Quinto vs. Comelec 1

12/1/2016
G.R.No.189698
ENBANC
ELEAZARP.QUINTOand
G.R.No.189698
GERINOA.TOLENTINO,JR.,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO,C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIOMORALES,
CHICONAZARIO,
VELASCO,JR.,
NACHURA,
versus
LEONARDODECASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DELCASTILLO,
ABAD,and
VILLARAMA,JR.,JJ.
Promulgated:
COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,
Respondent.
December1,2009
xx
DECISION
NACHURA,J.:
In our predisposition to discover the original intent of a statute, courts become the
unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are
bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the
[1]
statutemayalreadybeoutoftuneandirrelevanttoourday. Itisinthislightthatweshould
addresstheinstantcase.
BeforetheCourtisapetitionforprohibitionandcertiorari,withprayerfortheissuance
ofatemporaryrestrainingorderandawritofpreliminaryinjunction,assailingSection4(a)of
Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In view of pressing
contemporaryevents,thepetitionbegsforimmediateresolution.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/189698.htm
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TheAntecedents
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automatedelectionsystem(AES).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled AN
ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED
ELECTIONSYSTEMINTHEMAY11,1998NATIONALORLOCALELECTIONSANDIN
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING
FUNDSTHEREFORANDFOROTHERPURPOSES.Section11thereofreads:
SEC.11.OfficialBallot.TheCommissionshallprescribethesizeandformoftheofficial
ballotwhichshallcontainthetitlesofthepositionstobefilledand/orthepropositionstobevoted
uponinaninitiative,referendumorplebiscite.Undereachposition,thenamesofcandidatesshall
bearrangedalphabeticallybysurnameanduniformlyprintedusingthesametypesize.Afixed
space where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to
authenticatetheofficialballotshallbeprovided.
Bothsidesoftheballotsmaybeusedwhennecessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestationtoparticipateintheelectionshallnotbelaterthanonehundred
twenty(120)daysbeforetheelections:Provided,That,anyelectiveofficial,whethernational
orlocal,runningforanyofficeotherthantheonewhichhe/sheisholdinginapermanent
capacity, except for president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the
start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running:
Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effectuponthestartoftheaforesaidcampaignperiod:Provided,finally,That,forpurposesof
theMay11,1998elections,thedeadlineforfilingofthecertificateofcandidacyforthepositions
of President, Vice President, Senators and candidates under the PartyList System as well as
petitionsforregistrationand/ormanifestationtoparticipateinthePartyListSystemshallbeon
February9,1998whilethedeadlineforthefilingofcertificateofcandidacyforotherpositions
shallbeonMarch27,1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko
SentralngPilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security
measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of
private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
thatitcannotmeettheprintingrequirements.Accreditedpoliticalpartiesanddeputizedcitizens'
armsoftheCommissionmayassignwatchersintheprinting,storageanddistributionofofficial
ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure
that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily
detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying
machineandthatidentificationmarks,magneticstrips,barcodesandothertechnicalandsecurity
markings,areprovidedontheballot.
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Theofficialballotsshallbeprintedanddistributedtoeachcity/municipalityattherateof
one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per
[2]
precinct.
Almostadecadethereafter,CongressamendedthelawonJanuary23,2007byenacting
R.A.No.9369,entitledAN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED AN
ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED
ELECTIONSYSTEMINTHEMAY11,1998NATIONALORLOCALELECTIONSANDIN
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE
TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 13 of the amendatory law
modifiedSection11ofR.A.No.8436,thus:
SEC.13.Section11ofRepublicActNo.8436isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic
displayand/orthesizeandformoftheofficialballot,whichshallcontainthetitlesoftheposition
to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite.
Wherepracticable,electronicdisplaysmustbeconstructedtopresentthenamesofallcandidates
for the same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be
constructedtopresenttheentireballottothevoter,inaseriesofsequentialpages,andtoensure
thatthevoterseesalloftheballotoptionsonallpagesbeforecompletinghisorhervoteandto
allowthevotertoreviewandchangeallballotchoicespriortocompletingandcastinghisorher
ballot.Undereachpositiontobefilled,thenamesofcandidatesshallbearrangedalphabetically
bysurnameanduniformlyindicatedusingthesametypesize.Themaidenormarriednameshall
belistedintheofficialballot,aspreferredbythefemalecandidate.Undereachpropositiontobe
voteupon,thechoicesshouldbeuniformlyindicatedusingthesamefontandsize.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix his/her
signaturetoauthenticatetheofficialballotshallbeprovided.
Forthispurpose,theCommissionshallsetthedeadlineforthefilingofcertificateof
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidateatthestartofthecampaignperiodforwhichhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacy:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
uponthestartoftheaforesaidcampaignperiod:Provided,finally,Thatanypersonholding
a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and
officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be
consideredipsofactoresignedfromhis/herofficeandmustvacatethesameatthestartof
thedayofthefilingofhis/hercertificateofcandidacy.
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Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidates
withinthirty(30)daysbeforethestartoftheperiodforfilingacertificateofcandidacy.
Withrespecttoapaperbasedelectionsystem,theofficialballotsshallbeprintedbythe
NationalPrintingOfficeand/ortheBangkoSentralngPilipinasatthepricecomparablewiththat
of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The
Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National
Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements.
AccreditedpoliticalpartiesanddeputizedcitizensarmsoftheCommissionshallassignwatchers
intheprinting,storageanddistributionofofficialballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure
thatthenecessarysafeguards,suchas,butnotlimitedto,barcodes,holograms,colorshiftingink,
microprinting,areprovidedontheballot.
Theofficialballotsshallbeprintedanddistributedtoeachcity/municipalityattherateof
[3]
oneballotforeveryregisteredvoterwithaprovisionofadditionalthreeballotsperprecinct.
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,

[4]
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
ConnectionwiththeMay10,2010NationalandLocalElections.Sections4and5ofResolution
No.8678provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public

appointiveofficeorpositionincludingactivemembersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,
and other officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be
consideredipsofactoresignedfromhisofficeuponthefilingofhiscertificateofcandidacy.
b)Anypersonholdinganelectiveofficeorpositionshallnotbeconsideredresignedupon
thefilingofhiscertificateofcandidacyforthesameoranyotherelectiveofficeorposition.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.The certificate of candidacy shall be

filedonregulardays,fromNovember20to30,2009,duringofficehours,exceptonthelastday,
whichshallbeuntilmidnight.
