Introduction To Burner Managment

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Introduction to Burner
Management Systems
On-line Lesson
Welcome to the exida.com on-line lesson, Introduction to Burner

Management Systems. In this lesson we will introduce burner safety and the
systems used to achieve that safety.
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Prerequisite and Companion Lessons

Introduction to Safety Instrumented
Systems
Burner Management System Safety
Functions
It is recommended that the exida on-line lesson, Introduction to Safety

Instrumented Systems, may be helpful as a prerequisiste lesson for those
not familiar with functional safety systems. As a companion lesson, Burner
Management System (BMS) Safety Functions, will show typical safety
functions for a BMS system.
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General Lesson Objectives

Review general operation of combustion equipment
Understand the hazards associated with combustion
equipment
Understand basic operation of Burner Management
System (BMS)
Develop an understanding of NFPA, ISA and IEC
standards and their requirements for BMS systems
Copyright 2002, exida.com
Over the duration of this course the participant will:

Understand the associated hazards
Understand basic operation of a BMS
Develop an understanding of the major standards that apply to a BMS
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Boiler Components - FireBox

FIREBOX (WINDBOX)
9Ignition of fuel(s) takes place with proper air mixture
9Air and fuel Mixing takes place
9This air is referred to as the Primary Air
Stack
HRA
Fuel
Furnace
ID Fan
Windbox
FD Fan
4
First, we will examine the basic components of combustion equipment. A

good place to start in the firebox. Fuel and air are mixed in the Firebox
(sometimes called Windbox). Ignition takes place in the Firebox.
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Boiler Components - Furnace

FURNACE
9Heat release takes place to heat boiler tubes
9Combustion of fuel(s) takes place with proper air mixture
9Heat from other source such as Gas turbine
Stack
HRA
Fuel
Furnace
ID Fan
WindBox
FD Fan
Heat is released from combustion inside the Furnace. Much of that heat is
transferred into boiler tubes contained inside the furnace.
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Boiler Components - Fans

FD Fan (Forced Draft)
Provides the combustion air
into the boiler
Stack
ID Fan (Induced Draft)

Pulls flue gas from boiler.
Controls the furnace pressure
HRA
Fuel
Furnace
ID Fan
WindBox
FD Fan
6
Fans are used to maintain proper draft. The FD fan provides combustion air
into the boiler. The ID fan pulls flue gas from the boiler. The pressure inside
the boiler is controlled with this fan.
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Boiler Components PreHeater/Economizer

Combustion air Preheater
Economizer
Cools flue gas

Minimize/reduce heat loss to the
stack
Heats combustion air entering
furnace
Cools flue gas

Minimize/reduce heat loss to the stack
Heats feedwater to boiler drum
Stack
HRA
Economizer
Fuel
Air Heater
Furnace
ID Fan
WindBox
FD Fan
In some cases, a Combustion Air Preheater in combination with an

Economizer extracts energy from the flue gas and preheats the combustion
air.
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Boiler Components Superheater/Drums

Superheater
Reduce Moisture in Steam
Superheated steam required for turbines
Superheated
Steam
Steam Drum
Stack
Feedwater to boiler
Steam to headers
HRA
Drum
Economizer
Fuel
Air Heater
Furnace
ID Fan
WindBox
FD Fan
A Steam Drum is used to provide feedwater to the boiler. In some cases a

superheater is used to provide superheated steam required for turbines.
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Boiler Components Control Systems

Firing Demand based on Steam Required
Combustion Control
Fuel flow control
Air flow control
Furnace Draft = Fan Control (ID Fan)
Drum Level = Feedwater Control
Superheated
Steam
Stack
HRA
Drum
Economizer
Fuel
Air Heater
Furnace
ID Fan
WindBox
FD Fan
The control systems used include control of the firing demand based on the
need for steam. This is done by controlling fuel flow and air flow. The
firebox pressure is controlled with the ID fan speed. The water level in the
drum is also controlled.
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Consequences of Furnace Mis-Operation

Physical explosion of the steam drum and
piping
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) of Fuel Gas
and/or Coal Dust in Furnace/Firebox
Pool Fire of Fuel Oil
Implosion of the Furnace (Typically not a
safety concern)
10
There are a number of consequences when the combustion equipment is

not operated correctly. These include:
Physical explosion if the steam drum and piping
Possible vapor cloud explosion of fuel gas or coal dust
Possible pool fire of fuel oil
Possible implosion of the furnace itself.
Depending on circumstances, there are possible human injuries, human
death, environmental consequences and severe economic consequences.
10
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Causes of Furnace Explosions

