G.R. No.

L-12190

August 30, 1958

TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased.

FAUSTO
E.
GAN,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.
Benedicto C. Belran, Crispin D. Baizas and Roberto H. Benitez for
appellant.
Arturo M. Tolentino for appellee.

Beatriz
Alto ..............................................................

1 Bahagi

At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking

ipinamamana sa aking asawang si Idelfonso D. Yap sa kondisyong siya'y
magpapagawa ng isang Health Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa
halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking pangalang
Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At kung ito ay may kakulangan man ay bahala na ang aking
asawa ang magpuno upang matupad ang aking kagustuhan.

BENGZON, J.:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in
the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan,
Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila
court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will
allegedly executed by the deceased, substantially in these words:

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that
the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her
lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon
R. San Jose, Judge,1 refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page
motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.

Nobyembre 5, 1951.

Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip, ay nagsasalaysay na

ang aking kayamanan sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan ay aking ipinamamana sa aking
mga kamag-anakang sumusunod:

Vicente Esguerra, Sr. .............................................

5 Bahagi

Fausto E. Gan .........................................................

2 Bahagi

Rosario E. Gan ........................................................ 2 Bahagi

Filomena Alto .........................................................

(Lagda) Felicidad E. Alto-Yap.

1 Bahagi

The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents
and due execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra,
Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez, whose
testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra mentioned
to her first cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to make a will. She
confided however that it would be useless if her husband discovered or
knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E. Gan, nephew of Felicidad,
who was then preparing for the bar examinations. The latter replied it
could be done without any witness, provided the document was entirely in
her handwriting, signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra lost no time in
transmitting the information, and on the strength of it, in the morning of
November 5, 1951, in her residence at Juan Luna Street, Manila, Felicidad
wrote, signed and dated a holographic will substantially of the tenor above
transcribed, in the presence of her niece, Felina Esguerra (daughter of
Vicente), who was invited to read it. In the afternoon of that day, Felicidad
was visited by a distant relative, Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him to
read the will in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who again read it.

Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin, and Rosario
Gan Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will, again in the presence
of Felina Esguerra, who read it for the third time.
When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T. Hospital
for her last illness, she entrusted the said will, which was contained in a
purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few hours later, Ildefonso Yap, her
husband, asked Felina for the purse: and being afraid of him by reason of
his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him. Thereafter, in the
same day, Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it the
next day shortly before the death of Felicidad. Again, Felina handed it to
him but not before she had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and
read the will for the last time.2
From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been
suffering from heart disease for several years before her death; that she
had been treated by prominent physicians, Dr. Agerico Sison, Dr. Agustin
Liboro and others; that in May 1950 husband and wife journeyed to the
United States wherein for several weeks she was treated for the disease;
that thereafter she felt well and after visiting interesting places, the couple
returned to this country in August 1950. However, her ailment recurred,
she suffered several attacks, the most serious of which happened in the
early morning of the first Monday of November 1951 (Nov. 5). The whole
household was surprised and alarmed, even the teachers of the Harvardian
Colleges occupying the lower floors and of by the Yap spouses. Physician's
help was hurriedly called, and Dr. Tanjuaquio arrived at about 8:00 a.m.,
found the patient hardly breathing, lying in bed, her head held high by her
husband. Injections and oxygen were administered. Following the doctor's
advice the patient stayed in bed, and did nothing the whole day, her
husband and her personal attendant, Mrs. Bantique, constantly at her side.
These two persons swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will,
and could have made no will on that day.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several
reasons, the most important of which were these: (a) if according to his
evidence, the decedent wanted to keep her will a secret, so that her
husband would not know it, it is strange she executed it in the presence of
Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses were unnecessary; (b)
in the absence of a showing that Felina was a confidant of the decedent it
is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the former to see and
read the will several times; (c) it is improbable that the decedent would
have permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to
read her will, when she precisely wanted its contents to remain a secret
during her lifetime; (d) it is also improbable that her purpose being to
conceal the will from her husband she would carry it around, even to the
hospital, in her purse which could for one reason or another be opened by
her husband; (e) if it is true that the husband demanded the purse from
Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard to believe
that he returned it without destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner

being precisely that the will was executed behind his back for fear he will
destroy it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the
oppositor's evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed
such holographic will.
In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the
testimony of the oppositor and of his witnesses in a vigorous effort to
discredit them. It appears that the same arguments, or most of them, were
presented in the motion to reconsider; but they failed to induce the court a
quo to change its mind. The oppositor's brief, on the other hand, aptly
answers the criticisms. We deem it unnecessary to go over the same
matters, because in our opinion the case should be decided not on the
weakness of the opposition but on the strength of the evidence of the
petitioner, who has the burden of proof.
The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills along
with other forms. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) approved August 7,
1901, adopted only one form, thereby repealing the other forms, including
holographic wills.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts.
810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject
to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
not be witnessed."
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided
for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required
wills to be subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each
and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and
to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to prevent substitution of wills, to guarantee
their truth and authencity (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476) and to
avoid those who have no right to succeed the testator would succeed him
and be benefited with the probate of same. (Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off.
Gaz., 1855). However, formal imperfections may be brushed aside when
authenticity of the instrument is duly proved. (Rodriguez vs Yap, 40 Off.
Gaz. 1st Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled
when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose
the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if
there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if
available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57

Phil., 742). From the testimony of such witnesses (and of other additional
witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and
authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and
veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided
however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator himself." The law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard,
since it could at any time, be demonstrated to be or not to be in the
hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will" says
the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that
the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence
of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the
court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the
holographic will. They may be mistaken in their opinion of the handwriting,
or they may deliberately lie in affirming it is in the testator's hand.
However, the oppositor may present other witnesses who also know the
testator's handwriting, or some expert witnesses, who after comparing the
will with other writings or letters of the deceased, have come to the
conclusion that such will has not been written by the hand of the
deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such contradictory
testimony may use its own visual sense, and decide in the face of the
document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been written by the
testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition,
and of assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only
guaranty of authenticity3 the testator's handwriting has disappeared.
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated
upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who
declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator? How can the
oppositor prove that such document was not in the testator's handwriting?
His witnesses who know testator's handwriting have not examined it. His
experts can not testify, because there is no way to compare the alleged
testament with other documents admittedly, or proven to be, in the
testator's hand. The oppositor will, therefore, be caught between the upper
millstone of his lack of knowledge of the will or the form thereof, and the
nether millstone of his inability to prove its falsity. Again the proponent's
witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they may have been shown a
faked document, and having no interest to check the authenticity thereof
have taken no pains to examine and compare. Or they may be perjurers
boldly testifying, in the knowledge that none could convict them of perjury,
because no one could prove that they have not "been shown" a document
which they believed was in the handwriting of the deceased. Of course, the

competency of such perjured witnesses to testify as to the handwriting

could be tested by exhibiting to them other writings sufficiently similar to
those written by the deceased; but what witness or lawyer would not
foresee such a move and prepare for it? His knowledge of the handwriting
established, the witness (or witnesses) could simply stick to his statement:
he has seen and read a document which he believed was in the deceased's
handwriting. And the court and the oppositor would practically be at the
mercy of such witness (or witnesses) not only as to the execution, but also
as to the contents of the will. Does the law permit such a situation?
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of
a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of
witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have
contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly made here.
(See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art. 830-New Civil Code.)
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the
holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen 4 an implied admission
that such loss or theft renders it useless..
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and
presented to the judge, (Art. 689) who shall subscribe it and require its
identity to be established by the three witnesses who depose that they
have no reasonable doubt that the will was written by the testator (Art.
691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will has been
proven he shall order that it be filed (Art. 693). All these, imply
presentation of the will itself. Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a
greater degree. It requires that the surviving spouse and the legitimate
ascendants and descendants be summoned so that they may make "any
statement they may desire to submit with respect to the authenticity of the
will." As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done
by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either
its execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea
of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they know of the will,
but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote
it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is presented to the
Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the
choice of either complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to
oppose it, if they think it spurious. 5 Such purpose is frustrated when the
document is not presented for their examination. If it be argued that such
choice is not essential, because anyway the relatives may oppose, the
answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct disadvantage, and they
have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if genuine, a right
which they should not be denied by withholding inspection thereof from
them.

We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the document

itself--in the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 5, 1925, which
denied protocolization or probate to a document containing testamentary
dispositions in the handwriting of the deceased, but apparently mutilated,
the signature and some words having been torn from it. Even in the face of
allegations and testimonial evidence (which was controverted), ascribing
the mutilation to the opponents of the will. The aforesaid tribunal declared
that, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code (Spanish) the will
itself, whole and unmutilated, must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect.
Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y estableciendose en el parrafo
segundo del articulo 688 del Codigo civil, que para que sea valido el
testamento olografo debera estar escrito todo el y firmado por testador,
con expression del ao, mes y dia en que se otorque, resulta evidente que
para la validez y eficacia de esos testamentos, no basta la demostracion
mas o menos cumplida de que cuando se otorgaron se Ilenaron todos esos
requisitos, sino que de la expresada redaccion el precepto legal, y por el
tiempo en que el verbo se emplea, se desprende la necesidad de que el
documento se encuentre en dichas condiciones en el momento de ser
presentado a la Autoridad competente, para au adveracion y
protocolizacion; y como consecuencia ineludible de ello, forzoso es affirmar
que el de autos carece de validez y aficacia, por no estarfirmado por el
testador, cualquiera que sea la causa de la falta de firma, y sin perjuicio de
las acciones que puedan ejercitar los perjudicados, bien para pedir
indemnizacion por el perjuicio a la persona culpable, si la hubiere, o su
castigo en via criminal si procediere, por constituir dicha omision un
defecto insubsanable . . . .
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo,
admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter. 6
PRECEDENTES LEGALES--Fuero Juzgo, libro segundo, titulo V, ley 15--E
depues que los herederos e sus fijos ovieren esta manda, fasta ... annos
muestrenla al obispo de la tierra, o al juez fasta VI meses y el obispo o el
juez tomen otros tales tres escritos, que fuesen fechos por su mano daquel
que fizo la manda; e por aquellos escriptos, si semjara la letra de la
manda, sea confirmada la manda. E depues que todo esto fuere
connoscido, el obispo o el juez, o otras testimonios confirmen el escripto
de la manda otra vez, y en esta manera vala la manda. (Art. 689,
Scaevola--Codigo Civil.)
(According to the Fuero above, the will itself must be compared with
specimens of the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of
the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are
shown his handwriting and signature.7

Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers
the loss of the holographic will to be fatal. (Planiol y Ripert, Derecho Civil
Frances, traduccion por Diaz Cruz, 1946, Tomo V, page 555).
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that
the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may
not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or
read such will.8
Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered
to adopt this opinion as a Rule of Court for the allowance of such
holographic wills. We hesitate, however, to make this Rule decisive of this
controversy, simultaneously with its promulgation. Anyway, decision of the
appeal may rest on the sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the evidence
presented by petitioner Fausto E. Gan.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain
why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial
evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the
wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting
itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental
witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails
the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the
subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses
(four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be
checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day,
the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with
the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the
testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to
distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on
account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible 9
only one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or
passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he
may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read the
forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in
court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity.
The will having been lost the forger may have purposely destroyed it in
an "accident" the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the
error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the
holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one of them
need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the
most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more
objectionable feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the

several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and
Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and teachers of
Civil Law.10
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three
subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely
the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost
holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the
handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested
in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the
handwriting itself is not at hand.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves
sharing the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances
described in the appealed decision, we find it hard to believe that the
deceased should show her will precisely to relatives who had received
nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her
into amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its
execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another point: if
she wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she not
entrust it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for
instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few days after the alleged
execution of the will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a
lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner
is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to
measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.
Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by
failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as
required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a
disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect
after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof,
must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v.
Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise,
executed and attested as required by law.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitionerappellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.

