Live Fire Discipline of A Minuteman Company

Live Fire Discipline of a Minuteman Company
Herman Karl
Introduction
Soldiers of the Lincoln Minute Men, a Revolutionary War re-enacting group in
Lincoln, Massachusetts, conducted two live fire experiments the primary purpose of
which was to test Col. George Hanger’s statement:1
Figure 1. Lincoln minutemen standing in front of the redcoat target (the target is placed on a slope, which
was the backstop); from left to right: Herman Karl (Armorer and Quartermaster of Muskets), Jim
Ringwood (Private), Don Hafner (Drum Major), David Crisafi (Lieutenant), Keith Gilbert (Private), Steve
McCarthy (Private/past Captain), Andy Scheff (Color Guard Sergeant), Peter Secor (Private, not in photo
and did not participate in the volley firing), and Paul Musow (Sergeant, taking photo). All shots were aimed
at redcoat II in the middle.
A soldier's musket, if not exceedingly ill-bored and very crooked, as many are,
will strike the figure of a man at 80 yards; it may even at 100 yards; but a soldier
must be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common musket at
150 yards, PROVIDED HIS ANTAGONIST AIMS AT HIM; and as to firing at a
man at 200 yards with a common musket, you may just as well fire at the moon
and have the same hopes of hitting your object. I do maintain, and will prove,
whenever called upon, THAT NO MAN WAS EVER KILLED AT TWO
HUNDRED YARDS, by a common soldier’s musket, BY THE PERSON WHO
AIMED AT HIM2
The second experiment May 2014 tested the efficacy of independent fire. The
minutemen fired when they were ready from cover and rests (FIG. 2). The initial distance
was 140 yards and the targets moved to positions at 100, 75, 50, and 25 yards (FIG 3).3
The minutemen used smoothbore fowlers and muskets typical of those used ca.
1
1774/1775 in both experiments. A rifle was used at 140, 100, and 75 yards during the
independent fire experiment to compare its effectiveness to the smoothbores.
Figure 2. Lincoln minutemen behind cover. As mentioned in the text two of the five shoot offhand not
resting their guns for a steadier arm and three took advantage of rests (one is kneeling using the fence rail at
the extreme left, one is standing using the fence rail, and one on the extreme right is standing using a tree as
a rest).
Figure 3. Lincoln minutemen standing in front of redcoats targets mounted on frames; form left to
right Jim Ringwood (Private), Peter Secor (Private), Paul Musow (Sergeant), Terry Cornellier
(Private), and Don Hafner (Drum Major).
Lincoln Minute Men soldiers

Our experiment not only tested Colonel Hanger’s assertion but also simulated the
18th century military shooting at marks as part of live fire discipline. The principal
reason, elaborated upon below, to have regular troops shoot at marks was to get them to
2
level their muskets at the opposing force to improve the effectiveness of volley fire.
Special units, such as light infantry and rangers, practiced aiming to be more accurate
firing at individual targets. Many officers were sportsmen experienced at shooting at
game; they understood the principles of aiming and advocated practicing at marks to
introduce new recruits to live fire and improve and reinforce the skill of veterans.
With one exception (he had previously fired only about a half dozen shots) none
of the Lincoln minutemen had fired live ball. Thus, their familiarity with firing live
ammunition is probably similar to that of British army new recruits. American militia
would be more familiar with firearms.4 I am an experienced shooter and hunter and as the
officer in command coached the soldiers on loading and aiming; I did not instruct them
on trigger squeeze, breath control, etc. The fowlers and muskets had only a front sight.
Before engaging the redcoat targets the soldiers practiced shooting at marks (in our case a
variety of paper targets that included a turkey, squirrel, deer, duck, and bullseye) set at
distances of 15 and 25 yards. We fired at the redcoat targets as stated above at variable
distances. I provided guidance as to where to hold particularly for the targets at 100, 130,
and 140 yards that required aiming a substantial amount above the target to account for
the drop of the bullet. Even so each soldier had to judge for himself what, for example,
three feet above the target looked like at 140 yards. None of the soldiers was skilled in
judging distance.5 The loads we used produced a high trajectory, which put a premium on
judging distances accurately to help ensure a hit on target.6 Refer to APPENDIX for
exterior ballistic analyses of representative loads used in the experiment.
Background
As alluded to above two elements factor into Colonel Hanger’s assertion: 1) the
qualities of the musket and 2) the discipline of the soldier. A number of nations
investigated the accuracy of the smoothbore muskets in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Articles cited herein discuss some of these tests, contemporary tests, and
variables that affect the accuracy of smoothbore muskets.7 In a 2008 article in Journal of
Conflict Archaeology, Roberts, Brown, Hammett, and Kingston report a modern study of
the effectiveness of the Brown Bess musket.8 This article is particularly broad and
thorough examining the gun, propellant, projectile, and in addition to ballistic
experiments presenting a computer model of the internal ballistics of the Brown Bess.
In general these studies support Colonel Hanger’s statement. Willegal concludes:
“… effective musket fire is not possible at ranges above 150 yards.”9 Irons states “the
general effectiveness of musket fire is 3 to 5 percent at ranges of 100 to 200 yards, which
is far less that the theoretical maximum.”10 In talking about the effectiveness of musket
fire it’s necessary to make a distinction between accuracy (the ability to hit what is being
aimed at) and lethality. Whereas accuracy decreases substantially beyond about 100
yards, the ball is still lethal in excess of 150 yards.11
I have not found a period standard of “effectiveness” with regard to eighteenth
century musketry. Would it be measured by a minimum percentage of hits on a
standardized target at a specific distance? Or would it be determined by number of
casualties in battle? Without a minimal standard there will be disagreement on the
meaning of “effective musket fire.” Among knowledgeable and experienced military
personnel, one would think a consensus on what is effective could be reached
(recognizing that consensus does not mean unanimous agreement) and, indeed, both the
3
period and contemporary literature do generally agree that 150 yards is about the limit of
effective fire. There is a notable 18th century exception to this apparent consensus
conclusion that “effective musket fire is not possible at ranges above 150 yards.”12
Col. John Lafausille, commanding officer of the 8th (King’s) Foot, cited in De
Witt Bailey, Small Arms of the British Forces in America 1664–1815, states,
I have … made them [men of the 8th Foot] without exception the very best
marksmen in the English Army. … A company of about sixty will in five rounds
hit a target of about 2½ feet in diameter at 300 yards eight or ten times [i.e. 8 or
10 hits out of 300 rounds fired] and throw forty or fifty ball close enough about it
to do execution if a Platoon was before them, and I will be answerable that at two
hundred and one hundred & fifty yards they would thin an enemy considerably.13
Refer to APPENDIX for a ballistic analysis and discussion of shooting at this distance.
Whether soldiers of the Revolutionary War period aimed with some degree of
precision at, as opposed to simply pointing their weapons in the general direction of, their
target has been the subject of discussion in the scholarly literature, popular magazine
articles and books, and re-enactor posts and blogs.14
Four studies in particular provide a comprehensive summary of the British army
with respect to marksmanship discipline and the effectiveness of that training in combat.
Because the American militia and Provincial armies used the British drill manuals and
fought together with the Crown’s regular troops in wars prior to the Revolution, the
conclusions of these studies, with exceptions unique to the American condition, apply to
the Continental army as well.15
J.A. Houlding in Fit for Service: the Training of The British Army 1715-1795
examines training of the British army in war and peace and the effectiveness of that
training in combat. With respect to the topic of this essay, there is abundant evidence that
aimed fire was practiced in wartime, but apparently not necessarily for the purpose of
aiming at individual targets nor to the degree necessary to make aiming automatic during
volley firing in combat.16 Soldiers that never had handled a gun before did not know how
to correctly level and aim unless specifically instructed by their officers. Houlding notes
“that none of the plates attached to the various drillbooks, illustrating the posture of the
soldier at ‘Present’ and ‘Fire’, shows him actually taking aim down the barrel of the
piece; he is, instead, invariably shown with the butt of his firelock pressed to the shoulder
but with the head held erect.”17 For proper aiming the cheek should be pressed firmly
against the comb of the butt stock and the eye looking down the barrel focused on the
front sight. Even though shooting at marks was common, it seems that few officers
trained their troops to properly aim and for those that did Houlding suggests
marksmanship in the sense it is understood today may not have been their primary
purpose.18
Stephen Brumwell in Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in The Americas,
1755-1763 presents a strong case that the British emphasized marksmanship in the
French and Indian War and it can be assumed that the lessons learned and target practice
were carried over to the Revolutionary War. Brumwell states that some troops practiced
in Great Britain in preparation for serving in America: “A year before arriving in
America, Amherst’s 15th Foot was devoting considerable attention to musketry.”19
Amherst’s troops practiced three field days per week firing a total of eighty four rounds,
which evidently included firing in platoon and individually. Regular practice at marks
4
continued in America and included the Provincials.20 There is French and Indian War
and Revolutionary War documentation that American soldiers practiced shooting at
marks and were urged to aim.21 With regard to “the question of ‘aimed fire’ it is
necessary to draw a distinction between what occurred on the European battlefield and
the very different conditions prevailing in America”.22 In Europe rapidity of fire was
prioritized over aimed fire, because large formations of troops maneuvered in open fields.
In America the more wooded and broken terrain inhibited this tactic and “as Wolfe
informed the 20th Foot in 1755, ‘There is no necessity for firing very fast; a cool well-
levelled fire, with the pieces carefully loaded, is much more destructive and formidable
that the quickest fire in confusion.’” 23
Maj.- Gen. B.P. Hughes in Firepower: Weapons Effectiveness on The Battlefield
1630-1850 makes an important and necessary distinction between the theoretical and
practical effectiveness of the 18th century smoothbore musket reinforcing the statement
of Iron. He states “Lauerma, quoting Rouqerol, estimates that between 0.2 and 0.5 per
cent of the bullets fired hit their targets and he repeats a statement of the times to the
effect that to kill one man it was necessary to fire at him seven times his own weight in
lead.”24 In contrast, controlled tests “indicate that, in theory, a battalion 500 strong firing
two volleys during an attack by infantry over 100 yards of ground might expect to obtain
500-600 hits from 1000 muskets that could have been fired during the attack.”25 He
points out battlefield casualties “on such a scale have never been inflicted….”26 Such
enormous discrepancy between the theoretically possible, which would result in
annihilation, and that obtained in practice has proven true in every war.
De Witt Bailey in Small Arms of the British Forces in America 1664-1815
documents that target practice was common and widespread in the British army in
America going so far to state, “…marksmanship training was a regularly established part
of everyday routine….27 Because he concludes that target practice was routine, he
apparently assumes the majority of soldiers to be good marksmen and seems puzzled by
the poor effectiveness of British musket fire during the Revolutionary War as measured
by the low numbers of casualties inflicted upon the Americans. Although he
acknowledges that actual combat conditions, “which affect all soldiers in all ages …
undoubtedly applied to the British in the 18th century,” his principal explanation for the
poor results embodies a justification protective of the soldier’s marksmanship, as for
example, “A variety of British officers commented on the poor results of ‘musquetry’
but it is usually difficult to tell whether they had some ulterior motive, some personal or
political ‘axe to grind.’”28 He concludes the chapter, “One point is, however, historically
evident British troops won most battles in which they engaged during the 18th century
and when, on occasion, they lost a battle, it is not, to my knowledge, attributable to any
absence of marksmanship or fire discipline.”29
The command ‘Present’ in the sequence ‘Make Ready, Present, Fire’ principally
fuels the discussion about 18th century military marksmanship. Many post-18th century
commentators interpret ‘present’ as not directing the soldiers to take careful aim, as
otherwise the command would be ‘aim’.30 Others surmise the fact the King’s troops
practiced firing at marks that the command ‘present’ meant for the troops to aim.
What might aim mean in combat of the time? In a nutshell it seems that for regular troops
in ranks firing smoothbore muskets in volley on command ‘fire’ aim (present) equated to
that of leveling their weapons at the opposing troops. Of course, we cannot know whether
5
an individual soldier took aim at a specific soldier.31 However, nothing in the drill
manuals of the time suggests ‘aiming’ in combat was anything more than pointing the
firelock at the opposing ranks.
To understand better the “style” and “intent” of aiming during the Revolutionary
War it is important to look upon it as a stage in the evolution of aiming and
marksmanship. As stated above Houlding noted that illustrations in 18th century manuals
showed the soldier holding his head above the comb of the stock. The eye is the rear sight
on weapons without a rear sight. For accurate and precision shooting the eye must be in
the same position for each shot. Placing the cheek firmly against the comb helps
accomplish this. Consistency in cheek placement is only developed through much
practice. A fraction of an inch deviation in the position of the head shifting the eye (rear
sight) is magnified many times down range; it’s the same as changing the adjustments on
the rear sight. For example, to determine the proper fit (the dimensions of the butt stock)
of a shotgun for an individual to hit where he is looking (aiming) the gun is fired at a
target exactly sixteen yards from the muzzle. Effectively a one-eighth inch deviation of
the position of the eye (at the gun) results in a two-inch deviation of the shot on target
(center of mass of pattern of shot pellets) at sixteen yards.32 This deviation is increased
proportionately with increasing distance.
Consistent cheek placement is challenging even for experienced target shooters
who may fire thousands of rounds per year. Take note of how carefully and methodically
world-class shooters place their cheek on the stock in shotgun events. When a soldier is
being ordered to load and fire three to four times a minute, being shot at, seeing cannon
balls rip through the ranks, and comrades falling around him, how consistently might he
place his cheek on the stock? Having possibly done so a few tens of times a year would
hardly develop the muscle memory to do so automatically under stress.
Illustrations in 18th and early 19th drill manuals demonstrate that the position of
the head progressively evolved from that of the head erect substantially above the stock
to cheek firmly pressed against the comb with the soldier clearly aiming along the barrel
(FIGS. 4-9). British and American Revolutionary War soldiers (before the introduction of
Baron von Steuben’s plan of discipline) were trained using the 1764 drill manual.
Remember before the Revolution Americans were proud British subjects and many
militia companies practiced the discipline laid out in the 1764 manual. It seems that
during the Seven Years War (French and Indian War in North America) and the
Revolutionary War the importance of placing the head on the comb was beginning to be
recognized and put into practice. Sportsmen of the period knew this well. Many officers
were sportsmen and the military gradually worked the principles of good gun mount and
aiming into the manuals. As the accuracy of the weapons themselves improved proper
aiming became increasingly important to achieve the full potential of the weapon—
especially the rifle.
American, British, and German (jaegers) riflemen did aim at specific targets.
Rifles are fitted with rear sights and it is necessary to place the head on the comb to use
the sights. Indeed, most American rifles of the period had cheek pieces. It is noteworthy
that a section of left butt stock of the 1777 Charleville is scooped out providing a
concavity to rest the cheek and to align the eye over the axis of the bore.33
Col. George Hanger in Colonel George Hanger’s Advice to All Sportsmen,
Farmers, and Gamekeepers talks at length about the aiming and accuracy of American
6
riflemen during the Revolutionary War.34 The importance of instructing the principles of
aiming took on greater emphasis in late 18th century and early 19th century drill manuals
especially the instruction of riflemen as rifles and rifled-muskets gradually replaced
smooth bore muskets.35
Figure 4. This illustration in the 1755 French drill manual (Ordonnance du Roy de 6 May 1755) is
labeled en joue, which means, “take aim.” The soldiers’ heads are erect and well above the stock.
Illustration in J.A. Houlding, French arms drill of the 18th century—1703-1760 (Bloomfield, Ont.:
Museum Restoration Service, 1988), 57.
7
Figure 5. “French infantry at the platoon exercise. This decorative chapter heading is from LeBlond’s
Elemens de tactique. Paris, 1758. Courtesy U.S. Military History Institute. Illustration in in J.A.
Houlding, French Arms Drill of the 18th Century—1703-1760 (Bloomfield, Ont.: Museum Restoration
Service, 1988), 21.
Figure 6. “Present as Front-rank, a side View” in William Windhan and George Townshend, A plan of
discipline, composed for the use of the militia of the county of Norfolk (1760) (Printed for J.
Shuckburgh, at the Sun, next Richard’s Coffee-House, Fleet-Street, London: 1760), pl. 31. The head is
above the stock and the eye above the barrel.
8
Figure 7. “Present as Center-rank, a side-View” in William Windhan and George Townshend, A Plan of
Discipline, Composed for the Use of the Militia of the County of Norfolk (1760) (Printed for J.
Shuckburgh, at the Sun, next Richard’s Coffee-House, Fleet-Street, London: 1760), pl. 33. The head is
above the stock and the eye above the barrel.