Statistics indicate Human Error is a contributing factor in the
majority of explosions
Errors are the Result of:
Lack of understanding of, or failure to use proper
operating procedures, safeguards and equipment
Unfavorable operating characteristics of equipment or
control
Lack of functional coordination of the various
components of the steam generating system and its
components
These failures justify the use of automatic light-off
11
Studies of furnace explosions often point to human error as a contributing

factor. While there were a number of reasons for this, most international and
national combustion safety standards now require automatic startup and
ignition of combustion equipment.
11
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Oil Firing Special Problems

9Leaks can create potential fire hazards
9Required atomizing steam system
9Water or sludge in fuel oil storage tanks
cause plugging
9Widely different characteristics from single
or multiple sources
12
Common hazards are involved in the combustion of solid, liquid and gaseous
fuels. Each of these fuels have special hazards related to its physical
characteristics. The following items must be considered in the design of
the firing systems for oil fuels
(a) Fuel oils have high volumetric heats of combustion; therefore, even small
leaks can create potential fire hazards.
12
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cause plugging
9Widely different characteristics from single
or multiple sources
13
Water or sludge in fuel oil storage tanks or improperly located suction

takeoffs from the storage tank could result in hazardous interruptions or
pulsations of the fuel supply to the burners. A flameout, either
immediately or later, could result due to plugged strainers in the burner
tips.
13
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9Required atomizing steam system
cause plugging
9Widely different fuel characteristics from
single or multiple sources
14
Widely different characteristics of fuel oil from either a single source or

multiple sources could result in a significant change in Btu input rate to
the burner(s) without an equivalent change in airflow or without an
appropriate change in fuel oil temperature needed to restore the flowing
viscosity to the proper value. Different shipments of fuel oil with dissimilar
characteristics can cause a precipitation of sludge that can lead to
hazards
14
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9 Many boilers designed to fire both heated and unheated
fuels
9 Viscosity of fuel varies considerably and special viscosity
control equipment may be required
9 Fuel oils have low conductivities and may generate static
electricity
9 Incompressibility of fuel oil cause very rapid transients
9 Initial firing of a cold boiler may cause special soot
problems
15
On installations designed to fire both heated and unheated fuel oils,

consideration shall be given to the design of the burner control system to
ensure proper interlocks are activated for the selected fuel oil. Similar
consideration shall be given to the fuel oil piping supply to the burner as
well as the oil recirculating piping to the fuel storage tanks, depending on
the arrangement of the equipment provided.
15
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9 Viscosity of fuel varies considerably and special viscosity
control equipment may be required
9 Fuel oils have low conductivities and may generate static
electricity
9 Incompressibility of fuel oil cause very rapid transients
problems
16
Proper pumping and atomization of fuel oils are dependent upon control of
viscosity. Changes in viscosity in relation to temperature vary for different
oils and blends of oils. Very close attention shall be given to the design
and operation of viscosity control systems for each fuel where the source
or properties are variable.
16
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9 Fuel oils have low conductivities and may
generate static electricity
9 Incompressibility of fuel oil cause very rapid
transients
problems
17
Clear distillate fuels have low conductivities and generate static electrical
charges in the fuel stream that can be dangerous unless flowing
velocities are limited.
NOTE: See NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity, and API
RP 2003, Recommended Practice for Protection Against Ignition arising
out of static, lightning, stray currents.
17
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transients
9 Initial firing of a cold boiler may cause special
soot problems
18
The incompressibility of fuel oil can create very rapid transients in oil flow
through operating burners under the following conditions:
1. The rapid operation of an oil supply valve;
2. The rapid operation of individual burner shutoff valves;
3. The rapid operation of a regulating valve in the return oil line from the
burner header (on systems using this type of control).
The equipment must be designed to withstand this transient pressure without
creating leaks or other equipment failures.
18
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transients
9 Initial firing of a cold boiler may cause special
soot problems
19
Automatic soot blowing equipment must be operated in accordance with

manufacturers instructions. Special instructions often refer to situations
where the initial firing of a cold boiler may create excess soot and an
associated fire hazard.
19
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Gas Firing Special Problems

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Gas is colorless and odorless

