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CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI

TC-08

IN THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition No. ______________ of 2015

PETITION FILED SEEKING SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL


UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950
MANU SHARMA.PETITIONER NO.1
VERSUS

U.T. OF CHANDIGARH..RESPONDENT NO.1


Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 2015
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 25 of 2015]

VAIBHAV SHARMA...PETITIONER NO.2


VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB.RESPONDENT NO.2


Criminal Appeal No. 33 of 2015
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 27 of 2015]

MANU SHARMAPETITIONER NO.3


VERSUS

UNION OF INDIARESPONDENT NO.3


W.P. (C). No. 16 of 2015

Most Respectfully Submitted before the Honble Chief Justice of India


and other Judges of the Supreme Court of India

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS DRAWN AND FILED BY


THE COUNSELS OF THE RESPONDENTS

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................I

II.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................................................................XII

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................XIII

IV.

QUESTIONS OF LAW .....................................................................................XIX

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ...........................................................................XX

VI.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1.

THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION AGAINST THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL BY


THE

HONBLE HIGH COURT

AGAINST

PETITIONER NO.1

IS

NOT

MAINTAINABLE ...................................................................................................1

1.1

THAT NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST FOR THE


APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 136 .1

1.2

THAT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE BY THE HIGH COURT......2
1.2.1

THAT THE POWERS OF THE HIGH COURT UNDER SECTION 482 SHOULD NOT
BE EXERCISED AT A PRELIMINARY STAGE 2

1.3

THAT THE POLICE MUST NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM INVESTIGATING A PRIMA FACIE
CASE 3

1.3.1
1.4

THAT MENS REA IS PRESENT .4

THAT THE PETITIONER NO. 1 IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF


STARGAZER ..................................................................................................7

1.4.1

THAT ELECTRONIC RECORDS GENERATED BY STARGAZER CAN BE


ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONER NO. 17

1.4.2

THAT STARGAZER WAS DEPENDENT ON MANUAL INTERVENTION ....8

1.4.3

THAT STARGAZER WAS AN INNOCENT AGENT PUT INTO INSTRUMENTAL


USE TO COMMIT OFFENCES ...8

1.5

THAT PETITIONER NO. 1 HAS NOT APPROACHED THE COURT WITH


CLEAN HANDS .9

2.

THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION AGAINST THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL BY


THE

HONBLE HIGH COURT

AGAINST

PETITIONER

NO.2

IS

NOT

MAINTAINABLE .11

2. 1

THAT NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST ....11

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI


2.2

THAT

SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE BY THE HIGH

COURT.......................................................................................................12

2.3

THAT

NON-APPLICATION OF THE POWERS UNDER ARTICLE

136

WOULD NOT

RESULT IN GRAVE INJUSTICE .12

2.4

THAT

THE F.I.R., IF QUASHED, WOULD PRECLUDE THE POLICE TO INVESTIGATE

FACTS THAT OTHERWISE WARRANT INVESTIGATION 13

3.

THAT THE ORDINANCE PROMULGATED BY THE PRESIDENT IS NOT LEGALLY


TENABLE

3.1

....15

THAT THE INSTANT WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE ..15


3.1.1 THAT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED WHICH WARRANTED IMMEDIATE ACTION
BY THE PRESIDENT .....................15

3.1.2 THAT THE SATISFACTION OF THE PRESIDENT IS BEYOND JUDICIAL


REVIEW ..16

3.2

THAT

THE

ORDINANCE

IS NOT ULTRA VIRES

ARTICLE 19(1)(G)

OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 ..17


3.2.1 THAT

THE OBJECT OF THE ORDINANCE IS MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND

ORDER ...................................................................................................18

3.2.2 THAT

THE ORDINANCE HAS BEEN PROMULGATED AS AN INTERIM

MEASURE .............................................................................................. 19

3.2.3 THAT

COMMERCIAL SALE OF AI MAKES IT EASILY AVAILABLE TO THE

PUBLIC AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISUSE ....................................................20

VII.

PRAYER ....21

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS
ABBREVIATION
@
AIR
Anr.
Art.
CrLJ
Ed.
HC
Honble
i.e.
ILR
Ltd.
No.
Ors.
p.
Pb.
S.
SC
SCC
SCR
Ss.
Cr.P.C.
IPC
UOI
v.
Vol.
Bom
Cal
Del
Guj
Kar
MP
Mad
RCR
Constitution
NCT
Pvt.
Supp.
F.I.R.
S.L.P.
AI
Assn.
C.C.E.

DEFINITION
Alias
All India Reporter
Anothers
Article
Criminal Law Journal
Edition
The High Court
Honourable
That is
Indian Law Reporter
Limited
Number
Others
Page
Publication
Section
The Supreme Court of India
Supreme Court Cases
Supreme Court Reporter
Sections
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
The Union of India
Versus
Volume
Bombay
Calcutta
Delhi
Gujarat
Karnataka
Madhya Pradesh
Madras
Recent Civil Reporter
The Constitution of India, 1950
National Capital Territory
Private
Supplementary
First Information Report
Special Leave Petition
Artificial Intelligence
Association
Collector Of Central Excise
I

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI


All
Mfg.
Corp.
Para
P&H
&
Ori
Raj
D.P.P.
Ch
Co.
J.
M/s
STC
Re
$
%
W.P.
Dr.
Rep.
Col.
Ker
IAMAI

Allahabad
Manufacturing
Corporation
Paragraph
Punjab and Haryana
And
Orissa
Rajasthan
Director of Public Prosecutions
Chapter
Company
Justice
Messers
Reference
Dollar
Per cent
Writ Petition
Doctor
Represented
Colonel
Kerala
Internet and Mobile Association of India
INDIAN CASES

S.No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Case

Citation

A Registered Society v. Union


of India
A.G. Abraham v. State of
Kerela
A.K. Roy v. Union of India and
Anr.
Arumugam v. State
Arun Sharma v. State of Assam

(1999) 6 SCC 667

Footnote
No.
27

1987 (3) Crimes 550


(Ker-DB)
1982 AIR 710

28

16

109

3
13

21
86

21

18

119

13

87

27

AIR 2009 SC 331


1986 (2) Crimes 61,65
(Gau)
Ashabai Machindra Adhagale 2009
(2)
R.C.R.
v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Criminal) 86
Ashok
Nagar
Welfare AIR 2002 SC 335
Association v. R.K. Sharma
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of AIR 2002 SC 1533
Rajasthan and Ors.
Atma Singh Caler v. State of 1991 (1) Crimes 714
Punjab
(P&H)
(2011) 4 SCC 266
B. Premanand and Ors. v.
Mohan Koikal and Ors.

Page No.

II

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI


11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

24.

25.
26.

27.

28.
29.
30.

B.S.E.S. Rajdhani Power Ltd.


v. Vijay Kumar Gupta & Anr.
BALCO Employees Union
(Regd.) v. Union of India and
Ors
Baldev Raj v. William Das

2009 SCC OnLine Del


693
2001 Indlaw SC 20366.

1991 (2) Crimes 350


(P&H)
Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1996 SC 372
Bengal
Chemical
& 1969 AIR SC 360
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.,
Calcutta v. Their Workmen
Bhaba Nandan Barma v. State AIR 1977 SC 2252
of Assam
Bharwada
Bhoginbhai AIR 1983 SC 753
Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat
Bimal Kumar Nopany v. 1991 (1) Crimes 1 (AP)
Registrar of Companies, AP
Bishna @ Bhiswadeb Mahato (2005) 12 SCC 657
& Ors v. State Of West Bengal
Cellular Operators Association (2003) 3 SCC 186
v. Union of India & Ors.
Central Bureau of Investigation (2009) 6 SCC 351
v. A. Ravishankar Prasad and
Ors.
Central
Bureau
Of 1996 SCALE (5) 99
Investigation v. Duncans Agro
Industries
Chairman Board of Mining (1977) 2 SCC 256
Examination
and
Chief
Inspector of Mines and Another
v. Ramjee
Chandrakant
Murgyappa AIR 1999 SC 1557
Umrani v. State of Madhya
Pradesh
Collector of Central Excise v. AIR 1989 SC 1298
Standard Motor Products
Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. The AIR 1954 SC 220
Excise Commissioner and
Chief Commissioner, Ajmer
Council of Scientific and (1989) AIR 1972 (SC)
Industrial Research v. K. G. S.
Bhatt
Devender Pal Singh v. State AIR 2002 SC 1661
(N.C.T. of Delhi)
Dharambir Khattar v. Central 2009 SCC OnLine Del
Bureau Of Investigation
1292
Dhirender Kumar Banerjee v. 2005 CrLJ 4791

23

16

107

28

3
1, 1

22
5, 9

48

12

82

13

87

21

16

102

18

19

27

45

19

129

14

47

21

17
III

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI


31.
32.
33.

34.
35.

36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.

