Review: On nta Rasa in Sanskrit Poetics

Author(s): Edwin Gerow and Ashok Aklujkar

Reviewed work(s):
ntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics by J. L. Masson;M. V. Patwardhan
Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1972), pp. 80-87
Published by: American Oriental Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/599651
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ON SANTA RASA IN SANSKRIT POETICS*

EDWIN GEROW
UNIVERSITY

ASHOK AKLUJKAR

OF WASHINGTON

UNIVERSITY

OF BRITISH

COLUMBIA

Although the rasa theory of Sanskrit authors on poetics and dramaturgy has been often
studied by scholars, several specific issues within the context of that theory still await extensive discussion. The understanding of some secondary yet historically significant concepts and the accurate translations of some of the Sanskrit passages expounding them are a
great desideratum. Our objective in the following article has been to comment on the place
of sdnta rasa in the rasa theory and to clarify some related theories and concepts of Sanskrit poetics.
1.1 OUR AIM IS TO EXAMINEthose theses of Sdntarasa
and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics (hereinafter referred to as SAPA) by J. L. Masson and M. V.
Patwardhan (hereinafter, MP) which have a bearing on
the understanding of Sanskrit poetics in general, and to
present alternative interpretations of certain key concepts. MP are nimitta-mdtra;' their book is stimulating;
we review it to re-attract the attention of scholars to
some interesting problems of Sanskrit poetics-which
are
likely to be misunderstood if the theses of SAPA are
taken without caveat.
1.2 MP are to be congratulated on the acharnement with
which they have collected and translated many difficult
text-passages; for their honesty in stating their doubts,
and on those occasions (and many more) presenting the
reader with an abundance of material enabling him to
come to his own conclusion; and above all, for sparing no
effort to unlock the formidable treasure-house of Indian
scholastic reasoning on sdnta and its place in aesthetic
theory. Their present book is only a part of a contemplated larger work to be published in the Harvard Oriental Series (Preface, i). We keep in mind the possibility
that at least some of the difficulties we have had with
SAPA will be resolved by that eventual publication.

1.3 The real value of SAPA, despite what Aklujkar will

publish in a forthcoming article, lies in its translations;
yet the book suffers because of overemphasis on translation. It is a close reading-in the style of explication de
texte-of passages on Sdnta rasa found in the major works
of Sanskrit poetics; nevertheless, the important theoretical issues raised by these passages are never satisfactorily noted, brought together, or coherently presented. Instead we find nearly a third of the work (pp.
of the
I-XVII,
1-59) devoted to an examination
"sources" of Abhinava's philosophical and critical views,
which is (a) derivative, the ground having been covered
extensively by V. Raghavan, K. C. Pandey, S. K. De,
R. Gnoli and others;2 (b) though interesting as commentary, not particularly relevant to the theoretical issues raised in the second part of the book; and (c) often
misinformed by inaccurate understandings of key terminology and theories (see 4.1-7.1 below). If, instead,
certain significant details furnished by the translated
passages themselves had been collected, MP would have
not only been able to raise some interesting problems
which need discussion, but might even have had the
means to resolve them, and thus put a more satisfactory
end to their own labors. In their book we find no detailed
discussion of any of the following issues raised by the
which are crucial both to the intentranslations-issues
tions of the authors and to the history of Sanskrit poetics:
(a) What are the sthdyi-bhdvas, vibhavas, etc. proposed
for Sdnta by different Sanskrit poeticians? (b) Why is
this difference of opinion found? (c) What are the various
senses in which adntarasa is interpreted by the various
authors treated? (d) What is the sthdyi-bhdva of sdnta
arsa according to MP (p. III, X) when they speak of
Santa as "the imaginative [= ?] experience of tranquil-

* Sdntarasa and Abhinavagupta's

Philosophy
of
Aesthetics. By J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan.
Bhandarkar Oriental Series, no. 9. Pp. 8 + XVII + 206.
Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1969.
$6.-, Rs. 25/1 Our system of transliterating Sanskrit words and
sentences differs from that of MP in some respects. We
have used the device of introducing hyphens in between
to show apart the member words of a Sanskrit compound
expression. Furthermore, we have used the circumflex
accent sign (^) to mark the long vowels resulting from a
coalescence of two words and the horizontal bar sign
(-) to mark naturally long vowels within a single word.
For the anusvdra, we have chosen th as the sign in transliteration, not m. In the passages quoted from MP, we
have, of course, followed their mode of transliteration.

2 Even the
possible influence of Agva-ghosa's Saundarananda, which seems "to have been overlooked" to MP
(p. 3), has been already pointed out by Raghavan
(1940:22). Raghavan even cites the two verses on sdnta
(MP p. 4).
3 We shall use square brackets to enclose our additions.
Parentheses will be used to include those explanatory

