1|
Page
2|
Page
3|
Page
4|
Page
5|
Page
6|
FACTS:
Manila Mandarin Employees Union, exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of the Manila Mandarin Hotel, Inc., filed a complaint to
compel the latter to pay the salary differentials of its concerned employees
because of wage distortions in their salary structure, allegedly created by the
upward revisions of the minimum wage, pursuant to various Presidential
Decrees and Wage Orders, and its failure to implement the corresponding
increases in the basic salary rate of newly-hired employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was wage distortion.
RULING:
The clear mandate of the issuances was merely to increase the
prevailing minimum wages of particular employee groups. There were no
Page
7|
FACTS:
PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo. The CBA contained a union
security clause. PSSLU wrote Sanyo that the private respondents/employees
were notified that their membership with PSSLU were cancelled for anti-union,
activities, economic sabotage, threats, coercion and intimidation, disloyalty
and for joining another union called KAMAO. In accordance with the security
clause of the CBA, Sanyo dismissed the employees. The dismissed employees
filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. Named respondent were
PSSLU and Sanyo. PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that
the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the case, relying on Article
217(c) of the Labor Code which provides that cases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA shall be disposed of by the labor
arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration. Nevertheless, the Labor Arbiter assumed jurisdiction. Public
respondent through the Sol Gen, argued that the case at bar does not involve
an "interpretation or implementation" of a collective bargaining agreement or
"interpretation or enforcement" of company policies but involves a
"termination." Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation
or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in
the CBA or by voluntary arbitration. Where there was already actual
termination, i.e., violation of rights, it is already cognizable by the Labor
Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
Page
8|
RULING:
The Court held that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance
Machinery
provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon
the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided
in the CBA, the Court is in the opinion that these facts do not come within the
phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their)
Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains
to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators. No grievance between them exists which could be
brought to a grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case
is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and
non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute has
to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members
designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial
against the dismissed employees. Due process demands that the dismissed
workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has
already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter.
when his subsequent request to refute the allegations against him was
granted and a hearing was set without counsel or representative. As stated
in section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If a person cannot afford
the service of counsel, he must be provided with one.The right to counsel, a
very basic requirement of substantive due process, has to be observed.
Indeed, the rights to counsel and to due process of law are two of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution to any person under
investigation, be the proceeding administrative, civil, or criminal.
10. Tanduay Distillery Labor Union vs. Tanduay Distillery, Inc. and
NLRC, 149 SCRA 470
FACTS:
Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI)
and members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized
and registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank and file employees of the petitioner company. A Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), was executed between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly
ratified by a majority of the workers in TDI including herein private
respondents and contained a union security clause which provides that all
workers who are or may during the effectivity of the CBA, become members of
the Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a condition
of their continued employment, maintain membership in good standing in the
Union for the duration of the agreement.
While the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar period the
private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang
Pilipino (KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI. KAMPIL filed a petition
for certification election to determine union representation in TDI, which
development compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU. TDLU created a
committee to investigate its erring members in accordance with its by-laws
which are not disputed by the private respondents. Thereafter, TDLU, through
the Investigating Committee and approved by TDLU's Board of Directors,
expelled the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the Union. By
letter, TDLU notified TDI that private respondents had been expelled from
the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation. All that has
been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the
use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view,
in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
13. Asia Bed Factory vs. National Bed and Kapok Industries Workers
Union, 100 Phil. 837
FACTS:
On June 2, 1953, the petitioner Asia Bed Factory and respondent labor
union entered into a CBA which contains that Employees paid on a monthly
basis and shall be paid on the daily basis at rates based on their present
compensation plus the additional increase of (P0.30) a day, employees shall
be provided with work on Sundays at time and one-half and in the event that
no work on Sundays is available through no fault of the employee or
employees, they shall be entitled to payment of the equivalent of their wages
as if they had performed referred to that day. In the event that an employee
shall absent himself for no excusable reasons, the Company shall be entitled
to reduce the corresponding wage or wages.
