petition. The petitioner adduced evidence ex-parte in support thereof and on
February 8, 1996, the court issued an order granting the petition and a writ of possession.
The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint praying that after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, and foregoing premises considered, the plaintiffs most respectfully pray
that:
A. Judgment be rendered declaring the Certificate of Sale, the Definite Deed of
Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 224439 issued to the defendants as
null and void;
B. In [the] same judgment, an order cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No.
224439 in the name of said defendants be issued to the Register of Deeds, City
of Manila;
C. The defendants shall be ordered also to pay the plaintiffs the damages in the
total sum of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX (P436,000.00) THOUSAND PESOS,
Philippine currency;
D. The injunction earlier issued be ordered to be permanent;
E. In [the] said judgment, the Family Home of the plaintiffs comprised as Lot 21
and the plaintiffs residence thereat be declared free from any encumbrances,
foreclosure sale, Certificate of Sale, Definite Deed of Sale, attachment and the
19

null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. 224439 aforementioned and any
other document that may later on be shown as affecting the same Family Home. 3
In a parallel move, Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. filed on March 25, 1996 in LRC Cad. No. 291 a
motion to set aside the Order dated February 8, 1996 and to dismiss the petition for a writ
of possession. On May 20, 1996, the court issued an Order in LRC Cad. No. 291 denying
the motion. The movants appealed the order to the Court of Appeals which rendered a
Decision on February 17, 2000 affirming the assailed order. The movants-appellants
received a copy of the decision of the CA on March 3, 2000. On March 20, 2000, they filed
a motion for the reconsideration of the decision. On August 17, 2000, the CA issued a
resolution denying the motion of the appellants. The latter received a copy of the said
resolution on September 4, 2000 and on September 19, 2000, the appellants, now
petitioners, filed with this Court a motion for extension of thirty days within which to file a
petition for review of the decision of the CA.
In their petition at bar, the petitioners assailed the decision of the CA contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT
HERETOFORE IN ACCORD WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT PARTICULARLY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF ART. 158 OF THE FAMILY
CODE IN RELATION TO ART. 153 THEREOF WHERE THE FAMILY RESIDENCE OF
PETITIONERS/BENEFICIARIES IS CONSTITUTED BY OPERATION OF LAW AS
FAMILY HOME.4
The petitioners assert that the real estate mortgage executed by the Spouses De Guzman
on March 9, 1993 is null and void for failure to secure the conformity of the beneficiaries of
the family home as required by Article 158 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Although
the respondents are entitled to a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the
said provision has been repealed by the Family Code of the Philippines, as provided for in
Article 211 thereof. The petitioners also contend that the petitioners cannot be ousted from
the property without the respondents filing an ordinary action for the recovery of possession
of the same, to give the mortgagors an opportunity to be heard not only on the issue of
possession of the property but also on the obligations of the mortgagors under the real
estate mortgage.
For its part, the CA noted that:
After expiration of the redemption period without redemption being made, the writ must
issue in order to place the buyer in possession of the foreclosed property (Veloso, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra). The right to such possession is absolute; it may be
obtained thru a writ which may be applied for ex-parte pursuant to Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135,
as amended (Navarra vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 850).
The subject property was not redeemed within the one-year period. Being the successful
bidder in the foreclosure sale, appellee had consolidated ownership over the property, for
which TCT No. 224439 was issued to him. In IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp.
vs. Nera (19 SCRA 181), the Supreme Court stated that "if under Section 7 of Act No. 3135,
the court has the power, on the ex-parte application of the purchaser, to issue a writ of
possession during the period of redemption, there is no reason why it should not also have
the same power after the expiration of that period, especially where, as in this case, a new
title has already been issued in the name of the purchaser."5

The respondents posit that the decision of the CA had become final and executory when
the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the decision only on March 20, 2000
or seventeen (17) days after being served a copy of the said decision. Furthermore, the
CA did not commit any reversible error in its decision on the merits of the petition.
By way of riposte, the petitioners aver that March 18, 2000, the last day to file a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the CA, fell on a Saturday. Hence, they had until March
20, 2000, the first regular working day, to file the said motion. However, the respondents
did not raise the issue in the CA, and raising the issue now in this case is but a mere
afterthought. In any event, the petitioners argue that their failure to seasonably file their
motion for reconsideration is a mere procedural lapse; hence, it should not prevail over
their right to appeal from the assailed decision of the CA.
The petition has no merit.
The parties raised two issues in this case: (a) whether the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the CA was filed out of time; and (b) on its merits, whether
the petition should be granted.
The
petitioners
of
the
CA
reglementary period therefor.

motion
decision
was

for
filed

reconsideration
within
the

Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, as amended, and as applied in several cases,
provides that where the last day of the period for doing an act as provided by law falls on
a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time should
not run until the next working day. In this case, the petitioners had until March 18, 2000
within which to file their motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the CA. Since
March 18, 2000 was a Saturday, the petitioners had until March 20, 2000, the next working
day thereafter, to file their motion. The petitioners filed their motion on the said date; hence,
the motion was filed within the reglementary period therefor. 6
The
petition,
fail on the merits.

however,

stands

to

The petition is bereft of merit, and is hereby denied due course.

First. The one-year period for the petitioners to redeem the mortgaged property
had already lapsed. Title to the property had already been consolidated under the
name of the respondent. As the owner of the property, the respondent is entitled
to its possession as a matter of right. 7 The issuance of a writ of possession over
the property by the court is merely a ministerial function. There is no need for the
respondent to file an action to evict the petitioners from the property and himself
take possession thereof.
Second. Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.
Regardless of whether or not there is a pending action for the nullification of the
sale at public auction, or the foreclosure itself, or even for the nullification of the
real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners over the property, the
respondent as purchaser at public auction is entitled to a writ of possession
20

without prejudice to the outcome of the action filed by the petitioners with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75769.8
Third. The writ of possession issued by the trial court must be enforced without
delay.1wphi1 It cannot be stymied or thwarted by the petitioners by raising
issues already raised by them in Civil Case No. 95-75769.
Fourth. The petitioners did not even oppose the petition for a writ of possession
filed by the respondent in the court a quo. Instead, they filed the complaint for the
nullification of the foreclosure proceedings, the sale at public auction and the
nullification of TCT No. T-224439 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila in the
name of the respondent, with a plea for injunctive relief.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.

21