80

GEROW AND AKLUJKAR:On Santa Rasa in Sanskrit Poetics

81

ity"? (e) In what precise sense is Santa crucial or central

to the poetic theory of Abhinava? (f) Is Abhinava really
an original thinker as far as santa is concerned? (g) Is
there sufficient evidence to suppose that Abhinava admitted santa as a distinctly feasible rasa in drama? (h)
How exactly is the history of Sanskrit poetics explicated
by the authors' apparent view that Abhinava's doctrine
on sdnta is of dominating importance and originality?
Allusions to some of these questions abound in SAPA,
but we would be hard pressed to attribute any precise,
comprehensively stated opinions to MP after a careful
reading of their work. Thus SAPA fails to achieve what
a book with such a title might be expected to achievethe explication of santa as understood by the Sanskrit
poeticians and of Abhinava's poetic theory in relation to
it.
we note question (f),
2.1 First, and paradoxically,
which is fundamentally related to the justification of
SAPA as a whole. By Abhinava's own statement, his
views on 6Snta (whatever they were) were modelled on
those of two of his predecessors, Bhatta-tauta
(SAPA
p. 97.24-26)4 and Bhatta-nayaka (SAPA p. 22; 120 fn. 2,
penultimate sentence). It is true that the works of these
two are not available and that Abhinava's writings are
one of our earliest extant sources for extensive discussions on santa. Yet from his own words we can see that
Abhinava's originality in this particular respect is at
least open to question. For this reason, any statement of
Abhinava's significance in the prosecution of the santa
rasa discussion must be qualified. Such a qualification is
not found in SAPA.
3.1 The main force of MP's interpretation, and what we
take to be the thesis of the book, is that Abhinava's
work culminates the Indian aesthetic tradition in expressing for the first time "a unified theory of rasa" (p.
VIII) or "a coherent philosophy of aesthetic experience"
(p. 158) with santa as its foundation. MP depict Abhinava
as concerned, on the one hand, with providing that unified theory and, on the other, with offering "a theoretical
justification for Santa rasa." They suggest that Abhinava
kills two birds with one stone by proposing that the
"otherwordly or transcendental experience which the
spectator undergoes" during sgnta rasa is "basic to all
aesthetic experience" (pp. VII-IX, 1, 3).5
3.2 Now, we question whether this approach correctly

situates Abhinava's views on rasa and whether MP

have properly understood the importance of Abhinava's
reference to santa. If Santa rasa had that centrality in
Abhinava's theories which MP suggest-if
Santa had
the status of a factor shaping Abhinava's theories, it is
strikingly odd that in the crucial rasa-nispatti passages
of the Abhinava-bhdratZ he makes no mention of Santa.
Moreover, it is clear that Abhinava's interest in how the
eight (or nine) rasas function dramatically outweighs his
concern for the status of the ninth (or, in a sense, first)
rasa. One does not get the impression that Abhinava is
anxious to reduce the eight (or nine) rasas to one rasa
(which would then be on a more fundamental level and
hence of a different kind); rather, the reduction if accepted, has been accepted reluctantly, not to create a
new theory but to keep the existing theory intact.
3.3 On the face of it, the reductionist thesis6 does not do
justice to Abhinava's remarkably sophisticated poetics.
If anything is clear about the dramaturgic analyses of
Bharata, Dhanahmjaya, and later writers, it is the multiplicity of rasas which is at the heart of the theory.7 Every
discussion of rasa, particularly those of Ananda and
Abhinava, insists on multiplicity as essential in the development of any rasa, which comes alive only in its contrasts and reaches its fulfillment only in the resolution of
those contrasts.8 Every extant Sanskrit drama illustrates

additions for which something correspondingexists in the

original passages.

reposeful awareness that is the test of the rasa's success;

and aviSrdnti-rupataiva duhkham. tata eva kdpilair duhkhasya cdncalyam eva prdnatvenoktarh rajo-vrttitarh vadadbhir ity dnanda-rupatd sarva-rasdndm (p. 282), where the

6 Gerow would like to observe the following at this

point: Since all the dramatic rasas aim at a state of mental repose (visranti), the reductionist "insight" that all
the rasas are fundamentally Santi is neither very daring
nor very unexpected, particularly in the spiritual-devotional climate in which Abhinava lived. Santa was a
if it did not exist,
rasa whose time had come-which,
would have had to be invented. Cf. Dhvany-&loka 2.3,
where (rasa-)-praSanti is spoken of in the context of the
dramatic development of the rasa, and Kdvya-prakdSa
4.13, where Sdnti itself refers to the moment of temporary
suspension of the rasa in development. These passages
are terminologically suggestive, but the point is made
even clearer in passages from the Abhinava-bharatz, attributed it is true to Bhatta-tauta, but approved of by
Abhinava, such as tathd hi loke sakala-vighna-vinirmuktd
sarhvittir eva camatkdra-nirvesa-rasandsvddana-bhogasamdpatti-laya-viSranty-ddi-Sabdair
abhidhlyate (p. 280,

Gaekwad's Oriental Series), associating viSrdntiwith the

4Wherever necessary,

we shall give line-references,

always counting the lines from the top with the exclusion
of the title line of the page.
6 Pages 158-164 of SAPA seem to suggest that Abhinava achieves his objective of providing "a coherent
philosophy of aesthetic experience" by taking rasdsvada
nearer to brahmdsvdda. But in SAPA (pp. 23; 159, fn. 5)
itself evidence is available to suppose that Bhaftanayaka had taken this step before Abhinava.

dnanda itself is more or less glossed with vigrdnti.