The petitioner faithfully complied with the terms until it was forced to
suspend its business on Sundays in obedience to the provisions of RA No. 946,
known as the Blue Sunday Law, which took effect on September 8, 1953,
prohibiting the opening of any commercial, industrial or agricultural enterprise
on Sundays. Petitioner's employees claimed that under the terms of their
bargaining agreement they were entitled to their Sunday wages even if they
did not work on those days, petitioner filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for a declaratory judgment that it ceased to be bound by
the above-quoted clause of the collective bargaining agreement when the Blue
Sunday Law went into effect.
The respondent labor union filed a motion for a summary judgment
declaring that petitioner's employees were entitled to Sunday wages
notwithstanding the passage of the Blue Sunday Law.
The lower court rendered judgment holding that, in view of the provision
of the Blue Sunday Law prohibiting the opening of commercial and industrial
establishments on Sundays, the petitioner was relieved from compliance with
its agreement "to provide its employees with work on Sundays and to pay
them for Sundays." Reconsideration of the judgment having been denied, the
respondents appealed directly to this Court on a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the approval of the Blue Sunday Law relieved petitioner from
complying with its agreement to pay its laborers Sunday wages.
RULING:
The lower court answers the question in the affirmative on the ground
that the clause in question provided for mutual prestations between the
contracting parties the petitioner to provide its employees with work on
Sundays and pay them for such work and the employees to do the work given
them on those days and that these prestations became impossible of
performance when the Blue Sunday Law prohibited the opening of commercial
and industrial establishments on Sundays.
To this view we are inclined to agree. The bargaining agreement puts the
employees on a daily basis at rates of compensation therein provided, with the
express stipulation that work shall be provided on Sundays and at higher
compensation. As the trial court says, payment for Sundays is in return for
work done. It is true the agreement provides for the payment of wages on
Sundays if no work is made available on those days through no fault of the
employees. But the fact is that the agreement does give the employer the
right to provide work on Sundays. And it would seem the height of injustice to
deprive the employer of this right without, at the same time, relieving him of
the obligation to pay the employees.
Section 6 of the Blue Sunday Law which says that "it shall be unlawful
for any employer to reduce the compensation of any of his employees or
laborers by reason of the provisions of this Act" does not militate against this
view. There is here no attempt on the part of the employer to reduce the
compensation of his employees. It is the law itself which in effect reduces that
compensation by depriving the employees of work on Sundays, thus
preventing them from earning the wages stipulated in the bargaining
agreement.
There is nothing to the contention that to apply the Blue Sunday Law to
present agreement would infringe the constitutional prohibition against the
impairment of the obligations of contract. The Blue Sunday Law is intended for
the health, well-being and happiness of the working class and is a legitimate
exercise of the police power.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
14. Kaisahan vs. Gotamco Sawsmills, 80 Phil. 521
FACTS:
The Kaisahan ng Manggagawa ng Kahoy sa Pilipinas declared a strike
against Gotamco Saw Mill because the latter did not accede to the formers
request of a salary increase. While the case being heard by the court of
industrial relations, the parties reached a temporary wage arrangement and
the workers were ordered to go back to work while the saw mill was ordered to
increase the salaries of the workers by P2 and let them take home small
pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood and was enjoined from laying-off
suspending or dismissing any laborer affiliated with the petitioning union.
Conversely, the workers were enjoined from staging walkouts or strikes during
the pendency of the hearing. Gotamco Saw Mill subsequently filed an urgent
motion asking that the petitioning union be held in contempt of court for
having staged a strike during the pendency of the main case for picketing on
the premises of the saw mill and for grave threats which presented the
remaining laborers from working. The union alleged that one of its
representatives conferred with the management of the saw mill but instead of
entertaining their grievances, the saw mill ordered the stoppage of the work
and employed four new Chinese laborers without express authority of the
court and in violation of Section 19 of Commonwealth Act 103. The court ruled
that there was a violation of the previous order of the court by the union which
warranted the commencement of contempt proceedings and that the saw mill
did violate Section 19 of CA No. 103. Said provision is unconstitutional for
being in violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Among
other things, Section 19 lays down the implied condition that when any
dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee tenant or laborer
has been submitted to the court for settlement or arbitration pursuant to the
provisions of the Act No. 103 and pending award or decision by it the
employee tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment
when so joined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires
and if he has already done so that he shall forthwith return to it upon order of
the court which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so
requires or when the dispute cannot in its opinion be promptly decided or
settled. Thus the voluntariness of the employees entering into such a contract
of employment, he has a free choice between entering into it or not with such
an implied condition negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.
