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fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI

10.1109/JIOT.2015.2452960, IEEE Internet of Things Journal

IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. **, NO. **, JULY 2015

Grid with Unstable Energy Providers and Malicious

Users

Qiang Tang, Kun Yang, Senior Member, IEEE, Dongdai Zhou, Yuansheng Luo, and Fei Yu

where some subscribers share several energy providers and

there are some malicious users in this power grid. The energy

providers are managed by a Power Market Scheduling Center

(PMSC), which broadcasts electricity price to subscribers and

energy providers. The energy providers and subscribers update

their capacities and energy consumption requirements respectively according to the electricity prices received. In order to

identify the malicious users and the unstable energy providers,

the Mechanism of Identification and Processing (MIP) for the

malicious users and unstable energy providers is proposed. By

integrating the MIP, we proposed a heuristic algorithm named as

Dynamic Pricing Algorithm with Malicious users and Unstable

energy providers (DPAMU) to get the optimal electricity price

as well as the optimal power requirement and the load capacity.

Finally, the simulation results show that the proposed DPAMU

has good convergence performance and can shave and clip the

peak load effectively.

Index TermsPower market scheduling center, demand response, real-time pricing, malicious user, unstable energy

provider, smart grid.

I. I NTRODUCTION

MART grid is integrated new technologies with power

grid, such as intelligent controllers, two-way communications between utilities and consumers. Smart gird is a

highly automated and distributed energy network, and the

users can communicate with the energy providers in real time,

which leads to improving the real time feature of the Demand

Response (DR) and makes the power grid more efficient and

stable.

In smart grid, Demand Response (DR) is the main activities

to manage the electricity price and the power consumption

by consumers as well as the generation capacities of energy

providers. DR has many types, which are mainly divided into

two categories named as Price-based DR and Incentive-based

DR [1]. In Price-based DR, the electricity price is used to

adjust the customers power consumption to avoid the timeslot with high price and achieve the maximum users utilities.

In most cases, the Price-based DR schemes try to determine

Qiang Tang, Yuansheng Luo and Fei Yu are with the School of Computer

and Communication Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha, Hunan, 410114 CHINA email: tangqiangcsust@163.com,

luodyx@msn.com, yufeiyfyf@163.com.

Kun Yang is with the School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, UK email: kunyang@essex.ac.uk.

Dongdai Zhou is with the College of Software, Northeast Normal University, Changchun, Jilin, 130117 CHINA email: ddzhou@nenu.edu.cn.

Manuscript received April 15, 2015; revised June 3, 2015.

the optimal electricity price for each time slot by using many

kinds of methods, thus the Price-based DR schemes can also

be called as the Time-based DR schemes.

In Incentive-based DR, the utilities or systems offer fixed

or time-varying incentives or payments to customers which

reduce their power consumption during the periods of system

stress [2].

There are many pricing schemes in Time-based DR, such as

Flat Pricing, Time-of-Use (TOU) pricing, Critical Peak Pricing

(CPP), Peak Load Pricing (PLP), Peak Day Rebates pricing (PDR), Real-Time Pricing (RTP), Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pricing

(VCG), et al [1]. Each of the above pricing schemes have some

variant schemes, such as the CPP has the variant scheme called

as fixed period CPP (CPP-F) [3], and the RTP has the variant

scheme named as Day-Ahead RTP (DA-RTP), in which the

next days prices are announced to the customers [4], [5]. In

the Incentive-based DR, there are also some programs, such as

Direct Load Control (DLC) [6], Interruptible/Curtailable(I/C)

[7] load, Emergency DR Programs (EDRPs) [8], Capacity

Market Program (CMP) [9], Demand Bidding (DB) [8], et

al.

In the above programs, each of the DR program has good

performance under certain circumstances. For example, if the

communication condition is limited, the DR program with little information exchange is required, while if the DR program

needs to optimize the utilities for both energy providers and

users, more communication capabilities are required. Thus, the

RTP scheme requires the maximum communication capabilities of the smart grid among the DR programs described above,

and the energy providers announces electricity prices, which

are determined before the start of each time slot [10]. The RTP

scheme can get the optimal price for each time slot, and makes

the benefit for both utilities and consumers maximum. In [11],

the RTP mechanisms have been applied into large industrial

and commercial customers.