7 In some of the
early writers, SrnTgdra
might appear to
occupy a central or essential place-yet this is clearly
because it is viewed as the typical and most universally
appealing rasa, not because the other rasas are, architectonically, forms of rhagdra.
8 See Dhvany-dloka 3.13, 20-23. That aucitya "propri-

82

Journal of the American Oriental Society, 92.1 (1972)

the appropriateness of this view. We wonder, therefore,

whether Abhinava could have been at ease with a doctrine that obliterates the functional relative differences
of the eight (or nine) rasas.
3.4 Furthermore, do we in fact have indications that
Sdnta is being introduced to give a stable, philosophical
foundation to an existing theory, as opposed to the possibility that sdnta is being fitted or forced into that
theory? We think the latter is actually the case. Passages in SAPA itself suggest that the new rasa, Sdnta, is
not exempt from any of the concerns to which the other
established rasas are subject. Witness the discussion (pp.
94ff) on the relation of vZraand gdnta, the search for the
sthdyi-bhdva of Santa (pp. 115ff), and the attempt to apply Sdnta in the Nagdnanda (pp. 96-97) and the epics
(pp. 109ff) through discernment of its proper vibhdvas,
anubhdvas, and the like. These arguments read more like
the inverse of MP's thesis; sdnta (if it exists) must be
constrained within the functional terms of the existing
aesthetic theory, rather than forcing (or itself constituting) any novel reinterpretation of that theory.
3.5 Another indication that sdnta lacks the status of
philosophical foundation emerges from the history of the
rasa theory itself. Abhinava, drawing on a long tradition
concerned with explicating the genesis of the rasa, has
focused on the nature of the awareness implied by the
realization of rasa. He has carried further than any of his
predecessors, as far as we know, the tendency to psychologize, to interiorize the theory of drama. He is led by his
very premises to equate rasa with no external or determining factor other than its awakening in the spectator,
in effect, with a certain kind of awareness itself, so generated (abhivyakti). The point he makes is that all the
rasas, though they are experiences, are of a wholly different sort than those which reflect the on-going worldly
life (laukika versus alaukika). The key to this difference
is the fact that somehow through, or by means of, the
drama a worldly experience, a determinate emotional
awareness (bhdva), is generalized (sddhdra.nkrta), that is,
freed of those specific determinants (which come to be
viewed as distractions, vighnas) which relate it to time
and place; what persists then is the pure emotional tone
(rasa) realized as such in the spectator. That is why, for
Abhinava, no specific or concrete determinant can be put
forward as the "cause" of rasa; he sees no "function"
involved in the experience of rasa other than the becoming aware of its implicitude as such. Just as brahman is
is
the one real basis of all apparent multiplicity-and
neither its cause, truly speaking, or its effect-so is rasa
the single inner reality brought out, but not created, by
the dramatic multiplicity which informs it.
3.6 Abhinava understands that his exposition of the
rasa-nispatti as a process leads one into an Advaitic
ety" is to be observed in the juxtaposition of various
rasas is emphasized in Dhvany-dloka 3.9-14, 17-19, 24-26.

epistemology. For when emotional experience has been

reduced or generalized to its own possibility, the condition of the spectator's soul is not unlike that of the
mumuksu who has also sought to realize consciousness
apart from or beyond the natural conditions in which
immediate consciousness is determined. But in the case
of the sahrdaya, the experience of rasa is not only in
principle temporary (occurring only while the spectator
is absorbed in a drama or poem), an anticipatory surrogate only of final bliss, but is not even free of the
emotional coloring by which the rasas are different from
one another and, in their multiplicity, reflect the inherently complex character of man's emotional life. We
may speak in both cases of "experience" being reduced,
or abstracted, to the condition of its possibility; but the
soul (atman) of the sahrdaya is more like a screen on
which the various emotional possibilities inherent in the
human condition are projected; it has not become, as in
the Veddnta, its own condition-pure
consciousness
(SAPA pp. 115.26-116.7; note especially bhitti "wall"
used for dtman).
3.7 It is clear from Abhinava's exposition that the crux
of his rasa theory is the notion of generalization and the
attendant radical distinction between rasa and bhdva
(the latter being the concrete, or manifest ordinary
emotion, determined in time and place). It is in terms of
this contrast
alone-involving
generalization-that
rasdsvdda becomes similar to brahmdsvdda. Now, the discovery of Sdnta (as understood by Abhinava's predecessors; see 3.10 below), far from explicating this homology,
obscures it. The transition from bhdva to rasa, the heart
of the theory, would on the face of it become inexplicable.
Since the state of sdnti, as the goal of the virdgin, involves
renunciation of emotional attachment, the rasa Sdnta
would appear to be capable of being focused on any
bhava whatsoever, but as a purely negative content, and
would in effect become the emotional awareness of the
absence of emotion! (This paksa is discussed by Abhinava; see SAPA p. 115.5-20.) The rasa sdnta poses the
threat of confusing the "real" world of philosophical,
spiritual experience with the "transient" one of art.
Surely this is not the "stable philosophical foundation"
which the consideration of Sdnta rasa brings to Abhinava's aesthetics! The new rasa seems more to embarrass Abhinava than to help him. His interest in it neither
buttresses his aesthetic theory, nor "unifies" a hitherto
unrigorous body of speculation; his account of rasanispatti is more lucid without it, and is neither made
more impregnable nor more relevant to poetry by it.
3.8 Abhinava's explanation of the aesthetic quality of
sdnta is thus a bit of a tour de force; the question of the
sthdyi-bhdva is resolved, not by positing an emotion (or
an anti-emotion) such as nirveda ("disinterest" or "disgust"), but by advancing the true nature of the soul
(atma-sva-ripa or tattva-jndna) itself as the only possible
constant underlying the attitude of repose. The nature
of the soul as a sthdyi-bhava is of course constancy itself,