ISSUE:
Whether the previous order of the court which ordered the union
laborers to go back to work is unconstitutional for being in violation of the
organic proscription of involuntary servitude.
RULING:
The order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their
work. That order was made after hearing and Section 19 authorizes such order
when the dispute cannot in its opinion be promptly decided or settled. In other
words, the order to return, if the dispute can be promptly decided or settled,
may be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires, but if in
the courts opinion the dispute cannot be promptly decided or settled, then it
is also authorized after hearing to issue the order: we construe the provision to
mean that the very impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the
dispute confers upon the power to issue the order for the reason that the
public has an interest in presenting undue stoppage or paralyzation of the
wheels of industry.
Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human rights of
individuals were subjected to regulation by the State basically in the exercise
of its paramount police power.
And, as well stated by the courts resolution of July 11, 1947, this
impossibility of prompt decision or settlement was a fact which was borne out
by the entire record of the case and did not need express statement in the
order. Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made
by the Court of Industrial Relations (Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 15, as
amended by Commonwealth Act 559, section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court)
For all these considerations, the orders and resolution of the Court of
Industrial Relations assailed by the instant petition are hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioner-appellant.
So ordered.
15. SSS Employees Association, et. al. vs. CA, et. al, 175 SCRA 686
FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS
Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS
members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported
to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to
return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS
suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro Sr, was hired by private respondent Coca-cola
Bottlers Phil Inc (CCBPL) in June 1977 as laborer/bottling crew with salary of
P36.00 a day plus ECOLA of P17.00 a day. On April 30, 1984, CCBPI entered
into contract of service with co-respondent Lipercon Services, Inc. the contract
as extended on January 1, 1986 for another year. Under the contract, Lipercon
was to provide CCBPI certain work and services which are not regular or
normal to the establishment nor directly related to the principal business of
the CCBPI, Naga Plant.
Petitioner alleged that after the contract of service was executed,
CCBPI made it appear that it was no longer its employee but that of Lipercon.
He was able to establish, however, that he still worked with the CCBPI,
performing jobs normally necessary in the business of CCBPI, using its tools
and equipment and under the supervision of its supervisors.
On February 15, 1986, petitioner was dismissed from his
employment. He was not allowed to enter the premises of CCBPI. He then filed
a complaint principally for illegal dismissal against CCBPI and Lipercon. CCBPI
maintained that petitioner is not its employee. Lipercon claimed that it is an
independent contractor and that petitioner is its contractual employee. It
further averred that petitioners employment depends on needs of its clients,
more specifically CCBPI. Allegedly, CCBPI had informed Lipercon that it no
longer needed the services of petitioner prayed for reinstatement with full
backwages and other monetary benefits. Respondent NLRC, in a resolution
dated October 21, 1993 affirmed the decision of Arbiter Bose but refused to
reinstate petitioner. It likewise rejected the claim of petitioner for damages as
bereft of basis. Hence, this petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it refused to
reinstate the petitioner.
RULING:
We hold that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it
refused to reinstate petitioner, a victim of illegal dismissal. Section 3 Article
XIII of the Constitution guarantees to our workers security of tenure. Article
279 of the Labor Code, as amended, implements this constitutional guarantee
by providing: xxx. Any employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
The importance of the remedy of reinstatement to an unjustly
dismissed employee cannot be overstated. It is the remedy that most
effectively restores the right of an employee to his employment and all its
benefits before its violation by his employer. Yet despite all its virtues,
reinstatement does not and cannot fully vindicate all of an employees injuries
for reinstatement no more than compensates for his financial damages. It
cannot make up for his other sufferings, intangible yet valuable, like the
psychological devastation which inevitably visits him after a sudden
displacement from work.