Because of the large amount of information exchange, some

alternative RTP programs are proposed. For example, the DayAhead RTP (DA-RTP) is proposed [12], [13] and the DARTP has better performance compared with the original RTP

in the term of communication requirement. Besides, in order

to improve the performance of RTP scheme, many real-time

pricing models are proposed.

In order to improve the pricing efficiency of the RTP

program, the authors proposed an optimization model to adjust

the hourly load level in response to hourly electricity price in

[14]. The objective of the model is to maximize the utility of

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http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.

This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI

10.1109/JIOT.2015.2452960, IEEE Internet of Things Journal

IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. **, NO. **, JULY 2015

level, maximum and minimum hourly load levels, and ramping

limits on such load levels. The robust optimization techniques

are used to model the uncertainty of price. In [15], a smart

power infrastructure is proposed, where several subscribers

share a common energy source. The objective of the model is

to maximize the social welfare subject to power consumption

range of each user in every time slot. A distributed algorithm

is proposed to solve the model. The model in [15] motivated

some studies, such as in [16], the authors studied the price

elasticity of electricity demand in a smart grid framework

where the loads of a power system are scheduled by energy

management controller (EMC) units that aim to maximize

users benefits by considering both load utilities and realtime electricity price. In [17], a real-time pricing algorithm is

described that allows different energy providers to share one

common network, without violating the network constraints.

The voltage balance among wires is considered as the main

constraint.

Based on the model proposed in [15], we focus on the realtime interactions among subscribers and PMSC which manage

some energy providers. Malicious users and unstable energy

providers are also introduced. We propose a DR program

between consumers and some energy providers, which can

identify the malicious users as well as the unstable energy

providers and process the malicious data from both the users

and energy providers to enable the DR program stable and

convergent.

Finally, the simulation results show that the proposed DR

program can schedule the power consumption and make

the electricity price in each time slot convergent. Both the

subscribers and energy providers can benefit from the proposed

algorithms.

In the follow sections, the system model is presented

in Section II. In Section III, we proposed heuristic pricing

algorithms. Simulation results are presented in Section IV. In

Section V, we will give the conclusion.

II. S YSTEM M ODEL

A. Problem Description

In [15], authors considered a smart power system consisting

of a single energy provider and several load subscribers. But

in the real life, one energy provider is not enough to provider

energy for a large number of subscribers, thus multiple energy providers are needed, which can provide enough energy

capacities to the subscribers.

But, if all energy providers announce their electricity prices

for all subscribers in each time slot respectively, the power

market will cause price competition, which is harmful to the

energy providers when the market is the buyers market. If the

market is the sellers market, all the subscribers may pay high

energy consumption fees for the energy providers. Thus, if

there is no the third-party supervision agency coordinating the

electricity for both the energy providers and the subscribers,

the total social welfare may not be maximized.

In this paper, a Power Market Scheduling Center (PMSC) is

proposed, which manages all the energy providers and makes

providers generate the optimal quantity of electricity to get the

maximum utilities.

In addition to coordinate the electricity price for both energy

providers and the subscribers in each time slot, the PMSC also

needs to identify and process the malicious subscribers as well

as the unstable energy providers.

Because the DR programs especially the RTP schemes

may be not so attractive for some risk-averse subscribers,

some users may consume the electricity as their will or even

change the programs solidified in the smart meters and send

the required energy consumption data to the PMSC as their

will. While if the energy providers received electricity price

announced from the PMSC, in the rational and safe case the

energy providers generate the optimal energy capacities to

maximize the utilities and send the optimal energy capacities

data to the PMSC. But if some of the energy capacities data are

hijacked and tampered to be a random number or the energy

capacities data are determined in the irrational case because of

the unstable generation behavior or other reasons, the PMSC

electricity price as well as the total energy capacities may

not convergent, which means the electricity price is not the

optimal.

In the above description, we conclude that the successful

implementation of DR program not only need the excellent

performance of the DR program but also need the security

mechanism to ensure the data and the participants are all safe.

In the following description, we will solve the problems

introduced above, and propose a heuristic algorithm named as

Dynamic Pricing Algorithm with Malicious subscribers and

Unstable energy providers (DPAMU).