GEROW AND AKLUJKAR:On Santa Rasa in Sanskrit Poetics

as it expresses the very condition of experience. As such
there is no possibility of "aesthetic" experience, no possibility of art. That possibility, as well as the distinction between the santa of art and the sdnti of life, is provided by the eight other sthdyi-bhavas, reintroduced as
"transitory" emotions on the ground, wall, or canvas of
the soul itself (SAPA pp. 115.26-116.11). The proper
understanding of Sdnta would thus appear to consist in
an appreciation of experience as impermanent, not in its
concrete everyday form (a truism), but even in relation
to its ground. In other words, the argument offered by
Abhinava reads like a play on the word sthayin9 and may
have been so intended. The question is: kas tarhy atra
sthdyl? The answer is: dtmaiva...atra sthdyT (SAPA p.
115.23, 26-27). The rasatva of sdnta is thus only analogical; it consists, we might say, in a recognition of the
rasatva of the other rasas. It is neither "a" rasa nor "the"
rasa, but "any" rasa (SAPA p. 96.25-29). The Vedantic
homology patent in the experience of the eight differentiable rasas has been carried one step further and restated
even more forcefully by establishing dSnta as another
rasa, yet not different in principle. In fact, Santa is (if
we go along with Abhinava) more like the other rasas
than they are like themselves: more perfectly expressive
of the rasa-bhdva distinction, more perfectly "generalized," and more cnandaika-ghana.10 However, the very
terms of the discussion betray the malaise which this odd
"rasa" provoked, for its "perfection" is and remains
more terminological than real. The discussion reads a bit
too much like an analogy being spelled out for us to be
comfortable with the genuineness of the explanation.
3.9 We think that Abhinava's treatment of santa, when
compared to that of Ananda-vardhana, is more sophisticated and also more conservative. The latter author acdanta as one of the many
cepts, purely and simply,
the ninth rasa among the already accepted
rasas-as
its proper sthdyi-bhdva (trsnd-ksaya-sukha)
rasas-with
and its epic (Mahdbhdrata) if not dramatic (Ndgdnanda)
exemplification (SAPA pp. 94, 103-104). With Abhinava,
however, we see a considerable retreat from this position.
Being more aware than Ananda of the functional difficulties of accepting santa simply as a ninth rasa (see
3.7 above), yet unwilling to abandon santa entirely (for
9 The technical meaning of sthdyin in the context of
the rasa theory is sthdyi-bhava "a fundamental emotion
or feeling that is not likely to be missing in a human being." The ordinary, etymological, meaning, on the other
hand, is "stable, enduring." In this second meaning the
word is found used at least once in the Dhvany-dloka
(3.22) also. See also SAPA, p. 117.23.
10It will be noticed from this discussion that Abhinava
carefully refrains from identifying literary experience
with religious-spiritual
experience-from
combining
MP (p. 1) would have him
"philosophy and poetics"-as
do.

83

it had been accepted by the tradition), Abhinava offered

a different justification for santa by modifying its status
and understanding. He truly poeticized Santa rasa, the
skeleton in the closet, by boldly homologizing santa and
rasatva itself." (We have come, it will be seen, to a position which is the mirror image of that of MP.) This is, as
far as the available sources inform us, his most important
accomplishment in the matter under consideration. Since
he could not dispense with Santa, he made capital of its
remarkable service in spelling out an analogy (which,
like all analogies, should not be pushed too far). He
"saved" &Snta by cleverly qualifying Ananda's position
and, in so doing, restated the contrast of rasdsvdda and
brahmdsvdda that is in any case implicit in the rasa
theory.
3.10 The difference between Ananda's understanding of
Sdnta and Abhinava's can be clarified in the following
terms: The word Santa (or santa rasa) seems to have been
used in two senses by Abhinava. On one level of his thinking, it refers to the experience of absorption or serenity
that comes about as a result of reading or witnessing,
under ideal conditions (that is, under conditions free
from the rasa-vighnas), a good piece of literature depicting any emotion. In other words, santa stands for rasdsvdda, a temporary aesthetic glimpse of the pure self
(dtma-sva-rupa), in some contexts. On a lower level, so to
speak, the same word refers to an intense experience (not
a hardened attitude like that of a true sa?hnydsin) of
detachment that comes from reading or witnessing a work
of art depicting ruin, impermanence, the transitory character of wordly existence, and the futility of ambition.
It is in this second sense only that Ananda uses the word
in the two passages reproduced and translated in SAPA
pp. 94-96, 103-108. In his case, there is no evidence to
suggest that he would include in Santa the ultimate
literary experience as such.
4.1 Why is it that MP have not been able to understand
Abhinava's position on Santa properly? Obviously the
fact that they do not analyze fully what they translate
(in the sense indicated in 1.3 above) and that their understanding of some theories and terms is imprecise (see
6.1-2 and 7.1 below) is in large measure responsible for
their failure in arriving at a tenable interpretation. But
we wish to stress that there are some additional factors
as well behind the misleading perspective adopted by
MP.
4.2 One such factor is the curiously unmodern anhistoricism that lurks through several pages of SAPA: (a) MP
(VIII, XI) think that Abhinava offers a Santa-based
11Viewed thus, Abhinava is not guilty of the reductionism that MP (pp. XV-XVI) see in his theories. Instead of reducing all rasas to santa, he transfers sdnta
to a different plane and preserves the emotional colorations that are characteristic of the experience of the eight
other rasas.