The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with
another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in
an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the
appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will.
They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as
to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded
by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary
evidence unlike ordinary wills.

RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final
determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla
and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo
Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim
Bonilla on the following grounds:

Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the
court in its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the order was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of
the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On
July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and
dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The
court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the
holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that
'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose,
regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said
wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13,
1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original
of the will could not be located shows to our mind that the decedent had
discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.

holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself
as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says
that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic
or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the

Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's
petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order
dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late
Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the
ground that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that
the trial court committed the following assigned errors:

SO ORDERED.

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL

MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS
DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or
cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to
Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance
of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The
probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying
witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted
to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However,
if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence
is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509,
the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed

Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves the determination of the quantity of

evidence required for the probate of a holographic will.
The established facts are thus summarized in the decision appealed from
(Rec. App. pp. 22-24):

G.R. No. L-14003

August 5, 1960

FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.
F. Lavides and L.B. Alcuaz for appellant.
Vicente J. Cuna and P.S. Singson for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15 January
1958 by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its Special

"Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the petitioner;

that on September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot,
Quezon City, known to be the last residence of said testatrix; that Francisco
Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the
said holographic will (Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the
sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; that witness
Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the holographic will (Exh. C) one
month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as the same was
handed to him and his wife; that the witness testified also that he
recognized all the signatures appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) as
the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said statement, witness
presented the mortgage (Exh. E), the special power of the attorney (Exh.
F), and the general power of attorney (Exh. F-1), besides the deeds of sale
(Exhs. G and G-1) including an affidavit (Exh. G-2), and that there were
further exhibited in court two residence certificates (Exhs. H and H-1) to
show the signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes; that said
witness, Azaola, testified that the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid
documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the
signatures appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the
handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein are
the signatures of the testatrix; that said witness, in answer to a question of
his counsel admitted that the holographic will was handed to him by the
testatrix. "apparently it must have been written by her" (t.s.n., p. 11).
However, on page 16 on the same transcript of the stenographic notes,
when the same witness was asked by counsel if he was familiar with the
penmanship and handwriting of the deceased Fortunata Vda. de Yance, he
answered positively in the affirmative and when he was asked again
whether the penmanship referred to in the previous answer as appearing in
the holographic will (Exh. C) was hers (testatrix'), he answered, "I would
definitely say it is hers"; that it was also established in the proceedings
that the assessed value of the property of the deceased in Luskot, Quezon
City, is in the amount of P7,000.00.
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of
the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not
seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was

actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on
November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil
Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that
the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate
being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent
"did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the
handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce
more than one witness because the will's authenticity was not questioned;
and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic
will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.
Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:
ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of
the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall
be required.
In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to. (691a).
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not
contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; but
even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of
the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted
as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic
will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes
obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not
merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must
be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and
who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express)
"that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator".
There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so

familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.

Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become
an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of
Article 811 prescribes that
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to.
As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness
may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent
witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and
provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be
presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was
derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (cf. Cabang vs.
Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can
not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in
the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least
three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential
to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need
be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses
must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by
the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law
deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will's
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and
the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if
no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is
convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting
experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of
inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true
intention of the testator be carried into effect.
Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889, the noted Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol. 12, 2nd Ed.,
p.421), sagely remarks:
La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo apartado de dicho
precepto induce la conclusion de que siempre o por lo menos, en la mayor

parte de los casos, el Juez debe acudir al criterio pericial para que le ilustre
acerca de la autenticidad del testamento olografo, aunque ya esten
insertas en los autos del expediente las declaraciones testificales. La
prudencia con que el Juez debe de proceder en resoluciones de
transcendencia asi lo exige, y la indole delicada y peligrosa del testamento
olografo lo hace necesario para mayor garantia de todos los interes
comprometidos en aquel.
En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras puede ser una confirmacion
facultativa del dicho profano de los testigos y un modo de desvanecer las
ultimas dudas que pudieran ocurrir al Juez acerca de la autenticidad que
trata de averigaur y declarar. Para eso se ha escrito la frase del citado
ultimo apartado, (siempre que el Juez lo estime conveniente), haya habido
o no testigos y dudaran o no estos respecto de los extremos por que son
preguntados.
El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con independencia de los
sucesos y de su significacion, para responder debidamente de las
resoluciones que haya de dictar.
And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed,
no unfavourable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer
expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with
the testimony of the lay witnesses.
Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the
Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has
been called upon to construe the import of said article, the interest of
justice would be better served, in our opinion, by giving the parties ample
opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses,
should the Court deem them necessary.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the
records ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold a
new trial in conformity with this opinion. But evidence already on record
shall not be retaken. No costs.

G.R. No. 123486

August 12, 1999

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,

vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA
PATIGAS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and
witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic
will has been established and the handwriting and signature therein
(exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will. Reversal of the judgment
appealed from and the probate of the holographic will in question be called
for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his
evidence and the defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to
evidence on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown
no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is
reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his
behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore,
be rendered for appellant in the instant case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered
allowing the probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seo
Vda. de Ramonal.2
The facts are as follows:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia
Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 18, a petition 3 for probate of the holographic will of the
deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.

In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will
on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress
employed in the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and
personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death. 4
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an
opposition5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will
was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression
that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on
will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the
one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature
should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and
not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud
and trickery.1wphi1.nt
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary
evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a
demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish
sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to
Evidence having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for
probate of the document (Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic Will of
the late Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of
evidence and lack of merits.7
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, 8 and in
support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the
testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2)
Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5)
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.

To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we

recite an account of their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
where the special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the
deceased was filed. He produced and identified the records of the case.
The documents presented bear the signature of the deceased, Matilde
Seo Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for comparison
of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to
produced and identify the voter's affidavit of the decedent. However, the
voters' affidavit was not produced for the same was already destroyed and
no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of Matilde's husband, the
latter lived with her in her parent's house for eleven (11) years from 1958
to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of close association the deceased,
she acquired familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she used to
accompany her (deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting
rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and deceased
always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay)
assisted the deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried
personal letters of the deceased to her creditors.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of
Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30,
1978, which was personally and entirely written, dated and signed, by the
deceased and that all the dispositions therein, the dates, and the
signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings
and documents signed by the deceased in connection with the proceedings
of her late husband, as a result of which he is familiar with the handwriting
of the latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the holographic
will was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, but
he can not be sure.
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She

testified that she processed the application of the deceased for pasture
permit and was familiar with the signature of the deceased, since the
signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for
pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had
lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter.
That after a long period of time she became familiar with the signature of
the deceased. She testified that the signature appearing in the holographic
will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English
as follows:

4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to

Evangeline R. Calugay
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in
favor of Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta.
Cruz, once I am no longer around.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978

Instruction
August 30, 1978
1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan
Street.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:
1. Eufemia Patigas
2. Josefina Salcedo
3. Evangeline Calugay
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978

6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
Gene and Manuel:
Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.
Mama
Matilde Vda de Ramonal
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision 9 ruling that
the appeal was meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs.
Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized
authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals held:
. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are
of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the
probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution
of the holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810, new civil
code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For

it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses;

they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the
testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does
not express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator." There may be no available witness acquainted with the testator's
hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness maybe unwilling to give a
positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811
may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the
second paragraph of article 811 prescribes that
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to.
As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness ma
be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness
may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for
resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be
presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was
derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs.
Delfianado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not
be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in case
of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three
witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to
their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be
present (art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must
be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the
words "if the court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law
deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and
the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if
no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is
convincing, the court may still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting
experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of
inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true
intention of the testator be carried into effect.
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be

interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to

identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of the having the
probate denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the
holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three witnesses is
merely permissive. What the law deems essential is that the court is
convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available
lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the proponent that
the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. And because the
law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no
unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert
evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the
testimony of the lay witnesses.10
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal
Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified
that the handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the
testator herself.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and
witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the
authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting and signature
therein, and allowed the will to probate.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners raise the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil.
102, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the
case.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private
respondents had been able to present credible evidence to that the date,
text, and signature on the holographic will written entirely in the hand of
the testatrix.
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the
signatures in the holographic will of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of
the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a
requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least

three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator.1wphi1.nt

A.
From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez
streets.12

We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil
Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have
ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is
that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory. 11

xxx

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil
or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is
to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is
the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

Q. In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?

So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is

to determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective
consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of
the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents
testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of testator.
In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis
Oriental, he merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427
before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the
signature appearing in the holographic was that of the deceased.

xxx

xxx

Q. Who sometime accompany her?

A. I sometimes accompany her.

A. Yes, sir.13
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you
are referring to as one of the receipts which she issued to them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q.
Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose
signature is that Mrs. Binanay?
A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
Q. Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?

Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was

presented to identify the signature of the deceased in the voter's affidavit,
which was not even produced as it was no longer available.

A. I am familiar with her signature.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:

Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de
Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her tenants?

Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided
with your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the
court what was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep
herself busy that time?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you say so?

A. Collecting rentals.

A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde

Vda. De Ramonal.

Q. From where?

Q. How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?

A. In handwritten.14

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q.
In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of
tenants and deed of sale which you said what else did you do to acquire
familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?

Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited

the fact that the will was not found in the personal belongings of the
deceased but was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:
Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the
late Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said, yes?

A. Posting records.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from that?
Q. Who was in possession of that will?
A. Carrying letters.
A. I.
Q. Letters of whom?
Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?
A. Matilde.
A. It was in my mother's possession.
Q. To whom?
Q. So, it was not in your possession?
A. To her creditors.

15

A. Sorry, yes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to
you a document with its title "tugon" is this the document you are referring
to?

Q. And when did you come into possession since as you said this was
originally in the possession of your mother?
A. 1985.17

A. Yes, sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon",

whose handwriting is this?

Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother
left that will to you and therefore you have that in your possession?

A. My Aunt.

A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when

she died.

Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?

Q. After taking that document you kept it with you?
A. Because I am familiar with her signature.16
A. I presented it to the fiscal.
What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the
deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not
declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.

Q. For what purpose?

A. Just to seek advice.

Q. Advice of what?

xxx

A. About the will.18

Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic
will. Now, you identified a document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated
January 8, 1978 which is only about eight months from August 30, 1978.
Do you notice that the signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is beautifully
written and legible?

In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about
the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased.
Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to
petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal.
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person
is that correct?

xxx

xxx

A. Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.
Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was
healthy was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was
exhausted?
A. In writing.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk
agilely and she could go to her building to collect rentals, is that correct?

Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present
and you just tried to explain yourself out because of the apparent
inconsistencies?

A. Yes, sir.19

A. That was I think. (sic).

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know

that there are retracings in the word Vda.?
A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.
Q. And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in
Matilde is continued towards letter D.

Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year
as the alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no
retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid
movement. . . . And in fact, the name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one
of the petitioners?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned
signature appearing in the alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but
in the handwriting themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and
tremors, do you notice that?
A. Yes, sir.21

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
A. Yes, sir.20

Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated
and signed in the handwriting of the testator. She testified that:

Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and
Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the
services if any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?

The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:

A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then
to her transactions.

A. Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my

godfather. Actually I am related to the husband by consanguinity.

Q. What else? What services that you rendered?

Q. Can you tell the name of the husband?

A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes
and to her lawyer.

A. The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24

Q. What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?

Q. Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

xxx

xxx

xxx

A. I used to be her personal driver.

Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde
Ramonal have legitimate children?

Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the
handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A. As far as I know they have no legitimate children.25

xxx

A. Yes, sir.
Q. How come that you acquired familiarity?
A. Because I lived with her since birth. 22
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated

Agosto 30, 1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1, will you tell
this court whose signature is this?
A. Yes, sir, that is her signature.

xxx

xxx

Q. You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?
A. Here in Cagayan de Oro City.
Q. Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de
Ramonal?
A. I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.
Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel
as in what case is that, Fiscal?

Q. Why do you say that is her signature?

A. It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was

under the court before.26

A. I am familiar with her signature.23

xxx

So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar
with the handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since
birth. She never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a
document.

Q. Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory

which is marked as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and there
appears a signature over the type written word Matilde vda de Ramonal,
whose signature is this?

xxx

xxx

A. That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.

A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.

Q. Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?

Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose
signature is this?

A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal. 27
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No.

427 what were the other assistance wherein you were rendering
professional service to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there
are documents to show that I have assisted then I can recall. 28

A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they
are similar.29
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde
Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of
Matilde vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly go

over this document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether you are familiar
with the handwriting contained in that document marked as exhibit "S"?

Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de
Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it seems to be her signature
because it is similar to the signature of the project of partition which you
have made?

A. I am not familiar with the handwriting.

A. That is true.30

Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the
will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of
contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31
ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.

A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde

vda de Ramonal.
Q. Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de
Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is this?
A.
Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of
partition.
Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can
you tell the court whose signature is that?
A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda
de Ramonal.
Q. Why do you say that?

In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But
on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the
object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in
the handwriting of the deceased.

The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with
one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased.
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her
possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the
deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the
handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by
her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the
cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms.
Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the
deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting
expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes
are different when compared with other documents written by the testator.
The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable.
There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, 33
and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for
pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, 34 and a letter dated June 16,
1978,35 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows
of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that
of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling
holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records
are ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow
petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate
of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo vda. de
Ramonal.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs
their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any
justifiable reason.3
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the
complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a
condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in
custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were
given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent
was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that
respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the
controversy with her before he filed the suit.4

G.R. No. 176831

January 15, 2010

UY KIAO ENG, Petitioner,

vs.
NIXON LEE, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the August 23, 2006 Amended Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 and the February 23, 2007
Resolution,2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a
holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his
mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for
mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce
the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be
instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to

The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of
respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed
to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will.
Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence
presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to
the issue involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove that she
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to
issue the writ of mandamus.5
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. 6 In its February 4, 2005
Order,7 however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter
order was denied on September 20, 2005. 8 Hence, the petition was
dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26,
2006, the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the
writ of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy
would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an
action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent
could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or
probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in
the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the
will.91avvphi1

Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed

August 23, 2006 Amended Decision, 10 granted the motion, set aside its
earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and
the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able
to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the
holographic will.

public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most

especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. 16
As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station.17

Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion in the further
assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution.11

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do

anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to
give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. 18 Nor will
mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to
which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere
technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious.19 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against
whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or
station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully
excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which he is entitled. 20 On the part of the relator, it is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required.21

Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this
Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the
proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate
court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible. 12
The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently
provides that
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the
court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the respondent.13
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring
the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from
operation of law.14 This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the
purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest.15 The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus

cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. 22 Generally, mandamus
will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against
an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasipublic duty is imposed.23 The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private
right against an individual.24 The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and,
regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government;
hence, it is called a prerogative writ. 25 To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but
only in matters relating to the public.26
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that
there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. 27 In
other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual
modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. 28
Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature
and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. 29 Indeed,
the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether

the obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic will
is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of
mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he
seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of
Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings
for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.
Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.Any executor,
devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the
production of the original holographic will. Thus
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.The person who has custody of a will
shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator,
deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in
the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.A person
named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of
the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he
is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the
testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will
has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within such period,
signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to
accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.A person who
neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections
without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two
thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.A person having custody
of a will after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable
cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having

jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers

the will.30
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot
be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action
in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 01100939 before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169144

January 26, 2011

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF

RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN
GREGORIO
PALAGANAS,
Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed
abroad by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of
execution.
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who
became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless.
In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated
her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she
had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another
brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment
as special administrator of her estate. 1 On October 15, 2003, however,
petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the
ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in
the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that,
assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid
nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the
testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto,
they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and
Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit,
respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their

deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the
parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not
Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the
Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: 2 (a) admitting to probate
Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated
in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),3 arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first
time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, 4 affirming the assailed order
of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will,
subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of
the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The
CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not
require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its
execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case,
said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already
probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or
procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to
this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a
foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not
been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners
abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution
before it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance
with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that
local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves
that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign
country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c)

the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on
probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the
same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in
the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in
our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien
who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC
of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that
the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the
same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the
names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property
of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and
(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person
having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province. 7 The rules do not require proof that the
foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed
by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have
in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here.
But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed
in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to
petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will,
it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local

court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court

provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically.1wphi1 If the
instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the
will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our
law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless
the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court. 8
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an
initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate
of Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as
special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present
evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind at
the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of
wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial courts directive for
Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the
certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978

PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, CORAZON GRECIA-GALLONOSA and
ADOLFO FORTAJADA, the deceased Pedro Gallanosa being
substituted by his legal heirs, namely his above-named widow and
his children, ISIDRO GALLANOSA and LEDY GALLANOSA, and
grandchildren named IMELDA TECLA GALLANOSA and ROSARIO
BRIGIDA GALLANOSA, children of the late SIKATUNA GALLANOSA,
son
of
Pedro
D.H.
GALLONOSA,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, Judge of Branch I of the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon and FLORENTINO G. HITOSIS, CASIANO G.
HITOSIS, TEOTIMO G. HITOSIS, VICTORIO G. HITOSIS, EMILIA G.
HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ,
JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS, FLORENTINO R. HITOSIS, VIRGINIA R.
MITOSIS, DEBORAH R. HITOSIS, EDILBERTO R. HITOSIS, LEONOR R.
HITOSIS, NORMA R. HITOSIS-VILLANUEVA, LEONCIO R. HITOSIS,
minors ANGEL R. HITOSIS and RODOLFO R. HITOSIS, represented
by their legal guardian and mother LOURDES RELUCIO VDA. DE
HITOSIS, PETRONA HITOSIS-BALBIDO, MODESTO HITOSIS-GACILO,
CLETO HITOSIS, AGUSTIN HITOSIS-FORTES, TOMASA HITOSISBANARES
VDA. DE BORRAS, CONRADA
HITOSIS-BANARES
FRANCHE, RESTITUTO HITOSIS-BANARES, DAMIAN HITOSISBANARES, FIDEL HITOSIS-BANARES, SUSANA HITOSIS-BANARES
RODRIGUEZ, JOSE HITOSIS, LOLITA HITOSIS-BANEGA, minors

MILAGROS HITOSIS-BANEGA, ALICIA HITOSIS-BANEGA AND ELISA

HITOSIS-BANEGA, represented by their legal guardian and father
ERNESTO BANEGA, FELICITAS HITOSIS-PENAFLOR, GENOVEVA
HITOSIS-ADRIATICO, MANUEL HITOSIS, PEDRO HITOSIS, LIBRATA
HITOSIS-BALMES, JUANITA HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GABAS,
MAURA HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GANOLA and LEONA HITOSISGABITO GAMBA, respondents.
Haile Frivaldo for petitioners.
Joaquin R Mitosis for private respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

