1.

CSC v. Belagan, 440 SCRA 578 (2004

HELD
Preliminary matters:
GR: Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. This Court is,
after all, not a trier of facts.
X: when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or a
quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein.
Rules on character evidence (R130.51.a.3): the provision pertains only to criminal cases,
not to administrative offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin cases, only character
evidence that would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged may
be proved. Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in
the type of offense charged.
>>>IN THIS CASE: no evidence bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What were presented
were charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries,
malicious mischief, etc. filed against her.
Rules of evidence for establishing lack of credibility of the witness: Credibility means the
disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a persons
integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. A witness may be discredited by
evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity.
SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the
record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
>>>Magdalena testified so shes considered a witness. Her character/reputation is a
proper subject of inquiry. HOWEVER
(1) the charges and complaints happened way back in the 70s and 80s while the act
complained of happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no longer reliable proofs of
Magdalenas character or reputation.
*evidence of ones character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from
the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or
reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period
remote from the commencement of the suit.
It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral
righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to
change or reform. oooohquotable quote!
(2) no evidence of conviction of the offenses charged.
The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to
show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for
a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility. This view
has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a
mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility,
(b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of
a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a
witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.
Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
a witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is
rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be involved,
and because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts.
As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the
charges against her listed by respondent.
(3) CSC resolution was supported by substantial evidence. Magdalenas testimony was
given weight by CSC plus corroborated by affidavit of Ngabit re: complaint by Magdalena.

ON ALLEGED MOTIVE (TO PRESSURE BELAGAN TO ISSUE PERMIT): none. Permit was
already issued when complaint was filed.
ON Penalty:
*Misconduct: intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions
and duties of a public officer.
>grave misconduct: the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest.
>>Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
>>> This is apparently present in respondents case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss
but also a demand for a date, an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to
operate a pre-school. Respondents act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable
by dismissal.
***SC Considered length of service (37 years) + analogous cases: suspension for 1 year
w/o pay
Disposition: Granted. Affirm CSC resolution. Suspend Belagan.

2.)

furello vs people

The initial query to be resolved is whose evidence between the prosecution and defense is
credible.
Case law dictates that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available as
long as sufficient circumstantial evidence had been presented by the prosecution.[35]
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if:
(a)

There is more than one circumstance;

(b)

The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[36]

Although none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw the petitioner falsifying the PDS,
they, nonetheless, testified that that they are very familiar with the petitioners handwriting
and signature. Magistrado testified that, being a subordinate of petitioner, she is very
familiar with petitioners signature and actually witnessed petitioner affixing his signature
on her daily time records for September 1987 to May 1988.[37] Brizo testified that he is
also familiar with petitioners signature because he personally knows petitioner and that he
regularly received petitioners daily time records and other documents bearing petitioners
signature.[38] Both Magistrado and Brizo opined that the signature in the PDS belongs to
petitioner.
The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of Magistrado and
Brizo as trustworthy and believable.
More significant are the documentary evidence consisting of petitioners signature in
certain authentic instruments which are apparently similar to the signature in the PDS. The
RTC and the Court of Appeals have compared petitioners signatures in Magistrados daily
time records and petitioners signature in his application letter to the CSC, Regional Office

No. 5, Legazpi City, with that of petitioners alleged signature in the PDS. They observed
that the slant position of the writing, as well as the stroke and the last rounding loop of the
signature in the PDS, does not differ from petitioners signatures in Magistrados daily time
records and in petitioners application letter.[39] They noted that petitioners signatures in
the said documents are strikingly similar, such that through the naked eye alone, it is
patent that the signatures therein were written by one and the same person. The
observation of the Court of Appeals is worth noting, viz:
Appellants allegation that he did not execute the subject PDS is unavailing. First, the
informations entered in the PDS, such as his accurate personal data and precise
employment history, are matters which only the accused could have known. Second, a
visual analysis of appellants signatures in the Certificate of Arraignment and Notice of
Hearing, vis-a-vis his signature in the PDS would show no significant disparity, leading to
the conclusion that appellant himself prepared the PDS and affixed his signature therein.
Third, the signature of appellant in the PDS and in the Daily Time Records (Exhibits J to Q)
of prosecution witness Florenda Magistrado, were glaringly identical. x x x.[40]