84

Journal of the American Oriental Society, 92.1 (1972)

theory of rasa because he "must have been under a certain amount of at least internal pressure to justify his
deep interest in purely secular literature." Now, even if
we ignore the certainty that the Sdnta which meets
Abhinava's approval (3.9-10 above) has nothing to do
with "religious" sentiments, MP's formulation involves
the unreflective improbability of attributing certain
psychological problems typical of twentieth-century
man-being caught in the conflict between religious and
secular ideals-to an Indian of the tenth or eleventh
century. From many Sanskrit works, poetic as well as
philosophical, we can easily see that it was a matter of
pride for the poets and philosophers of the Sanskrit
culture to be proficient at both kdvya and gdstra (which
includes the darsanas), and very unlikely to be an embarrassment requiring justification. The ambition of
most men in Abhinava's position could very well be resumed in the still current proverb: kavyesukomala-dhiyo
vayam eva ndnye, tarkesu karkasa-dhiyo vayam eva ndnye.

(b) MP (p. XV.9-13) indicate their awareness that the

poetics of the later Bengal Vaisnavas was in some way
different from that of Abhinava. Yet what significant difference can there be once MP (p. XVI; cf. p. VIII.22-24)
depict Abhinava as an author "in danger of turning literature into an icon, a representational object, an aid to
devotion rather than an experience unique and precious
for its own sake." As interpreted by MP, Abhinava seems
to be engaged in making poetics a framework for theology and brahmdnubhavain much the same way as Rupa
Gosvamin did. MP have made it difficult to interpret
what we see as a crucial historical development. We
would be hard pressed, in their terms, to assess the
novelty or significance of the Gosvamins' invertedview
of the world, vis-a-vis Abhinava. (c) On p. X, MP comment: "If Abhinava was struck by the poverty of much
Indian kdvya.. .he must have been equally disturbed by

the lifeless quality of much Indian philosophy." Here

they are engaged in attributing their own opinions (cf.
p. IX, 13) to Abhinava without seeking confirmation in
his works or determining whether his criteria of good
poetry and philosophy are the same as their own. This
they must do if they wish to present Abhinava's theories
as being shaped by "internal pressure." (d) Another
instance of MP's anhistoricism is found in the following
remark: "By establishing the intimate connection between theatre and ritual (and thus by implication
mythology as well), Abhinava foreshadowed certain
modern theories, even though he was not followed in this
brilliant insight by any of his successors." Now, although
both theatre and Tantric ritual play a significant role in
Abhinava's personal life, he does not, as far as MP and
other sources inform us, explicitly establish an intimate
functional connection between the two in his available
writings. At the most he uses the same terms in describing the delights that arise out of both (MP pp. 40-43).
This is a far cry from asserting a homology between

theatrical procedure and ritual activity. It does not even

imply that Abhinava saw the origin of theatrical activity in the ritual activity of bygone ages.l2
5.1 If it were only the philosophical prise de position of
MP that were open to question, this review article would
have been both shorter and, at this point, complete. But
we find also that their work is flawed by serious theoretical and terminological misapprehensions. Since the
great value of SAPA lies in its annotated translations
and since these misapprehensions have occasioned some
inaccurate translations" we report our criticisms here,
hoping to increase the utility of SAPA itself. Specific
inaccuracies of the translations themselves will be discussed in a sequel article by Aklujkar to be published in
the Silver Jubilee Volume of the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.

5.2 Although MP frequently speak of rasdsvdda as a

transcendental or extraordinary experience, they do not
seem to have understood clearly the distinction between
rasa and bhava (see 3.5-7 above). There are many passages in their book in which the rasa-level appears to be
confused with the level of concrete emotionality: (a)
"The one thing that sdntarasa does that no other rasa
can, is that it disturbs us." (p. IX) Of course, no rasa
can "disturb" us; the idea is a contradiction in terms.
(b) "This applies equally to srygdra, etc., where the
culminating state (for example, actual sexual intercourse) cannot be described." (p. 100). Fn. 2, which comments on this translation of Srigdrdder api phalabhumdv avarnianZyataiva, carries the confusion to ludi-

crous extremes: "Or does he [=Abhinava] mean, not

only sexual intercourse in general, i.e. not only the act
12 Gerow thinks that inattention to literature (in the
sense of belles lettres) is another factor behind the misleading perspective adopted by MP. According to him,
MP should have examined Abhinava's literary theory in
relation to the literature it was meant to "explain" in
some sense-against the background of the movements
and trends in Sanskrit (and regional) literature itself
which reflect profound changes of direction and focus in
the culture of classical India; but MP are content with
assessing Abhivana's theory for the insights it permits
in the older poetry and drama (e.g. SAPA pp. VIII-X)
and, aside from the mention of a few verses from ASvagho*a, they discuss the poetry of the classical and medieval period only through its refractions in other literary
theories (chiefly of Abhinava's predecessors). Aklujkar
agrees with the observation that MP do not view literary
criticism and literature together, but he is not sure that
MP have been misled because of this. Gerow further observes that MP's pessimistic view that the poetry really
wasn't as good as the theory (p. IX) argues not, as they
seem to think, for the seriousness of the theory, but for its
triviality!