As introduced in [15], the subscribers utility functions are

non-decreasing and the marginal benefit of customers is a nonincreasing function. Thus the utility function is defined as

follow:

wx x2 if 0 x w

2

U (x, w) = w

(1)

w

if

<x

is known by the PMSC. We assume the utility function type is

known by PMSC. The parameter w is the energy consumption

willing of subscriber and different subscribers have their own

different consumption willing denoted by wi .

We consider a cost function Cpk (Lkp ), p = 1, 2, ..., M indicating the cost of energy provider p in each time slot k K.

We consider the follow cost function:

Cpk (Lkp ) = akp (Lkp )2 + bkp Lkp + ckp

(2)

are only known by the energy provider p. We assume the cost

function type is known by PMSC.

2327-4662 (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See

http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.

This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI

10.1109/JIOT.2015.2452960, IEEE Internet of Things Journal

IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. **, NO. **, JULY 2015

C. Malicious Users

In this paper, we let N = {i | i=1,2,3,...,N} denote the users

or subscribers set, and rmal (0, 1) is the rate of malicious

users. We let Nmal denote the set of malicious users, then we

have:

formulate the following optimization problem:

maximize

(

U (xki , wik )

Cpk (Lkp ))

kK iN Nmal

s.t.

|Nmal | = |N | rmal

(3)

power consumption range [xkmin , xkmax ], which is also known

by PMSC. The malicious users calculate their own energy

requirements according to the following equation:

xki = xkmin + rand (xkmax xkmin ), i Nmal

(4)

interval (0, 1).

In DPAMU, the PMSC can identify all the malicious users

according to the energy requirement data received from malicious users. If the malicious users are identified, the PMSC

replaces the wrong data with the average energy requirement

data from all the non-malicious users:

k

jN Nmal xj

k

xi =

, i Nmal

(5)

|N Nmal |

We assume the PMSC can communicate with the malicious

users smart meter and set the maximum power consumption

in this time slot as (5) as a punishment.

iN Nmal

pMMust

xki +

xkj

jNmal

(7)

Lkp , k K

pMMust

wik

where

is the w parameter of user i in time slot k. Lkp is

the generation capacity of energy provider j in time slot k.

According to (5), the problem (7) can be converted to the

following problem:

maximize

(

U (xki , wik )

Cpk (Lkp ))

kK iN Nmal

pMMust

(8)

|N |

xki

s.t.

Lkp , k K

|N Nmal | iN Nmal

pMMust

In order to solving the problem (8), we found that the

U (xki , wik ) and Cpk (Lkp ) are convex functions, thus problem

(8) can be solved by using the dual decomposition approach.

Because the sub-problems of (8) in time slots are independent

with each other, the problem (8) is equivalent to the following:

Cpk (Lkp )

U (xki , wik )

maximize

iN Nmal

pMMust

|N |

s.t.

Lkp

xk

|N Nmal | iN Nmal i

pMMust

(9)

|N |

, then the Lagrangian function of

|N Nmal |

problem (9) is:

Cpk (Lkp )

U (xki , wik )

L(x, Lk , k ) =

Let =

Besides the malicious users, the energy capacities data from

the energy providers may be unstable and PMSC needs to

identify and process the wrong data.

We let M = {p | p=1,2,3,...,M} denote the set of all the

energy providers, and Must denote the set of all the unstable

energy providers.

We assume the capacities of the energy providers are the

same with each other. We let the load capacity of energy

provider p in the time slot k belongs to the following interval:

Lkp [0, |N | xkmax ]

(6)

meet the total energy requirement of all the users.

If some energy providers send the unstable energy capacities

data to the PMSC, PMSC should identify and cut the power

grid connections between the unstable energy providers and

the PMSC, which means the load capacities of the unstable

energy providers are set as zero.

In the following section, we will introduce the mechanism

of identifying the malicious users and the unstable energy

providers.

E. Optimal Model of DPAMU

After identify and process the malicious users and the

unstable energy providers, we make the objective of DPAMU

iN N mal

k (

=

pMMust

iN N mal

Lkp )

pMMust

(10)

iN N mal

xki

pMMust

D(k ) =

Bik (k ) +

Spk (k )

(11)

iN N mal

pMMust

(12)

(13)

iN N mal

pMMust

energy providers locally to obtain the optimal xk

and Lk

p

i

k

respectively, as long as the electricity price is received

from the PMSC.

