TRANSPORTATION LAW-CADC

DEFINITIONS; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

service on a regular or scheduled basis and one

offering such service on an occasional, episodic
or unscheduled basis; neither does it distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the
general population.

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons,

corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the
public.

IMPORTANT!!!

ELEMENTS OF COMMON CARRIER OPEN FOR

DISCUSSION:

Burden of proof upon the one who alleges the

other is a common carrier

(1) Persons, corporations, associations or firms

(2) Engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting

DE GUZMAN VS CA
FACTS:Upon gathering sufficient quantities of
such scrap material, respondent would bring such
material to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2)
six-wheeler trucks which he owned for hauling
the material to Manila. On the return trip to
Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles
with cargo which various merchants wanted to be
delivered
to
differing
establishments
in
Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged
freight rates which were commonly lower than
regular commercial rates.

(3) For compensation

(4) Publicthe same public term employed in
public utilities
PERSONS, CORPORATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS,
OR FIRMS, WHAT DOES IT ENTAIL?
Important for suability
PUBLIC, WHAT DOES IT MEANS

On the relevant date, he was contracted for the

shipping of packaged milk but these did not make
it to their destination for the trucks were hijacked
on the road. Consequently, petitioner sought
recovery of the value of the milk, interest,
damages amongst others. He alleged that being
a common carrier, respondent should have
exercised extraordinary diligence.

Engenders the same notion with public

utilitiesNot confined to privileged individuals,
but is open to the indefinite public
Doesnt have to make reference to all the
people in a given population as long as the offer
to provide the service is made indiscriminately
whether to a certain section of the population or
the whole populace

HELD:The above article makes no distinction

between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article
1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a
carrier offering its services to the "general
public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the
general population.

One of the tests: public may enjoy it by right

or only by permission? It is connected with
the conduct of offering (see US v. Tan Piaco) or
mode of doing it
FOR COMPENSATION, MEANING
When he holds himself to the public as he
holds business for compensation and not for free
ENGAGED IN CARRYING OR TRANSPORTING,
MEANING.
De Guzman v. Court of Appeals: no distinction
between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity; avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation

So understood, the concept of "common carrier"

under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide
neatly with the notion of "public service," under
the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No.
1416, as amended) which at least partially

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supplements the law on common carriers set

forth in the Civil Code.

another. The two parties entered into a charter

party which included some agreements regarding
inspection, loading/unloading, among other
concerns. When the shipment arrived and
petitioner had it surveyed, it was discovered
there was deficiency and that some were
contaminated with dirt. Planters filed a complaint
consequently with the resident agent of KKKK,
the ship owner. The respondent denies liability on
the ground that provisions on common carriers
isnt applicable as they have become private
carriers through the operation of the charter
party.

It appears to the Court that private respondent is

properly characterized as a common carrier even
though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other
merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such back-hauling was done on a periodic or
occasional rather than regular or scheduled
manner, and even though private respondent's
principal occupation was not the carriage of
goods for others. There is no dispute that private
respondent charged his customers a fee for
hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below
commercial freight rates is not relevant here.
Absent any CPCN, a certificate of public
convenience is not a requisite for the
incurring of liability under the Civil Code
provisions governing common carriers. That
liability arises the moment a person or firm
acts as a common carrier, without regard to
whether or not such carrier has also
complied with the requirements of the
applicable
regulatory
statute
and
implementing regulations and has been
granted a certificate of public convenience
or other franchise. To exempt private
respondent from the liabilities of a common
carrier because he has not secured the necessary
certificate of public convenience, would be
offensive to sound public policy; that would be to
reward private respondent precisely for failing to
comply with applicable statutory requirements.
The business of a common carrier impinges
directly and intimately upon the safety and well
being and property of those members of the
general community who happen to deal with such
carrier. The law imposes duties and liabilities
upon common carriers for the safety and
protection of those who utilize their services and
the law cannot allow a common carrier to render
such duties and liabilities merely facultative by
simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and
authorizations.