The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.[41] This is
more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding
upon this Court.[42]
In absolute disparity, the evidence for the defense is comprised of denials. Petitioner
denied having accomplished and signed the PDS. He tried to impart that someone else had
filled it up. However, aside from this self-serving and negative claim, he did not adduce any
convincing proof to effectively refute the evidence for the prosecution.
It is a hornbook doctrine that as between bare denials and positive testimony on
affirmative matters, the latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight.[43]
The subsequent matter to be determined is whether the elements of falsification for which
petitioner is charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 171, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

a)
the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts;
b)
he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by
him; and
c)
the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.[44]
In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or
employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In

falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his
official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in
the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he
falsifies.[45]
All of the foregoing elements of falsification of public documents under paragraph 4, Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code, have been sufficiently established.
First, petitioner was a public officer, being then the Acting Chief Operator of the BTO, Iriga
City, when he accomplished and submitted his PDS on 4 January 1988 at the BTO, Legazpi
City. It is settled that a PDS is a public document.[46] He stated under Item No. 18 of his
PDS that he passed the civil engineering board examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in
Manila with a rating of 75.8%. Thereafter, petitioner submitted his PDS to the BTO, Legazpi
City.

3.) de castro v de castro

Petitioner contends that because her direct examination has not been completed and as
she has not been cross-examined, her testimony has become useless. Apparently,
petitioner is alluding to the rule that oral testimony may be taken into account only when it
is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party;
until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be
considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to
be considered by the court in deciding the case.[25] The rule will not apply to the instant
case.

4.) Gaw vs chua

If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondents
testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitute a
harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.

In the first place, the delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one
party or the other is only significant in determining whether the party on whose shoulders
lies the burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge
the burden. In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her
case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants evidence. Thus, it barely
matters who with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider
the entirety of the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then
determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the
evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.[31]
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will
not be bound by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance that his
adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may
impeach an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,
[32] except by evidence of his bad character.[33] Under a rule permitting the
impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch for the
witness veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or
remains unrebutted.[34]

A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters
testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to
prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on.[35] A rule that provides
that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not
mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling
party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.[36]
This, the petitioner failed to do.
In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the
respondents testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The petitioner
admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the
property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary. On cross-examination, she confessed that
no other document was executed to indicate that the transfer of the business to Chua Siok
Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in 1993,
she did not initiate any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her
counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a claim over the business.

5.) salas vs sta mesa

We agree with the CA.

The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC.
Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow)
show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial statements
prepared by external auditors who are certified public accountants (like those presented by petitioner)
are audited financial statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as general rule,
private documents.[27] However, once financial statements are filed with a government office
pursuant to a provision of law,[28] they become public documents.[29]

Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness. [30] On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are
properly authenticated.[31] Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

a.

By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

b.

By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of the
audited financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies
presented were certified true copies[32] of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the
BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus, the
statements presented were private documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to
their admissibility in evidence.

During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is
genuine and has been duly executed[33] or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor
executed by mistake or under duress.[34] In this case, petitioner merely presented a memorandum
attesting to the increase in the corporation's monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his
management team. While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to
establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available must be presented.[35] The
best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of a representative of SMMC's
external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the
audited financial statements were never authenticated.

Nevertheless, petitioner insists on the application of an exception to this rule: authentication is not
necessary where the adverse party has admitted the genuineness and due execution of a document.
[36] The fact, however, was that nowhere in his testimony did Amado Domingo categorically admit the
authenticity of the copies of the audited financial statements. He only testified that SMMC regularly
submitted its audited financial statements to the BIR and SEC.[37] There was never any admission that
the documents presented by petitioner were true or faithful copies of those submitted to the BIR and
the SEC.[38]

6.) llemos vs llemos

In the present case, evidence shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "C") dated November 5,
1964, conveying the subject property to Felipe, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, was thumbmarked
by Saturnina, by virtue of which, the Register of Deeds of Dagupan, Pangasinan cancelled Original
Certificate of Title No. 38564 (Exhibit "B") and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 15632
(Exhibit "D") on November 5, 1964 in the name of Felipe.

Petitioners insist that respondents are guilty of laches considering that the latter filed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the TCT only on August 10, 1992 or almost 28 years after the TCT was issued to
the former on November 5, 1964. On the other hand, respondents claim that when the Deed of
Absolute Sale, on which basis the TCT was issued, was purportedly thumbmarked by Saturnina on
November 5, 1964, the latter had been dead since 1938; that therefore fraud attended the execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the TCTs in the names of petitioners are null and void; and that they
discovered the fact of fraud only in 1991.

It is a well-settled doctrine that laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate fraud and
injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from
recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.11

However, in order that respondents complaint may prosper, the burden of proof is on them to show by
preponderance of evidence that the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale was fraudulent and,
consequently, the issuance of the TCT, a nullity.

