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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 138884. June 6, 2002.
RODOLFO DE LEON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and SPOUSES ESTELITA and AVELINO
BATUNGBACAL, respondents.
Actions Judgments Appeals A several judgment is proper
only when the liability of each party is clearly separable and
distinct from that of his coparties, such that the claims against
each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and
judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the
otherwhere a common cause of action exists against the
defendants, as in actions against solidary debtors, a several
judgment is not proper.A several judgment is proper only when
the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from
that of his coparties, such that the claims against each of them
could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or
against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. Where a
common cause of action exists against the defendants, as in
actions against solidary debtors, a several judgment is not proper.
In this case, private respondents are sued together under a
common cause of action and are sought to be held liable as
solidary debtors for a loan contracted by Estelita. This is the clear
import of the allegation in the complaint that the proceeds of the
loan benefited the conjugal partnership.
Same Same Same Between two judgments rendered by a
trial court, there could only be one judgment that finally disposes
of the case on the merits, and it is receipt of notice of said final
judgment that marks the point when the reglementary period is to
begin running.Between the two judgments rendered by the trial
court, there could only be one judgment
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015752d6c1a583f6daa4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False
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VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002
217
that finally disposes of the case on the merits. Receipt of notice of

this final judgment marks the point when the reglementary
period is to begin running. In this case, that judgment is the
decision rendered by the trial court on June 2, 1997 and it is only
from the date of notice of this decision that the reglementary
period began to run. The partial judgment dated May 14, 1996
was rendered only with respect to one issue in the case and is not
the final and appealable order or judgment that finally disposes of
the case on the merits. It must, therefore, only be appealed
together with the decision dated June 2, 1997.
Same Same Words and Phrases Final and Interlocutory
Orders A final order is that which gives an end to the litigation,
and when the order or judgment does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is
merely interlocutory.A final order is that which gives an end to
the litigation. When the order or judgment does not dispose of the
case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits,
it is merely interlocutory. Quite obviously, the partial judgment
ordering Estelita to pay petitioner is an interlocutory order
because it leaves other things for the trial court to do and does not
decide with finality the rights and obligations of the parties.
Specifically, at the time the partial judgment was rendered, there
remained other issues including whether the husband Avelino
had any liability under Article 121 of the Family Code. However,
as the partial judgment disposed of one of the issues involved in
the case, it is to be taken in conjunction with the decision dated
June 2, 1997. Together, these two issuances form one integrated
decision.
Same Same Attorneys Pleadings and Practice When a party
is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices
must be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and to
any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law.
The question now is when the period to appeal should actually
commence, from June 6, 1997, as petitioner contends or from
June 10, 1997, as private respondent Estelita Batungbacal
claims? We hold that the period began to run on June 6, 1997
when counsel for private respondents received a copy of the
decision dated June 2, 1997. When a party is represented by
counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon
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said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not
the counsel of record, is not notice in law. The exception to this
rule is when service upon the party himself has been ordered by
the court. In this case, it does not appear that there was any
substitution of counsel or that service upon private respondent
Estelita Batungbacal had been specifically ordered by the trial
court hence, the counsel of record for the private respondents is
presumed to be
218
218

their counsel on appeal and the only one authorized to receive

court processes. Notice of the judgment upon such counsel,
therefore, was notice to the clients for all legal intents and
purposes.
Same Same Parties Where the spouses have been jointly
sued under a common cause of action, an appeal made by the
husband inures to the benefit of the wife.Private respondents
appeal had been taken within the reglementary period since
Avelino Batungbacal had filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 1997
or 13 days from their counsels receipt of the decision on June 6,
1997. Respondent spouses having been jointly sued under a
common cause of action, an appeal made by the husband inures to
the benefit of the wife. The notice of appeal filed by Estelita was a
superfluity, the appeal having been perfected earlier by her
husband.
Same Same The grounds for dismissal of an appeal under
Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court are discretionary upon
the Court of Appeals.Worth stressing, the grounds for dismissal
of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court are
discretionary upon the Court of Appeals. This can be seen from
the very wording of the Rules which uses the word may instead
of shall. This Court has held in Philippine National Bank vs.
Philippine Milling Co., Inc. that Rule 50, Section 1 which provides
specific grounds for dismissal of appeal manifestly confers a
power and does not impose a duty. What is more, it is directory,
not mandatory. With the exception of Sec. 1(b), the grounds for
the dismissal of an appeal are directory and not mandatory, and it
is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the appeal. The
discretion, however, must be a sound one to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having in mind
the circumstances obtaining in each case.
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Same Same Pleadings and Practice Appeal Briefs Where