HELD:
A "charter-party" is defined as a contract by
which an entire ship, or some principal part
thereof, is let by the owner to another
person for a specified time or use; a contract
of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or
other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a
merchant or other person for the conveyance of
goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of
the payment of freight. Charter parties are of two
types: (a) contract of affreightment which
involves the use of shipping space on vessels
leased by the owner in part or as a whole, to
carry goods for others; and, (b) charter by
demise or bareboat charter, by the terms of
which the whole vessel is let to the charterer with
a transfer to him of its entire command and
possession and consequent control over its
navigation, including the master and the crew,
who are his servants. Contract of affreightment
may either be time charter, wherein the vessel
is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of
time, or voyage charter, wherein the ship is
leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the
charter-party provides for the hire of vessel only,
either for a determinate period of time or for a
single or consecutive voyage, the shipowner to
supply the ship's stores, pay for the wages of the
master and the crew, and defray the expenses for
the maintenance of the ship.

Note: the court was wrong when it rendered

Cendana as a common carrier. It was wrong also
for the court to rely on article 1745 since this
provision provides for prohibited stipulations.

Upon the other hand, the term "common or public

carrier" is defined in Art. 1732 of the Civil Code.
The definition extends to carriers either by land,
air or water which hold themselves out as ready
to engage in carrying goods or transporting
passengers or both for compensation as a public
employment and not as a casual occupation. The
distinction between a "common or public
carrier" and a "private or special carrier"
lies in the character of the business, such
that if the undertaking is a single

PLANTERS VS CA
FACTS:Petitioner
ordered
from
Mitsubishi
International urea fertilizer. The latter in turn
shipped the same through a vessel owned by

TRANSPORTATION LAW-CADC
transaction, not a part of the general
business or occupation, although involving
the carriage of goods for a fee, the person
or corporation offering such service is a
private carrier.

FABRE VS CA
FACTS:Petitioners were the owners of a minibus
which they used as school service for students,
mostly those who studied in St. Scholastica
Manila. They employed a driver who drove the
minibus in its school services. On a relevant date,
WWCF hired the services of the petitioners for
transportation from and back to Manila, going to
La Union. The bus left late and since one of the
roads to be passed through was under repair, a
different route was taken by petitioner driver. And
since he was unfamiliar with the route he was
taking, and the road being slippery due to the
rains, he wasnt able to notice a sharp curve till it
was too late. This resulted to numerous injuries to
his passengers and likewise, to the vehicle.

Article 1733 of the New Civil Code mandates that

common carriers, by reason of the nature of their
business, should observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods they carry. In the
case of private carriers, however, the exercise of
ordinary diligence in the carriage of goods will
suffice. Moreover, in the case of loss, destruction
or deterioration of the goods, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, and the burden of proving
otherwise rests on them. On the contrary, no
such presumption applies to private carriers, for
whosoever alleges damage to or deterioration of
the goods carried has the onus of proving that
the cause was the negligence of the carrier.

HELD:Petitioners argue that they are not liable

because (1) an earlier departure (made
impossible by the congregation's delayed
meeting) could have a averted the mishap and
(2) under the contract, the WWCF was directly
responsible for the conduct of the trip. Neither of
these contentions hold water. The hour of
departure had not been fixed. Even if it had been,
the delay did not bear directly on the cause of the
accident. With respect to the second contention,
it was held in an early case that:

It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the

ordinary course of business, operates as a
common
carrier,
transporting
goods
indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner
chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship
captain, its officers and compliment were under
the employ of the shipowner and therefore
continued to be under its direct supervision and
control. Hardly then can we charge the charterer,
a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the
duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer
did not have any control of the means in doing
so. This is evident in the present case considering
that the steering of the ship, the manning of the
decks, the determination of the course of the
voyage and other technical incidents of maritime
navigation were all consigned to the officers and
crew who were screened, chosen and hired by the
shipowner.

[A] person who hires a public automobile and

gives the driver directions as to the place to
which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no
other control over the conduct of the driver, is not
responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or
prevented from recovering for injuries suffered
from a collision between the auomobile and a
train, caused by the negligence or the automobile
driver.
As already stated, this case actually involves a
contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did
not have to be engaged in the business of public
transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code
on common carriers to apply to them.

