G.R. No.

L-54919 May 30, 1984

POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII,
which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of
Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia,
Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As
Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition
for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was
allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the
time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January
31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate,
Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament
on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating
Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with
the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L.
McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had
declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is
also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent
need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually
distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.

On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to
believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the
will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would
work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty.
Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or
Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the
will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter
Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the reprobate of
the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C.
Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a
permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit
D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament
in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws
thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the
Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving
property both in the Philippines and in the United States of America; that the
Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and
granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas,
the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the
petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification which would render her
unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C.
Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is
hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos
Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let
Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said
Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00
conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming
the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary
act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that
the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of
his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. According
to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers
which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he
executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of
the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear.
He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May
29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate
and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided: Please
include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the
morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable
Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of
the case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When
the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to
argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the
petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the
petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order,
respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a
will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children
and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the
instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent
and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on
September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to
Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of
rights or interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus,
paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of
decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a
public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the
court but by way of a motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of
the estate-the law especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must
be presented, within 30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of
the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a
decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced
heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence
was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was
set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition a denial of the due
process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator
at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently
Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja
vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation
that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the
will.

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No

proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to
withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola
was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the
contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein
he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and
deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been
substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present
petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record
was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in
order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the
will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.

whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.

The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis
v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:

In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2). However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,

Art. 1039.
the decedent.

Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of

the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit
that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate
may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner
argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the
sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,
the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing
on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief
and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason
why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even
admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for
relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The
fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did
not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and

given preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request
should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.

of the deceased which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. The
reprobated will was allowed.

Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction

utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is
provided that:

Issue: Whether or not the reprobation of the will is invalid for it divested the
father of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him and the same
would work injustice and injury to him.

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided
at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

Held: No, the reprobation of the will is valid. Although on its face, the will
appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge
should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an
American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.
The order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration. It is therefore
evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly

filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it
was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen
and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a
"usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is
now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog
Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).

In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of: LOURDES G.

LUKBAN, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellee.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Cayetano vs. Leonidas

Facts: The decedent at the time of her death was an american citizen. Her
father, being the only compulsory heir adjudicated the entire estate to himself.
However, the sister of the decedent filed a petition for the reprobate of a will

[G.R. No. L-8492. February 29, 1956.]

This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration
that Petitioner is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed
to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not
authorized by law. After Petitioner had presented her evidence, the court
sustained the opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.
Lourdes G. Lukban, Petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco
Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On
December 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel
and since then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made by
her. She also inquired about him from his parents and friends but no one was
able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his
last known address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is
already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and
because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be
defined in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in
the case of Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 243, wherein it was held

that a petition for judicial declaration that Petitioners husband is presumed to

be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such
declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding similar to the present,
much less can the court determine the status of Petitioner as a widow since
this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband.
This the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is
merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup. 243).
The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be
made in a proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited.
Thus, we there said that A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final
and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a
case, or upon which a competent court has to pass cralaw. It is, therefore,
clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because
he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum
only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become
final.
Appellant claims that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the
present proceedings because in the case of Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil.,
880, it was declared that a special proceeding is an application or proceeding
to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the
purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the husband, and not, as in the
present case, to establish a presumption of death. If it can be satisfactorily
proven that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a
declaration to that effect as has been intimated in the case of Nicolas
Szartraw, supra.
Appellant also claims that the present petition can be entertained because
article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in defining bigamy, provides that a
person commits that crime if he contracts a second marriage before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings and, it is claimed, the present petition
comes within the purview of this legal provision. The argument is untenable
for the words proper proceedings used in said article can only refer to those
authorized by law such as those which refer to the administration or
settlement of the estate of a deceased person (Articles 390 and 391, new Civil
Code). That such is the correct interpretation of the provision in question finds
support in the case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil., 179, wherein this Court
made the following comment: For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is
not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second

marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to
be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage
(section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Lukban vs Republic