the citations found in the appellants brief could sufficiently enable
the appellate court to locate expeditiously the portions of the record
referred to, there is substantial compliance with the requirements
of Section 13(c) and (d), Rule 46 of the Rules of Court For the
same reason, the Court also holds that the Court of Appeals did
not err when it did not dismiss the appeal based on the allegation
that appellants brief failed to comply with the internal rules of
said court.The Court of Appeals rightly exercised its discretion
when, in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, it ruled that the
citations contained in the appellants brief were in substantial
compliance with the rules. Where the citations found in the
appellants brief could sufficiently enable the appellate court to
locate expeditiously the portions of the record referred to, there is
substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 13(c) and
(d), Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Such determination was
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VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002
219
properly within the appellate courts discretion. Nothing in the

records indicate that it was exercised capriciously, whimsically, or
with a view of permitting injury upon a party litigant. For the
same reasons, we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals also
did not err when it did not dismiss the appeal based on the
allegation that appellants brief failed to comply with the internal
rules of said court.
Same Same Same It is error for the Court of Appeals to
require the appellee to file an appellees brief in response to an
amended appellants brief that had been filed without the proper
motion for leave to do so and corresponding order from the
respondent court.The Court of Appeals erred in requiring
petitioner to file the appellees brief in response to the amended
appellants brief. Note that the amended brief was filed without
the proper motion for leave to do so and corresponding order from
the respondent court. Even more significant, it was filed beyond
the extensions of time granted to appellants. The discretion in
accepting late briefs conferred upon respondent court which this
Court applied in the cases of Maqui vs. CA and Vda. de Haberer
vs. CA, finds no application under the present circumstances
because, unlike in these two cases, here no valid reason was
advanced for the late filing of the amended brief. While the
amended brief might contain no substantial and prejudicial
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changes, it was error for the respondent court to accept the

amended brief as filed and then require petitioner to file
appellees brief because admittedly the amended brief was filed
beyond August 31, 1998, the last period of extension granted to
private respondents.
Same Same Same The proper remedy in case of denial of the
motion to dismiss is to file the appellees brief and proceed with the
appeal.On the second issue, we hold that the Court of Appeals
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in considering the appeal
submitted for decision. The proper remedy in case of denial of the
motion to dismiss is to file the appellees brief and proceed with
the appeal. Instead, petitioner opted to file a motion for
reconsideration which, unfortunately, was pro forma. All the
grounds raised therein have been discussed in the first resolution
of the respondent Court of Appeals. There is no new ground raised
that might warrant reversal of the resolution. A cursory perusal
of the motion would readily show that it was a near verbatim
repetition of the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss hence,
the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not suspend the
period for filing the appellees brief. Petitioner was therefore
properly deemed to have waived his right to file appellees brief.
220
220

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gil Venerando R. Racho for petitioners.
De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices for private
respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. It seeks to
1
annul and set aside the resolution dated January 13, 1999
of the Court of Appeals, in CAG.R. CV No. 57989, denying
petitioners motion (a) to dismiss the appeals of private
respondents, and (b) to suspend the period2 to file appellees
brief. Also assailed is the CA resolution dated April 19,
1999, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 11, 1996, petitioner Rodolfo de Leon filed with3
the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 3, a complaint
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for a sum of money plus damages, with a prayer for

preliminary
attachment,
against
herein
private
respondents Avelino and Estelita Batungbacal. The
complaint averred that private respondent
Estelita
4
Batungbacal executed a promissory note in favor of herein
petitioner for her P500,000 loan with stipulated interest at
5 percent monthly. The loan and interest remained unpaid
allegedly because the check issued by Estelita was
dishonored. Private respondents filed an answer with
counterclaim. Estelita admitted the loan obligation, but
Avelino denied liability on the ground that his wife was not
the designated administrator and therefore had no
authority to bind the conjugal partnership. Avelino further
averred that his wife contracted the debt without his
knowledge and consent.
_______________
1
CA Rollo, pp. 116117.
Id., at 135136.
Rollo, pp. 3138.
Id., at 39.
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VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002
221
Based on Estelitas admission, petitioner filed a motion for