Figure 8. The illustration is an interpretation of the instructions for the command “Take Aim!” in
Baron de Stuben, Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States to Which
is Added, an Appendix Containing, the United States Militia Act, passed in Congress, May, 1792
(Baron von Steuben’s Revolutionary War drill manual, a facsimile reprint of the 1794 addition: New
York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1985), 27. “Take Aim! One motion. Step back about six inches with the
right foot, bringing the left toe to the front; at the same time drop the muzzle, and bring up the butt-
end of the firelock against your right shoulder; place the left hand forward on the swell of the stock,
and the fore-finger of the right hand before the trigger; sinking the muzzle a little below a lever, and
with the right eye looking along the barrel.” The illustration is in A.N. Schultz and R.T. Coleman,
Illustrated Drill Manual and Regulations for the American Soldier of the Revolutionary War—Excerpts
from: Baron von Steubens’ Regulations of 1778 (Union City, TN: Pioneer Press, 2004), 31.
It’s important to note that the degree of precision and accuracy expected of 18th
marksmen is not comparable to standards in the 19th century, 20th century, and at
present, which progressively evolved to greater accuracy and precision at all distances.
For example, as stated in ENDNOTE 36, a target five feet in diameter at a distance of
fifty yards was used to instruct new riflemen in aiming. This is an enormous target at a
very close distance by today’s standards even for smoothbore muzzleloaders.36 And the
9
Figure 9. Napoleonic war era French soldiers taking aim; clearly their heads are pressed against the
stock and eyes looking down the barrel. (Public domain illustration on the internet, Infantry tactics
and combat during the Napoleonic Wars:
http://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/infantry_tactics_2.htm#infantrycom
batmuskets2
soldiers did not practice nearly as frequently or with as much expert instruction as
today— the principles and practice of good marksmanship were in their infancy. Per the
discussion below typically practice was held at irregular intervals and soldiers fired as
few as two to more typically half a dozen shots at a mark; however, a few troops fired
several score balls at marks over a year.37 Period accounts in addition to practice firing
by platoons describe troops firing individually one-by-one. To my knowledge (with one
exception in ENDNOTE 40) there is no record of the size and distance of the targets or
the results of firing at marks by individuals with military muskets. Results that have been
tabulated and reported are of soldiers standing in ranks as they would during combat. The
targets, when dimensions are given, are huge. For example, in 1779 the Norfolk militia
fired at a target about 2’x8’ fixed to poles at a distance of seventy yards; twenty percent
of their 632 shots hit the target, which pleased their colonel greatly.38 Shooting well
during any period of time is a demanding skill that requires extensive and constant
practice.
10
In sum there is abundant evidence that British and American soldiers practiced
aiming at marks prior to and during the Revolutionary War. As is often the case more
information raises more questions. Although the references are numerous, it’s unclear to
me how regularly they practiced marksmanship. Did they practice daily as Bailey implies
or occasionally? ‘Frequent’ indicates the practice was habitual. Was it at a periodic
interval once a week, once a month, etc. or was it at an irregular interval? The fact that
shooting at marks was so often noted suggests to me practice was not routine and
periodic—it was an unusual event in the sense it was not part of the regular discipline
such as practicing the manual of arms.39 It may seem counterintuitive that frequency of
notation does not necessarily equate to that which is common and routine. But, for
instance, consider that daily and routine events and drills are not often regularly recorded
as a matter of course in dairies, orderly books, and other records, but the unusual and
exceptional is always remarked upon.40 What seems to have been the typical amount of
practice (perhaps firing a few tens of shots a year at a mark) by regular troops would not
have been nearly sufficient to develop skilled and expert marksmen (of course a few
individuals may have attained a high level of skill; see ENDNOTE 30). In general,
shooting at marks does not seem to have been encouraged as a way to develop marksman
in today’s sense of precision and accuracy, but rather to get troops accustomed to loading
with live ammunition and leveling their weapons at the opposing troops looking along the
barrel and using the sight (what we today call bayonet lug) as a reference.
Results and Observations

Volley Firing
This experiment is similar to that reported on by Daniel O’Connell in the August
2011 issue of Smoke & Fire News.41 It differs, however, in important ways.
• As stated, in contrast to the skilled and expert marksmen of the King’s 8th
participating in O’Connell’s experiment, the Lincoln soldiers are novice shooters
with virtually no live fire and target practice experience.
• The muskets and fowlers were loaded with patched ball appropriate for the
caliber. For example, a 20 gauge (.62 caliber) fowler was loaded with a .595
diameter ball and a 0.10 thick lubricated patch over 60 grains FFG. This
ball/patch combination was snug, but loose enough to enable easy ramming in a
fouled bore. The King’s 8th loaded .69 caliber ball in .75 caliber Brown Bess
muskets over 70 grains FFG.
• Each minuteman fired two shots at each distance; each of the King’s 8th fired five
shots at each distance. Instead of aiming at the regular across from him, each
soldier aimed at the middle regular to test Colonel Hangar’s assertion. The
King’s 8th group consisted of six soldiers firing at six silhouettes.
• The minutemen lined up abreast in one rank; they fired immediately upon the
command “fire” in the sequence “make ready, present, fire” as stated at the
middle regular (FIGS. 10 and 11). Of interest is that one of the minutemen
remarked, “when you command ‘fire’ sometimes my musket is not aimed at the
target.”
Results are summarized in TABLE 1. The weather did not affect the shooting; it was
a pleasant day and negligible wind. As expected the number of hits on the target regular
increased with decreasing distance. Even though all shots were aimed at the target
11
Figure 10. Minutemen primed and loaded preparing to fire.
Figure 11. Minutemen firing on command “fire!”
regular, adjacent regulars were sometimes hit probably owing both to the inherent
inaccuracy of the smoothbore musket and the lack of skill of the inexperienced
minutemen (FIGS. 12 and 13).42 TABLE 2 describes the location of the hits relative to the
regulars. Balls hitting the board but missing the front rank of regulars could possibly hit
individuals in deeper ranks (in North America typically ranks were no more than two or
at most three deep). The terrain limited our test to 130 yards. Nonetheless, the results
12
Figure 12. Collateral hits on the redcoat to the left of the target redcoat. These are examples of non-
disabling wounds that probably would have been flesh wounds.