The dual optimization problem can be solved in an iterative

manner by using gradient projection method, and the k is

2327-4662 (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See

http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.

This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI

10.1109/JIOT.2015.2452960, IEEE Internet of Things Journal

IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. **, NO. **, JULY 2015

k

kt+1 = [kt + (

xk

i (t )

iN Nmal

(14)

k

+

Lk

p (t ))]

pMMust

k at the iteration t of the time slot k.

In the above description, the model of DPAMU can be

solved in the iterative manner. But first of all, the PMSC needs

to identify the malicious users as well as the unstable energy

providers according to the data their submitted, which needs

the Mechanism of Identifying and Processing (MIP) for the

malicious users as well as the unstable energy providers.

The participant of DPAMU is either the user/subscriber or

the energy provider. If the participant is the subscriber, in

the iteration t of pricing in time slot k, it should calculate

k

the optimal energy requirement xk

i (t ) according to the

(12), while if the participant is the energy provider, it should

k

calculate the optimal energy capacity Lk

p (t ) according to

k k

k

the (13). All the xk

i (t ) and Lp (t ) need to be sent to

the PMSC and proceed in MIP. Thus in the MIP, there are

two types of participants need to be identified and proceed by

PMSC according to the data received from them.

The MIP contains two parts which are identifying and

processing the malicious users and identifying and processing

the unstable energy providers. We will introduce the two parts

respectively.

for user i in time slot k, and in this paper, we assume all the

users load ranges in time slot k are the same and known

by the PMSC. Then if wi / xki,min , the optimal load is

xki,min . If wi / xki,max , then the optimal load can only be

calculated by using (17), because the optimal load can only

stay in the range [xki,min , xki,max ], then the optimal load is:

k

xk

i (t ) = max(min(

wi k k

, xi,max ), xki,min )

(19)

divided into two sub ranges [xki,min , wi /] and [wi /, xki,max ].

In the range [xki,min , wi /], the optimal load is:

k

xk

i ( ) = max(min(

wi k wi

, ), xki,min )

(20)

According to the analysis above, the optimal load of nonmalicious user i can be xki,min ,xki,max ,wi / or (wi k )/.

If PMSC has received the optimal load data from user i, it

estimates whether the data is xki,min or xki,max . If the received

data is neither xki,min nor xki,max , PMSC uses (17) and (18)

t

t

to calculate the user is consumption willing wi1

and wi2

and

store them.

In the next several iterations, we will continue to calculate

the consumption willing of user i. For example, in the iteration

t + 1, if the optimal load data of user i is neither xki,min

t+1

t+1

nor xki,max , the willing are calculated as wi1

and wi2

respectively. Then, we compare the four willing, and conclude

that user i is the malicious user or not.

F. Identifying and processing the malicious users

The steps of identifying and processing the malicious users

If there are some malicious users in the power grid, which

are executed by PMSC, and shown as following:

cant comply with the pricing program or send the wrong data

Step1: PMSC initializes a willing set for every user, for

to the PMSC in order to disturb the pricing progress. Then

0

0

}, and the initial values

, wi2

example user is willing set is {wi1

the PMSC has to identify the malicious users according to the

0

0

of wi1 and wi2 are zeros.

wrong data received from them and process their submitted

Step2: If all users data is proceed, exit. Or PMSC gets any

wrong data. In this paper, we assume the malicious users send

user is data in time slot k, at the iteration t, and compares it

random loads to the PMSC in the each iteration of pricing.

with the load range [xki,min , xki,max ].

According to (12), every non-malicious user needs to loStep3: Estimates whether the xti is equal to xki,min or xki,max .

cally calculate the optimal load and send the data to PMSC.