Alarmedthattheywillbedeemedipsofactoresignedfromtheirofficesthemomentthey
filetheirCoCs,petitionersEleazarP.QuintoandGerinoA.Tolentino,Jr.,whoholdappointive
[5]
positionsinthegovernmentandwhointendtoruninthecomingelections, filedtheinstant
petitionforprohibitionandcertiorari,seekingthedeclarationoftheaforequotedSection4(a)
ofResolutionNo.8678asnullandvoid.
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ThePetitionersContention
PetitionerscontendthattheCOMELECgravelyabuseditsdiscretionwhenitissuedthe
assailedResolution.TheyaverthattheadvancefilingofCoCsforthe2010electionsisintended
merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time
limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a
candidateatthemomentoffiling.Infact,thelawconsidershimacandidateonlyatthestartof
thecampaignperiod.Petitionersthenassertthatthisbeingso,theyshouldnotbedeemedipso
facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time
they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their
respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already
[6]
consideredascandidates.
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed
COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or
reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto
[7]
resignedfromtheirpositionsuponthefilingoftheirCoCs.
Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from
officeuponthefilingoftheirCoCsisdiscriminatoryandviolatestheequalprotectionclausein
[8]
theConstitution.
TheRespondentsArguments
Ontheproceduralaspectofthepetition,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG),representing
respondent COMELEC, argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit.
Petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed
provisionintheCOMELECresolution.TheOSGfurtherclaimsthatthepetitionisprematureor
unripeforjudicialdetermination.Petitionershaveadmittedthattheyaremerelyplanningtofile
their CoCs for the coming 2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is thus
merelyspeculativeandcontingentuponthefilingofthesame.TheOSGlikewisecontendsthat
petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. They are questioning an issuance of the COMELEC
made in the exercise of the latters rulemaking power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an
[9]
improperremedy.
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On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretioninphrasingSection4(a)ofResolutionNo.8678foritmerelycopiedwhatisinthe
law.TheOSG,however,agreeswithpetitionersthatthereisaconflictinSection13ofR.A.No.
9369 that should be resolved.According to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to consider
appointiveofficialsasipso facto resigned and to require them to vacate their positions on the
same day that they file their CoCs, because they are not yet considered as candidates at that
time.Further,thisdeemedresignedprovisionexistedinBatasPambansaBilang(B.P.Blg.)881,
andnolongerfindsaplaceinourpresentelectionlawswiththeinnovationsbroughtaboutby
[10]
theautomatedsystem.
OurRuling
I.
Atfirstglance,thepetitionsuffersfromanincipientproceduraldefect.Whatpetitioners
assail in their petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi
legislativepower.CertiorariunderRule65,inrelationtoRule64,cannotbeavailedof,because
itisaremedytoquestiondecisions,resolutionsandissuancesmadeintheexerciseofajudicial
[11]
or quasijudicial function.
Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what
petitionersactuallyseekfromtheCourtisadeterminationoftheproperconstructionofastatute
andadeclarationoftheirrightsthereunder.Obviously,theirpetitionisonefordeclaratoryrelief,
[12]
[13]
overwhichthisCourtdoesnotexerciseoriginaljurisdiction.
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned

provisions of both the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may
stepinandresolvetheinstantpetition.
The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the
compellingstateinterestinvolvedintheirearlyresolutiontheperiodforthefilingofCoCsfor
the2010electionshasalreadystartedandhundredsofcivilservantsintendingtorunforelective
officesaretolosetheiremployment,therebycausingimminentandirreparabledamagetotheir
meansoflivelihoodand,atthesametime,cripplingthegovernmentsmanpowerfurtherdictate
thattheCourtmust,forpropriety,ifonlyfromasenseofobligation,entertainthepetitionsoas
toexpeditetheadjudicationofall,especiallytheconstitutional,issues.
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Inanyevent,theCourthasampleauthoritytosetasideerrorsofpracticeortechnicalities
ofprocedureandresolvethemeritsofacase.Repeatedlystressedinourpriordecisionsisthe
principlethattheRuleswerepromulgatedtoprovideguidelinesfortheorderlyadministrationof
justice,nottoshacklethehandthatdispensesit.Otherwise,thecourtswouldbeconsignedto
[14]
beingmereslavestotechnicalrules,deprivedoftheirjudicialdiscretion.
II.
Toputthingsintheirproperperspective,itisimperativethatwetracethebriefhistoryof
theassailedprovision.Section4(a)ofCOMELECResolutionNo.8678isareproductionofthe
secondprovisointhethirdparagraphofSection13ofR.A.No.9369,whichforreadyreference
isquotedasfollows:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who
fileshiscertificateofcandidacywithinthisperiodshallonlybeconsideredasacandidateatthe
start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawfulactsoromissionsapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectonlyuponthestartofthe
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive
officeorposition,includingactivemembersofthearmedforces,andofficersandemployees
in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
fromhis/herofficeandmustvacatethesameatthestartofthedayofthefilingofhis/her
[15]
certificateofcandidacy.
Notably,thisprovisoisnotpresentinSection11ofR.A.No.8436,thelawamendedby
R.A.No.9369.TheprovisowasliftedfromSection66ofB.P.Blg.881ortheOmnibusElection
Code(OEC)ofthePhilippines,whichreads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.Any person holding a public
appointiveofficeorposition,includingactivemembersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,
andofficersandemployeesingovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations,shallbeconsidered
ipsofactoresignedfromhisofficeuponthefilingofhiscertificateofcandidacy.
Itmayberecalledininversechronologythatearlier,PresidentialDecreeNo.1296,orthe
1978ElectionCode,containedasimilarprovision,thus
SECTION29.Candidates holding appointive office or position. Every person holding a

public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall
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ipsofactoceaseinhisofficeorpositiononthedatehefileshiscertificateofcandidacy.Members
of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of
certificateofcandidacy,subjecttothepleasureofthePresidentofthePhilippines.
Muchearlier,R.A.No.6388,ortheElectionCodeof1971,likewisestatedinitsSection
23thefollowing:
SECTION23.CandidatesHoldingAppointiveOfficeorPosition.Everypersonholdinga
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippinesandeveryofficeroremployeeingovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations,shall
ipsofactoceaseinhisofficeorpositiononthedatehefileshiscertificateofcandidacy:Provided,
That the filing of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrativeliabilitieswhichhemayhaveincurred.