State of Bihar
Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of
Rajasthan and Anr.
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v.
Election Commission of India
Dr. Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal
Gupta and Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra
Feroza Mehboob v. Ramar Ali

(2001) 8 SCC 570

18

AIR 1996 SC 577

19

131

JT 2010 (12) SC 287

21

28

27

21

18

123

27

13

86

15, 17

98, 111

53

18

120

18

122

16

106

13

87

12
2

82
18

2, 12
10

20, 81
74

1987 (3) Crimes 846


(MP)
Francis Coralie Mullin v. (1981) 1 SCC 608
Administrator, Union Territory
of Delhi
Gorle S. Naidu v. State Of A.P. (2003) 12 SCC 449
& Ors.
Government of Maharashtra &. 2003 (5) SCC 669
Ors. v. Deokar's Distillery
Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel v. (1975) 2 SCC 482
Agricultural Produce Market
Committee, Godhra and Ors.
Gurdip Singh v. Daljit Kaur
1991 (2) Crimes 72
(P&H)
Gurudevdatta VKSS Maryadit AIR 2001 SC 1980.
v. State of Maharashtra
H.E. Nasser Abdulla Hussain v. [2003] 84 ITD 43
DCIT
(MUM.)
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union 1960 AIR 554
of India and Ors.
Handicrafts Emporium & Ors 2003 AIR (SC) 3240
v. UOI
Har Sharan Verma v. Chandra AIR 1962 All 301
Bhan Gupta and Ors.
Harakchand Bhagehand Oswal 1991 (1) Crimes 531
v. Satilingappa Bhagwanappa
(Bom)
Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer
AIR 1954 SC 462
Inder Mohan Goswami v. State AIR 2008 SC 251
of Uttaranchal
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. 1986 4 SCC 146
State of Bihar and Ors.
Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. 2004 176 ELT 24 SC.
Board of Trustees, Port of
Mumbai
Janata Dal v. H.S Choudhary
1992 (4) SCC 305
Jeevan Kumar and Anr. v. 2002 VII AD (Delhi)
Union of India
100

IV

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI


52.
53.

54.
55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.
73.

Jwala Prasad v. State of U.P.

1987 (2) Crimes 360


(All)
Jyoti
Pershad
v.
The 1961 AIR 1602
Administrator for the Union
Territory of Delhi
K. Nagaraj v. State of Andhra (1985) AIR 1985 SC 551
Pradesh
Kartar and Ors. v. State Of 28
August,
2012
Haryana
(Unreported)
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and (2012) 12 SCC 291
Ors. v. Mahadeshwara S.S.K.
Ltd.
Kishori Mohan v. State of West AIR 1973 SC 1749
Bengal
Krishna Govind Patil v. State AIR 1963 SC 1413
of Maharashtra
Lalit Mohan Pandey v. Pooran (2004) 6 SCC 626
Singh
Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. (2013) 4 SCC 1
& Ors.
M.V. Arunachalam v. Tamil 1992 CrLJ 188 (Mad)
Nadu Pollution Control Board,
M/s Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of (1973) 1 SCC 216
U.P. and Anr.
M/S S.K.G. Sugar Ltd. v. State 1974 AIR 1533
of Bihar and Ors.
Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State (2009) 11 SCC 334
of Uttar Pradesh
Makhan Singh v. State of (1964) 4 SCR 797 1963
Punjab
Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel
AIR 2010 SC 932
Mathai @ Joby v. George
(2010) 4 SCC 358
Mohd Khalid v. State of West (2002) 7 SCC 334
Bengal
Municipal
Corporation
of 1986 AIR 1205
Ahmedabad and Ors. v. Jan
Mohammed Usmanbhai and
Anr.
N. Suryakala v. A. Mohan and (2007) 9 SCC 196
Ors.
Narpat
Singh
v.
Jaipur AIR 2002 SC 2036;
Development Authority
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. 1991 (1) Crimes 798,807
Narendra Kumar Jhanjhri
(Pat)
Naveen Kumar Ahuja v. State 2012 SCC Del 3765
(NCT of Delhi)

28

18

126

17, 17

111, 112

21

18

124

48

27

27

1, 4

9, 28

27

16

108

21

16

104

12
2, 12
6

83
15, 83
46

18

128

1, 1, 1

2, 9, 10

10

13

87

21
V

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI


74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.

Noida
Entrepreneurs (2011) 6 SCC 508, 521
Association v. Noida and Ors.
P.G. Bhavani v. C.L. Patil
1986 (1) Crimes 481
(Bom)
P.S.R.
Sadhanantham
v. 1980 AIR SC 856
Arunachalam and Anr.
Pandurang
v.
State
of AIR 1955 SC 216
Hyderabad
Parichhat v. State of Madhya AIR 1972 SC 535
Pradesh
Parinda Milind Keer v. Indian 2008 (1) BomCR 182
Oil Corporation Ltd.
People for Animals v. Union of AIR 1974 SC 1755
India and Ors
Prakash Jayawant Koli v. State 2008 (1) BomCR 196
Of Maharashtra
Prativa Bose v. Kumar (1964) 4 SCR
Rupendra Deb Raikat
R.K. Garg and Ors v. Union of (1981) 4 SCC 675
India and Ors.
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab
AIR 1960 SC 866
Rajesh Arockiasamy and Ors. 2014 SCC OnLine Mad
v. Suganthi and Ors.
10065
Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State AIR 2000 SC 160
of Maharashtra
Ram Pal v. State of Haryana
1991 (1) Crimes 566
(P&H)
Ramesh Chand Sharma and 2005 Indlaw DEL 367
Anr. v. Commissioner of Police
and Others
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP AIR 1957 SC 620
Reliance Airport Developers (2006) RD-SC 758
Pvt. Ltd. v. Airport Authority
of India & Ors;
S. Sudershan Reddy and Ors. v. 2006
(3)
R.C.R.
State of Andhra Pradesh
(Criminal)
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1
Sawant Singh and Ors.v. State 1961 SCR (3) 120
of Rajasthan
Secy. to Govt. Tamil Nadu & 2002 (7) SCC 104
Anr. v. K. Vinayagamurthy
Sesami Chemicals Private 2014 (12) SCALE 2
Limited v. State of Meghalaya
Shaw Wallics & Co. Ltd. v. 1987 (3) Crimes 371
Rajvir Singh
(All)

17

114

13

86

43

45

10

74

20

135

10

74

27

15

100

2
3

18
21

49

13

87

15

96

18
16

125
102

21

16
12

108
83

18, 19

123, 132

50

28
VI

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI


97.

98.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Smt. G. Bharati Devi and Ors.


v. The Hyderabad Urban
Development
Someshwar Bora v. State of
Assam
Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. the
Chief Commissioner, Union
Territory of Tripura
Sri Sujithnarayana v. State Of
Karnataka
St. of Punjab v. Devans
Modern Brewery
State of Andhra Pradesh and
Ors. v. McDowell
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma

2008 (3) ALD 292

10

74

(1981) CrLj (NOC)51


(Gau)
(1964) 3 SCR. 442 1963

66

16

104

23

(2004) 11 SCC

18

122

AIR 1996 SC 1627

19

129

2, 12

20, 81

14

2, 3, 4, 11
6

20, 24,
26, 79
44

18
3

127
23

16

110

15, 16

96, 103

28 September,
(Unreported)

2012

1992 (Supp.) (1) SCC


222
State of H. P. v. Kailash Chand (1992) AIR 1277 (SC)
Mahajan
State of Haryana and Ors v. Ch. AIR 1992 SC 604
Bhajan Lal and Ors.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. AIR 1965 SC 257
Deshraj and Ors.
State of Madras v. V.G. Row
AIR 1952 SC 196
State Of Orissa v. Debendra (2005) 1 SCC 568
Nath Padhi
State of Punjab v. Sat Pal Dang 1969 AIR 903
and Ors.
State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. 1977 AIR 1361
Union of India
State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal (2004) 5 SCC 57

112. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v.


K. Shyam Sunder and Ors.
113. State Represented by Inspector
of Police v. Saravanan & Anr.
114. Superintendent of Police, CBI
and Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh
115. Supt., Central Prison v. Ram
Manohar Lohia

AIR 2011 SC 3470

17

114

AIR 2009 SC 152

21

AIR 2003 SC 4140

21

AIR 1960 SC 633

18

125

116. Suraj Prakash Sood v. State of


U.P.
117. Suresh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
118. Sushil Suri v. C.B.I. & Anr.
119. Swami Raghva Nand v. Bedi
and Anr.

1991 (2) Crimes 18 (All)

13

86

AIR 2001 SC 1344


[2011] 8 S.C.R. 1
2014 SCC OnLine P&H
408

6
4
3

45
29
21
VII

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120. Swantraj and Ors. v. State of AIR 1974 SC 517
Maharashtra
121. T. Muralidhar Rao v. State of 2004 (5) ALT 634
Andhra Pradesh and Ors.

17

114

16

107

122. T. Paith Sarathy v. Madhu


Sangal
123. T. T. Mohammed Devahar S/o
C. G. Kasmikoya v. Union
Territory of Lakshadweep and
Anr
124. T. Venkata Reddy v. State of
Andhra Pradesh
125. T.J. Stephen v. Parle Bottling
Co. Ltd.
126. Talab
Haji
Hussain
v.
Madhukar
Purshottam
Mondkar
127. The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v.
The Employees of Bharat Bank
Ltd., Delhi etc.
128. The State of Bombay v. Rusy
Mistry and Anr.

1992 CrLJ 26 (MP)

13

86

(2002) 1 SCC 219

25

(1985) 3 SCC 198

15

101

AIR 1985 SC 994

28

AIR 1958 SC 376

17

AIR 1950 SCC 188

11

AIR 1960 SC 391

129. Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt.


Ltd. v. State of Bihar
130. Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State
of U.P.
131. Vimal Vitthal Chavan v. Nava
Maharashtra Education Society
Trust and Ors.
132. Vinod Chandra Dube v. Aruna
Dube
133. Virendra Kumar Rai and Ors.
v. Union of India and Ors.

AIR 2004 SC 2351

12

1991 (1) Crimes 298


(All-DB)
2005 SCC OnLine Bom
916

13

87

10

74

AIR 1977 Delhi 24

10

74

(2004) 13 SCC 463

Page No.
16

Footnote
No.
105

64

16

104

16

104

INTERNATIONAL CASES
S. No.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Case

Citation

Charles W. Baker et. al. v. Joe 369 US 186


C. Carr et al.
Dusenbery v. Commonwealth
220 Va. 770, 263 S.E.2d
392 (1980)
Greene v. Secretary of State for (1942) A.C. 284
Home Affairs
Liversidge v. Anderson
(1942) A.C. 206

VIII

CHECKMATE 2015, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI


5.
6.
7.