It is therefore imperative that a public

carrier
shall
remain
as
such,
notwithstanding the charter of the whole or
portion of a vessel by one or more persons,
provided the charter is limited to the ship
only, as in the case of a time-charter or
voyage-charter. It is only when the charter
includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a
bareboat or demise that a common carrier
becomes private, at least insofar as the particular
voyage covering the charter-party is concerned.
Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage
charter retains possession and control of the ship,
although her holds may, for the moment, be the
property of the charterer.

As common carriers, the Fabres were found to

exercise "extraordinary diligence" for the safe
transportation of the passengers to their
destination. This duty of care is not excused by
proof that they exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employee. As Art. 1759 of the
Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of
or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees although such employees may

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have acted beyond the scope of their

authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.

Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the

exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but
only to extra-contractual obligations or to use
the technical form of expression, that article
relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.

This liability of the common carriers does not

cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees.

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff

carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of
entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct
and immediate, and its non-performance could
not be excused by proof that the fault was
morally imputable to defendant's servants.

2. NATURE OF BUSINESS; POWER OF STATE

TO REGULATE
Art. 1765. The Public Service Commission may,
on its own motion or on petition of any interested
party, after due hearing, cancel the certificate of
public convenience granted to any common
carrier that repeatedly fails to comply with his or
its duty to observe extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in this Section.

MEDINA VS CRESENCIA

3. NATURE AND BASIS OF LIABILITY

A passenger jeepney driven by Brigido Avorque

smashed into a Meralco post resulting in the
death of Vicente Medina, one of its passengers.
Guillermo Cresencia is the registered owner of
the jeepney as well as the registered operator. On
the other hand, Rosario Avorque, after the
jeepney having been repeatedly sold from one
buyer after another, is its current absolute owner
as well as the employer of driver Brigido.
Issue:
(1) Who should be held liable for the death of
Medina the registered owner or the absolute
owner?
(2) WON Rosario Avorque has a subsidiary
liability under the RPC for damages arising from
her drivers criminal act.
Held:
(1) The registered owner.
The requires the approval of the Public Service
Commission in order that a franchise, or any
privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or
leased without infringing the certificate issued to
the grantee x x x As the sale of the jeepney was
admittedly without the approval of the Public
Service Commission, Guillermo Cresencia, who is
the registered owner and operator thereof,
continued to be liable to the Commission and the
public for the consequences incident to its
operation.
(2) No, she has no subsidiary liability.

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of

their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755
and 1756.
CANGCO VS CA
FACTS:This is the same Torts case wherein when
Cangco alighted from the train, he slipped from
the platform due to some melons negligently
placed therein. He suffered serious injuries due to
the accident and filed a case against MRR.
HELD:It is important to note that the foundation
of the legal liability of the defendant is the
contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has
suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant to
exercise due care in its performance. That is to
say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing
essentially, in legal viewpoint from that
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of
its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil

Medinas action for damages is independent of

the criminal case filed against Brigido Avorque,
and based, not on the employers subsidiary
liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a

TRANSPORTATION LAW-CADC
breach of the carriers contractual obligation to
carry his passengers safely to their destination
(culpa contractual). And it is also for this reason
that there is no need of first proving the
insolvency of the driver Brigido Avorque before
damages can be recovered from the carrier, for in
culpa contractual, the liability of the carrier is not
merely subsidiary or secondary, but direct and
immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and 1759, New
Civil Code).

run over a greater portion of the pile, the peak of

which was about 3 feet high, without
endangering the safety of his passengers. And
notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side
of the bus was hit by the pick-up car.

FORES VS MIRANDA
FACTS:Miranda was a passenger in a jeep owned
by Fores. Since the jeep was driving at excessive
speed and it lost control while crossing a bridge,
it collided with the bridge wall causing the
passengers, one of whom was Miranda, serious
physical injuries.

ISAAC VS A.L AMMEN

FACTS:Isaac was a passenger in one of Ammens
buses transversing the Albay- Camarines Sur
route. During the voyage, the bus collided with
another motor vehicle which caused Isaac to
severe his arm. He underwent serious medical
treatment and as a result thereof, he filed a
complaint against the bus company.