L-8492, February 29, 1956

FACTS: Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a
violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She
diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his
whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent
for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to
have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.
ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death
before she can remarry.
HELD: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of
presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their
marriage in 1933. It provides that for the purposes of the civil marriage law,
it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to
be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
G.R. No. L-42678 April 9, 1987
PEDRO E. BAYBAYAN, CIPRIANO EVANGELISTA, and SPOUSES
BARTOLOME and CONSUELO BAYBAYAN,petitioners,
vs.
HON. NARCISO A. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge CFI Pangasinan Branch
XIV; Deputy Sheriff CONSTANCIO PAGADUAN; EULALIA EVANGELISTA,
NORBERTO, PAULINA, FELIZA, all surnamed PADUA; DIONISIA,
LAUREANO, JOSEFINA, LEONARDO, ANASTACIA, VALENTINA, all
surnamed ORPIANO; SERVILLANO, GERTRUDES, PASTORA, LORENZO,
FAUSTA, all surnamed DELFIN; and DIONISIO, FAUSTINA, AMADO
BENJAMIN, all surnamed ORIA, respondents.

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Order issued by the
respondent Judge on 4 December 1975, which dismissed, without prejudice,
the petitioners' complaint filed in Civil Case No. 23 1 -R of the then Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, as well as the Order, dated 24 December 1975,
which denied petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of said order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto Padua, Paulina
Padua, Felisa Padua, Dionisia Orpiano, Laureano Orpiano, Leonardo Orpiano,
Josefina Orpiano, Valentina Orpiano, Servillano Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin,
Pastors Delfin Lorenzo Delfin, Fausta Delfin, Dionisio Oria, Faustina Oria,
Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all claiming to be the nephews and nieces of
one Vicente Oria who died intestate sometime in 1945 in Balungao,
Pangasinan, filed a petition for the summary settlement of the decedent's
estate, the value of which did not exceed P6,000.00. The petition was filed in
the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch. The case was
docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. T-300. 1
After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an order
adjudicating the estate to the heirs of the decedent, who were ordered to
submit a project of partition. 2 Sometime in 1971, the case was transferred to
the Resales Branch of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan where it was
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.
On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the adjudication earlier
made and ordered Eulalia Evangelista to deliver the respective shares of her
co-heirs; to make an accounting of the produce thereof from 1960; and to
deliver said produce to her co-heirs or pay its equivalent. A writ of execution
was subsequently issued pursuant thereto. 3
A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the private
respondents were placed in possession of their respective shares. 4 However,
when a representative of the private respondents went to cultivate the portion
adjudicated to said private respondents, he was prevented by Jose Diaz and
Cipriano Evangelista. In view thereof, the private respondents filed a motion to
cite said Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista in contempt of court. 5
As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelists,
and the spouses Bartolome and Consuelo Baybayan, claiming to be the
registered owners of the lots involved, filed a complaint in the Court of First

Instance of Pangasinan, Rosales Branch docketed therein as Civil Case No.

231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff and the herein private respondents, for the
quieting of their title, plus damages, and to restrain said defendants from
enforcing the writ of execution issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R. 6
Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R,
the question of the Identity of the lands subject of Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, was
brought up, so that the probate court ordered a relocation survey and
commissioned a geodetic engineer to undertake said survey. After the survey,
the commissioner submitted to the Court a report stating, among others, that
the lands which were delivered by the Deputy Sheriff to the heirs of Vicente
Oria, pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the probate court, are
registered in the names of herein petitioners under TCT No. 50269 and TCT No.
50270 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. 7
By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30 October 1975,
dismissed the contempt charge against Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelists.
However, the same court ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 231-R since "it is necessary that an amended complaint
be filed by Pedro Baybayan in order to determine whether or not the property
in question is part of the property under Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, inasmuch as it is
now the property claimed by him which is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 50269." 8
Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case
No. 231-R, to which was attached an amended complaint wherein some
defendants were dropped. 9 The respondent Judge, however, found that the
Amended Complaint did not comply with his order of 30 October 1975 to
exclude Lot E and dismissed the case, "without prejudice on the part of the
plaintiffs to file a proper complaint for the recovery of ownership or possession
of the property in controversy which is Lot B in the relocation plan and
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 23684, now under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50269."
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, 11 but the
motion was denied on 24 December 1975. 12 Thereupon, they filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari for the review of the orders of the lower court.
The Court treated the petition as a special civil action for certiorari.
Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the respondent
Judge had no authority under the law, both substantive and procedural, to

issue the questioned orders because the order to amend the complaint was
issued in, and in connection with Spec. Proc. No. 24-R where the herein
petitioners are not even parties.

amended so that the petitioners should not be faulted if the amended

complaint subsequently filed by them in Civil Case No. 231-R does not contain
the allegations that the respondent Judge would want to appear therein.

