Interview questions for AOPA article by Rich Stowell

Have you ever had a control failure? If so what was it, how did you identify it, and how did
you handle it?
Yes, two in fact--both occurred during instructional flights (one during an EMT lesson, one
during a basic aerobatic lesson); neither was serious in terms of the ensuing controllability of the
airplane:
In the first situation, I placed the airplane (a Decathlon) into a ninety-degree bank to the left and
called Recover over the intercom. The student initiated the Power-Push-Roll recovery
response, rolling the airplane to the right. The roll to wings level, however, was sluggish. I
coached the student into being more positive with his roll inputs, and we repeated the unusual
attitude scenario.
Again the aileron input was weak, so I asked the student to follow along with me on the controls
while I demonstrated the recovery actions from a ninety degree left bank. As I applied full right
aileron during the recovery sequence, I felt a bump--an obstruction--in the aileron control at
about half deflection. I instinctively reversed the aileron input, feeling the bump again. By this
time, the airplane had rolled approximately twenty degrees past upright with the nose
approximately ten degrees below the horizon.
Somethings not right here, I said over the intercom. I still have the controls.
I experimented a bit with the ailerons and found that I had virtually full left aileron, but only
about ten percent or so of right aileron deflection before the stick stopped against something. I
also had the sense that I could, if necessary, overpower the aileron to move past the obstruction.
However, we didnt need to force the issue. We terminated the lesson and returned to the airport
without incident (it was left traffic all the way!).
Upon inspection, the mechanic found a rogue PK screw wedged in the aileron bell crank located
out on the right wing.
-----------------------In the second situation, I was coaching a student through some Immelmanns--the Immelmann
consists of a half loop to inverted followed by a half roll to upright. In spite of my verbal
prompts, the maneuver was not improving. In fact, it was getting worse. It was time for a
demonstration.
Follow me through an Immelmann, I said as I gripped the stick in earnest (up to this point, Id
been maintaining feather-light pressure on the controls). Immediately it was apparent that we had
a problem with the elevator--the normal tension in the stick was gone! Aileron control was
normal, but I could move the stick almost a foot in pitch without generating any response. Um,
weve got a problem with the elevator control. Lets head back to the airport now.

En route, I played around with the elevator to see what controllability, if any, was available.
There was some pitch control left in the stick, but it took a disproportionate amount of control
movement to generate a delayed and small pitch change. I decided not to rely on the stick during
the landing. Since the student was a retired airline pilot, I reintroduced him to the concept of
CRM--he was assigned the task of working the elevator trim while I would manage the power in
the pattern.
Except for the greatly reduced elevator authority in the stick, the landing was normal. Inspection
revealed a frayed elevator cable in the vicinity of one of the elevator control pulleys. This
particular pulley had a metal guard on it, which over time apparently sawed through the cable
as the cable moved back and forth across it. The cable consisted of many individual wires
braided into strands. Seven strands were braided to form the cable. Five of the seven strands
making up the cable were severed. And several individual wires making up the two remaining
strands were broken.
The failure of the cable likely had started some time before our flight. Moreover, the pulley
assembly was in a difficult location to inspect adequately for cable wear. A contributing factor to
the cable failing on this particular flight may have been an inadvertent tailslide encountered on
the previous flight (with another instructor and student). The mechanic and I were made aware of
the tailslide, so together we inspected the tail section of the airplane for telltale signs of damage.
However, it didnt occur to either of us to check cable tension. We could have checked for play
in the control rather simply--one of us could have held the stick rigid in place while the other
tried to move the control surface up and down. I suspect the tailslide may have stretched the
already weak cable.
-----------------------Another observation about the above:
As you know, I try to be hands off the controls as an instructor as much as possible, preferring
instead to talk (and maybe talk too much at that!) students through various maneuvers. Prior to
taking the controls in order to perform the roll recovery and Immelmann demonstrations, neither
student mentioned anything unusual with the controls. Perhaps because we were in the training
environment, the students were so focused on the maneuvers not to notice anything unusual with
the controls? Perhaps their unfamiliarity with the airplane was a factor? Perhaps my cajoling
them into trying to perform the maneuvers better masked the real problem? I dont know. Just an
observation.

What are the most common control failures?