HELD:It is also suggested that a carrier's violation

of its engagement to safety transport the
passenger involves a breach of the passenger's
confidence, and therefore should be regarded as
a breach of contract in bad faith, justifying
recovery of moral damages under Art. 2220. This
theory is untenable, for under it the carrier would
always be deemed in bad faith, in every case its
obligation to the passenger is infringed, and it
would be never accountable for simple
negligence; while under the law (Art. 1756). the
presumption is that common carriers acted
negligently (and not maliciously), and Art. 1762
speaks of negligence of the common carrier.

HELD:From the above legal provisions, we can

make the following restatement of the principles
governing the liability of a common carrier: (1)
the liability of a carrier is contractual and
arises upon breach of its obligation. There is
breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence
according to all circumstances of each case; (2) a
carrier is obliged to carry its passenger
with the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, having due regard for all the
circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to
be at fault or to have acted negligently in
case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it
being its duty to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is
not an insurer against all risks of travel.

The action for breach of contract imposes on the

defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon
mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter
is relieved from the duty to established the fault
of the carrier, or of his employees, and the
burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it
was due to an unforseen event or to force
majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil.,
768, 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike in suits
for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by
proving that it has exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees (Art.
1759, new civil code; )

The question that now arises is: Has defendant

observed extraordinary diligence or the utmost
diligence of every cautious person, having due
regard for all circumstances, in avoiding the
collision which resulted in the injury caused to the
plaintiff?
The evidence would appear to support the above
finding. Thus, it appears that Bus No. 31,
immediately prior to the collision, was running at
a moderate speed because it had just stopped at
the school zone of Matacong, Polangui, Albay. The
pick-up car was at full speed and was running
outside of its proper lane. The driver of the bus,
upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was
then running, swerved the bus to the very
extreme right of the road until its front and rear
wheels have gone over the pile of stones or
gravel situated on the rampart of the road. Said
driver could not move the bus farther right and

PHIL RABBIT VS IAC

FACTS:On Christmas eve, passengers were on
board a jeepney. The jeepneys right rear tire
suddenly cut loose causing the jeep to take a
sharp and swift u-turn to the opposite lane of the
road. This was evinced by the skid marks on the
road. As it made the sharp u-turn to the opposite
side, petitioners bus bumped the jeepney. This
caused the death and serious physical injuries of
the passengers of the jeep.

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HELD:

Commerce and by special laws.

The principle about "the last clear" chance,

would call for application in a suit between
the owners and drivers of the two colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier
to
enforce
its
contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and
its owners on the ground that the other driver
was likewise guilty of negligence.

Art. 1753. The law of the country to which the

goods are to be transported shall govern the
liability of the common carrier for their loss,
destruction or deterioration.
B. COMMON CARRIAGE OF GOODS
1.
LIABILITY
NEGLIGENCE

AND

PRESUMPTION

OF

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of

their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.

In this case, evidence shows that the bus driver

could not be held liable for the deaths and
serious physical injuries of the jeepneys
passengers. He could not have foreseen the
sharp u-turn made by the jeepney when its right
rear tire got loose. It shows as well that the bus
was traveling at an expected speed in the
highway.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over

the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755
and 1756.

4. CLASSES OF COMMON CARRIERS

Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the
public.

Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for

the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods, unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other
natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public
enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3)
Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the
goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects
in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or
act of competent public authority.

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of

their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.

Art. 1735. In all cases other than those

mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the
preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed
or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as required in Article
1733.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over

the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755
and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to

passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless
they
prove
that
they
observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755.

5. LAWS APPLICABLE
Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this
Code, the rights and obligations of common
carriers shall be governed by the Code of

YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO. V DEXTER

TRANSPORTATION LAW-CADC
FACTS:Petitioner filed for mandamus against the
government for payment of its shipping fees for
the shipment of mineral oil. The government
withheld payment on the ground that there was
loss of one or two of its caskets.

unrefuted upon the record.