Respondents rely principally on the Certificate of Death12 issued by Rev. Fr. Camilo V. Natividad on
January 29, 1991, attesting that "Salvatin Salvatin", widow of Andres Llemos died on the 12th day of
March 1938 and was buried in the Roman Catholic Cemetery of the parish of St. John Metropolitan
Cathedral, Dagupan City. The Certificate further attests that it is a true copy of the original records as it
appears in the Register of Dead of said Parish, Book No. 20, Folio No. 91.

It is well-settled that Church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the
promulgation of General Orders No. 6813 and the passage of Act No. 19014 are no longer public
writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials.15 They are private writings and their
authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence.16

Respondents failed to establish the due execution and authenticity of the Certificate of Death in
accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

As aptly pointed out by the RTC, respondents failed to present a witness to prove the due execution
and authenticity of the Certificate of Death.

7.) lee vs people

When the original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Rule 132, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure on how the authenticity and
due execution of a private document which is offered as authentic may be proved:

Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

The testimony of an eyewitness as to the execution of a private document must be positive. He must
state that the document was actually executed by the person whose name is subscribed thereto.45
The admission of that party against whom the document is offered, of the authenticity and due
execution thereof, is admissible in evidence to prove the existence, authenticity and due execution of
such document.

In this case, there is no dispute that the original copies of the checks were returned to VMCI after the
same were negotiated and honored by the drawee bank. The originals of the charge invoices were kept
by VMCI. There is also no dispute that the prosecution offered the photocopies of the invoices in
evidence to prove the contents thereof, namely that: (a) VMCI purchased 203,500 empty bags from
NMI for the total price of P1,500,150.00; (b) VMCI received the said goods in good order and condition;
and (c) NMI charged VMCI for the purchase price of said goods. The prosecution offered the checks to
prove the contents thereof as well as the following: (a) VMCI drew and delivered the checks to the NMI;
(b) the said checks were endorsed by the petitioner; and (c) the said checks were deposited by the
petitioner with the Solidbank which was not the official depository of NMI. Thus, the prosecution was
burdened to prove the loss, destruction or its inability to produce in court without bad faith on its part
of the original copies of the said invoices and checks without bad faith on its part.

We agree with the petitioner that the Certification signed by Carolina Diaz was inadmissible in
evidence against him because of the failure of the prosecution to present her as witness and to testify
on said certification.

9.) dela rama vs papa

The Court of Appeals noted that his testimony was not corroborated, thus, self-serving, and further
castigated the trial court for failing to apply Section 22 of Rule 132, which establishes how the
genuineness of handwriting must be proved. The provision reads:

SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also
be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge.

Petitioners argue that our ruling in Emas v. De Zuzuarregui and Aguilar[21] is in point. Emas involved a
plaintiff who sought annulment of title on the ground that his signature on the contract of mortgage on
which the conveyance of the property was based had been forged. In explaining that the plaintiffs
testimony on the forgery of his signature sufficed to debunk the genuineness of the contract, we held:

The proof adduced before the trial court shows, we think, beyond any doubt, that the deed, original of
Exhibit A, which purports to show a conveyance of the property in which purports to show a
conveyance of the property in question from the plaintiff, Lucio Emas, to the defendant De
Zuzuarregui, is a forgery, and that the fraud was consummated substantially in the manner above
described. The plaintiff in this action (the real Lucio Emas) testified unequivocally that he had never
taken any part in the creation of the deed in question, and his testimony, in our opinion, leaves no
room to doubt that he was speaking the truth. As evidence of the crime of forgery, the plaintiff's
attorney submitted in the trial court certified copies of the judgments entered in the Court of First
Instance of Manila and afterwards in the Supreme Court in the criminal case convicting Ortega of the
crime of estafa by falsification of a public document. These certified copies were admitted by the trial
court as competent proof and the attorney for the defendants objected on the ground that said
judgments are inadmissible in this civil action, being res inter alios acta. As an abstract point of law the
assignment of error based on this exception is perhaps well taken; but we are of the opinion that, apart
from said certified judgments, the record contains ample evidence to support the finding of the trial
court that the original of the Exhibit A is a forged document, and that the present plaintiff, Lucio Emas,
was not a party thereto.[22]

