JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY
Regina v Davies

PP v Mohd Abdullah

PP v Glen

PP v Erwin Hardy

PP v Mahanthiran Durasamy

PP v Teo Siew Peng

ACTUS REUS CONDUCT CRIME

R v Pittwood
The accused was a railway gatekeeper employed to keep the gate shut whenever a train
passed between 7am till late afternoon. One day he left the gate open which resulted in a
collision between a train and a car which was crossing the line, killing one man and injuring
the other seriously.
Held: The accused was liable of a gross negligence as he was paid to keep the gate shut and
protect the public and therefore he may incur criminal liability from a duty arising out of a
contract.
R v Instan
The accused lived with the deceased where the deceased had developed gangrene on her leg
before she died. During the last 12days of her life, she could not fend for herself, move about
or summon help. The accused knew of her state but gave no help nor seek medical assistance.
Held : while it would not be correct that every moral obligation involved legal duty, not
every duty is founded on moral obligation. A common law duty is nothing else that the
enforcing by law that which is a moral obligation without legal enforcement. There can be no
question in this case that it was clear duty of the prisoner to impart to the deceased so much
as was necessary to sustain life,of the food which she from time to time too in, which was
paid by the deceaseds own money for the purpose of maintenance of herself and the

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prisoner, it was only through the instrumentality of the prisoner that the deceased could get
the food.
There was, therefore, a common law duty upon the prisoner which she did not discharge. The
prisoner was under a moral obligation to the deceased from which arose a legal duty towards
her ; that legal duty the prisoner wilfully and deliberately left unperformed, with the
consequence that there has been an acceleration of the death of the deceased owing to the
non-performance of that legal duty.
R v Miller
The Df had been out drinking for the evening. He went back to the house he had been staying
in and fell asleep on a mattress with a lighted cigarette in his hand. He awoke and saw that
the cigarette had started a small fire, went to another room and went back to sleep.
Held: The Df had created a dangerous situation and owed a duty to call the fire brigade upon
becoming aware of the fire. He was therefore liable for his omission to do so.
Om Prakash v State of Punjab
The accused starved his wife and denied her to leave the house. In defence, the accused
contended that it was not a husbands duty to spoon fed the wife but only to provide food and
funds.
Held : Being deprived from food is in pursuance of a scheme to accelerate her end : the
responsibility of the appellant for the condition to which the wife was brought was clear.
Hill v Baxter
The case of Hill v Baxter concerns the issue of automatism in English law. It sets out
guidelines as to when the defence will apply, and when it will not.
In this case, a man succeeded in driving a substantial distance before having an accident. He
was charged with dangerous driving. He could not remember anything between a very early
point of the journey and immediately after the accident. It was suggested (and accepted at
first instance) that he was not conscious of what he was doing, and "that he was not capable
of forming any intention as to his manner of driving."The reason for this is because he
succumbed to an unknown illness, and so was not able to control his actions.
Held : As dangerous driving under the Road Traffic Act 1930 was an offence of strict
liability, a denial of the requisite mens rea would not be enough to exculpate him. He was
instead required to rely on the defence of automatism. Lord Goddard CJ ruled that there
would be some situations where "the driver would be in such a state of unconsciousness that
he could not be said to be driving." This is in effect a denial of actus reus. However, Lord
Goddard found on the facts that the accused had simply fallen asleep. As this was something
he had substantial control over, being presumed to have been aware that he was tired, he
found that he was reckless in continuing to drive, he then quoted Humphreys J in Kay v
Butterworth (1945) and resurrected the now famous and hypothetical situation of a swarm of
bees attacking the driver, in which case the driver would not have been held liable.
Pearson J agreed on all relevant points of law, but disagreed as to why he should not be
convicted. He held that as the defendant had driven a substantial distance without incident, he
was clearly "driving with skill", and therefore must have been driving. The prosecution's
appeal was allowed, and the case was referred back to the trial judge. The defendant was,
however, eventually found guilty. The judge in this case held that only a voluntary act or
omission can qualify as an actus reus.

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Broome v Perkins
The appellant was a diabetic. He had driven erratically while suffering from hypo-glycaemia
(low blood sugar level caused by an excess of insulin in the bloodstream). His defence of
non-insane automatism failed because of evidence that he had exercised conscious control
over his car by veering away from other vehicles so as to avoid a collision and braking. His
conviction for driving without undue care and attention was therefore upheld.
Bratty v Attorney-General
D strangled a girl with her stocking. He claimed that at the time he was suffering from
psychomotor epilepsy.
Held: D is entitled to raise the defence of automatism if the jury rejects the defence of
insanity.
'No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily and an involuntary act means an act which
is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a
convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing, such as an
act done whilst suffering from concussion or done whilst sleep-walking'.
An act is not involuntary simply because the defendant does not remember it or because he
was unable to control an impulse to do it.
Lord Denning:
"Any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a
disease of the mind (p. 412)."
Psychomotor epilepsy would be insanity. Found guilty
Re Pappathi Ammal
The accused, who recently gave birth to a child, jumped into a well with the child at night.
An alarm was sounded, the woman was rescued but the child drowned. The woman was
charged with murder and attempted suicide. She pleaded that she was a sleepwalker
(somnambulism).
Held: The allegation of somnambulism was not substantiated although it proved that it would
constitute unsoundness of mind attracting Section 84.
Sinnasamy v PP
The appellant murdered his 21 months old daughter however he had a history of being an
epileptic. He had no motive for killing and although he remembered in detail the events and
circumstances preceding and immediately after the event, he had no recollection of the event
itself or why he did it. The appellant relied on the defence of automatism, where he was
under a state of temporary unconsciousness. He tried to bring himself under the exception
under Section 84 ie: insanity.
Held: The Appeal Court in upholding the Trial Courts decision rejected the defence of
automatism and found that the appellant acted on an irresistible impulse and that was no
defence per se.