HELD:In section 646 of the Administrative Code it

is provided that when Government property is
transmitted from one place to another by carrier,
it shall be upon proper bill of lading, or receipt,
from such carrier, and it shall be the duty of the
consignee, or his representative, to make full
notation of any evidence of loss, shortage, or
damage, upon the bill of lading, or receipt, before
accomplishing it. It is admitted by the petitioner
in the agreed statement of facts that the
consignee, at the time the oil was delivered,
noted the loss in the present case upon the two
respective bills of lading. The notation of these
losses by the consignee, in obedience to the
precept of section 646 of the Administrative
Code, is competent evidence to show that the
shortage in fact existed. As the petitioner admits
that the oil was received by it for carriage and
inasmuch as the fact of loss is proved in the
manner just stated, it results that there is a
presumption that the petitioner was to blame for
the loss; and it was incumbent upon the
petitioner in order to entitle it to relief in the case
to rebut that presumption by proving, as is
alleged in the petition, that the loss was not due
to any fault or negligence of the petitioner.

FACTS:Plaintiff was the owner and shipper of

goods of books from New York. He sought the
shipment of the books to Manila through
engaging the services of defendant. A bill of
lading included a clause limiting defendants
liability but the same wasnt signed by defendant
or otherwise known to him. Upon arrival of the
books, it was in bad order, prompting plaintiff to
file an action against defendant for damages.

MIRASOL v DOLLAR

HELD:The defendant having received the two

boxes in good condition, its legal duty was to
deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition
in which it received them. From the time of their
delivery to the defendant in New York until they
are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes
were under the control and supervision of the
defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff.
The defendant having admitted that the boxes
were damaged while in transit and in its
possession, the burden of proof then shifted, and
it devolved upon the defendant to both allege
and prove that the damage was caused by reason
of some fact which exempted it from liability. As
to how the boxes were damaged, when or where,
was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the
knowledge of the defendant and in the very
nature of things could not be in the knowledge of
the plaintiff. To require the plaintiff to prove as to
when and how the damage was caused would
force him to call and rely upon the employees of
the defendant's ship, which in legal effect would
be to say that he could not recover any damage
for any reason. That is not the law.

The mere proof of delivery of goods in good order

to a carrier, and of their arrival at the place of
destination in bad order, makes out a prima facie
case against the carrier, so that if no explanation
is given as to how the injury occurred, the carrier
must be held responsible. (4 R. C. L., p. 917.) It is
incumbent upon the carrier to prove that the loss
was due to accident or some other circumstance
inconsistent with its liability. (Articles 361-363,
Code of Commerce.) Indeed, if the Government of
the Philippine Islands had instituted an action in a
court of law against the petitioner to recover the
value of the oil lost while these consignments
were in the court of transportation, it would, upon
the facts appearing before us, have been entitled
to judgment.

Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an

ocean liner or any other ship have some legal
rights, and when goods are delivered on board
ship in good order and condition, and the
shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad
order and condition, it then devolves upon the
shipowner to both allege and prove that the
goods were damaged by the reason of some fact
which legally exempts him from liability;
otherwise, the shipper would be left without any
redress, no matter what may have caused the
damage.

From this it is apparent that the mandamus

prayed for cannot be granted. It is a rule of
universal application that a petition for
extraordinary relief of the character here sought
must show merit. That is, the petitioner's right to
relief must be clear. Such cannot be said to be
the case where, as here, a presumption of
responsibility on the part of the petitioner stands

In the final analysis, the cases were received by

the defendant in New York in good order and
condition, and when they arrived in Manila, they
were in bad condition, and one was a total loss.
The fact that the cases were damaged by "sea

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carrier.

water," standing alone and within itself, is not

evidence that they were damaged by force
majeure or for a cause beyond the defendant's
control. The words "perils of the sea," as stated in
defendant's brief apply to "all kinds of marine
casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering,
stranding," and among other things, it is said:
"Tempest, rocks, shoals, icebergs and other
obstacles are within the expression," and "where
the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the
shipowner is excused." "Something fortuitous and
out of the ordinary course is involved in both
words 'peril' or 'accident'."