The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may be true that the
order to amend the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was issued in Spec.
Proc. No. 24-R, so that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are
not parties in said special proceedings, it appears, however, that the
petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate
court, when they filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, wherein
they prayed for leave to amend their complaint in accordance with the order
of the probate court of 30 October 1975. They cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the
respondent trial Judge to whom they submitted their cause voluntarily. 14

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and a writ issued, setting aside the
Orders issued by the respondent Judge on 7 December 1975 and 24 December
1975, in Civil Case No. 231-R of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Without costs.

We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of

discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint filed
by the petitioners, for their alleged failure to amend their complaint to exclude
therefrom Lot E which the respondent Judge found, in his order of 30 October
1975, issued in the probate court, to be owned by the petitioners Cipriano
Evangelists and Consuelo Baybayan. The findings of the respondent Judge as
to the ownership of Lot E after the hearing conducted in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R
do not justify the order to amend the complaint since the determination of the
ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge presiding over a court
exercising probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature and is without
prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the question of ownership
in a proper action. 15
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long
fine of decisions, that "when questions arise as to ownership of property
alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some
other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings.
The Court of First Instance, acting, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first
instance." 16
Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not
specify what the amendments should be or how the complaint should be

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088

July 31, 1954

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO

SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
disallowing the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on November
1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy,
China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the
deceased is more than P50,000.
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the
Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China,
leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy,
Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late
Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana,
Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second
marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special
proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued
to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed
administrator of the estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a

petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will
and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on
November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because
of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing
thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said
will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and
this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the
loss of the will and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
for the further proceedings (63 Phil., 793). In spite of the fact that a
commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking
of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February
1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by
cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In
the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he
had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and
testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4
January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy
district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the
intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the
Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy,
Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his
mother Maria Natividad Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of
the lost will or of the foreign will because of the transfer or assignment of their
share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G.
Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goo and the
subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by
the latter to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such
assignments cannot be threshed out in this proceedings which is concerned
only with the probate of the will and testament executed in the Philippines on
November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January
1931 and claimed to have been probated in the municipal district court of
Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China.
As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7
February 1938 was no bar to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or
before the expiration of ten years.
As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution
and validity of the same be established, and the will is proved to have
been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown
to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of
the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. When

a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated

and certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and the
certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and
recorded.
The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an
attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was
an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of the hearing of this
alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that he was one of the
witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B.
Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the
testator's signature the attesting witnesses signed and each of them signed
the attestation clause and each and every page of the will in the presence of
the testator and of the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th,
50th, 55th and 63rd interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the
drafting thereof (answer to the 11th interrogatory, Id.); that he knew the
contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew very little of that
language (answers to the 22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 crossinterrogatory, Id.) and all he knows about the contends of the lost will was
revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers to the
25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B.
Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the same as those of the draft
(Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 crossinterrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office of Alberto Barretto in November
1929 when the will was signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th
interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed the draft and said to Jose B.
Suntay: "You had better see if you want any correction" (answers to the 81st,
82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put the
"Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" (answers
to the 91st interrogatory, and to X-18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs.
Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read
the translation (answers to the 67th interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read
the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft (Exhibit B) (answers
to X-6 and X-20 cross-interrogatories, Id.).
Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her
brother Apolonio Suntay she learned that her father left a will "because of the
arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was bringing along with him certain
document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of our father
Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24
February 1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the document
in her presence and of Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the will
by her father of his estate, to wit: one-third to his children, one-third to Silvino
and his mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose,
Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that portion,
then he turned over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s.