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MENS REA MENTAL STATE

PP v Norazam bin Ibrahim
Mens Rea, being a mental element, has to be gathered from indirect evidence by reference to
all the facts and circumstances in each particular case.
INTENTION
Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutor
Defendant was convicted of murder for deliberately setting fire to a house which resulted in
the death of two occupants. Defendant argues he lacked the requisite intent for murder.
Has the intent to cause grievous bodily harm for a conviction of murder been modified by
English case law to include a requirement that the Defendant must intend to endanger the
victims life?
Held :No, appeal Dismissed.
Malice aforethought is defined as an intent to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to,
a person, whether such person is actually killed or not.
R v Moloney
The probability of the consequence taken to have been foreseen must be a little short of
overwhelming before it will suffice to establish necessary intent.
Rajendra Prasad Singh

PP v Tan Buck Tee

With five appalling wounds penetrating to the heart and liver, which must have been caused
by violent blows with a heavy sharp instrument like an axe, then it must have intended to kill
the person.
PP v Sameer Klom Klom

Ram Kumar v State of Rajasthan

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KNOWLEDGE
Roper v Taylors Central Garages
Evidence.
1) court cannot rely on evidence given against different defendant in related case.
2) shutting the eyes is actual knowledge but neglecting to make inquiries is not
William Tan Cheng Eng v PP
The accused was driving in a dangerous manner which could likely cause death.
Held: It has to be proven that the accused knew that his conduct was dangerous. That it must
in all probability cause death/bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd
The defendants had been acquitted of running a sex establishment otherwise than in
accordance with a licence from the appellant authority. The defendant had leased premises
which were known to have been running such, but the defendant director had not been shown
to have known that the tenant did not have a licence. The Council said that it having shown
the use, no onus lay on the prosecutor to show knowledge of the absence of a licence.
Held: The councils appeal failed. the word knowingly in paragraph 20(1 )(a) cannot
sensibly have been introduced merely to apply to the use which the defendant is making, or
causing or permitting another to make, of premises as a sex establishment. I can conceive of
no circumstances in which a person could be said to be using premises, still less of causing or
permitting them to be used, to a significant degree for the exhibition of pornographic films
or for a business which consists to a significant degree of the sale of pornographic material
if that person were ignorant of the nature of the offending use. If the argument for the council
is right, the word knowingly is tautologous . . If the argument for the council were accepted,
it would lead to the conclusion that paragraph 20(l)(a) had in effect created an offence of
strict liability. The offence would consist in the unlawful use of premises as a sex
establishment and even an honest belief in facts which, if true, would make the use lawful
would afford no defence. It is trite law that the legislatures intention to create an offence of
strict liability must be signified by clear language. To find such an intention in paragraph
20(1 )(a) with its iteration of the word knowingly is obviously impossible.
REASONS TO BELIEVE
Ahmad bin Ishak v PP
The appellant, a penghulu, was convicted on the charge that he voluntarily assisted in
disposing of a cheque which he knew or had reason to believe to be stolen property. The
cheque had been handed to the appellant by an office boy. The appellant had taken the
cheque to a goldsmith's shop and had purchased gold ornaments and had taken the balance in
cash.
Held: The Appeal Court held that the accused knew that the person from whom he had
obtained the cheque was a mere office boy and that the sum made out thereon was
considerable. There was sufficient cause for the accused to have reason to believe that the
cheque was stolen and the conduct of the accused tended to show that the cheque was stolen.
Therefore the presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act was correctly applied.

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PP v Tan Ser Juay

PP v Koh Hak Boon

RASHNESS / RECKLESS
Nga Min Tat

Chamman Lal

Subba Rao S V

NEGLIGENTLY
Anthonysamy v PP

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Adnan bin Khamis v PP

The courts had to determine if the standard of proof for a charge under Section 304A of the
PC is a high degree of negligence similar to that required for manslaughter in England or is
the burden same as any act done rashly or negligently as to endanger human life.
Held: The test to be applied for determining the guilt or innocence of an accused person
charged with rash or negligent conduct is to consider whether or not a reasonable man in the
same circumstances would have been aware of the likelihood of damages of injury to others
resulting from such conduct and taken adequate and proper precautions to avoid causing such
damage or injury.
FRAUDULENTLY
Naidu S P C AIR

Seet Soon Guan v PP

PP v Li Chuan Pin

DISHONESTLY
Yap Sing Hock v PP

Ang Teck Hwa v PP

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MALICIOUSLY
R v Cunningham
The appellant ripped a gas meter from the wall in order to steal the money in the meter. This
caused gas to escape and seeped through small cracks in the wall to the neighbouring
property where his future mother-in-law was sleeping and was poisoned by the gas. He was
charged with unlawfully and maliciously caused the victim to inhale a noxious fume as to
endanger her life.
Held: Malicious means either, (i) An actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in
fact was done, or (ii) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not.
The Moghul Steamship Co Ltd v Mc Gregor, Gow & Co
Defendant lowered prices and offered incentive in an attempt to drive Plaintiff from the
market. Plaintiff sued Defendant for unfair competition. Is there a cause of action for unfair
competition when that competition complained of consists of a price confederation that wants
to control shipping of goods by lowering prices?
Held : No. The act of Defendants in lowering their freights far beyond a lowering for any
purpose of trade that is to say, so low that I they continued it they themselves could not
carry on trade was not an act done in the exercises of their own free right of trade, but was
an act done evidently for the purpose of interfering with, i.e. with intent to interfere with,
Plaintiffs right to a free course of trade.
CAUSATION
R v White
The defendant put some poison in his mother's milk with the intention of killing her. The
mother took a few sips and went to sleep and never woke up. Medical reports revealed that
she died from a heart attack and not the poison. The defendant was not liable for her murder
as his act of poisoning the milk was not the cause of death. He was liable for attempt.
This case established the 'but for' test. Ie would the result have occurred but for the actions of
the defendant? If the answer is yes the defendant is not liable.
R v Marchant