ELEMENTS
FOR
THE
EXEMPTION
NATURAL DISASTER TO APPLY

OF

(1) The natural disaster is the proximate and

only cause of the loss, deterioration, and
destruction
(2) The carrier exercised due diligence to
prevent or minimize loss before, during or
after the occurrence of the natural disaster or
calamity
a. The carrier isnt allowed to just fold his hands
by virtue of the natural disaster

2. EXCEPTION FROM LIABILITY

A. NATURAL DISASTER
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for
the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods, unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:

(3) The carrier must not have negligently

incurred in delay in transporting the goods
a. As a general rule, delay is punished and
looked at by law as a kind of breach
b. Cf. Article 1169

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other

natural disaster or calamity;

Tan CHiong v Ynchausti

Art. 1739. In order that the common carrier may

be exempted from responsibility, the natural
disaster must have been the proximate and only
cause of the loss. However, the common carrier
must exercise due diligence to prevent or
minimize loss before, during and after the
occurrence of flood, storm or other natural
disaster in order that the common carrier may be
exempted from liability for the loss, destruction,
or deterioration of the goods. The same duty is
incumbent upon the common carrier in case of an
act of the public enemy referred to in Article
1734, No. 2.

FACTS:Tan Choing engaged the services of

defendant for the shipment of cases of general
merchandise. However, it is alleged that the
merchandise was almost lost for the failure of
defendant to ship the same.
HELD:The general rule established in the first of
the foregoing articles is that the loss of the vessel
and of its cargo, as the result of shipwreck, shall
fall upon the respective owners thereof, save for
the exceptions specified in the second of the said
articles.

Art. 1740. If the common carrier negligently

incurs in delay in transporting the goods, a
natural disaster shall not free such carrier from
responsibility.

These legal provisions are in harmony with those

of articles 361 and 362 of the Code of Commerce,
and are applicable whenever it is proved that the
loss of, or damage to, the goods was the result of
a fortuitous event or of force majeure; but the
carrier shall be liable for the loss or the damage
arising from the causes aforementioned, if it shall
have been proven that they occurred through his
own fault or negligence or by his failure to take
the same precautions usually adopted by diligent
and careful persons.

Art. 361, Code of Commerce. Merchandise shall

be transported at the risk and venture of the
shipper, unless the contrary was expressly
stipulated.
Therefore, all damages and impairment suffered
by the goods in transportation, by reason of
accident, force majeure, or by virtue of the nature
or defect of the articles, shall be for the account
and risk of the shipper.

In the contract made and entered into by and

between the owner of the goods and the
defendant, no term was fixed within which the
said merchandise should be delivered to the
former at Catarman, nor was it proved that there

The proof of these accidents in incumbent on the

TRANSPORTATION LAW-CADC
was any delay in loading the goods and
transporting them to their destination. From the
28th of November, when the steamer Sorsogon
arrived at Gubat and landed the said goods
belonging to Ong Bieng Sip to await the lorcha
Pilar which was to convey them to Catarman, as
agreed upon, no vessel carrying merchandise
made the voyage from Gubat to the said pueblo
of the Island of Samar, and with Ong Bieng Sip's
merchandise there were also to be shipped goods
belonging to the defendant company, which
goods were actually taken on board the said
lorcha and suffered the same damage as those
belonging to the Chinaman. So that there was no
negligence, abandonment, or delay in the
shipment of Ong Bieng Sip's merchandise, and all
that was done by the carrier, Inchausti & Co., was
what it regularly and usually did in the
transportation by sea from Manila to Catarman of
all classes of merchandise. No attempt has been
made to prove that any course other than the
foregoing was pursued by that firm on this
occasion; therefore the defendant party is not
liable for the damage occasioned as a result of
the wreck or stranding of the lorcha Pilar because
of the hurricane that overtook this craft while it
was anchored in the port of Gubat, on December
5, 1908, ready to be conveyed to that of
Catarman.

spare parts, this time consigned to Central Textile

Mills. Likewise, cartons of general merchandise
and garments, and surveying instruments were
loaded. On the way to Manila, the ship caught fire
and sank. This resulted to the loss of all the cargo
shipped therein.
HELD:As the peril of the fire is not comprehended
within the exception in Article 1734, supra, Article
1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases
than those mention in Article 1734, the common
carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it
has observed the extraordinary deligence
required by law.
In this case, the respective Insurers. as subrogees
of the cargo shippers, have proven that the
transported goods have been lost. Petitioner
Carrier has also proved that the loss was caused
by fire. The burden then is upon Petitioner Carrier
to proved that it has exercised the extraordinary
diligence required by law.
The evidence of the defendant did not show that
extraordinary vigilance was observed by the
vessel to prevent the occurrence of fire at
hatches numbers 2 and 3. Defendant's evidence
did not likewise show he amount of diligence
made by the crew, on orders, in the care of the
cargoes. What appears is that after the cargoes
were stored in the hatches, no regular inspection
was made as to their condition during the
voyage. Consequently, the crew could not have
even explain what could have caused the fire.
The defendant, in the Court's mind, failed to
satisfactorily show that extraordinary vigilance
and care had been made by the crew to prevent
the occurrence of the fire.