partial judgment against
Estelita, which the trial court
5
granted in an order dated May 14, 1996:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings is hereby granted in accordance with Sec. 4 of Rule 36,
Rules of Court. As prayed for, judgment is hereby rendered
against Estelita Q. Batungbacal, ordering her to pay plaintiff
Rodolfo de Leon the principal amount of the loan obligation of
P500,000.00 plus the stipulated interest which has accrued
thereon at 5% per month since May 1995 until now, plus interest
at the legal rate on said accrued interest from date of judicial
demand until the obligation is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of

the partial judgment on May 21, 1996, but no appeal was
taken therefrom. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for
execution of said judgment on June 6, 1996. Counsel for
private respondents was furnished a copy of the motion on
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the same date. As private respondents interposed no

objection, a writ of execution was correspondingly issued.
The sheriff then proceeded to execute the writ and partially
satisfied the judgment award against the paraphernal
property of Estelita and the conjugal properties of the
private respondents with due notice to the latter and their
counsel. Again, private respondents interposed no
objection.
Pretrial was held and trial proceeded on two main
issues: (1) whether the loan was secured with the
knowledge and consent of the husband and whether the
same redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
and (2) whether the capital of the husband would be liable
if the conjugal assets or the paraphernal property of the
wife were insufficient to satisfy the loan obligation.
On
6
June 2, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment ordering
private respondent Avelino Batungbacal to pay the amount
of the loan plus interest and other amounts in accordance
with Article 121 of the Family Code.
_______________
5
Id., at 4849.
Id., at 5464.
222
222

Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of

the decision on June7 6, 1997. Avelino through counsel, filed
a notice of8 appeal on June 19, 1997. In a notice of
appearance dated June 25, 1997 bearing the conformity
solely of Estelita, a new counsel appeared in collaboration
with the counsel of record for the private respondents. On
the same date, Estelita through said new counsel, served a
notice that she is appealing both decisions promulgated on
May 14, 1996, and June 2, 1997, to the
Court of Appeals.
9
However, the trial court, in
an order dated July 7, 1997
10
denied the notice of appeal filed by Estelita on the ground
that said notice was filed beyond the reglementary period
to appeal.
Private respondents appeal was docketed with the
respondent Court of Appeals as CAG.R. CV No. 57989.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to
Dismiss the Appeal
with Motion to Suspend period to file
11
Appellees Brief on October 21, 1998. Petitioner based his
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motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) that the

statement of the case as well as the statement of the facts
in the appellants brief do not have page references to the
record, and that the authorities relied upon in the
arguments are not cited by the page of the report at which
the case begins and the page of the report on which the
citation is found (2) that no copy of the appealed decision
of the lower court was attached to the appellants brief, in
violation of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (3)
that private respondents furnished only one copy of the
appellants brief to the petitioner, also in violation of the
Rules of Court (4) that the decision promulgated against
Estelita on May 14, 1996 is no longer appealable and (5)
that the notice of appeal filed on June 25, 1996 by Estelita
concerning the decision of the trial court against Avelino
12
was filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal. The
motion also prayed that the period for filing
_______________
7
Id., at 65.
Id., at 66.
Id., at 68.
10
Id., at 67.
11
Supra, note 1 at 5763.
12
Id., at 5759, 62.

