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Mary Kay OConnor

Process Safety Center

Process Safety Research


Agenda for the 21st Century
Dr. M. Sam Mannan, PE, CSP, DHC
Regents Professor and Director
Holder of T. Michael OConnor Chair I
Mary Kay OConnor Process Safety Center
Chemical Engineering Department
Texas A&M University System
College Station, Texas 77843-3122, USA
(979) 862-3985, mannan@tamu.edu
http://process-safety.tamu.edu

Lessons from Past

Flixborough

Deepwater
Horizon

Bhopal

Buncefield

Fukusima
Texas City

1947

Philips

Three Miles
Island

1974

1979

1984

1989

http://www.acusafe.com/Incidents/Flixborough1974/incident-flixborough1974.html

BP Texas City

2005

http://toxipedia.org/display/toxipedia/Bhopal+Disaster

2010

2011

We
are
here

2012
2

Industrial incidents
Cause costly consequences (human, environment and property)
Hinder development

Damage reputation
Erode public trust

The disappearance of
Union Carbide Corporation
after Bhopal accident.
http://bama.ua.edu/~rdrogers/sandiego/
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/07/bhopal-disaster-india-sentences

The slow
development of
nuclear industry.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power

The damaged name of


BP
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill

Consideration of Safety of Processes


Drilling & Exploration
Mining

Refining
Production, Operation and Maintenance
Transportation and Storage of

substance/materials

With hazardous properties


Under hazardous conditions

Areas of Expertise in Process Safety


Properties of Substances
Capability to start reacting
unintentionally and
Generating heat, or/and
toxic, pungent or corrosive
effect on people and
environment

Process Technology, Engineering,


Operation and Organization
Inherently Safer Design (ISD)

Understanding behavior of
substance under process
conditions
Computer simulation for reliable
prediction of safe operation
5
Mary Kay OConnor Process Safety Center. (2011). Process safety research agenda for the 21 st century. Policy document developed by a representation of the global process safety academia, College
Station, TX

Areas of Expertise in Process Safety


Risk Analysis
What can go wrong?

What are the consequences?

- Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)


- Hazard and Operability
Analysis (HAZOP)
- Failure Mode and Effect

- Physical Effects Calculations


- Release rates
- Evaporating rates

How likely is it?


- Quantitative Risk Assessment

- Dispersion of cloud
- Radiant heat calculation of fires
- Effects of explosion
- Probability estimates of injury and

- Fault Tree/Event Tree


- Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (FMEA)

fatality
- Probability calculation of damage
to structures and environment

Analysis (FMEA)

Achievements in Process Safety


Contributing factors to process safety
Technical Safety

Human Errors/Factors
Management Focus
Safety Management System
Safety Culture
Body of

process safety
knowledge has
grown
impressively
over the years

Publication in scientific journals


with process safety as a keyword

3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1971

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

Open Ends for Research in Process


Safety!!
More efficient and safer production process
Process safety issues of existing/new processes
Establish management effectiveness and human

reliability
Define and monitor indicative process safety

performance indicators
Security of highly hazardous chemicals
Hazardous waste treatment
Facility location and siting near populated areas
8

New Frontiers
Artic

Deep ocean

What we know we know


Biofuels

Shale gas

New Sources

What we know we do not


know
What we do not know we
do not know ?

New Technologies
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090805/full/460677e.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/business/global/16arctic.html?_r=1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methane_clathrate

http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-20072986.html
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/05/sci_nat_nanotechnology___building_the_future_from_the_bottom_up/html/1.stm

Current Developments in Science and


Engineering
Computing and Instrumentation
- Development of computational fluid dynamics
- Electronic and molecular structure modeling to
determine chemical reactivity of substances
- Instrumentation on combustion research
Instrumentation at Chemical Plant

Statistics and Reliability

Engineering
- Frequentists vs. Bayesians
- Bayesian data processing
- Bayesian belief network
- Learning from Reliability Engineering

Bayesian network representing causal


influences among five variables

10

Current Developments in Science and Engineering


Psychology and Organizational Science

Human Error/Factors
Safety Culture
Resilience Engineering
Construction Design and Engineering

Loading of structures and behavior of materials under


dynamic stresses

Finite element codes


Probabilistic approach for decision making
Process Equipment, Systems and Control
Optimization for improving efficiency and saving energy
Further automation of control
11

Expectation of Society
Risk communication and acceptability
- Voluntary risk vs. Involuntary risk
- Concept of risk is not well understood by public

Community issues regarding facility


SAFETY
Recommended timing of risk communication

Early public alert Low risk Optimal timing


1
2

decreasing
risk

Safety
margin

Minimally
Sufficient?

Increasing
risk
3

Timing of risk Communication in disaster

Unacceptable timing High risk Warning too late


4

RISK

Communication Timeline
12

Expectation of Society
Risk perception and affecting factors
- Expected number of perceived fatalities or losses
- Catastrophic potential of the hazard

http://www.optical-illusionist.com/

- Qualitative characteristics as degree of exposure control or


familiarity with the hazard
- Cultural and social beliefs
- Role of media
- Strong demand for information after harmful
event occurs
- Independent media collect, interpret and present it to public
- Rumors and misunderstanding easily develop during disaster

events
13

Expectation of Society
Before Incidents:

Facility Construction & Design Notify and Explain to


Residents Communications & Agreement Launched
After Incidents:
Questions: Why did this occur near our backyard even
though facilitators claimed everything to be safe?

Low Probability High Consequence Incident


A Safety Assessment, Evaluation, and Risk Management
Program including in the Public Communication shall be set up
14

Complex Engineered Systems Failure


Deepwater Horizon Disaster
Deepwater Horizon (semi submersible)

- 5,000 ft. of water


- 8,000 ft. total depth

April 20th, 2010

- 11 fatalities
- Largest oil spill

Before Explosion
-Annular preventer closed but didnt seal
- VBR closed and sealed annulus
After explosion
- The emergency methods of activating the BOP failed (All 5 of
them)

Impact of the explosion


- Damage to MUX cables and hydraulic line
- Opening of annular BOP
- Rig drifted off location
- Upward movement of the DP in the BOP
15

Prioritization of the Research Agenda


Developed the criteria for prioritization:

Loss prevention potential


Historical losses
Knowledge gap
Cross-cutting benefits, multiple application
Potential for international collaboration
Capacity building potential
Input / Output ratio: investment incentives help process
safety business case
Time-scale and cost constraints
16

Categorization of Research Topics


Topic
No.
1,11

Technical safety topics

Hazardous phenomena,
properties of substances
Inherently safer design

12,13,18 Safety technologies, protection


layers, drilling

Topic
No.
8

Organizational safety
topics
Process + occupational
safety

9,10

Human Factors, safety


management, safety culture

14,15,17 Knowledge transfer,


learning, standards, easy
methods

3,4,5,16, Risk assessment, consequence 3


19
analysis, Natech

Risk management, decision


making

6,7

Complex systems, resilience

Complex systems, resilience

6,7

17

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