GEROW

AND

AKLUJKAR:

On Sdnta Rasa in Sanskrit Poetics

of penetration, but also the actual moment of ejaculation?" Actually the point involved is as follows:
'If the pirva-paksin objects that santa is not a rasa
because its culmination cannot be described because
of the unavailability of anubhdvas (indicatory or suggestive signs or gesticulations)13 then we, the siddhdntins, wish to point out that the same can be said
about the other rasas; if in this respect rasa status is
not denied to the other rasas, it should not be denied
to santa either. In the full intensity of any pure (nonphysical, intellectual, spiritual) emotional experience
(and any rasa is an experience of this kind), a person
becomes so absorbed, so full of concentration, that no
or specifiphysical activity that would distinctively
cally indicate the emotional coloring of his brahmdsvada-like experience is possible in his case; in spite of
their different colorations all such emotional experiences become indistinguishable because of their intensity. Consequently, the culmination of no rasa can
be described, that is, suggested through distinct
anubhavas.'
(c) For more instances of this serious misunderstanding
of the rasa-theory, see SAPA p. 102, fn. 4; 123, fn. 1,
lines 8-16 ("Truly.. .personality,");
p. 137, fn. 5; p.
163.23-25.
5.3 MP (pp. 15-16) speak of Bhatta-tauta as a critic who
emphasized the drama over and above lyric poetry. However, the evidence they present makes it clear that
Bhatta-tauta was not so much concerned with weighing
one literary form against the other as with stating that a
literary piece must not lack vividness of descriptionthat a literary piece must aim at recreating the original
experience in the reader (note pratyaksa-kalpa and
pratyaksavat in the passage cited by MP).14 Thus, the
celebrated teacher of Abhinava was in effect saying that
13 Note that
every rasa is realized through suggestion
only and that, for this reason, in the depiction of any
rasa, the knowledge of its suggestive signs or symptoms
is absolutely necessary.
14 In the
Abhinava-bhdrati, the remark immediately
preceding the passage is kavye 'pi ndtydyamdne eva
rasah, which literally means, "Only when it (a poetic
piece) is being made drama-like (that is, is being invested
with the qualities of a drama, rasa exists even in a poetic
piece." From this it is clear that Bhatta-tauta is concerned with the dramatic character of poetry, not with
the relative superiority of one literary genre over
another. Note also that throughout the passage Abhinava and Bhatta-tauta speak not about ndtaka, but
about kdvya in general. From pratyaksa-kalpa and
pratyaksavat, it is evident that prayogatvam andpanne
has the sense of pratyak6a-kalpatvam andpanne, "when
it has not attained the vividness of a perceptible object";
prayoga here does not mean ndtya-prayoga or ndtakaprayoga, "performance of a drama."

85

Valmiki expressed through the line cira-nirvrttam apy

etat pratyaksam iva darAitam (Rdmayazna 1.4.16cd).
5.4 At several places MP (pp. 23-24; p. 67, fn. 2; p. 160)
earnestly discuss whether or not rasdsvdda is superior to
brahmdsvdda. In such discussions they show an unawareness of the henotheistic tendency (extolling as supreme
the purpose of present concern) of Sanskrit authors and
also of the ease with which Sanskrit authors move, by
pertinent qualification, from one level of discourse to
another. In this case the issue of superiority arises only
if the qualifications stated or indicated by the various
authors are ignored. As one possibility easily attainable
for many human beings, rasdsvdda can be said to be
superior. On the other hand, since it leads to the highest
goal of human life (moksa), brahmdsvdda can be said to
be superior; the question of absolute superiority in fact
does not exist.
5.5 The same kind of unilinear misapprehension is involved in the contradiction that MP (p. 103, fn. 1) see
between Ananda's statement sir7gdra-raso hi sarsdrina7f
niyamendnubhava-visayatvdt sarva-rasebhyah kamanmyatayd pradhdnabhutah and Abhinava's statement moksaphalatvena cdyam? [=sdntah] parama-purusdrtha-nisthatvdt sarva-rasebhyah pradhdnatamah. Actually the contradiction is forced; it exists only if one suppresses the
qualifications introduced by Ananda and Abhinava in
their statements: grAgdra is said to be the principal rasa
since it is universally experienced and happens to be
most delicate, while Sdnta is said to be the principal rasa
since it refers to moksa, the supreme objective of human
life. MP see a contradiction or theoretical problem here
simply because they do not take the trouble to find out in
what sense either rasa is said to be principal.
6.1 Coming to terminological
we
misapprehensions,
would like to point out that MP (pp. 54-55, fn. 7) accept
an unjustifiably narrow interpretation
of the term
adstra-kdvya; they express the opinion that the Yogavdsistha and the Mahabhdrata are the only Sanskrit works
that can "really" be considered gdstras as well as kdvyas.
In the traditional understanding, however, the term has
a much wider reference and primarily refers to such works
as the Bhatti-kdvya and the KdmandakZya NZti-sdra (see
Raghavan 1963:369, 608, 628-629, 766-767, 810-811). MP
(pp. 75-77), furthermore, translate Sanskrit dhvanana
throughout as "suggestiveness." But both context and
etymology establish that "act (process, or phenomenon)
of suggestion" is the appropriate translation for this
word. Another instance of imprecise rendering is found
in the case of the forms derived from bhogckr; e.g., on
SAPA p. 21.2, bhogZkrta is translated by "enjoyment,"
and on p. 75.6, bhogikara.na is translated by "aesthetic
relish." Clearly then MP do not see any distinction between bhoga and bhogikr. However, in the light of the
cvi-suffix and the presence of the root kr, there must be
some distinction; etymologically bhogikrta should mean
"that which is transformed into bhoga, that which is

