AsylumCase(Columbia/Peru);Yearofthedecision:1950;andCourt:ICJ.

Overview:
Columbia granted asylum to a Peruvian, accused of taking part in a military rebellion in Peru. Was
Columbiaentitledtomakeaunilateralanddefinitivequalificationoftheoffence(asapoliticaloffence)in
amannerbindingonPeruandwasPeruwasunderalegalobligationtoprovidesafepassageforthe
PeruviantoleavePeru?
FactsoftheCase:
PeruissuedanarrestwarrantagainstVictorRaulHayadelaTorreinrespectofthecrimeofmilitary
rebellion whichtookplaceonOctober3,1949,inPeru.3monthsaftertherebellion,Torrefledtothe
Colombian Embassy in Lima, Peru. The Colombian Ambassador confirmed that Torre was granted
diplomaticasylum inaccordancewithArticle2(2)oftheHavanaConventiononAsylumof1928and
requestedsafepassageforTorretoleavePeru.Subsequently,theAmbassadoralsostatedColombiahad
qualifiedTorreasapoliticalrefugeeinaccordancewithArticle2MontevideoConventiononPolitical
Asylumof1933(notethetermrefugeeisnotthesameastheRefugeeConventionof1951). Perurefusedto
accepttheunilateralqualificationandrefusedtograntsafepassage.
QuestionsbeforetheCourt:
(1) IsColombiacompetent,asthecountrythatgrantsasylum,tounilaterallyqualifytheoffencefor
thepurposeofasylumundertreatylawandinternationallaw?
(2) Inthisspecificcase,wasPeru,astheterritorialState,boundtogiveaguaranteeofsafepassage?
(3) DidColombiaviolateArticle1and2(2)oftheConventiononAsylumof1928(hereinaftercalled
theHavanaConvention)whenitgrantedasylumandisthecontinuedmaintenanceofasyluma
violationofthetreaty?
TheCourtsDecision:
RelevantFindingsoftheCourt:
(1)IsColombiacompetent,asthecountrythatgrantsasylum,tounilaterallyqualifytheoffenceforthe
purposeofasylumundertreatylawandinternationallaw?
1.Thecourtstatedthatinthenormalcourseofgrantingdiplomaticasylumadiplomaticrepresentativehas
thecompetencetomakeaprovisionalqualificationoftheoffence(forexample,asapoliticaloffence)and
theterritorialStatehastherighttogiveconsenttothisqualification.IntheTorrescase,Colombiahas
asserted,astheStategrantingasylum,thatitiscompetenttoqualifythenatureoftheoffenceinaunilateral
anddefinitivemannerthatisbindingonPeru.Thecourthadtodecideifsuchadecisionwasbindingon
Peru either because of treaty law (in particular the Havana Convention of 1928 and the Montevideo
Conventionof1933),otherprinciplesofinternationallaworbywayofregionalorlocalcustom.
2.Thecourtheldthattherewasnoexpressedorimpliedrightofunilateralanddefinitivequalificationof
theStatethatgrantsasylumundertheHavanaConventionorrelevantprinciplesofinternationallaw(p.12,
13).TheMontevideoConventionof1933,whichacceptstherightofunilateralqualification,andonwhich
Colombiareliedtojustifyitsunilateralqualification,wasnotratifiedbyPeru. TheConvention,persay,
wasnotbindingonPeruandconsideringthelownumbersofratificationstheprovisionsofthelatter
Conventioncannotbesaidtoreflectcustomaryinternationallaw(p.15).
3.Colombiaalsoarguedthatregionalorlocalcustomssupportthequalification.Thecourtheldthatthe
burdenofproofontheexistenceofanallegedcustomarylawrestswiththepartymakingtheallegation:
ThePartywhichreliesonacustomofthiskindmustprovethatthiscustomisestablishedinsucha
mannerthatithasbecomebindingontheotherParty(that)itisinaccordancewitha (1)constantand
uniformusage (2) practicedbytheStatesinquestion,andthatthisusageis(3) theexpressionofa

right appertaining to the State granting asylum (Columbia) and (4) a duty incumbent on the
territorialState(inthiscase,Peru).ThisfollowsfromArticle38oftheStatuteoftheCourt,whichrefers
tointernationalcustomasevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw(textinbracketsadded).