To get a better handle on this, I performed an on-line search of the NTSB database for general
aviation airplanes. I looked at the five-year period from January 1, 1997 thru January 1, 2002 for
various permutations of the following keywords:

Control, Elevator, Aileron, Rudder, Trim, Flap, and Throttle combined with the words Fail, Jam,
Stuck, Split, Flutter, Lock, Gust, Cable, and Linkage.
The search yielded fifty-four accidents where the cause was attributable to a failure of one or
more airplane controls (failure meaning disconnected, jammed, or somehow otherwise
inoperable, or a control out of aerodynamic balance which caused flutter). An average of about
eleven control-related accidents per year doesnt sound like a lot, but bear in mind that accidents
represent only those cases serious enough to trigger investigation by the NTSB. The study of
industrial accident prevention, however (which some researchers say also applies to general
aviation), proposes the following maxim: In a sample group of three hundred thirty-one
hazardous encounters of the same type, on average only one of the hazardous encounters will
culminate in an accident.
In other words, eleven control-related accidents per year may be indicative of perhaps as many as
three thousand five hundred or more cases annually where pilots encountered problems with
their controls. Its just that the pilots were able to land uneventfully in the vast majority of cases.
The fifty-four accidents found in the NTSB search involved a total of one hundred two people.
Sixty-one percent of the accidents occurred within the traffic pattern around an airport. Nine
airplanes (seventeen percent) were experimental/homebuilts. Table 1 lists a breakdown by
accident severity:
Severity of
Injuries
Fatal
Serious
Minor
None
Serious &
Minor
Minor &
None
Total

Accidents
Number
Percent
7
13
3
5
12
22
29
54

People
Number
Percent
16
16
6
6
25
24
55
54

---

---

---

---

54

100

102

100

Table 1
Overall, the chances of surviving a control failure are quite good. Eighty-four percent of the
people involved survived, with seventy-eight percent of them receiving minor or no injuries. But
a disturbing subset of control-related accidents emerged from the accident synopses:
Eleven accidents (twenty percent of the total) involved pilots who failed to remove control gust
locks during preflight. Four of these accidents killed ten people. In other words, nearly seventy
percent of those who died in control-related accidents were killed solely because the pilot-in-

command disregarded at least two separate control continuity checks prior to take-off--one by
not physically moving the control surfaces stop-to-stop during the preflight walk-around; the
other by not moving the control stick/yoke as part of the Controls, Free and Correct check
during run-up. This subset of accidents is totally preventable. Eliminating these cases from the
mix, we find that ninety-four percent of the people in airplanes with limited use of the controls
survived.
-----------------------Another thirty-one of the control-related accidents were classified as shown in Table 2:
Control Problem
Elevator
Throttle
Aileron
Flaps
Rudder
Aileron & Elevator
Trim

Number of Accidents
12
9
3
3
2
1
1
Table 2

It turns out that the most common control problem happens to be potentially the most dangerous
one as well--elevator ultimately controls the attitude with which we contact the ground. This is
why Part 23 Airworthiness Standards require the following inherent longitudinal controllability:
(See Part 23, Section 23.145(e)(1), my copy is January 1, 1993, so the wording now may be a
bit different)
By using normal flight and power controls...it must be possible...to establish a zero rate of
descent at an attitude suitable for a controlled landing without exceeding the operational and
structural limitations of [single- and multi-engine airplanes]...without the use of the primary
longitudinal control system.
The dozen elevator control problem accidents resulted in one serious injury, eleven minor
injuries, and twelve uninjured people. In a third of the cases, the cause for the elevator control
problem was never found. In another case, the stick grip became stuck under the instrument
panel during take-off in an RV-4 homebuilt. Another case involved a shotgun shell jamming the
rear stick in a Cub during a wildlife management flight (i.e.: shooting coyotes from the airplane).
Yet another accident involved a banner towing line wrapping around the horizontal stabilizer and
jamming the elevator of a Cessna tow plane.
Five cases appear to be related to airplane maintenance: For example, one pilot encountered
problems controlling pitch after thirty minutes of aerobatics in a Decathlon. The pilot controlled