S.No.
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Stephen Kalang Ningkan v. L.R. (1970) A.C. 379,


Government of Malaysia
392
United States v. Ruffin
613 F.2d 408 (2nd
Cir.1979)
United States v. Tobon-Builes
706 F.2d 1092 (11th
Cir.1983)

16

104

65

70

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Zelle, J., Python Programming: An Introduction to Computer Science,
Computers and Programs.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA EXERCISES
JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE OVER THE
MATTER UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA, 1950.

THE

PROVISION

UNDER

WHICH

THE

PETITIONERS

HAVE

APPROACHED THIS HONBLE COURT IS READ HEREINUNDER:

Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 states that


(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme
Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from
any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the
territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment,
determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or
tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
RIHA KAUSHALS BACKGROUND
Riha Kaushal, a twenty eight year old girl, lost her mother at a very young age. Her
father, Nitin Kaushal, had brought her up as a child who had never known no for an
answer. Kaushal was hugely successful in the world of high-end retail. He was an avid
user of social media using which he finalized Rihas marriage with one Sehajbir
Singh.
However, on December 31st 2014 Riha lost her father. The death came as a huge
blow to her due to which she refused to marry Sehajbir.
II.
INTERFACE WITH CHANDANDEEP JUNEJA
At the funeral, she was approached by her old friend, Chandandeep Juneja, who urged
her to try an experimental, but world-renowned invitation only program called
Stargazer that had greatly helped numerous people deal with the loss of a parent.
Her friend Ish, from college helped her cope with the loss. While he was always
romantically inclined towards her, she did not feel the same way. She would, however,
ever so often hint of a relationship. This was the reason Ish had come back to her side
in her hour of need and she was grateful for it.
III.
RIHA USES THE STARGAZER PROGRAM
On the night of 14th January 2015, Riha for the first time, logged into her email . One
email caught her attention, it was from Nitin Kaushal, and it simply said Yes Rihu,
its me. Chandan helped me get in touch with you. Click here so we can talk. She was
stunned. Riha called Chandan, who explained to her that he had gone ahead and
signed her up for the Stargazer program. It was the first real breakthrough in artificial
intelligence. The way it worked was that the program collected all the information
about the person that it could from the internet, social media, blogs etc. and identified
a pattern and a manner in which that person wrote, his likes, tastes and so on. It then
basically tried to replicate the person using AI, so you could chat with that person

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about virtually any subject. The experience would be as if the said person was away,
and you were chatting via Instant Messages.
The responses by the AI version of Nitin Kaushal to anything she asked sounded just
like what her father would have said. She was aware that this wasnt real, and that
Nitin was not the one talking to her, but she felt extremely well and happy.
Seeing her coping so well, Ish bought a ring on February 1st and asked Riha to marry
him. However, bitter memories of her broken relationship with Sehajbir came rushing
back to her, and with that came the realisation that her father had indeed died and that
she had been living in a bubble. She left without saying a word, and Ish was incensed
at this rejection which encouraged him to win her over.
IV.
INTERFACE WITH MANU SHARMA
Riha stopped using Stargazer and became dismal again. Her case was actively being
monitored at the Stargazer HQs in Los Angeles. Worried by the sudden termination of
the program, the M.D of Stargazer, especially informed the creator of Stargazer, Manu
Sharma about this development. Sharma immediately recognised Riha from his days
in college. Both of them had liked each other, but they had never really pursued it on
account of Ishs presence.
Manu Sharma personally took charge of her case and directed all Stargazer employees
that he would conduct the project himself and that it stood classified for everyone else
at the company. Riha then received an email that asked her to upload all the video and
audio clips that she had of her father. The email informed her that this project was
purely experimental and expensive. Despite this, she agreed because she missed him
terribly.
Two days later, she received a call from an international number Hello Baccha, its
me! The person on the other side sounded just like her father, and was speaking in
exactly the same manner as he did. Riha knew he wasnt real, but she started spending
a lot of time on the phone everyday.
Seeing this, Ish sensed another opportunity to approach her. He started sending
flowers to her workplace, her house, started calling her continuously, buying her
unwanted gifts. Riha mentioned all of this to her father, and asked him for ways to
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get rid of this relationship. He advised her to have a frank conversation with him, but
that had no effect, instead Ishs overtures were only growing. Frustrated she told Nitin
that she couldnt take it anymore and was afraid shell end up doing something to
herself. The AI powered call was immediately disconnected. Ten minutes later Nitin
told her that hed thought of something. He asked Riha to call Ish to her home, and
pretend that he was going to outrage her modesty, bruise herself a little, hit him with
something and run away from the house and call the police. That way, Ish would be
put in jail and shed have her life back once and for all.
Since to her mind, it was her father telling her to do this she went ahead with the plan.
On the evening of the 14th of February at about 7 pm she acted on the plan by
screaming for her safety and hittting Ish with a vase on the head and ran from the
house shouting Save me! Save me!. Then she called the police from her mobile
phone. The police arrived at the scene within 10 minutes and found Ish unconscious
inside Rihas home. She narrated to the police how he was harassing her, and how he
had come to her house uninvited that evening as well. She further stated that after
consuming wine Ish had become larkish after which he had attempted to assault her.
She further said that she had, with great difficulty, escaped from his clutches and
called the police.
Ish was found to be dead. The police then sent the body for a postmortem
examination. Meanwhile, the police sought to interview Rihas friends and colleagues
and also went through her call history. While they did find a few calls from Ish, her
calls and IM logs also indicated that she was chatting with someone most of the time,
which her phone identified as Dad. However, knowing that Mr. Kaushal had passed
away a little while ago, the police became suspicious. They brought in Mr. Salil
Sabhlok, a cyber security expert who after due analysis informed the police that the
calls and IM were coming from a company based in the U.S. called Stargazer. He
explained to the police how the company was a pioneer in the field of Artificial
Intelligence and what its business was.
V.
FILING OF FIRs
On February 16th while Manu Sharma was visiting India, the police summoned him
for questioning. The next day the police decided to register FIR No. 27 at Police
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Station Sector 3, Chandigarh under Sections 302, 120-B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code
1860, in which Manu Sharma was also named as an accused along with Riha Kaushal.
During the course of investigation the police interviewed the M.D. of Stargazer who
revealed that while their system was completely autonomous, it was, to a limited
extent, influenced by the inputs given by the handlers and psychological specialists to
tweak its code to better humanise it. He further stated that he knew Manu Sharma
from his college days, and he didnt believe that Manu Sharma was capable of
something as devious as using Stargazer to help eliminate Ish from the equation, so
that he could be with Riha. Although he did say that he found Manu Sharmas actions
in classifying Rihas files suspicious.
On the 17th of February Manu Sharma called a press conference in which he labeled
the actions of the police as myopic .He went on to explain to the press how the police
was missing the basic premise that Stargazer is based on Artificial Intelligence and
therefore he possibly could have no control over what that machine said to Riha, and
how she chose to interpret it. In any case, Riha had agreed to the terms and conditions
of the program that categorically stated that the users accepts all risks and
consequences for the use of the service, and that the company shall have no liability
whatsoever in any form as a result of the usage of their service. He further pointed out;
that it also wasnt a case where he had been negligent in any aspect that involved the
prevention of a crime, as all transcripts of the communication between parties are
secure and deleted at the end of each day. Therefore, he possibly couldnt be held
responsible for any actions of the AI software.
In a brief statement, the investigating officer of the case Sahil Sethi said that the police
force is a modern establishment that consults with the best minds on cases such as
these. He stated Manu Sharma isnt as clean as he claims to be. On 14th February
Ishs call records show that he had received a call from the same number that
Stargazer had been using to call Riha. Thats not all, as it turns out her ex-fianc
Sehajbir is an investor in Stargazer. Ill let it rest at that for now.
VI.
MEDIA REPORTS
Media reports carried a story about a teenage internet genius named Vaibhav Sharma
who had made an automated bot that ordered Coke from Internet sites that serviced
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his area the moment it was offered on a 5% or more discount. The code for the bot
included his payment details and delivery address, so the entire transaction was
automatic and seamless. One day that bot had accidently ordered Coke from a decoy
website setup by the police to catch drug peddlers and that had brought the police to
his door step and led to the registration of an FIR against Vaibhav. He had claimed
that he couldnt be held responsible for the crime as it had been committed by the
bot and also because he lacked the necessary intent to commit the crime.
VII.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE
In view of such incidents, where serious crime were being blamed on machines that
could act for themselves - independent of manual instructions, the Central
Government got issued an ordinance dated 20.02.15 banning commercial research,
sale or dissemination in any other form of hardware or code that possessed
characteristics of Artificial Intelligence including, but not limited to programs
which are considered bots in common parlance. This was undertaken to cast down
citizens from committing crimes and then blaming them on machines that couldnt be
prosecuted and punished under the law.
VIII.
HONBLE HIGH COURT
At once, Manu Sharma approached Vaibhav with an offer of legal assistance. Both
individuals filed petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973
seeking quashing of the respective FIRs qua them. However, the Honble Punjab and
Haryana High Court vide order dated 23.02.15 was dismissed both these petitions in
limine on the ground that the police was yet to present a chargesheet, and it would not
be proper to quash the FIRs at this preliminary stage itself.
Both Manu Sharma and Vaibhav preferred Special Leave Petitions before the Honble
Supreme Court against the order of dismissal. In a separate petition, Manu Sharma
also challenged the governments move to ban all forms of AI, being violative of the
Constitution of India and other laws of the land.

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IX.
HONBLE SUPREME COURT
The Honble Supreme Court issued notice in all the following cases, and listed them
for arguments together on March 20th 2015.

Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 2015, Manu Sharma v. U.T. of Chandigarh


[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 25 of 2015]

Criminal Appeal No. 33 of 2015, Vaibhav Sharma v. State of Punjab


[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 27 of 2015]

W.P.(C). No. 16 of 2015, Manu Sharma v. Union of India

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QUESTIONS OF LAW
I.

WHETHER

THE

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

DISMISSAL BY THE

HONBLE HIGH COURT

AGAINST THE ORDER OF

AGAINST

PETITIONER NO.1

IS

MAINTAINABLE?

II.

WHETHER

THE

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

DISMISSAL BY THE

HONBLE HIGH COURT

AGAINST THE ORDER OF

AGAINST

PETITIONER NO.2

IS

MAINTAINABLE?

III.

WHETHER THE ORDINANCE PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT NO. 3 IS


LEGALLY TENABLE?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION AGAINST THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL BY


THE HONBLE HIGH COURT AGAINST PETITIONER NO. 1 IS NOT
MAINTAINABLE.

The Special Leave Petition filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950
against the decision of the Honble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of
quashing of F.I.R. against Petitioner No. 1 is not maintainable. No exceptional or
special circumstances exist insofar as the High Court has rightly dismissed quashing
of the F.I.R. The investigation was at its preliminary stages and was yet to be
comprehensively conducted. Petitioner No. 1 is responsible for the actions of the AI
entity. An investigation held according to the procedure established by law ipso facto
does not adversely affect the interests of the Petitioner No.1.
II.

THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION AGAINST THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL BY


THE HONBLE HIGH COURT AGAINST PETITIONER NO. 2 IS NOT
MAINTAINABLE.

No exceptional or special circumstances exist insofar as the High Court has rightly
dismissed quashing of the F.I.R. The Petition was instituted only 4 days after the
registration of the F.I.R. The investigation was at its preliminary stages and was yet to
be comprehensively conducted. Moreover, the failure to accept the S.L.P. by this
Honble Court would not result in any grave injustice inasmuch as the F.I.R. only
results in setting the criminal law in motion. The preliminary investigations have
given an apprehension of commission of cognizable offences, which need to be duly
investigated to discover the true facts. An investigation held according to the
procedure established by law ipso facto does not adversely affect the interests of the
Petitioner No.2.

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III.

THAT THE ORDINANCE PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT NO. 3 IS LEGALLY


TENABLE.

The Ordinance is beyond the scope of judicial review by reason of the limited
application of judicial powers over the subjective satisfaction of the President. The
President is the sole judge to decide existence of circumstances which render it
necessary for him to take immediate action. It has been imposed after taking due
cognizance of incidents where serious crimes were being committed and consequently
blamed on machines. The Ordinance acts as a reasonable restriction on the exercise of
the right to trade inasmuch as it is in the interest of the general public.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION AGAINST THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL BY
THE HONBLE HIGH COURT AGAINST PETITIONER NO. 1 IS NOT
MAINTAINABLE.

The S.L.P. against the order of dismissal by the High Court seeking quashing of F.I.R.
is not maintainable as Special Leave cannot be granted when substantial justice has
been done and no exceptional or special circumstances exist for case to be
maintainable.1 The powers of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 are of a residual
nature which the court exercises in its discretion.2 The exercise of jurisdiction
conferred by Art. 136 on this Court is purely discretionary conditioned by the
existence of self-imposed conditions: Special circumstances3; miscarriage of Justice4;
violation of Principles of Natural Justice5; disregard of legal principles6; existence of
substantial question of law7; existence of question of general public importance.8 Art.
136 confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases.9
It does not confer a right to appeal on a party to litigation; it only confers a
discretionary power of widest amplitude on this Court to be exercised for satisfying
the demands of justice.10 The Respondent No.1 humbly submits that it is purely on the
discretion of this Court whether to grant the Special Leave to Appeal or not.
1.1

THAT NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST

It is contended by the Respondent No.1 that the Petitioner must show that
exceptional11 and special circumstances exist. Further, if there is no interference,

Virendra Kumar Rai and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2004) 13 SCC 463.
N. Suryakala v. A Mohan and Ors., (2007) 9 SCC 196.
3
Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, 2004 176 ELT 24 SC.
4
State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal, 2004 5 SCC 57.
5
Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., Calcutta v. Their Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 633;
Sanwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1961 3 SCR 120.
6
The State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry and Anr., AIR 1960 SC 391.
7
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 1986 4 SCC 146.
8
Collector of Central Excise v. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298.
9
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Ors. v. Mahadeshwara S.S.K. Ltd., 2013 117 SCL 278 SC; P.S.R.
Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Anr., 1980, AIR SC 856; Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical
Works Ltd., Calcutta v. Their Workmen, 1969, AIR SC 360; N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9
SCC 196; Ashok Nagar Welfare Association v. R.K. Sharma, AIR 2002 SC 335.
10
Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, AIR 2002 SC 2036; N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss,
(2007) 9 SCC 196.
11
The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi, AIR 1950 SCC 188.
2

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substantial and grave injustice12 will result that would warrant review of the decision
appealed against on merits. Only then the court would exercise its overriding powers
under Art. 136.13 Even if the decision of the lower court suffers from some legal
errors, Special leave shall not be granted unless there is a failure of justice or when
substantial justice has not been done.14 The Supreme Court has lamented15 the abuse
of Art. 136 of the Constitution wherein unscrupulous litigants approach the Supreme
Court at the drop of a hat, thereby clogging up the justice delivery system. In the
instant case, no exceptional and special circumstances have been shown by the
Petitioner.
1.2

THAT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE BY THE HIGH COURT

The inherent powers of the High Court under S. 48216 of the Cr.P.C are present for the
advancement of justice.17 Injustice by abuse of process of Court can be prevented by
exercising inherent powers. Such powers have to be used when facts are incomplete or
hazy or no evidence is produced in support of the facts.18
1.2.1 THAT THE POWERS OF THE HIGH COURT UNDER SECTION 482 SHOULD NOT BE
EXERCISED AT A PRELIMINARY STAGE

In the instant case, the High Court is not justified in quashing the F.I.R.s so as to
strangulate the investigations at the inception.19 It is not the duty of the High Court to
embark upon appreciation of evidence in quashing the proceedings. 20 The F.I.R. stated
that the Petitioner No. 1s action is a criminal offence under Ss. 302, 120B and 34 of
the I.P.C. It is submitted that the allegations made in the F.I.R., taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety, prima facie constitute an offence and make out a

12

Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 2351.
MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (16th Edn. Lexis Nexis Buttersworth Wadhwa Nagpur 2011).
14
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. S. Bhatt, (1989) AIR 1972 (SC); State of H. P.
v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, (1992) AIR 1277 (SC).
15
Mathai @ Joby v. George, (2010) 4 SCC 358.
16
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 states that Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.
17
Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376; Dhirender Kumar
Banerjee v. State of Bihar, 2005 CrLJ 4791.
18
Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, AIR 2008 SC 251; R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR
1960 SC 866; Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan and Anr., (2001) 8 SCC 570; Central Bureau of
Investigation v. A. Ravishankar Prasad and Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 351.
19
Central Bureau Of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries, 1996 SCALE (5) 99.
20
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 (1) SCC 335; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 (Supp.) (1)
SCC 222; Janata Dal v. H.S Choudhary, 1992 (4) SCC 305.
13

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case against the Petitioner.21Only the essential or broad picture need to be stated in the
F.I.R. and all minute details need not be mentioned therein. It is not verbatim
summary of the prosecution case.22
A note of caution has been made by the Supreme Court that the power under S. 482
should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases 23. The illustrative
categories indicated by the Court24 are as follows:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials,
if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under S. 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of S. 155(2) of the
Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4)Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused."
Therefore, it is submitted that the High Court was justified by dismissing the petition
seeking quashing of F.I.R. at such a preliminary stage.
1.3. THAT

THE POLICE MUST NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM INVESTIGATING A PRIMA

FACIE CASE

It is submitted that quashing of the F.I.R. would hinder the process of investigation. At
such a preliminary stage of investigation, it would not be proper for the High Court to

21

State Represented by Inspector of Police v. Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 152; Arumugam v.
State, AIR 2009 SC 331; Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 11 SCC 334; Dr.
Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, JT 2010 (12) SC 287; Kartar and
Ors. v. State Of Haryana, on 28 August, 2012 (Unreported); Rajesh Arockiasamy and Ors. v. Suganthi
and Ors., 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 10065; Naveen Kumar Ahuja v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2012 SCC Del
3765; S. Sudershan Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal); Ashabai
Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2009 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 86; Swami Raghva
Nand v. Bedi and Anr., 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 408; Superintendent of Police, CBI and Ors. v. Tapan
Kumar Singh, AIR 2003 SC 4140; Gorle S. Naidu v. State Of A.P. & Ors., (2003) 12 SCC 449;
Dharambir Khattar v. Central Bureau Of Investigation, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1292; Bishna @
Bhiswadeb Mahato & Ors v. State Of West Bengal, (2005) 12 SCC 657.
22
Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 372.
23
State Of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568; B.S.E.S. Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Vijay
Kumar Gupta & Anr., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 693; Sri Sujithnarayana v. State Of Karnataka, on 28
September, 2012 (Unreported).
24
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal; 1992 (1) SCC 335.

