Anda di halaman 1dari 109

S. Hrg.

109591

HURRICANE KATRINA: PERSPECTIVES OF FEMAS


OPERATIONS PROFESSIONALS

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 8, 2005

Printed for the use of the


Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON

26744 PDF

2006

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office


Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 5121800; DC area (202) 5121800
Fax: (202) 5122250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 204020001

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00001

Fmt 5011

Sfmt 5011

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS


SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
DAVID T. FLANAGAN, General Counsel
JONATHAN T. NASS, Counsel
JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
ROBERT F. MUSE, Minority General Counsel
MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Counsel
TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk

(II)

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00002

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

CONTENTS
Opening statements:
Senator Collins .................................................................................................
Senator Lieberman ...........................................................................................
Senator Stevens ................................................................................................

Page

1
2
4

WITNESSES
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2005
Scott Wells, Federal Coordinating Officer, FEMA Joint Field Office, Baton
Rouge, Louisiana ..................................................................................................
Philip E. Parr, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer, FEMA Joint Field Office,
Austin, Texas ........................................................................................................
William L. Carwile III, Former Federal Coordinating Officer, FEMA Joint
Field Office, Biloxi, Mississippi ...........................................................................
ALPHABETICAL LIST

OF

7
9
13

WITNESSES

Carwile, William L. III:


Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Parr, Philip E.:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Wells Scott:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................

13
61
9
52
7
43

APPENDIX
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit

1 ...................................................................................................................
8 ...................................................................................................................
9 ...................................................................................................................
F ...................................................................................................................
G ..................................................................................................................
H ..................................................................................................................
I ...................................................................................................................

71
83
90
94
99
102
104

(III)

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00003

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00004

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

HURRICANE KATRINA: PERSPECTIVES OF


FEMAS OPERATIONS PROFESSIONALS
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2005

U.S. SENATE,
ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE

Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room
SD342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Susan M. Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Stevens, and Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Today,


the Committee continues its investigation into the preparation for
and response to Hurricane Katrina.
This morning, at our eighth hearing, we will hear from three witnesses who are among the Federal Emergency Management Agencys most experienced emergency managers and operations professionals. Each of our witnessesScott Wells, Philip Parr, and William Carwilewas directly involved in Katrina preparation and response. They will give us a more complete understanding of
FEMAs role, share their observations about the State and local response, and provide their insights and recommendations for reforms.
One of our witnesses today has described the national emergency
response as a bottom-up system, with local and State authorities
leading the way and Federal authorities coordinating operations
and the deployment of resources. In Katrina, this system broke
down, and the result was the very deprivation and suffering the
structure was designed to avoid. This system must be fixed from
the bottom to the very top.
One of the most glaring breakdowns was in communications.
This powerful storm devastated the land-based communications infrastructure throughout the Gulf region. This, however, was an utterly foreseeable result of howling winds and surging water that
apparently was not adequately anticipated, nor compensated for.
At our last hearing on November 16, we heard testimony from
private sector witnesses who stressed the critical importance of
maintaining communications in disaster management. They emphasized that good communications are the life blood of emergency
operations, allowing for the effective movement of personnel and
other assets as well as real-time assessments.
(1)

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00005

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

2
In each of these companies, developing and maintaining robust
systems, importing extra communications gear, and re-establishing
contact with the outside world were of the utmost priority and a
key component of their preparedness plans. Their outstanding performance, unfortunately, stands in stark contrast to the inability of
government at all levels to plan and execute backup communications systems.
FEMA has mobile communications vehicles. But by the time anyone thought to bring one to the Superdome, the building was already surrounded by water, and FEMA was apparently unable to
figure out a way to get its equipment into the building.
FEMA also has communications equipment that could be airlifted in. But despite Mr. Parrs urgent request for such equipment,
none arrived. In his interview with the staff, Mr. Parr estimated
that the lack of communications equipment reduced his teams effectiveness by an astounding 90 percent.
Much of the post-Katrina criticism has been justifiably focused
on FEMA. But todays witnesses will explain that Katrina also exposed serious flaws at the local and State level that contributed to
the suffering experienced by so many in the Gulf region.
For example, according to the staff interview of Mr. Wells, Louisianas emergency operations officials failed to followperhaps
even to comprehendthe National Response Plan, which is an integrated system designed to coordinate the Federal, State, and
local responses to a disaster. Indeed, Mr. Wells noted that Louisianas emergency managers were getting training on the critical Incident Command System 2 days after the storm hit.
Todays witnesses will also help us determine how FEMA, State,
and local officials can do better. They are all current or former Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) and possess a wealth of emergency management experience. The FCOs play a critical role in
FEMA.
In June of 2004, the FCO cadre urged Under Secretary Michael
Brown to undertake reforms to remove obstacles to command, control, and core mission accomplishment and to reconfigure and enhance the national emergency response teams. The memorandum
strongly advised that these reforms be implemented to help prepare for the next big one.
But we will hear today that disturbingly little was done in response to these recommendations, far too little to prepare for the
big one when, indeed, it hit 14 months later.
I very much appreciate the testimony of our witnesses today so
that we can be better prepared for the catastrophic events yet to
come.
Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman, for


calling this hearing and for your continued leadership of our investigation.
We have already held several important and informative hearings about Hurricane Katrina on subjects that range from the fate
of the levees to the actions of the private sector in the wake of the
storm, to the testimony of FEMA employee Marty Bahamonde dur-

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00006

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

3
ing those dangerous days when he tried to get help to the thousands stranded in the Superdome.
This mornings witnesses, FEMAs operations professionals who
were on the scene in the Gulf Coast, will, I am confident, move the
Committees investigation forward toward finding out what went
wrong before and after Hurricane Katrina so that we can achieve
the purpose that Congress and all of us have in mind, which is to
make sure that it never happens again.
I want to thank our witnesses for the testimony they are about
to give. I want to thank them for their distinguished careers of
public service that each of them has. And those careers should not,
in any sense, be diminished by the criticism that FEMA is receiving and may well receive today.
I will say that, having reviewed your testimony prepared for this
morning and the interviews that you had with our Committee staff
and having now gone over other testimony and documents gathered
by the Committee so far, it certainly seems to me that FEMA is
a troubled agency that failed at its prime mission, the mission it
draws its name from, which is emergency management.
The fact is that the whole world watched on television as Hurricane Katrina, a disaster waiting to happen, developed in the Gulf
of Mexico. The whole world listened to the experts who said that
this was the long-dreaded big one that could take out the levees
and flood the Big Easy. Yet FEMA seemed to underestimate the
gravity of the storm coming and/or failed to realize that doing business as usual was unacceptable and would compound the disaster.
Katrina obviously was not a typical hurricane in response to
which FEMA or anyone elseFederal, State, or localcould work
off of a typical playbook. Katrina required a more urgent, comprehensive, and aggressive governmental response.
Katrina was a catastrophe. It knocked out many of the State and
local communications, as Senator Collins has said, and response capabilities and overwhelmed those that remained. But FEMA
seemed to expect a severely damaged State and local response network, itself the victim of the catastrophe, to operate as if it was at
full and normal capacity.
Like Senator Collins, I have been very surprised and upset to
learn in the course of our Committees investigation that Americas
battle plan for catastrophes, the National Response Plans Catastrophic Incident Annex, was never activated in response to
Katrina. And FEMA apparently still believes that it should not
have been activated.
As we will hear today, FEMA deployed too few people to respond
to Katrina and deployed them too slowly. Many of those that did
deploy apparently failed to appreciate what the breaking of the levees around New Orleans meant, and that failure had disastrous
consequences, as we all know, for the people of New Orleans.
As we learned at our previous hearings, New Orleans industrial
canal levees were leveled by the storm surge early Monday morning, August 29. That led to almost immediate flooding in the eastern part of the city, including the lower 9th Ward. By mid day, the
Lake Pontchartrain levees were also breaking, and that led to a
much slower flooding of downtown New Orleans, what we so often
heard referred to as New Orleans filling up like a bowl.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00007

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

4
Mr. Bahamonde, previously referred to as FEMAs first man on
the ground in New Orleans, told us that he communicated these
facts by mid day Monday to FEMA and had a conference call with
FEMA officials at the emergency operations center, among others,
that night. We now know that other sources were providing the
same information throughout the day to the Baton Rouge emergency operations center, where FEMAs top regional operators were
stationed. Yet, as we will hear today, the FEMA emergency response team did not depart Baton Rouge for New Orleans until
noon on Tuesday, significant hours later, almost a full day after the
hurricane had hit and already passed.
By that time, Lake Pontchartrain had been dumping its waters
into downtown New Orleans for hours, making it impossible for the
FEMA team to bring its vital communications tractor-trailer, socalled Red October, into the city. This left the team without any
reliable means of communications and reduced its effectiveness in
New Orleans, as Senator Collins said, by some 90 percent. That is
according to Mr. Parrs testimony that we will hear this morning.
But that wasnt the only costly delay. Unfortunately, we have
learned from other witnesses that the Coast Guard was performing
rescue missions as soon as hurricane-force winds abated on Monday afternoon. The State itself sent out rescue boats later Monday
afternoon. But FEMAs search and rescue teams didnt arrive in
New Orleans until Tuesday morning, and we want to ask why.
Given the catastrophic nature of Katrinas damage, we must understand why FEMA wasnt prepared to move sooner. And of
course, the most vexing part of it all is not just that this was all
foreseeable, but that, in fact, it had been foreseen. This precise disaster scenario was used in the Hurricane Pam planning exercise
conducted in June 2004. It also had been the topic of numerous stories in the media and hurricane conferences over the years.
This was not a failure of imagination, as some might want to
label it. It was a failure of realization. Realization that the catastrophe, about which we had all long been warned, was about to
occur and that FEMA and everybody else, State and local, had to
move quickly to address it.
Yes, a disaster like Hurricane Katrina is an act of God. Yes,
there will be confusion in such extraordinary natural disasters.
Yes, mistakes will be made by people who are well intentioned. But
adequately preparing for and responding to a disaster of this magnitude required a well-led, well-trained, well-drilled, and wellmanned FEMA that had a plan in place and a sense of mission to
guide its actions.
Regrettably, it appears to me, at this point in our investigation,
that all of these things were lacking as disaster swept across the
Gulf Coast region last August. This morning, we want to ask why.
And I am confident that these three witnesses can help us answer
that question.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Stevens.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS

Senator STEVENS. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Senator


Lieberman.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00008

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

5
I regret to disagree with the Senator from Connecticut. Our Committee took a trip to New Orleans. As a result of that trip, we became convinced that what happened in New Orleans was that
Katrina went through New Orleans. We saw the buses in line that
were ready to deal with the evacuation. The people of New Orleans
were prepared for Hurricane Katrina. They were not prepared for
the failure of the man-made systems of levees and gates and the
enormous impact of that canal from New Orleans to the sea, which
should never have been there.
It is like saying that in terms of our earthquake, which we had
in the Anchorage area, that someone was at fault because they
didnt notify Kodiak and Seward that a tsunami might hit them
which did happen. What happened here is in the aftermath of
Katrina going through, because of the subsequent series of events
that caused the failure of the levees, the failure of the system, it
was impossible to execute the plan.
Now the plan for New Orleans was caused by a provision in the
1998 appropriations bill, which the last administration failed to
make. But finally, in 1999, we mandated that plan. It was prepared. It was actually exercised after the start of 2001. It was
there, and I think the people of New Orleans started to follow that
plan, and they started to move their people to the dome and to the
various places which should have been safe.
But with the failure of the man-made systems and the failure of
having the ability to shut off the surge that came across Lake
Pontchartrain, this became a man-made disaster. And I do not
agree that we can fault FEMA or the City of New Orleans or the
State of Louisiana for failing to anticipate the complete failure of
the systems that were prepared in the past.
As a matter of fact, I think you can go back to President Johnsons time and find that he tried to build even better systems at
the time, and the funding was turned down.
But as a practical matter, this damage, as sad as it isit is a
sad thingit is not a failure of the warning system. The warning
was there. It was a failure of systems that were put in over the
last 30 years to prevent the surges that happened in a way and the
combination of them was by the time that surge came in from the
ocean, it came up that canal, it was like a tsunami coming up that
canal. Had the canal not been there, those levees might not have
failed.
So this is not some time to critique the failure of the people involved to predict that the basic systems for protection that had
been designed over a period of years would simultaneously all collapse. And that is what happened. Every single one of them collapsed.
Now those were man-made. This isnt an act of God. This is a
failure of our basic engineering systems, our basic concepts of protection, and we have to do better in the future. I am not going to
join in criticizing those who tried to do the best in the most extraordinary circumstance I have ever seen.
Now this Senator has seen war. I have seen cities in China totally destroyed. I never saw destruction like I saw in New Orleans.
No person on Earth could have predicted that. It had to be a com-