Goingfurtherbackinhistory,R.A.No.180,ortheRevisedElectionCodeapprovedon
June21,1947,alsoprovidedthat
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who are
candidates.Everypersonholdingapublicappointiveofficeorpositionshallipsofactoceasein
hisofficeorpositiononthedatehefileshiscertificateofcandidacy.
During the Commonwealth era, CommonwealthAct (C.A.) No. 725, entitled AN ACT
TOPROVIDEFORTHENEXTELECTIONFORPRESIDENTANDVICEPRESIDENTOF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
SENATORS
AND
MEMBERS
OF
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR,

approvedonJanuary5,1946,contained,inthelastparagraphofitsSection2,thefollowing:
A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any of its political
subdivisionsoragenciesorgovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations,whethersuchofficeby
appointiveorelective,shallbeconsideredtohaveresignedfromsuchofficefromthemomentof
thefilingofsuchcertificateofcandidacy.
Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST
ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICEPRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE
CONSTITUTIONANDTHEAMENDMENTSTHEREOF,enactedwithoutexecutiveapproval
on June 22, 1941, the precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic resignation of
elective,butnotappointive,officials.
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Nevertheless,C.A.No.357,ortheElectionCodeapprovedonAugust22,1938,had,in
itsSection22,thesameverbatimprovisionasSection26ofR.A.No.180.
TheearliestrecordedPhilippinelawonthesubjectisActNo.1582,ortheElectionLaw
enactedbythePhilippineCommissionin1907,thelastparagraphofSection29ofwhichreads:
Sec.29.Penaltiesuponofficers.xxx.
Nopublicofficershallofferhimselfasacandidateforelection,norshallhebeeligible
during the time that he holds said public office to election, at any municipal, provincial or
Assemblyelection,exceptforreelectiontothepositionwhichhemaybeholding,andnojudge
oftheCourtofFirstInstance,justiceofthepeace,provincialfiscal,orofficeroremployeeofthe
BureauofConstabularyoroftheBureauofEducationshallaidanycandidateorinfluenceinany
manner or take any part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of
beingdeprivedofhisofficeandbeingdisqualifiedtoholdanypublicofficewhateverforaterm
offiveyears:Provided,however,Thattheforegoingprovisionsshallnotbeconstruedtodeprive
anypersonotherwisequalifiedoftherighttovoteatanyelection.
Fromthisbriefhistoricalexcursion,itmaybegleanedthatthesecondprovisointhethird
paragraphofSection13ofR.A.No.9369thatanypersonholdingapublicappointiveofficeor
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in
governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his/herofficeandmustvacatethesameatthestartofthedayofthefilingofhis/hercertificate
ofcandidacytracesitsrootstotheperiodoftheAmericanoccupation.
Infact,duringthedeliberationsofSenateBillNo.2231,thebilllatertobeconsolidated
withHouseBillNo.5352andenactedasR.A.No.9369,SenatorRichardGordon,theprincipal
authorofthebill,acknowledgedthatthesaidprovisointheproposedlegislativemeasureisan
oldprovisionwhichwasmerelycopiedfromearlierexistinglegislation,thus
SenatorOsmea.MayIjustopinehereandperhapsobtaintheopinionofthegoodSponsor.This
readslike,ANYPERSONHOLDING[meanscurrently]APUBLICAPPOINTIVEPOSITION
SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED [which means that the prohibition
extends only to appointive officials] INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES This is a prohibition, Mr. President. This means if
oneischairmanofSSSorPDIC,heisdeemedipsofactoresignedwhenhefileshiscertificateof
candidacy.Isthattheintention?
SenatorGordon.Thisisreallyanoldprovision,Mr.President.
SenatorOsmea.Itisinboldletters,soIthinkitwasaCommitteeamendment.
SenatorGordon.No,ithasalwaysbeenthere.
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SenatorOsmea.Isee.
Senator Gordon. I guess the intention is not to give them undue advantage, especially certain
people.
[16]
SenatorOsmea.Allright.
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago expressed her

concernovertheinclusionofthesaidprovisioninthenewlaw,giventhatthesamewouldbe
disadvantageousandunfairtopotentialcandidatesholdingappointivepositions,whileitgrantsa
consequentpreferentialtreatmenttoelectiveofficials,thus
SenatorSantiago.On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause, so I make this point
moreasamatterofrecordthanofanyfeasiblehopethatitcanpossiblybeeitheracceptedorif
wecometoadivisionoftheHouse,itwillbeupheldbythemajority.
I am referring to page 15, line 21. The proviso begins: PROVIDED FINALLY, THAT ANY
PERSON HOLDING A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE OFFICESHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO
FACTORESIGNEDFROMHIS/HEROFFICE.
ThepointthatImadeduringtheappropriatedebateinthepastinthisHallisthatthereis,forme,
novalidreasonforexemptingelectiveofficialsfromthisinhibitionordisqualificationimposed
by the law. If we are going to consider appointive officers of the government, including AFP
membersandofficersofgovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporations,oranyothermemberof
theappointivesectorofthecivilservice,whyshoulditnotapplytotheelectivesectorfor,after
all,evensenatorsandcongressmenaremembersofthecivilserviceaswell?
Further,itisselfservingfortheSenate,orfortheCongressingeneral,togiveanexceptionto
itself which is not available to other similarly situated officials of government. Of course, the
answer is, the reason why we are special is that we are elected. Since we are imposing a
disqualificationonallothergovernmentofficialsexceptourselves,Ithink,itisthebetterpartof
delicadezatoinhibitourselvesaswell,sothatifwewanttostayassenators,wewaituntilour
termexpires.Butifwewanttorunforsomeotherelectiveofficeduringourterm,thenwehave
tobeconsideredresignedjustlikeeverybodyelse.Thatismyproposedamendment.Butifitis
unacceptabletothedistinguishedSponsor,becauseofsensitivitytotheconvictionsoftherestof
ourcolleagues,Iwillunderstand.
Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is wellthought of. It is a good policy.
However,thisissomethingthatisalreadyintheoldlawwhichwasupheldbytheSupremecourt
[17]
inarecentcasethattheriderwasnotupheldandthatitwasvalid.