223
VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002
223
the appellees brief be 13suspended in view of the pendency of

the motion to dismiss.
14
Private respondents, in their opposition, insisted that
the statements of the case as well as the statement of facts
in their brief contained page references to the record, and
that Estelita had seasonably filed her appeal. Private
respondent spouses also stated
that they had filed an
15
Amended Appellants Brief on November 27, 1998 and
that two copies thereof had been served on petitioner
together with copies of the trial courts decisions.
On January 13,161999, the Court of Appeals issued the
assailed resolution denying petitioners motion to dismiss
and virtually admitting the Amended Appellants Brief as
follows:
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As submitted by appellants, they adopted pertinent portions of

the appealed Decision in the Statement of the Case, indicated
specific pages in the appealed decision where the quoted portions
are found. In the bottom of page 2 of the brief, is the quoted
portions of the decision, referring to pages 1 and 2 thereof. On
page 3 of the brief is the dispositive portion, taken on page 11 of
the decision. The rest of the narration in the Statement of the
Case are the specific dates of the pleadings, orders, and portions
of the decision citing the page references where they are found.
Two (2) copies of the Amended Brief were served upon appellee
with the appealed Decision attached as Annex A, and B.
Appellant Estellita Batungbacal explained that her appeal was
filed on time. She cited Guevarra, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
L49017 and 49024, that a partial judgment may be appealed only
together with the judgment in the main case. She personally
received a copy of the main Decision, dated June 2, 1997 on June
10, 1997, and filed her notice of appeal dated June 25, 1995 (sic)
sent by registered mail on even date, per Registry Receipt No.
2618, attached as Annex C hereof, thereby showing that the
notice of appeal was filed within 15 days from receipt of the
Decision appealed from. At any rate, the merit of appellees
contention that appellant Estellita Batungbacal can no longer
appeal from the decision may be resolved after the case is
considered ready for study and report.
_______________
13
Id., at 63.
14
Id., at 9293.
15
Id., at 8191.
16
Id., at 116117.
224
224

WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED, and

appellee is required to file his appellees brief within fortyfive
(45) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On January 22,
1999, petitioner filed a Motion for
17
Reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution but said
18
motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution
dated April 19, 1999, the pertinent portion of which reads
as follows:
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The resolution promulgated on January 13, 1999 required

appellee to file his appellees brief within fortyfive (45) days from
receipt of that resolution, or up to March 4, 1999. Up to this date
no appellees brief has been submitted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal by appellants is deemed submitted
for decision without the benefit of appellees brief, and the records
of this case is hereby transmitted to the Raffle Committee, for re
raffle, for study and report.
SO ORDERED.
19
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

wherein petitioner contends that respondent Court of
Appeals acted:
(1) WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING
THE APPEAL OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
ESTELITA BATUNGBACAL
(2) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN
DISREGARD OF THE EXPRESS MANDATORY
REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES AS WELL AS
AGAINST SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN
IT DENIED THE PETITIONERS MOTION TO
DISMISS THE APPEAL OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT SPOUSES
(3) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN
GRAVE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED APPELLANTS
BRIEF FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AND IN REQUIRING THE PETITIONER AS
APPELLEE TO FILE HIS APPELLEES BRIEF
_______________
17
Id., at 121125.
18
Id. at 135136.
19

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VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002
225
(4) WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT

RESOLVED TO HAVE THE APPEAL OF THE
APPELLANT
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
DEEMED
SUBMITTED
FOR
DECISION
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WITHOUT
BENEFIT OF APPELLEES BRIEF. . .
20
.
Simply put, the following are the issues presented before
this Court for resolution: (1) whether or not the appellate
court erred in taking cognizance of the appeal and (2)
whether or not the appellate court erred or committed
grave abuse of discretion when it considered the appeal as
submitted for decision without petitioners brief.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the decisions
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6480 promulgated on
May 14, 1996 and June 2, 1997 had become final and
executory as to private respondent Estelita Batungbacal.
This is because Estelita never appealed the partial
judgment promulgated on May 14, 1996. In fact, there has
been a partial execution of said judgment with notice to
and without objection from private respondent spouses. As
regards the decision dated June 2, 1997, petitioner
contends that the same had become final for failure to file
the notice of appeal within 15 days, counted from the time
counsel of record for private respondent spouses received a
copy on June 6, 1997 and not from the time Estelita
received a copy on June 10, 1997. Petitioner points to
Section 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and argues that
since the trial court never ordered that service of the
judgment be made upon Estelita, she was not entitled to
service of the judgment. The fact that she received a copy of
the judgment separately from her counsel cannot prejudice
the legal consequences arising out of prior receipt of copy of
the decision by her counsel. It was thus clear error for the
Court of Appeals to accept Estelitas argument that the
reglementary period commenced not from receipt of a copy
of the decision by counsel of record but from the time she
received a copy of the decision. The appeal having been
filed out of time, the Court of Appeals did not have
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Estelita.
_______________
20
Id., at 5.
226
226