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00009

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

6
bination of circumstances caused by Katrina going through, and
then the surge and all the collapse that came afterward.
So I hope we look at FEMA and the rest of these people and ask
them what can we do to prevent this in the future? Let us quit
looking backwards and trying to assess blame. Let us find out what
can we do to assure that this wont happen not only in New Orleans, but anywhere else where we are relying on levees and manmade protections to prevent disasters.
Thank you very much.
Chairman COLLINS. I would now like to welcome our panel of
witnesses before us today.
Our first witness, Scott Wells, joined FEMA as a Federal Coordinating Officer in 1999. Since that time, he has been deployed by
FEMA to more than 20 disasters. For Hurricane Katrina, he was
the second in command, serving as the deputy FCO.
Mr. Wells arrived at the emergency operations center in Baton
Rouge on Saturday, August 27. Mr. Wells previously served as an
Army officer for more than 20 years, and he was the DOD liaison
to FEMA before retiring from the Army in 1999.
Next we will hear from Philip Parr. For more than 20 years, Mr.
Parr served as a firefighter for New York City, ultimately rising to
the rank of battalion chief. In January 2004, Mr. Parr left the New
York City Fire Department and joined FEMA as a Federal Coordinating Officer.
During Hurricane Katrina, Mr. Parr led the emergency response
advance team and was deployed to New Orleans. Mr. Parr and
members of his team arrived in the Superdome on the morning of
Tuesday, August 30. He later led FEMA teams into the hardesthit parishes of southern Louisiana.
William Carwile joined FEMA in 1996 as director of Region 10,
headquartered in the Pacific, and was a Federal Coordinating Officer for five tropical storms in the Pacific. His emergency management experiences on the mainland include New York City following
September 11, the 2003 California wildfires, and four hurricanes
that struck Florida last year.
During Hurricane Katrina, he served as the Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel
with a 30-year military career.
I want to thank each of you for your testimony today and for
your public service. Because this is part of an ongoing investigation, I would ask that you each stand so that I can swear you in.
Please raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to the
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?
The WITNESSES. I do.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.
Mr. Wells, if you would go first and proceed with your statement?

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00010

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

7
TESTIMONY OF SCOTT WELLS,1 FEDERAL COORDINATING OFFICER, FEMA JOINT FIELD OFFICE, BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA

Mr. WELLS. Good morning, Chairman Collins and Members of


the Committee.
My name is Scott Wells, and I am honored to appear before you
today. My current position with FEMA is Federal Coordinating Officer in Louisiana for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
I would like to start this morning by thanking you for the invitation to testify before this Committee. I appreciate the opportunity
to share my perspectives on FEMA operations before, during, and
after our Nations costliest disaster, Hurricane Katrina.
It is my intention today to speak candidly with you about my experiences in Louisiana, both leading up to and following Katrina,
as well as my perspectives on emergency management. I will begin
my testimony today with a brief overview of my professional career
in emergency management.
For almost 2 decades, I served in various positions of emergency
management. Beginning in 1985, for 2 years as a first responder
MEDEVAC pilot. During my 24-year military career, I also spent
10 years in the Pentagon providing military support to civilian authorities. My last military assignment in the Pentagon was as a
military liaison officer to FEMA.
In these assignments, I was involved in numerous disasters and
emergencies such as Hurricane Andrew, the Northridge earthquake, the Midwest floods of 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing,
the Haitian/Cuban immigration emergency, the Waco siege, and
the Ruby Ridge incident.
I retired in 1999 from the Army and have been working for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency as an FCO for the past 6
years and served on several disasters and emergencies to include
Tropical Storm Allison in Texas and the Columbia Shuttle recovery
operation.
On August 27, I was assigned to Louisiana as the Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer to Bill Lokey for Hurricane Katrina. I
served in that capacity until September 19. At that time, I was reassigned to Texas as the Federal Coordinating Officer for Hurricane Rita, as she made her way through the Gulf of Mexico. As the
FCO for Rita, I remained in Texas until the first week of October,
at which time I returned to Louisiana to replace Bill Lokey for
Hurricane Katrina.
Detailed preparation for a Katrina landfall in Louisiana started
in earnest on Friday, August 26, when the National Weather Service quickly changed the projected zone for landfall to include Louisiana. Much work had been done earlier in the week, but the focus
of those effortsgiven the projected path of the stormwas on
Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi.
Field deployments to Louisiana began on Saturday, August 27,
with the emergency response teams advance elements deploying to
the Louisiana emergency operations center here in Baton Rouge.
The Federal regional and national staffs consolidated that night
and started conducting field operations in preparation for landfall.
1 The

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

prepared statement of Mr. Wells appears in the Appendix on page 43.

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00011

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

8
In addition to the command and control element being set up in
Baton Rouge, we concurrently were setting up an operational staging area in Alexandria, Louisiana, that served as a Federal logistics base for Katrina operations.
The first actual employment of Federal resourcesthat is, where
we providedFEMA provided response assets to the Stateoccurred on Sunday, the day before landfall, when we shipped six
truckloads of water and three truckloads of MREs to the Superdome. Two of the truckloads, one each of water and MRE, did not
complete delivery. They were denied entry by the Louisiana State
Police before reaching the Superdome.
That was the beginning of response operations and was soon followed by many other response resources, such as medical teams,
search and rescue teams, and other critical commodities, such as
water, food, and ice.
There has been much said about the slow Federal response to
Katrina. From my perspective, with all due respect to Senator
Lieberman, I want to say nothing could be further from the truth.
We had a fully operational logistics base, a fully operational command cell, and response teams in place, all before landfall. We even
moved some supplies in before landfall and attempted to move in
a medical team.
On the day of landfall, we moved search and rescue teams, medical teams, and critical supplies into the affected area. It may not
have been enough for an event of this magnitude, but it was fast.
I think the real issue is that the response was not robust. It was
not enough for the catastrophe at hand. And as you lookas we
all lookto make it better next time, I think it is an important distinction to make. Slow means one thing. Not enough means
something else. More importantly, the corrective actions between
fixing slow and not enough could be significant.
Emergency management is unlike any other system in the government. It is a bottoms-up approach. The people on the ground
are in charge. The first responders are supported, as required, by
local government, then State government, and as a last resort, the
Federal Government. Ultimately, authority for disaster response
operations rests at the local level. The State and Federal Governments are not in charge, but are responsible for assisting local governments.
And that is how it should be, as all disasters are local. Disasters
start at the local level, and disasters end at the local level. This
system works for small to medium disasters. It does not work so
well for large disasters, and it falls apart for a catastrophic disaster. I think that is a fundamental problem with the response to
Katrina.
Following are some of the other major problems and proposed
changes I believe could improve our national readiness posture to
respond to future disasters. And I will list them, but in the interest
of time, I wont go through all of my statement, but you will have
it.
(1) We need to strengthen the emergency management capability
at the State and local level.
(2) We need to review the emergency management architecture
for response and recovery operations. There are problems associ-

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00012

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

9
ated with the implementation of the Stafford Act as it is executed
through the National Response Plan and the Incident Command
System.
(3) We need a trained, staffed, and equipped Federal response
team.
(4) We need to change the financial management of disasters.
(5) We need to simplify the public assistance process.
(6) We need to simplify individual assistance process.
(7) We need a greater investment in the leadership and management within FEMA.
Emergency management is not a simple system. Accordingly,
there are no simple solutions. To have an effective national disaster
response structure, we must have a viable local, State, and Federal
capability. If any of these links in the emergency management
chain breaks, the system itself begins to break down. If we cannot
have viability at all three levels, then we should change the system.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to share a field perspective of Hurricane Katrina.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Wells. Mr. Parr.
TESTIMONY OF PHILIP E. PARR,1 DEPUTY FEDERAL COORDINATING OFFICER, FEMA JOINT FIELD OFFICE, AUSTIN,
TEXAS

Mr. PARR. First, I want to say good morning to this august Committee. Good morning, Chairman Collins.
My name is Phil Parr, and I want to thank you for the opportunity of testifying before you about my experiences and the response to Hurricane Katrina. The views expressed in my testimony
are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Homeland Security.
Presently, my position with FEMA is that of Federal Coordinating Officer. I have been involved with response and emergency
management for the past 26 years. I was sworn in as a member
of the New York City Fire Department in 1979 and rose through
the ranks to attain the level of chief officer in 1999.
During my tenure with the FDNY, and particularly during my
tenure as a chief officer, I served in many capacities, including, but
not limited to, fire and emergency ground commander, operations,
planning for Y2K scenarios, and as a deputy director in the New
York City Office of Emergency Management. I have played an active role in countless disasters and crisis situations to include the
September 11 attack at the World Trade Center, where I was on
scene prior to the towers collapse.
Since January 2004, I have been a member of the Federal Coordinating Officer program, assigned to FEMA Region 1, New England. In this role, I have served in various capacities, including
FCO for three presidentially declared disasters.
Before I continue with my testimony, I think it is important to
mention that I have always taken great pride in my years of service as a member of the New York City Fire Department. At one
1 The

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

prepared statement of Mr. Parr appears in the Appendix on page 52.

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00013

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

10
time, I would not imagine serving in any other position in which
I would serve with the same feeling and pride.
However, during my tenure with FEMA, the dedication to service
as displayed by its members and their care for disaster victims has
allowed me to serve with the same pride and satisfaction that I experienced during my previous 25 years of public service. So it is
with that passion that I speak before this Committee, and I thank
you again for the opportunity to do so.
On Saturday, August 27, I was informed that I would be the
emergency response team advance element team leader for the
State of Texas. My team was composed of personnel from FEMA
Region 1, New England, and we were instructed to rendezvous in
the Region 6 Regional Response Coordination Center in Denton,
Texas, on Sunday, August 28. Soon it became clear that Texas was
not in the path of Hurricane Katrina and that members of my team
and I would be assigned as the lead element in New Orleans, Louisiana.
I flew to Louisiana immediately following the hurricane passing,
Monday, August 29, with a contingent of my team. And Tuesday
morning, August 30, we helicoptered into the Superdome. Our mission was threefold. One, form a unified command with the State,
as represented by the Louisiana National Guard, and the City of
New Orleans. Two, maintain visibility of commodities ordered. And
three, build out a base from which FEMA teams could be formed
to locate and assist in the hardest-hit parishes.
To accomplish these goals, we were to meet a mobile emergency
operations and communications vehicle and use that as a base of
operations and communication. Due to extensive flooding in the
city, our communications vehicle was unable to enter the Superdome, and this severely hampered our operations.
Despite this, and while working under the most difficult of circumstances, we were able to assist the National Guard in maintaining a supply of food and water to Superdome evacueesall
were fed and provided waterand, even with limited communications, facilitate the arrival of what was to become over the next 4
days a thousand-bus convoy to evacuate the City of New Orleans
to start the day after our arrival.
The FEMA disaster medical assistance team treated hundreds
and identified seriously injured and special needs patients who
were evacuated via air and ground assets throughout the operation.
In addition, several meetings were held with the mayor and his
staff, ranking National Guard officers on the scene, and other Federal officials to include DOD and the Coast Guard. This facilitated
the initiation of a unified command structure.
Due to the enormity of the event, not all of our initial goals were
met. A delay ensued in placing teams into other hard-hit parishes,
which I believe took place that Friday and Saturday.
I have been asked whether FEMA was overwhelmed, or could
our response be considered slow? To consider the latter first, I
must say, in my opinion, no. FEMA teamsresponse, management,
medical, and urban search and rescuewere in position in four
States pre-landfall. Commodities were staged close to the impacted
areas, and in some cases, the hand-off to the State had already
taken place.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00014