R v Ismail

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R v Malcherek
It was held that in the ordinary case, if the treatment is given bona fide by competent and
careful medical practitioners, then evidence will not be admissible to show that the treatment
would not have been administered in the same way by other medical practitioners. In other
words, fact that the initial victim died despite or because of medical treatment for the initial
injury given by careful and skilled medical practitioners will not exonerate the original
assailant from responsibility.
R v Jordan
The defendant stabbed the victim. The victim was taken to hospital where he was given antibiotics after showing an allergic reaction to them. He was also given excessive amounts of
intravenous liquids. He died of pneumonia 8 days after admission to hospital. At the time of
death his wounds were starting to heal.
Held : The victim died of the medical treatment and not the stab wound. The defendant was
not liable for his death.
R v Cheschire
The defendant shot a man in the stomach and thigh. The man was taken to hospital where he
was operated on and developed breathing difficulties. The hospital gave him a tracheotomy (a
tube inserted into the windpipe connected to a ventilator). Several weeks later his wounds
were healing and no longer life threatening, however, he continued to have breathing
difficulty and died from complications arising from the tracheotomy. The defendant was
convicted of murder and appealed.
Held : His conviction was upheld despite the fact that the wounds were not the operative
cause of death. Intervening medical treatment could only be regarded as excluding the
responsibility of the defendant if it was so independent of the defendant's act and so potent in
causing the death, that the jury regard the defendant's acts as insignificant. Since the
defendant had shot the victim this could not be regarded as insignificant.
R v Blaue
The victim, a Jehovah witness, refused a blood transfusion which might have saved her life.
The DF, in the course of a violent assault, had injured the victims fingers. A surgeon had
advised amputation because of danger to life from complications that had developed. The
advice was rejected and the victim died.
Held : it has long been the policy of the law that those who use violence on other people
must take their victims as they find them. This is in our judgement means the whole man, not
just the physical man.
It does not lie in the mouth of the assailant to say that his victims religious beliefs which
inhibited her from accepting certain types of treatment were unreasonable. The question is
what caused her death. The answer is the stab wound. The fact that the victim refused to stop
this end coming about did not break the causal connection between the act and death.

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R v Smith
The deceased received bayonet wounds during a fight with soldiers. A friend carried him to
the medical station but tripped and dropped him twice. On arrival, he was given a throroughly
bad medical treatment.
Held : Although that if better treatment was to be given to the deceased, he would not have
died, to break the causation there must be unreasonable. Extraneous or extrinsic. There was
none in this case. Thus, the wound, although badly treated is still the operating cause of the
death.
R v Latif

R v Finlay
In the circumstances of the instant case, where the defendant had prepared a lethal dose of
heroin which the deceased had self-injected, the judge had properly left an offence of
unlawful act manslaughter to the jury. The act of preparing heroin was capable of being an
offence within s23 of the and, in the circumstances, there was a chain of causation between
the defendant's act and the deceased's death which had not been broken by self injection.
CONCURRENCE
Thabo Meli v R
The four appellants were convicted of murder. They had planned to kill a man and then make
it look like an accident. They took him to a hut and beat him over the head. Believing that he
was dead, they then took his body to a cliff and threw it off. Medical evidence showed that
the deceased died from exposure of being left at the bottom of the cliff and not from the blow
to the head. They appealed against their convictions on the grounds that the actus reus and
mens rea of the crime did not coincide. That is to say when they formed the intention to kill,
there was no actus reus as the man was still alive. When they threw him off the cliff, there
was no mens rea as they can intend to kill someone they believed was already dead.
Held : Convictions upheld. The act of beating him and throwing him off the cliff was one
continuing act.
R v Church
Sylvia Notts mocked the appellant's ability to satisfy her sexually and slapped his face. A
fight developed during which the appellant knocked her unconscious. He tried to wake her
for 30 mins to no avail. He believed she was dead and threw her body into a river. Medical
evidence revealed that the cause of death was drowning and she therefore had been alive
when he threw her into the river. The trial judge made several errors in his direction to the
jury and in the event they convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. The appellant
appealed on the grounds of misdirection.
Held : Whilst there were several errors in the judge's direction the conviction for
manslaughter was safe.

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Edmund Davies LJ set the applicable test for constructive manslaughter:

"The conclusion of this Court is that an unlawful act causing the death of another cannot,
simply because it is an unlawful act, render a manslaughter verdict inevitable. For such a
verdict inexorably to follow, the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people
would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm
resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm."
R v Le Brun
The defendant punched his wife on the chin knocking her unconscious. He did not intend to
cause her serious harm. The defendant attempted to move her body, and in the course of so
doing dropped her, causing her head to strike the pavement. His wife sustained fractures to
the skull that proved fatal. The defendant's appeal against his conviction for manslaughter
was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Lord Lane CJ said:
"It seems to us that where the unlawful application of force and the eventual act causing
death are parts of the same sequence of events, the same transaction, the fact that there is an
appreciable interval of time between the two does not serve to exonerate the defendant from
liability. That is certainly so where the appellant's subsequent actions which caused death,
after the initial unlawful blow, are designed to conceal his commission of the original
unlawful assault."
In Re Kaliappa Goudan v State
The two appellants were charged in the Sessions Court of Coimbatore with having murdered
a woman named Muthayee, the wife of the 1st appellant and also with having caused
evidence of the said offence to disappear by placing her body on the railway line with the
intention of screening themselves from legal punishment.
Held : Appellants were guilty of the offence of murder.
Moore

Masilela

Khandu Valad Bhavani

In that case it was found that the accused struck the deceased three blows on the head with a
stick with the intention of killing him. The accused, believing him to be dead, set fire to the
hut in which he was lying with a view to remove all evidence of the crime. The medical
evidence showed that the blows were not likely to cause death and did not cause death and
that death was really caused by injuries from burning. The Bombay High Court was of the
opinion that the offence committed was attempt to murder and not murder. In this view the