Figure 13. Mortal wounds in the center of the chest. Disabling wounds that probably would have
broken the forearm, wrist, and leg (these hits are an aggregate from different volleys).
clearly support Colonel Hangar’s assertion. Hitting a human-size target purposefully

aimed at 200 yards away with a smooth bore musket would be mere chance.
13
Table 1. Statistical results of volley firing
Statistic Yards
130 100 75 50 25
Total hits on 4’x8’ 1/13 5/12 8/11 10/12 11/11
board (8%) (42%) (73%) (83%) (100%)
Hits on other redcoats 0 3 (25%) 2 (18%) 0 1 (9%)
Hits on target redcoat 0 1 (8%) 2 (25%) 7 (58%) 7 (64%)
Hits on all redcoats 0 4 (33%) 4 (36%) 7 (58%) 8 (67%)
Disabling wounds 0 0 4 (36%) 1 (8%) 1 (9%)
Mortal wounds 0 0 0 3 (25%) 5 (42%)
1/13=one hit out of thirteen shots. Fourteen shots were fired at 130 and 100 yards. One of the muskets
became inoperable at the 75-yard distance; twelve shoots were fired at 75, 50, and 25 yards. Several
misfires occurred of which we did not keep track. These two circumstances account for the reduced total
number of total shots (e.g., x/13 instead of x/14). The target board is 4x8 feet with three redcoats; total hits
on board include all hits both on the board and redcoats. At all distances the aim point, adjusted for drop of
the ball, was the middle redcoat; at 150 yards soldiers aimed about one foot above the top of the board, at
100 yards top of the hat, at 75 yards bottom of the chin, at 50 yards center of the chest, and at 25 yards
center of the chest. Disabling wounds are those that would likely prevent the redcoat from advancing.
Mortal wounds are those that are mortal on the battlefield and not possibly mortal post-battle owing to
complications.
Table 2. Location of hits at different distances
Yards Location of Hits

150
B About 3 feet to the left head and level with the eyes of the redcoat on the right.
ORC N/A
TRC N/A
100
B 1 above left shoulder of middle redcoat
ORC 1 on left wrist of left redcoat; 1 left flank of left redcoat; 1 left thumb of right
redcoat
TRC Left wrist
75
B 1 6" to left of right shoulder of right redcoat; 1 inner right thigh of right redcoat;
1 inner left thigh of right redcoat; 1 outer right thigh of middle redcoat; 1 middle
right thigh of middle redcoat; 1 left tip of hat of middle redcoat; 1 6" to the left of
shoulder of middle redcoat; 1 6" below right hat tip of left redcoat
ORC 1 inner right thigh of right redcoat; 1 inner left thigh of right redcoat
TRC 1 outer right thigh; 1 middle right thigh
50
B 1 6" to right and 6" below right tip of hat target redcoat, 1 4" below left tip of hat
ORC N/A
TRC 1 between the eyes, 1 top of left shoulder next to neck, 3 clustered right side of
chest just off white cross, 1 right forearm middle redcoat, 1 right side of chest
under armpit middle redcoat
14
25
B 1 above left shoulder target redcoat, 1 8" above right hat tip target redcoat, 1 2"
below left hat tip
ORC N/A
TRC 1 center chest, 1 grazing right flank, 1 middle stomach, 1 stomach right side of
white strap, 1 upper right thigh, 1 above left eye middle redcoat, 1 middle chest
6" above strap cross, 1 left ear of right redcoat
B=board (any shot hitting the 4’x8’ board), ORC=other redcoats, TRC=target redcoat
Although several variables (e.g., number of shots and loads) differed, our results
make an interesting comparison with those obtained by the King’s 8th expert marksmen
(TABLE 3). O’Connell does not state the dimension of the target board. However,
because it consists of six silhouettes, twice the number in our experiment, we can assume
it is about twice the area of ours. Of note is that the number of hits on the silhouettes by
the King’s 8th is 50% at all distances. I presume that each soldier aimed at the silhouette
directly across from him and that being the case would think that the percentage of hits
on the silhouette would increase with decreasing distance.43 O’Connell offers no
explanation for these results, which seem to me anomalous. The percentage of total hits
on the board including the silhouettes is about 75% at 100 and 60 yards and 100% at 50
yards. In contrast, hits by the minutemen on the target regular consistently increased with
decreasing distance. A possible explanation for the constant 50% hit rate of the King’s
8th is that the accuracy reflected the inherent accuracy of the smooth bore musket firing a
greatly undersized ball (presuming that each soldier took aim at the silhouette opposite
him). In other words, the skill of the marksmen was offset and constrained by the
Table 3. Results of King’s 8th
Hits Yards
100 60 50
Silhouette 15 (50%) 15 (50%) 14 (47%
Target Board 7 8 16
Total Hits 22 (73%) 23 (77%) 30 (100%)
A total of 30 shots were fired at each distance.
inherent accuracy of the weapon.44 The consistent improvement in number of hits on the
target regular with decreasing distance by unskilled and unpracticed shooters suggests
that patched balls fitted to the bore make a difference in the inherent accuracy of the
smooth bore firelock. Given the different variables of each experiment, further analysis is
not warranted.
Independent firing from cover

During more than 100 years of fighting Indians prior to 1775 the New England
militia developed tactics firing from behind cover at individuals. They were not
accustomed and not practiced in volley firing. This experiment simulated this tactic,
15
which the militia and minutemen employed during the withdrawal of the British back to
Boston after the battle at Concord, 19 April 1775 and the Battle of Bunker Hill.
Unlike the consistent weather during November weather conditions changed
significantly during the course of the testing. The light rain in early morning stopped
before shooting began at about 10 am. When the rain stopped the wind increased to
about 10 to 15 mph; it varied in speed and intensity with stronger gusts.45 Some gusts
were estimated at 20-25 mph and strong enough to blow the targets down several times
during the morning when we shot at the 140 and 100 yard targets. When firing at these
targets the wind generally was at about 90 degrees blowing from the target’s left to right.
As the day progressed the wind decreased in speed and shifted direction from crossing to
quartering in to the shooting position when we shot the 75, 50, and 25 yard targets,
although strong gusts continued to occur. The wind caused the bullets to drift a greater
amount at the 140 and 100 yard distances than at the 75, 50, and 25 yard distances owing
to the shorter distance, decreasing speed, and shift in direction (Appendix). The wind
drift might not matter all that much when firing at a linear formation, because even
though the ball would drift off the soldier aimed at it might hit another in the extended
rank. It is a significant factor when trying to hit a specific target.46
Five minutemen participated in the May experiment. Three of them participated in
November. One who did not participate in the volley firing did practice, however, at
targets prior to the volleying. The other soldier had not before fired live ammunition.
Before beginning the test I instructed him in loading and aiming and he fired a couple of
rounds at a target placed at 15 yards.
As in November the soldiers fired at only the center redcoat (I) at the 140, 100,
and 75 yard distances (FIGURE 14 shows the redcoats at the 140 yard distance). At 50
Figure 14. Redcoats at 140 yards in a early morning mist; one can imagine how visible they would be
in the smoke created by hundreds of muskets during battle.
16
and 25 yards two soldiers fired at redcoat II, two at redcoat III and one at redcoat I
(FIGURE 15 shows the redcoats at 25 yards). Two shots were fired at each distance.
TABLE 4 tabulates the results. FIGURE 16 shows the location of the hits. An interesting
observation is that although the soldiers were able to rest their weapons against trees, on
fences, and across logs standing, kneeling, or prone two of them chose to stand (shoot
offhand) and did not take advantage of the rests to steady their aim at the 140 and 100
yard distance (FIG. 2). When asked why one said, “I’m not a hunter and I shot as I’ve
been trained” meaning as a re-enactor standing in rank. American militia of the period as
has been noted always took advantage of available cover and rested their weapons for a
steadier aim whenever possible.
Figure 15. Redcoats at 25 yards for comparison at 140 yards.
Table 4. Statistical results of musket and fowler independent firing