4. ThecourtheldthatColumbiadidnotestablishtheexistenceofaregionalcustombecauseitfailedto
prove consistent and uniform usage of the alleged custom by relevant States. The fluctuations and
contradictionsinStatepracticedidnotallowfortheuniformusage(seealsoMendelson,1948andseealso
Nicaraguacase,p.98,thelegalimpactoffluctuationsofStatepractice).Thecourtalsoreiteratedthatthe
factthataparticularStatepracticewasfollowedbecauseofpoliticalexpediencyandnotbecauseofabelief
thatthesaidpracticeisbindingontheStatebywayofalegalobligation(opiniojuris)isdetrimentaltothe
formationofacustomarylaw(seeNorthSeaContinentalShelfCasesandLotusCaseformoreonopinio
juris):
[T]heColombianGovernmenthasreferredtoalargenumberofparticularcasesinwhichdiplomatic
asylumwasinfactgrantedandrespected.Butithasnotshownthattheallegedruleofunilateraland
definitivequalificationwasinvokedorthatitwas,apartfromconventionalstipulations,exercisedbythe
StatesgrantingasylumasarightappertainingtothemandrespectedbytheterritorialStatesasaduty
incumbentonthemandnotmerelyforreasonsofpoliticalexpediency.Thefactsbroughttotheknowledge
oftheCourtdisclosesomuchuncertaintyandcontradiction,somuchfluctuationanddiscrepancyinthe
exerciseofdiplomaticasylumandintheofficialviewsexpressedonvariousoccasions,therehasbeenso
muchinconsistencyintherapidsuccessionofconventionsonasylum,ratifiedbysomeStatesandrejected
byothers,andthepracticehasbeensomuchinfluencedbyconsiderationsofpoliticalexpediencyinthe
variouscases,thatitisnotpossibletodiscerninallthisanyconstantanduniformusage,mutuallyaccepted
aslaw,withregardtotheallegedruleofunilateralanddefinitivequalificationoftheoffence.
5.ThecourtheldthatevenifColombiacouldprovethatsucharegionalcustomexisted,itwouldnotbe
bindingonPeru,becausePerufarfromhavingbyitsattitudeadheredtoit,has,onthecontrary,repudiated
itbyrefrainingfromratifyingtheMontevideoConventions of1933and1939,whichwerethefirstto
includearuleconcerningthequalificationoftheoffence[aspoliticalinnature]inmattersofdiplomatic
asylum.(Seeinthisregard,thelessononpersistentobjectors.SimilarlyintheNorthSeaContinentalShelf
Casesthecourtheldinanyeventthe...rulewouldappeartobeinapplicableasagainstNorwayinas
muchasshehadalwaysopposedanyattempttoapplyittotheNorwegiancoast.)
6.ThecourtconcludedthatColumbia,astheStategrantingasylum,isnotcompetenttoqualifytheoffence
byaunilateralanddefinitivedecision,bindingonPeru.
(2)Inthisspecificcase,wasPeru,astheterritorialState,boundtogiveaguaranteeofsafepassage?
7.Thecourtheldthattherewas nolegalobligationonPerutograntsafepassageeitherbecauseofthe
HavanaConventionorcustomarylaw.InthecaseoftheHavanaConvention,aplainreadingofArticle2
resultsinanobligationontheterritorialstate(Peru)tograntsafepassageonlyafteritrequeststheasylum
grantingState(Columbia)tosendthepersongrantedasylumoutsideitsnationalterritory(Peru).Inthis
casethePeruviangovernmenthadnotaskedthatTorreleavePeru.Onthecontrary,itcontestedthelegality
ofasylumgrantedtohimandrefusedtograntsafeconduct.
8.ThecourtlookedatthepossibilityofacustomarylawemergingfromStatepracticewherediplomatic
agentshaverequestedandbeengrantedsafepassageforasylumseekers,beforetheterritorialStatecould
request for his departure. Once more, the court held that these practices were a result of a need for
expediencyandotherpracticeconsiderationsoveranexistenceofabeliefthattheactamountstoalegal
obligation(seeparagraph4above).
There exists undoubtedly a practice whereby the diplomatic representative who grants asylum
immediatelyrequestsasafeconductwithoutawaitingarequestfromtheterritorialstateforthedepartureof
therefugeebutthispracticedoesnotandcannotmeanthattheState,towhomsucharequestforsafe
conducthasbeenaddressed,islegallyboundtoaccedetoit.
(3)DidColombiaviolateArticle1and2(2)oftheHavanaConventionwhenitgrantedasylumandis
thecontinuedmaintenanceofasylumaviolationofthetreaty?

9.Article1oftheHavanaConventionstatesthat ItisnotpermissibleforStatestograntasylumto
personsaccusedorcondemnedforcommoncrimes(suchpersons)shallbesurrendereduponrequestof
thelocalgovernment.