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Judges were not unanimous. Parsons, J. took the view that the whole transaction, the blow
and the burning, must be treated as one and that therefore the original intention to cause death
applied to the act of burning which did cause death. With this view Napier, J. agreed - and for
reasons which I will presently state I do also - and expressed the opinion that Queen-Empress
v. Khandu valad Bhavani (1890) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 194 was wrongly decided
Re Palani Goudan
The accused struck his wife a blow on her head with a ploughshare, which, though not known
to be a blow likely to cause death, did, in fact, render her unconscious and believing her to be
dead, in order to lay the foundation of a false defence of suicide by hanging, the accused
hanged her on a beam by a rope and thereby caused her death by strangulation, and it was
held by the Full Bench that the accused was not guilty of either murder or culpable homicide
not amounting to murder as the original intention was not to cause death but only to cause
injury and the second intention was only to dispose of a supposedly dead body in a way
convenient for the defence which the accused was about to set up.
INFANCY
Ula Mahapatra v The King
Ula was getting palm fruit plucked from a tree standing on his land. The deceased picked up a
fruit on the ground and Ula protested and demanded its price. The deceased threw the food
and threatened to cut Ula into pieces if he went to Tope for plucking palm fruits. Ula told the
deceased that he would cut him instead. Then Ula struck deceased with a kathi on the left side
of his chest. The deceased fell down and died on the spot.
Held: The appellant is over 11 and below 12 years of age. The manner in which he answered
the questions leaves the impression that the appellant is an extraordinary precocious
(unusually advanced or mature in development, esp mental development) child. He gives
minute details of what he did after he returns from his padar field, prior to the occurrence,
how he bargained for wages, and explained very detail of the evidence against him. The
answer he gave disclose an acute and intelligent mind and he can by no means be regarded as
suffering from any immaturity of understanding. (court observes the conduct). The words he
uttered: I shall cut you to bits now show that he realized the nature and consequences of
what he was going to do. S83: Penal Codes contemplates that the child should know the
nature and physical consequences of his conduct. When the appellant picked up his knife and
advanced towards the deceased with a threatening gesture, saying that he would cut him into
pieces, and did actually cut him, his entire action can only lead to one inference, namely, that
he did intended to do and that he knew all the time that a blow inflicted with a kathi would
effectuate his intention. He knew that it was wrong as he tried to explain every evidence
adduced against him in order to negate the evidence.
Abdul Sattar v The Crown
The accused were boys below 12yo who had prised open locks on two shops and went inside
to commit theft. In one shop, they stole a bag of pulses while in the other there was nothing
for them to steal.
Held : The very act of breaking the locks showed that they were sufficiently mature to
understand the nature and consequences of their conduct.

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A v DPP

C v DPP
The defendant was aged 12. He was holding the handlebars of a motorcycle while another
was attempting to force the chain and padlock which secured it with a crowbar. When the
officer approached, the 2 boys ran off, leaving the crowbar in the chain. The defendant was
charged with interfering with a motor cycle the intention that an offence of theft should be
committed.
Held: Defendant knew that he was in serious trouble because he had done something
seriously wrong. His act was of such nature that a boy of that age would have understood it
to be unlawful. The defendant and his accomplice ran away from the police officers leaving
the crowbar behind. This is an dishonesty case, a theft. Due to this rank of dishonesty, the
facts are allowed to speak for themselves as regards the child defendants state of mind.The
child must have known the moral quality of his act though there might be no evidence as to
his actual state of knowledge.
R v LMW
A 10 year-old boy, LMW, was charged with the manslaughter of six year-old Corey Davis,
who drowned on 2 March 1998. The defendant had dropped Corey into the Georges River,
knowing that Corey was unable to swim. The defendant was found not guilty of
manslaughter, as the jury supported the defence case that the drowning of Corey had been an
act of bullying that went wrong. This case raised the issue of doli incapax, which presumes
any child aged 10-14 is incapable of criminal intent unless proven otherwise.
UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND
McNaghtens Case
Daniel McNaghten was charged with the murder of Edward Drummond, private secretary of
the then PM of England. McNaghten was suffering from delusions of persecution that PM
had injured him.He intended to kill the PM but shot and killed Edward instead. He was
acquitted on the ground of insanity.
Held : Legal test of insanity: To establish a defence on the ground pf insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.

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R v Codere
The appellant was convicted of murder. He sought to rely on the defence of insanity,
however, at the time of the killing he knew that it was unlawful to kill.
Held : He was not able to rely on the defence of insanity.Lord Reading on the meaning of
'wrong' referred to in the McNaghten rules:
"If the accused does know either that his act is morally wrong according to the ordinary
standard adopted by reasonable men or that it is legally wrong then it cannot be said that he
does not know he was doing what was wrong.
Geron Ali v Emperor
Pir is a holy man, his wife is Pirani. They asked appellant to bring a head as sacrifice if he
wants to go to heaven. He cut off a mans and his daughters head and bring it to Pir.
Held: The appellant knew the nature of his act. Evidence showed that he considered that he
was doing a meritorious act which qualified him for heaven. If he knew that what he was
doing was wrong then he will not be protected even if he doesnt know that it was contrary to
law. If he knew that what he was doing was contrary to law then he will also not be protected
even though he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Any act contrary law if
conducted, ignorance of the law will not protect a man from punishment when it is shown
that the man knew that what he was doing is wrong.
Ashiruddin Ahmad v King
The appellant was convicted under s302 for the murder of his 5 year old son. He dreamt that
he had been directed by someone in paradise to sacrifice his son by killing him.
Held: The nature of act was clearly known to the accused. The accused most probably knew
the act was contrary to law. The 3rd point: whether the accused knew that the act was wrong.
The 3rd point is not properly put forward. Hence the court found that the accused committed
the act of causing the death of his son by cutting his throat was by reason of unsoundness of
mind. He was incapable of knowing that his act was wrong, he misunderstood the law. The
accused was acquitted.
Alang Mat Nasir

Jusoh v PP
The appellant ran amok for no apparent reason. He slashed his sister in law and her 1 children
to death. He then killed a man who was a complete stranger to him and inflicted severe
injuries on 2 young men who led the villagers to secure him. A medical officer who was with
the appellant 2 hours after his arrest described him as in a daze and overwhelmed with
woe.
Held : The defence case was that there were 4 killings which where was no motive at all, in
short, the facts were such that an ordinary man might well be prompted to say this is the

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work of a madman. There was an uncontradicted evidence of a medical man with long
experience in diseases of the mind who had had the app under observation for about 3 months
was that at the time of the killings the accused was suffering from mania which could
produce him an irresistible impulse to do what he did and the type of mania which it springs
generally produces the consequences that the sufferer does not know what he is doing is
wrong. However, on the basis of no rebutting medical evidence, etc, the court was only told
that PP who haves studied the appellant for 2 days and thus in better position than anybody
else including the medical man who had had him under observation for 3 months, in judging
the mental condition at the time of the killing. The contention by prosecutor was rejected.
Appeal was allowed.