In this special civil action of certiorari, filed on July 29, 1968, the petitioners
seek to annul the orders of respondent Judge dated May 3 trial June 17,
1968, wherein he reconsidered his order of January 10, 1968, dismissing,
on the ground of prescription, the complaint in Civil Case No. 2233 of the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.
The case involves the sixty-one parcels of land in Sorsogon left by
Florentino Hitosis, with an estimated value of P50,000, trial claims for
damages exceeding one million pesos. The undisputed facts are as follows:
1. Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938
when he was eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin,
Sorsogon. A childless widower, he as survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis.
His other brothers, named Juan, Tito (Juancito), Leoncio (Aloncio) trial
Apolonio and only sister, Teodora, were all dead.
2. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon (Special Proceeding No. 3171). The
notice of hearing was duly published. In that will, Florentino bequeathed
his one-half share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla Dollentas,
and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his one-half share
would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the
reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under
the care of Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro
has rendered services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise

bequeathed his separate properties consisting of three parcels of abaca

land and parcel of riceland to his protege (sasacuyang ataman), Adolfo
Fortajada, a minor.
3. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator's
legal heirs, namely, his surviving brother, Leon, trial his nephews trial
nieces. After a hearing, wherein the oppositors did not present any
evidence in support of their opposition, Judge Pablo S. Rivera, in his
decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed
Gallanosa as executor. Judge Rivera specifically found that the testator
executed his last will "gozando de buena salud y facultades mentales y no
obrando en virtud de amenaza, fraude o influencia indebida."
4. On October 24, 1941, the testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses
trial Adolfo Fortajada, submitted a project of partition covering sixty-one
parcels of land located in various parts of Sorsogon, large cattle trial
several pieces of personal property which were distributed in accordance
with Florentino's will. The heirs assumed the obligations of the estate
amounting to P7,129.27 in the portion of P2,376.42 for Adolfo Fortajada
and P4,752.85 for the Gallanosa spouses. The project of partition was
approved by Judge Doroteo Amador in his order of March 13, 1943, thus
confirming the heirs' possession of their respective shares. The testator's
legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate trial from the order of
partition trial distribution.
5. On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis trial the heirs of Florentino's
deceased brothers trial sisters instituted an action in the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon against Pedro Gallanosa for the recovery of the said
sixty-one parcels of land. They alleged that they, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, had been in continuous possession of those
lands en concepto de dueo trial that Gallanosa entered those lands in
1951 trial asserted ownership over the lands. They prayed that they be
declared the owners of the lands trial that they be restored to the
possession thereof. They also claimed damages (Civil Case No. 696).
6. Gallanosa moved to dismiss the above complaint for lack of cause of
action trial on the ground of bar by the prior judgment in the probate
proceeding. Judge Anatolio C. Maalac dismiss the complaint on the ground
of res judicata in his order of August 14, 1952 wherein he said:
It also appears that the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors-in-interest had
intervened in the testate proceedings in Civil Case No. 3171 of this Court
for- the purpose of contesting the probate of the will of (the) late Florentino
Hitosis; trial had their opposition prospered trial the will denied of probate,

the proceedings would have been converted into one of intestacy (Art. 960
Civil Code) and the settlement of the estate of the said deceased would
have been made in accordance with the provisions of law governing legal
or intestate succession ... , in which case the said plaintiffs, as the nearest
of kin or legal heirs of said Florentino Mitosis, would have succeeded to the
ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question forming
part of his estate (art. 1003, Civil Code).
However, the derision of the Court was adverse to them, when it their
opposition trial ordered the probate of his will. From this decision (Annex K)
legalizing the said will, the oppositors did not file any appeal within the
period fixed by law, despite the fact that they were duly notified thereof, so
that the said decision had become final trial it now constitutes a bar to any
action that the plaintiffs may institute for the purpose of a redetermination
of their rights to inherit the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis.
In other words, the said decision of this Court in Civil Case special ) No.
3171, in which the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest had
intervened as parties oppositors, constitutes a final judicial determination
of the issue that the said plaintiffs, as ordinary heirs, have no legal rights
to succeed to any of the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis;
consequently, their present claim to the ownership trial possession of the
61 parcels of land in question is without any legal merit or basis.
7. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that order of dismissal which should
have set the matter at rest. But the same plaintiffs or oppositors to the
probate of the will, trial their heirs, with a persistence befitting a more
meritorious case, filed on September 21, 1967, or fifteen years after the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 696 trial twenty-eight years after the probate of
the will another action in the same court against the Gallanosa spouses
trial Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis
trial and for the recovery of the same sixty-one parcels of land. They
prayed for the appointment of a receiver.
8. As basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses,
through fraud trial deceit, caused the execution trial simulation of the
document purporting to be the last will trial testament of Florentino Hitosis.
While in their 1952 complaint the game plaintiffs alleged that they were in
possession of the lands in question, in their 1967 complaint they admitted
that since 1939, or from the death of Florentino Hitosis, the defendants
(now the petitioners) have been in possession of the disputed lands (Par.
XIV of the complaint, p. 70, Rollo in Civil Case No. 555, Gubat Branch,
which was transferred to Branch I in Sorsogon town where Special

Proceeding No. 3171 trial Civil Case No. 696 were decided trial which was
re-docketed as Civil Case No. 2233).
9. As already stated, that 1967 complaint, upon motion of the defendants,
now the petitioners, was dismissed by respondent Judge. The plaintiffs filed
a motion for reconsideration Respondent Judge. granted it trial set aside
the order of dismissal. He denied defendants' motion for the
reconsideration of his order setting aside that dismissal order.
The petitioners or the defendants below contend in this certiorari case that
the lower court has no jurisdiction to set aside the 1939 decree of probate
trial the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 trial that it acted with
grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondents' 1967
complaint.
The issue is whether, under the facts set forth above, the private
respondents have a cause of action the "annulment" of the will of
Florentino Hitosis trial for the recovery of the sixty-one parcels of land
adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.
We hold that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
reconsideration its order of dismissal trial in ignoring the 1939
testamentary case trial the 1952 Civil Case No. 696 which is the same as
the instant 1967 case.
A rudimentary knowledge of substantive law trial procedure is sufficient for
an ordinary lawyer to conclude upon a causal perusal of the 1967
complaint that it is baseless trial unwarranted.
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trial testament
duly probated in 1939 by the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled
with an action to recover the lands adjudicated to the defendants by the
same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will, which action is a
resuscitation of The complaint of the same parties that the same court
dismissed in 1952.
It is evident from the allegations of the complaint trial from defendants'
motion to dismiss that plaintiffs' 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a
double-barrelled defense, trial by prescription, acquisitive trial extinctive,
or by what are known in the jus civile trial the jus gentium as usucapio,
longi temporis possesio and praescriptio (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872,
December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).

Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a
will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is
mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76,
Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98
Phil. 249).
The testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for the settlement of
the testator's estate. A special proceeding is distinct trial different from an
ordinary action (Secs. 1 trial 2, Rule 2 trial sec. 1, Rule 72, Rules of Court).
We say that the defense of res judicata, as a ground for the dismissal of
plaintiffs' 1967 complaint, is a two-pronged defense because (1) the 1939
trial 1943 decrees of probate trial distribution in Special Proceeding No.
3171 trial (2) the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 of the lower
court constitute bars by former judgment, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or order
is conclusive upon the title to the thing the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a
will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties trial their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating of the same thing trial under the same title trial in
the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually trial necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal

validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190, sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 838, Civil Code).
That means that the testator was of sound trial disposing mind at the time
when he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace,
fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence
of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine trial is not
a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a
subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the
will. (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395;
Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448).
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness
of its execution cannot be raised anymore (Santos vs. De Buenaventura, L22797, September 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47).
In Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will"
was not entertained after the decree of probate had become final. That
case is summarized as follows:
Wills; Probate; Alledged Fraudulent Will; Appeal. V. died. His will was
admitted to probate without objection. No appeal was taken from said
order. It was admitted that due trial legal notice had been given to all
parties. Fifteen months after the date of said order, a motion was
presented in the lower court to have said will declared null and void, for
the reason that fraud had been practised upon the deceased in the making
of his will.
Held: That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given parties
who are displeased with the order admitting to probate a will, for an appeal
is the time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding
whether or not an order admitting a will to probate will be opened for
fraud, after the time allowed for an appeal has expired, when no appeal is
taken from an order probating a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent
litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions relating to its due
execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution trial as
to the testamentary capacity of The testator. (See Austria vs. Heirs of
Ventenilla. 99 Phil. 1069).
On the other hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication rendered by the trial
court in the testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Florentino Hitosis, having been rendered in a proceeding in rem, is under

the abovequoted section 49(a), binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs.
Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; De la Cerna vs.
Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364; McMaster vs. Hentry Reissmann & Co., 68 Phil.
142).
It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res
judicata with respect to private respondents' complaint, The 1952 order of
dismissal rendered by Judge Maalac in Civil Case No. 696, a judgment in
personam was an adjudication on the merits (Sec. 4, Rule 30, old Rules of
Court). It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the aforequoted
section 49(b) (Anticamara vs. Ong, L-29689. April 14, 1978).
The plaintiffs or private respondents did not even bother to ask for the
annulment of the testamentary proceeding trial the proceeding in Civil
Case No. 696. Obviously, they realized that the final adjudications in those
cases have the binding force of res judicata and that there is no ground,
nor is it timely, to ask for the nullification of the final orders trial judgments
in those two cases.
It is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system, a
principle of public policy, that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object for which the courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies." (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield and
O'Brien, 38 Phil. 521: Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil, 303; De la Cerna vs.
Potot, supra).
After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set
aside only on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process
of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or
collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is
four years from the discovery of the fraud (2 Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp. 245-246; Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil.
1159).
To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the trial court, naively adopting
the theory of plaintiffs' counsel, held that the action for the recovery of the
lands had not prescribed because the rule in article 1410 of the Civil Code,
that "the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe", applies to wills.

That ruling is a glaring error. Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills
trial testaments. The trial court trial plaintiffs' counsel relied upon the case
of Dingle vs. Guillermo, 48 0. G. 4410, allegedly decided by this Court,
which cited the ruling in Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67, that mere lapse of
time cannot give efficacy to void contracts, a ruling elevated to the
category of a codal provision in article 1410. The Dingle case was decided
by the Court of Appeals. Even the trial court did not take pains to verify the
misrepresentation of plaintiffs' counsel that the Dingle case was decided
by this Court. An elementary knowledge of civil law could have alerted the
trial court to the egregious error of plaintiffs' counsel in arguing that article
1410 applies to wills.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 3 trial June 17, 1968 are
reversed trial set aside trial its order of dismissal dated January 10, 1968 is
affirmed. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to
annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the
Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a
probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at
78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived
by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named
Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm
Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first
marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One
will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal
property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his
estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two
children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will
disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his
property outside this country, the testator said: t.hqw

G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of
Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and
LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita

Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm
Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will
disposing of my Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate
Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third
Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of
Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe
Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C,
pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in
Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April 10,
1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and
the codicil It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4,
1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm,
Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife),
Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51,
Rollo).

Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda
and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their
mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in
Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald
B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorneyin-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris
and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's
Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half
conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not
be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila
(par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable
estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the
Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall
share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita
Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net
distributable estate and marital share. A supplemental memorandum also
dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61,
Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that
forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of
the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and.
Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First
Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate.
She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed
an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's
will. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She
submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine
estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine,
through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to
dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint
administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned

Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in
the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and
approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the socalled Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and
Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned
out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by
Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p.
90, testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they
sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM
Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed
by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two
children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated
to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth
(1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No
mention at all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced
Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved
to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the
motion moot considering that it had already approved the declaration of
heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that
he was no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the
Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who
negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to
sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner
of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that
Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he
interposed no objection to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p.
153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with its
order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was
no movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita

Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so
that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the
present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was
notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law
firm filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel
for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that
the firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March
11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and
furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm
was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On
September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of
Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition
praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah),
that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and
the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix
and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due
to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah
compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void
because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the
decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for
lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding
be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated
and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah
compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 2223, Rollo).
Ruling. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to
dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two
wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479
and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It
is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be
settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the
testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this
judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers
her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose.
Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served
with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is
dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR
JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated
June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982,
declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the
resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and
Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on
the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina
Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their
signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1,
2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and
the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public
Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J.
Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated
in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez
by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since
1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been
living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952,
the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno
were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator

devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his
children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof
to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned
legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both
surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly
entitled to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my
above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was legally
married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for
reasons and justifications known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia
J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and
affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past;
that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent,
did comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact,
as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy
bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the
last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance
to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her
children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will
was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was
already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters
testamentary should not be issued to her.

court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the
petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article
1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question
declared valid except the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared
null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in intestacy
to the appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion
for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last
sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to
"appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on
intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to
costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10,
1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This
was denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28,
1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent
court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will
and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of
herein petitioner.

The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her
favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but
in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a
Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the
mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that
even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be
made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for
the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the
testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the
testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.

On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent

The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will
and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the

On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the
ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the
petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's
admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the
Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.

meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the
fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her
alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private
respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the
doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and
Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June
27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of
the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the
legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the
Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry
is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the
Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts
that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator
instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her
surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may
appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings
to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.

... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba,
21 SCRA 428)

Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in
Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its
intrinsic provisions.

The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of
inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the
resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature.

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity,
and in declaring it void.

xxx xxx xxx

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition
for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary
provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and
the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent
and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx

Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will,
which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the
petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with
the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing
upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135,
December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965,
13 SCRA 693).

There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity
of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was
executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had
the mental capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she
completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the
question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate
of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A
of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of
Appeals' decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to
declare the testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and
void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v.
Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in the
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the
case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a
belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case,
et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified
provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply
because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or

concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal
offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants,
by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor
and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same
action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos
shall apply to testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost
six years before the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated
that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been
estranged "for so many years." He also declared that respondents
Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he
stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since
1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and
affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own
husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could
not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing
marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that
the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital
relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J.
Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of
Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48.
Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the
belief that she was legally married to the testator.

The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued

by the private respondents:

3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private

respondents respectfully offer the following analysis:

First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its
face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the
devisee.

FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator
in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there
was nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of course, it maybe
argued that the marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina
Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should be remembered that
Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would
seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so
much so that an action in court was brought concerning the marriage.
(Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)

Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her

alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private
respondents to present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the
legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start
of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had
lived with as man and wife, as already married, was an important and
specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and passed
upon by the Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was
petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in
marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp.
56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the
testimony of petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at
length on the meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN
of August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a
decisive issue right at the inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the
question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner
'were deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that
petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx

SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they

were still both single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married
respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner
married the testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of
about 30 years in between. During those 30 years, could it be believed that
she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her
anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her
groom before she married him in secrecy, especially so when she was
already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by
itself conclusive demonstration that she new that the man she had openly
lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with already two
children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina
Gomez, is it possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or
not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is
un-Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the
deceased testator, is it possible that she would not have known that the
mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was
respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of
Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that of respondent
Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They
are, to say the least, inherently improbable, for they are against the
experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings of

human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she
was going to marry whether or not he was already married to another,
knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that would strain
human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was
already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely
his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off
with the deceased during their younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the
making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the
Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing
the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

After hearing, during which the parties presented their respective

evidences, the probate court rendered judgment upholding the due
execution of the will, and, as therein provided, appointed petitioner Andres
Pascual executor and administrator of the estate of the late Catalina de la
Cruz without bond. The oppositors appealed directly to the Court, the
properties involved being valued at more than P300,000.00, raising only
the issue of the due execution of the will.

G.R. No. L-24819

May 30, 1969

TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, deceased, ANDRES

PASCUAL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Avelino Pascual for petitioner-appellee.
Raul Manglapus and Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O for oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in
Sp. Proc. No. 3312) admitting to probate the purported will of Catalina de la
Cruz.
On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving
descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San
Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960, a petition for the probate of
her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres
Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the
decedent. 1
Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces
of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on the
grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that
the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will
at the time of its execution; that the will was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the
signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.

In this instance, oppositors-appellees claim that the lower court erred in

giving credence to the testimonies of the subscribing witnesses and the
notary that the will was duly executed, notwithstanding the existence of
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies, and in disregarding
their evidence that the will was not signed by all the witnesses in the
presence of one another, in violation of the requirement of the law.
On this point, the lower court said:
Regarding the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony
of the three attesting witnesses and of the Notary Public, some of which
have been enumerated in the Memorandum of Oppositors' counsel, this
Court has taken pains in noting said inconsistencies but found the same
not substantial in nature sufficient to discredit their entire testimony on the
due execution of Exhibit "D". It is to be noted that Exhibit "D" was signed in
1954 and that the attesting witnesses testified in Court in 1962 or after a
lapse of eight years from the date of the signing of the document. It is,
therefore, understandable and reasonable to expect that said witnesses
will not retain a vivid picture of the details surrounding the execution and
signing of the will of Catalina de la Cruz. What is important and essential is
that there be unanimity and certainty in their testimony regarding the
identity of the signatures of the testatrix, the attesting witnesses, and the
Notary Public, and the fact that they were all present at the time those
signatures were affixed on the document Exhibit "D". ....
In this jurisdiction, it is the observed rule that, where a will is contested,
the subscribing with are generally regarded as the best qualified to testify
on its due execution. However, it is similarly recognized that for the
testimony of such witnesses to be entitled to full credit, it must be
reasonable and unbiased, and not overcome by competent evidence, direct
or circumstantial. 2 For it must be remembered that the law does not simply
require the presence of three instrumental witnesses; it demands that the
witnesses be credible. 3
In connection with the issue under consideration, we agree with the trial
judge that the contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the

testimonies of the witnesses and the notary, pointed out by the oppositorsappellants (such as the weather condition at the time the will was
executed; the sequence of the signing by the witnesses; and the length of
time it took to complete the act), relate to unimportant details of the
impressions of the witnesses about certain details which could have been
affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory, and
which inconsistencies, by themselves, would not alter the probative value
of their testimonies on the due execution of the will [cf. Peo. vs. Sigue, 86
Phil. 139-140 (3 years interval)].
In Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana, L-13781, 30 January 1960, 106 Phil.
1076, this Court ruled:
For the purpose of determining the due execution of a will, it is not
necessary that the instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and
detailed account of the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the
signing of the document by the said witnesses. It is sufficient that they
have seen or at least were so situated at the moment that they could have
seen each other sign, had they wanted to do so. In fact, in the instant case,
at least two witnesses, ... both testified that the testator and the 3
witnesses signed in the presence of each and every one of them (Jaboneta
vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 451; Neyra vs. Neyra, 42 Off. Gaz. 2817; Fernandez vs.
Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380.).
Neither do we believe that the fact that the witnesses were better known
to proponent Andres Pascual than to the testatrix suffices to render their
testimony suspect. Under the circumstances, considering the admitted fact
that when the will was executed (1954) the testatrix was already 83 years
old, suffering from rheumatism to the extent that she had to wear thick
socks and soft shoes, it did not unlikely that she should have entrusted the
task of requesting them to act as witnesses to Andres Pascual himself,
albeit the said witnesses, testifying eight years later, should have stated
that they were asked by Catalina to witness her testament. The error of
recall, considering the eight-year interval, is consonant with the well known
vagaries of human memory and recollection, particularly since the main
detail that must have stuck in his minds is that they did witness the signing
of the will, upon which their attention must have principally concentrated.
That they did so is attested by their signatures and those of the deceased
testatrix, which are nowhere impugned; nor is there any claim by
appellants that the latter was incapable of reading and understanding the
will that she signed. In fact, the evidence is that she did read it before
signing. The authorities are to the effect that friendly relations of the
witnesses with the testator or the beneficiaries do not affect the credibility
of the former, 4 so that the proven friendship between the proponent and

the instrumental witnesses would have no bearing on the latter's

qualification to testify on the circumstances surrounding the signing of the
will.
Appellant's main reliance is the alleged tape recording of a conversation
between instrumental witness Manuel Jiongco and oppositor Pedro B. Cruz
at the latter's house sometime in 1960 (which recording was admittedly
taken without Jiongco's knowledge) wherein said witness is supposed to
have stated that when he signed the will the other witnesses' signatures
were already affixed, and were not then present, and that he (Jiongco)
signed the document in 1958 or 1959 (Exhibit 22; transcription; Exhibit 23
et. seq.).
There are two circumstances that militate against giving credence to
particular evidence. The first is that there is no adequate proof that the
declarations tape recorded were in fact made by Jiongco. The latter denied
that the voice was his, and in this respect the trial judge stated (Record on
Appeal, pages 83-84):
We do not doubt the fact that Manuel Jiongco was in the house of Pedro
Cruzon the occasion that Exhibit "23" was taken. But it is important to note
that when said recording was replayed before Manuel Jiongco in Court he
denied that the voice which uttered the above-quoted portions in the
conversation was his. So that with the denial of Manuel Jiongco, the Court
was left with no other recourse than to make its own comparison between
the natural voice of the witness, Manuel Jiongco, while testifying on the
witness stand and his supposed recorded voice in Exhibit "23". It is to be
admitted that we noted some similarity between the two voices but it was
not enough to justify a categorical and definite conclusion that the
recorded voice identified by Pedro Cruz to be that of Manuel Jiongco is in
truth and in fact the voice of the latter. Between a testimony given in Court
under oath which was subjected to and stood of rigorous cross-examination
and loose statements made out of Court which even then are of doubtful
source, this Court gives full faith and credence to the former. And this is
true even if this particular witness admits having a poor memory, and his
trustworthiness is assailed due to a previous record of an administrative
case filed against him wherein he was fined for a charge of falsification of
public document (see Exh. "25"). This is so, because the veracity of his
testimony in Court regarding the due execution of Exhibit "D" is
corroborated and confirmed by the testimony of the two other attesting
witnesses to the document and the Notary Public who notarized the same.
Not having heard Jiongco testify, this court is not in a position to contradict
the appreciation of the trial court that the voice in the tape recording was