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of

appointivecivilservantsmusthavebeenthereasonwhySenatorRectoproposedtheinclusion
of the following during the period of amendments: ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE
CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR
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[18]
WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.
The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of
disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as
candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that
persons holding appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the
campaignperiodwhentheyarealreadytreatedbylawascandidates.
Parenthetically,itmayberememberedthatSection67oftheOECandSection11ofR.A.
No.8436containedasimilarprovisiononautomaticresignationofelectiveofficialsuponthe
filingoftheirCoCsforanyofficeotherthanthatwhichtheyholdinapermanentcapacityorfor
PresidentorVicePresident.However,withtheenactmentofR.A.No.9006,ortheFairElection
[19]
[20]
Act,
in2001,thisprovisionwasrepealedbySection14
ofthesaidact.Therewas,thus,
createdasituationofobviousdiscriminationagainstappointiveofficialswhoweredeemedipso
factoresignedfromtheirofficesuponthefilingoftheirCoCs,whileelectiveofficialswerenot.
This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Farias v. The Executive
[21]
Secretary
whenitruledthat
Section14ofRep.ActNo.9006
IsNotViolativeoftheEqual
ProtectionClauseoftheConstitution
The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertainingtoelectiveofficialsgivesunduebenefittosuchofficialsasagainsttheappointiveones
andviolatestheequalprotectionclauseoftheconstitution,istenuous.
TheequalprotectionofthelawclauseintheConstitutionisnotabsolute,butissubjectto
reasonableclassification.Ifthegroupingsarecharacterizedbysubstantialdistinctionsthatmake
realdifferences,oneclassmaybetreatedandregulateddifferentlyfromtheother.TheCourthas
explainedthenatureoftheequalprotectionguaranteeinthismanner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individualorclassprivilege,aswellashostilediscriminationortheoppressionof
inequality.It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
objecttowhichitisdirectedorbyterritorywithinwhichitistooperate.It does
notdemandabsoluteequalityamongresidentsitmerelyrequiresthatallpersons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specifiedclass,ifitappliesaliketoallpersonswithinsuchclass,andreasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
andthosewhodonot.
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Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
Theformeroccupytheirofficebyvirtueofthemandateoftheelectorate.Theyareelectedtoan
officeforadefinitetermandmayberemovedtherefromonlyuponstringentconditions.Onthe
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointingauthority.Someappointiveofficialsholdtheirofficeinapermanentcapacityandare
entitledtosecurityoftenurewhileothersserveatthepleasureoftheappointingauthority.
AnothersubstantialdistinctionbetweenthetwosetsofofficialsisthatunderSection55,
Chapter8,TitleI,SubsectionA.CivilServiceCommission,BookVoftheAdministrativeCode
of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service,arestrictlyprohibitedfromengaginginanypartisanpoliticalactivityortakepartinany
election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislatorsdeemeditpropertotreatthesetwoclassesofofficialsdifferentlywithrespecttothe
effectontheirtenureintheofficeofthefilingofthecertificatesofcandidacyforanyposition
otherthanthoseoccupiedbythem.Again,itisnotwithinthepoweroftheCourttopassuponor
lookintothewisdomofthisclassification.
SincetheclassificationjustifyingSection14ofRep.ActNo.9006,i.e.,electedofficials
visavis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the
personsbelongingunderthesameclassificationaresimilarlytreated,theequalprotectionclause
[22]
oftheConstitutionis,thus,notinfringed.
However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Farias, was intently focused on the
main issue of whether the repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally
proscribedrider,inthatitunwittinglyfailedtoascertainwithstricterscrutinytheimpactofthe
retention of the provision on automatic resignation of persons holding appointive positions
(Section 66) in the OEC, visvis the equal protection clause. Moreover, the Courts vision in
Farias was shrouded by the fact that petitioners therein, Farias et al., never posed a direct
challenge to the constitutionality of Section 66 of the OEC. Farias et al. rather merely
questioned, on constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14 of the Fair Election
Act. The Courts aforequoted declaration in Farias may then very well be considered as an
obiterdictum.
III.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the constitutional
challenge advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to settle the issue of whether the second
provisointhethirdparagraphofSection13ofR.A.No.9369,areproductionofSection66of
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the OEC, which, as shown above, was based on provisions dating back to the American
occupation,isviolativeoftheequalprotectionclause.
Butbeforedelvingintotheconstitutionalissue,weshallfirstaddresstheissuesonlegal
standingandontheexistenceofanactualcontroversy.
Centraltothedeterminationoflocusstandiisthequestionofwhetherapartyhasalleged
suchapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthecontroversyastoassurethatconcreteadverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
[23]
illuminationofdifficultconstitutionalquestions.
Inthiscase,petitionersallegethattheywill
bedirectlyaffectedbyCOMELECResolutionNo.8678fortheyintend,andtheyallhavethe
qualifications,toruninthe2010elections.TheOSG,foritspart,contendsthatsincepetitioners
have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet candidates hence, they are not yet directly
affectedbytheassailedprovisionintheCOMELECresolution.
TheCourt,nevertheless,findsthat,whilepetitionersarenotyetcandidates,theyhavethe
standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A
restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to
choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend
themselvestoneatseparationlawsthataffectcandidatesalwayshaveatleastsometheoretical,
[24]
correlative effect on voters.
The Court believes that both candidates and voters may
challenge,ongroundsofequalprotection,theassailedmeasurebecauseofitsimpactonvoting
[25]
rights.
Inanyevent,inrecentcases,thisCourthasrelaxedthestringentdirectinjurytestandhas
observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil
organizationstoprosecuteactionsinvolvingtheconstitutionalityorvalidityoflaws,regulations
[26]
andrulings.
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial
[27]
powerislimitedtothedeterminationandresolutionofactualcasesandcontroversies.
The
Court,inthiscase,findsthatanactualcaseorcontroversyexistsbetweenthepetitionersandthe
COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and administration of all election laws.
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Petitionershaveallegedinaprecisemannerthattheywouldengageintheveryactsthatwould
triggertheenforcementoftheprovisiontheywouldfiletheirCoCsandruninthe2010elections.
GiventhattheassailedprovisionprovidesforipsofactoresignationuponthefilingoftheCoC,
it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners
[28]
candidacy.
IV.