If xti = xki,min or xti = xki,max , then user i is non-malicious

According to the piecewise function (1) and (12), we get the

user and go to Step2.

following two maximizing problems respectively:

Step4: If xti = xki,min and xti = xki,max , then uses (17) and

t

t

of user i respectively

(18) to calculate the willing wi1

and wi2

wi

k 2

k

k

k

k

k

0

0

)

x

,

x

xk

(

)

=

argmax

w

x

(x

(15)

and

compares

them

with

w

and

w

.

i i

t

i

i

i

t

i1

i2

2 i

iN Nmal

0

0

0

0

t

Step5: If wi1

= wi2

= 0, replaces wi1

and wi2

with wi1

wi

k k

k

k wi

k

t

0

0

and

w

respectively.

If

w

=

0

or

w

=

0,

then

estimates

xi (t ) = argmax

t xi ,

< xi (16)

i2

i1

i2

0

t

0

t

iN Nmal

whether one of the four equations wi1

= wi1

, wi2

= wi2

,

0

t

0

t

= wi2

, wi2

= wi1

is true. If none of the four equations is

where wi is the consumption willing for user i, which is wi1

constant in all the time slots. If the user i received the price kt correct, user i is malicious user. If one of the four equations

of iteration t in time slot k, user i will calculate the optimal is correct, user i is non-malicious user and go to Step2.

Step6: PMSC replaces user is load according to (5) and go

load according to (15) and (16). If according to (15), the

to Step2.

optimal load of user i is:

wi kt

wi

k

xk

i (t ) =

k

xk

i (t ) =

(17)

(18)

If there are some energy providers which send the nonoptimal load capacity data to the PMSC and disturb the

progress of pricing. For every stable energy provider p, it will

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10.1109/JIOT.2015.2452960, IEEE Internet of Things Journal

IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. **, NO. **, JULY 2015

The optimal load capacity of energy provider p is:

k

k k

k

k 2

k k

k

Lk

p (t ) = argmax t Lp ap (Lp ) bp Lp cp

(21)

pMMust

where akp > 0, bkp , ckp 0 are the pre-defined cost function

parameters of energy provider p in time slot k. Then we can

get the optimal load capacity according to (22):

kt bkp

2akp

k

Lk

p (t ) =

part, and the optimal electricity capacities of all the energy

providers are calculated by the energy provider part.

After integrating the MIP, the PMSC has to add more steps

contained by MIP to identify and process the malicious users

as well as the unstable energy providers.

Finally, we get the following DPAMU flow chart shown in

Fig 1.

(22)

capacity range [0, |N |xkmax ], and we can get the optimal load

capacity of energy provider p:

k

Lk

p (t ) = max(min(

bkp

, |N |

2akp

kt

k

xik * (tk ) =

xkmax ), 0)

jN N mal

x kj * (tk )

N N mal

k*

Lp

( t

k

Lkp* (tk ) = rand N xmax

, p Must

, i N mal

(23)

Lkp* (tk ) = 0, p M ust

In this paper, the akp , bkp and ckp are three different constants

in all the time slots of energy provider p. Thus, if the

PMSC has received two values of optimal load capacity in

k

the iteration t and t + 1 in time slot k denoted by Lk

p (t )

k k

k k

k k

and Lp (t+1 ) respectively and if Lp (t ) and Lp (t+1 ) are

neither equal to 0 nor |N | xkmax respectively, then PMSC can

solve the following equation set and get the parameters ak

p

and bk

p of energy provider p in time slot k:

{ k

k

t bkp 2akp Lk

p (t ) = 0

(24)

k

k k k

k

t+1 bp 2ap Lp (t+1 ) = 0

If the PMSC received the third optimal load capacity data

k

k

Lk

p (t+2 ) which is neither equal to 0 nor |N | xmax from the

energy provider p, PMSC only needs to validate the following

expression is equal to zero or not:

k k k

kt+2 bk

p 2ap Lp (t+2 )

t +1

(25)

provider, otherwise the energy provider p is unstable energy

provider.

The steps of identifying and processing the unstable energy

providers are shown as following:

Step1: PMSC initializes a parameter set for every energy

provider, for example energy provider ps parameter set is

{akp , bkp } and the initial values of akp and bkp are 1.

Step2: If PMSC has received two optimal load capacity data

from energy provider p and which are both not equal to 0 and

|N | xkmax , calculates the cost function parameters of energy

provider p according to (24).

