Revolution and Counterrevolution in Tunisia:

The Forty Days That Shook the Country

Mounir Saidani
Translated by R. A. Judy

We cannot yet know what the outcome will be of the recent course
of events known as the Tunisian Revolution. Its beginning on December 17, 2010, with Mohamed (whose real name was Tarek) Bouazizis selfimmolation, gave birth to a genuine process of jumps, jerks, pauses, stops,
starts, restarts, and waves of highs and lows. The resulting dialectic of conflict and appeasement highlights this as a process of making, unmaking,
and remaking that is being driven by an intense ongoing struggle between
emergent social forces and established political formations. Some sense of
the prospects of this struggle may only become clear when the final results
of the vote for the election of a constituent assembly scheduled for October 23, 2011, are announced.
Sociological analysis cannot wait, however, until this emergent
Tunisian history achieves its end before offering an assessment, partial
as it may be. We indeed find ourselves in the midst of events and practices warranting apprehension as significant expressions in the constructive work of bold sociological analysis that first descriptively records their
boundary 2 39: 1 (2012)DOI 10.1215/01903659-1506238 2012 by Mounir Saidani

44boundary 2/Spring 2012

unfolding and then provides analytic clarity. There is, in fact, a fairly high
risk that what we experience will be lost forever to a forgetfulness that is
hopelessly closed off from the flow of life. It can be argued that there lies
the work of the historian, to whom falls the task of capturing and fixing as
much as possible from the flow of events that will become the object of
analysis for the various social sciences. Nevertheless, the social character
of the course of history in such situations as ours will likely not attract the
attention of historians, especially given the current prevailing tendency for
historiographical formalism.
The objective here, then, is to offer a preliminary provisional account
of what has transpired during the initial phase of the Tunisian Revolution.
In accordance with the fundamentals of historiography, and maintaining a
modicum of methodological rigor, that account is restricted to the first forty
days of the revolution as the determinate period for the subsequent observations. The basis for this account is direct observation as a participant in
the events, augmented by a documentation of dates, numbers, names, and
other material garnered from newspapers and magazines, as well as information and analyses from television and radio broadcasts, some of which
I participated in personally. Another important source of information are
the various Facebook pages and blogs that paid considerable attention to
the aftermath of the initial events of the revolution. I have also been directly
and heavily involved in these forums, which disseminated live footage of
events, sometimes with only slight delays, along with ongoing summations
and commentaries posted on network walls and status profiles.
This account will be based on rather classical sociohistorical criteria for evaluating the occurrence of revolutions, symbolized by the various more or less violent clashes between the involved conflicting forces.
It is common practice in the sociological analysis of revolutionary processes to proceed on the basis of a distinction between two main camps.
It becomes apparent in the course of a conflict between the political institutions, parties, and associations that extraordinary social forces enter a
revolutionary strugglethat is to say, the sociohistorical actions that challenge an established political orderset out to conduct the most radical
change in social relations possible by either destroying the state apparatus
or forcing it to take up the task of its own transformation. Accordingly, we
call any sociopolitical formation that declares and/or works toward imple1. I was an eyewitness to many of the events described here, as well as an activist in a
number of demonstrations and street rallies, and I organized local mass meetings in the
capital, particularly during the period from December 12, 2011, to February 12, 2011.