PP v Muhammad Suhaimi bin Abdullah

INTOXICATION
DPP v Beard
The appellant whilst intoxicated raped a 13 year old girl and put his hand over her mouth to
stop her from screaming. She died of suffocation.
Held : Lord Birkenhead LC - "Under the law of England as it prevailed until early in the 19th
century voluntary drunkenness was never an excuse for criminal misconduct; and indeed the
classic authorities broadly assert that voluntary drunkenness must be considered rather an
aggravation than a defence. This view was in terms based upon the principle that a man who
by his own voluntary act debauches and destroys his will power shall be no better situated in
regard to criminal acts than a sober man.Where a specific intent is an essential element in the
offence, evidence of a state of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of forming such
an intent should be taken into consideration in order to determine whether he had in fact
formed the intent necessary to constitute the particular crime. If he was so drunk that he was
incapable of forming the intent required he could not be convicted of a crime which was
committed only if the intent was proved. ... In a charge of murder based upon intention to kill
or to do grievous bodily harm, if the jury are satisfied that the accused was, by reason of his
drunken condition, incapable of forming the intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm ... he
cannot be convicted of murder. But nevertheless unlawful homicide has been committed by
the accused, and consequently he is guilty of unlawful homicide without malice aforethought,
and that is manslaughter"
AG for NI v Gallagher
The Respondent was an aggressive psychopath and prone to violent outbursts. This was
particularly so if he had taken alcohol. He was frequently violent towards his wife. He had
spent some time in a mental hospital for which he blamed his wife. On his release he went
out and brought a bottle of whiskey and a knife. He intended to use the knife to kill his wife
and brought the whiskey as he knew that this would make him aggressive to the extent that he

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

would be able to kill. He drank the whiskey and killed his wife with the knife and a hammer.
He was convicted of murder and appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal N.I on the
grounds of a mis-direction. His conviction was quashed. The Attorney General appealed to
the House of Lords on the grounds that the defence of insanity was not open to him because
before taking the drink, when there was no defect in his reason, he had clearly evinced an
intention to kill his wife and any temporary derangement of his reason at the time of the
killing was the result of his own voluntary act in taking the drink.
Held : Appeal allowed. The conviction restored. Where a person forms the intention to kill
and drinks in order to give themselves Dutch courage, they can not then rely on their
intoxication to demonstrate they did not have the necessary mens rea.
Ismail bin Abdul Rahman v PP
Appellant was convicted for the murder of a male Indian. He appealed and alleged that the
trial judge had failed to give adequate consideration to the fact that the appellant was drunk at
the time of the attack and accordingly was incapable of forming the intention to kill.
Held : The only evidence adduced that the accused consumed liquor came from the accused
himself. He did not disclosed what he drank, the quantity he drank or the state of his
intoxication. It was insufficient to support the defence of intoxication laid down in section 85
(intoxication insane). The bare statement of the appellant that he was drunk was inadequate to
negative the intention to kill and this ground of appeal failed.
PP v Tan Ho Teck
The accused was charged with causing the death of his brother by stabbing him. A had
become upset because of his inability to pay a debt owed to his uncle and because of an
argument with his brother. The accused had consumed a whole bottle of brandy and while
intoxicated, he fatally stabbed his brother and injured his sister. The accuseds defence was
that he was so heavily intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing. At the close of the
case for the prosecution, it was submitted that there was no case to answer, relying on the fact
that the accused was heavily intoxicated and that the accused by reason thereof did not have
the intention of committing the offence for which he was charged. The court disagreed and
held that the prosecution had made out a case which, if unrebutted, would warrant a
conviction for the offence.
Important facts: The relationship between the accused, his brother and sis was good. Medical
evidence adduced by an expert stating the accused at the time of stabbing his brother and
sister, was suffering from delirium due to acute alcoholic intoxication. Delirium is a
psychiatric syndrome characterized by a transient disorganization of a wide range of
cognitive functions (affect the cognitive function). The accused consumed a large quantity of
brandy in undiluted form by the accused before the stabbing. Police officers found the
accused unable to take or walk steadily and smelled of alcohol. When he was brought to the
hospital, he was heavily intoxicated which he was found to be in coma III on examination.
There are predisposing factors additional to the acute alcoholic intoxication which produced
delirium in the accused. There was no heated exchange or words preceded the stabbing of his
sister and brother despite the fact that he had an argument 2 or 3 hours before and before he
consumed the whole bottle of undiluted brandy. He did not run away. He did not hide the
knife or wipe all the blood on him. He even asked his sister where his brother was.

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

Held: The court is satisfied that the accused at the material time was suffering from delirium
due to acute alcoholic intoxication. (sufficient support). By reason of intoxication, he was
insane at the time of stabbing. As a result he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act
or what he did was wrong. He did not know what he was doing. The expert explained that the
delirium is a mental illness. There was no apparent motive or reason for stabbing (motive is
not applicable in malaysia). Hence it is unnecessary for the court to consider the other
defences, eg: the accused by reason of his intoxication did not form the specific intention of
committing the offence in which he was charged.
PP v Awang Radhuan bin Awang Bol

Kenneth Fook Mun Lee v PP

Held: In an appropriate case, a finding on intoxication may be made at the close of the case
for prosecution, especially where s86(2) is relevant. This was not such a case. The court
relied on s300(d) of the code (the knowledge limb) for the MR of murder. S86(2) only
affects offences which require intention. It excludes other types of Mens Rea. Since 300(d)
involves merely knowledge and not intention, it is not within the ambit of s86(2). Intoxication
is thus irrelevant in securing a conviction for murder if knowledge as per 300(d) is proved
beyond reasonable doubt by prosecution.
Chan Kwee Fong

CONSENT
Ngwa Shwe Kin v Emperor
The deceased, Pan Zan, a middle aged man was a believer in charm. He rendered himself as
da-proof. In an ordinary conversation, he told Shwe Kin to test his da-proof. He put out his
arm and Shwe Kin cut the arm with his da. Pan Zan bled to death.
Held: Deceased gave his consent under misconception of fact, erroneously believe that he is
da-proof . But it cannot be said that appellant knew of this misconception or had reason to
believe the deceased was mistaken in thinking himself so not vulnerable. He is only 19 years
old and would believe in a much elderly man. So it cannot be said that his act was likely to
cause such result. a. He did not use great force b. He had Pan Zans assurance that he was
invulnerable c. He inflicted cut on the art of the body specially presented for the purpose by
the deceased.
R v Flattery
A 19 years old girl went to see a prisoner with her mother for medical advice to cure her.
The prisoner told her mother that it was the natures string wanted breaking, and asked if he