HavinghurdledwhattheOSGposedasobstaclestojudicialreview,theCourtnowdelves
intotheconstitutionalchallenge.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two
fundamentalfreedoms,thoseofexpressionandofassociation.Thispremiseisbestexplainedin
[29]
Mancusov.Taft,
viz.:
Freedomofexpressionguaranteestotheindividualtheopportunitytowritealettertothe
local newspaper, speak out in a public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or
picketanofficialbuildingtoseekredressofgrievances.Alloftheseactivitiesareprotectedby
theFirstAmendmentifdoneinamannerconsistentwithanarrowlydefinedconceptofpublic
orderandsafety.Thechoiceofmeanswilllikelydependontheamountoftimeandenergythe
individualwishestoexpendandonhisperceptionastothemosteffectivemethodofprojecting
his message to the public. But interest and commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an
effective means for protest at one point in time may not seem so effective at a later date. The
dilettantewhoparticipatesinapicketlinemaydecidetodevoteadditionaltimeandresourcesto
hisexpressiveactivity.Ashiscommitmentincreases,themeansofeffectiveexpressionchanges,
buttheexpressivequalityremainsconstant.Hemaydecidetoleadthepicketline,ortopublish
thenewspaper.Atonepointintimehemaydecidethatthemosteffectivewaytogiveexpression
to his views and to get the attention of an appropriate audience is to become a candidate for
publicofficemeansgenerallyconsideredamongthemostappropriateforthosedesiringtoeffect
changeinourgovernmentalsystems.Hemayseektobecomeacandidatebyfilinginageneral
election as an independent or by seeking the nomination of a political party. And in the latter
instance,theindividual'sexpressiveactivityhastwodimensions:besidesurgingthathisviewsbe
the views of the elected public official, he is also attempting to become a spokesman for a
politicalpartywhosesubstantiveprogramextendsbeyondtheparticularofficeinquestion.But
Cranston has said that a certain type of its citizenry, the public employee, may not become a
candidateandmaynotengageinanycampaignactivitythatpromoteshimselfasacandidatefor
publicoffice.Thusthecityhasstifledwhatmaybethemostimportantexpressionanindividual
cansummon,namelythatwhichhewouldbewillingtoeffectuate,bymeansofconcretepublic
action,werehetobeselectedbythevoters.
Itisimpossibletoignoretheadditionalfactthattherighttorunforofficealsoaffectsthe
freedomtoassociate.InWilliamsv.Rhodes,supra,theCourtusedstrictreviewtoinvalidatean
Ohioelectionsystemthatmadeitvirtuallyimpossibleforthirdpartiestosecureaplaceonthe
ballot.TheCourtfoundthattheFirstAmendmentprotectedthefreedomtoassociatebyforming
and promoting a political party and that that freedom was infringed when the state effectively
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denied a party access to its electoral machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also
affectsassociationalrights,albeitinaslightlydifferentway.Anindividualmaydecidetojoinor
participateinanorganizationorpoliticalpartythatshareshisbeliefs.Hemayevenformanew
grouptoforwardhisideas.Andatsomejuncturehissupportersandfellowpartymembersmay
decide that he is the ideal person to carry the group's standard into the electoral fray. To thus
restricttheoptionsavailabletopoliticalorganizationastheCranstoncharterprovisionhasdone
istolimittheeffectivenessofassociationandthefreedomtoassociateisintimatelyrelatedwith
theconceptofmakingexpressioneffective.Partyaccesstotheballotbecomeslessmeaningfulif
some of those selected by party machinery to carry the party's programs to the people are
precludedfromdoingsobecausethosenomineesarecivilservants.
Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual
expression or associational effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual who seeks
publicoffice.Thefactofcandidacyalonemayopenpreviouslycloseddoorsofthemedia.The
candidatemaybeinvitedtodiscusshisviewsonradiotalkshowshemaybeabletosecureequal
timeontelevisiontoelaboratehiscampaignprogramthenewspapersmaycoverhiscandidacy
hemaybeinvitedtodebatebeforevariousgroupsthathadtheretoforeneverheardofhimorhis
views.Inshort,thefactofcandidacyopensupavarietyofcommunicativepossibilitiesthatare
notavailabletoeventhemostdiligentofpicketersorthemostloyalofpartyfollowers.Aview
today,thatrunningforpublicofficeisnotaninterestprotectedbytheFirstAmendment,seemsto
us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office was the preserve of the
professional and the wealthy. Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First
Amendment right and a fundamental interest. Hence any legislative classification that
[30]
significantlyburdensthatinterestmustbesubjectedtostrictequalprotectionreview.
Here,petitionersinterestinrunningforpublicoffice,aninterestprotectedbySections4and8
ofArticleIIIoftheConstitution,isbreachedbytheprovisoinSection13ofR.A.No.9369.Itis
nowtheopportunetimefortheCourttostrikedownthesaidprovisoforbeingviolativeofthe
equalprotectionclauseandforbeingoverbroad.
Inconsideringpersonsholdingappointivepositionsasipsofactoresignedfromtheirpostsupon
thefilingoftheirCoCs,butnotconsideringasresignedallothercivilservants,specificallythe
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying
electiveposts,doesnotjustifysuchdifferentialtreatment.
Inorderthattherecanbevalidclassificationsothatadiscriminatorygovernmentalactmaypass
the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classificationbecompliedwith,namely:
(1)Itmustbebaseduponsubstantialdistinctions
(2)Itmustbegermanetothepurposesofthelaw
(3)Itmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonlyand
(4)Itmustapplyequallytoallmembersoftheclass.
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The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between
theclassestreateddifferently.AsillustratedinthefairlyrecentMirasolv.DepartmentofPublic
[31]
Works and Highways,
a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and
other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying
thetollways.Notallmotorizedvehiclesarecreatedequalatwowheeledvehicleislessstable
andmoreeasilyoverturnedthanafourwheelvehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the
secondrequirementifitisnotgermanetothepurposeofthelaw.JusticeIsaganiA.Cruz(Ret.),
inhistreatiseonconstitutionallaw,explains,
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not
germane to the purpose of the law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina
betweenmenandwomenwilljustifytheprohibitionofthelatterfromemploymentasminersor
stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification,
however,thelawcannotprovideforalowerpassingaverageforwomeninthebarexaminations
becausephysicalstrengthisnotthetestforadmissiontothelegalprofession.Importedcarsmay
be taxed at a higher rate than locally assembled automobiles for the protection of the national
economy, but their difference in origin is no justification for treating them differently when it
comestopunishingviolationsoftrafficregulations.Thesourceofthevehiclehasnorelationto
[32]
theobservanceoftheserules.