Tunisia Dossier/Saidani/Revolution and Counterrevolution in Tunisia45

menting such total transformation a revolutionary force. By the same token,

those forces that are characterized by their efforts to hinder and obstruct
the sociohistoric work of the forces of radical social change through any
means we call counterrevolutionary.
The Eruption of the Social Protest
Bouazizis act of self-immolation was by no means the first such act
engendered by the logic of hopeless protest. Incidents of self-immolation
by fire had been on the rise in recent years in Tunisia. A dozen such acts
were recorded as having occurred in many small towns and large villages
throughout the country in the last weeks of 2010 alone. A spontaneous
popular uprising erupted in the mining area of Gafsa (the governorate in
the southwest on the border with Algeria) in Mtlaoui, Redaef, Oum Laarayes (known during the French colonization as the Moulars) on January 5, 2008, when the phosphate company that was the main employer in
the region published blatantly fraudulent and nepotistic results of its professional recruitment competition. The subsequent handling of that crisis,
with its bloody crackdown and summary arrests, prompted a surge of demonstrations and sit-ins that developed intermittently over the course of the
year into a full-fledged protest movement. And during that time, numerous
instances of self-immolation by fire were reported. It warrants remarking
that for some time now, among the young who consider emigrating illegally
to Europe, it is said in all the various Maghrebian dialects that one wishes
to yahreq, meaning to burn ones self [in the act of burning ones identity
papersTrans.]. By doing it outside the office of the regional governor, who
was the ruling partys regional representative, Mr. Bouazizi gave new meaning to the act of self-immolation by fire. In this way, he forced the authorities
to accept full political and moral responsibility for his act. The subsequent
eruption of ever-growing national popular protest confirmed his judgment.
The states increasingly bloody repression over the course of the following days in response was disproportionate to the peaceful demonstrations
and transformed them into confrontations between the masses driven by
anger and the forces of public order, on which fell an increasingly heavier
task of maintaining civil order. The cities of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine,
which are the regional administrative centers or capitals of two midwestern governorates along the Algerian border, became focal points of popular action in the first ten days of the uprising and rapidly found themselves
under a state of siege. More and more rallies, sit-ins, and demonstrations

46boundary 2/Spring 2012

were being organized mostly by young people of both sexes, many of whom
were university graduates who had been unemployed for years and had no
foreseeable prospects for securing a job. Mobilization of whole families and
tribal communities quickly followed. The rapid fluidity of this sort of mobilization is quite understandable in this region of strong community cohesion
because of the absence of the sort of intermingling associated with robust
economic activity that, in turn, generates geographic and social mobility. In
fact, the ten western governorates, from Jendouba in the far north to Ben
Guerdene in the southknown in the official state sociopolitical language
as the remote sub-Saharan governorates of the interior, and accordingly
collectively labeled areas of darknesshave been described in numerous socioeconomic studies as severely deficient in programs of development. A study by the Tunisian General Labor Union (lUnion Gnrale Tunisienne du Travail [UGTT]), the sole central trade union until the beginning
of 2011, reported that the rate of poverty, relative to the total population
of the region, is nine to ten times greater than that of the capital of Tunis,
with its million or more inhabitants. This situation of deep poverty and economic deprivation has been aggravated over the years by a profound social
isolation as reflected in the very low rate of participation in national political, social, and cultural life among those from this region who migrate to
the cities. Their elected representatives in the various national institutions, particularly the two chambers of parliament, stand out by their general absenteeism and alienation from their electoral base immediately upon
their permanent installation in the capital. This causes considerable damage to their representation, as well as their capacity for negotiating vis-vis the central authorities in crisis situations that require establishing viable
channels of bilateral communications.
The similarity in conditions across the governorates of the region
is what caused the popular demonstrations to spread so contagiously, so
that by the second week of the uprising (December 24), it was no longer
possible for the local, regional, or central officials to contain them. Reports
began to emerge on that date of police firing on peaceful demonstrations,
which resulted in the first two casualties, one of whom was Chawki Hidra
from Menzel Bouzayen, near Sidi Bouzid. An increasingly bloody repression
only highlighted the fact that the very heavy-handed police response aimed
to deny the poor their right to peacefully protest against a socially devastating situation. This put the demonstrators in a state of total hopelessness
about any help coming from the political and administrative authorities, who
appeared to be unconditionally behind the police, who were increasingly