The first right of unjustly dismissed employee is therefore
reinstatement to work and it is our duty to direct it except if his reinstatement
will most probably do him less good and more harm. In determining whether
or not we should order an employees reinstatement, our eyes should focus on
the need to protect the over-all interest of the dismissed employee and not on
the necessity of preserving the interest of the employer who caused the unjust
dismissal. To give more sensitivity to the interest of the employer who violated
the law is to make a travesty of the constitutional right of an employee to
security of tenure. We do not treat our workers as merchandise and their right
to security of tenure cannot be valued in precise peso-and-centavo terms. It is
a right which cannot be allowed to be devalued by the purchasing power of
employers who are only too willing to bankroll the separation pay of their
illegally dismissed employees to get rid of them.
In view whereof, the Oct 21, 1993 resolution is modified and CCBPI
ordered to reinstate the petitioner instead of paying separation pay in accord
to Art 279 of Labor Code as amended. In all other aspects, the appealed
Resolution is affirmed.
18. People vs. Turda, 233 SCRA 702
FACTS:
GENER TURDA together with his wife Milagros Turda and Carmen
Manera, was charged with illegal recruitment in Crim. Case No. 57218 and two
(2) counts of estafa in Crim. Cases Nos. 57219 and 57220. However, Milagros
Turda and Carmen Manera were never apprehended so that only Gener Turda
could be arraigned and tried. As the three (3) cases involve the same factual
milieu, they were jointly tried.
In August 1986, appellant Turda, Milagros and Carmen could secure an
overseas job for complainant Florante in Italy and for his sister Shirley Cabalu
in France. Florante and Shirley accepted the offer and paid P70,000.00.
However, he did not ask for a receipt.
Despite several promises, Florante and Shirley were still unable to leave.
Complainant finally demanded the return of their money, but the Turdas failed
to give their money back. Consequently, Florante Rosales went to the Office of
the City Fiscal of Quezon City to file the corresponding complaint.
On September 1987, another complainant, Celina Andan, learned that
her application for an immigrant visa with the Canadian Embassy was denied.
After the denial of Celina Andan's application, Gener and Mila undertook the
processing of Celina's travel papers for a downpayment of P25,000.00 with the
promise to refund the amount if she would not be able to leave for Canada
within 45 days. However, should they succeed, Celina would have to pay them
an additional amount of P35,000.00 upon delivery to her of her visa.
On 14 September 1987, the mother of Celina gave a check for
P14,500.00 and cash of P500.00 to Mila for which the latter gave a receipt in
the presence of appellant Gener. On 22 September 1987, Celina's mother
again gave a check to the Turdas in the amount of P10,000.00 for which a
receipt was likewise issued by Milagros Turda. Celina asked spouses but failed
to return money, she decided to charge the Turda spouses with estafa and
illegal recruitment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is in conspiracy on large-scale illegal
recruitment.
RULING:
Art. 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, read Art. 38. Illegal recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this code. The Ministry of Labor and
Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this
Article. (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by
a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
Article 13, (b), of the same Code defines recruitment as "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement."
A review of the testimonies of complainants leads us to no other
conclusion than that appellant, his wife, and Manera were conspirators in the
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour
equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per
centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty
per centurn thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed
to being from seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the
morning .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x
x.
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any
official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his
normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years continuous service
with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not less
than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after
five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in
respect of the proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite
duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other
party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly
paid workers and fifteen days notice in respect of other workers. The party
terminating a contract without the required notice shall pay to the other party
compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for
the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of the
first three years of service and of one months wages for each year of service
thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon
a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a
year.
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.
(WON the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the abovementioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is
applicable WON complainants claim for the benefits provided therein have
prescribed.)
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko
nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in
evidence a simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour
Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater
benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the
claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of
the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and
BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable
to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those
stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment contract
which provides that the compensation of the employee may be adjusted
downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall
the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after
finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription
was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law
even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on
prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local
Court) has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing
statute directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute
of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred
by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum
even though the local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: If by the
laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is
barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot
be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this
jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive
period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question
would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution
emphasized that:The state shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing
of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as
provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3)
Upon a judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the
written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period
provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy
is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all the claims
are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked
outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under
different terms and condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common
or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is
only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile their
claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of
the claims is the same (for employees benefits), there is no common question
of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many
of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere.
Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims
of the other employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting
the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of
them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate
26. Alga Moher Int'l Placement Service vs. Atienza, 168 SCRA 174
FACTS:
On March 18, 1981, Ramon C. Ponce and Claudio M. Miraflor entered into
separate contracts of employment with the Modem System Contracting
Establishment, through its agent, Alga Moher International Placement
Services, a duly licensed recruitment and placement agency. Under the terms
and conditions of said contracts, Ponce was hired as a driver of light
equipment, while Miraflor was hired as an air conditioning technician.
Pursuant to their employment contracts, Ponce and Miraflor left for Saudi
Arabia on March 31, 1981 where, for the first two weeks, Ponce worked as a
cook while Miraflor worked as an air conditioning technician. Thereafter, Ponce
was assigned to work as a heavy equipment operator and later, as a
construction worker. Miraflor was assigned as a construction worker. Thinking
that these reassignments constituted a breach of their contracts, Ponce and
Miraflor reported the matter to Alga Moher. In due time, Modern System was
appraised of the complaint and soon thereafter, it terminated the contracts of
Ponce and Miraflor, detained them for one week, and repatriated them after
giving their passports, plane tickets.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
The private respondents were illegally dismissed. Under Art. 279.
Security of Tenure.in cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his back
wages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of reinstatement.
This law was correctly applied by the POEA and the respondent
Commission because private respondents were found to have been illegally
dismissed by their foreign employer, Modem System. The fact that they were
dismissed during the probationary period stipulated in their contracts is
immaterial.
Yes. the NLRC completely disregarded the fact that the petitioner tried to
prove that the final agreement was only forced upon him not only by alleging
threats of being jailed in a foreign country which were employed by the private
respondents against him but also by presenting evidence to show that he was
entitled to much more than what was credited to him in the final settlement
and that he could not have possibly willingly agreed to receive less than what
he could prove by the evidence in his possession had there been no threat or
intimidation on the part of the private respondents. Hence, there could be no
other explanation for his signing the final settlement other than that he was
forced to do so.
Furthermore, the private respondents not only failed to deny the
allegations of the petitioner concerning the final settlement but they
altogether failed to attend the POEA hearings and present controverting
evidence. Thus, such failure should have been construed as an admission of
the petitioner's allegations by the private respondents. In Ondap v. Abugaa,
(88 SCRA 610, 612-613): It was a judgment on the pleadings, as defendants,
who did not even bother to file a written answer, merely denied at the trial
paragraphs 2 to 8 of the complaint filed with the Justice of the Peace of Court.
Clearly then, they failed to deny specifically the material allegations, a failure
which in law amounted to an admission.
29. Royal Crown International vs. NLRC, et. al., 179 SCRA 569
FACTS:
In 1983, petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency,
recruited and deployed private respondent for employment with ZAMEL as an
architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. On May 25, 1983, a service
agreement was executed by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby the
former was to receive per month a salary of US$500.00 plus US$100.00 as
allowance for a period of one (1) year commencing from the date of his arrival
in Saudi Arabia. Private respondent departed for Saudi Arabia on June 28,
1983.
On February 13, 1984, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private
respondent on the ground that his performance was below par. For three (3)
successive days thereafter, he was detained at his quarters and was not
allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16,
1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not sufficient evidence was presented by petitioner to
establish the termination of private respondent's employment for just and
valid cause.
RULING:
This assertion is without merit. The NLRC upheld the POEA finding that
petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove termination from employment
for just and valid cause. And a careful study of the evidence thus far presented
by petitioner reveals to this Court that there is legal basis for public
respondent's conclusion.
It must be borne in mind that the basic principle in termination cases is
that the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is
for just and valid cause, and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was not justified and, therefore, was illegal [Polymedic General
Hospital v. NLRC, G.R. No. 64190, January 31, 1985,134 SCRA 420; and also
Article 277 of the Labor Code]. And where the termination cases involve a
Filipino worker recruited and deployed for overseas employment, the burden
naturally devolves upon both the foreign-based employer and the employment
agency or recruitment entity which recruited the worker, for the latter is not
only the agent of the former, but is also solidarily liable with its foreign
principal for any claims or liabilities arising from the dismissal of the worker.