Hazard is increased within buildings
Hard to detect improper air/fuel ratio
Gas impurities can cause plugging or fouling
Widely different characteristics from multiple sources
Discharges from relief valves or vents
Maintenance and repair of piping
20
The following items must be considered in the design of the firing systems
for gas fuels
Gas is colorless; therefore, a leak usually cannot be detected visually. In
addition, detection of a gas leak by means of odor is unreliable.
Potentially hazardous conditions are most likely to occur within buildings,
particularly where the gas piping is routed through confined areas. In the
latter situation, adequate ventilation shall be provided.
20
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9
9
9
9
9
9
9

21
The nature of fuel gas makes it possible to experience severe departures

from proper air/fuel ratios without any visible evidence at the burners,
furnace, or stack that could escalate into a progressively worsening
condition. Therefore, combustion control systems that respond to reduced
boiler steam pressure or steam flow with an impulse for more fuel shall be
considered potentially hazardous.
This also shall apply to manual firing.
NOTE: A safety instrumented function designed to prevent a fuel-rich
mixture is needed to protect against this hazard.
21
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9
9
9
9
9
9
9

22
Natural gas can have many impurities. These cause plugging or fouling of
smaller lines. Natural gas can be either "wet" or "dry." A wet gas usually
implies the presence of distillate, which can be characteristic of a particular
source. In the case of such a wet gas, the carryover of distillate into the
burners could result in a momentary flameout and possible re-ignition. Reignition could result in a furnace explosion. Therefore, special precautions
shall be taken with wet gas supply systems.
22
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9
9
9
9
9
9
9

23
Natural gas can discharge from relief valves or vents. If ignited, this can be
the cause of explosions.
The maintenance and repair of piping is more hazardous with natural gas as
gas must be purged from lines for safe maintenance.
23
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Coal Firing Special Problems

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
A Small amount of coal can form explosive mixture

Coal undergoes considerable processing
Methane can be released in storage
Raw coal contains considerable impurities
Pulverized coal is conveyed thru pipes
Pulverizer system explosions
Pulverizer system must be tightly integrated with burner(s)
Equalizing transport air velocities
Necessary to dry coal for pulverizer
Difficult to measure combustibles
24
There are also a number of special issues to be considered when coal is the
fuel. The key point is that different hazards may be present depending on
fuel type. All such hazards must be identified and addressed with sufficient
protection. The safety lifecycle is becoming the most commonly used
method process to address the necessary protection.
24
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Case Study: Ford Rouge Power House

What investigators
say they believe
happened during
the annual boiler
maintenance
shutdown to cause
the Feb. 1 blast at
the Ford Rouge
power plant.
25
A study of one boiler explosion provides some insight.
25
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1. Noon: A crew on
the east side of the
boiler works to
insert a blanking
piece into the
natural gas supply
line to seal off the
flow. A crew on the
west has inserted
theirs.
26
At around noon a crew on the east side of the boiler inserted a blanking
piece into the natural gas supply line to seal off the flow. It is believed that
the blanking plate was not fully inserted.
26
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2. The east side
main gas valve is
open.
27
The east side main gas valve was open.
27
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3. 12:45 p.m.: Pilot
burner valves are
opened from a
control room to
purge any
remaining gas from
supply lines
through the boiler.
28
Pilot burner valves were opened to purge any remaining gas from supply
lines through the boiler.
28
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4. Gas flows into
the furnace and
builds up.
29
However, it is believed that gas flowed from the east side supply line into the
furnace and slowly built up.
29
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5. About 1 p.m.:
Explosion.
Investigators
believe an electric
spark in an
electrostatic
precipitator, which
is a pollutioncontrol device, may
have ignited gas
flowing through the
furnace exhaust.
30
About an hour after the maintenance action, an explosion occurred. The

ignition was believed to be an electrostatic precipitator, a pollution control
device.
30
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State inspectors
say a double block
and bleed venting
system probably
would have
prevented the gas
buildup that led to
the explosion.
Outside consultants
had recommended
installation of such
a system.
Sources: Department of Consumer and Industry Services, Bureau of Construction Codes Boiler Division; Free Press research by Mark
Thompson-Kolar
GENTRY J. SLEETS/ Detroit Free Press
31
State inspectors state that a double block and bleed valve probably would
have prevented the gas buildup that led to the explosion.
31
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1997 - 1999 Power Boiler accidents

Injuries
73
12
Deaths
1058
Accidents
From The National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors

32
Combustion equipment presents many hazards. A compilation of the total

number of Power boiler incidents for 1997 thru 1999 in the United States
shows many accidents with some injuries and deaths.
It is easy to estimate that the economic consequences were quite high.
NOTE: The source is The National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors.
32
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Burner Management Systems (BMS)

Alternate Names
Burner Safety Systems

Burner Control Systems
Combustion Safeguards
Flame Safeguard System
Safety Shutdown Systems
Furnace Safeguard Systems
Boiler Safety Systems
Emergency Shutdown Procedures
33
Burner Management Systems (BMS) are designed to protect against such

hazards. These systems have had many different names.
33
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Burner Management Functions

The Old BMS DEFINTION
The Burner Management System (BMS) is a system to monitor/control
the FUEL BURNING EQUIPMENT during all start-up, shut-down,
operating and transient conditions.
PURPOSE
To protect against start-up when unsafe conditions exist.
To protect against the unsafe operating conditions and admission
of improper quantities of fuel to the furnace.
Provide the operator with status information
Initiate a safe operating condition or shut-down procedure if
unsafe condition exists.
34
The scope of BMS attention has increased to a more comprehensive level.

Consider the the old BMS (circa 1988) definition taken from the NFPA 85C.
It focused on the FUEL BURNING EQUIPMENT.
34
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Burner Management Functions

Todays BMS DEFINTION
The control system dedicated to boiler furnace safety and operator
assistance
Key is to look outside the Firebox!
35
This is an excerpt from the 1995 NFPA 8502 Standard for the prevention of
Furnace Explosions/Implosions in Multiple Burner Boilers. It explicitly covers
the entire safety of the boiler and does not just look at the burners.
This is consistent with newer standards that ask for a comprehensive review
of possible hazards and risk reduction methods.
35
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Standards Covering Burner Management

Systems (BMS)
NFPA
FM - Factory Mutual
UL Underwriters Lab
ISA 84.01
IEC 61508/61511
CGA Canadian Gas
Association
36
There are a number of design documents that apply to burner management

systems. Some have a long history and are rather prescriptive (e.g., NFPA).
Some are more recent, and as is the trend, are generic and performance (or
goal) oriented (FM, IEC, & ISA).
NOTE:
NFPA has combined BMS standards into its 85 standard. This combined the older standards:
NFPA 8501-1992 Single Burner Boiler Operation. The standard, formerly known as NFPA 85A, applies only to
boilers with a single burner and a fuel input rating greater than 12,500,000 Btu/hr (3.6MW) or output of
approximately 10,000 lbs/hour.
NFPA 8502-1995 Prevention of Furnace Explosions/Implosions in Multiple Burner Boilers. This standard, formerly
known as NFPA 85C, applies to boilers with multiple burners and a fuel input rating greater than 12,500,000
Btu/hr (3.6MW) or output of approximately 10,000 lbs/hour. It is a compilation of four formerly individual NFPA
standards:
NFPA 85B (Natural Gas-Fired)
NFPA 85D (Fuel Oil-Fired)
NFPA 85E (Pulverized Coal-Fired)
NFPA 85G (Prevention of Furnace Implosions)
The purpose of the NFPA 85 series of standards is to prevent furnace explosions and implosions. They define the
Burner Management System as: The control system dedicated to boiler furnace safety and operator assistance in
the starting and stopping of fuel preparation and burning equipment and for preventing misoperation of and
damage to fuel preparation and burning equipment.
The NFPA is not involved in any way with the enforcement of these standards. However, insurance companies,
regulatory agencies, and company standards often require compliance with the NFPA standards.
36
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NFPA Standards
8501 - Single Burner
8502 - Multiple Burner
(Previously 85C)
8503 - Pulverized Fuel
8504 - Fluidized Bed
Boilers
8506 - Ovens & Furnaces
37
ANSI/NFPA 85C An American National Standard August 16, 1991

ANSI/NFPA 85C An American National Standard August 16, 1991
NFPA
NFPA85C
85C
Prevention
Preventionof
ofFurnace
Furnace
Explosions/Implosions
Explosions/Implosions
in
inMultiple
MultipleBurner
Burner
Boiler-Furnaces
Boiler-Furnaces
1991
Edition
1991Edition
National Fire Protection Association 1 Batterymarch Park, POBox 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101
National Fire Protection Association 1 Batterymarch Park, POBox 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard 85 is probably the

most recognized standard worldwide for combustion systems safety. The
current standards are quite prescriptive with very specific design
requirements.
37
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NFPA Standard covers entire lifecycle.