Tunisia Dossier/Saidani/Revolution and Counterrevolution in Tunisia47

committed to the logic of repressive security. Zine El Abidine Ben Alis first
public statement about what Bouazizi had done, in which he asserted it
was an isolated act that some sought to exploit and in which he denounced
various terrorist acts committed by masked thugs, only inflamed the situation. Beyond the thorny issue of rampant unemployment, stifling the prospects for any improvement in the material circumstance of thousands of
youth, there was emerging in the contestation a set of core social demands
that were rapidly fixing a political horizon.
The Social Protest Movement
The masses, whose numbers were steadily growing, responded
to the usual violent antiriot measures by the forces of public order with
increased involvement in a movement that already gave signs of quite
unexpectedly blossoming into a revolution. The demonstrations, which
were held, in the beginning, at dusk and later at night, quickly degenerated into clashes and even small pitched battles with the police, in which
young people almost always took the lead. The natives of those towns and
villages in which fighting was increasing knew every street corner, every
bend, every alleyway, and every hiding place. There is an often-recounted
story of an episode in which one of the young demonstrators came out of
nowhere on a dark icy night and, addressing a policeman, said: Im going
now to eat the couscous my Yamma [mama] just prepared for me and, later
on, I will return back to work [i.e., demonstrating] until dawn. I will not give
you a moments rest. Ill make you suffer a sleepless night.
By the end of the second week of protest, the movement had
expanded in every dimension. Geographically, the contagion had reached
the neighboring governorates, moving to Kef in the northwest, Kairouan in
the center, Kebili, Tozeur, and Ben Guerdene in the southwest and southeast. Employed professional and occupational groups began joining the
unemployed protestors, whose demonstrations were taking on more and
more the appearance of a full-scale revolt. The inclusion of elements of
the trade unions (particularly from the primary and secondary education
sector), and the rank and file of regional branches of the UGTTdespite
the disapproval of the National Executive Bureau, based in the capital
facilitated the radicalization of the protest movement. That radicalization
was affirmed by the remarkable active presence of lawyers in the different locations where protests were taking place, first individually, and then
organized into groups guided by leaders known for their political action and

48boundary 2/Spring 2012

long-time labor organizing among their colleagues. One of the most important arguments of the mobilization organized by the youth was the assertion that this was the response of those who had worked for the countrys
independence without seeing any of the fruits of their labor. The radicalization resulted in a better organization of collective action (carefully planned
march routes and choice of rally topics, the multiplication of contacts establishing networks, and the deployment of new information technologies and
communications, especially mobile phones for exchanging SMS messages). As far as the political line was concerned, the radicalization gave
rise to a heightened bold sentiment, expressed more or less provocatively
in slogans targeting the Regent Family of Ben Alis wife: Work is a right!;
Ban the band of thieves!; No to Trabelsi! (the surname of president Ben
Alis wife); Leila and her family are organized like Mafiosi who have plundered the state treasury!; Down with the Destour Party!; and Down
with the torturer of the people!
Despite the increasingly remarkable radicalization, the movement
suffered a certain stifling in the media. Its momentum was slow, and it only
managed to garner new strength through its own (internal) efforts. At the
end of the second week, however, a new element of mobilization and radicalization came into play. Bloggers, of both sexes, in the large cities and
especially in the capital, where most of them resided, began relaying when
and where the activists would be demonstrating in various towns across
2. Destour is the Modern Standard Arabic term for constitution. The reference here is
to the complicated history of the political formation that began in 1920 with the founding
of al-hizb al-hurr ad-Dustr at-Tnis, or the Free Tunisian Constitutional Party, which,
as the successor to the outlawed Young Tunisian Party, asserted the continued legitimate application of the suspended 1861 constitution as the basis for complete independence from French colonial rule. When that party was banned by the French in 1933, it
reemerged the following year (1934) in a more liberal form as the Neo-Destour (NoDestour), which was the predominant party at national liberation in 1956 under Habib
Bourguiba, who was prime minister and then became president in 1957 with the establishment of the republic. After consolidating itself as the sole political party in 1963, it officially adopted a collectivist ideology and became in 1964 the Destourian Socialist Party
(Parti Socialiste Destourien [PSD]). After Zine El Abidine Ben Ali staged a constitutional
coup in 1987, the party was renamed in 1988 as the Democratic Constitutional Assembly
(Rassemblement Constitutionnel Dmocratique [RCD]). In Arabic, the term Destour has
occurred in all of the partys formations throughout its history.Trans.
3. It goes without saying that the texts of these slogans, chanted, for the most part, in Arabic (Tunisian) dialect, adhered to a minimal poetics. The demonstrators benefited from,
took pleasure in, their musicality to give them a greater powerful voice and to make them
easier for the masses to take up.