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consider whether the crime could be quashed under S. 482 Cr.P.C.25The dominant
purpose of registration of the case and the intended follow up action are only to
investigate the allegations and present a case before the Court.26 It may be noted that it
is a duty of the Police to initiate investigation and the legislative intent under S. 154
Cr.P.C is therefore quite clear, i.e., to ensure that every cognizable offence is promptly
investigated in accordance with law.27The Supreme Court has held that the High Court
should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision28 in a case where all the
facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when the evidence has not been collected and
produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient
material.29
In the present case, the Police has not been given adequate time to investigate into the
F.I.R. The F.I.R.30 against Petitioner No.1 was registered on 16.02.2015 and the High
Court prudently decided to dismiss the petition seeking the quashing of the F.I.R. on
23.02.2015.31
1.3.1 THAT MENS REA IS PRESENT
A criminal act generally requires some element of wrongful intent or other fault.32
This is known as mens rea or guilty mind.33 In the instant case the F.I.R. against
Petitioner No. 1 is filed for the offences of conspiracy and murder of Ish in furtherance
of his common intention with Riha.

25

T. T. Mohammed Devahar S/o C. G. Kasmikoya v. Union Territory of Lakshadweep and Anr., (2002)
1 SCC 219.
26
State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 AIR 604.
27
Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2013) 4 SCC 1; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator,
Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608; A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1999) 6
SCC 667; B. Premanand and Ors. v. Mohan Koikal and Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 266; M/s Hiralal Rattanlal
v. State of U.P. and Anr., (1973) 1 SCC 216; Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel v. Agricultural Produce
Market Committee, Godhra and Ors., (1975) 2 SCC 482; Chairman Board of Mining Examination and
Chief Inspector of Mines and Another v. Ramjee, (1977) 2 SCC 256; Lalit Mohan Pandey v. Pooran
Singh, (2004) 6 SCC 626, Prativa Bose v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikat, (1964) 4 SCR.
28
T.J. Stephen v. Parle Bottling Co. Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 994; Jwala Prasad v. State of U.P., 1987 (2)
Crimes 360 (All); Shaw Wallics & Co. Ltd. v. Rajvir Singh, 1987 (3) Crimes 371 (All); A.G. Abraham
v. State of Kerela, 1987 (3) Crimes 550 (Ker-DB); Feroza Mehboob v. Ramar Ali, 1987 (3) Crimes 846
(MP); Baldev Raj v. William Das, 1991 (2) Crimes 350 (P&H); M.V. Arunachalam v. Tamil Nadu
Pollution Control Board, 1992 CrLJ 188 (Mad).
29
Sushil Suri v. C.B.I. & Anr., [2011] 8 S.C.R. 1.
30
F.I.R.No. 27 at Police Station Sector-3, Chandigarh under Ss. 302, 120-B, 34 of the Indian Penal
Code 1860.
31
The Moot Proposition, para 20.
32
Glanville Williams, Text Book Of Criminal Law, (2nd Edition,Universal Law Publishing,1999).
33
The Digest 17 (1st ed., Vol 14 (2), London Butterworths & Co. Ltd. 1993).

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EXISTENCE OF MOTIVE

It is a matter of fact that, Petitioner No. 1 and Riha were college friends. Both of them
had a thing for each other, but they had never really pursued it on account of Ishs
presence.34 His desire presumably actuated the subsequent events. The mental element
should require proof that the Accused has personal awareness and has himself
perceived the relevant circumstances and consequences comprising of the actus reus
of the offence.35 It is contended as evidence, motive is always relevant. 36 Motive may
be relevant to proof; the prosecution may prove the motive for a crime if it helps them
to establish their case, as a matter of circumstantial evidence.37
EVIDENCE OF A DESIGN OR A PLAN AND SUBSEQUENT ACTION

John H. Wigmore, Rule of Evidence in Trials at Law38, S. 266 Rule 59 states the
General Principle when dealing with Evidence to Prove a Design or Plan. It states that
whenever a persons design or plan to do an act is in issue, it may be evidenced
circumstantially(a) by his conduct or utterances indicating the design or plan, (b) Or,
by the prior or subsequent existence of the design or plan. In Principles of Judicial
Proof39 it has further been explained that for establishing the existence of a design or
plan two ingredients must be circumstantially explained. The first ingredient to be
demonstrated before the court is the process of active deliberation by the accused. In
this stage, the accused duly weighs the good and the evil, which may result from any
action and consciously choose or decide upon a particular course with its attendant
result. The second ingredient to be proved by the prosecution is resolution on part of
the accused towards an action, which is seen to lead to a desired end. Resolution on its
psychical side is equivalent to a complete process of volition. It may be added that
resolution enters into all action, so far as this becomes complex, in the sense a
prolonged activity, or a series of combined movements. Resolution implied
maintenance of the idea an end that has been selected in furtherance of an
opportunity.40

34

The Moot Proposition, para 8.


Lennards Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1915] AC 8 713.
36
Williams (1986) 84Cr AppR 299, CA.
37
Wigmore, John H., Rule of Evidence in Trials at Law, 50, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston,
1910).
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid, p. 245247.
40
Ibid, p. 7. See also: Sully, James, The Human Mind, 1892, Vol II, 255.
35

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It is submitted that Petitioner No. 1 had classified the case and was personally
handling it. The said Petitioner had directed all Stargazer employees that the project
stood classified for everyone else at the company.

41

It may further be observed that

Riha perpetrated an attack on Ish based on a felonious execution of the advice


rendered to her by the software Stargazer. Riha had approached the AI powered
persona of her father Nitin Kaushal and asked him to advice her on how to get rid of
her relationship with Ish. The AI powered persona asked her to have a frank
conversation with Ish. However, she told the AI powered persona of Nitin that she
couldnt take it anymore and was afraid shell end up doing something to herself,
Nitin asked Riha to call Ish to her home, and pretend that he was going to outrage her
modesty, bruise herself a little, hit him with something and run away from the house
and call the police. 42
These facts very expressly indicate an active involvement on part of the Petitioner
No.1 wherein, he hatched the above mentioned conspiracy in form of a pre-arranged
plan.43 Riha followed the plan in toto and hit Ish with a vase. This resulted in his
death. Subsequently, the Police filed an F.I.R. under Ss. 34, 120B, 302 IPC.
According to s. 34 IPC, there must be a criminal act done by several persons; the
criminal act must be in furtherance of common intention of all, and there must be
participation44 of all persons in furthering the common intention.45 To adequately
prove common intention, direct evidence of conspiracy is most reliable.46 The offence
of criminal conspiracy under s. 120A I.P.C. takes place when two or more persons
agree to do, or cause to be done an illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal
means.47 The existence of meeting of minds and the consequential common intention
is a question of fact to be proved as a matter of inference from the circumstances of a
case at hand48 and the conduct of the parties.49 It is submitted that in the instant case,
the facts reveal that all the ingredients of the offences are made out as the plan
41

The Moot Proposition, para 9.


The Moot Proposition, para 11.
43
Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216.
44
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Deshraj and Ors., AIR 1965 SC 257.
45
Parichhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 535; Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC 1557; Suresh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2001 SC 1344.
46
Hari Singh Gaur, Penal Law of India, Vol 1, 11th Edn., Law Publishers, Allahabad, 1998, p. 316.
47
Mohd Khalid v. State of West Bengal, (2002) 7 SCC 334; Devender Pal Singh v. State (NCT of
Delhi), AIR 2002 SC 1661.
48
Bhaba Nandan Barma v. State of Assam, AIR 1977 SC 2252; Krishna Govind Patil v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413.
49
Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 160.
42

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between Riha and Petitioner No. 1 are conclusive to ascertain their active
involvement. The Supreme Court has expressed that when the facts are seriously in
dispute, the truth of such facts can only be established by evidence at the trial and in
such situations the High Court would err in quashing the FIR.50 Therefore, it is
submitted that the facts of the case warrant thorough investigation.
1.4

THAT

THE PETITIONER NO.

IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF

STARGAZER

It is submitted that the Petitioner No. 1 is vicariously responsible for the actions of
Stargazer. This is so because, the electronic records generated by the AI can be
attributed to him. The automated information system, Stargazer created by him was
under his active control. Stargazer was dependent on external manual support for his
functioning. Petitioner No.1, in the capacity of creator of Stargazer, could easily
manipulate the functioning of Stargazer.

The day-to-day actions of the AI

communicating with Riha were controlled by Petitioner No. 1. The AI is merely an


innocent agent employed by Petitioner No.1 instrumental in conspiring against Ish
with Riha.
1.4.1 THAT ELECTRONIC RECORDS GENERATED BY STARGAZER CAN BE
ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONER NO. 1

An electronic record includes inter alia data and sound generated or sent in an
electronic form.51 Any such electronic record is attributed to the originator if it is
generated by an information system programmed by or on behalf of the originator to
operate automatically.52 The law is based on the latin maxim qui facit per alium facit
per se, meaning One who acts through another, acts himself.

53

The originator

instructs the automatic information system and possesses reasonable control over its
functioning, hence the liability. Bots represent an automated information system too.
They are small scripts, which have been designed to perform specific automated
functions.54 A network of computers can be injected without permission with bots
giving the coder control over these systems.55 The coder then coordinates the systems

50

Sesami Chemicals Private Limited v. State of Meghalaya, 2014 (12) SCALE 2.


