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G.R. Nos.

66102-04 August 30, 1990


PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS: Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes
Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses
Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective
homes. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip. As a result of the
collision, three passengers of the jeepney, died while the other jeepney passengers
sustained physical injuries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the common carrier is liable to the death of the passengers of the
jeepney.
HELD: The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly
and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous The driver cannot be held jointly and severally
liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this
is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible
therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see
Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In
other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it
with him, for his driver's negligence is his. 4 Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and
severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of
merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to
the driver, 5 contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. 6

G.R. No. L-9907

June 30, 1958

LOURDES J. LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA, defendantappellant.


BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao with an
annual salary of P1,800. The defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from his
lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession. In the morning of January 9,
1954, Lara who then in a hurry to return to Davao asked defendant if he could take him in
his pick-up as there was then no other means of transportation, to which defendant agreed,
Upon reaching Km. 96, barrio Catidtuan, Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a
result he suffered serious injuries. they took him to St. Joseph's Clinic of Kidapawan. But
when Lara arrived he was already dead.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDAT IS LIABLE DESPITE THE FACT APPELLANT IS A MERE
ACCOMODATION PASSENGER.

HELD: It therefore appears that the deceased, as well his companions who rode in the pick-up of defendant, were
merely accommodation passengers who paid nothing for the service and so they can be considered as invited guests
within the meaning of the law. As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the
pick-up owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their
destination. ). Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law. There is every reason to believe that
the unfortunate happening was only due to an unforeseen accident accused by the fact that
at the time the deceased was half asleep and must have fallen from the pick-up when it ran
into some stones causing it to jerk considering that the road was then bumpy, rough and full
of stones.

G.R. No. 52159 December 22, 1989


JOSE PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas,
Iriga City. While said bus No. 409 was in due course negotiating the distance between Iriga City and Naga
City, upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the way to
Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along said national highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the
bus, which hit petitioner above his left eye. petitioner lost partially his left eye's vision and
sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HEREIN COMMON CARRIER CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR ACTS
OF STRANGERS.
HELD: While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the
safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in
the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of
private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to
provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury arising
wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even
knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not
and ought not to be held liable.
it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers,
as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for
the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

G.R. No. L-20761

July 27, 1966

LA MALLORCA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN,


ET AL., respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
FACTS: at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor daughters.
boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and
operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. After
about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound
therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Afterwards, he returned to the

bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter
Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. . Incidentally, when the bus was again
placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the
point where the plaintiffs had gotten off. At that precise time, he saw
people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on
the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other
than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode
earlier together with her parents.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT WHEN the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of
the bus involved in the incident and, therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated.
HELD: the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner
remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not
necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's
servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.1 The issue to be
determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a
place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety
under the contract of carriage also persisted.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point
of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier's premises.
G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA
VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS: on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers
therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of
using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. While the
crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while
he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit
him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT VIANA IS STILL CONSIDERED AS A PASSENGER AND THUS THE
COMMON CARRIER IS LIABLE.
HELD: The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at
the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship will
not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the
carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain
on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and
includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure.
G.R. No. L-22272

June 26, 1967

ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.


PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS: Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and
operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found guilty. while appeal was
pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants
asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from
behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not
liable.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the
passengers.
HELD: the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by
its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the
principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act
of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient
that the act be within the course of employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is
enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no
defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the carrier's orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in the
sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the
second view.

G.R. No. L-55347 October 4, 1985


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and ROSARIO TUPANG, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
FACTS: on September 10, 1972, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Winifredo Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of
appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the
train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon,
Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. Upon complaint filed by the deceased's widow, Rosario
Tupang, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, after trial, held the petitioner PNR liable for damages for breach of
contract of carriage.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER PNR AS A COMMON CARRIER IS LIABLE.
HELD: The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and
to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its
passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court,
the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
evidence.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, 8 it appears that the
deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the
coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of