Tunisia Dossier/Saidani/Revolution and Counterrevolution in Tunisia49

the country. Toward the end of December (2010), there were independent
journalists transmitting through Facebook real-time videos of the demonstrations. These tended to be Web activists, who exhibited the same
sociopolitical characteristics as the bloggers. There were even those who
tried to join together the two types of intervention that were becoming more
and more pronounced: the struggle against the repression of the demonstrations, and the denunciation of criminal acts perpetrated by fringe elements. A network of Web activists rapidly formed, involving young people
who had, for the most part, been themselves engaged in virtual activism
for many years, whether or not that was matched by real activism. Tunisian bloggers living abroad ensured the internationalization of the mediacombatants scoops. It warrants noting, however, that a number of these
bloggers had already received training in e-journalism, as well as in the
techniques of blog publication and online writing, from programs sponsored
by the US embassies and funded through the Middle East Initiative Program (MEPI), which, for the past three or four years has focused on training national and regional journalists throughout North Africa and the Middle
East. One of these bloggers, Slim Amamou, who was imprisoned under
Ben Ali, became the minister for youth and sports affairs during the shortlived Ghannouchi transition government of early 2011.
On Political Revolution
January 8, 2011, was a particularly bloody day. With popular demonstrations throughout the country, a series of regional strikes organized
by the UGTTthe executive of which had changed its position in favor of
the demonstratorsthe activities of the lawyers, and the proliferation of
videos and live-broadcast testimony, the situation had become desperately
unmanageable for the authorities, resulting in twenty-one deaths in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb. That same day saw a surge in media exposure,
especially on Facebook, of the atrocities the authorities were committing
and trying to hide. The official declaration by the minister for youth and
sports affairs on the evening of January 8 repeated the same terms used
by Ben Ali in his first public statement about the demonstrations. These
were reiterated by the president in his second statement, which he gave on
January 10, 2011, even though he wished in that second statement to show
more understanding, and made the dubious promise to create three hundred thousand jobs in two years. The television sector of the state media
machine, following the print sector, formally attacked the opposition as

50boundary 2/Spring 2012

enemies of the regime who disregard the record of the nations victorious
march of socioeconomic progress, and those who have sold out to hostile
foreign forces jealous of Tunisias advancements under Ben Ali, and who
insidiously inflate the regimes few small deficiencies in order to undermine the countrys strategic interest. The repeat appearances of political
leaders affirmed the political character of what was happening, and by
their carelessness and discernible disdain, they further enflamed the anger
that was already spreading in the popular districts of the capital. During
the nights of January 911, the police came under attack from unemployed
youth in the streets of Ettadhamen in Ariana Governorate and in the Alintilaka housing project just outside the capital, two densely populated communities well known as centers of repeated expressions of popular discontent not easily kept under official administrative and police control. Many
of these youth had a subversive edge and could organize themselves into
familial and community networks with blood relations that extended to more
distant centers of social subversion in the interior, where the first month of
the revolution was coming to a close. The demonstrations rapidly reached
the heart of the capital with the mobilization of increasingly engaged trade
unions, lawyers, and human rights activists. The emergence of the slogan
Down with Ben Ali! was synchronous with the multiple occurrences of
government snipers firing on the crowds in Lafayette and Bab El Khadra
Streets, and the reinforcement of riot police in the vicinity of the headquarters of UGTT, as well as that of the Council of the Bar. January 12 was the
decisive day in the ultimate politicization of the social mobilization, with the
Regional Union of Workers of Sfax (a regional office of UGTT) organizing a demonstration of one hundred thousand people. All demonstrations
nationwide modified their individual itineraries to collaboratively organize
strikes at every local office of the ruling Democratic Constitutional Assembly
(RCD) Party. In some instances, the demonstrators torched RCD offices,
as well as local or regional administrative offices (governorate headquarters, regional branches of administration, seats of municipalities, etc.). Very
few casualties resulted from the clashes of that day, as the tides of demonstrators overwhelmed any barriers set up to impede their advance.
4. Sfax is the capital city of the governorate of Sfax in the southeast, along the Mediterranean coast. It is generally considered the capital of southern Tunisia. Its industrial,
commercial, and university potential is the result of a highly active population of 750,000
inhabitants. It is second only to the capital, Tunis, in union activism. Being, in fact, the
birthplace of the UGTT in 1946, any alignments its local makes with other social movements and unions are taken to be a strong barometer of the overall balance of power
within the UGTT.Trans.