9Design
9Installation
9Operation
9Maintenance
38
The standard does provide requirements for the lifecycle of a BMS.
38
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NFPA 85
General Requirements
The logic system for burner management
shall be designed specifically so that a
single failure in that system does not
prevent an appropriate shutdown.
39
The standard has a general requirement that the logic system be designed
specifically so that a single failure does not prevent an appropriate
shutdown. This is equivalent to the IEC61508 and IEC 61511 requirement
for a hardware fault tolerance of 1.
39
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NFPA 85
Failure Effects
The logic system designer shall evaluate the failure modes of
components where considering the design application of the system. As
a minimum, the following failures shall be evaluated and addressed:
Interruptions, excursions, dips, recoveries, transients, and

partial losses of power
Memory corruption and losses
Information transfer corruption and losses
Inputs and outputs (fail-on, fail-off)
40
The standard requires that the designer evaluate the failure modes of
components used in the system to insure the general requirement that no
single failure will prevent a safety function.
A checklist of possible failure modes is given. The BMS system should
continue proper operation or fail-safe.
40
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NFPA 85
Failure Effects (cont.)
The logic system designer shall evaluate the failure modes of
components where considering the design application of the
system. As a minimum, the following failures shall be evaluated
and addressed:
Signals that are unreadable or not being read

Failure to address errors
Processor faults
Relay coil failure
Relay contact failure (fail-on, fail-off)
Timer failure
41
Many different failure modes of the components must be considered

and analyzed as part of the design effort.
For each component failure mode, the system must either continue
successful operation or fail-safe.
41
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Typical PLC wiring for diagnostics

Output Module
H
Trip
WD WD Relay
H
L
TR
WD
Power Supply
Input Module
Output Module
H
TR
Fuse
Input Module
H
Trip
Alarm
Load
Typical for 1 of 8 channels
42
Many BMS designers add redundant hardware and diagnostic

hardware to meet the requirements of the standard.
This drawing shows ONE functional output of a PLC logic system.
Extra inputs are added to check output operation. An extra output is
added with an external watchdog timer that will de-energize outputs
if the processor does not continue its periodic update.
The design can get quite complicated.
42
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Safety Certified PLC design

H
Power/Fuse
Monitor
Fuse
Output
Module
Watchdog
Circuit(s)
Diagnostic
Cut-Off
Relay
Relay
Control
Microprocessor
Relay
Monitor
Typical for 1 of
8 channels
Output
Readback
Output
Command
Output
Switch
Monitor
Output
Protection
Circuit
Solid-State
Switch
I/O
Fuse
Load
43
Many BMS designers choose safety certified equipment that has been
designed to meet many functional safety standards including BMS
standards. This type of equipment meets failure effect requirements
without external components or special design effort.
43
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NFPA 85
Design
Logic shall not be changed while the associated
equipment is in operation.
Diagnostics shall be included in the design to monitor
processor logic function.
Logic system failure shall not preclude proper operator
intervention.
Logic shall be protected from unauthorized changes.
44
In addition to failure effect requirements, NFPA has design requirements.

These include the need to prevent changes in the logic when the equipment
is operating.
There is a requirement that diagnostics be programmed into the logic to
insure proper processor operation. The logic must not preclude operator
intervention and the logic must be protected from unauthorized changes.
44
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NFPA 85
Design (cont.)
System response time (throughput) shall be sufficiently
short to prevent negative effects on the application.
Protection from the effects of noise shall be adequate to
prevent false operation.
The operator shall be provided with a dedicated manual
switch(es) that shall actuate the master fuel trip relay
independently and directly.
45
The designer must be careful about equipment response time and electrical
noise. Systems must include a dedicated manual switch to directly stop the
fuel source.
45
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NFPA 8502
Requirements for Independence
Shall not be combined with any other logic system
The logic system shall be limited to one boiler
Independent logic, I/O systems, Power supplies,
functionally and physically separated from other
systems
The same Hardware type can be used for other logic
systems
Data Highway communications, but not for trip signals
A trip will require operator action prior to restarting
46
There is a requirement that the logic be independent from other logic