said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting
the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages
G.R. No. 71238 March 19, 1992
LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and SPOUSES HENRY H. ALCANTARA and TERESITA ALCANTARA,respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
FACTS: On January 21, 1979, respondent Henry H. Alcantara shipped thirteen (13) pieces of luggage through
petitioner Lufthansa from Teheran to Manila. On March 3, 1979, the thirteen (13) pieces of luggage were
boarded in one of Lufthansa's flights which arrived in Manila on the same date. After the luggages arrived in
Manila, the consignee, respondent Teresita Alcantara, was able to claim from the cargo broker Philippine
Skylanders, Inc. on March 6, 1979 only twelve (12) out of the thirteen (13) pieces of luggage. Since efforts to
trace the missing luggage yielded negative results, Lufthansa informed Henry Alcantara accordingly and
advised him to file a claim invoice. the private respondents filed a complaint dated May 7, 1980, for breach of
contract with damages.
ISSUE: whether or not the private respondents are entitled to an award of damages
beyond the liability set forth in the Warsaw Convention and in the Airwaybill of
Lading.
HELD: Common carriers are liable for the missing goods for failure to comply with its duty. The
Convention's provisions, in short, do not "regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the
carrier" or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage.
Otherwise, "an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal,
in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd."
G.R. Nos. 100374-75 November 27, 1992
RUFINO Y. LUNA, RODOLFO J. ALONSO and PORFIRIO RODRIGUEZ, petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CRISTINA M. ESTRADA in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Br. 69, Metro Manila, HON. TERESITA D. CAPULONG in
her capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-Valenzuela, Br. 172, Metro Manila, and
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS: On 19 May 1989, at around 8:00 in the morning, petitioners Rufino Luna,
Rodolfo Alonso and Porfirio Rodriguez boarded Flight 020 of private respondent
Northwest Airlines bound for Seoul, South Korea, to attend the four-day Rotary
International Convention from the 21st to the 24th of May 1992. When petitioners
arrived in Seoul, they discovered that their personal belongings were nowhere to
be found instead, they were allegedly flown to Seattle, U.S.A. It was not until four
(4) days later, and only after repeated representations with Northwest Airlines
personnel at the airport in Korea were petitioners able to retrieve their luggage.
Thus, on 14 July 1989, petitioners Luna and Alonso jointly filed a complaint for breach of
contract with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NORTHWEST AIRLINES IS LIABLE AS COMMON
CARRIER UNDER WARSAW CONVENTION.
HELD: Warsaw Convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the
instances for declaring an airline liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an
absolute limit of the extent of that liability. 16 The Convention merely declares
the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases, if the conditions therein
specified are present. 17 For sure, it does not regulate the liability, much less
exempt, the carrier for violating the rights of others which must simply be

respected in accordance with their contracts of carriage. The application of the


Convention must not therefore be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil
Code and other pertinent laws.

G.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993


PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO ZAPATOS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts: private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of
carriage 2against Philippine Airlines. he was among the twenty-one (21) passengers
of PAL Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City . The flight was rerouted
to Cotabato City due to heavy rainfall in Ozamiz City. They were given option to return to cebu city on
the same day or the following day or remain in cotabato city and take the flight to Ozamiz city the nex
day. Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not accommodated due to
shortage in seats. He was not given accommodation, food nor transportation from

the airport to the city proper. His personal effects including the camera, which were
valued at P2,000.00 were no longer recovered.
Issue: Whether or not PAL is liable to the private respondent on account of fortuitous
event.
Ruling: The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp
the exacting standard required by law. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due
to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not
terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage
and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with
situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be
stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has
been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier's premises. 22 Hence,
PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding
the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have
reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then
ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and
the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place.

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991


DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y
MALECDAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT,
EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT,
NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA
CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by Inocencia
Cudiamat, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:p
Facts: private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the
death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident. Among others, it was
alleged that on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a
passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent
manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to
persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead
of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad
faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other
passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to
the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
Issue: WON petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Pedro Cudiamat
Ruling: The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no
knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly
not manifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When
the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the
same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect
making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver
and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect
of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same.
The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty.

G.R. No. 145804

February 6, 2003

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE
NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY
AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Facts: Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a
"token". While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a
fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or
who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT
tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed instantaneously.
Issue: Whether or nor petitioner is liable on the act of the security guard
Ruling: The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation
to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its
failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.