Does Section 22 of Rule 132 accommodate the testimony of the very person whose signature is
disputed as a means to establish the genuineness of handwriting? We believe that it does, and Emas
remains a good law notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of the Rules of Court. After all, the
owner of such disputed signature may fall within the category of any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write and has thus acquired knowledge of
the handwriting of such person. In Alo v. Rocamora,[23] plaintiff Alo presented in evidence a deed of
sale establishing that he, and not the defendant, was the prior purchaser of the land in question. Alo
himself testified as to the authenticity of the deed of sale. In discussing whether the genuineness of
such document was proved, we cited the then Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
provides any writing may be proved, either by anyone who saw the writing executed; or by evidence of
the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or by a subscribing witness. The Court then
pronounced:
As to the authenticity of Exhibit A, introduced by the plaintiff, it may be said that it was fully
established by the testimony of the plaintiff himself and by that of the witness, Vicente Alquizola, who
signed the same together with the gobernadorcillo and who testified under oath that he was present
when the document was executed and signed by those whose names are subscribed thereto. x x x

Telesforo Alo and Vicente Alquizola witnessed the execution of the said instrument, the latter having
been one of the accompanying witnesses of the local authority before whom it was executed.
Consequently there is no doubt as to the authenticity of the said document, nor as to the truth of the
contents thereof, nor is there anything in the record, or any legal reason, that would justify this court in
holding that the said document was false.[24]

Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure is substantially similar to Section 22 of Rule 132, so our
application of the former rule in Alo remains appropriate today. At the very least, Section 22 of Rule
132 does not exclude such testimony from consideration. It is in fact well-established in the law of
evidence that the testimony of the very person whose signature is disputed is more than competent
proof on the genuineness of such signature. According to Wigmore on Evidence, there even was once
thought that for proving the genuineness of a document the alleged writer was a preferred witness,
though it is now believed that no such rule of preference exists.[25] At the same time, there really is
no rule that automatically discounts the testimony of the alleged writer as to the genuineness or
spuriousness of his own signature. In enumerating the methods of authentication of a handwriting,
Professor Herrera actually designates as the first method, the testimony of the purported writer:

I.

A.

Proof of the Genuineness of a handwriting

Methods of Authentication

1. The Testimony of the purported writer

Except to the extent that certain formalities of proof are required by the rules relating to attesting
witnesses or rules requiring formal certification, and the like, various means are available for proving
the authenticity of a document as a prerequisite to its admission in evidence. Under ordinary
circumstances, it would seem that the testimony of the purported writer would be the most
satisfactory authentication, where it is available.

While this is generally true, it is not necessarily so in all cases. There is no preferential rule requiring
the testimony of the writer on the ground that it is the best evidence; the fact that the best available
evidence is not used being significant only in so far as it affects the weight. Thus evidence of
handwriting may be admissible even though the person whose writing it is claimed to be in available
as a witness.

xxx

When the testimony of the writer is not available it may be said that the next best evidence in quality
would be in the testimony of a witness who had seen the writer sign his name or actually make the
writing x x x (Citations omitted)[26]

We acknowledge the general premise that the testimony of the very person whose signature is put in
question has probative value, whether such testimony is offered to affirm or dispute the genuineness
of his signature. That testimony satisfies the requirements under Section 22 of Rule 132 on how
handwriting must be proved. At the same time, the evidentiary weight of such testimony wholly
depends on the strength of the particular witnesss testimony viewed in conjunction with the totality of
the evidence at hand.

It may be possible, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, to discount the testimony of a plaintiff
disavowing the authenticity of his purported signature as self-serving, but such posture can only be
warranted if the self-serving assertion is negated by other evidence or legal presumptions. If the
challenged deed of sale were considered by us as a public document, then dela Ramas mere
testimonial disavowal of his signature would be insufficient to rebut the presumptive due execution of
that writing. However, since we cannot consider the deed of sale as a public document owing to its
improper acknowledgment, Dela Ramas denial that the signature was his gains greater weight for
evidentiary purposes.

10) Gabatan vs ca

It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she convincingly proves the
filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of
respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such
familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic
document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented
proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present
other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan
Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the
best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence
at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment
categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac
Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena
(respondents mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none
of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or
the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very
young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all
admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas wedding or Hermogenas
birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or heard
from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents witnesses
testimonies. The records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial
witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan
Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.[29] His testimony
regarding the relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima

Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,[30] this
Court is wary of according probative weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted
during her cross-examination that her (respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima
Nagac Pacana.[31] In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of
petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of respondents husband. They cannot
be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied
heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale[32] (Exhibit H) presented by respondent
and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan
Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5,
Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan was indicated as one of the
vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo
Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan
Gabatan.[33] The CA considered the same statement as a declaration against interest on
the part of Teofilo Gabatan.[34]