Petitioner also assails the appellants brief for certain

formal defects. As pointed out in his motion to dismiss filed
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before the public respondent, there are no page references

to the record in the statements of the case and of the facts
in the appellants brief submitted by private respondents.
Petitioner asserts that while there are many pleadings and
orders mentioned in said statements, only the decision
dated June 2, 1997 is cited, and the citation is limited only
to the particular page or pages in said decision where the
citation or quotation is taken, without any reference to the
pages in the record where the decision can be found.
Neither is there reference to the pages in the record where
the particular cited or quoted portions of the decision can
be found.
Petitioner likewise alleges that the authorities relied
upon in the appellants brief of private respondents are also
not cited by the page on which the citation is found, as
required in Sec. 13 (f) of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Page
references to the record are also required in Section 13,
paragraphs (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44 and absence thereof is
a ground for dismissal of the appeal, pursuant to Sec. 1(f) of
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also harps on the
failure of private respondents to furnish petitioner with
two copies of the original appellants brief, to submit proof
of service of two copies of the brief on the appellee, and to
furnish the petitioner with two copies of the amended
appellants brief as required by the Rules of Court.
Additionally, petitioner asserts that the failure of private
respondents to append copies of the appealed decisions to
their appellants brief constitutes a violation of the Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals and is likewise a ground for
dismissal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the virtual admission
into the record by the respondent court of the amended
appellants brief of the private respondents under the
resolution dated January 13, 1999 and its corresponding
action to require the petitioner to respond thereto,
constitute grave abuse of discretion and blatant disregard
of due process of law because the amended brief was filed
without leave of court.
Private respondents, for their part, argue that the
resolutions being assailed by petitioner are interlocutory in
character because the Court of Appeals still has to decide
the appeal on the merits
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VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002
227

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hence, certiorari does not lie in his favor. Private

respondents allege that petitioner has another adequate
and speedy remedy, i.e., to file his brief raising all issues
before the Court of Appeals. Once the appeal is resolved on
the merits, all proper issues may be elevated to the
Supreme Court. An order denying a motion to dismiss
being merely interlocutory, it cannot be the basis of a
petition for certiorari. The proper remedy is to appeal in
due course after the case is decided on the merits.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
On the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals did
not act without jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal filed
by private respondent Estelita Batungbacal. Contrary to
petitioners apparent position, the judgments rendered by
the trial court in this case are not several judgments under
the Rules of Court so that there would be multiple periods
of finality.
A several judgment is proper only when the liability of
each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his
coparties, such that the claims against each of them could
have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or
21
against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.
Where a common cause of action exists against the
defendants, as in actions against solidary debtors, a several
judgment is not proper. In this case, private respondents
are sued together under a common cause of action and are
sought to be held liable as solidary debtors for a loan
contracted by Estelita. This is the clear import of the
allegation in the complaint that the proceeds of the loan
benefited the conjugal partnership.
Thus, between the two judgments rendered by the trial
court, there could only be one judgment that finally
disposes of the case on the merits. Receipt of notice of this
final judgment marks the point when the reglementary
period is to 22begin running. In this case, that judgment is
the decision rendered by the trial court on June 2, 1997
and it is only from the date of notice of this decision that
the reglementary period began to run. The partial
judgment dated May 14, 1996 was rendered only with
respect to one issue in
_______________
21
F. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 375 (6th ed. 1997).
22
Supra, note 6.
228
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228