Statistic Yards
140 100 75 50* 25*
Total hits on 4’x8’ 3/10 4/9 1/6 9/9 8/10
board (30%) (56%) (10%) (100%) (80%)
Hits on other redcoats 2 (20%) 1 (11%) 0 0 0
Hits on target redcoat 0 2 (33%) 0 8 (89%) 7 (70%)
Hits on all redcoats 2 (20%) 3 (33%) 0 8 (89%) 8 (80%)
Disabling wounds 1 (10%) 1 (11%) 0 5 (56%) 5 (50%)
Mortal wounds 1 (10%) 2 (22%) 0 2 (22%) 2 (20%)
3/10=one hit out of ten shots; total shots fewer than 10 are the result of misfires. The target board is 4x8
feet with three redcoats; total hits on board include all hits both on the board and redcoats.
17
The targets were arranged right to left: III, I, II. Soldiers fired at only target I (in the center) at 140, 100,
and 75 yards. At 50 and 25 yards two soldiers fired at target III, two soldiers at target II, and one soldier at
target I. Each soldier fired two shots at each distance. A misfire counted as a shot. There was one misfire at
100 and 50 yards.
At all distances the aim point, adjusted for drop of the ball, was the middle redcoat; at 140 yards soldiers
aimed about three feet above the top of the board, at 100 yards top of the hat, at 75 yards bottom of the
chin, at 50 yards center of the chest, and at 25 yards center of the chest. Disabling wounds are those that
would likely prevent the redcoat from advancing. Mortal wounds are those that are mortal on the
battlefield and not possibly mortal post-battle owing to complications.
* Two rounds of buck and ball were fired at target I at 50 and 25 yards. The load consisted of 8 buckshot
and one ball, which was a common load during the revolution, indeed, recommended by Gen. George
Washington. Buck and ball results are reported in Table 5.
Figure 16. Hits on all three redcoats; colored tabs idenfity classe of firearm and yardage (see legend).
18
The soldiers shot for a prize at the 75 yard distance at redcoat I; all took care to
rest their guns at this distance and the 50 and 25 yard redcoats. The one closest to the ‘X”
formed by the crossing white bands won a pint of rum (shared only after the guns were
put away). Surprisingly the redcoat was unscathed with only one shot hitting the board to
the right of the redcoat’s hat. Two shots hit the support framing about six inches above
the ground of redcoat III.47 There were four misfires out of ten attempts (a misfire
counted as a missed shot). In the volley firing experiment at this distance 8 of 11 shots hit
the target board and 2 shots hit the target redcoat. It was expected that shooting from a
rest most of the shots would hit the target redcoat. The result, however, may simply be
attributed to novice skills combined with loads that were not optimized for accuracy.
At the 50 and 25 yard distance I fired two rounds at the center redcoat with buck
and ball, which was a load used commonly by 18th century American militia and
Continental army soldiers.48 My fowler is a replica of the Jacob Man fowler carried by
him at Concord and subsequent Revolutionary War battles. The results are tabulated in
TABLE 5.
Table 5. Statistical results of musket and fowler independent firing

Statistic Yards
50 ball 50 buck 25 ball 25 buck
19
Total hits on 4’x8’ board 2/2 6/16 2/2 11/16
(100%) (38%) (29%)
1Hits on other redcoats 0 4 0 2
(25%) (16%)
Statistic Yards
Hits on target redcoat 1 1 2 8

(50%) (6%) (100%) (50%)
Hits on all redcoats N/A 4 N/A N/A
(25%)
Disabling wounds 1 2 0 0
(50%) (13%)
Mortal wounds 0 1 2 2
(6%) (100%) (100%^)
As a comparison to the accuracy and effectiveness of smoothbore muskets, I fired

a rifle at the 140, 100, and 75 yard distances. I fired prone using a rest and used a .32
caliber rifle at each distance and a .45 caliber rifle at 100 yards. Both calibers, especially
the .32, are smaller than would be typical of rifles ca. 1774/1775. Nonetheless, they
provide a fair comparison between the accuracy of the smoothbore and rifle. At 140 and
100 yards I fired at the center redcoat I. The wind caused the balls to drift significantly at
these distances. At 75 yards I fired two shots with the .32 caliber rifle at redcoat I and one
at each redcoat II and III. Although, each redcoat aimed at was hit, the accuracy at this
distance was not what I would expect based on prior shooting experience; the wind may
have been a factor as well. The rifle results are reported in TABLE 6.
Table 6. Results with .32 and .45 caliber rifles

20
140/.32 100/.32 100/.45 75/.32*
Total hits on 2/2 2/2 2/2 3/3 (100%)
4’x8’ board (100%) (100%) (100%)
Hits on other 0 0 0 N/A
redcoats
Hits on target 1 (50%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 3 (100%)
redcoat
Hits on all 2 (100%) 0 0 3 (100%)
redcoats
Disabling 1 (50%) 0 0 1 (33%)
wounds
Mortal wounds 0 1 2 (100%) 2 (67%)
*One shot was taken at redcoat II and III and two at redcoat I
A strong wind was blowing from right to left during firing at the 140 and 100
yards targets. This caused the bullets to drift significantly to the left.

Subsequent test:
On May 15 I conducted a test as an experienced “veteran,” using my Jacob Man
fowler with a load sighted in (regulated) to hit at the point of aim at 25 yards, as a
comparison with the “new” recruits. I fired two shots at each distance. There was an
intermittent, strong wind quartering into the gun. Both the 140 and 100 yard targets were
obscured by the muzzle, because of the distance I had to hold above them to account for
drop. At 140 yards I held a good three feet over the target; I used a prominent clump of
grass as an aiming point. At 100 yards I held about two feet over the target, but did not
have a defined spot on which to hold above and align with the target.49 I held just below
the chin at 75 yards and at 50 and 25 yards I held on the ‘X’ of the crossed white straps.
TABLE 7 tabulates the results.
Table 7. Results of subsequent test with Jacob Man fowler

Statistic Yards
140 100 75 50 25
Total hits on 4’x8’ board 1/2 (50%) 0/2 (0%) 1/2 (50%) 2/2 (100%) 2/2 (80%)
Hits on target redcoat 0 0 0 2/2 (100%) 2 (100%)
Disabling wounds 0 0 0 2 (100%) 0
Mortal wounds 0 0 0 0 2 (100%)
I fired 2 shoots at redcoat III standing, resting my fowler on a fence rail
Conclusions
We don’t want to over analyze the results. We cannot compare firing for pleasure
with combat; the differences are extreme and obvious. Overall our experiments are
consistent with all previous mid- to late18th century, early 19th century, and modern tests
of the accuracy of smoothbore flintlock muskets. However, ours differed in some aspects.
For example, we used ball and patch combinations that closely fit the diameter of the
21
bore; a .715 diameter ball and 0.010 thick patch was used for the Brown Bess and a .595
diameter ball and 0.010 thick patch for the American fowler. Because fouling quickly
built up during battle inhibiting ramming the ball home, the British military used a .69
diameter ball in the .75 caliber Brown Bess. The undersize ball without patching (other
than the paper of the cartridge) would be less accurate than a properly sized and patched
ball. Recall that the King's 8th in their experiment used .69 diameter balls. Our weapons
are modern replicas of the originals. Modern manufacturing techniques enable closer
tolerances and better quality control. Whether modern replicas are inherently more
accurate than originals is not known; comparison testing would have to be done. Finally,
the skill of the shooter is a significant factor in the accuracy of the "shooter/firearm
system."50 These factors, and others, need to be considered when interpreting, and
drawing conclusions from, the results.
Buck and ball from a volley would be tremendously effective against a rank(s) of
soldiers. Unless buck and ball were loaded into cartridges it's probable that only the first
volley could be fired with it, as it would take too long to load subsequent charges. Given
our results it’s no wonder General Washington urged the troops to use buck and ball.
Buck shot was also among the items stipulated in some town resolves to be carried by
militia.51
The superior accuracy of the rifle to the smoothbore is well known. Muzzle
loading rifles are loaded using a powder horn and loose ball and patches carried in a shot
pouch. The ball/patch combination fits very tightly in the bore requiring considerable
effort to ram home. As a consequence they are much slower to load than muskets charged
with cartridges and not suitable for, and a disadvantage during, rapid volley fire.52 Special
units (e.g. German jaegers, American rifle companies) employed rifles in the 18th
century. The deadly accuracy of the American rifleman grew to legendary proportions
and he was much feared by British officers. Although not appropriate for deploying in
ranks, rifle companies could be very effective in battle when used in combination with
musketry. Brig, Gen. Daniel Morgan’s understanding of the tactical deployment and
capability (and psychology) of Continental troops, militia, and riflemen enabled him to
achieve an overwhelming victory against Col. Barnastre Tarleton's troops an elite and
hated British unit. Few American officers, however, knew how to use so effectively rifle
companies.53
The subsequent test on May 15 (and discussion in ENDNOTE 37) suggests that
having a defined point at which to aim is a significant factor in accuracy and
effectiveness of fire. This should be obvious and is an oxymoron; I mention it because
one might consider, for instance, how smoke accumulating during firing would obscure
the opposing forces and its effect on aiming. The overall poor results with “recruit”
muskets and fowlers, “veteran” fowler, and rifle at seventy-five yards are a puzzle. I had
expected better accuracy at this distance. Perhaps it is my expectation that biases my
characterization of the results as “poor.”
We had fun and learned a lot conducting our two experiments, which we think
shed some light on the discipline and marksmanship of the soldiers and accuracy of their
weapons circa the Revolutionary War. Our results, like others before us, are not definitive
and simply informative. The theoretical effectiveness of any conventional weapon is
never fully realized in battle—if it were, annihilation would likely be the result. The
many variables that include environmental, tactical, technical, and human of actual
22
combat combine in unpredictable ways to create the fog of war. It is this, which must be
kept upmost in mind, when interpreting the potential not only of the weapon but also of
the soldier.
Acknowledgements
The minutemen thank Randy Martin for his hospitality in making the grounds of the
Timberdoodle Club available and two excellent luncheons and the staff for their help.
About the author
Herman A. Karl holds a Ph.D. in geological sciences. After thirty-three years with the
U.S. Geological Survey he retired June 2010. The last seven years of his USGS career he
was on the faculty of the MIT Environmental Policy and Planning Group and co-director
of the MIT-USGS Science Impact Collaborative. Karl has authored more than two
hundred professional publications. As a member of the Lincoln Minute Men, a
Revolutionary War re-enactor group in Lincoln, Massachusetts, he studies the history and
material culture of the New England militia with a focus on firearms, accouterments and
tactics.
23
APPENDIX
Ballistic Analyses and Discussion

To better understand the effectiveness of 18th century muskets and
marksmanship it is useful to compare them to modern firearms and standard of
marksmanship. An examination of the exterior ballistics of muskets and modern
cartridge firearms will help provide a context for comparison. The results below
were calculated using the ballistic program Shoot.
Colonel Lafausille implied that the charge used when practicing at a mark
300 yards distant was approximately 137 grains of powder. I assume the ball was
the standard .69 caliber pure lead ball weighing about 479 grains used in the .75
caliber Brown Bess (an undersized ball was used because build up of powder
fouling made a more closely fitting ball difficult to ram home). The strength of the
18th century powder relative to modern black powder is not known. Roberts,
Brown, Hammett and Kingston, A detailed study of effectiveness and capabilities of 18th
century musketry on the battlefield, tested various types and quantities of modern
black powder attempting to duplicate 18th century Brown Bess ballistics. Based on
their testing, I assumed a velocity of 900 feet per second for the load used by Colonel
Lafausille’s soldiers. I do not know if the muskets were regulated to hit at point of
aim at a specific distance. I assumed 50 yards.
A ball fired with the barrel of the musket level to the ground would drop
303.4 inches (about 25 feet) at 300 yards. If the muzzle was level with and about
five feet above the ground, the ball would hit the ground at about 150 yards. To hit
the target at 300 yards the soldiers would have to aim 81 inches (almost 7 feet)
above the target. Consequently the muzzle has to be elevated to hit a target at that
distance. The reason the amount of hold over (point of aim above the target) is not
the same as the drop is owing to the parabolic path of the projectile from the
elevated muzzle to the target (for a discussion of trajectory see:
http://www.chuckhawks.com/bullet_trajectory.htm and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/External_ballistics)
Another factor is the drift of the ball owing to wind. I assumed a quartering
light breeze of 7 mph, which would result in a drift of almost three feet. That alone
would cause the target to be missed holding dead on. In wind conditions (described
below) experienced during the May experiment, the drift would be eleven feet.
Colonel Lafausille, in the quote cited by Bailey, does not state the
atmospheric conditions, why he chose 300 yards as the distance to practice, how he
determined the amount of hold over, and how often his troops had to practice to
have balls land on and near the target. Recall the target was 2½ feet in diameter.
FIGURE A1 shows a 2½ foot diameter white target being held about six feet high at
300 yards. Unless there was an object for reference, such as a tree, in an open field
with nothing but grass and sky as background how accurately could one estimate
seven feet to hold over at 300 yards? FIGURE A2 is the shooter’s view holding over
the target to account for drop. The musket barrel obscures the target and without a
reference point it is near impossible to estimate the amount of hold over. The
slightest fraction of an inch deviation of elevation of the barrel would result in
24
several feet difference at 300 yards. For comparison FIGURE A3 shows the white
target at 25 yards.