The Information Technology Act, S. 2(t).
52
Ibid, S. 11.
53
H.E. Nasser Abdulla Hussain v. DCIT, [2003] 84 ITD 43 (Mum).
54
Gupta, B.B., Botnet-based Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks on Web Servers:
Classification and Art, International Journal of Computer Applications Volume 49, No.7, p. 24
55
Gray Byrne, BotnetsThe Killer Web App, Syngress Publishing Inc., ISBN:1-59749-135- 7
51

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for spamming, click-frauds, spywares, worm dissemination and Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) Attacks.56 The liability therefore is of the coder.
In the instant case, all electronic records sent by Stargazer to Riha can be attributed to
Petitioner No. 1. It is a matter of fact that he had taken personal charge of Rihas case
and decided to conduct it himself thereby declaring the records classified for other
employees.57 The electronic records leading to the conspiracy to commit murder were
thus sent by Petitioner No. 1 to Riha.
1.4.2 THAT STARGAZER WAS DEPENDENT ON MANUAL INTERVENTION
Currently, numerous interactive artificial creatures equipped with touch, audio, and
visual sensors as well as different levels of robo-IQ58 already exist in the market and
laboratories. Their code relies heavily on manual assistance.59 In reference to
intelligent machines, the question of liability for actions done by AI entities is one of
prime importance. The question of culpability first came up in 1981 when a 37-yearold Japanese employee of a motorcycle factory was killed by an artificial-intelligence
robot working near him.60
In the instant case, Stargazer was influenced by the inputs given by the handlers and
psychological specialists to tweak its code.61 There was an obvious scope of manual
intervention capable of steering the program in a direction deemed desirable by the
handler. It is submitted Petitioner No. 1 programmed Stargazer to hold conversations
with Riha with a view to attract Riha and eliminate Ish. The conspiracy against Ish too
was contrived by Petitioner No. 1.
1.4.3 THAT STARGAZER WAS AN INNOCENT AGENT PUT INTO INSTRUMENTAL
USE TO COMMIT OFFENCES

An innocent agent is one that lacks the ability to commit an offence but functions as a
mere instrument in the hands of another to commit one.62 In such cases, the
intermediary is regarded as a mere instrument, albeit a sophisticated one. The party
orchestrating the offense is the real perpetrator as a principal in the first degree and is
56

C. Douligeris and D. N. Serpanos, "Network security: current status and future directions," WileyIEEE Press, 2007. See: Goyal, M., Ethics and Cyber Crime in India, International Journal of
Engineering and Management Research, Vol. 2, Issue 1, p. 1.
57
The Moot Proposition, para 9.
58
A. Libin and E. Libin, Robotic psychology, in Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology. San Francisco,
CA: Academic, 2004.
59
R. Brooks, Flesh and Machines. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.
60
Yueh-Hsuan Weng, Chien-Hsun Chen and Chuen-Tsai Sun, Towards the Human-Robot Co-Existence
Society: On Safety Intelligence for Next Generation Robots, 1 INT. J. SOC. ROBOT 267, 273 (2009).
61
The Moot Proposition, para 8.
62
Glanville Williams, Innocent Agency and Causation, 3 Crim. L. F. 289 (1992).

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held accountable for the conduct of the innocent agent.63 The perpetrators liability is
determined on the basis of that conduct64 and mental state.65 The term includes
Artificial Intelligence since AI possesses no will of its own.66 The other party is
deemed to be criminally liable for the actions of the innocent agent. 67 The legal model
attributing liability as above is called the perpetration-through-another model.68 The
perpetrators liability is determined on the basis of the conduct of the instrument69 and
of the mental state of the perpetrator70. The physical actions of the AI entity are
considered as though they have been conducted by the perpetrator while no mental
attribute is credited to the AI entity.71 The perpetrator is the programmer of the AI
software, its operator or the end user who uses the entity for his own benefit resulting
in the offence.72 The inputs of the developers play an active role in determining the
result of the AI entity.
In the instant case, Petitioner No. 1 is the person responsible for the actions of
Stargazer. The conduct of the instrument, viz. Stargazer, amounted to a conspiracy
against Ish. The mental state of Petitioner No. 1 reflected his affection towards Riha
and an intention to devise a conspiracy with her.
1.5. THAT PETITIONER NO. 1 HAS NOT APPROACHED THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS

The doctrine of Clean Hands states that one who seeks equity must do equity.73 Any
willful conduct that is iniquitous, unfair, dishonest, fraudulent, unconscionable, or

63

Hellevy, G., When Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence Under Criminal Law, p. 72.
Dusenbery v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 770, 263 S.E.2d 392 (1980).
65
United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408
(2nd Cir.1979).
66
Hellevy, G., When Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence Under Criminal Law, p. 74; AI can be
compared with a child, a mentally-incompetent person and a dog, who do not possess a logical state of
mind; See: Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1984 SC 237; Someshwar Bora v. State of
Assam, (1981) CrLj (NOC)51 (Gau).
67
Peter Alldridge, The Doctrine of Innocent Agency, 2 Crim. L. F. 45 (1990).
68
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1231, 1262
(1992).
69
Dusenbery v. Commonwealth, 263 S.E.2d 392 (Va. 1980).
70
United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1101 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Ruffin, 613
F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1979).
71
The AI entity is used as an instrument and not as a participant, although it uses its features of
processing information. See: Cross, G.R. & Debessonet, C.G., An Artificial Intelligence Application in
the Law: CCLIPS, A Computer Program that Processes Legal Information, 1 High Tech. L.J. 329
(1986).
72
Hellevy , op.cit., p. 73.
73
Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution 68 (2d Ed. 1993); Thomas W.
Merrill, Golden Rules For Transboundary Pollution, 46 Duke L.J. 931.
64

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performed in bad faith may constitute unclean hands under the Clean Hand
Doctrine.74
In the given factual matrix, the Petitioner No. 1 has gone beyond his duty and acted in
a suspicious manner that was contrary to his duty as creator of the software, Stargazer.
These facts can be noted as follows:
1. That Petitioner No. 1 suspiciously classified the project making it unavailable for
others.
2. That Petitioner No.1 took personal charge of services to Riha.
3. That Petitioner No.1 to an experimental section of Stargazer wherein the control of
the program solely vested in him.
4. On the day of his death, Ish had received a call from the number Stargazer had been
using to call Riha.75
Therefore, the Petitioner No. 1 has not acted in a fair, equitable or honest manner.76

In light of the above presented arguments, the Special Leave filed under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India, 1950 against the decision of the Honble Punjab and
Haryana High Court in the matter of quashing of F.I.R. against Petitioner No. 1 is not
maintainable. Petitioner No. 1 is responsible for the actions of the AI entity.

74

Prakash Jayawant Koli v. State Of Maharashtra, 2008 (1) BomCR 196; Vimal Vitthal Chavan v.
Nava Maharashtra Education Society Trust and Ors., 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 916; Jeevan Kumar and
Anr. v. Union of India, 2002 VII AD (Delhi) 100; Parinda Milind Keer v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,
2008 (1) BomCR 182; Smt. G. Bharati Devi and Ors. v. The Hyderabad Urban Development, 2008 (3)
ALD 292; Vinod Chandra Dube v. Aruna Dube, AIR 1977 Delhi 24.
75
The Moot Proposition, para 17.
76
P.C.Tobin, p.60; A.Shapovalov, p. 856; UN Yearbook 2008.

10

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II.

THAT THE S.L.P.

AGAINST THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL BY THE HONBLE HIGH

COURT AGAINST PETITIONER NO. 2 IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.


The instant S.L.P. has been instituted by Petitioner No. 2 before the Honble Supreme
Court challenging the order of dismissal by the Honble High Court of Punjab and
Haryana. The submissions made by Respondent No. 2 are fourfold. Firstly, no special
and exceptional circumstances exist. Secondly, substantial justice has already been
done by the High Court. Thirdly, non-application of the powers under Art. 136 would
not result in grave injustice. Fourthly, the F.I.R., if quashed, would preclude the police
to investigate facts that otherwise warrant investigation.
2.1 THAT NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST
For the sake of brevity, the law regarding maintainability of special leave to appeals
has not been discussed since the same has been elaborated above.77 The power to
decide special leave to appeals is restricted to exceptional and special circumstances.78
In the instant case, the facts apropos of Petitioner No. 2 do not qualify as exceptional
and special. Petitioner No. 2 has been found in possession of cocaine (popularly
known as coke). S. 21, NDPS Act prohibits, inter alia, sale and possession of
manufactured drugs like cocaine. With a view of bringing drug-peddlers to the
book, a decoy website was set up by the police. The website was designed to look
genuine and accepted payments and delivery address of those willing to illicitly
purchase drugs, like offered by other websites. It is a matter of fact, Petitioner No. 2
was found to have ordered 20 units of cocaine. The police took cognizance of the act
and an F.I.R. was registered against Petitioner No. 2 as the purchase prima facie
amounted to a cognizable offence. The dominant purpose of registration of the F.I.R.
and the intended follow-up actions are only to investigate the allegations and present a
case before the Court.79
It is submitted, a mere registration of an F.I.R. does not indicate exceptional and
special circumstances: a sine qua non for maintainability of an S.L.P.

77

Supra: Issue 1.1 at p. 1.


MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law and Constitutional Documents, Vol. 1, p. 318 (6th Ed. 2013);
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169; Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank, SC 459
79
State Of Haryana And Ors v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1962 AIR 1314.
78

11

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2.2 THAT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE BY THE HIGH COURT
The power to quash the F.I.R. vests in the High Court by virtue of S. 482, Cr.P.C. The
power is to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases: the allegations in toto dont
constitute any offence or the allegations are prima facie absurd and reasonably warrant
no investigation.80 It is not the duty of the High Court to embark upon appreciation of
evidence in quashing the proceedings.81
In the instant case, the High Court (vide order dated 23.02.15) has rightly dismissed
the petition to quash the F.I.R. The Honble High Court justifiably took notice of the
preliminary nature of the investigation. The Court considered the gravity of the
offence alleged and the need to investigate such offences. Substance-abuse is a grave
offence that adversely affects the socio-economic state of the public. The allegations
prima facie indicate commission of a cognizable offence that warrant investigation.
It is submitted that substantial justice was done by the High Court. The Order of the
High Court requires no further scrutiny.
2.3 THAT

NON-APPLICATION OF THE POWERS UNDER ARTICLE

136

WOULD NOT

RESULT IN GRAVE INJUSTICE

The overriding powers of this Court have been reserved for application in
circumstances where its non-application would result in injustice to the petitioners.82
As an exceptional remedy, the powers are to be exercised where, if not applied, the
interests of the Petitioners would be prejudicially affected.83
In the instant case, non-exercise of powers of the Apex Court would have no bearing
on the rights of the Petitioner No. 2. The police have merely registered an F.I.R.
against the Petitioner based on material-on-record. The F.I.R. is intended only to set
the criminal law in motion.84 The offence has been committed using complex
technologies hitherto unknown. The law regarding AI is complex. A sufficient period
is required to understand the technology and consult experts in the field. The
investigation is being conducted according to due procedure established by law to
prevent any possible victimization to and prejudice to the rights of Petitioner No. 2.