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

might break it. Her mother did not know what he meant but was not mind if it would make
her daughter any good. The girl had a fit and fainted. When she recovered, she went with the
prisoner to an adjoining room.He had sexual connection with her. She made feeble resistance,
believing that he was treating her medically and performing a surgical operation.
Held: By fraud and false representation, the girl was induced and persuaded to allow him to
touch and approach her person. Even though a 19 years old girl should know that it was a
sexual intercourse, she was under the impression that the prisoner was performing the
operation by some instrument or with his fingers. There was no evidence showing that the
girl knew the prisoner was about to violate her. She submitted to what was done under the
belief that the prisoner was performing a surgical operation to cure her from her illness.
(misconception). Prisoner was guilty.
R v Clarence
The accused man had sexual intercourse with his wife He has the knowledge he was
suffering from gonorrhoea. His wife was ignorant of that fact. If she had known, she would
not have consented to the intercourse. The result of which was she contracted the disease.
Held: S20 of the Offences Against the Person Act: It must be proved that the infliction of a
wound or grievous bodily harm by some direct personal violence, with or without weapon,
unlawful/maliciously. There is an implicit consent by the wife to intercourse in her entering
into the marriage with the accused. The act is immoral but not to the extent of unlawful.
THREATS
Tan Seng Ann v PP
App and 4 other Chinese were stopped while travelling in a motorcar and detained. App led
the police to his house and pointed the inspector a revolver (firearm) lying concealed in a
cupboard. App stated that 2 men brought a small parcel requesting him to keep in the house
for the night. He objected but the 2 men still left the parcel in his house and took him in the
car to Selayang where they were arrested, as he was not cooperating. He was afraid upon the
arrest but he decided to disclose it 2 days later.
Held: There was nothing on the record in the case to suggest that duress was present or
continued when the appellant went out in the car with the other Chinese (no express defence
of duress has been submitted). In order to plead for the defence of duress to be upheld, the
duress must be imminent, extreme and persistent.
Subramaniam v PP
App was found guilty for being in possession of 20 rounds of ammunition contrary to
Emergency Regulations. He raised the defence that a. he had been captured by terrorists,
trained and given ammunition b. at the material times he was acting under duress c. at the
time of his capture he intended to surrender d. with such intention he came to the place where
he was found.
Held: It was submitted that as there was no communist around, there was no duress. S94:
instant, imminent death, and it must be reasonable and must be supported with evidence.
Very subjective. However, Privy Council held that since, he was found in jungle, he is no
way near to the any village or place with public, the threat is still imminent to him. The
terrorists may return anytime. The court has extended the meaning of imminent

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

Mohd Yusoff bin Haji Ahmad v PP

App is guilty of trafficking 2700grammes of cannabis. He was deemed to be in possession
and knowledge of the said drugs (carry it in his right hand, walking). He admitted that he
carried 2 bags containing cannabis to Padang Besar. He did it because he is under threat from
a male Thai in a hotel in Sadau. The man threatened him with a pistol, ordered him to carry
the 2 bags across the border to railway station.
Held: S94: there must be reasonable fear, at the very time, of instant death. Person who do
criminal act from fear of anything but instant death, do them at their peril, not protected by
s94. If an offence is completed when all danger of instant death has been removed, the person
committing the offence is not protected under s94. If the accused on his own accord places
himself in a situation by which he becomes a subject to the threats, even if it is a death threat,
s94 does not apply.
Explanation two, s94: need to be reasonable to apprehend that he will be killed instantly if he
does not carry out the threat. App had complied with the request to carry the 2 bags to the
railway and reached the station, placed the bags on the platform and gone to purchase ticket
to leave Padang Besar. He had been carrying the drug for 1 and half hour without making any
attempt to seek for help. Although the Thai was 20 feet away on the platform when he last
saw him, there are people at the public place, and there are officers from whom he can seek
for help. (there is no reasonable apprehension of death). The duress was no longer instant,
imminent, extreme and persistent. The moment he placed the bag and purchase ticket,
mission completed under no such duress present or continue. Conviction confirmed.
MISTAKE
Bonda Kui v King Emperor
A woman, in the middle of the night, saw a form, apparently human, dancing in a state of
complete nudity, with a broomstick tied on one side and a torn mat around the waist. The
woman taking the form to be an evil spirit or a thing which consumes human beings,
removed her own clothes and with repeated blows by a hatchet felled the thing to the ground.
Examination showed that she had killed the wife of her husbands brother.
Held: Conviction and sentence of the woman under s304 was held aside, on the ground that
she was protected by the provision of s79. The evidence made by her which constituted the
only evidence in the case, demonstrated conclusively that she thought the she was by mistake
of fact, justified in killing the deceased who she did not consider to be a human being, but a
thing which devoured human beings.
Sulong Naim v PP
The appellant was found carrying a bag which contained 2 hand grenades. He stated that he
was arrested when he was carrying the grenades with the intention of handing over to the
police. He said that there was a circular to the effect that of any person delivered arms to the
police he would be rewarded. (no evidence was adduced pertaining this)
Held: S76 and s79 are only applicable when there is a mistake of fact. A mistake of law does
not excuse. Mistake as understood in jurisprudence, is used in the sense of misconception or
error of judgement. He knows that he is carrying and he is intentionally carrying those arms.
A person carrying arms even though with a view to handing them to the police is guilty of an
offence.

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

Mat Salleh v Sarah

R v ALB Swaine
Ng Hock Su was a squatter. He occupied a piece of land at a rental of 1 $ a month.The rent
was increased. This led to an affray and Ng Hock Su hurt the Mandor who attempted to
collect the rent. When Ng was in custody, Manager demolished his house.
Held: 1. The appellant cannot plead that he did this bona fide because he has made a mistake
not of fact but of what his legal power are to enforce the contract and is not within the
protection of s79.
Chirangi v State of Nagpur
Chirangi killed his son by mistake thinking he was a tiger. He was suffering from bilateral
cataract. There was evidence that he had abscess in his leg which would have produced a
temperature which might have caused a temporary delirium. This might cause a secondary
delusion affecting his vision
Held: Chirangis fall combined with his existing physical ailments would have produced a
state of mind which he in good faith thought that object he attacked was a tiger, not his son. It
was manifest that he had had no intention of doing wrong or committing any offence. There
was no reason why he should have attacked him and as shown, they were mutually devoted.
If Chirangi had for a single moment thought that the object of his attack was his son, he
would have stopped and desisted. He considered his target was a tiger (in good faith). He
thought that by reason of mistake of fact he was justified in destroying the deceased whom he
did not regard to be a human being but who as he thought was a dangerous animal. He was in
circumstances protected by provision s79.
PP v Teo Eng Chan
Four men had sex with a 16 year old girl. They claimed that they believed she had consented,
even though she had not. The girl did not struggle. The accused argued that the absence of
injury and struggle indicated consent. The court rejected this argument and found that even
though there was no injury or resistance, there was no consent. The victim had submitted
because of the presence and threats of the four men and the fact that she was in a deserted
quarry on a dark night. Submission does not necessarily imply consent.
PP v Wong Haur Wei