Figure A1. View of 2 ½ foot diameter target at three hundred yards; target is about six feet above the
ground.

Figure A2. View over Brown Bess (1730 Pattern Long Land Service) musket with muzzle elevated above
target to account for bullet drop. The muzzle obscures the target and without a reference mark it’s difficult
to judge the amount of hold over, which is seven feet to hit the target at 300 yards.

The characterization of this performance as marksmanship provides some
insight as to how the definition and standards of marksmanship have evolved over
25

Figure A3. View of 2 ½ foot diameter target about six feet above the ground at twenty five yards.

the centuries (see Alexander Rose, Marksmanship in 1775: myth or reality?, especially
47 and 70). The following discussion is neither a criticism of the skill of Colonel
Lafausille’s soldiers nor of his pride in their ability; it is an observation and
comment as to the meaning of marksmanship then and now. In my view, given the
known inaccuracy of smoothbore military muskets, largely unpredictable path of
the ball over several hundred yards (the non-spinning ball can be thought of as
analogous to a knuckle-ball), and challenges of aiming at a small target 300 yards
away, the fact that any shots hit the target is not owing to marksmanship but to
chance. Recall, Colonel Lafausille stated in addition to a few balls hitting the target
the fusillade threw “forty or fifty ball close enough about it [the target] to do
execution if a Platoon was before them [the soldiers].” An analogy is throwing a
handful of pebbles at a distant specific lily pad among a group in a pond. By chance
some pebbles might hit the pad. Other pebbles would hit pads around it.
Marksmanship would be throwing one pebble at the lily pad and hitting it.
Today with modern firearms, ammunition, and telescopic sights hitting a
target 2 ½ feet in diameter at 300 yards (given mild atmospheric conditions) should
pose a minor challenge for a shooter of even minimal skill. Many factory rifles and
ammunition are capable of near minute of angle (MOA) accuracy—that is putting a
group of bullets into a nominal one inch circle at 100 yards, two inch circle at 200
yards, three inch circle at 300 yards, etc. (for a definition of MOA see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minute_of_arc).
The trajectory of modern high velocity (greater than 2600 fps) bullets is very flat
meaning there is little arc of the bullet’s flight path. For a typical hi-power hunting
rifle sighted to hit dead center at 200 yards the sights would have to be raised only
about 2.5 inches to hit the target dead center at 300 yards. This means that the
shooter could hold dead on at targets from ranges of under 50 yards to 500 yards
26
and the bullet would never be further than nine inches from the aiming point
(assuming no wind drift). The above is a generic example for discussion purposes, of
course. The exact trajectory would vary according to the load. In practice
atmospheric conditions, skill, and other variables make long range shooting more
difficult than what is theoretically possible.
Now let’s consider the ballistics of the flintlock muzzleloaders and conditions
prevailing during the May experiment. The calculations, in particular the
assumption of a consistent 20 mph crossing wind, are for illustrative and discussion
purposes. A chronograph was used to measure the velocity of the different loads.
Three different firearms were used in the experiments: 1) Brown Bess, 2) American
fowler, and 3) longrifle. To illustrate more dramatically the impact of wind and
reinforce the importance of accounting for wind drift on long range shooting I used
a 20 mph crossing wind from left to right in the ballistic calculations. As discussed in
the text the wind shifted during the course of the day being a significant factor at
140 and 100 yards but less so at the closer distances. The soldiers did not account
for wind drift at any of the distances. The “X” formed by the crossing white lines on
the redcoats is the bullseye.
Brown Bess: This was the standard service musket of the British army. For
our test the replica Brown Besses were loaded with a 0.715 diameter ball weighing
550 grains over a charge of 80 grains of FFG black powder and a lubricated patch
0.010 thick. The nominal muzzle velocity was 825 fps. TABLE A1 shows drop and
hold over amount necessary to hit dead center at each target distance. At 140 and
100 yards it was necessary to account for wind drift to hit dead center by holding
about 27” and 14” respectively to the left.

Table A1. Brown Bess .75 caliber ballistics*
Range Drop Drift Zero#
(yards) (inches) (inches) Adjust
(inches)
140 -60.99 27.74 33
100 -29.44 14.04 20
75 -16.05 8.06 13
50 -6.85 3.48 6
25 -1.69 1.16 0
*Calculations are based on a velocity of 825 fps,
550 grain round ball, 0.07 ballistic coefficient,
20 mph wind from east (right to left crossing);
#
Zero adjust is the amount the gun must be sighted
above the target to hit it dead center
American Fowler: Fowlers were common firearms used by the militia. The
load consisted of a 317 grain .595 diameter round ball over 60 grains of FFG black
powder and a lubricated 0.010” patch. The nominal muzzle velocity was 925 fps.
TABLE A2 shows drop and hold over amount necessary to hit dead center at each
target distance. The drift was about 27 inches at 140 yards and about 14 inches at
100 yards.

27
Table A2. American fowler ballistics*
(inches)
140 -49.75 27.63 27
100 -23.80 13.94 16
75 -12.97 8.17 10
50 -5.57 3.91 5
25 -1.36 1.27 0
#

Rifle: Two rifles of .32 and .45 calibers were used in the experiment. The .45
caliber rifle was used only at 100 yards. The muzzle velocity for the .45 caliber rifle
was a nominal 1500 fps. It was loaded with a 128 grain 0.440 diameter ball over 70
grains FFFG and lubricated 0.010” patch. The drop at 100 yards is almost 12 inches
and the drift almost 24 inches (TABLE A3). The ballistic data reported for the .32
caliber rifle is

Table A3. .45 caliber longrifle*
(inches)
140 -26.27 43.86 15
100 -11.88 23.94 8
75 -6.07 13.83 5
50 -2.43 6.30 2
25 -0.55 1.62 0
#
calculated at a nominal muzzle velocity of 2000 fps. It was loaded with a 45 grain
0.311 diameter ball over 30 grains of FFFG black powder and a 0.010 lubricated
patch. TABLE A4 shows drop and hold over amount necessary to hit dead center at
each target distance. At 140 yards the drift is 43 inches and at 100 yards almost 22
inches. The flight of the

Table A4. .32 caliber longrifle*
28
(inches)
140 -16.32 43.01 9
100 -7.08 21.54 8
75 -3.52 11.76 3
50 -1.39 5.07 1
25 -0.31 0.041 0
#

ball is more impacted by the wind, because it is much lighter than the musket and
fowler balls. I held dead center at 140 yards. At 100 yards I held a bit to the left to
account for the wind. At 75 yards I held dead center.
The ballistics for the Jacob Man fowler used in the subsequent test are
reported in TABLE A5.

Table A5. Jacob Man .68 caliber ballistics ballistics*
(inches)
140 -52.71 20.46 29
100 -25.33 10.53 18
75 -13.72 6.02 11
50 -5.89 0.178 5
25 -1.44 0.90 0
20 mph wind quartering into the gun from northeast
#

29
Endnotes

1. George Hanger was a British officer who fought in the Revolutionary War .He was one
of the more colorful characters of the 18th century. This statement is often quoted as
evidence of the inaccuracy of the Brown Bess. Because it is so well known,
contemporary 18th century military re-enactors less often cite more specific
documentation on the accuracy of the Brown Bess. For a short biography of Hanger see:
http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/friends/hanger.html
2. G. Hanger, 1808, A letter to … Lord Castlereach…. Online
http://books.google.com/books?id=fycAAAAAQAAJ; p. 78 viewed January 8, 2014
4. For this experiment the redcoats were mounted on separate frames so that they could
be moved and positioned easily. During the November experiment the minutemen stood
in a rank near the boundary of the open field and woods, which permitted a maximum
distance of about 130 yards to the target. The minutemen took cover ten yards in back of
the volley position a few yards into the woods during the May experiment accounting for
the increase to 140 yards of the target.
5. It is generally agreed that many colonial Americans owned and used guns for hunting
and trained regularly as part of the militia. Consider the following: Alexander Rose,
“Marksmanship in 1775: Myth or Reality? (American Rifleman, 5, no. 7 July 2010): 47.
Their ‘unfamiliarity’ with shoulder arms is another baseless myth. The militia’s
arms were treasured tools used every day for hunting and protection. Israel
Litchfield, a Massachusetts militiaman, keenly maintained his musket and
accoutrements. According to his diary, he prepared for the worst on March 10,
1775 when he ‘scoured up my gun’ to clear the fouling in the barrel (from
shooting at targets) before taking it to Hezekiah Hutson, the local gunsmith, to
‘put in a new main-spring into my lock.’
6. Col. George Hanger, Colonel George Hanger’s Advice to All Sportsmen, Farmers, and
Gamekeepers (Printed for the author: Sold by J.J. Stockdale, no.41, Pall-Mall: 1814),
republished by Read Country Book, www.readcountrybooks.com, 189.
Colonel Hanger states four reasons why British soldiers cannot be taught the high degree
of skill with a firearm exhibited by American riflemen and German jaegers. One reason
is:
A British soldier can never be taught to be a perfect judge of different distances.
Place an object, in the shape and size of a man, at 150 yards distant, ask him how
far that object is from him, one will say 100 yards, another will say 200 yards.
Place the same object at 200 yards from him, he most likely, will display more
ignorance respecting what distance the object is from him. Place the same object
at 300 yards, you may as well not ask him the distance at all, for that distance is
totally beyond his scale of judgement.
Estimating distance correctly is the topic of much discussion on hunting, shooting, and
archery websites (see, for example, http://www.biggamehunt.net/articles/judging-distance
and http://www.northamericanwhitetail.com/2011/11/29/bullet-drop-range-estimation/).
All agree that it is critical to making a good shot. Many if not most people are not good at
30