86

Journal of the American 0 'riental Society, 92.1 (1972)

made amenable or available for enjoyment, that which is

brought to the level of aesthetic relish," and bhoglkarana
should likewise mean "the act (process, or phenomenon)
of bringing something to aesthetic relish." It will be
noticed that these meanings are appropriate also from
the point of view of the contexts in which the two terms
occur.
6.2 In the case of some other terms, MP are not exactly
inaccurate, but misleadingly ambiguous: (a) Bhdvana,
a key term in Bhatta-nayaka's poetic theory is generally
understood in SAPA (pp. 20.11-20; 65.13; 66.7-12, fn. 5;
72, fn. 3 conclusion; 75, fn. 2) as a synonym of sadhdranzi"universalizakarana, which means "generalization,"
tion," or "depersonalization." Yet, on pp. 75.11-13 and
76.9-11, MP suggest "production" as a translation for
bhavana15 and draw the attention of readers to the use of
the same word in MAlmdrhsd.Actually, this second interpretation is more basic or primary (the first being only a
specific extension of it), and is appropriate in almost all
the occurrences of bhdvand. Etymologically the word
means "the process (or function) of causing to become,"
that is "the process (or function) of producing [an experience]." That this is the meaning understood by
Abhinava is evident from such phrases as rasdn bhdvayati
(MP p. 62.14). Since abhidhd, being common to all
language, cannot be the linguistic function responsible
for producing the aesthetic experience of rasa, Bhattanayaka accepts an additional function in the form of
bhdvand in the case of words used in belles lettres. He
further proposes that this additional function exists in
the case of poetic language because it possesses gunas
and alahkdras (MP pp. 21, fn. 1;16 60.18-61.2; 62.9, 13-14;
75, fn. 2). Having thus explained the causal factors in
its essential
characterizes
bhdvand, Bhatta-nayaka
nature as a process: since the experience of rasa is not
possible without the generalization of vibhdvas, etc. and
15
Closely related to bhdvand are the terms bhdvaka
("producer" or "causer") and bhdvakatva ("being a producer" or "capacity to produce"). The present discussion, therefore, applies to MP's understanding of these
terms also.
16 The second and third lines of the passage cited in
this footnote should be read as follows in the light of the
other remarks of Abhinava referred to here: abhidhd
dhdma, tdrh ydte sabddrthalaAkrtz, tatah a bhdvand,
bhdvya eso 'pi srAgdrddi-gano matah (for the last word, see
De 1959:225). These would then give the following meaning: "Abhidhd (primary signification or denotation) is
the basis (substratum, or foundation). Taking recourse
in it (that is, based on the foundation in the form of
abhidhd) are the figures of word and sense. From them
comes the production (or realization of rasa experience).
And this class consisting of srAgdara, etc., is thought to be,
entity to be produced (or realized)." The translation offered by MP (p. 20.19-20) is inaccurate.

since bhavand is the process of bringing about the experience of rasa, bhdvand must be essentially the same
as the process or phenomenon of generalization (note...
bhdvakatvarh... vibhdvddZndrhsddhdra.natvdpddanarh ndma
on SAPA p. 61.2-3; and.. .vibhdvddi-sddharanikarandtmand ... bhdvakatva-vydpdrezna.. on Abhinava-bhdratl,
vol. 1, p. 277). In other words, looked at from the point
of view of the poetic words, bhdvand is a function comparable to abhidhd, etc. and, looked at from the point
of view of the genesis of rasa, bhdvand is sddhdranikarana.
(Its first aspect, as we see from SAPA p. 62.9-15, does not
meet Abhinava's approval.) Unfortunately, MIP do not
supply any explanation that will bridge the gap between
their two renderings of this term. (b) From pp. XIV.6,
46.3, 48.19-20, and 77.10-11, one gets the impression that
MP understand the important word camatkdra to mean
"a feeling or experience of wonderment." Now, if this
interpretation is accepted, the conclusion must be that
Abhinava reduces all experience of poetry to wonderment, as in his works camatkdra quite commonly (although not exclusively) applies to such experience. But
this is not supported by what he writes on rasa (see 3.6
above). Camatkdra, therefore, must mean "a wonderous
phenomenon, an extraordinary or transcendental happening, an event of mysterious genesis" rather than "a
feeling or experience of wonderment." Several reasons
for attaching the label camatkdra to the highest aesthetic
experience are indicated in the passages quoted in SAPA
pp. 22, fn. 6 (continued from previous page; yathd hi...
[satyam iva] bhati.); 44, fn. 2 (tasmad.. .paramdnandam);
46, fn. 3; 48, fn. 2.
7.1 So far we have restricted ourselves to commenting
on MP's understanding of some key Sanskrit terms. But
we wish to point out that in SAPA a few English terms
are also oddly used. In part "religious" and "philosophical" are used when "spiritual, yogic, mystical" would
have been more expressive of what MP seem to have in
mind (e.g., pp. V-10). Frequently (pp. 53.41; 63, fn. 3;
73.2; 78.9-10), "perception" is offered as a translation of
pratzti and related words like anubhava, which commonly
mean "experience, knowledge, or cognition in general";
the authors seem to have decided not to adhere to the
usual practice of restricting the use of the term "perception" to Sanskrit pratyaksa "direct sense-experience";
but nowhere do they make an explicit statement to that
effect.
8.1 We would like to close with a few points of lesser interest that are primarily concerned with the particular
book, SAPA. We feel that the misapplied attack on
Franklin Edgerton (p. III) should be deleted from future
editions. Whatever one may think of Edgerton's methods
and views, it is fatuous to accuse him of disrespect to the
Sanskrit text. We can think of only a few other scholars
less likely to be accused justly of "relying on secondary
literature instead of going to the sources." Actually, in
the article cited by MP, which is little more than a popular causerie and in which the theses of the dhvani school