not really that of Jiongco. And considering that he denied that fact under
oath, that the tape recording was not supported by truly impartial
evidence, and was done without the knowledge of the witness, we cannot
see our way clear to rule that Jiongco has been successfully impeached,
and shown guilty of false testimony. It would be dangerous to rule
otherwise.
The second point that renders incredible the alleged assertion of Jiongco in
the tape recording, that he signed the testament only in 1958 or 1959, is
that in the Notarial Registry of the notary, Gatdula, the ratification of the
testament appears among the entries for 1954, as well as in the
corresponding copies (Exhibit I) filed by him with Bonifacio Sumulong, the
employee in charge of the Notarial Section of the Clerk of Court's office,
who produced them at the trial upon subpoena, and who testified to his
having searched for and found them in the vaults of the Clerk of Court's
office. No evidence exists that these documents were not surrendered and
filed at the Clerk of Court's office, as required by law, and in the regular
course of official duty. Certainly, the notary could not have reported in
1954 what did not happen until 1958.
In view of the evidence, we do not feel justified in concluding that the trial
court erred in accepting the concordant testimony of the instrumental
witnesses as warranting the probate of the will in question, taking into
account the unexcelled opportunity of the court a quo to observe the
demeanor, and judge the credibility, of the witness thereby. Furthermore, it
would not be the first time in this jurisdiction that a will has been admitted
to probate even if the instrumental witness testified contrary to the other
two, provided the court is satisfied, as in this case, that the will was
executed and attested in the manner provided by law (Fernandez vs.
Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil. 742; Cuyugan vs.
Baron, 69 Phil. 639; Ramirez vs. Butte, 100 Phil 635). There is greater
reason to admit the will to probate where only the testimony of one
witness is subjected to serious, if unsuccessful attack.
Contestants further assail the admission to probate on the ground that the
execution of the will was tainted by fraud and undue influence exerted by
proponent on the testarix, and affirm that it was error for the lower court to
have rejected their claim. Said the court in this regard (Record on Appeal,
page 87):
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a Will was
made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was
obtained through fraud and undue pressure or influence, for we have
numerous instances where strangers are preferred to blood relatives in the

institution of heirs. But in the case at bar, Andres Pascual, although not
related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a
stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of
fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres
Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so that
Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her
property in her Will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.
Before considering the correctness of these findings, it is worthwhile to
recall the basic principles on undue pressure and influence as laid down by
the jurisprudence of this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the
influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the
mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express
the will of another rather than his own (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil.
596; Icasiano vs. Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964; Teotico vs. Del Val, L18753, 26 March 196); that the contention that a will was obtained by
undue influence or improper pressure cannot be sustained on mere
conjecture or suspicion, as it is enough that there was opportunity to
exercise undue influence, or a possibility that it may have been exercised
(Ozaeta vs. Cuartero, L-5597, 31 May 1956); that the exercise of improper
pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence
that it was actually exercised (Ozatea vs. Cuartero, ante; Teotico vs. Del
Val, L-18753, 26 March 1965); that the burden is on the person challenging
the will to show that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution
(Teotico vs. Del Val, ante); that mere general or reasonable influence is not
sufficient to invalidate a will (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, ante); nor is
moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the
testator (Barreto vs. Reyes, L-5831-31, 31 January 1956), or omission of
relatives, not forced heirs, evidence of undue influence (Bugnao vs. Ubag,
14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs. Coronel, 45 Phil. 416).
Tested against these rulings, the circumstances marshalled by the
contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence or improper
pressure exercised on the testarix by the proponent. Their main reliance is
on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the
deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it" (t.s.n., page 7, 27
January 1962), which does not amount to proof that she would sign
anything that proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of
contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for
the testarix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de
la Cruz" to be painted thereon in bold letters to mislead the deceased,
even if true, demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to
overpower to destroy the free will of the testarix. Because if the mind of
the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the

contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse to the deception

averred.lawphi1.et
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testarix, who asked Dr.
Sanchez to be one of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue
influence, for the reason that the rheumetism of the testarix made it
difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to
relatives or friends is, likewise explainable: it would have meant the
disclosure of the terms of her will to those interested in her succession but
who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant
importunity and recriminations that an aged person would naturally seek
to avoid. The natural desire to keep the making of a will secret can,
likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament during her
lifetime.
We conclude that the trial court committed no error in finding the
appellant's evidence established at most grounds for suspicion but fell far
short of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or influence.
Considering that testarix considered proponent as her own son, to the
extent that she expressed no objection to his being made the sole heir of
her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing
abnormalin her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary. As stated
by the Court in the Knutson case
The truth of the matter is that bequests and devises to those in whom the
testator has confidence and who have won his affection are more likely to
be free from undue influence that bequests or devises to others. (In re
Knutson's Will, 41 Pac. 2d 793).
Appellants invoked presumption of undue influence held to exist by
American authorities where the beneficiary participates in the drafting of
execution of the will favoring him; but since the will was prepared by Atty.
Pascual, although nephew of the proponent, we do not think the
presumption applies; for in the normal course of events, said attorney
would follow the instructions of the testatrix; and a member of the bar in
good standing may not be convicted of unprofessional conduct, or of
having conspired to falsify a statement, except upon clear proof.
The charge of fraud, being premised on the existence of undue influence,
needs no separate discussion.
WHEREFORE, the decree of probate appealed from is affirmed; with costs
against contestants-appellants.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES,

petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs.
Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived
by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna
Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed
has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R.
Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix
of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of
the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated
February 4, 1975.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of

the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned
Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition.
First is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-inlaw? Second are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow
from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said
widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those
who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the
same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several
heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in
equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or
their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the
same share as that of a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid
of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either

by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the

Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to
1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of
the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-inlaw, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the
provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those
in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse
in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the
estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in
Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married
to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it

unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited
does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said
Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the
deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the
mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded
to the trial-court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by

Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz

G.R. No. 179859

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of

which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if
he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to
succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed
his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as
she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband
Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her
husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving

spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

August 9, 2010

IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF

BASILIO SANTIAGO, MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE
SANTIAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF
RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
TOMAS SANTIAGO, Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO,
GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO, Oppositors.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to Bibiana
Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan.
Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of
herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and
Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo,
respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed
Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner
Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.1

After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan2 a petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed as SP
No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC
and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN,
IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga nasabing
tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at mamamahala ng
balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na nasasaysay sa itaas na
2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop at lupat
bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng daang MalolosPaombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang palaisdaan na
nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente;
ngunit ang kita ng palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa lahat at
anomang kailangang gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupat
bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c)
ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang
pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila
at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko
sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay
ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Zoilo,
Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang
pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng
aking kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni
Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang
magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na
ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o
pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa

kanila at pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa

kanila ding kapakinabangan at kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila, ay
ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak
na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente
at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan,
makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng
dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din
nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng
nasabing mga pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba
pang mga gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o
salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) 3
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and his first wife,
were, on their motion, allowed to intervene.4
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting, Partition
and Distribution in Accordance with the Will," 5 the probate court approved
the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of
Bulacan and Manila to register the certificates of title indicated therein. 6
Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos,
Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were transferred in the name of
petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.7
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention 8 with the
probate court, alleging that Basilios second wife was not Irene but a
certain Maria Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilios will
violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code.9
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its
previous approval of the "Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in
Accordance with the Will."10
The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for
completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
562-M-90,11 against the heirs of the second and third marriages.
In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially
maintained that they were partially preterited by Basilios will because
their legitime was reduced.12 They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory
and appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be conducted and that Ma.
Pilar and Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting of all the

incomes of the properties from the time of Basilios death up to the time of
the filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-90.13
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime)
in favor of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.

Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also rendered
an accounting of their administration from such death of the testator up to
the present or until transfer of said properties and its administration to the
said legatees.
x x x x20

On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals, by

Decision of January 25, 2002, 14 annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17,
holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention
in SP No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978 Order approving the probate of
the will constitute res judicata with respect to Civil Case No. 562-M-90. 15
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is hereby ANNULLED on the ground of
res judicata. Let the Decree of Distribution of the Estate of Basilio Santiago
remain UNDISTURBED.
SO ORDERED.16 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate courts
decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
155606, which this Court denied. 17 The denial became final and executory
on April 9, 2003.18
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second
marriage filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for
Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in
the Names of the Legatees.19 Citing the earlier quoted portions of Basilios
will, they alleged that:

Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:

1) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to
[the] Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the names of the
designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament, to wit:
1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
2) Tomas
3) Zoilo
4) Ma. Pilar
5) Ricardo
6) Cipriano
7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
9) Clemente at

x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties should
be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
expired on September 16, 1993.