Step3: If PMSC has received the third optimal load capacity

data which is not equal to 0 and |N | xkmax from the energy

provider p, validates the (25) is equal to 0 or not. If (25) is

equal to 0, p is stable energy provider, else p is a unstable

energy provider.

III. HEURISTIC ALGORITHM

DPAMU contains three parts, which are the energy provider

part, subscriber part and PMSC part.

According to (11), (12), (13), (14), we know that the

electricity price is updated by the PMSC, and the users

xik * (tk )

mal

ust

tk+1 ,

k

k

k

xik * (tk ) = xmin

+ rand ( xmax

xmin

), i N mal

it to all the energy providers as well as the subscribers. If

the subscribers received the price, the non-malicious users

calculate the optimal load requirements and the malicious

users send the random load requirements to the PMSC.

While the stable energy providers update the load capacities

according to (21) and the unstable energy providers update

the load capacities randomly decided belong to the interval

[0, |N | xkmax ]. All the subscribers and the energy providers

send the optimal data to the PMSC. If PMSC received the

data, it firstly identifies and processes the malicious users and

the unstable energy providers by using MIP. And then the price

is updated according to (14) and broadcasted to the subscribers

and energy providers by PMSC, and the malicious user rate

is also broadcasted to the subscribers.

A single iteration of pricing consists of the electricity price

broadcasting, the optimal load and capacity updating and

sending, malicious user and unstable energy provider identification and processing, electricity price updating. In each

time slot, several iterations are contained and the electricity

price becomes stable finally.

A. Complexity Analysis

According to Fig 1, we assume there are m energy providers

and n users, and the electricity price converges to a stable

value after k iterations. Then the PMSC received k(n + m)

messages from the energy providers and users, and every

energy provider as well as user received k messages from the

PMSC, thus the message complexity is O(k(n+m)). The time

complexity is O(k), where k is determined by the electricity

price k and the step size according to (14).

IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In this section, we will simulate the performance of DPAMU

in the MATLAB, where the PMSC, energy provider and

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IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. **, NO. **, JULY 2015

bkp = 1 0.02p, p = 1, 2, ..., M

ckp = rand(0, 1)

(26)

DPAMU is not good and vice versa.

Thus, in order to illustrate the real time feature of DPAMU,

the convergence of price, the load requirements as well as the

load capacities are all simulated.

In this simulation, we set the combinations of the percentage of malicious users and the percentage of unstable

energy providers as [0, 0], [0.2, 0.2], [0.5, 0.5] and [0.8, 0.8]

respectively to simulate the convergence of price.

The simulations are all executed in a single time slot, and

the simulation result of price convergence is shown in Fig 2.

4

DPAMU rate=0.0

DPAMU rate=0.2

DPAMU rate=0.5

DPAMU rate=0.8

3.5

3

Price($)

randomly sets and sends the initial price to energy providers

and subscribers. If the energy providers and subscribers have

received the price, they update their capacities or loads and

send them to the PMSC, which updates the price and identifies

malicious users as well as unstable energy providers if all

the updated loads and capacities are received. After several

iterations, the price will be stable and the sum of capacities

is equal to the sum of loads, which represents the end of the

real-time pricing process in this time slot, in other words the

simulation of this time slot is ended.

The entire time cycle is divided into 24 time slots representing the 24 hours of one day.

We assume the users willing w is randomly selected from

the interval [1, 4] and remains fixed within the entire day. We

let N = 100 and M = 10. The parameter is set as 0.5, and

the parameters of the cost function of the energy providers are

defined as following:

2.5

of all users in each time slot are the same and vary in each

time slot. The PMSC knows the maximum and minimum

power requirements and consider them as constant in each

time slot. We define the following maximum and minimum

power requirements of each time slot in table I for each user.

1.5

Max Req

Slot No

Min Req

Max Req

0.6333

1.0667

0.7167

1.0000

0.7667

1.0667

0.9667

1.2833

1.1833

1.3833

0.9500

1.2333

7.9000

9.4000

8.6000

9.1000

12.0000

10.4000

11.8000

13.5000

13.9000

15.6000

13.0000

11.1000

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

0.8233

0.5833

0.6267

0.2500

0.2567

0.2500

0.2483

0.1200

0.1183

0.1217

0.0833

0.0833

9.7000

7.3000

6.7000

3.5000

3.0000

2.5000

2.5600

1.5600

1.5600

1.5500

0.9000

0.8900

capacity is |N | xkmax , and the optimal load capacity belongs

to the interval [0, |N | xkmax ].