MARTINI V MACONDRAY
FACTS:Martini engaged the services of defendant
for the shipment of several cases of chemical
products from Manila to Japan. Under the bill of
lading, the goods shall be carried on deck entirely
at the shippers risk. When the shipment arrived
in Japan, it was damaged. Plaintiff sought
recovery of damages from defendant.

Where a cargo is shipped with the owners

consent, on the deck of the vessel upon a bill of
lading exempting the ship owner from liability for
damage, the risk of any damages resulting from
the voyage must be borne by the owner.

And even if fire were to be considered a "natural

disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of
the Civil Code, it is required under Article 1739 of
the same Code that the "natural disaster" must
have been the "proximate and only cause of the
loss," and that the carrier has "exercised due
diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before,
during or after the occurrence of the disaster. "
This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to establish
satisfactorily.

EASTERN SHIPPING v IAC

B. ACT OF PUBLIC ENEMY

FACTS:M/S Asiatica was a vessel owned by

petitioner, which loaded carolized lance pipes
consigned to Phil. Blooming Mills and cases of

xxx (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether

international or civil;

HELD:The defendant company cannot be held

liable.

Art. 1739. In order that the common carrier may

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[TYPE THE DOCUMENT TITLE]

be exempted from responsibility, the natural

disaster must have been the proximate and only
cause of the loss. However, the common carrier
must exercise due diligence to prevent or
minimize loss before, during and after the
occurrence of flood, storm or other natural
disaster in order that the common carrier may be
exempted from liability for the loss, destruction,
or deterioration of the goods. The same duty is
incumbent upon the common carrier in case of an
act of the public enemy referred to in Article
1734, No. 2.

FACTS:The
government
shipped
through
Ynchaustis vessel, roofing tiles, to Manila. Upon
delivery of the tiles to the consignee of the
government, the tiles were found to be damaged.
The tiles in this case were admittedly of fragile
nature and were shipped in bundles, without any
protective
covering.
The
question
arises
regarding the alleged negligence of the carrier in
shipping the tiles.
HELD:Under the provisions of article 361 the
defendant, in order to free itself from liability,
was only obliged to prove that the damages
suffered by the goods were "by virtue of the
nature or defect of the articles." Under the
provisions of article 362 the plaintiff, in order to
hold the defendant liable, was obliged to prove
that the damages to the goods by virtue of their
nature, occurred on account of its negligence or
because the defendant did not take the
precaution usually adopted by careful persons.

C. ACT OR OMISSION OF SHIPPER

xxx (3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of
the goods;
Art. 1741. If the shipper or owner merely
contributed
to
the
loss,
destruction
or
deterioration of the goods, the proximate cause
thereof being the negligence of the common
carrier, the latter shall be liable in damages,
which however, shall be equitably reduced.

The defendant herein proved, and the plaintiff did

not attempt to dispute, that the tiles in question
were of a brittle and fragile nature and that they
were delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant
without any packing or protective covering. The
defendant also offered proof to show that there
was no negligence on its part, by showing that
the tiles were loaded, stowed, and discharged in
a careful and diligent manner.

D. CHARACTER OF GOODS, ETC.

xxx (4) The character of the goods or defects in
the packing or in the containers;
Art. 1741. If the shipper or owner merely
contributed
to
the
loss,
destruction
or
deterioration of the goods, the proximate cause
thereof being the negligence of the common
carrier, the latter shall be liable in damages,
which however, shall be equitably reduced.

In this jurisdiction there is no presumption of

negligence on the part of the carriers in case like
the present. The plaintiff, not having proved
negligence on the part of the defendant, is not
entitled to recover damages.