10) Cleotilde
(all surnamed SANTIAGO)

Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have

ceased as such administrator[s] way back on September 16, 1993 and
they should have transferred the above said titles to the named legatees in
the Last Will and Testament of the testator by then. Said named legatees in
the Last Will and Testament are no[ne] other than the following:
xxxx

2) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject

properties, including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees.
3) To render an accounting of their administration of said properties and
other properties of the testator under their administration, from death of

testator Basilio Santiago on September 16, 1973 up to the present and

until possession and administration thereof is transferred to said
legatees.21
Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the Final
Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with
the subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the properties
involved, the case had long since been closed and terminated. 22
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be
transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of
administration only, granted the motion, by Order of September 5, 2003, 23
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Termination of
Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of
the Legatees dated October 3, 2000 filed by some heirs of the testator
Basilio Santiago xxx is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the administratrix
[sic] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Mr. Clemente Santiago are hereby DIRECTED,
as follows:
a.) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to
this Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the names of the
designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament, to wit: 1.) asawa,
Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak na 2.) Tomas 3). Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo
6.) Cipriano 7.) Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde all
named SANTIAGO.
b.) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject
properties including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees;
and
c.) To render an accounting of their administration of subject properties,
including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of the above-mentioned
estate of the testator or all the above said lots including the rice mill,
animal feeds factory, and all improvements thereon from August 14, 1978
up to the present.
e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition, indicating how the parties
may actually partition or adjudicate all the above said properties including
the properties already in the name of all the said legatees xxx.

x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to cancel
and consider as no force and effects Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and
T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and
Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in the lieu thereof in the names
of Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma. Pilar
Santiago, Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia
Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to cancel
and consider as no force and effect Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044
[Lot No. 8-C] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the names of the Heirs of Bibiana
Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma.
Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco, dated
December 3, 2002, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 24
Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been closed and
terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject properties
cannot actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the death of the
testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that something more
has to be done after the approval of said Final Accounting, Partition, and
Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on September 16, 1973,
hence, the present action can only be filed after September 16, 1993.
Movants cause of action accrues only from the said date and for which no
prescription of action has set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present probate
proceeding which is continuing in character, and terminates only after and
until the final distribution or settlement of the whole estate of the
deceased in accordance with the provision of the will of the testator. The
Order dated August 14, 1978 refers only to the accounting, partition, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased for the period covering from the
date of the filing of the petition for probate on December 27, 1973 up to
August 14, 1978. And in the said August 14, 1978 order it does not
terminate the appointment of petitioner[s] Ma. Pilar Santiago and

Clemente Santiago as executrix and administrator, respectively, of the

estate of the deceased particularly of those properties which were
prohibited by the testator to be partitioned within 20 years from his death.
Since then up to the present, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
remain the executor and administrator of the estate of the deceased and
as such, they are required by law to render an accounting thereof from
August 14, 1978 up to the present; there is also now a need to partition
and distribute the aforesaid properties as the prohibition period to do so
has elapsed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)25
Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for
reconsideration,26 which the probate court denied, drawing them to appeal
to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court, 27 hence,
the petition28 which raises the following grounds:
I. CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE ITSELF"
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING ITSELF WITH ITS
PREVIOUS DECISION INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES AND SAME
PROPERTIES;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC AS IT AGREED
WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
C. IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HELD
THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA; IN C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS
NO RES JUDICATA.
II. GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL THE COMPETENCE
AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS ORDER TO TRANSFER THE MANILA
PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004 TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA
LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA. PILAR, RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD,
EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO." 29
(emphasis in the original)
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners argument that the decision of the appellate court in the earlier
CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes

res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the
present petition for review) fails.
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and
47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 30 The first, known as "bar
by prior judgment," proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action already settled in a prior action. 31
The second, known as "conclusiveness of judgment," ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.32
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the
present case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on the
reduction of their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present
petition, which solely tackles the propriety of the termination of
administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the names of the
legatees-heirs of the second and third marriages. There is clearly no
similarity of claim, demand or cause of action between the present petition
and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of parties,
"conclusiveness of judgment" cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as regards
the issue on oppositors supposed preterition and reduction of legitime,
which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked, in the
present petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors only. The
records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the decision of
the appellate court in this case and were only impleaded pro forma parties.
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate court in
CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio
should remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to prohibit
the interference of the oppositors in the distribution of Basilios estate and
does not pertain to respondents supervening right to demand the
termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in their
names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting
respondents Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and

for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees is a proper and

necessary continuation of the August 14, 1978 Order that approved the
accounting, partition and distribution of Basilios estate. As did the
appellate court, the Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to
become final pending the whole settlement of the estate. And final
settlement of the estate, in this case, would culminate after 20 years or on
September 16, 1993, when the prohibition to partition the properties of the
decedent would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila,
covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the
legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testators intent that no one is to
own the same.1avvphi1
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he intended
the house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners names for
administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs
in common, thus:
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c)
ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang
pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila
at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko
sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang
itoy walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng
sinomang magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan
sa paaralan sa Maynila at katabing mga lunsod x x x x 33 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is
subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the appellate court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]s contention, is
to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083
of the Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in
a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years x x x x
xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a
property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy

to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the

Civil Code x x x x34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

daughters1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona

respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. 2

P.

Arellano,

and

In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of

Letters of Administration," docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the
donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of
Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which
donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance
legitime" of petitioner.
Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as
Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC. 3
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati,
which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it
"may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court,
acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the
validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated
property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedents estate,4 the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in
light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on
to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil
Code which reads:5
G.R. No. 189776

December 15, 2010

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed

guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate
estate. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
that:

1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of

Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;
3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and
the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of
Angel N. Pascual;
4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:
a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati
TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income thereon;
b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters located at
Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;
c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta Galera
Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;
d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the following
Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906, A006087, A065796,
A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026,
C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308,
S69309;

a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No. 181889;

b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real properties
covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the Register of Deeds of
Makati City and the property covered by OCT No. 2159, to be divided
equally between them up to the extent that each of their share have been
equalized with the actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of
donation, the value of which shall be determined by an independent
appraiser to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and
Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not sufficient to equalize the
shares, then Franciscos and Miguels shares may be satisfied from either
in cash property or shares of stocks, at the rate of quotation. The
remaining properties shall be divided equally among Francisco, Miguel and
Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO
IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION
UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following

Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680,
A020786, S18539, S14649;

III

f. share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.;

. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED

ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO
LEGITIMES.

g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name
of Nona Arellano;

xxxx

i. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by TCT No.
181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;

and
V

j. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch 64 of

the Court on November 17, 1995.
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:

. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. EQUALLY

AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.6 (underscoring supplied)

By Decision7 of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners

appeal "partly meritorious." It sustained the probate courts ruling that the
property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:

. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO

COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III

Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on

equality of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter
vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered
a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under the circumstances,
the value of such immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance
legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate.
The trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the
said property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.8 (citation
omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvph!1
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the
probate court, herein petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence
of shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included
in the inventory submitted by the administrator."
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of
properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the
partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in
accordance with the disquisitions herein.9 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration 10 having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution11 of October 7, 2009, the present petition for
review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its
ruling
I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO
PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE
TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II

. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED

BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. EQUALLY
AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE
HEIRS.12 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to
petitioner is subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate
should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere
mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by
the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the
return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by
the testator during his lifetime.13
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory
heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after
finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. 14
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no
compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. 15
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that
part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for compulsory heirs.16
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary,
and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have
precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children

and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory

heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the
legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The
concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the
primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and
the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs. 17
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was
left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was valid, 18 is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"
chargeable against the free portion of the estate. 19 There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among
his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents,
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N.
Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch
135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms
part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally
among the parties.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185226

February 11, 2010

CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as administratrix of the estate litigated

in the case below, RAMIRO T. MADARANG, and the heirs of
CASIMIRO R. MADARANG, JR., namely: Estrelita L. Madarang,
Consuelo P. Madarang, Casimiro Madarang IV, and Jane Margaret
Madarang-Crabtree, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG and VICENTE R. MADARANG, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on
June 3, 1995, leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value
of P200,000.00.1 He was survived by his wife Dolores and their five
children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon.
In the intestate proceedings filed by the couples son Jose which was
lodged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57,
Dolores was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of Casimiro,
Sr.2
Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the
decedents estate. Jose filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it
omitted six lots including Lot 829-B-4-B located in Cebu City which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125429.
A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed
part of the estate of the decedent. By Order of April 5, 2002, 3 the RTC,
noting the following:

x x x The said properties appear to have been acquired by the spouses

after [their marriage on] December 27, 1931 and during their marriage or
coverture. Article 160 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines (which is the
governing law in this particular case) is very explicit in providing that all
properties of the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership. This presumption, to the mind of the Court, has not been
sufficiently rebutted by the special administratrix. [Dolores] This
presumption applies and holds even if the land is registered under the
wifes name as long as it was acquired during marriage (De Guinoo vs.
Court of Appeals. G.R. No. L-5541, June 26, 1955) or even if the wife
purchased the land alone (Flores, et.al. Vs. Escudero, et.al., G.R. No. L5302, March 11, 1953).4 (underscoring supplied),

Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that
since the title to Lot 829-B-4-B remained registered in the name of his
parents, it should not be excluded from the Inventory; and that the Deed of
Donation in Vicentes favor was not notarized nor registered with the
Register of Deeds. Joses motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Order of February 5, 2003, he filed a Notice of Appeal.

instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.

Jose later filed before the appellate court a "Motion to Withdraw Petition"
which his co-heirs-oppositors-herein petitioners opposed on the ground
that, inter alia, a grant thereof would "end" the administration proceedings.
The appellate court, by Resolution of January 18, 2008, 8 granted the
withdrawal on the ground that it would "not prejudice the rights of the
oppositors."

Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be
referred to as "oppositors,"5 questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six
lots via motion for reconsideration during the pendency of which motion
the court appointed herein petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her
mother Dolores.
As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been
transferred during the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to
submit their affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support the allegation.
Only herein respondent Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared
that one of the six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of
Donation executed in August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro,
Sr.6
It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the
provisional inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.
The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003, 7 thus modified its April 5, 2002
Order as follows:
Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be
excluded. The administratrix is directed within sixty (60) days: (1) to
submit a revised inventory in accordance with the Order dated April 5,
2002, as here modified; and (2) to render an accounting of her
administration of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang. (underscoring
supplied),

In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Jose claimed that the RTC
erred in excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory as "what the lower
court should have done was to . . . maintain the order including said lot in
the inventory of the estate so Vicente can file an ordinary action where its
ownership can be threshed out."