pitch and altitude with power, but landed short of the intended runway. The airplanes shoulder
harnesses had been replaced sometime prior to the accident. A chromed seatbelt adjustment
buckle was found wedged in an elevator bell crank.
Another pilots RV-4 elevator control disconnected in-flight twenty-nine hours after he had
performed maintenance on it. The pilot used throttle and trim to control the airplane, but landed
short of the intended runway.
And a Mooney pilot used power to control the airplane to a forced landing after the elevator
control rod disconnected while performing touch-and-gos. The elevator control rods had been
removed and serviced twelve hours previously. The control rods were reinstalled improperly.
-----------------------Throttle control problems ranked a surprising second on the list, attributed to nine accidents. Five
of these involved a separation of the throttle cable from the carburetor as a result of improper
maintenance (usually forgetting to secure the cable with a bolt, castellated nut, and cotter key).
The post-maintenance time-in-service before the throttle cables disconnected ranged from the
first flight out of the shop, to 5.4 hours, to 71.3 hours, to 7 months.
The throttle linkage became loose but remained attached in another accident attributed to
improper maintenance. Two more accidents occurred when the throttle cables actually failed. In
the remaining accident, the throttle cable in a homebuilt airplane became jammed at a low power
setting. This throttle cable had been salvaged from another airplane and showed signs of chafing
from the previous installation.
In three of these accidents, the throttle cable failed with the engine still producing partial power.
It also appears the pilot in each case should have been able to land on the runway, but in the heat
of the emergency did not think to shut the engine off with the mixture or the mags once the
landing was assured. All three airplanes ended up crashing, fortunately with only one serious
injury.
-----------------------Flap failures precipitated three accidents: one where the flaps split on short final; one where the
flaps failed in the fully extended position during a touch-and-go; one where a locking pin on a
mechanical flap handle was missing, allowing the air loads against the flaps to extend them
inadvertently during take-off. Ten people were involved in these accidents. Four received minor
injuries; the rest were not injured.
Rounding out the control-related accidents, jammed ailerons caused three accidents, a jammed
rudder caused two accidents, a jammed aileron and elevator caused one accident, and elevator
trim position was a factor in one accident.
Interestingly, both rudder control accidents occurred in tandem seat airplanes. In one case, the
rear passengers foot likely became stuck in one of the rudder pedals during a landing in an

Aeronca Champ. In the other case, the rear seat passengers briefcase likely obstructed rudder
travel during a take-off in a Super Cub.
The trim-related accident appears to have been pilot induced--the pilot trimmed a Cessna 185 to
the full nose down position for take-off, well outside the manufacturers marked take-off trim
position. The pilot encountered difficulty pulling the yoke aft after the tailwheel lifted off the
ground. The propeller eventually struck the ground.
-----------------------The last subset of control-related accidents involved twelve cases (twenty-two percent of the
accidents) where control surfaces excited flutter. One accident resulted from elevator flutter
when the pilot exceeded Vne in a Mooney M20K. This led to the catastrophic failure of the
airframe and one fatality. Two accidents without injuries involved flutter induced by a failure of
elevator trim tabs in two Cessnas (210 and 421). Corrosion led to the failure of the trim tab,
which set off flutter, which led to failure of the elevator in one case; in the other, improper
maintenance and an inadequate preflight were cited as reasons why the trim tab bolt backed out
in-flight, inducing flutter which damaged the trim and elevator. And a Velocity homebuilt
airplane experienced flutter in one of its rudder/winglets during its maiden test flight. The pilot
executed a forced landing, receiving minor injuries.
The remaining eight flutter accidents all involved the same make of airplane--the V-tail Bonanza.
No one was injured in these accidents, but all experienced flutter of the ruddervators in-flight. In
some cases, extensive damage occurred to the aft fuselage. In each case, the flutter was stopped
by reducing the throttle and reducing the airspeed.
(My recommendation -- dont fly the V-tail Bonanza; but if youre going to fly the V-tail,
dont fly too fast!)
Note to Elizabeth -- Rod Machado addressed the flutter issue in a recent issue of AOPA
Pilot, so you may want to cross-reference...
-----------------------An Interesting Sidebar:
I wrote an article, which appeared in the May 2001 issue of Sport Aerobatics magazine, resulting
from an on-line search I performed for accidents where the occupants were wearing parachutes. I
wanted to see if there is any real benefit to wearing a parachute when performing aerobatics. In
other words, if something did go wrong with the airplane, given the option, are your chances of
surviving greater by staying in the airplane or by bailing out?
I looked at all the years available at the time (from 1983 to sometime in 2000). The search
revealed seventy-nine accidents where the words chute, parachute, or bail appeared in the
text. The most common cause for accidents where those on board were wearing parachutes?

Control failures! Eighteen of the seventy-nine accidents--twenty-three percent--were attributed to

a problem with one of the primary controls (elevator, aileron, or rudder). This did not include
accidents where flutter was involved (flutter occurred in four percent of the cases).
The second greatest cause of accidents during flights where the occupants wore parachutes was
loss of control--spins, representing fifteen accidents (nineteen percent of the total).
The results: Twenty-seven accidents were found where those on board either made no attempt to
bail out, or only got as far as unbuckling their seat belts before impact. NO ONE in these
airplanes survived any of these accidents. On the other hand, fifty accidents involving fifty-two
people were found where all on board managed to get out of the airplanes prior to impact.
Eighty-three percent of them survived! And sixty-six percent of them escaped with minor or no
injuries.
Four of those who bailed out but did not survive bailed out too low, and several of the other fatal
bailouts involved other extenuating circumstances.
The reason we wear parachutes when performing aerobatics is clear: It gives us a viable survival
option should something go terribly wrong with our airplane. And the most likely scenario when
we would exercise the bailout option: a control failure of some sort.