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

11
In addition, and as previously mentioned, FEMA mission assigned Emergency Support Function 1, the Department of Transportation, and they verified that, by September 3, 990 buses were
in service performing evacuations. It is estimated that over 66,000
persons were transported by that date. The number of buses grew
to over 1,100 in the next 2 days.
Were we overwhelmed? The simple answer is yes. But what
needs to be understood is that, at any disaster, the initial response
always feels overwhelmed. I must draw on my experience as a local
responder to give you an example on a small scale of what I mean,
and then a larger one.
The police officer who pulls up to a 2-car accident with severe injuries while he operates alone, waiting for help, is overwhelmed.
The fire officer who pulls up to a burning structure with people
trapped inside is overwhelmed. But the true professional, while responding and operating, knows that he is constantly sizing up the
situation, gaining intelligence, shifting strategies, modifying plans,
and calling for assistance where needed to meet unfulfilled needs,
whether expected or unexpected.
I would like to refer back to the disaster of September 11 and
its effect on the emergency personnel operating at the World Trade
Center. First, it must be remembered that within the 369 square
miles of New York City are the resources of a State with a strong
central government. There are over 35,000 New York City police officers, about 13,000 firefighters and emergency medical personnel.
These numbers only begin to enumerate the assets available to the
city. No other city in the country can begin to come close to the responders that are contained within New York City.
The response to the attacks on the towers was immediate. The
enormity of the task at hand was overwhelming. Then with the collapse of the towers, it was chaos. Emergency services within New
York regrouped almost immediately and restarted operations, but
a full, coordinated plan took days.
The World Trade Center complex was 13 acres. The landfall of
Hurricane Katrina affected four States and covered an area of
90,000 square miles, an area the size of Great Britain. It affected
millions.
Effectively, Louisiana was hit by two disasters. First, a devastating hurricane along with its associated blast damage and, second, a catastrophic flooding event caused by levee failures. Hurricane Katrina was the most devastating disaster to hit our country.
We were all overwhelmedthe city, the State, the affected parishes, and the Federal Government.
What can FEMA, individuals, local governments, and States do
to be more prepared? First, it must be realized that the response
to any crisis or disaster is the responsibility of every individual and
form of government in this country. Emergency management is
more than just coordination. It is about partnership with all entities previously mentioned.
Each of us plays a vital part, and any one of us who fails in our
part fails in that partnership. That failed responsibility must be
picked up by one of their partners, and that causes delay, confusion, and lack of coordination.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00015

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

12
For FEMAs part, it is my belief we have not done what is needed to get that message across to individuals, locals, and States. We
have worked to create an image that Uncle Sam will be on your
doorstep with MREs, food, water, and ice before the hurricane-force
winds subside. We have created an expectation that in a large or
no-notice event, such as a terrorist attack or an earthquake, we can
never hope to meet.
As an agency, we must help our partners understand their role
in the emergency management cycle, as many States and locals do
now. To this end, I believe we can do much with conditional and
competitive grants to State and local governments to achieve this.
Generally because response is immediate and local, FEMAs primary role in disaster is recovery. With some notable exceptions,
what is described at the Federal level as response in actuality is
response supportthat is, supplying life-saving commodities
with local and State responders performing what we traditionally
call response.
But as an agency, we can do better in the response role. Primarily, I believe this can be accomplished by a shift in attitude and
training by some in management and decisionmaking roles in our
agency.
In another area of improvement, FEMA has initiated a total
asset visibility system whereby truckloads of commodities can be
located via satellite transponder and tracked more closely. This
system must be fully put online before our next hurricane season.
We should recognize that FEMA is a small agency, especially
when compared with other Federal agencies. But its strength lies
in the fact that the National Response Plan identifies it as the coordinating agency for the entire Federal response.
I believe more drills, familiarization and otherwise, are necessary
between FEMA and other Federal agencies to help clarify roles and
responsibilities under the NRP and in their critical emergency support functions. Understanding their contribution and role in the
emergency response team structure is essential for effective response. These crucial elements must be established and become
routine to help ensure that a better-coordinated Federal package
can be delivered to States to assist them in their response.
Additional standardized and practical training must be provided
to personnel who may be asked to serve on response teams at the
county or local level. Training programs and expectations that
build on practical experience from this and previous operations,
with input from States, must be provided to FEMA staff, who may
be needed to assist at the local level in response operations.
As with any operation, I hope that, as an agency, we can make
these changes based on lessons learned. I would also hope that
State and local officials will review their emergency management
procedures and also adopt necessary changes. Finally, each citizen
has a responsibility to plan, heed warnings, and do whatever is
within their means to prepare and respond to disaster.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak on this subject.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Carwile.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00016

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

13
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. CARWILE III,1 FORMER FEDERAL
COORDINATING OFFICER, FEMA JOINT FIELD OFFICE, BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI

Mr. CARWILE. Good morning, Chairman Collins and distinguished Members of the Committee.
I am Bill Carwile. Thank you for inviting me today to testify
about operations in Mississippi during Hurricane Katrina.
Between August 29 and October 15, I was initially the Federal
Coordinating Officer and later the Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer. I recently retired from FEMA and am currently affiliated
with the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I am testifying today
as a private citizen.
There are many lessons to be learned from the responses to Hurricane Katrina. I applaud your efforts to gather information critical
to charting a future for disaster operations in our country. I hope
my testimony will, in some way, make a contribution to that undertaking.
My perspective is from one who has been in the field, on the
ground in large-scale disasters during much of the last 9 years. My
recent experiences include serving as operations section chief for
the World Trade Center operations in New York, serving as Federal Coordinating Officer for the 2003 wildfires in California, and
FCO for each of the four hurricanes last year in Florida.
I joined FEMA in 1996 as the director of the Pacific area office
in Honolulu, Hawaii, where I reside today. In 1999, I became one
of the first members of the Federal Coordinating Officer program
created to provide a pool of trained professionals to manage the
Federal side of disasters.
In 2003, I was appointed as one of the first predesignated principal Federal officials by former Homeland Security Secretary Tom
Ridge. Prior to my service with FEMA, I retired as an Army colonel, having served almost 3 decades as a special forces and infantry
officer in the regular Army. My assignments included two tours in
Vietnam.
I would like to address three major points in my oral testimony.
First, there were three separate presidential disaster declarations
as Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf CoastLouisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. These were three different disasters in the
type and extent of destruction, the number of people affected, and
each States constitutional relationships with its local jurisdictions.
While each disaster was different, they were similar in that in
each disaster the governor of the State was in charge. As FCO, I
was appointed by the President as his representative to support
the governor using the authorities provided for in the Stafford Act.
While there were three distinct disasters, today my comments will
cover only operations in Mississippi, where I was.
Second, in my view, this was the first time we fully implemented
appropriate portions of the National Incident Management System,
the National Response Plan, and the Incident Command System in
a major disaster response. During the summer of 2005, following
the distribution of the National Response Plan, many Federal and
1 The

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

prepared statement of Mr. Carwile appears in the Appendix on page 61.

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00017

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

14
State emergency managers underwent training on the plan and
ICS.
Fortunately, I and key members of our emergency response team
in Mississippi, which is mostly comprised of personnel with whom
I have worked for years, had participated in extensive ICS training. Similarly, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency Director Robert Latham and his staff and most county emergency managers had recently undergone NIMS and ICS training.
One of the key members of my team, operations section chief Bob
Fenton, has long been involved in the doctrine on training development, is an expert on how to adapt ICS for large-scale operations.
Using this training and our experience in prior disasters, Robert
Latham and I and our teams established a unified command to a
degree beyond which I believe is envisioned by the National Response Plan and began the joint incident action planning process,
which set our priorities for each of the operational periods, which
is a 24-hour period at first, following the ICS concepts. Governor
Barbour attended and participated in many of our meetings and
provided leadership and important strategic guidance.
During the response, we found that some aspects of the National
Response Plan did not fit our organizational needs for a joint State/
Federal response to a catastrophic disaster. We found it necessary
to modify some important aspects of the plan. These changes are
detailed in my written testimony.
While it is my belief that ICS works well for fires and smaller
disasters, some substantial modifications are required for largescale events. Mostly, these modifications revolve around the need
for unified command up and down the organization and in order to
address political and operational realities.
I would recommend that an effort be made to capture the experiences of the individual geographic and branch directors and division supervisors. They were down in the communities and provided
us a manageable span of control. This might be accomplished
through interviews, similar to the Armys oral history program, to
find out what really worked down there, where the rubber meets
the road.
This effort will provide a more detailed view of what changes to
the NRP should be made to accommodate the realities of joint
State/Federal response to a catastrophic disaster.
Third, there have been questions raised about the competence of
FEMA personnel in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. In my career
in FEMA, I worked with many dedicated and highly competent individuals who were committed to serving both our country and the
victims of disasters. Many routinely give up holidays, anniversaries, birthdays, and normal family lives to help others. I am
proud to have been part of FEMA and especially proud of the many
individuals whose heroic efforts helped the people of Mississippi
and other States in which I have served. They deserve our thanks.
A disaster can bring out the best in people. There are thousands
of stories of individual acts of heroism and kindnesses during
Katrina. Mississippians helped their neighbors. Hundreds of local
officials, who had just lost everything, reported for duty. And all
around the country, volunteers left their lives behind and headed
for the Gulf Coast to help.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00018

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

15
We should not forget, however, that in a catastrophic disaster,
the government and those wonderful voluntary agencies can never
provide adequate aid in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
We all need to better prepare ourselves and our families and be
ready to help our neighbors.
In my written testimony, I provide comments about what I think
went well and what didnt go well in the response and initial recovery for Katrina in Mississippi. Two main points. The State/Federal
unified command worked well in Mississippi. But this success was
obscured by the fact that requested resources did not arrive quickly
enough. Better, more effective methods must be adopted to quickly
deliver resources in a catastrophic event.
In Mississippi, while temporary housing has been provided in
numbers far exceeding any previous effort, this success is obscured
by the overwhelming need and an exceptionally long period of time
that people remain in shelters. New methodologies must be examined and implemented to take care of Americans in need of humane
housing while in a catastrophic event.
These are but two of the many challenges the Nation faces if it
is to really prepare for the next catastrophic disaster. We must do
all we can to capture the lessons learned, both good and bad, from
Katrina in Mississippi in order to make real changes so that the
next time, elected and appointed officials will be able to better support the needs of victims.
I thank the Committee for undertaking this important work for
the Nation. I will be glad to try to answer any questions you may
have.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your testimony.
I want to start my questioning today to get your judgment, your
assessment of preparedness and response at the State and local
level. As Mr. Wells pointed out in his testimony, our Nations emergency management structure is often referred to as a bottom-up
structure. It has key roles for local, State, and Federal Governments to play.
I thought that Mr. Wells made an important point when he said
that there is some misconception on the part of the public about
who plays what role in our emergency response system. So starting
with you, Mr. Wells, if FEMA and the Federal Government are at
the top of the structure, how did the bottom part work, in your
judgment, for Hurricane Katrina? How would you assess the State
and local response in Louisiana?
Mr. WELLS. Well, a lot of it is situational. Each parish in Louisiana has different capability. The important thing in emergency
management is you have to have a foundation established for the
Federal departments to build on.
When we go into a disaster, the locals are in charge. The locals
ask for assistance from the State, who, in turn, asks for assistance
from FEMA. If there is no structure, if there is no organization, if
there is no capability at the local or the State level, there is no
foundation from which we can build.
I will give you one example to compare between Katrina in Louisiana and Rita in Texas to try to demonstrate what I mean by
that. In Texas, for Rita, I was there for the preparation phase, and
we are just going to talk about prior to landfall because it is equiv-