80

Supra: Issue 1.2 at p. 2.


State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 (1) SCC 335; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 (Supp.) (1)
SCC 222; Janata Dal v. H.S Choudhary, 1992 (4) SCC 305.
82
Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat,
AIR 1983 SC 753; N. Suryakala v. A Mohan and Ors., (2007) 9 SCC 196.
83
Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, AIR 2010 SC 932; Mathai v. George and Anr., (2010)4 SCC 358;
Sawant Singh and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 1961 SCR (3) 120.
81

12

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It is submitted that non-application of the powers under Art. 136 would not adversely
affect the rights of Petitioner No. 2. Investigations according to law are in progress
and do not demand quashing.
2.4 THAT THE F.I.R., IF QUASHED, WOULD PRECLUDE THE POLICE TO INVESTIGATE
FACTS THAT OTHERWISE WARRANT INVESTIGATION

It is the duty of the police to conduct investigation of offences and collect evidence.85
Any extraordinary attempt to disentitle the police of its inherent power of investigation
must be exercised with due caution and prudence.86 An F.I.R. that discloses a serious
offence must not be quashed.87 An adequate time is imperative for due investigation of
offences.
The State of Punjab is reeling under the epidemic of drug-abuse.88 Statistics represent
a stark picture of the state of public health: extent of drug addiction is 70 percent in
Punjab89, nearly 73% of drug addicts belong to the age group of 16-35 years90 and
every third male student is a drug addict91. Heavy crackdowns coupled with constant
vigilance have resulted in large-scale seizing of drugs in Punjab.92
The Central Government is under an obligation to take all such measures as it deems
necessary or expedient for the purpose of combating abuse of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances.93 The States obligation to curb substance abuse has been

85

Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2013) 4 SCC 1; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator,
Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608; A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1999) 6
SCC 667.
86
T. Paith Sarathy v. Madhu Sangal, 1992 CrLJ 26 (MP); Arun Sharma v. State of Assam, 1986 (2)
Crimes 61, 65 (Gau); P.G. Bhavani v. C.L. Patil, 1986 (1) Crimes 481 (Bom); Suraj Prakash Sood v.
State of U.P., 1991 (2) Crimes 18 (All); Gurdip Singh v. Daljit Kaur, 1991 (2) Crimes 72 (P&H).
87
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Narendra Kumar Jhanjhri, 1991 (1) Crimes 798,807 (Pat); Atma Singh
Caler v. State of Punjab, 1991 (1) Crimes 714 (P&H); Ram Pal v. State of Haryana, 1991 (1) Crimes
566 (P&H); Harakchand Bhagehand Oswal v. Satilingappa Bhagwanappa, 1991 (1) Crimes 531 (Bom);
Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P., 1991 (1) Crimes 298 (All-DB); Bimal Kumar Nopany v.
Registrar of Companies, AP, 1991 (1) Crimes 1 (AP).
88
Basu, D. and Avasthi, A. (2015). Strategy for the management of substance use disorders in the
State of Punjab, Indian Journal of Psychiatry, 57(1), 920.
89
Guideline for the Implementation of the Project Awareness and Education for Prevention of Drug
Abuse & Alcoholism in Punjab, Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, Govt. of India.
90
Sandhu RS (2006). "Drug addiction in Punjab: A Sociological Study", Department of Sociology,
Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar.
91
Harjit Singh, Secretary, Department of Social Security and Women & Child Development,
Chandigarh, in reply to a petition filed by drug rehabilitation centres before the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in May, 2009.
92
Chiteen K. Sethi, Punjabs Drug Crackdown, Feb. 17, 2015, The Indian Express; Punjab has
reported the highest number of convicts (2,092) under NDPS Act, Prison Statistics India, 2013, p. 73
93
The NDPS Act, 1985, S. 4.

13

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recognized internationally as well.94 To this end, S. 21, the NDPS Act prohibits, inter
alia, possession and purchase of manufactured drugs. Such drugs include all forms of
coca derivatives. Cocaine is a form of coca derivative as per S. 2(v) of NDPS Act.
In the instant case, an order of 20 units of coke was made by Petitioner No. 2. He
presumably believed that the website was genuine accepting delivery of cocaine and
hence placed the order. The online-purchase made amounts to a purchase made of
manufactured drugs for the purpose of S. 21 of the NDPS Act and is hence punishable.
The investigation of the offences against Petitioner No. 2 is in process. The intricate
technology of AI poses a challenge to the police. Efforts are being made to consult
cyber-experts to understand its nature.95 The offence alleged to have been committed
has adverse ramifications. Drug-abuse is a socio-economic offence known to have
large-scale dire consequences on the society at large. The order was placed of a huge
quantity of cocaine leading to grave suspicions of its use. The far-reaching effects of
drug-abuse necessitate an investigation. Should the F.I.R. be quashed, the police
would be deprived of its inherent power to investigate rendering it impossible to reach
the root of the malaise.
It is submitted that quashing the F.I.R. would preclude the police to investigate the
grave offence of drug-abuse.

In light of the above presented arguments, no exceptional or special circumstances


exist insofar as the High Court has rightly dismissed quashing of the F.I.R. The
Petition was instituted only 4 days after the registration of the F.I.R. The investigation
was at its preliminary stages and was yet to be comprehensively conducted. Moreover,
the failure to accept the S.L.P. by this Honble Court would not result in any grave
injustice inasmuch as the F.I.R. only results in setting the criminal law in motion. The
preliminary investigations have given an apprehension of commission of cognizable
offences, which need to be duly investigated to discover the true facts. An
investigation held according to the procedure established by law ipso facto does not
adversely affect the interests of the Petitioner No.2.

94

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Art. 4; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971
Preamble; United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, 1988, Art. 2.
95
The Moot Proposition, para 14.

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3.

THAT THE ORDINANCE PROMULGATED BY THE RESPONDENT IS

LEGALLY

TENABLE

The instant Writ Petition (W.P. (C). No. 16 of 2015) seeks to challenge the validity of
the Presidential Ordinance dated 20.02.15. The submissions made by Respondent No.
3 are twofold. Firstly, the instant writ petition is not maintainable. Secondly, the
Ordinance is not ulra vires Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950.
3.1.

THAT THE INSTANT WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

An Ordinance is declared ex debito justitiae to meet unexpected circumstances.96 The


satisfaction of the President over existence of such circumstances is beyond judicial
review.
3.1.1. THAT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED WHICH WARRANTED IMMEDIATE ACTION BY
THE PRESIDENT

The circumstances justifying an Ordinance are in the nature of grave and emergent
situations.97
The power of the President to promulgate Ordinances during recess of the Parliament
has been enshrined in Art. 123 of the Constitution. The Chapter aptly titled:
Legislative Powers of the President enjoins him to make laws when the Parliament
is unable to.98 The power to promulgate is as necessary for peace and governance as
the Parliamentary power to legislate.99 The promulgation may be made ex necessitate
in order to enable the Executive to meet an emergent situation. 100 The Presidential
satisfaction of the existence of such circumstances is based on the advice of the
Council of Ministers.101
In the instant case, the current legal regime was felt unable to cope with the advanced
technology of Artificial Intelligence. To fill the legal vacuum which was being
exploited, the Ordinance was promulgated to prohibit its possible misuse. It would
serve as an effective pre-emptive measure to curb AI-based crimes whose
consequences can be far-reaching. The measure should only be seen as provisional
and operative till an effective law is put into enforcement.
96

State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 1977 AIR 1361; Ramesh Chand Sharma and Anr. v.
Commissioner of Police and Ors., 2005 Indlaw DEL 367.
97
Ibid.
98
Gurudevdatta V.K.S.S.S. Maryadit and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 980.
99
Constitutional Assembly Debates, Vol. 8, Part V, Chapter III, p. 201-217.
100
R.K. Garg and Ors v. Union of India and Ors., (1981) 4 SCC 675.
101
T. Venkata Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1985) 3 SCC 198.

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It is submitted that the circumstances warranted immediate action and consequently
the Ordinance was promulgated that effectively addresses the circumstances
unexpectedly arisen.
3.1.2. THAT THE SATISFACTION OF THE PRESIDENT IS BEYOND JUDICIAL REVIE
An Ordinance is promulgated when the President is satisfied that circumstances exist
which render it necessary for him to take immediate action. The President has the
discretion to decide on the nature of the immediate action resorted to with a view to
address emergent circumstances.102
The satisfaction cannot be judged using objective tests and is purely a political
question depending upon assessment of diverse and varied factors, fast changing
situations, potential consequences, public reaction, motivations, public responses and
their anticipated future behaviour and a host of other considerations left to be judged
by the complex democratic government.103 The conclusion may be based on
information only available with the government not known to those who seek to
impugn.104 The lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards makes it
dangerous for the Court to delve into such political questions.105 The Court should not
ordinarily comment on any act of the Executive unless the act is such that it is likely to
promote disrespect for the law.106 It is settled that the power of Judicial Review is
concerned with validity rather than merits.107
For the existence of such circumstances that necessitate promulgation, the President is
the sole judge.108 The initial burden of proof rests on the one claiming invalidation to
establish that no circumstances exist to justify promulgation and it is only then can an
ordinance be struck-down.109 The satisfaction of the existence of such circumstances
cannot be questioned on ground of error of judgment or otherwise in court.110 An
Ordinance cannot be questioned on its motive or mala fide or on the ground that
102

Reliance Airport Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Airport Authority of India and Ors., [2006] RD-SC 758;
Cellular Operators Association v. Union Of India & Ors., on 17 December, 2002 (Unreported)
103
State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Union of India, 1977 AIR 1361.
104
Stephen Kalang Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia, L.R. (1970) A.C. 379, 392; Liversidge v.
Anderson, (1942) A.C. 206, Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (1942) A.C. 284), Sree
Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief Commissioner, Union Territory of Tripura, (1964) 3 SCR. 442 1963,
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 797 1963.
105
Charles W. Baker et al. v. Joe C. Carr et al, 369 US 186.
106
Har Sharan Verma v. Chandra Bhan Gupta and Ors., AIR 1962 All 301
107
T. Muralidhar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., 2004 (5) ALT 634; BALCO Employees
Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors., 2001 Indlaw SC 20366
108
M/S S.K.G. Sugar Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 1974 AIR 1533; S.R. Bommai v. State, (1994) 3
SCC 1.
109
A.K. Roy v. Union of India and Anr., 1982 AIR 710.
110
State of Punjab v. Sat Pal Dang and Ors., 1969 AIR 903.