Thethirdrequirementmeansthattheclassificationmustbeenforcednotonlyforthepresentbut
aslongastheproblemsoughttobecorrectedcontinuestoexist.And,underthelastrequirement,
the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated
[33]
similarly,bothastorightsconferredandobligationsimposed.
Applyingthefourrequisitestotheinstantcase,theCourtfindsthatthedifferentialtreatmentof
personsholdingappointiveofficesasopposedtothoseholdingelectiveonesisnotgermaneto
thepurposesofthelaw.
Theobviousreasonforthechallengedprovisionistopreventtheuseofagovernmentalposition
topromoteonescandidacy,oreventowieldadangerousorcoerciveinfluenceontheelectorate.
Themeasureisfurtheraimedatpromotingtheefficiency,integrity,anddisciplineofthepublic
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by
[34]
politicalconsiderationsratherthanthewelfareofthepublic.
Therestrictionisalsojustified
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by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office,
could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attendingtotheircampaignratherthantotheirofficework.
Ifweaccepttheseastheunderlyingobjectivesofthelaw,thentheassailedprovisioncannotbe
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite
thattheclassificationmustbegermanetothepurposesofthelaw.Indeed,whetheroneholdsan
appointiveofficeoranelectiveone,theevilssoughttobepreventedbythemeasureremain.For
example,theExecutiveSecretary,oranyMemberoftheCabinetforthatmatter,couldwieldthe
sameinfluenceastheVicePresidentwhoatthesametimeisappointedtoaCabinetpost(inthe
recent past, elected VicePresidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social
welfaredevelopment,interiorandlocalgovernment,andforeignaffairs).Withthefactthatthey
bothheadexecutiveoffices,thereisnovalidjustificationtotreatthemdifferentlywhenbothfile
their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the VicePresident, in the
example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire
electionperiodandcanstillusetheresourcesofhisofficetosupporthiscampaign.
Astothedangerofneglect,inefficiencyorpartisanshipinthedischargeofthefunctions
ofhisappointiveoffice,theinversecouldbejustastrueandcompelling.Thepublicofficerwho
fileshiscertificateofcandidacywouldbedrivenbyagreaterimpetusforexcellentperformance
toshowhisfitnessforthepositionaspiredfor.
[35]
Mancuso v. Taft,
cited above, explains that the measure on automatic resignation, which
restrictstherightsofcivilservantstorunforofficearightinextricablylinkedtotheirfreedomof
expressionandassociation,isnotreasonablynecessarytothesatisfactionofthestateinterest.
Thus,instrikingdownasimilarmeasureintheUnitedStates,Mancusosuccinctlydeclares
Inproceedingtothesecondstageofactiveequalprotectionreview,however,wedosee
somecontemporaryrelevanceoftheMitchelldecision.NationalAss'nofLetterCarriers,supra.
InorderfortheCranstoncharterprovisiontowithstandstrictscrutiny,thecitymustshowthatthe
exclusionofallgovernmentemployeesfromcandidacyisnecessarytoachieveacompellingstate
interest.And, as stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar statutes, see Wisconsin
StateEmployees,supraBroadrick,supra, government at all levels has a substantial interest in
protectingtheintegrityofitscivilservice.Itisobviouslyconceivablethattheimpartialcharacter
ofthecivilservicewouldbeseriouslyjeopardizedifpeopleinpositionsofauthorityusedtheir
discretiontoforwardtheirelectoralambitionsratherthanthepublicwelfare.Similarlyifapublic
employeepressuredotherfellowemployeestoengageincorruptpracticesinreturnforpromises
of postelection reward, or if an employee invoked the power of the office he was seeking to
extract special favors from his superiors, the civil service would be done irreparable injury.
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Conversely,members of the public, fellowemployees, or supervisors might themselvesrequest

favors from the candidate or might improperly adjust their own official behavior towards him.
Even if none of these abuses actually materialize, the possibility of their occurrence might
seriouslyerodethepublic'sconfidenceinitspublicemployees.Forthereputationofimpartiality
isprobablyascrucialastheimpartialityitselftheknowledgethataclerkintheassessor'soffice
who is running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files which could provide
pressurepointsforfurtheringhiscampaignisdestructiveregardlessofwhethertheclerkactually
takesadvantageofhisopportunities.Forallofthesereasonswefindthatthestateindeedhasa
compellinginterestinmaintainingthehonestyandimpartialityofitspublicworkforce.
We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranstona flat

prohibition on officeseeking of all kinds by all kinds of public employeesas even reasonably
necessary to satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice Marshall pointed out in Dunn v.
Blumstein,[s]tatutesaffectingconstitutionalrightsmustbedrawnwithprecision.Forthreesets
of reasons we conclude that the Cranston charter provision pursues its objective in a far too
heavyhandedmannerandhencemustfallundertheequalprotectionclause.First,wethinkthe
natureoftheregulationabroadprophylacticrulemaybeunnecessarytofulfillmentofthecity's
objective. Second, even granting some sort of prophylactic rule may be required, the provision
hereprohibitscandidaciesforalltypesofpublicoffice,includingmanywhichwouldposenone
oftheproblemsatwhichthelawisaimed.Third,theprovisionexcludesthecandidaciesofall
types of public employees, without any attempt to limit exclusion to those employees whose
positionsmakethemvulnerabletocorruptionandconflictsofinterest.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the
purposesofthelaw.Themeasureencapsulatedinthesecondprovisoofthethirdparagraphof
Section13ofR.A.No.9369andinSection66oftheOECviolatestheequalprotectionclause.
V.
Thechallengedprovisionalsosuffersfromtheinfirmityofbeingoverbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without
distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility
workerinthegovernmentwillalsobeconsideredasipsofactoresignedoncehefileshisCoC
forthe2010elections.Thisscenarioisabsurdfor,indeed,itisunimaginablehowhecanusehis
positioninthegovernmenttowieldinfluenceinthepoliticalworld.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office
are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for
themalone,orwiththemaloneinmind.Fortherighttoseekpublicelectiveofficeisuniversal,
openandunrestrained,subjectonlytothequalificationstandardsprescribedintheConstitution
andinthelaws.Thesequalificationsare,asweallknow,generalandbasicsoastoallowthe
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widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of ones highest
aspirationstopublicoffice.Suchistheessenceofdemocracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices,
whethertheybepartisanornonpartisanincharacter,whethertheybeinthenational,municipal
or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the
[36]
fundamentalrightinvolvedonsuchasweepingscale.