the case and is not the final and appealable order23 or

judgment that finally disposes of the case on the merits. It
must, therefore, only be appealed together with the
decision dated June 2, 1997.
A final24 order is that which gives an end to the
litigation. When the order or judgment does not dispose of
the case completely but leaves something
to be done upon
25
the merits, it is merely interlocutory. Quite obviously, the
partial judgment ordering Estelita to pay petitioner is an
interlocutory order because it leaves other things for the
trial court to do and does not decide with finality the rights
and obligations of the parties. Specifically, at the time the
partial judgment was rendered, there remained other
issues including whether the husband Avelino had any
liability under Article 121 of the Family Code. However, as
the partial judgment disposed of one of the issues involved
in the case, it is to be taken in conjunction with the
decision dated June 2, 1997. Together, these two issuances
form one integrated decision.
The question now is when the period to appeal should
actually commence, from June 6, 1997, as petitioner
contends or from June 10, 1997, as private respondent
Estelita Batungbacal claims? We hold that the period
began to run on June 6, 1997 when counsel for private
respondents received a copy of the decision dated June 2,
1997. When a party is represented by counsel of record,
service of orders and notices must be made upon said
attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer,
26
not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. The
exception to this rule is when service
upon the party
27
himself has been ordered by the court. In this case, it does
not appear that there was any substitution of counsel or
that service upon private respondent Estelita Batungbacal
had been spe
_______________
23
24
See Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Investments, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L60036, 147 SCRA 334, 340
(1987), citing PLDT Employees Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers
Union, G.R. No. L8138, 97 Phil. 424, 426 (1955).
25
PLDT Employees Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers Union, id.
at 426427.
26
Bernardo vs. CA (Special Sixth Division), G.R. No. 106153, 275 SCRA
413, 423424 (1997), citing Chainani vs. Tancinco, G.R. No. L4782, 90
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Phil. 862, 864 (1952).

27
Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

229
VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002
229
cifically ordered by the trial court hence, the counsel of

record for the private respondents is presumed to be their
counsel on appeal and the only one authorized to receive
court processes. Notice of the judgment upon such counsel,
therefore, was notice to the clients for all legal intents and
purposes.
Private respondents appeal had been taken within the
reglementary period since Avelino Batungbacal had filed a
notice of appeal on June 19, 1997 or 13 days from their
counsels receipt of the decision on June 6, 1997.
Respondent spouses having been jointly sued under a
common cause of action, an appeal made by the husband
inures to the benefit of the wife. The notice of appeal filed
by Estelita was a superfluity, the appeal having been
perfected earlier by her husband.
We come now to petitioners contention that the
appellants brief suffers from fatal defects.
Worth stressing, the grounds
for dismissal of an appeal
28
under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court are
discretionary upon
_______________
28
RULE 50DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.An appeal may be dismissed by the

Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was
taken within the period fixed by these Rules
(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period
prescribed by these Rules
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided
in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41
(d) Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record on
appeal as provided in section 4 of Rule 44
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of
his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules
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(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief, or of page

references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d)
and (f) of Rule 44
(g) Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the correction or
completion of the record within the time limited by the court in its order
230
230

the Court of Appeals. This can be seen from the very

wording of the Rules which uses the word may instead of
shall. This Court has held 29in Philippine National Bank vs.
Philippine Milling Co., Inc. that Rule 50, Section 1 which
provides specific grounds for dismissal of appeal manifestly
confers a power and does not impose
a duty. What is
30
more, it is directory, not mandatory. With the exception
of Sec. 1(b), the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal are
directory and not mandatory, and it is not
the ministerial
31
duty of the court to dismiss the appeal. The discretion,
however, must be a sound one to be exercised in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play
having in mind the
32
circumstances obtaining in each case.
The Court of Appeals rightly exercised its discretion
when, in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, it ruled
that the citations contained in the appellants brief were in
substantial compliance with the rules. Where the citations
found in the appellants brief could sufficiently enable the
appellate court to locate expeditiously the portions of the
record referred to, there is substantial compliance with the
requirements of Section 13(c) and (d), Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court. Such determination was properly within the
appellate courts discretion. Nothing in the records indicate
that it was exercised capriciously, whimsically, or with a
view of permitting injury upon a party litigant. For the
same reasons, we hold that the respondent Court of
Appeals also did not err when it did not dismiss the appeal
based on the allegation that appellants brief failed to
comply with the internal rules of said court.
_______________
(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under
Rule 48 or to comply with orders, circulars, or directives of the court
without justifiable cause and
(i) The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable. (1a).
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29
G.R. No. L27005, 26 SCRA 712, 715 (1969).
30
Ibid.
31
See Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L41609, 69 SCRA 368, 374
(1976).
32
Vda. de Haberer vs. CA, G.R. Nos. L42699 to L42709, 104 SCRA
534, 544 (1981).