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00019

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

16
alent to Katrina in that no disaster struck. It wasnt catastrophic
in Texas for Rita. So, post landfall, it was different. So let us just
talk about pre-landfall.
In the State of Texas, they had plans. They had plans at the
local level. They had plans at the State level that leveraged the
Federal capability. One example, evacuation. In Texas, we were
askedthe Federal Governmentto provide evacuation support
prior to landfall. The State of Texas had a plan to build on, and
so we worked with the State of Texas and the areas of Beaumont
to Houston to evacuate special needs patients, elderly, and the disabled. One person had an iron lung.
This is a very difficult mission. Just getting one patient onboard
an airplane is very difficult, and they did somewhere between
11,000 and 13,000. And we were able to have an effective national
response structurenational is local, State, and Federalbecause
the Federal Government had something to build on. We did not
have that in Louisiana.
Chairman COLLINS. Senator Stevens informs me that he has to
leave, and he has one question that he would like to ask before he
does so.
Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. I am going to the reconciliation meeting.
One of the problems we are having is that there seems to be a
congressional feeling about the extent of our responsibility to the
people in New Orleans, who really suffered damage from what I
call really man-made disasters. I wonder if the two of you would
join me in sending a letter from this Committee asking the Department of Justice if there is a different standard of liability for the
Federal Government to those areas that were not harmed by
Katrina, but were harmed by the failure of the levee and other systems that were man-made?
Chairman COLLINS. Well, as the distinguished Senator may be
aware, we have had one hearing looking at why the levees have
failed. We have a second hearing scheduled for next week, which
is going to look at all the roles of the various playersthe local
levee district, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the State of Louisiana, and the Commonwealth of Louisianas Transportation Department.
There is a lot of confusion, our investigation has found, over who
was responsible for the maintenance and the inspection of the levees. I would like to wait until we complete that hearing before proceeding. But I hope you will be able to attend that hearing. I think
it is going to be a very interesting one, based on what our extensive
investigation has found.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, thanks, Madam Chairman.
Senator Stevens, obviously, I would be glad to look at any letter
you put together. But I agree with the Chairman, it is probably
best for us to wait until after the hearing next week.
I will just say very briefly, because I know you have to go, where
I think we agree is that the immediate cause of most of the damage
in New Orleans was the failure of the levees. And there is some
reason to believeI cant conclude at this pointfrom what we

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00020

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

17
have heard that there was a failure of construction, design, and
other issues.
Where I think we disagree is that, unfortunately, I believe that
was foreseeable. In other words, the levees may have failed more
quickly and in some different ways than people expected. But we
have a lot of history that we put together here that shows that the
experts were all saying if a category 3 or higher hurricane hit New
Orleans, those levees would not hold.
Maybe more of them broke than we thought. Maybe they broke
sooner. But there is a lot of communication indicating they might
fail. In fact, the Hurricane Pam exercise that was carried out in
June 2004 was based on the levees failing and what would we do
as a result. And that is where, I think, we have a reason to ask
FEMA why it wasnt ready to deal with it.
Senator STEVENS. Well, I think my question goes to who is going
to be responsible? There is a lot of damage out there now that was
not covered by insurance, either flood or otherwise.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Senator STEVENS. And attempts to try and use Federal funds to
meet some of that damage is being met with resistance. I think the
duty of this Committee is to demonstrate that there is an extra
added level of responsibility in the areas where those levees failed.
And it is true that there were predictions. When we did our thing
in appropriations in 1998 and 1999, we had the feeling that there
were severe problems. We had people that told us there were problems there.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Senator STEVENS. But notwithstanding that, we got a plan. But
no one really fixed the levees, and no one fixed the gates, and people have suffered enormous loss. Now we have to have a greater
feeling in Congress about our responsibility to those people who are
in that one area where it was not just Katrina, a natural disaster,
but damage from man-made disaster.
I think there has been a failure in Congress to recognize that difference. But I appreciate and I hope I can attend the hearing.
Thank you very much.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.
I am going to resume my questioning with Mr. Wells to try to
get us back on track a little bit.
It was helpful to hear your different experience dealing with Louisiana versus Texas. In general, were the Louisiana officials that
you dealt with familiar with their responsibilities under the National Response Plan? And did they understand how the Incident
Command System worked, in your view?
Mr. WELLS. No. Short answer.
The Incident Command System is very important. You cannot do
anything without command and control. If I may take a minute to
read something from an emergency services person who is on a
workgroup for the search and rescue mission, which was a combined effort of the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,
the Coast Guard, the state police for Louisiana, DOTD, and FEMA,
to show you what it is like when you dont have an effective Incident Command System? And I am just going to read this verbatim.
It is unvarnished.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00021

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

18
Establishing a State/Federal search and rescue workgroup on
August 28 was a great concept. However, there were some shortfalls. The workgroup was a joint effort in name only. We had a
great initial meeting and established solid operational concepts, but
had no decision-makers present with the authority to obligate their
agencys resources.
The State appointed a workgroup leader who was to oversee the
State assets. However, this workgroup leader flew to Jackson barracks the afternoon after the initial meeting and was not heard
from for 9 days. For 3 weeks, I sponsoredthis was the FEMA
personthe workgroups twice-a-day meetings that were attended
by FEMA, who had resources and authority to direct search efforts.
The U.S. Coast Guard, who had junior officer representation but
no authority to direct search and rescue air operation, all operations were directed by senior Coast Guard officers from another
location. These officers refused to meet and conduct joint search
and rescue operations with FEMA and State agencies.
State wildlife and fisheries had representation but no authority
to make management decisions on search and rescue operations.
That authority remained with senior officers who conducted solo
operations.
State police, who had an interest in following up on 911 calls,
but had no State search and rescue authorities or resources to assist.
Civil air patrol attended and had air resources to support search
and rescue, but had no State taskings to engage their resources.
The DOTD, the State Department of Transportation, had resources to support joint search and rescue missions, but refused to
attend any of the meetings or plan joint efforts.
This is a failure of the Incident Command System. It is all about
having people that can make decisions on the spot and get on down
the road. This is just but one example of why things were slow and
why things didnt work out as fast, as efficient, or as effective as
they should. If people dont understand ICS, we cant do ICS. And
if we cant do ICS, we cannot manage disasters.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Parr, what is your assessment of how
the Incident Command System worked in Louisiana?
Mr. PARR. I want to echo Mr. Wellss sentiments. It is extremely
important, in my experience, at a local level, as something that is
near and dear to my heart. I think, and as I said beforeand this
is not necessarily to point fingers, but hopefully, for us to critique
ourselves and learn how we can do better next timeI cannot
begin to explain the dedication that the police officers and firefighters in the City of New Orleans, how they acted, how they responded.
The same thing with the National Guard. I was working with
people every second of every day who literally lost everything. But
they were there doing their jobs, working as hard as they could.
I think one place where we need vast improvement is in their
preparation. It is the responsibility of local authorities to evacuate
their people. It is the responsibility of local authorities to set up
shelters that are properly protected from flood waters, that are
properly protected from hurricanes because not all are going to be

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00022

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

19
able to be evacuated. It would be unreasonable for us to expect 100
percent evacuation of a city the size of New Orleans.
I found that there was very little preparation. No information on
shelters other than the Superdome. There was no assets or commodities at the Superdome, other than what FEMA gave to the
State, which they did distribute at the Superdome.
There were no sanitation facilities before the levees broke. You
can imagine the difficulty of moving sanitation facilities into a city
with 4, 5, 6, and, in some areas of the city, 14 feet of water once
that happened. That is the job of local and State governments. And
simply, that just did not happen.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Carwile, how did the Incident Command
System work in Mississippi?
Mr. CARWILE. Madam Chairman, I think it worked very well at
the top. There had been training previous to Hurricane Katrina by
the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency on down to the
county emergency managers. So it worked well.
We quickly were able to form a unified command with both myself and Robert Latham, my counterpart from the State. And we
included at the top of the unified command the Adjutant General
for the State of Mississippi, Major General Cross, as well as the
commissioner of public safety, George Phillips, because each one of
those brought so much to the table in terms of resources to manage.
I think where the difficulty becomesand I believe Senator
Lieberman talked about this in his opening remarksin a situation, a catastrophic disaster, it is very difficult to build from the
bottom up if there is no bottom. Mayor Tommy Longo of Waveland
and over in Hancock County, Mississippi, I mean, he lost every fire
truck, and the fire station. Every police officer lost their home.
There was no city hall. There was nothing left for Mayor Longo to
build on.
Similarly, in Hancock County, the emergency operations center
in the county had to be evacuated, and we moved our folks over
to Stennis in order to have a communications and a coherent system. So I think it is true that it builds from the bottom up. But
in a catastrophic, we have got to be able to reach down and to supplement the absence of a coherent system down below.
And to get around that, we predeployed division supervisors with
communications from both the Federal and the State teams to the
three what we believed would be, most impacted counties with
available resources to prop up, if you will, those great first responders and emergency managers and mayors down in the local areas.
We did not do that to the degree we would have liked to have
done it because, frankly, there was a paucity of trained personnel
to do that. But I think overall, and I believe in ICS. I think that
we need to make some modifications as we look at a catastrophic,
however, because, to me, the unified command as it is outlined in
the National Response Plan calls for unified command only at the
top, a few people.
I believe that unified command has to go all the way down the
structure, and we have to be able to use State and Federal personnel to prop up local communities that have been totally destroyed by something like Katrina.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00023

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

20
Chairman COLLINS. I think that is an excellent point that perhaps we should take a look at whether the system is scalable,
whether it makes sense to expect the State and local governments
to play the role that is envisioned when the magnitude of the catastrophe may wipe out all of the capability at the State and local
level.
Mr. Carwile.
Mr. CARWILE. Yes, maam. And I think we can do that without
in any way encumbering or impeding the constitutional authorities
within the State constitutions of the local elected and appointed officials.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Wells, under the current system, FEMA
is besieged with requests from State and local governments for various commodities or forms of assistance. I would like to refer your
attention to certain exhibits that are in the book that is by you,
specifically Exhibits 8, 9, G, H, and I. They all reflect requests
made by State and local government entities in Louisiana to FEMA
for assistance.
And I am just going to go through what those are. Exhibit 81 is
from the New Orleans police department asking FEMA for, among
other things, 400 M4 weapons, 25,000 rounds of ammunition,
1,500 pairs of black military boots in various sizes, and 200 Crown
Victoria police cruisers.
Exhibit 92 is from New Orleans parish, and it asks for 10 gaspowered golf carts to transport firefighters around Zephyr Field.
Exhibit G3 is from Mayor Nagins office. It seeks a bus to Shreveport. Exhibit H4 is also from the mayors office. It seeks portable
air conditioning units to cool offices. And Exhibit I5 is from the
Louisiana Department of Social Services, asking for a taxi to take
one person from a hospital to a shelter.
As I was reading through these requests, they struck me as not
the typical requests that State and local governments would make
to FEMA during a natural disaster. But obviously, I dont have
your experience.
First, let me ask you, are these typical of the requests that you
would expect to get from State and local governments to FEMA in
the aftermath of a disaster?
Mr. WELLS. The problem with these is we got literally hundreds
and hundreds of requests like this intermingled with valid requests. And when you get that volume that are not screened, it
clogs down the system for legitimate requests that we need to process.
I think this is an indication of just a lack of understandingthis
came from the local levelthe lack of understanding of what
FEMA is there for, what we can do, and probably more importantly, what they can do themselves.
Also, we normally with most disaster operations, when the request comes to the State emergency ops center, they will screen out
1 Exhibit

8 appears in the Appendix on page 83.


9 appears in the Appendix on page 90.
G appears in the Appendix on page 99.
4 Exhibit H appears in the Appendix on page 102.
5 Exhibit I appears in the Appendix on page 104.
2 Exhibit
3 Exhibit

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00024

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

21
all of those requests prior to us even getting them. So this is not
typical. No, maam.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Thanks to you
three gentlemen.
Having heard your opening statements and the questioning thus
far, I go back to what I said at the beginning. You are three extraordinary professionals. I admire the work that you have done.
We are lucky to have had you working and to have you still working, at least in two cases, for FEMA.
And what strikes me as particularly significant is that you have
something to add from the ground about what we could do to perform better in the next catastrophic natural disaster. That you are
proud of your service in FEMA, but you are not defensive about everything that happened. And I think that is the spirit of this Committee. We are not out to get or protect anybody in this. We are
out to figure out what happened.
In response to what Senator Stevens said, just beyond what I
have said when he was here, there is no question that New Orleans
suffered a lot because the levees failed. It was a hurricane that
would have had one level of damage. But the levees failing compounded it enormously. The failure of the levees was not only foreseeable, but was foreseen for years if the hurricane was above category 3.
In fact, there is some reason now to believe that maybe the levees failed even earlier with a lower category impact of the hurricane because of some kind of negligence in design or construction.
That is a very important question we have to answer.
But having said all of that doesnt mean that FEMA was ready
or did everything it should have done. And that is why, in a nondefensive way, we want to get at it. I will say and ask my first
questions to you, Mr. Wells, that just a few of the things you have
said so far suggest to me changes that ought to be implemented.
For instance, as you said, and in some sense was expanded upon
by Mr. Parr and Mr. Carwile in response to Senator Collins questions, the bottoms-up approach makes a lot of sense in many disasters or emergencies. I wrote it down quickly, so I may have missed
it. But when you get to a large disaster, it doesnt work so well.
And when you get to a catastrophe, the bottoms-up falls apart.
And part of what I think, therefore, we probably want to do as
a government going forward is, as you all said, to put in place for
FEMA and the rest of the Federal apparatus some plans in those
more significant disaster situations when the bottoms-up wont
work, and the Federal Government really has to assume a significant amount of responsibility.
Second very instructive thing I thought you said, you compared
the preparation of Texas for Hurricane Rita to the prepareatin of
New Orleans and Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina. Texas had an
evacuation plan that was adequate to the circumstances. We all
understand that Rita didnt hit at the level of catastrophe that
Katrina did. But you saw a plan there, which you didnt see in the
case of Louisiana.
So this suggests to me that part of what we may want to do as
a matter of law or regulation, probably law, is to have some more