Specificevilsrequirespecifictreatments,notthroughoverlybroadmeasuresthatunduly
restrictguaranteedfreedomsofthecitizenry.Afterall,sovereigntyresidesinthepeople,andall
governmentalpoweremanatesfromthem.
[37]
Mancusov.Taft,
onthispoint,instructs
As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the device of the
leaveofabsence. Some system of leaves of absence would permit the public employee to take
time off to pursue his candidacy while assuring him his old job should his candidacy be
unsuccessful.Moreover,aleaveofabsencepolicywouldeliminatemanyoftheopportunitiesfor
engaginginthequestionablepracticesthatthestatuteisdesignedtoprevent.Whilecampaigning,
the candidate would feel no conflict between his desire for election and his publicly entrusted
discretion, nor any conflict between his efforts to persuade the public and his access to
confidentialdocuments.Butinsteadofadoptingareasonableleaveofabsencepolicy,Cranston
haschosenaprovisionthatmakesthepublicemployeecastoffthesecurityofhardwonpublic
employmentshouldhedesiretocompeteforelectedoffice.
Thecitymightalsopromoteitsinterestintheintegrityofthecivilservicebyenforcing,
through dismissal, discipline, or criminal prosecution, rules or statutes that treat conflict of
interests, bribery, or other forms of official corruption. By thus attacking the problem directly,
instead of using a broad prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective without unduly
burdeningtheFirstAmendmentrightsofitsemployeesandthevotingrightsofitscitizens.Last
term in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court faced an analogous question when the State of
Tennesseeassertedthattheinterest of ballot box purity justified its imposition of one yearand
three month residency requirements before a citizen could vote. Justice Marshall stated, inter
alia,thatTennesseehadavailableanumberofcriminalstatutesthatcouldbeusedtopunishvoter
fraud without unnecessary infringement on the newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it appears
fromtherecordinthiscasethattheCranstonchartercontainssomeprovisionsthatmightbeused
againstopportunisticpublicemployees.
Evenifsomesortofprophylacticruleisnecessary,wecannotsaythatCranstonhasput
much effort into tailoring a narrow provision that attempts to match the prohibition with the
problem.ThecharterforbidsaCranstonpublicemployeefromrunningforanyoffice,anywhere.
The prohibition is not limited to the local offices of Cranston, but rather extends to statewide
officesandeventonationaloffices.Itisdifficultforustoseethatapublicemployeerunningfor
the United States Congress poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same
employeeifhewererunningforalocalofficewherethecontactsandinformationprovidedby
hisjobrelateddirectlytothepositionhewasseeking,andhencewherethepotentialforvarious
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abuses was greater. Nor does the Cranston charter except the public employee who works in
Cranstonbutaspirestoofficeinanotherlocaljurisdiction,mostprobablyhistownofresidence.
Here again the charter precludes candidacies which can pose only a remote threat to the civil
service.Finally,thecharterdoesnotlimititsprohibitiontopartisanofficeseeking,butsterilizes
alsothosepublicemployeeswhowouldseeknonpartisanelectiveoffice.Thestatutereviewedin
Mitchellwaslimitedtopartisanpoliticalactivity,andsincethattimeothercourtshavefoundthe
partisannonpartisandistinctionamaterialone.SeeKinnear,supraWisconsinState Employees,
supra Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line between nonpartisan and partisan can often be
blurred by systems whose true characters are disguised by the names given them by their
architects,itseemsclearthattheconcernsofatrulypartisanofficeandthetemptationsitfosters
aresufficientlydifferentfromthoseinvolvedinanofficeremovedfromregularpartypoliticsto
warrantdistinctivetreatmentinacharterofthissort.
The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the Cranston charter
relatesnottothetypeofofficesought,buttothetypeofemployeeseekingtheoffice.AsJustice
DouglaspointedoutinhisdissentinMitchell,330U.S.at120126,67S.Ct.556,restrictionson
administrativeemployeeswhoeitherparticipateindecisionmakingoratleasthavesomeaccess
toinformationconcerningpolicymattersaremuchmorejustifiablethanrestrictionsonindustrial
employees, who, but for the fact that the government owns the plant they work in, are, for
purposes of access to official information, identically situated to all other industrial workers.
Thus,aworkerinthePhiladelphiamintcouldbedistinguishedfromasecretaryinanofficeof
the Department of Agriculture so also could a janitor in the public schools of Cranston be
distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the same city. A second line of distinction that
focusesonthetypeofemployeeisillustratedbythecasesofKinnearandMinielly,supra.Inboth
ofthesecasesacivilservicedeputydecidedtorunfortheelectedofficeofsheriff.Thecourtsin
both cases felt that the nocandidacy laws in question were much too broad and indicated that
perhapstheonlysituationsensitiveenoughtojustifyaflatrulewasoneinwhichaninferiorina
public office electorally challenged his immediate superior. Given all these considerations, we
think Cranston has not given adequate attention to the problem of narrowing the terms of its
chartertodealwiththespecifickindsofconflictofinterestproblemsitseekstoavoid.
Wealsodonotfindconvincingtheargumentsthatafterhourscampaigningwilldrainthe
energyofthepublicemployeetotheextentthatheisincapableofperforminghisjobeffectively
andthatinevitableonthejobcampaigninganddiscussionofhiscandidacywilldisruptthework
ofothers.Althoughitisindisputablethatthecityhasacompellinginterestintheperformanceof
official work, the exclusion is not welltailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the city
couldfiretheindividualifheclearlyshirkshisemploymentresponsibilitiesordisruptsthework
of others. Also, the efficiency rationale common to both arguments is significantly
underinclusive.Itappliesequallywelltoanumberofnonpolitical,extracurricularactivitiesthat
are not prohibited by the Cranston charter. Finally, the connection between afterhours
campaigning and the state interest seems tenuous in many cases a public employee would be
[38]
abletocampaignaggressivelyandstillcontinuetodohisjobwell.
