REYES
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as
the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the
toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Taon
Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos)
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal
guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the
Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the
protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to
protect the Taon Strait, among others.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, nonprofit, non-governmental organization, established for the
welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo
D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and
Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and
as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the
municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late
Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the Department of
Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the
DENR; Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional
Director for Region VII and Chairman of the Taon Strait
Protected Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and
existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch
office; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the
alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as
additional public respondents: Alan C. Arranguez
(Arranguez) and Antonio Labios (Labios), in their
capacities as then Director of the EMB, Region VII and
then Regional Director of the DOE, Region VII,
respectively.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines,
acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical
Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102)
with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and
geophysical studies of the Taon Strait. The studies
included surface geology, sample analysis, and
reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX,
assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite
surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Taon Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally
converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration,
development,
and
production
of
petroleum
resources in a block covering approximately 2,850
square kilometers offshore the Taon Strait.
xxx
ISSUES
Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771;
and
Main Issue: Legality of Sendee Contract No. 46.
DISCUSSION
Procedural Issues Locus Standi of Petitioners
Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards,
"claim" that they have the legal standing to file this
action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in this suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they
also assert their right to sue for the faithful performance
of international and municipal environmental laws created
in their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they
propound that they have the right to demand that they be
accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral
international instruments that the Philippine Government
had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be
no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine
Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners
of a campaign to build awareness among the affected
residents of Taon Strait and as stewards of the
environment since the primary steward, the Government,
had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant
to the public trust doctrine.
xxx
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate
objects should be given legal standing in actions before
courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and
environmental law. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals
and Stewards cited the 1972 United States case Sierra
Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton, wherein Justice William O.
Douglas, dissenting to the conventional thought on legal
standing, opined:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and
also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that
allowed environmental issues to be litigated before
federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the
xxx
Agreements Involving Technical Or Financial
Assistance Are Service Contracts with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the
phrase agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service
contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new
ones are between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the
government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the
new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide
capital, technology and technical know-how, and
managerial expertise in the creation and operation of
large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the
government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively
exercises control and supervision over the entire
operation.68cralawlawlibrary
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we
established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards
in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2
of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court
enumerated
in La
Bugal:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Antinarcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory
statutes. They are rules of convenience designed to
secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society,
and
their
violation
gives
rise
to
crimes mala
prohibita. They are not the traditional type of criminal law
such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that
deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful
and immoral. x x x
xxx
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buybust operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This
must start from the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise
or payment of the consideration until the consummation
of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of
the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was
made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money,
and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the
informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject
of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same
time, however, examining the conduct of the police
should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's
predisposition to commit the crime. If there is
overwhelming
evidence
of
habitual
delinquency,
recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also
be considered. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an
offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the
validity of the defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was
the confidential informant who initially contacted
accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting,
the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who
posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed
the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as
advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accusedappellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned
and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was
an incident to her lawful arrest.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught redhanded during the buy-bust operation to give ground for
her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not
committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial
court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao
to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be
justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal
knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under
Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of
the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts , i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on
the basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct
examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused
in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where
the marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to
appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business,
but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This
identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in
pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money
in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or
without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant
Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable
grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug
pushing. If there is no showing that the person who
effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right,
knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of accusedappellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the
search of her person and home and the subsequent
seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot
be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This
brings us to the question of whether the trial court
THE FACTS
THE ISSUE
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Facts:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed
separate petitions with the SC in an effort to reverse
various resolutions by the Comelec disqualifying them
from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its
assailed resolutions issued in October, November and
December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these partylist groups and organizations failed to represent a
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sector,
their
nominees did not come from a marginalized and
underrepresented
sector,
and/or
some
of
the
organizations or groups were not truly representative of
the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the May 2013 party-list election.
Ruling:
NO. COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set
in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
cases were remanded back to the COMELEC because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters prescribed by this Court.
In determining who may participate in the partylist elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
RULING:
1.
FACTS:
2.
xxx
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
xxx
This is an area that needs delineation.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo
the
authority
to
promulgate
decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.
such
enlightenment
and
SUMMATION
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP
1021 a supervening event would have normally
rendered this case moot and academic. However, while
PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed
allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no
guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not
again be issued. Already, there have been media reports
on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be
reimposed if the May 1 rallies become unruly and
violent. Consequently, the transcendental issues raised
by the parties should not be evaded; they must now be
resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional
insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP
to
prevent
or
suppress lawless
violence. The
proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed
earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving
the President express or implied power (1) to issue
decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all
laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court
also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the
responsibility
governed.158
of
the
government
to
the