GEROW AND AKLUJKAR: On Santa Rasa in Sanskrit Poetics

are briefly discussed for an audience of non-specialists,
Edgerton does little but translate the remarks of
Dhanarhjaya and Dhanika on Sdnta. The opinions attributed to him are amply documented in SAPA (pp. 97,
fn. 1; 143-151) itself!
8.2 A surprising omission in MP's otherwise impressive
bibliography is that of S. K. De's Sanskrit Poetics as a
Study of Aesthetic (University of California Press, 1963),
which is more recent, philosophical, and raisonne than
his History of Sanskrit Poetics and more germane to the
concerns of SAPA. Secondly, although Hiriyanna's excellent collection of essays on aesthetics, Art Experience,
is noted, the one essay among them devoted more
directly to the exposition of the rasa theory, "Art Experience-2," is not singled out.
8.3 There are at least three occasions on which MP have
chosen wrong readings in preference to contextually appropriate variant readings: (a) In the famous verse from
the Dasa-rupaka, ananda-nisyandisu etc. (p. 56), they
prefer to read sadhu in place of the more sarcastic and
hence more appropriate sddhuh (this latter reading is
supported also by Bhatta-nrsimha's commentary) and
attach an unsubstantiated sense "low" to sddhu as an
adverb. (b) On p. 65 (fn. 1), MP express the opinion that
raty-ddi-visayam must be the reading in place of rasddivisayam which occurs in line 17 of p. 60. This is not only
contradictory to phrases such as bhdvakatvarhndma rasdn
prati that are found in the same context (pp. 61.2-3;
62.10), but also forces MP to interpret the term rasa in
the sense sthdyi-bhdva (p. 66.8, 10)! (c) The suggestion
made on p. 140 (fn. 3) that na should be dropped from the
sentence Sdnte tu sdttvaty eva vrttir iti na tad-vyavacchedakam evaitat leads to difficulties. In the first place, tadvyavacchedakam evaitat would most naturally mean, "this
(qualification,
namely sdttvaty-drabhatz-vrtti-sarhpannah) only (or definitely) excludes it (santa)," and not,
"this (qualification) is quite sufficient to exclude it,"
as MP would like it to mean. Secondly, even if one accepted this latter rendering, it would be difficult to reconcile it with the context. How would the phrase sdttvaty...-sarhpannah exclude Sdnta, when sdttvatz is the only
vrtti possible in Sdnta? Moreover, is not the whole point
of Abhinava's discussion to prove that no qualification
other than dZpta-rasa-kdvya-yonih can suggest the exclusion of gdnta from a dima (and thereby suggest
Bharata's awareness of the existence of Sdnta)? How
would he then assign the role of suggesting the exclusion
of Sdnta to the qualification sdttvaty-.. -sarhpannah?
8.4 An important reading that would (if accepted) have
a profound effect on the authors' zeal in attributing the
acceptance of Santa to all major Sanskrit poeticians is
passed over in silence. MP (p. 94.18) read na ca vZrefollowing the Haridas Sanskrit Series edition of the Dhvany-

87

aloka. But the Kavya-mala edition (p. 177) reads vtre ca,
which would yield the translation, "For it is proper to
include it (Adnta) in vZra." The rest of the passage can
be made sense of in such a way that Ananda here seems
to adopt the antar-bhdva position on Sdnta, thus denying
its independence and affirming instead its functional
equivalence with vzra rasa through a common bhava,
viz. utsdha. We think the Kavya-mala reading less likely
and so do not make the point strongly; still, MP do not
appear aware that a good deal of their argument on Ananda would have to be revised in the light [of this ignored variant. Not to criticize them unjustly, Jacobi
(ZDMG 57, p. 40) also ignores it, although he is translating from the Kavya-mala edition.
8.5 SAPA in general appears to have been put together
and published with extreme haste. Sanskrit terms and
sentences are sometimes cited in Deva-ndgarl, sometimes
in the Roman script. In the latter case they are not always put in italic type (e.g. pp. 193-194). References are
sometimes given to SAPA texts or translations, sometimes, most confusingly (as on p. 137, fn. 2) to the original
edition, though the passage is in SAPA (p. 97). The Addendum (pp. 184-194) seems to be composed of those
afterthoughts which occurred to the authors as they
edited their own footnotes (cf. p. 150, fn. 3). On p. 40
(fn. 3), it is not clear whether "me" refers to Masson or
Patwardhan, and, on p. 126 (fn. 3), the cited verse does
not contain the word tattva-jndna as promised. Sanskrit
texts are left unexplained on pp. 46 (fn. 2) and 48 (fn. 2),
and uncited Sanskrit texts are translated on pp. 78.8-10
and 96.15-17. The word "consensus"
is misspelled
throughout the Introduction (pp. IV, XIV).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abhinava. Abhinava-bhdratz. Vol. I (Ed.) Ramakrishna
Kavi, M. Second edition, revised and critically
edited by Ramasvami Shastri, K. S. Gaekwad's
Oriental Series, no. XXXVI. Oriental Institute,
Baroda. 1956.
Ananda-vardhana. Dhvany-aloka (with the commentary
Avadhana by Madhusudana Misra). (Eds.) Hemantakumara Tarka-tirtha and Ananda MiSra. The Calcutta Sanskrit Series, no. 25B. Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, Calcutta. Sarhvat 1995.
De, Sushil Kumar. 1959. Some Problems of Sanskrit
Poetics. Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta.
Raghavan, V. 1940. Number of Rasas. Adyar Library,
Madras. Second edition 1967.
1963. Bhoja's Sr6'gdra Prakdaa. Punarvasu,
Madras.
Valmiki. Ramdyana. (Eds.) Bhatt, G. H. and others.
Oriental Institute, Baroda. 1958 onwards.