In the next paragraph, we will simulate the performance of

convergence, peak shaving and clipping, the social welfare

respectively. The convergence will illustrate how fast the

convergence of the electricity price in DPAMU is. The peak

shaving and clipping will illustrate the DPAMU can reduce the

peak load and make the load requirements in the time slots

flat. The social welfare will illustrate the DPAMU can benefit

both the energy providers and the subscribers.

A. Convergence Performance

Because the DPAMU is executed in each time slot in the

iterative manner, the number of iteration is very important for

the performance of convergence. If the number of iteration

20

Iteration

25

30

35

40

500

Load Requirement rate=0.2

Generation Capacity rate=0.2

Load Requirement rate=0.5

Generation Capacity rate=0.5

450

400

350

Aggregate Load(kW)

Min Req

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

15

Slot No

10

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

10

15

20

Iteration

25

30

35

40

at a stable value in about 15 iterations, and if the percentage of

the malicious users as well as the percentage of the unstable

energy providers varies, the stable values are different. In Fig

2, we found that the prices are negative at some iteration,

which means that the total load capacities of energy providers

are much bigger than the total load requirements from the users

and cause the situation of oversupply. Thus, the electricity

price can be negative in theory before it converges at a stable

value.

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IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. **, NO. **, JULY 2015

In this simulation, we first propose another simple algorithm

named as Flat Price Mechanism (FPM), where there is no

interaction between the energy provider and the users. All

the prices of time slots are equal to each other. All users at

the beginning of each time slot k initialize their own load

requirements randomly, which belong to the range shown in

Table I. We assume there are no malicious users and unstable

energy providers in the simulation of FPM.

We compare the performance of peak shaving and clipping

among the FPM, DPAMU. In DPAMU, we set the rate of

malicious users and unstable energy providers as 0.5. We

firstly simulate the users total load requirements of DPAMU,

FPM respectively in 24 time slot. The simulation result is

shown in Fig 4.

1000

900

DPAMU Total Load

DPAMU Total Capacity

FPM Total Load

800

Aggregate Load(kW)

700

in the 24 time slots, which means the total load capacities are

all used by the users. Besides, the total load curve of DPAMU

in the 24 time slots is more smooth than that of FPM, and the

peak load is shaved and clipped by DPAMU.

C. Social Welfare

According to (9), we can calculate the total social welfare

for each time slot for MMP. In order to compare, we assume

the social welfare of DPAMU is also calculated by (9). The

percentage of malicious users as well as the percentage of the

unstable energy providers is set as [0.5 0.5] respectively. The

social welfare of DPAMU and FPM are compared in Fig 5.

1000

0

1000

Aggregate Social Welfare

In order to illustrate the convergences of the load requirements and the load capacities of energy providers, we set the

combinations of the percentage of malicious users and the

percentage of unstable energy providers as [0.2, 0.2] and [0.5,

0.5] respectively. The number of energy providers is 10, and

the number of users is 100. The simulation result is shown in

Fig 3.

From the Fig 3, we conclude that the total load requirements

and the total load capacities of DPAMU are all convergent at

the same value, and finally they are equal to each other in

about 15 iterations. If the total load requirements are equal to

the total load capacities, there is no waste of the electricity

energy, and the supply and demand is balanced. In Fig 3,

if the percentage of the unstable energy provider becomes

bigger, the number of unstable energy providers identified and

processed by the PMSC is more, which reduces the stable

energy providers and cause the total optimal load capacities

reduced. So, when the percentage of the unstable energy

providers is 0.2, the total load capacities are bigger than that

of the situation, when the percentage of the unstable energy

providers is 0.5.

2000

3000

DPAMU Social Welfare

FPM Social Welfare

4000

5000

6000

7000

10

15

20

25

K=24

of DPAMU is better than that of FPM, especially when the

time slot is 10. The social welfare of DPAMU in each time

slot almost equals to a same value compared with that of

FPM, which is because the total social welfare of DPAMU

is optimized for the stable energy providers and the nonmalicious users, while the total social welfare of FPM is

decided by the random load from the users.