[39]
Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing
sustained as constitutional a provision on the
automatic resignation of District Clerks, County Clerks, County Judges, County Treasurers,
Criminal District Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and Animals, County
Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes, District
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G.R.No.189698
Attorneys,CountyAttorneys,PublicWeighers,andConstablesiftheyannouncetheircandidacy
oriftheybecomecandidatesinanygeneral,specialorprimaryelection.
In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently particular

officials,asdistinguishedfromallothers,underaclassificationthatisgermanetothepurposes
of the law, merits the stamp of approval from American courts. Not, however, a general and
sweepingprovision,andmoresooneviolativeofthesecondrequisiteforavalidclassification,
whichisonitsfaceunconstitutional.
Onafinalnote,itmaynotbeamisstostatethattheAmericans,fromwhomwecopiedthe
provisioninquestion,hadalreadystrickendownasimilarmeasureforbeingunconstitutional.It
ishightimethatwe,too,shouldfollowsuitand,thus,upholdfundamentallibertiesoverage
old,butbarren,restrictionstosuchfreedoms.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepetitionisGRANTED.Thesecondprovisoin
thethirdparagraphofSection13ofRepublicActNo.9369,Section66oftheOmnibusElection
Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SOORDERED.
ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
RENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJustice
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G.R.No.189698
CONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice
PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice
ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice
LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice
ROBERTOA.ABAD
AssociateJustice
MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice
TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJustice
DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice
MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJustice
MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
abovedecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriterof
theopinionoftheCourt.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
[1]
Salvacionv.CentralBankofthePhilippines,G.R.No.94723,August21,1997,278SCRA27,28.
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G.R.No.189698
[2]
Emphasissupplied.
[3]
Emphasissupplied.
[4]
PromulgatedonOctober6,2009.
[5]
PetitionerEleazarP.QuintoistheUndersecretaryforFieldOperationsoftheDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources
(DENR).HeintendstorunforRepresentativeinthe4th CongressionalDistrictofPangasinan.PetitionerGerinoA.Tolentino,Jr.is
theOICDirectoroftheLandManagementBureauoftheDENR.HelikewisedesirestorunforCityCouncilorinthe4th Districtof
Manila.(Rollo,pp.89.)
[6]
Rollo,pp.1013.
[7]
Id.at11.
[8]
Id.at1213.
[9]
CommentoftheOSG,pp.1126.
[10]
Id.at2740.
[11]
ThefirstparagraphofSec.1ofRule65provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted
withoutorinexcessofitsorhisjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction,andthereis
noappeal,noranyplain,speedy,andadequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw,apersonaggrievedtherebymayfileaverified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedingsofsuchtribunal,boardorofficer,andgrantingsuchincidentalreliefsaslawandjusticemayrequire.(SeePatalinghugv.
CommissiononElections,G.R.No.178767,January30,2008,543SCRA175,184185.)
[12]
ThefirstparagraphofSec.1ofRule63provides:
SECTION1.Whomayfilepetition.Anypersoninterestedunderadeed,will,contractorotherwritteninstrument,orwhoserightsare
affectedbyastatute,executiveorderorregulation,ordinance,oranyothergovernmentalregulationmay,beforebreachorviolation
thereof,bringanactionintheappropriateRegionalTrialCourttodetermineanyquestionofconstructionorvalidityarising,andfora
declarationofhisrightsorduties,thereunder.(SeeAlmedav.BathalaMarketingIndustries,Inc.,G.R.No.150806,January28,2008,
542SCRA470,478479JohnHayPeoplesAlternativeCoalitionv.Lim,G.R.No.119775,October24,2003,414SCRA356,369.)
[13]
Salvacionv.CentralBankofthePhilippines,supranote1,at39.
[14]
MCCIndustrialSalesCorporationv.SsangyongCorporation,G.R.No.170633,October17,2007,536SCRA408,433.
[15]
Emphasissupplied.
[16]
RecordoftheSenate,Vol.III,SessionNo.29,September27,2006,pp.6970.
[17]
RecordoftheSenate,Vol.III,SessionNo.12,August16,2006,pp.7172.
[18]
SenateRecordsandArchives,13th CP,3rd RegularSession,Vol.III,August1,2006,p.25.
[19]
Entitled AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE
ELECTIONSTHROUGHFAIRELECTIONPRACTICES,approvedonFebruary12,2001.
[20]
Sec.14ofR.A.No.9006provides:
SEC.14RepealingClause.Sections67and85oftheOmnibusElectionCode(BatasPambansaBlg.881)andSections10and11of
RepublicActNo.6646areherebyrepealed.Asaconsequence,thefirstprovisointhethirdparagraphofSection11ofRepublicAct
No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof
inconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisActareherebyrepealedormodifiedoramendedaccordingly.
[21]
463Phil.179,205208(2003).
[22]
Citationsomitted.
[23]
ProvinceofBatangasv.Romulo,G.R.No.152774,May27,2004,429SCRA736,755.
[24]
Bullockv.Carter,405U.S.134,143(1972).
[25]
Mancusov.Taft,476F.2d187,190(1973).
23/24
12/1/2016
G.R.No.189698
[26]
Davidv.MacapagalArroyo,G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489
SCRA160,218.
[27]
Dumlaov.COMELEC,G.R.No.L52245,January22,1980,95SCRA392,401.Thiscaseexplainsthestandardsthathavetobe
followedintheexerciseofthepowerofjudicialreview,namely:(1)theexistenceofanappropriatecase(2)aninterestpersonaland
substantialbythepartyraisingtheconstitutionalquestion(3)thepleathatthefunctionbeexercisedattheearliestopportunityand
(4)thenecessitythattheconstitutionalquestionbepasseduponinordertodecidethecase.
[28]
Clementsv.Fashing,457U.S.957,960102S.Ct.2836,2843(1982).
[29]
Supranote25,at195196.
[30]
Citationsomitted.
[31]
G.R.No.158793,June8,2006,490SCRA318,351352.
[32]
Cruz,ConstitutionalLaw(1998ed.),p.131.
[33]
Id.at131132.
[34]
Fort v. Civil Service Commission of the CountyofAlameda,61 Cal.2d 331, 336 392 P.2d 385, 388 38 Cal.Rptr. 625, 628
(1964).
[35]
[36]
Kinnearv.CityandCountyofSanFrancisco,61Cal.2d341,343392P.2d391,39238Cal.Rptr.631,632(1964).
[37]
[38]
Citationsomitted.
[39]
Supranote28.
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