accurately judging distance (see, for example,
http://www.sportsmansblog.com/2006/04/21/can_you_accurat/).
7. The trajectory of the bullet is the path, which forms an arc it takes from the muzzle to
the target.
8. For examples of some of these studies see:
Larry Lyons, Smoothbore musketry, online:
www.scotwars.com/equip_smoothbore_musketry.htm; viewed 2/17/14.
Joseph Seymour, A chart showing the results of a 1779 Woolwich ballistic test (Military
Collector & Historian, vol. 65, no. 4, winter 2013), 373-374.
M. Willegal, The accuracy of black powder muskets, online:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/76363586/The-Accuracy-of-Black-Powder-Muskets-Mike-
Willegal; viewed 2/17/14.
Maj.-Gen. B.P. Hughes, Firepower: Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630-1850
(New York: Sarepon,1974, 1997).
9. N.A. Roberts, J.W. Brown, B. Hammett, and P.D.F. Kingston, A detailed study of the
effectiveness and capabilities of 18th century musketry on the battlefield (Journal of
Conflict Archaeology, 4 (1-2), 2008), 1-21.
10. M. Willegal, The accuracy of black powder muskets, online:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/76363586/The-Accuracy-of-Black-Powder-Muskets-Mike-
Willegal, 8.
11. Larry Lyons, Smoothbore musketry, online:
www.scotwars.com/equip_smoothbore_musketry.htm; 6.
Lyons does not define “effectiveness” I presume he means hits on target, which in this
case would be a front of soldiers.
T.P. Savas and J.D. Dameron, A Guide to the Battles of the American Revolution (New
York and California: Savas Baetie, 2006)
I derived casualty rates for selected battles from statistics reported in Savas and Dameron.
The percentages have a high degree of uncertainty as among other factors missing and
captured are not included in the calculations.
Lexington and Concord and Retreat to Charlestown, p. 1-6: British 14% (total of 247 out
of 1700); American 90 casualties (percentage difficult to estimate because of unknown
total number of militia).
White Plains, p. 76-81: British 2%; American between 3% and 10%.
Bennington (Battle of Saratoga), 108-113: British 14%; American 5%.
Brandywine, p. 113-120: British 3%; American 6%.
Monmouth Courthouse, p. 170-178: British 3%; Americans 2% (several tens on both
sides died of heatstroke, which is not included in the casualty calculation).
Cowpens. p. 276-282: British 28%; American 7% (the Americans employed riflemen,
militia, and Continentals).
Guilford Courthouse, p. 286-292: British 24%; Americans 6% (it must be noted that over
1,000 North Carolina militia when charged left the field and did not return; this may have
contributed to the low American casualty rate).
12. N.A. Roberts, J.W. Brown, B. Hammett, and P.D.F. Kingston, A detailed study of the
effectiveness and capabilities of 18th century musketry on the battlefield (Journal of
Conflict Archaeology, 4 (1-2), 2008), 20.
31

13. Colonel Hanger’s statement does not address the effectiveness of volley fire on ranks
at distances of 150 and 200 yards. He asserts that an individual purposefully aimed at
those distances would be hit essentially by chance.
13
. De Witt Bailey, Small Arms Of The British Forces In America 1664–1815
(Woonsocket, RI: Andrew Mowbray Incorporated Publishing, 2009), 247. There are no
combat data known to me that support Colonel LaFausille’s assumption that the results
obtained by his soldiers at 300 yards would “thin an enemy considerably” at 200 and 150
yards. Pure chance might result in eight or ten balls hitting the 2½-foot diameter target at
three hundred yards. Given the known inaccuracy of a smoothbore military musket firing
a greatly undersize ball relative to its bore at hits on a target at three hundred yards is not
owing to the skill of the marksmen, but to chance. It’s curious why Colonel Lafausille
would have his men practice firing at a target three hundred yards distant especially when
such open unobstructed space was not common in North America. Credible accounts
during the French and Indian War indicate that firing began at much closer distances.
Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in The Americas, 1755–1763
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 249:
For example, eye-witnesses agree that the volleys which staggered Montcalm’s
advance at Quebec were administered at 40 yards. Four years earlier, Wolfe had
himself recommended that troops attacked by column should reserve their fire
until the enemy was ‘within about twenty yards’: at that range fire delivered ‘with
a good aim’ would—he added with some understatement—‘necessarily stop them
a little.’
15. Some examples:
J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: the Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2000)
De Witt Bailey, Small Arms of the British Forces in America 1664-1815 (Andrew
Mowbray Incorporated Publishering. Woonsocket, R.I.: 2009); see especially Chapter 19
British Army Marksmanship.
Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British soldier and war in Americas, 1755-1763
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); see especially Chapter
7.
Maj.-Gen. B.P. Hughes, Firepower: weapons effectiveness on the battlefield, 1630-1850
(New York: Sarepon, 1974, 1997).
Alexander Rose, “Marksmanship in 1775: Myth or Reality? (American Rifleman, 5, no.
7, July 2010): 44.
This article provides context and background on marksmanship at the time of the
Revolutionary War. It focuses on the American militia.
Alexander Rose, American rifle: a biography (New York: Delta Trade Publications,
2009)
D.N. Hagist, The aim of British soldiers, online:
http://allthingsliberty.com/category/shorts/mythbuster/; viewed February 2014
16. Exceptions include: the fighting style of the American militia and Provincial army
that developed from fighting Indians for over century, which was to fight from cover and
fire independently at individual targets; the greater familiarity of Americans with
firearms in general; and lack of discipline fighting in linear formation. The American
32

army resembled the discipline and tactics of the British army to a great degree after
training introduced by General von Steuben in 1777.
17. J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: the Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2000), 262,263.
Virtually all the eighteenth-century … drill books stressed the importance of at
least some target practice … but before 1786 it was only in wartime that this
aspect of training could be pursued to any advantage…. In 1779 a battalion of the
excellent Northfolk Militia standing on three ranks, fired two volleys at a target
70 yards distant and measuring about 2’x80’, supported on poles. Firing 632
shots, the battalion scored 126 hits, for a score of 20 percent … the Norfolk’s
colonel thought these results were proof that his men shot very well.
Clarendon Press, 2000), 279-280.
’Any commander that desires His Men to hold up their Heads when they fire …
was never a Marksman himself; and in such Case, you may set Blind Men at
Fireing as a Man that can see.’
Houlding further states:
The directions on ‘presenting’, in all of the regulations, were no more specific
than the plates; at best (as in the 1764 Regulations) they offered simple and
unsatisfactory descriptions.
The Manual Exercise as ordered by His Majesty in the Year 1764. Together with plans
and explanations of the method generally practiced at reviews and field-days (sold by J.
Humphreys, R. Bell, and R. Aitken,
Philadelphia: MDCCLXXVI), B2.
Bring the firelock briefly down to the present, by extending the left Arm to the
full Length, with a strong Motion; at the same Time spring up the butt by the
Cock with the right Hand, and raise up the Butt so high upon the right Shoulder,
that you may not be obliged to stoop too much with the head, the right Cheek to
be close to the butt, and the left Eye shut, and look along the Barrel with the right
Eye from the Breech Pin to the Muzzle….
W. Windham and G. Townshend, A plan of discipline, composed for the use of the militia
of the county of Norfolk (Printed for J. Shuckburgh, as the Sun, next Richard’s Coffee-
House, Fleet-Street, London: MDCCLX (1760); reprinted by Kessinger Publishing’s
Legacy Reprints, 19.
Bring down the muzzle of your piece with both hands, flipping your left hand
forward, as far as the swell of the stock by the tail pipe, and place the butt-end in
the hollow betwixt your right breast and shoulder, pressing it clost to you; at the
same time take your right thumb from the cock, placing your fore finger on the
trigger, both arms close to your body, taking a good aim by leaning the head to
the right, and looking along the barrel.
Plate 31 referred to in the instructions above shows the soldier with his head erect off the
comb of the stock (see text figure 6). It’s of interest that Plate 1 in the Errata label what
we call today the bayonet lug the sight.
W. Windham and G. Townshend, A plan of discipline, composed for the use of the militia
of the county of Norfolk (Printed for J. Shuckburgh, as the Sun, next Richard’s Coffee-
33

House, Fleet-Street, London: MDCCLX (1760); reprinted by Kessinger Publishing’s
Legacy Reprints, 115.
… the front rank taking care to level horizontally, and the rear ranks to sink their
muzzles a little, the butt resting even with the shoulder; and the men must sink
their heads a little, in order take a better aim, and look boldly into their fire.
Frederick William Baron von Steuben, Baron von Steuben’s Revolutionary War drill
manual: a facsimile of the 1794 edition (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1985), 17.
Take Aim! One motion. Step back about six inches with the right foot, bring the
left toe to the front; at the same time drop the muzzle, and bring up the butt-end of
the firelock against your right shoulder; place the left hand forward of the swell of
the stock, and the fore-finger of the right hand before the trigger; sinking the
muzzle a little below a level, and with the right eye looking along the barrel.
An instruction to put the cheek “close” to the butt is not the same as to “place” the cheek
on the butt nor, of course, is “leaning the head”. This is not a matter of semantics; it is
matter of technique, which directly affects the accuracy obtained by the shooter. What is
close? Is it within a quarter inch, within half an inch, within an inch, etc.? To consistently
hit where one is aiming, it is critical that the head be positioned consistently on the stock.
This is especially true for firearms that lack a rear sight, as the eye becomes the rear
sight. One can understand that an instruction to put the check “close” to the stock might
be confusing when combined with plates illustrating soldiers with their heads erect and
cheek off the butt stock. Officers desiring improved marksmanship had to instruct the
men to press their cheek against the comb and aim along the barrel using the bayonet lug
as a sight. Many battle accounts remark on how often shots went high. A target will be
invariably missed high when one holds his head above the stock. Perhaps this was a
factor on the battlefield. Parenthetically, on a personal note, my biggest flaw when
shooting a shotgun is lifting my head off the stock, which causes a miss high. I was not
aware I was doing it and would not believe I did it until shown a videotape of myself.
M. de Marolles, An essay on shooting. Containing the various methods of forging,
boring, and dressing gun barrels…also instructions for attaining the art of
shooting…(Printed for T. Cadell, in the Strand, London, 1789; Gale ECCO print edition),
197.
Marolles devotes an entire chapter to how the sportsman should shoulder his fowling
piece and aim. He notes the importance of the dimensions of the stock for fitting persons
of different sizes and how the dimensions influence “…the act of lowering his head to
that place on the stock at which his cheek should rest, in taking aim….”
The statement clearly indicates that the cheek is placed on the stock. The explicit and
lengthy instructions by Marolles are in contrast to the ambiguous and short descriptions
in the military manuals of the same period. Although Marolles is talking about fowling
pieces and not muskets, the same principles of good gun mount apply.
19. .A. Houlding, Fit for Service: the Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2000), 280.
The value of target practice with ball ammunition was sometime stressed—
although marksmanship was not necessarily the priority. Thus the lieutenant-
colonel of one battalion said ‘firing ball at objects teaches the soldiers to level
34