systems and that it be limited to one boiler. Newer technology can be used
but must be independent.
46
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NFPA 8502
Maintenance and Inspection
An inspection and maintenance schedule shall be
established and followed
Operation, set points, and adjustments shall be verified
by periodic testing (and documented)
Defects shall be reported and corrected
System configuration (system, not just logic solver)
shall not be changed without evaluation and approval
Inspections, adjustments and repairs shall be
performed by trained personnel according to mfg.
recommendations and applicable standards
47
Maintenance activities are also specified so that the entire lifecycle of the
equipment be considered.
47
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FM 7610
BMS Standard written for relay
based systems
Allen Bradley Burner Master (PLC5
based) FM approved per 7610 for
single burner applications.
Replaced by FM7605, December 1999
48
Factory Mutual also writes standards for BMS equipment. The early
standard was created for relays based equipment but was used to approve a
programmable logic controller based on a microprocessor. This standard
was replaced in December 1999.
48
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FM 7605 Equipment Certification

BMS Standard written for compliance
with IEC61508.
WEquipment must be IEC61508 certified.
Hardware architecture for specified SIL
Software compliance for specified SIL
WManufacturing facilities examination.

WDemonstrated Quality and Reliability.
49
FM standard 7605 builds upon an international functional safety standard

IEC61508. The FM standard requires that equipment for BMS applications
be functional safety certified per IEC61508. Other requirements in addition
to those of IEC61508 are listed as well.
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WRedundant components separated for common
cause strength
WNon-volatile memory for safety parameters
WControl system including flame scanner shall
respond within 4 seconds
WTrail-for ignition shall not exceed 10 seconds
WSingle automatic retrial for flame failure during
normal firing (under certain conditions)
50
The FM standard has specific requirements for separation of redundant

components, non-volatile memory, response time and logic time limitations
and the requirement for a single retry on flame failure during normal firing.
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WEquipment must operate with power inputs
85-100 percent of normal
WEquipment shall be immediately operable
when the main power is turned on.
WEquipment Operating Temp. 0 60 C
51
There are certain equipment strength requirements as well as operational

requirements.
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ANSI/ISA 84.01 Standard

Recognized by OSHA as industry accepted
good engineering practices.
Approved in 1994
Offers the Safety Lifecycle as a method for
SIS design
Risk reduction targets and compliance
measured by Safety Integrity Levels (SIL)
52
The ISA 84.01 standard was not written specifically for BMS. It covers
functional safety of programmable equipment used in the process industries.
Since this standard was endorsed by OSHA in the United States it is
required on many BMS projects as well. This standard describes a lifecycle
approach to risk assessment and management using safety instrument
systems (SIS) as a risk reduction mechanism. A BMS is classified as a SIS.
The standard requires that risk reduction for specific hazards be classified
according to order of magnitude levels called safety integrity levels (SIL).
During risk analysis, a SIL target is assigned to each hazard and a safety
function is designed to prevent the hazard.
52
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Trips and Permissives

Trip Conditions and action taken to move
the heater to a safe state when a hazardous
condition is present (Master Fuel Trip)
Permissive Set of conditions that must be
met prior to an action being taken (Purge
Sequence)
53
Safety functions are classified as either a trip (a shutdown) or a permissive.

A trip function looks for dangerous conditions and takes action to move the
process to a safe state. A permissive function looks for dangerous
conditions and prevents a process from moving to a dangerous state.
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Permissive - Furnace Purge System

(All Fuels)
All main, igniter, and individual
burner and igniter safety shutoff
valves are closed?
One set of ID and

FD fans running?
Are required burner

registers open?
Yes
Yes
Is air at purge rate?

Yes
Yes
Five-minute
time delay
Yes
Reset master
fuel trip relay(s)
54
An important permissive safety function in a BMS is the furnace purge.

Ignition cannot be done unless the furnace has been purged of residual fuel.
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Fuel Gas Trip System