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00025

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

22
aggressive Federal oversight of the emergency planning of State
and local authorities to the point of having to certify and make
sure not just that we look at it, but that they actually have as comprehensive a plan ready for emergencies as possible.
Mr. Wells, let me, in that spirit, go on. Because as I read the
statements that you made to our staff in the interviews, I am
struck by one quote after another in which you are willing, from
the ground, in a very professional and confident way to say this
just didnt go as it should have gone. And I am going to quote a
little bit.
You talk about FEMAs ability to respond, But FEMA is not
trained. FEMA is not equipped. FEMA is not organized to do very
large response operations.
You talk about inadequate communications, What we had was
a communications kind of vacuum here in Baton Rouge.
You speak of FEMAs difficulties in staffing positions. Just
about every position we have, this is a secondary job for people. I
think everybody fails to recognize this. Very important.
Our system is based onthis is whole interagencywho is
available at this time, put them in there, get them out the door.
You acknowledge difficulties in planning. Now we did do some
different things here that would need a lot of study like the continuity of government. We didnt work continuity of government at
all. In New Orleans, they melted down. Their whole government
was just melted down. We didnt have a plan for continuity of government.
And I was struck also by your views of the Stafford Act, You
need different laws. The Stafford Act is notthe Stafford Act is
like bringing a donkey to the Kentucky Derby. Have you heard
him say that before? It is not designed for a disaster this big.
So what I am saying is that your candor is very important and
very appreciated and very necessary as we work together to try to
fix this. And bottom line, it would appear from your statements
that FEMA was lacking a plan, communications, appropriate personnel, and various other assets to deal with a catastrophic disaster of this kind.
I want to give you a chance now to comment broadly on those
points that you made in the staff interviews.
Mr. WELLS. I dont know if I can remember all that you said, sir.
Let us talk about the FEMA part
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.
Mr. WELLS [continuing]. And the Stafford Act and all that. We
are not, we do not have the capability versus equipment, people,
expertise, training to do large catastrophic disasters. We do not
have teams. We do not work as teams. The people you get, and it
is not just FEMAthis was a National Response Plan.
And people talk FEMA this and FEMA that. But you know
what? FEMA, once you get out in the field, we are a very small
percentage of what is out there. And at the height of Katrina, I
think we had, if you include the military, maybe 70,000 people?
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. WELLS. And FEMA was maybe 1,500 or 2,000 of that. And
even when the military went down, it was still a small part.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00026

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

23
Senator LIEBERMAN. Am I right that full-time FEMA personnel
are numbered at about 2,000? This is all around the country, not
in that crisis.
Mr. WELLS. Right. There are only 2,500.
Senator LIEBERMAN. And so, what you are drawing on when you
say 1,500 to 2,000 personnel for Katrina was redeployment of
FEMA full-time personnel from elsewhere, but also a lot of parttime people or people just brought in for the crisis?
Mr. WELLS. Right.
Senator LIEBERMAN. I want to get to that later.
Mr. WELLS. Anyway, we do not have enough people. We rob
Peter to pay Paul in disasters. Even in medium disasters, we are
doing that. We have 10 regions we have to man. A regional office
has to do three things. They have to do two things. They need to
do three things, but they have to do two things.
They have to set up a regional response coordination center. It
is an emergency ops center. And they have to staff a team that
goes forward to Louisiana like we did. Now you only have about
90 people in a region. That is woefully inadequate to do both. You
cannot do both. Pick one.
When you get to a field, when we got to Louisiana, we had
enough staff for our advance team to do maybe half of what we
needed to do for a day shift. We had to do a day and night shift.
So we had to prioritize.
We did not have the people. We did not have the expertise. We
did not have the operational training folks that we needed to do
our mission. And it has been this way for years, sir. Years after
years, you are working on the margins. You are getting people from
other agencies with no experience or no experience in response operations. They are just filling a billet. We have never trained together.
We need to really train together as a team. We need to work as
a team. What you have with this National Response Plan in the
field is we have no unity of command.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. WELLS. FEMA has more of a coordination role. We need to
have a command role, where we can direct the sub-elements assigned to us to do things. And it doesnt play out that way, despite
what the National Response Plan indicates.
Senator LIEBERMAN. That is a very important point. In some
sense, as I read your testimony, as I hear you today, it is as if you
are the generals, and you are first rate. But we havent really given
you an adequate trained force to go into battle with you.
I want to ask a few questions similar to Mr. Carwile. I know you
also expressed some concern about FEMAs staffing levels and
problems. In your opening statement, you talked of how FEMA
needs many more trained people.
I know that you had a chance to look at these problems. I wonder
if you would describe the impact of funding decisions on FEMAs
effectiveness, particularly the ERTN team. And let me refer you

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00027

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

24
in particular to a memorandum that I believe you contributed to,
dated June 30, 2004, which is Exhibit 1.1
In it, you refer to the unpreparedness of national emergency response teams. You say the teams are unprepared because of zero
funding for training exercises or equipment. So I ask you to comment on that in light of what you found in the response to Katrina.
Mr. CARWILE. Yes, Senator Lieberman. This has long been a concern of mine, as well as Mr. Wells.
After September 11, I was asked by Director Allbaugh at the
time to reconstitute a national team, an emergency response team
national, and to write an operations plan and be prepared to respond to the next terrorist event. It was an all-hazards plan, but
the focus, obviously, at the time was on terrorism.
I took a small group from New York City, our joint field office
there, went down to Atlanta and put together a team of very seasoned emergency managers and with members of other Federal
agencies, including the military, and wrote what was known then
as an ERTN op plan. We were then able to build a team to about
125 individuals, hand picked, from around the country, and we
were able to routinely exercise that team because we had the funding in place to do so on the plan against several scenarios.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Were these full-time FEMA employees?
Mr. CARWILE. Yes, sir. For the most part. We did have some reservists, which we called disaster assistance employees, on the
team. But the intent was to use them only in certain areas where
we have almost no full-time employees to do certain functions within FEMA. We rely solely on our reservists for things like administration and that sort of thing.
We were asked to take the team to the Winter Olympics in Salt
Lake City, and we exercised and exercised. And as well as buying
satellite communications and being able to, we felt we had a robust
plan, a well-trained team, and communications.
It wasnt long after that, and the longer we got away from September 11, the less funding we had. Funding, it appeared to us
and I am just a field guy, not a headquarters person. The small
amount of money we did have was being diverted, and we got no
money in the out-years. So there was no money.
Then we morphed that team into another team. The red team
morphed, and we split it up and formed a blue team. And subsequently, a white team, which was a hollow team. But there was
never any money. In former years, prior to September 11, when I
was on a national team, we at least had money to do one training
event a year and one meeting for the leadership of the teams. That
money also went away.
Senator LIEBERMAN. So in that period of years that you have described post-September 11, there was no money for training exercises?
Mr. CARWILE. Except for that first year, sir.
Senator LIEBERMAN. That first year.
Mr. CARWILE. Yes, sir. And after that, the money went away, and
the emphasis on the readiness of those teams, as I said in my opening comments, I came from 30 years in the military. We had a very
1 Exhibit

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

1 appears in the Appendix on page 72.

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00028

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

25
rigorous reporting system and the red/amber/green to report unit
status. We had nothing like that in FEMA, although those things
were beinganyway, I think there was a great problem in
resourcing those teams.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So this was not only a natural disaster
waiting to happen, this was a personnel, kind of a FEMA disaster
waiting to happen because we werent giving you the resources to
get ready for this.
If I may, Madam Chairman, I just want to ask one follow-up
question because I think it is important. It is something I have
come to learn myself, in the course of this investigation, which
speaks to the fact that FEMA has relatively few full-time personnel.
And this is the response teams and the so-called reservists,
which in the interview you did with our staff, it seemed to me you
were saying that these teams are mostly names on rosters. They
are not really teams because they dont train together, they dont
work together, and they dont really have a budget.
And I wonder if you could just give, for the record, a little background on what does it mean to be a reservist for FEMA in this
regard? Who are these people, typically? And obviously, I assume
you believe, based on what you said before, that if they are there
as reservists that we ought to be spending more money training
them?
Mr. CARWILE. Yes, sir. I will specifically speak to the fine Americans that form the reserve cadre, which we call the disaster assistance employees, which we rely on almost to a great extent to our
ability to surge personnel capacity to respond to any large disasters. In other words, in Florida last year, probably 90 percent of
the workforce were disaster assistance employees.
Those employees have traditionally, if you look at the demographics, many of them are retired from all sorts of walks of life.
They are people you would be very proud to be associated with.
They bring skill sets from decades of experience in various parts
of the civil sector and some from the military.
They are inadequately recompensed for the time they spend on
active duty. They have absolutely no benefits. None, no benefits
whatsoever, even when they are on active duty, we call them up.
So, for example, if there is a holiday, and you happen to be on a
big disaster, and there is no benefit. If you want to let a few people
off, you cant even pay them for being off on the holiday.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Am I right? They dont really train as units?
Mr. CARWILE. Sir, was that the individual part of your question?
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.
Mr. CARWILE. The collective part of your question and the teams,
there is no training money and very little. Now the regions, as Mr.
Wells indicated, they have a responsibility to field an emergency
response team for a small to a mid-level disaster. They may, because they are all pretty much co-located, have an opportunity to
do some, what we used to call in the Army, collective training as
opposed to individual. But there is no money to do team training.
So if you go out on a disaster, to meand I was very fortunate
in Mississippi because I had a team from my home region that I

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00029

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26
have worked with for yearsyou need to know how that other person is going to respond in a crisis. You need to have gone through.
In the military, of course, we have a very rigorous exercise program that is evaluated. And I have long advocated, and it was included in a white paper that I wrote last year, that we should have
a similar system and have emergency deployment readiness exercises for these teams, and go out and do a rigorous evaluation and
give feedback to the team members, much like we do in the military. But that is not done, sir.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. That is a real big gap that we have to
figure out how to fill. I assume that there were a lot of people on
the reserve rosters who were called up to respond to Hurricane
Katrina?
Mr. CARWILE. Sir, one of the national teams was deployed to Louisiana, that is the blue teamthe blue team went down. In Mississippi, we had a lot of members that were on the national teams,
but we did not deploy a national team, per se. There are only two
remaining. Those two teams were reconfigured probably in the last
month or so before Katrina.
They were brand-new teams. New members were put in there,
some of whom have been on other teams in the past. And they
were pared down to, I think, around 25 persons per team, and
they, to my knowledge, never had an opportunity to train together
beforehand.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Carwile. Thanks, Madam
Chairman.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Carwile, I want to follow up
with some additional questions on this June 2004 memo that Senator Lieberman just questioned you about.
First of all, this memo was an extensive memo. It includes many
significant recommendations, and it also sounds the alarm. There
is the heading on page 3 that says unpreparedness of national
emergency response teams. It says unprepared teams, zero funding for training exercises and team equipment.
It talks about the need for a single division for response and recovery. It mentions that there had been four different budget proposals submitted over an 18-month period.
And just so we understand, this is from highly trained and important professionals within FEMA. It is the Federal Coordinating
Officers. Did you get any response to this memo from Michael
Brown or anyone else in his office?
Mr. CARWILE. Madam Chairman, first of all, I wasnt the author
of the entire document. But these two
Chairman COLLINS. You were the author of part of it?
Mr. CARWILE. Yes, maam. These two issues wereand I am
guilty as charged on that. Maam, we put this together, and probably Scott may have had input as well. I am pretty sure he did.
Former Director Brown had asked the Federal Coordinating Officers for their input on things we thought were critical. And my
former colleague Mike Hall was elected by the rest of us to put this
together, each of us having some input. These were mine.
Mike related to me that this had been submitted to the eighth
floor, being kind of the command group in FEMA. And as far as
I know, there was never any feedback on any of these issues.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00030