Article 366, Code of Commerce. Within the 24

hours following the receipt of the merchandise a
claim be brought against the carrier on account
of damage or average found therein on opening
the packages, provided that the indications of the
damage or average giving rise to the claim
cannot be ascertained from the exterior of said
packages, in which case said claim would only be
admitted on the receipt of the package.

SOUTHERN LINES V CA
FACTS:The City of Iloilo requisitioned rice from
NARIC, based on Manila. Upon order of the same,
NARIC shipped through Southern Lines the sacks
of rice. Upon receipt of the same, the city
government paid for it and noted down in the bill
of lading that the rice received was lesser than
what was ordered. This gave rise to a complaint
against the shipper and NARIC.

After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or

after the transportation charges have been paid,
no claim whatsoever shall be admitted against
the carrier with regard to the condition in which
the goods transported were delivered.

HELD:Under the provisions of Article 361, the

defendant-carrier in order to free itself from
liability, was only obliged to prove that the
damages suffered by the goods were "by virtue of

GOVERNMENT V YNCHAUSTI

10

TRANSPORTATION LAW-CADC
the nature or defect of the articles." Under the
provisions of Article 362, the plaintiff, in order to
hold the defendant liable, was obliged to prove
that the damages to the goods by virtue of their
nature, occurred on account of its negligence or
because the defendant did not take the
precaution adopted by careful persons.

HELD:By the said act of delivery, the scraps were

unconditionally placed in the possession and
control of the common carrier, and upon their
receipt by the carrier for transportation, the
contract of carriage was deemed perfected.
Consequently,
the
petitioner-carrier's
extraordinary
responsibility
for
the
loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods
commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such
extraordinary responsibility would cease only
upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the
carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has
a right to receive them. The fact that part of the
shipment had not been loaded on board the
lighter did not impair the said contract of
transportation as the goods remained in the
custody and control of the carrier, albeit still
unloaded.

Petitioner claims exemption from liability by

contending that the shortage in the shipment of
rice was due to such factors as the shrinkage,
leakage or spillage of the rice on account of the
bad condition of the sacks at the time it received
the same and the negligence of the agents of
respondent City of Iloilo in receiving the
shipment. The contention is untenable, for, if the
fact of improper packing is known to the carrier
or his servants, or apparent upon ordinary
observation,
but
it
accepts
the
goods
notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved
of liability for loss or injury resulting thereform. (9
Am Jur. 869.) Furthermore, according to the Court
of Appeals, "appellant (petitioner) itself frankly
admitted that the strings that tied the bags of
rice were broken; some bags were with holes and
plenty of rice were spilled inside the hull of the
boat, and that the personnel of the boat collected
no less than 26 sacks of rice which they had
distributed among themselves." This finding,
which is binding upon this Court, shows that the
shortage resulted from the negligence of
petitioner.

The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of

the scraps was due to any of the following causes
enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code,
namely:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other
natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public
enemy in war, whether international or civil;(3)
Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the
goods;(4) The character of the goods or defects
in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or
act of competent public authority.
Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently. By reason of
this presumption, the court is not even required
to make an express finding of fault or negligence
before it could hold the petitioner answerable for
the breach of the contract of carriage. Still, the
petitioner could have been exempted from any
liability had he been able to prove that he
observed extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods in his custody, according to all the
circumstances of the case, or that the loss was
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
As it was, there was hardly any attempt on the
part of the petitioner to prove that he exercised
such extraordinary diligence.

E. ORDER OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY

GANZON V CA
FACTS:Tumambing contracted the services of
Ganzon for the shipping of tons of scrap iron from
Mariveles to Manila. Ganzon was the owner of the
ligther LCT Batman. While the scrap iron was
being loaded to the lighter, the mayor of
Mariveles arrived and demanded money from
Tumambing. This led to an altercation and the
shooting of Tumambing. After Tumambing was
rushed to the hospital and the loading of scrap
iron was resumed, the acting mayor demanded
from Ganzon to throw the scrap iron already
loaded to the dock and the remaining scrap to be
transported to another place. Upon order of the
mayor, Ganzon complied. This led to a case filed
by Tumambing against Ganzon for damages.
Ganzon was held liable.

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