231
VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002
231
However, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring petitioner

to file the appellees brief in response to the amended
appellants brief. Note that the amended brief was filed
without the proper motion for leave to do so and
corresponding order from the respondent court. Even more
significant, it was filed beyond the extensions of time
granted to appellants. The discretion in accepting late
briefs conferred upon respondent court
which this Court
33
applied in
the cases of Maqui vs. CA and Vda. de Haberer
34
vs. CA,
finds no application under the present
circumstances because, unlike in these two cases, here no
valid reason was advanced for the 35
late filing of the
amended brief. While the amended brief might contain no
substantial and prejudicial changes, it was error for the
respondent court to accept the amended brief as filed and
then require petitioner to file appellees brief because
admittedly the amended brief was filed beyond August 31,
1998, the last period of extension granted to private
respondents.
On the second issue, we hold that the Court of Appeals
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in considering the
appeal submitted for decision. The proper remedy in case of
denial of the motion to dismiss is to file the appellees brief
and proceed with the appeal. Instead, petitioner opted to
file a motion for reconsideration which, unfortunately, was
pro forma. All the grounds raised therein have been
discussed in the first resolution of the respondent Court of
Appeals. There is no new ground raised that might warrant
reversal of the resolution. A cursory perusal of the motion
would readily show that it was a near verbatim repetition
of the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss hence, the
filing of the motion for reconsideration did not suspend the
period for filing the appellees brief. Petitioner was
therefore properly deemed to have waived his right to file
appellees brief.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The resolutions

dated January 13, 1999 and April 19, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 57989 are AFFIRMED, and the
Court of Appeals is
_______________
33
Supra, note 31.
34
Supra, note 32.
35

232
232

Alvarico vs. Sola
ordered to proceed with the appeal and decide the case with
dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Actg. C.J., Chairman), Mendoza, De
Leon, Jr. and Corona, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.
Notes.Final, in the phrase judgments or final
orders found in Section 49 of Rule 39, has two accepted
interpretationsin the first sense, it is an order that one
can no longer appeal because the period to do so has
expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the
highest possible tribunal involved, while in the second
sense, it connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing
else to be done, as distinguished from one that is
interlocutory. (Macahilig vs. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit, 344
SCRA 838 [2000])
Interlocutory orders are not appealable as these are
merely incidental to judicial proceedings. In these cases,
the court issuing such orders retains control over the same
and may thus modify, rescind, or revoke the same on
sufficient grounds at any time before final judgment.
(Testate Estate of Maria Manuel Vda. de Biascan vs.
Rosalina C. Biascan, 347 SCRA 621 [2000])
o0o
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 138884. June 6, 2002.

RODOLFO DE LEON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals

that finally disposes of the case on the merits. Receipt of notice of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

their counsel on appeal and the only one authorized to receive

Same Same Pleadings and Practice Appeal Briefs Where

VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals

properly within the appellate courts discretion. Nothing in the

changes, it was error for the respondent court to accept the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

for a sum of money plus damages, with a prayer for

CA Rollo, pp. 116117.

Rollo, pp. 3138.

VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals

Based on Estelitas admission, petitioner filed a motion for

Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of

the same date. As private respondents interposed no

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of

motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) that the

Supra, note 1 at 5763.

Id., at 5759, 62.

VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals

the appellees brief be 13suspended in view of the pendency of

As submitted by appellants, they adopted pertinent portions of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED, and

The resolution promulgated on January 13, 1999 required

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

Supra, note 3 at 328.

VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals

(4) WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioner also assails the appellants brief for certain

before the public respondent, there are no page references

VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals

hence, certiorari does not lie in his favor. Private

F. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 375 (6th ed. 1997).

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the case and is not the final and appealable order23 or

See Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Phil. 862, 864 (1952).

Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals

cifically ordered by the trial court hence, the counsel of

RULE 50DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.An appeal may be dismissed by the

(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief, or of page

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the Court of Appeals. This can be seen from the very

G.R. No. L27005, 26 SCRA 712, 715 (1969).

534, 544 (1981).