10.Inotherwords,thepersonseekingasylummustnotbeaccusedofacommoncrime(forexample,
murderwouldconstituteacommoncrime,whileapoliticaloffencewouldnot).Theaccusationsthatare
relevantarethosemadebeforethegrantingofasylum.Torresaccusationrelatedtoamilitaryrebellion,
whichthecourtconcludedwasnotacommoncrimeandassuchthegrantingofasylumcompliedwith
Article1oftheConvention.
11.Article2(2)oftheHavanaConventionstatesthatAsylumgrantedtopoliticaloffendersinlegations,
warships,militarycampsormilitaryaircraft,shallberespectedtotheextentinwhichallowed,asarightor
throughhumanitariantoleration,bytheusages,theconventionsorthelawsofthecountryinwhichgranted
andinaccordancewiththefollowingprovisions:First:Asylummaynotbegrantedexceptinurgentcases
andfortheperiodoftimestrictlyindispensableforthepersonwhohassoughtasylumtoensureinsome
otherwayhissafety.
12.Anessentialprerequisiteforthegrantingofasylumistheurgencyor,inotherwords,thepresenceof
animminentorpersistenceofadangerforthepersonoftherefugee.Thecourtheldthatthefactsofthe
case,includingthe3monthsthatpassedbetweentherebellionandthetimewhenasylumwassought,did
notestablishtheurgencycriteriainthiscase(pp.2023).Thecourtheld:
Inprinciple,itisinconceivablethattheHavanaConventioncouldhaveintendedthetermurgentcases
toincludethedangerofregularprosecutiontowhichthecitizensofanycountrylaythemselvesopenby
attackingtheinstitutionsofthatcountryInprinciple,asylumcannotbeopposedtotheoperationof
justice.
13.Inotherwords,TorrewasaccusedofacrimebuthecouldnotbetriedinacourtbecauseColombia
grantedhimasylum.Thecourtheldthatprotectionfromtheoperationofregularlegalproceedingswas
notjustifiedunderdiplomaticasylum.
14.Thecourtheld:
InthecaseofdiplomaticasylumtherefugeeiswithintheterritoryoftheState.Adecisiontogrant
diplomaticasyluminvolvesaderogationfromthesovereigntyofthatState.Itwithdrawstheoffenderfrom
thejurisdictionoftheterritorialStateandconstitutesaninterventioninmatterswhichareexclusively
withinthecompetenceofthatState.Suchaderogationfromterritorialsovereigntycannotberecognised
unlessitslegalbasisisestablishedineachparticularcase.
15.Asaresult,exceptionstothisrulearestrictlyregulatedunderinternationallaw.
Anexceptiontothisrule(asylumshouldnotbegrantedtothosefacingregularprosecutions)canoccur
onlyif,intheguiseofjustice,arbitraryactionissubstitutedfortheruleoflaw.Suchwouldbethecaseif
the administration of justice were corrupted by measures clearly prompted by political aims. Asylum
protects the political offender against any measures of a manifestly extralegal character which a
GovernmentmighttakeorattempttotakeagainstitspoliticalopponentsOntheotherhand,thesafety
whicharisesoutofasylumcannotbeconstruedasaprotectionagainsttheregularapplicationofthelaws
andagainstthejurisdictionoflegallyconstitutedtribunals.Protectionthusunderstoodwouldauthorizethe
diplomaticagenttoobstructtheapplicationofthelawsofthecountrywhereasitishisdutytorespect
themSuchaconception,moreover,wouldcomeintoconflictwithoneofthemostfirmlyestablished
traditionsofLatinAmerica,namely,nonintervention[forexample,byColombiaintotheinternalaffairsof
anotherStatelikePeru].
16.Asylummaybegrantedonhumanitariangroundstoprotectpoliticalprisonersagainsttheviolentand
disorderlyactionofirresponsiblesectionsofthepopulation.(forexampleduringamobattackwherethe
territorialStateisunabletoprotecttheoffender).Torrewasnotinsuchasituationatthetimewhenhe
soughtrefugeintheColombianEmbassyatLima.
17.Thecourtconcludedthatthegrantofasylumandreasonsforitsprolongationwerenotinconformity
withArticle2(2)oftheHavanaConvention(p.25).
Thegrantofasylumisnotaninstantaneousactwhichterminateswiththeadmission,atagivenmoment

ofarefugeetoanembassyoralegation.Anygrantofasylumresultsin,andinconsequence,logically
implies,astateofprotection,theasylumisgrantedaslongasthecontinuedpresenceoftherefugeeinthe
embassyprolongsthisprotection.
NB:Thecourtalsodiscussedthedifferencebetweenextraditionandgrantingofasylumyoucanread
moreonthisinpp.1213ofthejudgment.Thediscussionsontheadmissibilityofthecounterclaimof
Peruaresetoutinpp.1819.