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

27
Chairman COLLINS. So, as far as you know, there were no actions
taken in response to this detailed set of recommendations that the
FCOs sent to Secretary Brown?
Mr. CARWILE. That is correct, Madam Chairman.
Chairman COLLINS. If the recommendations in this June 2004
memo had been implemented, do you believe that the response to
Katrina would have been improved? I realize that is speculative.
But what is your best judgment?
Mr. CARWILE. Yes, maam. I cant help but believe that having
trained and effective teams that are well equipped and have had
opportunities to work together through training and rigorous exercises would not have made a difference.
Again, I felt very fortunate because many of my colleagues with
me in Mississippi had been with me on a national team in years
past. It was kind of coincidental.
But I cant help but believe that trained and ready teams, people
who have worked together, would not have made some difference
in a positive way.
Chairman COLLINS. Could you explain to us why you think that
a single division for response and recovery would help improve the
response to future disasters?
Mr. CARWILE. Yes, maam. And first of all, that is not a novel
idea. That was formerly that way. My former colleague is sitting
right back here, who was formerly the associate director for FEMA
for response and recovery. It was only with the formation of the
Department of Homeland Security that the two efforts, that is response and recovery, were bifurcated.
Formerly, there was a greater among equals division within
FEMA was response recovery. Because when you go to the field,
you dont do response, and then all of a sudden, one day you say,
Well, we are going to quit doing response. Now, guys, we are going
to start doing recovery. It is a continuous effort.
I was looking at our timeline in Mississippi. On September 2, we
were putting disaster recovery centers out to meet the needs of the
people to be able to communicate with us and the Federal and the
State officials.
So, to me, and it is also from a person in the field, it is a little
bit difficult to know who the heck you work for at headquarters.
You know, on some issues, you go to one person. Other issues, you
go to another.
When they first bifurcated them, I was in the field, and we would
talk to what is now called the National Resource Coordination Center, then known as the Emergency Support Team, and you really
didnt know who you were reporting to. Because was it the response guys or was it recovery guys?
So, to me, it is a natural fit. It was an unnatural thing to break
it up in the first place.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.
I would now like to turn to the issue of evacuation. One of the
problems that New Orleans had was evacuating citizens before the
storm. Mr. Wells, are you aware of any requests from the City of
New Orleans for assistance with evacuation? Any request to
FEMA?

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00031

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

28
Mr. WELLS. No. We would get the request from the State. The
city would come to the State, and the State would come to us. And
for any pre-landfall evacuation requests, we got none, zero. And as
I mentioned earlier, that was totally unlike what we did in Texas,
where we were actively involved.
Chairman COLLINS. Now I understand that you were involved in
the Hurricane Pam exercise. Did that include a segment on the
evacuation of New Orleans and the vicinity? Was that part of the
exercise?
Mr. WELLS. No, maam. Evacuation was not part of it. When we
set up the Pam exercises, we were developing it, we worked with
the officials in Louisiana. And they determined I think it was five
to eight functions that they wanted us to work as Federal/State
partners in it.
And I think we had talked about evacuation, and they said let
us leave that off the table because the city and the State, we have
been working evacuation issues. And we will park that over there,
and we will just work on these other issues. So that was not one
of the issues we addressed in the Pam exercise.
Chairman COLLINS. And whose decision, just for clarity, was it
to not include evacuation as part of the Hurricane Pam exercise?
Mr. WELLS. Well, it would have been the deputy director of emergency management at the time in Louisiana.
Chairman COLLINS. So it was a State official?
Mr. WELLS. The State. Yes, they determined the issues that we
were going to be looking at for Pam.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.
Mr. Parr, another issue of evacuation arose after the storm, and
that was the evacuation of the Superdome. You have previously
told the Committee that you worked with the National Guard at
the Superdome throughout Tuesday night and that you had a plan
that was actually approved by your supervisors at FEMA and was
in coordination with the National Guard to evacuate the victims at
the Superdome, beginning Wednesday morning. Is that correct?
Mr. PARR. That is correct.
Chairman COLLINS. Could you explain what that plan was?
Mr. PARR. Sure. As the population of the Superdome started
growing almost exponentially on Tuesday and with the waters rising, the breach wasnt able to be closed, we realized we had to get
the people out of the Superdome. We felt, the Guard felt that there
would be mass confusion, violence once the lights went out in the
Superdome. That was the only thing that was keeping people together.
We came up with a plan in conjunction with the Guard. It was
the chief of staff or the adjutant general, the ops officer, the commanding general that was there for the Guard. What we were
going to do was use Chinook helicopters because they are the largest in the U.S. inventory. The Guard had availability of three.
We came up with a plan to move anywhere from 300 to 500 people an hour out of the Superdome by landing helicopters every 15
to 20 minutes. At the time, we estimated about 15,000 people in
the Superdome. We figured we could clear them out within about
a day, about 30 hours or less, once we started the evacuation with
an additional 9 helicopters.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00032

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

29
In addition to that plan, I should say it would be short haul
trips. The airport was dry. I believe Belle Chase, which is a base,
was also dry. We would have buses meet them there and then take
them to shelters after that.
Chairman COLLINS. That sounds to me like a very good plan that
would have helped to evacuate people from a situation that was becoming increasingly unsanitary and dangerous. Why wasnt it implemented? In fact, the evacuation did not occur the next day, despite your having what sounds like a very good plan.
Mr. PARR. That is correct. At least the evacuation for the general
population didnt begin the next morning, as we had hoped. At
some point during the early morning hoursthis was a plan we
worked on in the overnight hours. None of us slept at all as we developed this and had constant conference calls with Washington,
DC.
We couldnt reach our command group at the EOC in Baton
Rouge because of communications, but we were able to reach our
response and coordination center in Denton, Texas. So we would
have conference calls with those two groups.
We were notified at some time around 5 a.m. that General
Honore had taken charge or was in charge of the evacuation of
New Orleans and that all plans were to be put on hold, that he
would be directing the evacuation. And that was the direction I got
from the command group of the National Guard that they would
be awaiting his orders.
Chairman COLLINS. So, as far as you know, General Honore canceled the plan?
Mr. PARR. Well, I cant speak to specifically what happened, but
I will tell you that the Guard told me I got a call from General
Landreneau at some point probably between 5 and 6 a.m. in the
morning, thanking me and thanking us for our hard work. But
they were awaiting orders of General Honore.
Chairman COLLINS. So instead of the evacuation from the Superdome starting on Wednesday morning as it would have under your
plan, the plan worked out with the National Guard, when were
people actually evacuated from the Superdome?
Mr. PARR. The start for the general population was about Thursday morning, about 24 hours later.
Chairman COLLINS. So the result of the delay of that evacuation
plan, which you had worked all night to put together, was that
thousands of people in the general population in the Superdome
had to spend another very unpleasant, hot, dangerous night in the
Superdome. Is that correct?
Mr. PARR. That is correct.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Wells, I noted in your bio that you had
been the liaison from DOD to FEMA back when you were working
for the Department of Defense. DOD has an unusual relationship
with FEMA. As I understand it, FEMA can assign other agencies
certain missions. But with DOD, it is my understanding the Department has to agree to accept the missions from FEMA, and it
is a much longer process. Is that correct? Is my understanding correct?
Mr. WELLS. Yes. When all of the agencies come into the joint
field office and we give what we call mission assignments or

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00033

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

30
taskings out to these agencies to do specific things, the approval
authority generally rests with the person in the joint field office,
and it gets done immediately.
But the Department of Defense, their approval authority rests
with the Secretary of Defense. And so, it has to go through a long
process of validation and through their chain of command to get it
approved. And that is more than awkward. It is more than cumbersome. It just takes a long time to execute.
I need to say, parenthetically, that in Katrina we did not see that
lag that we normally see in most disasters, and they were fairly
responsive.
Chairman COLLINS. But from your perspective, since you have
seen it both as a DOD employee as well as a FEMA employee,
should the Department be treated differently?
Mr. WELLS. No. Having DOD is sort of like somebody giving you
an 800-pound gorilla. You are supposed to take care of that gorilla
and be responsible for that gorilla. But that 800-pound gorilla is
going to do what he wants to do, when he wants to do it, and how
he wants to do it. So you lose some of that control in your organization with the Department of Defense structure.
What they have is, when General Honore came in, for example,
he had really two organizations. He had a defense coordinating officer, who was in that joint field office. And he had a brigadier general, Mark Graham, with the staff, who worked directly with us out
of the joint field office. And that fell within the architecture of the
National Response Plan, and it was more organized.
General Honore had a joint task force that went and did things
separate and beyond that. He did great things. Him and his joint
task force did great things, but it wasnt coordinated, and it led to
some problems.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Carwile, did you have something you
would like to add to that?
Mr. CARWILE. Madam Chairman, in a previous life, I served as
a defense coordinating officer, as Mr. Wells talked about, and I
have had discussions with Secretary McHale on this very subject.
And we spoke earlier about a unity of command and a unified command, and what Mr. Wells just described is outside of unity of command, unity of effort, and a unified command.
In other words, you cant have two Federal agencies, even if one
is an 800-pound gorilla, operating independently of other Federal
agencies. And there is a difference of opinion of my personal opinion as a private citizen between what I read in the Stafford Act and
the way that the current secretary and assistant secretary for
homeland defense read their authorities.
And as Mr. Wells indicated, we mission assign other Federal
agencies. DOD, I personally knowSecretary McHale and I have
discussed thistakes exception with even the term mission assignment from FEMA to the Department of Defense.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Parr, do you have anything to add to
that debate?
Mr. PARR. I can tell you on a local level. After leaving New Orleans, I worked in St. Bernard Parish for about 30 days. I think Mr.
Wells description of the 800-pound gorilla, because we had a major
significant military DOD presence there, was true.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00034

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

31
They did some great things. The men and women that were there
were truly phenomenal. But keeping themand I will use this
term, but it is not pejorativereined in to keep them inremember, when they were there on the ground, it wasnt me that was
directing operations in the parish. It was the parish leadership. It
was the parish president. It was the sheriff. It was the parish
emergency manager.
And keeping them from running over that was my job because
I was supposed to be the lead Federal person there. And it is difficult. But they do bring a lot to the table, and they are a necessary
part of the National Response Plan.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks again, Madam Chairman.
The more we go on, the more I keep coming back to military
terms because, in some sense, you are in a real crisis, almost a battlefield situation. And one I want to talk about is situational
awareness.
Obviously, in military matters, we are, through technology, dramatically improving the situational awareness of our forces. And
that is not a bad ideal to set up for emergency response here as
well. But it was, really in this case, lacking, again beginning with
the fact that this was an extraordinary disaster. But part of what
I want to get at is the details of that.
Mr. Parr, I am going to ask you the first questions. We have seen
photographs and video showing the absolutely devastating situation at the convention center. I know that most of the accounts
have focused on what went on at the Superdome. But I want to ask
you to talk a little bit about what was unfolding a mile down the
road at the convention center, where thousands of recently homeless people sought refuge from the storm.
I have taken a look at your notes from August 30, which is Exhibit F, and they mention that you had a briefing with Bill Lokey
and Scott Wells. And your notes mention the convention center.
But we dont see anything in your e-mails or any other documents
from yourself or the FEMA team regarding the circumstances in
the convention center on Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday.
So I wanted to ask you during the briefing with Mr. Wells and
Mr. Lokey, first, what did you discuss, to the best of your recollection, regarding the Superdome?
Mr. PARR. OK. You have an advantage over me, Senator, because
since this was kind of a last-minute request for me to appear before
you, I left my notes in Texas, where I am assigned right now. So
I am not able to look and see exactly what you are referring to.
Senator LIEBERMAN. I am glad to try to get our staff to give it
to you.
Mr. PARR. I think it is Exhibit F?
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, it is Exhibit F1 in that exhibit book.
Mr. PARR. Just one second. I am sorry.
Senator LIEBERMAN. You went to the same handwriting course
that I did.
Mr. PARR. You noticed that, sir.
Senator LIEBERMAN. It is on page 8, noted at the bottom, 0008.
1 Exhibit

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

F appears in the Appendix on page 94.