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts grant of

Joses Motion to Withdraw Petition was, by Resolution of November 6,
2008,9 denied in this wise:
xxxx
In the instant case, the Probate Court found that the parties of the case
interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the
inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have
consented thereto. x x x
xxxx
Moreover, [herein petitioners] in their appeal brief, ha[ve] extensively
argued that . . . Vicente Madarang [to whom the questioned lot was
donated] and his family have been in continuous, actual and physical
possession of the donated lot for over twenty (20) years, even before the
execution of the so called donation inter vivos in 1992. . . . Vicente
Madarang has his residential house thereon and that his ownership over
the donated lot has been fully recognized by the entire Madarang Clan,
including all his brothers and sisters, except the much belated objection by
the appellant (Jose), allegedly resorted to as an act of harassment. 10
(emphasis and underscoring supplied),

thus affirming the RTC order of exclusion of the questioned lot.

Hence, the present petition for review filed by the oppositors-herein
petitioners. Casimiro, Jr. having died during the pendency of the case, he
was substituted by his wife petitioner Estrelita and co-petitioners children
Consuelo, Casimiro IV, and Jane Margaret.
Petitioners contend that since the only issue for consideration by the
appellate court was the merit of Joses "Motion to Withdraw Petition," it
exceeded its jurisdiction when it passed upon the merits of Joses appeal
from the RTC order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory.
Petitioners contention does not lie.
In their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts grant of Joses
"Motion to Withdraw Petition," petitioners, oddly denying the existence of a
"petition," raised the issue of the propriety of the RTC Order excluding Lot
829-B-4-B from the Inventory. Their prayer in their Motion clearly states so:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Oppositors-Appellees [petitioners]
respectfully PRAY for this Honorable Court to RECONSIDER its questioned
Resolution and rendering [sic], forthwith, a decision resolving the merits of
the Partial Appeal of petitioner-appellant Jose Madarang.11 (capitalization in
the original; emphasis supplied)
The appellate court did not thus err in passing on the said issue.
More specifically, petitioners question the appellate courts finding that as
the parties "interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4B in the inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they
have consented thereto."12
A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there
was no accord among the parties respecting the exclusion of Lot 829-B-4-B.
While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act
on questions of title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or
exclusion in the inventory of properties of a decedent, make a provisional
determination of ownership, without prejudice to a final determination
through a separate action in a court of general jurisdiction.1avvphil

B-4-B. It bears stress that the question is one of collation or advancement

by the decedent to an heir over which the question of title and ownership
can be passed upon by a probate court.13
As earlier reflected, Vicentes claim of ownership over Lot 829-B-4-B rests
upon a deed of donation by his father (decedent) and his mother.
Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the
account of partition. (underscoring supplied)
in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to
advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to
any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have
been donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent
Vicente, should not be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the
decedent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed November 6, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Corazon M.
Gregorio and her co-administratrix Dolores Madarang are DIRECTED to
include Lot 829-B-4-B in the Inventory of the properties of the intestate
estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr.
Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin, the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57, which is DIRECTED to proceed with the
disposition of the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the
probate court to make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA
DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:

Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving

the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of OppositorsAppellants' proposed counter-project of partition. 1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in
Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit,
six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita
Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and
Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is
the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased
legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs
(except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositorsappellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and
written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the
above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate
grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon,
Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her
properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land
appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank
deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated
March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly
allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera
was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her
bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo
of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the
properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and
the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963
upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death
thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each
of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (/7 of the half
of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
descendants). 4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be

divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she

devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the
entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by
the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in
substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina
(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to
have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest
of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia
received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively
given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their
respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and
Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the
cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime
mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
untouched.<re||an1w>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of
partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution
of the estate on the following basis:

(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the

value of one-half () of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half ()
amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants
should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor
proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants
in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties
left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the
grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties
respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D.
Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be
proportionally reduced.

controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the
testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her
own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of
the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some
P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the
will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon),
to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he
payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the
requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired
is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the
last wishes of the testatrix."

Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary

disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of
P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the
amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees
totalling one-half thereof as follows:

From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed

this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56

Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80

T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as
constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositorsappellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11
as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix'
project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil
Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced,
the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process
has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is
observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the
source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully
restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld,
will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in

1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will

are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and
therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime
under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under
Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on
account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the
Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of
the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." 5 In consonance therewith,
our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791
thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the
disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will
are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred
which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico 6 for violation of these
rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of
Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned
the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of
the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of

interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution
and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that
his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in
the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last
will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully
obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may
substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted
by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary
disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in
the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all
her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and
the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her
property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is
my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with
the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified
each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the
Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as
it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a
testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory
heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the
right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title
less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of
the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as
they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of
partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita,
Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively

distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each
were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee,
Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were
favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than
their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even
in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as
Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the
provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as
under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was
intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to
partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the
efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us,
for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which
perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of
Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court
rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositorsappellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or
partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they
would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the
disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment
of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would
amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the
testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run
counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition
legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will
of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in
favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other
compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in
accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made
by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor
in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory
heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became
the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers
upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him'
(Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to

rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659,
and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in
question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties,
especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly
recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary
dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property,
citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her
assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs.
From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous
conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by
operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion,
that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the
compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature
of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the
remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in
the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be
considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the
will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some
small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this
opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through
her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into
devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the
estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions
were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere
devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the
fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise
command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament
any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at
the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said
deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary
dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs,
do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code
precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of

his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own
theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers
precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored
by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he
devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,
provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of
the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is
the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as
well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the
testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080
of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the
primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left
by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise
provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and
invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not
deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or
chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in
an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have
a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix,
without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which
would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having
left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the
legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants,
the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the
Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of
partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the
remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the
testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed
with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the
approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the
purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them
to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with
and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by
implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact

to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The

appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the
commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon
joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any
question and none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof
or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The
plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has
greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no
legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the
testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and
accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise,
estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every
subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the
estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964,
one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on
account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does
not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of
partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that
she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by
way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements
of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the
last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21
That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when
the value of the currency has declined further, whereas they could have
received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project
of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to
their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without
cost.

This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties

earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not
been included.1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the
parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation.
The private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article
1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she
has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation
and the donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the
donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate
the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

G.R. No. L-46903

July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma
and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and
administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was
appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate.

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court, * which
held that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay,
expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in,
and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate. 3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court **
holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to
collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation
and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of
the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa
akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda,
may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may
pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng

kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat

sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at
tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli,
ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng
kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga
lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng
mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay
nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at
mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa
sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang
legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga
lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may
layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre
Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above
provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As
the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as
"irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition
against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under
Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in
the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also
presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being
made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the
document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to
collate if that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was an implied
prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free
portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is
not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is
officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition
to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and

unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article
1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the
exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner
regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court
beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the
1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was
merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the
corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been
reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also
impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the
need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their
dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken
by the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
the petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B.
LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL
V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO
JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J.
BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE
JAUCIAN, respondents.
Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.
Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186
affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian,
et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property
with damages is sought. in these proceedings initiated by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It
was however reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment thereon.
The petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed
to submit their memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having
been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and
Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and
agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his
death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were
adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;

(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the
petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all
surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen
(18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga,
Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought
into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought
into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from her
parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by
other properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1
which however was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the
Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio
Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano
Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife,
Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was
drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they
had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should
revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties
would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and
nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering
illness. In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138,
CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. As
directed in his will, Doa Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate.
Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the
inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate
court for approval, 6 Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos.
1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his
capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items
Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to
her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria
Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last
two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio
was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties;
and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her

lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who

prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to
the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio,
Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her
life-long companion in her house.
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their
compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his
voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in
years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment,
Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews
and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which
she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and
nieces:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000
Jose R. Locsin
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco

5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto Aurea Locsin
16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto favor of Mariano Locsin
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina
Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin
2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio
Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own
nephews and nieces and others:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE

2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000

Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
in favor of Francisco M.
Maquiniana
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300
favor of Francisco
Maquiniana
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000
favor of Ireneo Mamia
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750
favor of Zenaida Buiza
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Felisa Morjella
30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000
favor of Inocentes Motocinos
31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Casimiro Mondevil
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200
favor of Juan Saballa
25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500
of Rogelio Marticio
Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973
affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in
favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will,
all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for
probate because the properties devised to them under the will had already
been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except

some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.

incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing, of this
case

In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian
nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and
hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties
which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that
the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended
solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to
Doa Catalina did not join the action.

(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00
each as moral damages; and

After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the
plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the
defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and
Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire
estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the
nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio,
both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange
and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J.
Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory of known
properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all
certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this
case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives therefrom, and issue new
ones to the plaintiffs;
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership
and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all
muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered, and all the fruits and
incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal
interest from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery
cannot be effected for reasons that might have intervened and prevent the
same, defendants shall pay for the value of such properties, fruits and

(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any
contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants. 9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186)
which rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming
the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private
respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin,
entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more
than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part
of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to
a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and
do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had
transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer
formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may
lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her
estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if
those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising
under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced)
heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa
Catalina, in transferring the properties she had received from her late
husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in
violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said
respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she

had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be
impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom
to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth
in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents
may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the
donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct,
sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the
time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported
by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
petition of any person affected. (634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90
years old when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her
advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced
and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the
petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited from
Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa
Catalina had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces
the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m.
lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13
On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43
hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or
on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian
Locsin. 15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa
Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 17 At least
Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped
from assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of
Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the partition
agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot
2020.
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the
sales of property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano
Locsin in 1975. 18

There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was
mentally incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can
any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was
transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously
disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her
nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) onehalf (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967,
she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. 19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to
her relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo
Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro
Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions
was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not
only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was
competent to make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any
doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of
property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire
estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the
implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had
inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doa Catalina's admission
in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private
properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital
at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42
are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have
known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her
paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included.
The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the
probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of
Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel,
Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false
inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his
own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that
before Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless,
had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to
their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses

and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a tale
out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among
Doa Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyernephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena
Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and
their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not
join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made
in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to
do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina
acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor
of the petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it
would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud,
undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or
donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian,
daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her
nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her
properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the
petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew,
Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 19,
1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated
February 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed
dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all
witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa Catalina's niece,
Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece,
Maria Olbes. 26 The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July

15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given
those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but
free and voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and
reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after
the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after Doa
Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions
were recorded in the Registry of Property, 28 whether considered an action
based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs.
The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions
because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to
them and the whole world. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March
14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts
and reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the
private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.