Tunisia Dossier/Saidani/Revolution and Counterrevolution in Tunisia51

A few days prior to Ben Alis departure, bloggers revealed that a

mysterious Hakim Karouia relative of the former director of the RCD who
resided in Paris and who was a consultant for Hubert Vdrine, who is a
member of the Socialist Party and served as foreign minister in the government of Lionel Jospin and continues to have influence in French political
circleshad sent to Ben Ali on January 12 what proved to be the second
of two messages, in which Karoui drew Ben Ali a road map for resolving
the crisis with the following advice: implement a radical change of government with a major overhaul of the cabinet; discredit the family member of
Leilas clan; and disseminate a strong message of sympathy for the families of the victims of violence. A combination of circumstances prevented
Ben Ali from implementing any part of this plan. Instead, the violent repression continued throughout the country, resulting in further deaths, including that of an academic in Douz. The army was deployed, and the prime
minister announced the removal of the minister of the interior and promised
the release of detainees jailed in recent arrests. The demonstrations continued, with two more deaths in Monastir and Kairouan. In his third and last
speech on January 13, Ben Ali declared a state of emergency, lowered the
price of commodities, abolished censorship, provided unrestricted access
to the Internet, and announced that this would be his last term in office,
stating that he would not be a candidate in the 2014 presidential elections
and that he would call for the election of a new legislative body in the next
six months.
After Ben Alis departure the next day, on January 14, the prime minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, proclaimed himself interim president. The
next day, following intense debate between Ghannouchi and the president
of the chamber of deputies, Fouad Mebazaa, over Articles 56 and 57 of the
constitution, about which of the two of them was to preside over an interim
government, Ghannouchi was removed in favor of Mebazaa. However,
Ghannouchi resumed the post of prime minister, and on January 18 formed
a government with fourteen ministers from the RCD, four from LAssociation
des Tunisiens des Grandes Ecoles (Atugiens), leaders from the two opposition parties, the Progressive Democratic Party (Le Parti dmocrate pro5. The reference is to the state security forces killing of Hatem Ben Tahar, a professor of
computer science at the University of Technology in Compiegne, France.Trans.
6. The Tunisian Association of Grandes Ecoles (of France) is one of the most influential
organizations of expatriate young Tunisians and a kind of relay between the Tunisian and
French political spheres, with a marked preference for rightist orientations defending the
long-standing mutual interests and historical connection between the two countries bordering the Mediterranean.

52boundary 2/Spring 2012

gressiste [PDP]) and the Renewal Movement (Le Mouvement Ettajdid), a

Freemason, and the former secretary general of the UGTT, who was a leftist
and had become the president of the Arab Institute for Human Rights. The
next three days, January 1921, were dedicated to rallies universally held
under the slogan Down with the RCD, torturer of the people. The most significant development among these rallies was the March of Liberty.
On January 22, a march consisting of people coming from the towns
and villages that had been the cradle of the revolution converged on the
capital, Tunis, in buses, trucks, and cars. Starting in the early hours of Sunday, January 23, the first teams began arriving and descended on the Kasbah Government Square, in front of the Prime Ministry building. This was
the beginning of the first Kasbah sit-in, in which several scores of people,
led by youth from different regions of the country, joined by friends, colleagues, relatives, classmates, acquaintances, natives of the country (i.e.,
from cities or villages or outlying regions), residents of Tunis and occupants of more or less influential positions. The diversity ensured important
linkages, establishing the basis for media, material, political, and logistical
support. For a few long days, the Kasbah Government Square became
an agora, a kind of public space emblematic of a revolution that would not
accept the diversion of either its noble objectives or its being usurped
through the political shenanigans of those in the capital. Those who occupied the Kasbah Government Square made sure their sentiments were
felt, that they were understood, and that their double rejection of both the
government and the political parties was heard. Some of their leadership
had suffered considerably during the early days of the revolution, from
being denied freedom of speech and publication to the right to assemble at
the sites where their comrades-in-arms fell as martyrs of Sidi Bouzid and
Kasserine. None of this was tolerable any longer to those who had come
to defend the revolution in the face of an interim government composed
mostly of associates of Ben Ali.
There was a veritable festival of graffiti, songs, dance, flags, placards, and manifestos written in flower arrangements in the Kasbah Government Square. Among the ten points of demand, five were, in summary:
the immediate dissolution of the government, a general amnesty, the election of a constituent assembly charged with drafting a new constitution,
the arrest and prosecution of criminals, and the dissolution of the political
police. The program of the revolution was sketched out there in the display of placards and national flags (Tunisian, Palestinian, Egyptian), discussions, manifestos, and declarations, some of which found their way to
various television channels, but were more widely posted on Facebook.