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00035

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

32
Mr. PARR. Let me address, I believe, the phone call you are
speaking about because this was probably the only time we were
able to get a hold of the EOC, where Scott Wells, the deputy, and
Bill Lokey were.
Senator LIEBERMAN. So they were in Baton Rouge?
Mr. PARR. Baton Rouge. Correct. And this was probably the only
time we had any conversation, certainly any extended conversation
with them.
Senator LIEBERMAN. And at that point, you were
Mr. PARR. I was? This was Tuesday. I would guess early afternoon?
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. PARR. Or mid afternoon?
Senator LIEBERMAN. And you had arrived a little earlier that
day.
Mr. PARR. We had arrived at some point Tuesday morning or late
morning.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. PARR. This is when we went from the Superdome to the city
EOC, which was across the street. At that point, we had called
back to the State EOC. The primary purpose of that call was to
give the citys list of priorities to the EOC there up at the State,
for FEMA and the State to start working on those priorities.
If the call was an hour, the biggest part of that call, probably 45
or 50 minutes, was getting visibility on what was being done to
close I believe it was the 17th Street Canal breach.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. PARR. That is what was filling up the city, and there was a
whole domino effect of things that happen if that breach was not
closed as quickly as possible. Just to mention two of those things.
The power plant, once that went under water, and it is my understanding that it was within inches2 or 3 inches of going under
waterthe city would take about 6 months, it would probably still
be under water right now
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.
Mr. PARR [continuing]. If that was submerged. The emergency
power at the Superdome was literally within 1 inch of overflowing
the sandbags that were protecting the emergency generator there.
We would have lost power there. It would have caused chaos there.
So gaining visibility on that. Talking about it was the cityI am
not sure of his exact title. I believe he was either the emergency
manager or the homeland security person.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me interrupt you. By gaining visibility, you mean trying to get attention from the EOC onto those
two significant problems you have just talked about?
Mr. PARR. I was informed by Colonel Terry Ebert, who is the
citys, I think, homeland security director, that the breach
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. PARR [continuing]. That the Army Corps had stopped attempting to close the breach, and we werent sure why. And there
were some significant issues with them trying to close the breach,
and they were unable to do it, and they were working the problem.
We did not know that at the time, which is one thing that prompted the call.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00036

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

33
So getting that back up on the table and letting them know back
up at the State why it was so important to get that closed. Which
that did not happen, at least not at that point, was the primary
purpose of that call, and in addition, the other priorities that the
city had, the Colonel, Terry Ebert, gave it to them on that call.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Did you become aware in that conversation of the problem of the growing crowds at the convention
center?
Mr. PARR. Let me say that we were helicoptered into the Superdome and had no movement, no visibility of the city. The only thing
we had was what the National Guard had given us. I dont quite
see my note on the convention center. I am sure I was told by the
Guard that there were issues at the convention center.
Like I said, I dont have my notes. But because we were, in effect, literally on an island or stranded at the Superdome, if I have
a note here about the convention centerOK, yes. I dont think,
that was not a note about conditions at the convention center. I see
it now. I am not even sure I was aware of conditions at the convention center at this time.
What that was, if you notice it says convention center, EOV or
com suite, that was mentioned as another place that we can carry
out operations because of the difficulty of carrying out operations
at the Superdome because of the situation there. I was trying to
identify another place in the city where we can operate from, and
that was a place that was mentioned.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So, obviously, you were at the Superdome. So you had an awareness of what the conditions were there?
Mr. PARR. Yes, sir.
Senator LIEBERMAN. But you did not know at that point what the
situation was at the convention center?
Mr. PARR. Correct. There would be snippets from certain Guardsmen who were patrolling the city saying that the convention center
was filling up. I am not sure when or how that was brought out
to me. We had no personal knowledge of what was going on at the
convention center.
As a matter of fact, I learned more about what was going on at
the convention center when I left and went back up to Baton
Rouge. Then I had visibility on it.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So during that period of days before
you went back to Baton Rouge, which, if I recall correctly, was
Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of that week?
Mr. PARR. Correct.
Senator LIEBERMAN. The FEMA teams that you were involved
with did not do anything with regard to the convention center?
Mr. PARR. No, sir, and I think this is an important point that we
need to remember, and I alluded to this earlier in one of the answers to one of the questions that were given. There were no, to
my knowledge, identified shelters in the City of New Orleans.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. PARR. That is a very important thing. What was used as a
shelter was any place that was dry. Any overpass, any high piece
of ground. It is important that the city had identified shelters and
areas of refuge, and they did not.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00037

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

34
So I think that was an ad hocsince it was largely dry, it is my
understandingan ad hoc shelter that people flowed to simply because it was out of the pool of water in the city.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Parr.
Mr. Wells, you were a senior Federal official at the emergency
operating center in Baton Rouge. When did you become aware of
the crowds and the problems at the convention center in New Orleans?
Mr. WELLS. To be candid, I am not exactly sure. It was probably
around I would say Wednesday or Thursday, we got calls from here
in Washington, DC. What is going on at the convention center?
And I think they were getting reports from the media.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.
Mr. WELLS. And as I recall, we tried to get communications up
with Phil and his folks. We couldnt get communications with him
to have them go check it out. And so, we went to the State and
asked them what they knew, and they used their National Guard
and State police assets to give us some visibility. And the big issue
was how many people were there? And what is going on, and how
many people were there?
And we did not get a clear picture. It probably took 24 to 48
hours from the time we started asking the question to get a picture
of just what was going on in the convention center.
Senator LIEBERMAN. So your answers, I think, illustrate the real
problems there were in communications under the circumstances
there and the inability to have anything approaching the kind of
situational awareness that you would want to have or we would
want you to have.
I want to go back to something you said in your interview with
our staff, Mr. Wells, that there was a big communications void,
which created a black hole in communication abilities from the
emergency operating center in Baton Rouge and New Orleans. And
if I asked you why, I know it may be an obvious question. But for
the record, since obviously FEMA is supposed to be prepared for
emergencies of this kind, why did that black hole of communications occur?
Mr. WELLS. I dont know. I was told all of the lines were saturated. The big vacuum was in Baton Rouge. No one could get in
to us, and we couldnt get out to anybody. The people in New Orleans could talk to our regional office in Texas in a degraded way,
and they could talk to the national office here in Washington, DC.
But nobody could call us in Baton Rouge, and we couldnt call out.
So that was the biggest vacuum in Baton Rouge.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Parr, I know that at some point in your
testimony or work with the staff, you described FEMAs Red October, the mobile command post 12 feet longer than a tractor-trailer
with the most elaborate state-of-the-art capabilities for communications, which would have served as the base for communications in
New Orleans.
As the vehicle was in transport to the Superdome, I would just
say for the record, it was determined that you could not get it into
the area, and you were left with no communications at the Superdome. Am I right about that?

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00038

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

35
Mr. PARR. That is largely correct, sir. That was the original intention to either move that vehicle or a similar vehicle into the Superdome, but because of the water around the stadium, we could
not get it in.
Senator LIEBERMAN. And there was no backup plan for anything
else in that kind of circumstance?
Mr. PARR. Well, sir, initially the backup plan was to have a
smaller vehicle, a vehicle that was a little bit more maneuverable
get into the stadium. I dont believe that the situational awareness
allowed us to know. I dont believe that it was common knowledge.
It certainly was not my knowledge that water would prevent us
from getting those vehicles into the Superdome.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. And this is the final question because
my time is up. You did previously state, as I mentioned and Senator Collins did, that your access to communications was extremely, extremely limited and affected your operations effectiveness, what you were able to do in the circumstance by, in your
opinion, about 90 percent. Is that right?
Mr. PARR. Yes, sir. And just to expand on that a little bit, as I
look back on the events that happened, we were able to achieve a
lot. At the time, it was extremely frustrating. It might take 2 or
3 hours to get through to the people we were calling, but we did
get through and we did get things done as far as the evacuation
of the Superdome. We made sure that we kept some eye on visibility of commodities so people ate.
But I believe we could have accomplished a lot more if we had
the proper communications.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure. And when you did get through on the
calls, what were you using?
Mr. PARR. The National Guard had two communications vehicles,
one with one phone and one with I think three or four phones. So
it was kind of like waiting in line. When they finished their business, then we got to go.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.
Just a couple of concluding questions. First, I realize all of you
were deployed to the Gulf region in your roles as FCOs. But are
any of you living in the Gulf region? Mr. Wells.
Mr. WELLS. I am staying there.
Chairman COLLINS. Pardon me?
Mr. WELLS. Yes, I will be in Baton Rouge.
Chairman COLLINS. You are now. But prior to being deployed
there, where were you living?
Mr. WELLS. I was living in Texas.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Parr.
Mr. PARR. I have only been living in the Gulf since August 28.
But my home now or at least where I rent an apartment is in Boston, Massachusetts.
Chairman COLLINS. I noticed you were Region 1, Senator
Liebermans and my region.
Mr. Carwile.
Mr. CARWILE. Maam, my family is from Gulf Shores, Alabama.
It is in Baldwin County, Alabama, on the coast. They have evacuated probably six times in the last 2 years, with my mother, who

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00039

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

36
turned 89 last month. I personally reside in the State of Hawaii,
though.
Chairman COLLINS. I was surprised, when I looked at where
FEMA officials were deployed from, that they werent individuals
already assigned to the Gulf region. Would it increase the effectiveness of FEMA officials if they were from the region to which they
are deployed, or does it not make any difference?
The reason I ask is there have been some indications that FEMA
officials were just not very familiar with New Orleans or the areas
to which they were assigned. And I am wondering if it would be
better to have the FCOs come from the area or whether it doesnt
matter. Mr. Carwile.
Mr. CARWILE. Madam Chairman, the Congress authorized FEMA
25 Federal Coordinating Officer positions back in 1999.
Chairman COLLINS. Right.
Mr. CARWILE. And those positions were sprinkled throughout the
country. And ideally, the Federal Coordinating Officer would come
from the home region impacted. For example, if the State of Maine
were impacted, hopefully, Mr. Parr would be the person, as he
would be.
What happens in a very large disaster like Katrina, the resources
are quickly stripped down in terms of personnel who are familiar
to the area. So over in Alabama, Mike Bolch, who was the Federal
Coordinating Officer, did come from Atlanta in the home region.
But FEMA can get very quickly overwhelmed in terms of having
people with regional experience.
And Mississippi, fortunately, the team from Region 9, which was
California and the West, that we brought in had been with Mississippi during Hurricane Dennis and also with a short exercise we
had prior to the hurricane season in Washington.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Parr, do you have anything to add to
that?
Mr. PARR. I will say all of us are national assets, and traveling
is very demanding on all of us. I know in the 2 years I have been
in the Federal Coordinating Officer program, I have traveled about
300 days.
Chairman COLLINS. Wow.
Mr. PARR. I dont know. I think it is important that we have significant representation from the region that is experiencing the disaster. So, for instance, Scott Wells is a resident and member of Region 6, which is a large part of the Gulf Coast.
The fact that I come from Region 1 and have a lot of experience
in Region 2, which would be the New York area, I dont know is
significant. I think all of us are kind of, to a large extent, plug and
play. You bring us to where we need to go, and the actions that
we have to do are pretty much the same.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Wells, are you from the region?
Mr. WELLS. Yes. And I think there is value added. You get your
value in the peacetime planning. For example, with Katrina, prior
to Katrina, in July, just a month before, Hurricane Dennis was
threatening Louisiana, and we deployed our response team to Louisiana and did some training with them. So we had built up some
experience with the State and did some hasty planning and things
like that. And that was a benefit when we went back for Katrina.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00040