What's the most important thing you can do if you have a control failure?
Dont panic. Fly the airplane (how clich, but it works!). The odds are that no one will get hurt
(except for those who leave the gust locks in, that is). The airplane may get damaged, but its the
well being of those on board that matters most.
Be willing and able to use all the controls that are still available to put you in the best possible
position for landing. Keep in mind, too, that a controlled off-airport landing is better than an
uncontrolled on-airport landing. If you cant make it to a runway, set yourself up for the best
possible touchdown wherever you might be landing--low, slow, landing attitude, with the wings
as close to level as possible.

What can pilots who may not be able to get to California and take your program do to
prepare? (Read the book, get the videos, lessons with instructors at their own airports?)
Aside from shamelessly plugging my book, video, and course???
Take preflight and before take-off check items seriously. Actually touch, move, and look at all
the control surfaces to ensure full and unhindered operation while youre on the ground. Get on

your knees once in a while and look up into the engine compartment from below--often you can
see the throttle-to-carburetor/fuel injector connections. Shine a light up there if necessary to get a
good look. Participate in the maintenance of your airplane, even if its only to serve as another
pair of eyes making sure that everything is connected before the airplane is buttoned up and
returned to service.
Based on the accident reports, discuss scenarios with your instructor. Bat around ideas about how
to handle limited control situations. Similar to what we do out here, have your instructor simulate
control failures. Learn how to slip properly, and how the slip can be used to help offset aileron,
rudder, and split flap problems.

What can/should pilots do in their normal flying to stay sharp and be ready in case they
have a control problem? (practice those stabilized slips, etc?)
See above, and make it a habit to practice your flying skills, whether its slips and slipping turns,
or stalls, or turns around a point--anything and everything you can do to become more aware of
the capabilities and limitations of your airplane. And stay proficient in emergency procedures.

Is there some tip/tips you can offer that will serve pilots well in all/most emergencies?
Im reminded of a quote in the book, Slipping the Surly Bonds, Great Quotations on Flight
compiled by Dave English. In it he attributes the following to NTSB Investigator Steve Wilson
(during Oshkosh, 1996), p. 185:
Responding to the question, What is the cause of most aviation accidents?
Usually it is because someone does too much too soon, followed very quickly by too little too
late.
His point is a good one. It highlights the three-prong strategy pilots should adopt when things
start to go wrong in the cockpit:
1. Do Nothing
2. Think
3. Act
Our minds must control our physical actions in an emergency. The instinctive response our
bodies have to unusual situations or unusual attitudes typically aggravates the situation. This is
why I have students talk their way out of unusual spin and roll attitudes in the EMT Program.
Talking forces the pilot to focus on what they need to do--what they can do--to regain control

over the airplane rather than becoming overloaded, and thus incapacitated, by all the sensory
information associated with the emergency.
At the same time, I cannot overemphasize the importance of training followed by repeated
practice of maneuvers and techniques that can be used to cope with various emergencies. In the
case of control failures, mastering the slip and slipping turns are useful tools for managing
aileron, rudder, and split flap problems. Dealing with elevator problems requires proper use of
power and perhaps elevator trim to manage your pitch attitude and altitude profile without
encountering a departure stall.
And lets not forget prevention as probably the best weapon against surprises in the cockpit!
Were taught preflight and before take-off checks for good reason. Make sure the controls are
truly Free and Correct physically and visually before going airborne. Whenever possible,
visually check the flaps as they deploy and retract, watching for smooth and equal operation on
both sides.
Airplane owners might ask their mechanics to notify them any time a major airplane component
is disassembled or disconnected during maintenance. Owners might also request that, prior to
inspection covers and engine cowls being reinstalled, they be allowed to have a look inside the
airplane--not only for their own peace of mind, but as fresh pairs of interested eyes double
checking things. This may be somewhat problematic for renter pilots. Even so, a renter pilot
might ask if the airplane he or she is about to rent has recently had maintenance performed on it.
If so, consider performing a better-than-normal preflight on those components involved in the
maintenance.