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prevailing circumstances did not warrant the issue of the Ordinance.111 It cannot be
challenged on the grounds of non-application of mind either.112
In the instant case, the power of promulgation has been exercised justifiably after due
consideration of existing facts. Several incidents were witnessed of increasing misuse
of Artificial Intelligence-based technology to commit serious offences: a conspiracy of
murder was engendered under the guise of Artificial Technology and drugs were being
sold illicitly.113 The courts have repeatedly discouraged resorting to surreptitious ways
to put into effect something indirectly which cannot be done directlystated as
quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur at omne per quod devenitur ad illud.114 Any
attempt to blame technology for crimes is facetious.115
The material-on-record illustrates the potency of AI to function independently and
commit crimes.116 Eminent scientists of this field too have cautioned against its
threats.117
It is submitted that the Presidential satisfaction was based on incidents that indicated
that machines which could not be prosecuted were being blamed for offences to
dislodge any guilt.
Thus, it is submitted that the instant writ petition is not maintainable.
3.2

THAT THE ORDINANCE IS NOT ULTRA VIRES ARTICLE 19(1)(G) OF THE


CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

The Ordinance was promulgated with a view of banning commercial research, sale,
or dissemination in any other form of hardware or code that possessed characteristics
of Artificial Intelligence including, but not limited to, programs which are
considered bots in common parlance.118 The restriction on trade and commerce of
111

K. Nagaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1985) 1 SCC 523:AIR 1985 SC 551; Gurudevdatta V.K.S.S.
Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2001 SC 1980.
112
K. Nagaraj v. State of Andra Pradesh, (1985) 1 SCC 524.
113
Moot Proposition, para 19.
114
Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. Noida and Ors., (2011) 6 SCC 508, 521; Swantraj and Ors. v.
State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 517; State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. K Shyam Sunder and Ors.,
Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 154, 166 of 2013.
115
Technology is an innocent agent put into instrumental use to commit offences like spamming, clickfrauds, spywares, worm dissemination and DDoS Attacks. See: Supra Issue 1.4.1 at p. 7; See also:
Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1984 SC 237; Someshwar Bora v. State of Assam,
(1981) CrLj (NOC) 51 (Gau).
116
The Moot Proposition, para 19.
117
The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race, Hawking, S.,
Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind, Jones, R.C., BBC News (2014);
Bill Gates too has expressed concerns, See: Microsoft's Bill Gates Insists AI is a Threat, Rawlinson,
K.., BBC News (2015); Artificial Intelligence is our Biggest Existential Threat, Musk, E., AeroAstro
Centennial Symposium, December, 2014.
118
The Moot Proposition, para 19.

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hardware employing AI is a reasonable restriction insofar as the same has been
imposed in the interest of general public. The State has taken cognizance of serious
crimes being committed in the garb of using AI. The current laws are incapable of
regulating Artificial Intelligence. Its unregulated sale poses a threat of its misuse to
commit serious offences.
While judging a statute, the initial presumption is in favour of its constitutionality and
the one attacking it must show that there has been a clear transgression of the
constitutional principles.119 This rule is based on the assumption, judicially recognised
and accepted, that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its
own people.120 The Indian Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to practice
any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 121 The right is
qualified to the extent that reasonable restrictions may be imposed in the interest of the
general public.122 Laws may also be made to allow the State to carry on any trade,
business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens
or otherwise.123
3.2.1. THAT THE OBJECT OF THE ORDINANCE IS MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER
Any infraction of law necessarily affects law and order of the State and must be
prohibited.124 It is the duty of the State to prevent actions that disturb general peace
and tranquillity.125
While assessing the restriction, courts must consider the problem faced and the
solution sought to curb the problem from the point of view of furtherance of social
interests.126 The restriction placed must have a reasonable nexus with the underlying
purpose sought to be achieved.127 Reasonable restrictions may be placed for the
achievement of Directive Principles crystallized in Part IV of the Constitution.128 The

119

Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1533.


Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India and Ors., 1960 AIR 554.
121
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(g).
122
Ibid.; Art. 19(6); See: Indian Handicrafts Emporium & Ors v. UOI, 2003 AIR (SC) 3240; State of
Punjab v. Devans Modern Brewery, (2004) 11 SCC.
123
Ibid; See: Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. K. Vinayagamurthy, 2002 (3) CTC
696; Government of Maharashtra &. Ors. v. Deokar's Distillery, 2003 (5) SCC 669.
124
Kishori Mohan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 1749.
125
Supt., Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633; Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP,
AIR 1957 SC 620.
126
Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, 1961 AIR 1602.
127
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196.
128
Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad and Ors. v. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai and Anr., 1986 AIR
1205.
120

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State has the authority to prohibit dangerous equipments in the interest of health and
welfare.129
In the instant case, the restriction has been imposed after due assessment of its benefits
and possible consequences. It has been imposed after taking due cognizance of
incidents where serious crimes were being committed and consequently blamed on
machines, disturbing law and order. The Ordinance preserves law and order, peace
and tranquillity by reigning in nefarious activities otherwise being committed with
impunity. The object also sought to be achieved inter alia is improvement in public
healthan objective enshrined as a Directive Principle of the State Policy.130
Additionally, the State is under an obligation to prevent misuse of technology.131 The
restriction also seeks to prohibit misuse of technology. No person can claim a
Fundamental Right to trade in noxious goods.132 The State is enjoined to prohibit
consumption of drugs injurious to public health.133
It is submitted that the restriction is reasonable insofar as it bears a cogent nexus with
the object it seeks to achieve.
3.2.2. THAT THE ORDINANCE HAS BEEN PROMULGATED AS AN INTERIM MEASURE
The restrictions were imposed on commercial research, sale and dissemination of
Artificial Intelligence to discourage citizens from committing crimes and then blaming
them on machines that couldnt be prosecuted and punished under law.
In the instant case, Artificial Intelligence poses a challenge to the existing legal
framework. At first blush, Artificial Intelligence-based hardware may ostensibly
appear to operate without manual assistance. However, the technology is apparently
vulnerable to human interventions. It is prone to be influenced by inputs given by the
handlers.134 The handlers may easily override it to perpetrate offences. The resultant
action would entirely be the consequence of manual intrusion. Thus, it would be
erroneous for the perpetrator to deflect guilt on AI by completing disregarding the
scope of manual instructions to the system.

129

Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. the Excise Commissioner and Chief Commissioner, Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC
220; State of A.P. v. McDowell, AIR 1996 SC 1627.
130
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 47.
131
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Election Commission of India, AIR 1996 SC 577.
132
Secy. To Govt. Tamil Nadu & Anr v. K. Vinayagamurthy, SLP 14735 of 2002.
133
Ibid.; The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, Section 4; Art. 2(5), Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.
134
The Moot Proposition, para 15.

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It is submitted that, in the absence of a legal scheme to regulate Artificial Technologybased hardware and code, the Ordinance has been promulgated as an interim measure.
3.2.3.

THAT COMMERCIAL SALE OF AI MAKES IT EASILY AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC


AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISUSE

The State is obliged to prohibit free-distribution of instruments that lead to easy


commission of offences.135
In the instant case, commercial sale of AI-based hardware and codes is grossly
dangerous and poses an injurious risk: the imminent risk of its indiscriminate use to
commit offences with impunity. The sale and distribution of AI-based hardware would
make it easily available to the public.
It is submitted that, in the absence of regulation, AI-based hardware and code is prone
to misuse to commit grave offences.
Thus, it is submitted that the Ordinance is not ultra vires Art. 19(1)(g) of the Indian
Constitution.
In light of the above presented arguments, the Ordinance is beyond the scope of
Judicial Review by reason of the limited application of judicial powers over the
subjective satisfaction of the President. The President is the sole judge to decide
existence of circumstances which render it necessary for him to take immediate action.
It has been imposed after taking due cognizance of incidents where serious crimes
were being committed and consequently blamed on machines. The Ordinance acts as a
reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right to trade inasmuch as it is in the
interest of the general public.

135

People for Animals v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 1755.

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PRAYER
In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and cases cited it is most humbly
prayed before this Honble CourtA. That SLP (Crl.) No. 25 of 2015 be dismissed.
B. That SLP (Crl.) No. 27 of 2015 be dismissed.
C. That W.P. (C). No. 16 of 2015 be dismissed.
Or grant such other relief as the court may deem fit in the light of justice, equity and
good conscience.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE RESPONDENTS SHALL DUTY BOUND EVER PRAY.

Sd/-

Counsel for the Respondents

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