Jamaluddin Hashim v PP

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

PRIVATE DEFENCE
Ewin v PP
The assessors were not directed to consider whether or not the appellant was exercising the
right of private defence. The conviction was set aside.
Musa bin Yusoff v PP
The appellant had been convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. He was
first attacked by the deceased with a piece of iron. And that by the time he struck the fatal
blow the same piece of iron has passed from the deceaseds possession into his own
possession. Issue was whether after disarming the deceased of the piece of iron, the appellant
was justified in going further than it is necessary to defend himself.
Held : The law in this country gives greater latitude to a person who is attacked than does the
law in England. In England, if self-defence is to be successful, the attacked must attempt to
disengage himself from the attack, and his killing the assailant is only excuseable if there was
no other way of saving his life. The question in such cases is not whether there was an actual
continuing danger but whether there was a reasonable apprehension of such danger. If such a
condition exists, the person attacked is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary
till he finds himself out of danger. And if in a conflict between them, he happens to kill, such
killing is justifiable. The one blow which the appellant gave to the deceased with the trident
was for the purpose of preventing a renewed attack upon him, he was entitled to acquittal.
PP v Yeo Kim Bok
The accused in this case was charged for having committed culpable homicide not amounting
to murder by causing the death of one Lee Peak. The deceased demanded repayment of a loan
in aggressive way and pick up a knife when the accused was going out of the shop calmly.
The deceased rushed towards the accused who had no way to escape. Desperately, the
accused picked up a wooden ladle and hit the knife. The knife fell on the ground. Both the
accused and deceased started to grapple with each other and fell down rolling, endeavouring
to pick up the knife. Then an object looked like a knife was seen in the hand of the deceased.
The accused remained pinned under the deceased most of the time. The defence of private
defence was raised.
Held: There was a reasonable apprehension of danger to the life of the accused when the
deceased rushed at him with the knife in his hand and at threat stage he had the right of
private defence which extended even to the killing of the deceased. There was a reasonable
possibility that if the deceased had himself managed to get hold the knife, he would have
struck some blows with the knife on the accused. The accused in such a circumstance was
bound to be in his mind a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt being caused to
him by the deceased unless he got out of the reach of the deceased. The deceased might wrest
the knife from his hand and use it against him.The reasonable apprehension of death at the
hands of the deceased could not thus be said to have left the mind of the accused.
Mohd Kunjo v PP

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

PP v Ngoi Ming Sean

The accused was a police detective. There was a quarrel between the accused and the
deceased and in the struggle for the revolver the accused caused the deceaseds death.
Held : The accused was placed in a situation of such great peril that he had no time to think or
do anything else but to fire the shot from his revolver. The act was done in the exercise of the
right of private defence and was not in excess of that right.
PP v Halim Din

PP v Dato Balwant Singh

The provisions (s96, 97, 99,100 and 102) must be read together. The right of private defence
commences as soon as there is a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body of a person
and this right continues for as long as such apprehension of danger to his body or life exists.
It must however be noted that the right has a limitation. If a person has time to have recourse
to seek the protection of a public authority or inflicts more harm than is necessary for the
purpose of defending his life and limb then such a right will no longer be available. Any
retaliation in the exercise of private defence should not exceed what is reasonably necessary
to avert the assailants attack. Thus an accused person should not be allowed to put his
superiority to such use so as to beat up the assailant. He needs not wait till he is actually
attacked or inflicted with injury in order to react. He is not obliged to run away. The law does
not require a citizen to behave like a coward. If he is unable to escape, he may turn around
and attack. The law does not require the person should have exercised a calm and cool
judgement and that he should have weigh his acts in golden scales. The person does not have
to be inflicted with serious injury before the exercise of the right of private defence can
begin. He can make sure his defence is effective. Thus a person having reasonable grounds to
believe the existence of imminent danger can use a gun in self-defence. If there is an
apprehension of further violence the right of defence comes in. It is not only the injuries
already inflicted but also the injuries the attacker might inflict if the defender does not
exercise his right of self-defence that must be taken into consideration. A person is not
obliged to wait until the attack upon him is repeated. Even if the aggressor is disarmed but
there is a possibility of him wrestling the weapon from the defender the latter has a right to
use violence. The fact that the aggressor was unarmed while the accused was armed with a
revolver cannot affect the right of private defence. The deceased was armed with a stick and
the accused with a gun. However the stick was not an ordinary stick. It was a thick branch
and more than 4 feet in length. It is big enough to cause a persons skull or bones to crack if
hit with it. It was submitted during the cross examination that it could cause grievous hurt and
possible death if hit on the head. There is a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous
harm although there is no serious injuries inflicted before the right begins, it is an injury that
might be inflicted. No obligation on the accused to run away, he may attack and a gun may be

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

used in private defence. As long as the accused has proved on a balance or probabilities that
he acted in the exercise of the right of private defence.
PP v Dato Marzuki bin Salleh

PP v Muhammad Suhaimi Abdul Aziz

Chung Tain Kong @ Chuing Fook Chung

ACCIDENT
Jagesher v Emperor
The accused was beating a person with his fists when the latters wife, with a baby on her
shoulder interfered. The accused hit the woman but the blow accidentally struck the baby. It
died two days later due to the effect of the blow.
Held : S80 of indian penal code did not apply as he was doing an unlawful act.
Koh Poh Ing v PP
The accused tried to stop the victim from committing suicide but end up accident took place.