1.
Loss of igniter flame
2.
Igniter fuel pressure out of stable range
3.
See Note
Loss of ID fan
6.
Loss of ID fan
5. Cut back main fuel
8.
Combustion airflow low
9.
Excessive furnace pressure
10a.
Burner header fuel pressure high
10b.
Burner header fuel pressure low
11.
Loss of all flame
12.
Partial loss of flame introducing hazard
A
N
D
4. Loss of FD fan
7. Loss of FD fan
13.
All fuel inputs zero
14.
Manual trip switch
15.
Loss of individual burner flame with one or more additional

stable burner flames present
Master
Fuel Trip
Logic
Close igniter header and

individual igniter safety shutoff
valves and deenergize sparks
Master
Fuel Trip
Relay(s)
Close main safety shutoff
and individual burner safety
valves
Close individual burner safety shutoff valve(s) and

its individual igniter safety shutoff valve(s) and
deenergize the associated sparks
Note: Based upon two pairs of ID and IF fans; other

arrangements of fans affect actions in blocks 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
Based on Figure 6-6.3.1.1 NFPA 8502
Typical Cause of
Trip Indication
Close individual igniter safety

shutoff valve(s) and
deenergize sparks
55
Other trip safety functions in a BMS look for dangerous conditions and stop
the fuel flow, shutting down the combustion.
55
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Interlocks/Safety Functions
Light off Sequences
Trips vs. Permissives
Master Fuel Trip and Purge Sequence
Gas-Fired Systems
Oil-Fired Systems
Pulverized coal-fired systems
Safety Instrumented Functions
56
A typical BMS includes safety functions for ignition (light off) sequences,
permissives and trips. The safety functions are different depending on fuel
type and BMS systems designed for multiple fuels and by necessity more
complicated.
56
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General Lesson Objectives

Understand the hazards associated with combustion
equipment
Understand basic operation of Burner Management
System (BMS)
Develop an understanding of NFPA, ISA and IEC
standards and their requirements for BMS systems
57
This lesson was intended to provide an introduction to BMS.

A description of combustion equipment was provided. A brief review of
some of the possible hazards was presented. Some of the standards
covering BMS were presented and a brief description of common safety
functions was presented. It should be understood that this lesson is not
comprehensive. Those designing and operating combustion equipment
have the responsibility to completely and thoroughly understand the hazards
and consequences of such equipment operation. Operation of such
equipment may require compliance with many local and regulatory
standards not covered in this lesson.
57
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Questions
Questions: please send any questions to
info@exida.com We will respond as soon as possible.
Additional Resources:
Free articles are available to download from the
exida.com website. These can be reached at
http://www.exida.com/articles.asp
Additional resources including books, tools, and reports
are available from the exida on-line store. A product
listing is available at http://www.exida.com/products2/
58
If have any questions, they may sent via email to info@exida.com. Please
refer to this particular lessonIntroduction to Burner Management Systems.
exida.com is a knowledge company focused on system reliability and safety.
We provide training, tools, coaching, and consulting. For general information
about exida, please view our detailed website at www.exida.com.
Thank you for your interest. Please consider other lessons in the on-line
training series from exida.com.
58

Introduction To Burner Managment

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Introduction To Burner Managment

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Welcome to the exida.com on-line lesson, Introduction to Burner

Prerequisite and Companion Lessons

It is recommended that the exida on-line lesson, Introduction to Safety

General Lesson Objectives

Copyright 2002, exida.com

Over the duration of this course the participant will:

Boiler Components - FireBox

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First, we will examine the basic components of combustion equipment. A

Boiler Components - Furnace

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Boiler Components - Fans

ID Fan (Induced Draft)

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Boiler Components PreHeater/Economizer

Cools flue gas

Cools flue gas

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In some cases, a Combustion Air Preheater in combination with an

Boiler Components Superheater/Drums

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A Steam Drum is used to provide feedwater to the boiler. In some cases a

Boiler Components Control Systems

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Consequences of Furnace Mis-Operation

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There are a number of consequences when the combustion equipment is

Causes of Furnace Explosions

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Studies of furnace explosions often point to human error as a contributing

Oil Firing Special Problems

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Oil Firing Special Problems

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Water or sludge in fuel oil storage tanks or improperly located suction

Oil Firing Special Problems

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Widely different characteristics of fuel oil from either a single source or

Oil Firing Special Problems

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On installations designed to fire both heated and unheated fuel oils,

Oil Firing Special Problems

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Oil Firing Special Problems

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Oil Firing Special Problems

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Oil Firing Special Problems

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Automatic soot blowing equipment must be operated in accordance with

Gas Firing Special Problems

Gas is colorless and odorless

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Gas Firing Special Problems

Gas is colorless and odorless

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The nature of fuel gas makes it possible to experience severe departures

Gas Firing Special Problems

Gas is colorless and odorless

Copyright 2002, exida.com

Gas Firing Special Problems

Gas is colorless and odorless