Besides, the total social welfare of FPM is negative at most

time slots, and that of DPAMU is positive at all the time slots,

which means both the energy providers and the users are all

benefit from the DPAMU. The FPM is harmful to at least one

of them.

600

V. CONCLUSION

500

400

300

200

100

0

10

15

20

25

time slot k

of DPAMU are equal to the total load capacities of DPAMU

the real-time pricing with the malicious users as well as the

unstable energy providers in the smart grid. The mechanism

of MIP is also proposed to identify and process the malicious

users as well as the unstable energy providers. Simulation

results show that DPAMU is a real-time algorithm for the

demand and response in the smart grid and can shave as well

as clip the peak load effectively.

In future, we can continue researching based on this paper

in the following aspects:

(1) Define the electricity generation cost in more detail, for

example the start stop cost of multiple generators, the line loss

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IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. **, NO. **, JULY 2015

of the power, and even the raw material (e.g. coal, gas etc.)

price of electricity generation.

(2) Research the real-time price based on the specific

appliances type, for example define the energy consumption

models and utility functions for air-conditioning, television,

rice cooker, water heater, etc., and research the real-time price

based on the appliances energy consumption models and utility

functions.

(3) Integrate the renewable energy (e.g. wind, solar, hydroenergy, etc.), and research the real-time pricing schema based

on the uncertainty energy source.

(4) Research the distributed algorithms for the real-time

pricing based on some theories, for example the convex

optimization and game theory.

based on smart metering and demand-side management, Energy, vol.

46, no. 1, pp. 221-230, Oct. 2012.

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program, Energy, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 1908-1915, May 2010.

[14] Antonio J. Conejo, Juan M. Morales, Luis Baringo, Real-Time Demand

Response Model, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol.1, no.3, pp. 236-242,

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demand elasticity model of electricity, in Proc. IEEE Smart Grid

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distribution grids with network constraints, in Proc. IEEE Power and

Energy Society General Meeting (PES), pp. 1-5, 2013.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The work presented in this paper was in part funded by

a Project Supported by Scientific Research Fund of Hunan

Provincial Education Department (No. 13C1022), and a Chinese 863 High-Tech Program 5G Cognitive and Virtualization Technologies and Validation (2015AA01A705), and UK

EPSRC Project NIRVANA (EP/L026031/1) and DANCER

(EP/K002643/1). This work is also in part funded by a Project

Supported by Scientific Research Fund of Hunan Provincial

Education Department (No. 13C1023), and a Project supported

by the Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province, China

(Grant No. 13JJ4052) and a Project supported by the National

Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61303043).

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Engineering in Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha,

China. He received his Ph.D., M.S. and B.E. degrees from Department

of Control Science and Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and

Technology, Wuhan, China, in 2010, 2007 and 2005, respectively. His main

research interests include: wireless networks, smart grid.

Engineering (CSEE), University of Essex, and the Head of the Network

Convergence Laboratory (NCL), University of Essex. He is a Fellow of IET,

Senior Member of IEEE, Member of IEEE ComSoc, and Member of ACM.

He received his PhD degree in network engineering from the Department of

Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University College London (UCL). His

main research interests include: Wireless networks, heterogeneous wireless

networks, network convergence, etc.

Dongdai Zhou got his Ph.D degree in Computer Science and Technology

from Jilin University. He is now working at Northeast Normal University as a

professor and doctoral tutor. His main research interests now include: software

engineering, digital learning environment theory, method and key technology.

Yuansheng Luo got his Ph.D degree in Computer Science and Technology

from Xian jiaotong University and MSc and BSc from Hunan University.

He is now working at Changsha University of Science and Technology as a

lecture. His main research interests now include: service computing, service

composition, wireless networks, mobile computing and data science.

Fei Yu received the B.E. degree from Anhui Normal University in 2007, the

M.S. and Ph.D. degree from College of Information Science and Engineering,

Hunan University, Changsha, China, in 2010 and 2013, respectively. He is

currently a lecturer at School of Computer and Communication Engineering

in Changsha University of Science and Technology, China. He focuses on

radio frequency integrated circuits design and UWB antenna design.

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