NECESSITY
R v Dudley & Stephens
The 2 accused and a 3rd man and 17 years old boy were cast away on the high seas in an
open boat. They drifted in the boat for 20 days. When they had been eight days without food
and 6 days without water, the fearing they would all soon die, the defendants killed the boy
who was likely to die first. The men ate his flesh and drank his blood for 4 days. They were
then charged with murder.
Held: There was no common law authority to support the proposition that necessity was a
defence to murder. The saint Christopher case was rejected as a precedent because it had not
been formally recoded in the law reports. No one is qualified to make the decision of who
should live and who should die. This principle may be the legal cloak (concealment) for
unbridled (free from restraint) passion and atrocious (dreadful) crime. A man has no right to
declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself have yielded to it, nor allow

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the legal definition of the
crime. Saint Christopher case - In the early 17th century, seven Englishmen in the Caribbean
embarked on an overnight voyage from Saint Christopher, but were blown out to sea and lost
for 17 days. During this time, starving, they cast lots to see who would sacrifice their own life
for the others. The lot fell to the man who had suggested the scheme and he consented to his
subsequent killing. His body sustained the rest until they made their way to Saint Martin.
They were returned to Saint Christopher where they were put on trial for homicide. The judge
pardoned them, their crime being "washed away" by "inevitable necessity". Though this case
was cited in defence of Dudley and Stephens, it was reported only anecdotally some years
later in a medical work and not in the law reports. They were sentenced to the statutory death
penalty.
PP v Ali Umar
The respondent had been charged under Customs Act for carrying tin-ore in a local craft
without the permission of the Director-General of Customs. They claimed that their boat
which was destined elsewhere, had broken rudder forcing them in distress to enter Malaysian
waters
Held: Necessity justified the respondents to enter the Malaysian water on specific reason that
the boat in which they were travelling was in distress due to the fact that the rudder of the
boat was broken in International water. It would be necessary for the respondent to seek
shelter for the safety of the boat and to preserve the lives of the crew during such distress.
Re A (Conjoined Twins)
Mary and Jodie were conjoined twins joined at the pelvis. Jodie was the stronger of the two
and capable of living independently. However, Mary was weaker, she was described as
having a primitive brain and was completely dependent on Jodie for her survival. According
to medical evidence, if the twins were left as they were, Mary would eventually be too much
of a strain on Jodie and they would both die. If they operated to separate them, this would
inevitably lead to the death of Mary, but Jodie would have a strong chance of living an
independent life. The parents refused consent for the operation to separate them. The doctors
applied to the court for a declaration that it would be lawful and in the best interests of the
children to operate. The High court granted the declaration on the grounds that the operation
would be akin to withdrawal of support ie an omission rather than a positive act and also the
death of Mary, although inevitable, was not the primary purpose of the operation. The parents
appealed to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the learned judge erred in holding that
the operation was (i) in Mary's best interest, (ii) that it was in Jodie's best interest, and (iii)
that in any event it would be legal.
Held : The appeal was dismissed. The operation could be lawfully carried out by the doctors.
STRICT LIABILITY
Sweet v Parsley
Held : whenever a section is silent as to MR, there is a presumption that in order to give
effect to the will of Parliament, we must read in words appropriate to require MR.

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

McNamara

B v Director of Public Prosecutor

Sherras v De Rutzen

Alphacell Ltd v Woodward

Held : It was clearly stated in terms that the mental element of mens rea had no relevance or
consequence in strict liability offences where the legislature expressly provided that the
offence was committed by the commission of the physical act.
Lim Chin Aik

Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v AG of Hong Kong

Mohammed Ibrahim v PP
Appellant was convicted of an offence under Penal Code for having in his possession for
purpose of sale, 65 copies of English obscene books. Appellant appealed against his
conviction on the ground that he could not read nor write English and that he did not know
the books were obscene. The related provisions : whoever sells, lets to hire,
distributesshall be punished

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

Held : the offence was a strict liability as the statute was concerned with the protection of the
public from the corrupting influence of obscene books.
KS Roberts

PP v Osman Apo Hamid

Melan Abdullah
On April 6, 1971, the Utusan Melayu newspaper published a report of a talk given by a
prominent Malay leader and member of Parliament. In the report was an editorial subheading, which, in the English translation reads: "Abolish Tamil or Chinese medium schools
in this country."
The first appellant was the editor-in-chief of the Utusan Melayu, and the second appellant the
author of the sub-heading inserted in the report. They were in the special sessions court on a
charge of publishing a seditious publication. The learned special president held the
publication to be seditious, that the first appellant "was responsible for all publications in the
Utusan Melayu", that the second appellant was the author of the sub-heading, and that
consequently they were both guilty.
Held: Ong CJ held that an offence of strict liability or absolute liability is one where proof pf
Actus Reus alone suffices for a conviction, however morally free form blame the Df may be.
PARTICIPATION
1. RESPONSIBLE FOR SAME OFFENCE
a. COMMON INTENTIONS
Kee Ah Tee

Mimi Wong v PP

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

Held : Parties are only required to have the criminal intention to do a particular criminal act
which ultimately leads to an offence being committed in furtherance of the criminal intention.
if A and B formed criminal intention to cause injury to C with a knife and A holds C while
B deliberately stabs C. Then C died. B is guilty of murder. Applying section 34, A is also
guilty of murder

Ramli bin Awang

Juraimi Hussin

Ho So Mui

Christopher Khoo Ewe Cheng

Lee Jun Ho

Low Kian Boon

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

Mahadzir bin Yusof

b. COMMON OBJECT
Ong Chin Seng

Tan Kheng Ann

Mohd Haikal bin Mohd Khatib Sadaly & Ors

Inthiran a/l Renganathan

2. RESPONSIBLE FOR DIFFERENT OFFENCES

a. ABETMENT
PP v Datuk Haji Harun Idris
Held : Abetment by conspiracy consists in the combination and agreement of persons to do
some illegal act ie to affect some illegal purpose by illegal means (CONSPIRACY)
Held : Abetment by aiding takes place when a person by the commission of an act intends to
facilitate and does facilitate the commission of an offence. (AIDING)

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

Haji Abdul Ghani bin Ishak

Paul Ratnam v The Law Society

Kong Fui Pen

Rejabbin Lebai Man & Anor

b. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
Gutta Sirramuthu Naidu

Yash Pal Mital v State of Punjab

Chew Chong Jin

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

EG Barsay v State of Bombay

Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar

ATTEMPT
Mohd Amin

State of Maharashtra v Mohd Yakub

Abhanyand Mishra v State of Bihar

PP v Kee Ah Bah

PP v Zainal Abidin B. Ismail

JANNA SUGIHARTO LEB140041

Om Prakash v State of Punjab

Muna Ali

Fairus Nizam bin Shueb

P.Rathinam v Union of India