Tunisia Dossier/Saidani/Revolution and Counterrevolution in Tunisia53

Thousands of people came to the square in support of this avant-garde

that had seemingly emerged out of nowhere. A new pathway presented
itself to the revolution, which appeared to falter under the weight of widespread prison breaks; an atmosphere of terror that began to take hold,
exacerbated by the first signs of food shortages; and serious disturbances
in numerous workplaces.
Soon there was talk of a full cabinet reshuffle, a minor concession
in light of UGTTs demand for the outright dissolution of the so-called Government of National Unity. Ghannouchi stepped down on January 27. Late
in the afternoon the next day, January 28, following a redeployment of the
National Army, which had been providing security at the Prime Ministry, the
security forces launched an assault. And so the first Kasbah sit-in ended in
blood. A demonstration in protest was organized by the survivors on Avenue Habib Bourguiba, the main artery of the capital, but it only succeeded
in heightening general awareness of bloody January 28. The dissemination
of some video sequences of the violence through the various social networks brought further attention to an event that leaves a bitter aftertaste
equally as revolting as the violence.
Conclusion
This brief history of the first forty days of the Tunisian Revolution distinguishes between two camps: that of the revolutionary forces and that of
counterrevolutionary forces. The basis for this distinction is evidenced in
the recorded acts and practices of those in power during Ben Alis reign,
as well as those who first came to power immediately after his departure,
most of whom were members of the RCD and associated political parties
that flocked to get a piece of the cake at the formation of the first interim
government of Ghannouchi. The state apparatus represented the main
bulwark of counterrevolution, principally through the police and security
forces. The minister of the interior in the Ghannouchi government, widely
known by the sobriquet Mr. Nadhif (Mr. Clean), found himself abducted
in the ministry with his mobile phone and jacket confiscated. The forces of
counterrevolution could also rally the national print media, radio, and television, which, having given Ben Ali a fair chance and praised his openness,
on the evening of January 13, when he stepped down, began to work the
familiar themes of cessation of subversive acts, the need to return to
calm, and with Ben Alis departure, there was no longer any reason for
demonstrations, marches, rallies, or strikes.
Foreign imperialist forces did not fail to support Ben Ali, beginning

54boundary 2/Spring 2012

with the infamous statement by the then French minister of foreign and
European affairs, Michle Alliot-Marie, that the French government was prepared to send its own renowned security forces to assist the authorities in
putting down the riots. For its part, Ghannouchis national unity government
began receiving emissaries of all stripes as early as January 25, including
US deputy secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman.
Subsequent eventsthe dissolution of the Ghannouchi second government, the second Kasbah sit-in (February 20March 4), the attempt
to organize a third Kasbah sit-in, the organization of a sit-in for peace in
the so-called Kobba (the domed El Menzah sports stadium, located in
an affluent neighborhood of the capital)have only confirmed the conclusion that we are in the midst of a struggle between two camps. The
analysis of social and political repositioning would not be adequate without taking into account the potential convergence of the political agenda
of the revolution with a challenging of the current forms of political activism practiced by different parties and groups. The de jure dissolution of the
former political frontsRCD and its allies, who composed the so-called
decorative opposition; Mouvement du 18 octobre (October 18 Movement),
consisting of Marxist, Islamists, and democrats; and Parti de la Citoyennet (Citizenship Party), composed of the former Communist Party, mixed
with the non-Marxist Left and anti-Islamist nationalistshas precipitated a
reallocation of political forces. On the left are Marxists and non-Marxists,
toward the Right are the so-called Islamists. The Pan-Arabists and nationalists can be called progressive, and the democrats, liberals, and republicans can be considered centrist. The formation on January 20 of Front du
14 Janvier (January 14 Front)a left secular and Pan-Arabist nationalist
front consisting of the Ligue de la gauche travailliste (League of the Labor
Left), Mouvement des Unionistes Nassriens (Nasserite Unionist Movement), Mouvement des Nationalistes Dmocrates (Nationalist Democrat
Movement; Al-Watad), Courant Baasiste (Neo-Baathist), Gauche Indpendante (Independent Left), Parti Communiste des Ouvriers de Tunisie (Tunisian Communist Workers Party [PCOT]), and Parti du Travail Patriotique et
Dmocratique (Patriotic Labor and Democratic Party [PTPD])along with
the emergence at the same time of various local, regional, and national
councils, organized on a nonpartisan basis to safeguard the Tunisian Revolution, are just the first signs of how difficult it will be for political activity to
continue in its current form.

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