incomparably, makes recruits steady, and removes the foolish apprehension that
seizes young soldiers when they first load their arms with bulletts.’
Evidently, however, instruction in marksmanship continued to be lax.
As late as 1807 the wise John Macdonald, in his annotated translation of Conduct
of Infantry on Actual Service, penned a fifty-page critique of the current British
regulations, calling among other things (I, p. lviii) for the addition of a good
section on target shooting.
Because shooting at marks was practiced upon occasion, one cannot presume that the
British soldiers automatically took careful aim when volley firing in combat; it shouldn’t
need to be said that shooting at targets is worlds apart from firing in combat. Moreover,
we cannot know if the soldier aimed deliberately at an individual or pointed (“leveled”
his firelock) at the rank across from him; that is we cannot know to what degree of
precision he took aim.
20. Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British soldier and war in Americas, 1755-1763
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 247.
21. Ibid, 248.

22. http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mgw:1:./temp/~ammem_4mVi::
General Washington’s general orders, Thursday August 31, 1780:
Till the Corps of rifle men are properly equip'd they are to take post on the right
of the first line and will practice firing at a Mark between the Hours of four and
Six in the afternoon till their rifles are in order for real service.
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw240382))
General Washington general orders, Sunday, June 16, 1782:
The General in the mean time is pleased to declare that some of the Manoevers
were yesterday performed with precision, but he is sorry to find Notwithstanding
the recomendation contained in the order of the 8th. instant that the men of the
Light Companies do not take so good aim as he expected; he hopes by great
attention and frequent practice so useful a habit will soon be acquired.
General Washington’s general orders, Tuesday, June 18, 1782
In the course of the Exercises the Officers are permitted to vary the manoevres as
time, circumstances and inclination may prompt: provided they do not deviate
from the established principles, but in all cases the General intreats the Officers to
pay the most minute attention to the soldiers method of priming and loading as
well as of levelling and taking aim, this is an article of the greatest consequence,
he hopes therefore that the utmost pains may be taken to instruct every individual
in this essential part of his professions.
Narratives of the French & Indian War, Orderly book and journal of Major John Hawkes
on the Ticonderoga-Crown Point campaign (Leonaur, Ltd.:2008).
There are numerous references of Provincial soldiers practicing at mark during the
French and Indian War, for example:
All the men returned by the Provincial regiments not to be marksmen, are to
assemble tomorrow morning in the front of their regiment. They will march to the
left to the ground where the Massachusetts fired this evening and will fire five
35

rounds a man; Major [Robert] Rogers will take care the ground in front is clear.
Officers of each regiment to attend to see the men level well (162).
This detachment likewise; the reserved men of the Provincials that marched into
camp this day are to fire two rounds of ball tomorrow morning at 6 o’clock at the
place where the Provincials fired this day (183).
23. Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British soldier and war in Americas, 1755-1763
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 248.
24. Ibid. 248.
25. Maj.-Gen. B.P. Hughes, Firepower: weapons effectiveness on the battlefield, 1630-
1850 (New York: Sarepon, 1974, 1997), 26, 27.
26. Ibid, 29.
27. Ibid, 29.
28. De Witt Bailey, Small Arms of the British Forces in America 1664-1815 (Andrew
Mowbray Incorporated Publishering. Woonsocket, R.I.: 2009), 273-277.
29. Ibid, 277.
30. Ibid, 277.
31. As Americans developed their own drill manuals the phrase “take sight” was used to
clarify ‘present’ making it explicit the soldier was to aim when commanded ‘present’.
General Washington commenting on Baron von Steuben’s draft manual of arms in reply
to the Baron
February 26, 1779:
The word of command take sight is to be universally used instead of present.
Timothy Pickering, An easy plan of discipline for a militia. By Timothy Pickering, Jun.
[three lines from treatise on militia, by C.S.] (Printed by Samuel and Ebenezer Hall:
Salem, New-England, 1775); Eighteenth Century Collections Online Print Edition, 21.
Although Pickering does not replace ‘present’ with ‘aim’ his description of the motion to
present leaves no doubt that he is instructing to aim:
… lean the right cheek against the butt of the firelock, shut the left eye, and look
with the right along the barrel, from breech-pin to the sight near the muzzle; or, in
three words (to use the well known phrase) take a good sight.
Frederick William Baron von Steuben, Baron von Steuben’s Revolutionary War Drill
Manual (a facsimile reprint of the 1794 edition, New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1985), 17.
Take Aim!
‘Aim’ replaced ‘present’ in the manual exercise.
32. Joseph Plumb Martin, A narrative of a Revolutionary soldier: some of the adventures,
dangers, and sufferings of Joseph Plumb Martin (New York: Signet Classic, 2001), 113.
36

During the campaign of 1778 Joseph Plumb Martin, a Continental Army soldier,
described an encounter with British troops:
When within about five rods of the rear of the retreating foe, I could distinguish
everything about them, they were retreating in line , though is some disorder; I
singled out a man and took my aim directly between his shoulders, (they were
divested of their packs,) he was a good mark, being a broad shouldered fellow;
what became of him I know not, the fire and smoke hid him from my sight; one
thing I know, that is, I took a deliberate aim at him as ever I did at game in my
life. But after all, I hope I did not kill him, although I intended to at the time.
33. Chris Batha, Do-it-yourself gunfitting (Shooting Sportsman, the magazine of
wingshooting & fine guns, July/August 2014).
34. This hollowed out portion of the stock permitted the eye to better align with the axis
of the bore without having to tilt the head excessively to the side; it enabled better
aiming. The same was accomplished in American longrifles by bending the stock away
from the axis of the bore. This is called ‘cast.’ Bending the stock to the right of the axis
is cast-off and to the left cast-on. Cast is particularly important for guns without a rear
sight such as shotguns. Production firearms today are not made with cast, because it is
unknown if the purchaser is right of left-handed. The eye of a left-handed shooter using a
gun with cast-off would be pushed away from the axis of the bore; it would be a serious
disadvantage. Expensive production and custom shotguns are made with cast fitted to the
individual shooter.
35. Col. George Hanger, Colonel George Hanger’s Advice to All Sportsmen, Farmers,
and Gamekeepers (Printed for the author: Sold by J.J. Stockdale, no.41, Pall-Mall: 1814),
republished by Read Country Book, www.readcountrybooks.com
I am not going to relate any thing respecting the American war; but to mention
one instance, as proof of most excellent skill of an American rifleman. If a man
shew (sic) me an instance of better shooting, I will stand corrected (122).
Now speaking of this rifleman’s shooting … he can take a more perfect aim
(124).
I have often asked American riflemen, what was the most they thought they could
do with a rifle? They have replied, that they thought they were generally sure of
splitting a man’s head at two hundred yards, for so they termed their hitting the
head (144).
The section “Plan for a new corps” (185-226) is very interesting reading on the
effectiveness of rifles and Colonel Hanger’s thoughts on the development of a new rifle
gun.
Colonel Hanger notes that American rifleman and German jaegers are expert at judging
distance and this is one reason they are so accurate and efficient with their rifles (189).
He states it is not possible,
to train a common British soldier to shoot with the same degree of precision as a
German jäger will do, or an American back-woodsman, although he my be made a
very formidable marksman before an enemy (189).
He gives four reasons (189-195) the first, which is most relevant to the experiments
conducted in this essay is:
37

A British soldier can never be taught to be a perfect judge of different distances.
Place an object, in the shape and size of a man, at 150 yards distant, ask him how
far that object is from him, one will say 100 yards, another may say 200 yards.
Place the same object at 200 yards from him, he, most likely, will display more
ignorance respecting what distance the object is from him (189-190).
36. Regulations for the exercise of riflemen and light infantry, and the instructions for
their conduct in the field (Printed fro the War-Office, by T. Egerton, at the military
library, near Whitehall, London: MDCCXCIX), chapter II section 2 and 3.
Instructions for executing the command ‘Present’; the rifleman is told to aim and fire
when ready:
THE soldier half faces to the right, the butt is placed in the hollow of the right
shoulder, the right foot steps back about eighteen inches behind the left, the left
knee is bent, the body brought well forward, the left hand without having quitted
his hold, supports the rifle close before the lock, the right elbow raised even with
the shoulder, the fore finger on the trigger, the head bent and cheek resting on that
of the rifle, the left eye shut, the right taking aim through the sight;as soon as the
rifleman has fixed upon his object,he fires without waiting for any command.
When he has fired the right hand quits its hold in facing to the right about, the left
swings the rifle round into an horizontal position with the barrel downwards;
rifleman resumes his post in the platoon, in fronting to the left about, brings his
rifle into the to prime and load, half cocks and proceeds to load, going through the
motions as above without further words of command.
…To this end the rifle recruit must from the first in addition to his other exercise
be constantly practised in firing at the target. In firing at a mark it is to be
observed that the target should be at least five feet in diameter; for if were smaller
the unpractised recruit would be apt miss so often as to despair of hitting it; and to
become expert, a man should find encouragement, and even amusement in this
practice. Another disadvantage in its being too small would be, that the rifleman
could not become acquainted with his rifle, as in missing the target altogether, he
could not ascertain whether he had shot too much to the right, or too much to the
left; whereas a target of a proper size, and painted in circles, being easily hit, the
rifleman sees at once the fault he has made, and learns correct it The rifle recruit
must at first: be taught fire at the target without a rest, for if he accustoms himself
to make use of a support he, will rarely fire true without one; but as this method
will at first be found difficult, and only rendered easy by practice, he should begin
by firing at the distance of fifty yards, and increase it by degrees to three hundred.
37. For a comparison to today’s standards consider that hi-power rifle competition is not
shot as close as 50 yards today; 100 yards is the closest distance for sanctioned events.
The diameter of the lowest scoring circle (5 ring) of the official National Rifle
Association target at that distance is 18.5 inches; hits outside the black scoring circle (9
ring) of 6.35” would be considered bad misses by expert riflemen. Indeed, experts would
be scoring consistently within the 10 ring that is 3.35” in diameter.
38. Major John Hawks, Orderly book & journal [Ft. Ticonderoga-Crown Point campaign
1759-1760] (Narratives of the French & Indian War, Leonaur: 2008)
38