n., Id.). On cross-examination, she testifies that she read the part of the will on
adjudication to know what was the share of each heir (pp. 530, 544, t. s.
n., Id.) and on redirect she testifies that she saw the signature of her father,
Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.).
Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n.,
hearing of 19 January 1948), before the last postponement of the hearing
granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De los Reyes
Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p. 32, t.
s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947); that he checked up the signatures on the
envelope Exhibit A with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s.
n., Id.); that the will was exactly the same as the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47,
50, t. s. n., Id.).
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio
Teodoro And returned by the latter to the former because they could not agree
on the amount of fees, the former coming to the latter's office straight from
the boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought him to the
Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery took place in November 1934 (p.
273, t. s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw and heard her
brother Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t.
s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948), must not be true.
Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying
against her own interest, still the fact remains that she did not read the whole
will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n., Id.) and saw only
the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and
Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But her testimony on cross-examination
that she read the part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent with her
testimony in chief that after Apolonio had read that part of the will he turned
over or handed the document to Manuel who went away (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).
If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto
in November 1929 when the will was signed, then the part of his testimony
that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to Jose B. Suntay to whom he said: "You
had better see if you want any correction" and that "after checking Jose B.
Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and
executed" cannot be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of the
will, because it must have been corrected before and all corrections and
additions written in lead pencil must have been inserted and copied in the
final draft of the will which was signed on that occasion. The bringing in for the
draft (Exhibit B) on that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of the
appellant's theory. At any rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the
provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he
learned to them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from
reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.

Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that
he read the supposed will or the alleged will of his father and that the share of
the surviving widow, according to the will, is two-thirds of the estate (p. 229, t.
s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness testified to oppose the
appointment of a co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he had
acquired the interest of the surviving widow not only in the estate of her
deceased husband but also in the conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229,
231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the original will or just the copy thereof
(Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important point was that he had acquired
all the share, participation and interest of the surviving widow and of the only
child by the second marriage in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it
may, his testimony that under the will the surviving widow would take twothirds of the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and
the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro. According to the latter, the third for strict
legitime is for the ten children; the third for betterment is for Silvino, Apolonio,
Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for free disposal is for the surviving
widow and her child Silvino.
Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed
in the envelope (Exhibit A) and that it was in existence at the time of, and not
revoked before, his death, still the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls
short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be
"clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible
witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or
upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.
On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he
prepared or drew up two mills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request, the
rough draft of the first will was in his own handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez
for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after checking up the
final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel
Lopez; that this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-4,
449, t. s. n., hearing of 21 February 1948); that two months later Jose B.
Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and the former asked him to draw up
another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he had the rough
draft of the second will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel
Lopez (p. 396, t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness the second will of
Jose B. Suntay copied from the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s.
n., Id.); that the handwritten insertions or additions in lead pencil to Exhibit B
are not his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft of the first
will made up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and
executed, two or three months after Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp.
397-8, 403, 449, t. s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu Portland Cement in the
China Banking Building on Dasmarias street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel Lopez
and a Chinaman who had all come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on
that occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where the following words
were written: "Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that

after the signing of the will it was placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A)
together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B. Suntay and the
envelope was sealed by the signatures of the testator and the attesting
witnesses (pp. 398, 401, 441, 443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that he again saw the
envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later part of August
1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-6, 411,
440-2, t. s. n., Id.); that on the following Monday Go Toh went to his law office
bringing along with him the envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he
told Go Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee for probating the will (pp.
406, 440-2, Id.); that Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in his
house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to
keep it and on no occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s.
n., Id.).
The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in
connection with the complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for the
alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit A), corroborates the testimony of
Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose B. Suntay at
his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part as
attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified before the same
assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro
(p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He said, quoting his own words, "Because I can not
give him this envelope even though the contract (on fees) was signed. I have
to bring that document to court or to anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n.,
Exhibit 6).
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy,
China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of
such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court
of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines,
by the executor or other person interested, in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and
cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the
Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its

allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts,
to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and
recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if
originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court
must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of
wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid
will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There
is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions
propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic
of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the
appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of
Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert
on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted,
the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and crossexamine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district
court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting
witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy
does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal
district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure
in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as
those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for
the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all
interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were
known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice
was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474,
476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in
the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to
the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all
interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such
interested parties.
does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the
proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot
be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of
wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as
proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the
will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent
court of this country.
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO

SUNTAY,
petitioner-appellant,vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,FEDERICO C.
SUNTAY,
administrator-appellee./1954, J. Padilla.
Doctrine: There are matters to be established in order to prove a will proved
outside the Philippines, among these are: (a) that the foreign court was, under
the laws of said foreign country, a probate court with jurisdiction over the
proceedings; (b) the law of the foreign country on procedure in the probate or
allowance of wills; (c) the legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in
such foreign country. Note: In the absence of proof of the foreign law, it is
presumed that it is the same as that in the Philippines.
Facts: - Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino resident citizen, died in city of Amoy, Fookien
province, Republic of China. He entered into a contract of marriage twice in his
lifetime.- He had children, including the administrator-appellee Federico, with
the late Manuela T. Cruz. He also had a son herein petitioner-appellant Silvino
with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.- Intestate proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No.
4892). After the death of Apolonio Suntay, Federico C. Suntay was appointed
administrator of the estate.- On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of alast will
and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines in
November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. But it was denied because of the
loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof
and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will.
Appeal was taken and SC remanded the case to CFI Bulacan upon the finding
that the evidence is sufficient to prove the loss of the will.- Nonetheless, the
probate court denied motion for continuance of the hearing by the surviving
widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime Pacific War supervened.After liberation, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings
praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines in November
1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4January
1931 (Exhibit N). He claimed that he had found among the files, records and
documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters
executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same
was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of
Fookien, China.- The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will
are Go Toh, an attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoroand Ana Suntay. Manuel
Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of
the hearing of this alternative petition.- CFI disallowed the alleged last will and
testament executed in November 1929 and the alleged last will and testament
executed in Amoy, China.
Issue (TOPICAL): WON the last will and testament executed in Amoy, China
should be allowed and recorded by the CFI? [NO, because certain facts as to
the due execution of the China will were not established.]

Ratio: As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in

Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such
country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First
Instance in the Philippines. Section 2 provides: When a copy of such will and
the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance
n the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court
having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and
cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance. Section 3 provides: If it appears at the hearing that the will should
be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its
allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to
which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the
clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and
allowed in such court.1. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy,
China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the
probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for
the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.2. The unverified
answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the
Consul General of the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2,
objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from
the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the
person who holds it an
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 169144
PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL
OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
- versus ERNESTO PALAGANAS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
January 26, 2011
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad
by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became
a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last
will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother,

Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother
of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a
petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate. [1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners
Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas
(Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that
Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where
she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will
could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been
executed under duress and without the testators full understanding of the
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as
administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio,
were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent
Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it
granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their
memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be
probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: [2] (a) admitting to probate Rupertas
last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c)
issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), [3] arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first
time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of
the RTC,[5] holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will,
subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the
documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA
pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior
probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can
be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from
reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed
abroad.Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied
with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a
foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners
abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution
before it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with
the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local
courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the
testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has
been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has
jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that
foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal
requirements for the valid execution of a will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries
of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to
the formalities observed in his country.[6]
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of
the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of
such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor,
devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the
names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of
the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if
the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his

residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is
sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province.[7] The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by
the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in
mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a
foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for
the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter
rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the
present case.In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the
findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter
can be established.
Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs
do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as
depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and
allowed by the proper court.
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial
ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of
Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special
administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the
due execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of the
execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws
of California. This explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the
duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the certified copies of the Laws of
Succession and Probate of Will of California.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169144 IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE
THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
FACTS: Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and
childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated
her brother, Sergio, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the
Philippines and in the U.S. Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC, a

petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate. However, Manuel and Benjamin, nephews
of
Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas willshould not be
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines,
it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and
without
the
testators
full understanding of the consequences of such act.
Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified toact as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria and Sergio, were on
separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, Ernesto filed a motion with
the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. The RTC
directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or
not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the
Philippiines. The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will;
(b) appointing Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto. Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the CA arguing that
an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated
for the first time in the Philippines. The appellate court, in its decision, affirmed
the order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will,
subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies
of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA
pointed out that Section 2, Rule76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior
probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be
probated in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in
the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed?
RULING: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country. In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first
probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin
obviously have in mind the procedure for there probate of will before admitting it
here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed
in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically
governed by Rule77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this
latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the
present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of

the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established