Introduction
Interpretivism
It is essential to a science of
interpretation that these are subjective but not individualistic. Meanings must be
shared, intersubjective and not private, belonging to a cultural whole, so there is
a practice of indoctrination to them. Taylor contends that man is a selfinterpreting animal, and what he interprets himself in accordance with are these
publicly shared meanings. These meanings are thus constitutive of his selfunderstanding (p.48). Our actions are embedded with a purpose sought and
explains by feelings and desires interpreted as something from within the whole
in which we belong. By interpretivist standards, not only then can we only
understand others by getting into their circle but we only understand ourselves
from within our own. Taylor stresses however that these meanings are not
7
One way to think about this is taking the concern with coherence as necessary
but not sufficient. As Little (1991) points out, coherence in itself is too weak: We
want reasons to believe that our interpretation is true, and there might of course
be conflicting coherent interpretations. This prompts further questioning,
assessing what material supports which interpretation, and what conflicts with it.
Geertz (1973) on the other hand makes of aware of a danger awaiting in the
opposite direction: Cultural systems must have a minimal degree of coherence,
else we would not call them systems; and, by observation, they normally have a
great deal more. But there is nothing so coherent as a paranoids delusion or a
swindlers story. (p.10). Here the problem is in the craft of construing a more
intricate system of order than is really the case.
publicly shared opinions, but rather the ground or basis on which we understand
each other so as to be capable of agreeing and disagreeing with each other,
holding different opinions, in the first place.
The other line of criticism takes the form of a demand for a level of certainty
which can only be attained by breaking beyond the hermeneutic circle. The
respective opposition is not only dissatisfied with the degree of difficulty involved
in a hermeneutical approach, but rejects the nature of the object of study. In
Taylors terms this line of thought stems from rationalist and empiricist strains of
thought harbouring an epistemological bias. They do not recognize a social
reality of interactively relational network of meanings constitutive and
constituted by practices, but enters the discussion with an idea of what reality is
and how it is to be characterized, taking the cue from the natural sciences
themselves. A social phenomenon should be studied in the same way as natural
phenomena. Taylor writes that for these theorists what is objectively real is
brute data identifiable (p.21). By brute data it is meant data whose validity
cannot be questioned by offering another interpretation, such as natural
description of events (i.e. the rapidly contracting eyelids in Geertzs thin
desctipions), biological correlates of behaviour, propositional attitudes (to which
I will return later), or information capable of being registered by instruments of
measurement. With respect to this picture Taylor writes:
its conclusions, and it would involve the whole notion of witchcraft in contradiction were
they to do so.9
Winch responds:
The context from which the suggestion about the contradiction is made, the context of our
scientific culture, is not on the same level as the context in which the beliefs about witchcraft
operate. Zande notions of witchcraft do not constitute a theoretical system in terms of which
Azande try to gain a quasi-scientific understanding of the world.10
The idea here is that if we interpret the Azande idea of Witchcraft in its interrelation to the
customs, expression, concepts, and ordinary life of the Azande, that is, in terms of the whole
in which it becomes what it is (in terms of the hermeneutic circle), the apparent irrationality
makes way for an intelligibility so far alien to us. Winch seems to hold that if we apply the
interpretivist method we open the concept up and appreciate it in terms of the role it plays in
the Azande culture, we come to appreciate it as immersed in a cultural order with its own
internal logic of sorts. As I see it (though I think I see it differently than Winch), it is not that
that the concept of witchcraft then suddenly will show itself as rational, harbouring its own
hidden rationality, but that the model of rationality we impose upon the culture to begin
with fail to address the substance matter adequately, and so cannot stand as a court of appeal.
Lukes intend to attack Winchs solution to the problem. First he distinguishes between two
kinds of criteria for rationality, universal (i) and context dependent (ii).
Let us assume we are discussing the beliefs of a society S. One can then draw a distinction
between two sets of questions. One can ask, in the first place: (i) what for society S are the
criteria of rationality in general? And, second, one can ask: (ii) what are the appropriate
criteria to apply to a given class of beliefs within that society? (p.260)
Lukes writes:
In so far as Winch seems to be saying that the answer to the first question is culturedependent, he must be wrong, or at least we could never know if he were right; indeed we
9
E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (1937), P.73. Quoted in
Lukes (1967) p.256
10
P. Winch Understanding a Primitive Society, p. 315. Q uoted in Lukes (1967) p.257
cannot even conceive what it could be for him to be right. In the first place, the existence of a
common reality is a necessary precondition of our understanding S's language. () What
must be the case is that S must have our distinction between truth and falsity if we are to
understand its language, for, if per impossibile it did not, we would be unable even to agree
about what counts as the successful identification of public (spatio-temporally locations).
(ibid.)
Initially I comment that Lukes here, even in distinguishing types of rationality, is nevertheless
operating with a picture of rationality tailored to a certain type of ontological entity, that of a
belief proposition, which the science of interpretation will reject as an a-priori entity of study
for social science. Followingly I think there is a gap going from asserting that first-order
logical criteria of evaluating a set of propositional states, such as beliefs, constitutes universal
criteria for rationality to 1. that realism with respect to an independent reality depends on
accepting such criteria, and 2. that the role played by a certain concept in a given cultural
space could be best formulated in terms of such propositional attitudes. If this is so then I
would add that there is little sense to claim that the interpretivist has much use for universal
criteria of rationality (and then neither a context dependent criteria). To the contrary, before
questions of rationality of beliefs can be at all raised with respect to a culture, one must come
to an understanding, a clarity, with respect to the shared meanings of that culture which is
involved with the beliefs to be evaluated. This is not to say that apparent contradictions
cannot warrant interpretation, which was explicitly stated in the first section, but that if we
are bent on construing interpretations so to make clear the underlying rational logic in a
cultural discourse, then we have already saddled our investigation with an epistemological
bias as to uncover the hidden rational structure.
There is a tension between Lukes proposition that without accepting universal criteria of
rationality we could not in principle understand another culture, and the interpretivist project
of coming to such an understanding. I stress that this tension is one between theoretical and
empirical matters. Lukes anticipates Donald Davidsons idea of a translation manual11,
wherein to understand the meaning of a sentence is to understand the conditions under which
the proposition the sentence expresses would be true or false. Without dealing with the
obvious problem that not all meaningful sentences express propositions, this picture
11
See Davidson (1994) Radical Interpretation Interpreted in Philosophical
Perspectives Vol.8, for a summary.
There is nothing in holistic considerations that blocks universal accounts on the face
of it. If I sense the room as hot due me coming in from the cold, and you sense the
room as cold due being ill, there remains the option to check the thermometer.
Similarily universal systems of moral thought is not prima facie excluded, just
because subjectivist considerations are in place.
References
Little, Daniel. Varieties of Social Explanation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991)
Clifford Geertz, Thick Description (1971)
Dagfinn Fllesdal, Hermeneutics and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method