In the time period from 9 May, 1759 to 8 September, 1760 Major Hawks noted seven
occurrences when the soldiers were ordered to practice at marks (162, 179, 181, 183, 185,
202, 226). Two occurrences are cited below:
All the men returned by the Provincial regiments not to be marksmen, are to
assemble tomorrow morning in front of their regiment. They will then march to
the left to the ground where the Massachusetts fired this evening and will fire five
rounds a man: Major [Robert] Rogers will take care the grounds in front is clear.
Officers of each regiment to attend to see that the men level well (162).
The recruits and awkward [squads] of the regulars to practice with powder and
ball at a mark as often as the commanding officer of corps thinks it fit between the
hours of 5 and 8 in the morning. They may likewise practice the battalions at
marks not exceeding twelve rounds per month till further orders (226).
Captain Samuel Jenks, Journal of the campaign in 1760, (Narratives of the French &
Indian War 2, Leonaur: 2008)
From 22 May, 1760 to 26 November, 1760 Captain Jenks mentions shooting at marks on
three occasions (72, 73). One example:
Today the train are practicing their mortars in throwing shells, and our troops
have drawn six rounds per man in order to fire at a mark (72).
Clarendon Press, 2000), 262, 263.
40. Consider the following:
Frederick MacKenzie, edited by Allen French, A British fusilier in Revolutionary Boston,
being the diary of Lieutenant Frederick MacKenzie, adjutant of the Royal Welch
Fusiliers, January 5 – April 30, 1775 with a letter describing his voyage to America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), ix
He was a lieutenant and adjutant, and his duties were exacting. His record of facts
has a soldierly precision. Day after day passes with no entry except the date, but
when he does write he is sure to give in a clear and direct way information that is
of value.
Given this observation in the introduction by French, what is one to make of
MacKenzie’s entry 15 January, 1775? Is “The Regiments are frequently practiced at
firing with ball at marks” a daily discipline or a less common occurrence, although
frequent?
The Regiments are frequently practiced at firing with ball at marks. Six rounds pr
man at each time is usually allotted for this practice. As our Regiment is quartered
on a Wharf which projects into part of the harbor, and there is a very considerable
range without any obstruction, we have fixed figures of men as large as life, made
of thin boards, on small stages, which are anchored at a proper distance from the
end of the Wharf, at which the men fire. Objects afloat, which move up and down
with the tide, are frequently pointed out for them to fire at, and Premiums are
sometimes given for the best Shots, by which means some of our men have
become excellent marksmen.
It would have been clarifying if MacKenzie started specifically how often the men
practiced.
39

41. Sergeant David Holden, The diary of David Holden (Narratives of the French &
Indian War 2, Leonaur: 2008)
About a dozen entries from 20 February to 29 November 1760 by Sergeant Holden are
simply: “Nothing remarkable” (20) or similar words. Of course, this may just be his style
and what he considers unremarkable someone else may not. It is illustrative, however, of
my point.
42. Daniel O’Connell, Live fire volley experiment (Smoke & Fire News, August 2011),
11,12.
A pdf of the article can be obtained by contacting the editor Smoke & Fire News
Also cited in Tim J. Todish, Myths, truths, & half-truths explained: a look at training
with, and the use, care, and capabilities of, military firearms in colonial and revolutionary
America Part III (Muzzleloader, March/April 2014), 67, 68.
43. It’s important to note that smoothbore muskets can be very accurate at distances
under 100 yards. In part accuracy is a function of the charge—bullet, patch, lube, and
powder combination. Target shooters and hunters work up optimum loads to obtain the
best accuracy at a given distance. I use the term “inherent inaccuracy” as a descriptor of a
military musket loaded with a greatly undersize ball relative to its bore, which inherently
would have a negative impact on accuracy. In the case of our volley firing, even though
we used a ball/patch combination appropriate for the caliber we did not work up an
optimum load. In this experiment we were not concerned about optimizing loads for
accuracy but rather simulating 18th century
military musketry.
44. Larry Lyons, Smoothbore musketry, online:
www.scotwars.com/equip_smoothbore_musketry.htm; 4.
“It appears that the accuracy is inversely proportional to the distance. In other words, the
accuracy at range R is double that of Range 2R, or double the range and cause ½ as many
casualties.”
45. Herman Karl and George Morrison, Do dimples make a difference? (Muzzleloader, in
press).
I tested the accuracy of a .68 caliber smoothbore fowler under controlled conditions
shooting from a bench with the gun rested on sand bags. Square cut 0.010" thick patches
lubed with liquid Wonder Lube and 0.662" diameter balls were loaded over 60 grains
FFG for all trials. At 100 yards the balls grouped into 16" x 33 1/4" horizontal by
vertical. This accuracy could be improved by working up the optimum load.
46. The wind speed was estimated based on the Beaufort Scale by observing the motion
of trees and leaves.
47. An expert marksman would account for bullet drop and wind drift using ‘Kentucky
windage’—that is aiming at a point that would put the bullet on the target. This requires
much experience and practice. American riflemen would be practiced in this technique,
but it is highly doubtful that either militia soldiers or regular troops would have
developed such expertise.
47
The redcoats extend only to the knees and have no lower leg for a simple reason—I made the target from
a single 4x8 sheet of plywood. Because the test was not rigorous in either a scientific or statistical sense,
omitting the lower two feet would have little or no significant effect on our cursory observations. Our
surprise at the poor results at 75 yards probably owes more to our expectation than the actual results. We
expected better accuracy for two reasons: 1) the soldiers were shooting from rests and could take more
40

accurate aim and 2) they were shooting for a prize, which would cause them to take more care in aiming.
Actually this latter point may principally account for the results. Good marksmanship requires careful
trigger control. That is the trigger should be “squeezed” until the shot breaks (fires) and not pulled abruptly
(yanked or jerked) when the sights align with the target.. The tendency of novices is to yank the trigger
when the sights align with the target, which pulls the gun away from the point of aim and invariably results
in an erratic miss. So few shots were fired in volley and independent fire experiments that a robust
interpretation of the difference of results is not possible. The difference may be within the uncertainty
associated with such non-rigorous tests.
48
“The General expects that all Soldiers, who are intrusted with the defence of any work, will behave with
great coolness and bravery, and will be particularly careful not to throw away their fire--he recommends to
them to load for their first fire, with one musket ball and four or eight buck Shot, according to the size and
strenght of their pieces; if the enemy is received with such a fire at not more than twenty or thirty yards
distance, he has no doubt of their being repulsed.”
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw140290))“
Sir: I [Gen. Washington] must request the Board to give orders to have a considerable number of Cartridges
made up with Buck Shott and Ball, indeed it might not be amiss to have all from this time made up in that
manner.”
Gen. Washington’s order: Cambridge, April 3, 1776.“In loading the Teams at Cambridge, you will take
particular Care, to direct the Stores and Ammunition that will be first in Demand at the general
Rendezvous, to be first sent forward; such as, the fixed Ammunition, the Powder, Musquet Ball, Buck
Shot….”
50. The results of another experiment with the Jacob Man fowler suggest that having a
defined reference point at which to aim contributes significantly to accuracy. As reported
in Karl and Morrison, Do dimples make a difference? (Muzzleloader, in press) ten shots
grouped into 16” x 33 ¼” horzontal by vertical at 100 yards; all shots would have struck a
redcoat with many being mortal. The test was more controlled than that in May as I shot
with the gun rested on sand bags on a bench and aimed at a large bullseye target. Had the
Lincoln minutemen a specific point at which to aim when firing at the 140, 130, and 100
yard targets their hits on target might have increased. The temperature was in the low 40s
and a strong wind, comparable to that in May, was blowing into the gun. In the article we
report on other tests at 25 and 50 yards.
51. The results of the buck and ball test provide some indication as to the influence of the
skill of the shooter. I did the testing with a custom made replica of a fowler carried at
Concord and subsequent battles by Jacob Man, a Massachusetts militiaman. I have fired
this fowler many times and so am practiced with it. I fired two shots at 50 and 25 yards.
Both balls at each distance hit the target. I have also consistently hit targets similar in size
to the redcoats at 100 yards. This gun and load have proven to be accurate. Compare this
to the results of the expert marksmen of the King's 8th using undersize balls and Brown
Bess muskets; they faired no better than the unskilled Lincoln minutemen. Both
components of the "shooter/firearm system" contribute to the effectiveness of fire.
52. The Third Bristol County Militia Regiment wanted their men to have the following at
muster: "... a pouch containing a cartridge box that will hold fifteen rounds of cartridges
at least, a hundred of buckshot, ...one pound of powder, forty leaden balls fitted to his
gun...." (Continental Journal and weekly adviser, January 22, 1778).
53. Regulations for the exercise of riflemen and light infantry, and the instructions for
their conduct in the field (Printed fro the War-Office, by T. Egerton, at the military
library, near Whitehall, London: MDCCXCIX), chapter II section 2 and 3.
41

The above regulations for firing with cartridge will only be applicable when a
corps of riflemen is required to act in close order, an instance which will very
seldom occur, provided this arm is put to its proper use, and officers observe in all
cases where riflemen act as such, and whenever it is practicable, their men are to
load with the powder measure and loose ball; the principal instructions there fore
for recruits, will be how to load with loose ball, and to fire at the target, the
loading with cartridge is a secondary objective. … The rifleman must be made
acquainted with the nature of the sights and aim of the rifle; he must be taught to
use the plaster (i.e. a piece of greased leather or rag) in loading with a loose ball,
and how to force it down the barrel….
54. Lawrence E. Babits, A Devil of a Whipping: the Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill &
London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
42

Live Fire Discipline of A Minuteman Company

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Live Fire Discipline of a Minuteman Company

Lincoln Minute Men soldiers

Results and Observations

Figure 11. Minutemen firing on command “fire!”

clearly support Colonel Hangar’s assertion. Hitting a human-size target purposefully

Table 2. Location of hits at different distances

Yards Location of Hits

Table 3. Results of King’s 8th

Independent firing from cover

Figure 15. Redcoats at 25 yards for comparison at 140 yards.

Table 4. Statistical results of musket and fowler independent firing

Table 5. Statistical results of musket and fowler independent firing

Hits on target redcoat 1 1 2 8

As a comparison to the accuracy and effectiveness of smoothbore muskets, I fired

Table 6. Results with .32 and .45 caliber rifles

Table 7. Results of subsequent test with Jacob Man fowler

About the author

27. Ibid, 29.

30. Ibid, 277.

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