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

37
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.
Mr. Carwile, my final question is for you. Both Senator Lieberman and I have been to the Gulf region since the hurricane struck.
The damage in New Orleans and Louisiana is incomprehensible.
But what really astonished me was the devastation in Mississippi.
It is just extraordinary.
Do you think Mississippi has gotten the attention that it needs
compared to Louisiana? I am not trying to play off one State
against another. That is not my purpose. But the devastation from
wind damage in Mississippi matches in many ways the horrendous
devastation from water that we saw in New Orleans.
Mr. CARWILE. Madam Chairman, I have been on, I think, every
major disaster in the last 9 years with FEMA to include four hurricanes last year in Florida and a number of super typhoons in the
Pacific, and I have never seenand I had two combat tours in
Vietnam, special forces. I have never seen the damage that I saw
and you saw in Hancock County and Harrison County. Total devastation of entire communities.
We talk about communications. I have never been in a situation
where we had such a shortfall in communications. Last year in
Florida, fundamentally, we could use cell phones. Practically, just
most of the time, we had to rely on sat phones. But I am talking
about no communications.
Senator Lieberman talked about situational awareness. Very difficult to have down there other than overflights. I know that Governor Barbour and his staff in the State of Mississippi have done
an extraordinary job of leadership. I do think that there has been
an awful lot of focus on the visual on New Orleans, and obviously,
there was a great deal of suffering there that needed to be tended
to.
I do think that there could be more attention paid to the restoration of the Gulf Coast of Mississippi, especially. I say Gulf Coast,
but I was in Jackson when a stormwe had a category 1 hurricane
go over Jackson. We were without power in Jackson for days and
days, all the way up to the northern part of Mississippi.
So the visuals are on the Gulf Coast, and obviously, that is terrible. In addition to wind damage, the 30-foot surge just cleared off
whole counties practically. It was total devastation. But I would
concur if someone were to suggest that Mississippi probably deserves more attention than it has been getting, maam.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman, do you have
any questions?
Senator LIEBERMAN. I do, a couple. I will try to do them quickly.
Thanks, Madam Chairman.
I want to come back to the discussion about the communications
and situational awareness, and I am struck that the National
Guard had those two communications vehicles in the Superdome.
And I understand this is always a question of hindsight is clearer
than foresight.
The understanding was growing in the preceding week that this
was going to be a hurricane category 4 or a category 5. I was going
to read this to Senator Stevens, but I didnt.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00041

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

38
There was a communication from William Lundy of FEMA to
you, Mr. Carwile, and to Robert Fenton and others, e-mailed on
Saturday, August 27, at 11:41 p.m.
Recent recon flight reports category 4 now, maybe a weak category 5 by Monday morning. Landfall around noon. Storm is carrying a lot of moisture. Experts predict that the levees protecting
New Orleans will be breached late Sunday night, thereby flooding
the city to a depth of 6 to 12 feet. Storm surge 13 feet, with 20foot waves on top of that.
Unfortunately, that e-mail was pretty much correct, except it estimated a little bit earlier than the levees actually broke. So here
is my question. Again, hindsight clearer. And this is why some people say FEMA moved slowly. You have got this Red October, a fantastically equipped communications vehiclewhy not move it into
New Orleans in advance of landfall so you are there with a communications apparatus before, what was being talked about and predicted, the levees broke and the city was flooded?
Yes, Mr. Parr?
Mr. PARR. This was something that I discussed with the staffers
that were down beforehand. One thing that you never want to do,
especially when you are a responsewe are not a rescue organizationbut a response organization or an emergency organization, is
put equipment or people into harms way.
If we had brought those vehicles into the Superdome, they would
have been exposed. They probably, almost certainly with the high
winds of a hurricane hitting, would have been damaged and rendered useless. There are other things that we could have done. And
in hindsight, if we had been fully aware of the situation, we could
have helicoptered communications suites in.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Beforehand, you mean?
Mr. PARR. No. Afterwards.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Afterwards.
Mr. PARR. But in my opinion, and there is no response organization that I am aware of that puts people or equipment in harms
way prior to landfall of a hurricane, unless it is a rated hurricane
shelter beforehand, sir.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, I have learned this as we have gone on,
and I am not prepared to argue against it. But I am prepared, not
now, to question it as we go along.
Because, obviously, the people on the ground there, the local fire,
police, emergency personnel are there. And if you see something
this big coming, it is tough. I dont have an easy answer to this
one. But it seems to me that there is an argument to be made that
you would want to try to the best of your ability to get some people
in, maybe equipment in there beforehand. But I want to come back
to that.
Mr. Parr, I do want to give you, while you are here, an opportunity to answer questions that were raised in Mr. Bahamondes
testimony and then in other testimony before the Committee about
the fact that you and your teams left the Superdome on Thursday.
You were there Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and then left on
Thursday, which left, obviously, the Superdome without any FEMA
presence, including the medical team that you had.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00042

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

39
So, obviously, we ask why. And I want to give you the chance
while you are here to answer that.
Mr. PARR. Certainly. I could give you the long answer or the
short answer. So I will try to give you something in the middle
ground that would give you the situation.
Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. You have got two centrists up here.
So [Laughter.]
Chairman COLLINS. The middle position is always a good one.
Mr. PARR. I think that we have described the situation in the city
as a whole. The situation in the Superdome was always a powder
keg. The Guard first made the suggestion, one of the generals of
the Guard first made the suggestion that I consider leaving Tuesday night.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you remember which one that was?
Mr. PARR. Yes, sir. It was General Veillon.
Senator LIEBERMAN. General Veillon.
Mr. PARR. And that was when the city was filling, and they felt
that once the lights went out that there would be pandemonium
there.
Senator LIEBERMAN. So was he suggesting that your safety might
be in danger?
Mr. PARR. Well, I believe the school of thought was everyone, including the Guardbecause, remember, not everyone in the Guard
was armed. Most of the Guard was involved with getting food, commodities in, running and helping with medical missions. As I said
before, they did a phenomenal job in search and rescue, in everything, and assisting the New Orleans PD as much as they possibly
could. So I think it was everyones safety.
To skip many things, Thursday morning at first light, General
Jones, who was the commanding general in place, said to meI
dont remember his exact words, but there are certain phrases that
he said that stick out in my mind very clearly. I dont believe I
can protect you or your people any longer. We are going to be making our last stand, and he pointed to a portion of the parking lot
over there. He says, Get behind us, and we will do what we can.
That is when we started making plans to leave. I spoke, since it
was my responsibility to take care of the Federal forces on hand,
I spoke to the NDMS teams, told them to continue to operate. I
wanted to have helicopters standing by if the situation degenerated. We were unable to get helicopters in immediately.
To make a long story short, I was informed by the DMAT team,
the medical assistance team that was in the basketball stadium,
that the Guard, in shortening their lines, had pulled all security
from them. They told me that they did not feel safe and that they
were evacuating. And they had high-water vehicles that they used
to resupply and that they were pulling out in their vehicles.
It was only at that time that I made the decision to leave since
if conditions did degenerate, we would have no other way out.
Senator LIEBERMAN. I want you to know that some of the other
folks who were there say that, in fact, there was not any behavior
that would lead them to think that there was a riot or that there
was a safety problem. I guess my final question to you is the followingto what extent did you see any behavior that would lead

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00043

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

40
you to think that your personnel would be in danger, or was it derived from what the National Guard folks told you?
Mr. PARR. There are many things that I left out in not giving the
answer in total. The intelligence that we had all came from the
Guard. That is the first thing.
The second thing is is thatI just lost my train of thought. But
one of the things to remember, when I did make the decision to
leave, is not only did the Guard say that. You could see from some
of the memos that the city asked for with 400 rifles, etc., the
Guardand this was what I wanted to say. The Guard had intelligence that there would be riot. That people would move in force
against the Guard at some point that late morning.
Senator LIEBERMAN. And they told you that?
Mr. PARR. Yes, sir. And one of the things to remember is that
I have worked in riot situations in my time as a firefighter and fire
officer in New York City. I have worked in near-riot situations. The
time for unarmed people, that is specifically a security and law enforcement issue, and the time for unarmed people to leave is before
a situation starts, not after. And that is when I made the decision
to leave when I did.
Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. I appreciate your answer.
We are running out of time. I am going to mention something
else. Maybe I will send a letter to each of you and ask for your response.
This goes also to pre-storm, and the question is the following
in a circumstance like the one we saw coming here, a category 4
or 5 hurricane, with potential talked about widely that the levees
were going to break. And what seemed to you, Mr. Wells, to be an
inadequate evacuation plan in Louisiana as compared to what you
saw in Texas, should we in the future have the Federal Government, perhaps through the military, be prepared to do pre-storm
evacuation?
Let me state it in a dramatic metaphor. If we had intelligence
that led us to believe that a bomb was going to explode in one of
our major cities within 3 days, and if we thought it was accurate
intelligence, but we hadnt found a bomb, I presume we would use
whatever Federal resources we had to get in and evacuate as many
people as we could.
And in some ways, though not quite the same, if you put all the
facts together, we were in a somewhat similar situation with
Katrina. And my question is should the Federal Government try to
develop a kind of standby capacity, particularly using the military,
and have the ability to assist in that kind of massive evacuation?
Anybody really want to give a quick answer? Sorry.
Mr. WELLS. The answer is yes. And Katrina clearly showed that.
But it needs to be expanded. I mean, the continuity of government.
We need to have that capability. But this bottoms-up approach only
works to a certain point, and we need to have a Federal capability
that once you get beyond that point that can make up the difference. And it may mean a totally different architecture.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. WELLS. If that is the way it is, so be it. But this evacuation
is a very important thing. And if we would have gotten those peo-

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00044

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

41
ple out in time, we wouldnt have lost close to 1,100 lives in Louisiana.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Absolutely right.
Mr. WELLS. So those are things that I think we need to look at
to make it better next time so we dont have this happen again.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Carwile.
Mr. CARWILE. Senator Lieberman, if I might? I agree with my
colleague, Mr. Wells, on this point in terms of capacity. I get in a
little trouble, I think that the governors of the States have constitutional authorities that we can bring Federal capacity, whether
it is military or other, to bear in support of them to whatever degree they are comfortable with. But I just throw that small caveat
out.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Parr, do you want to answer?
Mr. PARR. Yes, sir. I also agree. I would defer a little bit. I think
the military, the DOD is a support group in every emergency support function we have because they have so many talents and bring
so many expertise to bear. In my opinion, I do not think they
should be the lead in an evacuation, but certainly their assets could
be used to help an evacuation.
It might actually mean changes in statute. Until there is a disaster, the Federal Government has limited involvement, at least
until there is some sort of declaration. I would like to see, personally, and I believe Mr. Wells in his writings has talked about expanding FEMAs role pre-disaster declaration. So that we can, even
if it is just technical assistance, provide some assistance to States
and locals from the Federal perspective in helping for evacuations.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Very helpful responses. Thank you. You
have been very helpful witnesses overall in assisting the Committee in fulfilling its responsibility.
Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.
I, too, want to thank each of you for appearing today, for your
candid and insightful testimony. It has been very helpful for us to
hear from those who were involved directly in the operations.
We are going to be continuing our investigation and ultimately
drafting some legislation for reforming the system, as well as recommending administrative reforms. And I would invite you to keep
in touch with the Committee, and I hope you will be willing to
react to proposals as we go along because you do have so much experience that I think is very helpful to this Committee as we attempt to determine what went wrong and what reforms are needed. So I thank you very much for your testimony and your cooperation.
The hearing record will remain open for 15 days. We will include
your complete written statements in the record, as well as any
other materials that you wish to submit.
This hearing is now adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00045

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00046

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

APPENDIX

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00047

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.001

(43)

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00048

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.002

44

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00049

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.003

45

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00050

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.004

46

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00051

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.005

47

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00052

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.006

48

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00053

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.007

49

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00054

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.008

50

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00055

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.009

51

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00056

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.010

52

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00057

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.011

53

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00058

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.012

54

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00059

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.013

55

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00060

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.014

56

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00061

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.015

57

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00062

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.016

58

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00063

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.017

59

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00064

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.018

60

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00065

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.019

61

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00066

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.020

62

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00067

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.021

63

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00068

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.022

64

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00069

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.023

65

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00070

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.024

66

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00071

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.025

67

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00072

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.026

68

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00073

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.027

69

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00074

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.028

70

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00075

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.029

71

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00076

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.030

72

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00077

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.031

73

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00078

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.032

74

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00079

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.033

75

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00080

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.034

76

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00081

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.035

77

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00082

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.036

78

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00083

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.037

79

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00084

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.038

80

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00085

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.039

81

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00086

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.040

82

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00087

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.041

83

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00088

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.042

84

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00089

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.043

85

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00090

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.044

86

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00091

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.045

87

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00092

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.046

88

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00093

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.047

89

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00094

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.048

90

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00095

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.049

91

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00096

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.050

92

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00097

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.051

93

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00098

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.052

94

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00099

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.053

95

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00100

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.054

96

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00101

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.055

97

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00102

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.056

98

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00103

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.057

99

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00104

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.058

100

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00105

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.059

101

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00106

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.060

102

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00107

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.061

103

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00108

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.062

104

105

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

13:55 Sep 28, 2006

Jkt 026744

PO 00000

Frm 00109

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6011

C:\DOCS\26744.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

26744.063