In the case at bar, petitioner had indeed failed to discharge the burden
of proving that private respondent was terminated from employment for just
and valid cause.
Thus, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals erred when it annulled
the assailed orders of respondent judge, enjoined petitioner from garnishing
the cash bond, and ordered it to return the amount of the bond to the POEA if
it had not yet done so.
ACCORDINGLY, after deliberating on the Petition, Comment and Reply,
the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.
34. JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC, 228 SCRA 129
To satisfy the first element, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the
complainants clearly pointing to the appellants as two of the three persons
who promised them employment abroad and who collected and received
varying amounts from them. The appellants, on the other hand, vigorously
maintain that the lower court erred (a) in finding that there was conspiracy
and (b) in giving credence to the conflicting testimonies of the private
complainants.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the sole modification that the penalty properly imposable and
hereby imposed is life imprisonment and not reclusion perpetua.
recruitment in large scale and must suffer the consequences thereof. Indeed,
the continuing incidence of such nefarious acts rationalizes the severe
penalties therefor under the axiom that extreme situations require extreme
remedies. the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Lucille
Sendon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale
and imposing the corresponding penalties and civil liabilities.
Whether or not the Court erred holding that the respondent was regular
employee
RULING:
The Court find merit in the submission of the Solicitor General that
"considering the circumstances of the case and the seeming bad faith of
petitioner in dismissing private respondent, it is in consonance with justice,
reason and equity that respondent NLRC awarded back wages to private
respondent. Private respondent, during his lay-off, and his family have to
undergo difficulties and hardships of life (National Shipyards and Steel
Corporation vs. CIR, et al., 57 SCRA 642). It has not been shown that in the
interim from his illegal dismissal, private respondent has found some means of
livelihood to support himself and his family."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is dismissed and the
temporary restraining order issued on September 22, 1982 is hereby LIFTED.
for the reinstatement of Capili and to collect his back wages. Petitioner, Nitto
Enterprises filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does the NLRC correctly rule that Capili is a regular employee and not an
apprentice of Nitto Enterprises?
RULING:
Yes. The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as
an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder.
However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7,
1990.Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor
and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was
signed. The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the
Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final
approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice
relationship. Nitto Enterprises did not comply with the requirements of the law.
It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer
and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship
program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. Thus, the
apprenticeship agreement has no force and effect; and Capili is considered to
be a regular employee of the company.
could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of counting and
sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deafmutes; that the counting and sorting of money are tellering works which were
always logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers normal functions;
that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent
Bank plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already did
the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their
duties (p. 97, Records); that through the pakiusap of Arturo Borjal, the tellers
were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes
without creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent
or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and
sorting of bills in banking operations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are regular employees
RULING:
The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of
them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal
rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of
compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.
In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the
constitutional bias in favor of the working class, but also the concern of the
State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on
justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not. In the
present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to
their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of
their employment contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply
because they are physically impaired? The Court believes that, after showing
their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and
granted the same rights like any other regular employees.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
June 20, 1995 Decision and the August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
48. Insular Life Ass. Co. vs. NLRC, 179 SCRA 459
FACTS:
Since 1968, respondent Basiao has been an agent for petitioner
company, and is authorized to solicit within the Philippines applications for
insurance policies and annuities in accordance with the existing rules and
regulations of the company. In return, he would receive compensation, in the
form of commissions.
Some four years later, in April 1972, the parties entered into another
contract an Agency Manager's Contract and to implement his end of it
Basiao organized an agency or office to which he gave the name M. Basiao
and Associates, while concurrently fulfilling his commitments under the first
contract with the Company. In May, 1979, the Company terminated the
Agency Manager's Contract. After vainly seeking a reconsideration, Basiao
sued the Company in a civil action and this, he was later to claim, prompted
the latter to terminate also his engagement under the first contract and to
stop payment of his commissions starting April 1, 1980.
(2) Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent in ordering the award of separation pay to private
respondents as sanction for Grepalife's failure to accord them due process
even though there was finding of just cause for their dismissal.
RULING:
The Court finds that, as correctly held by public respondent, the
relationships of the Ruiz brothers and Grepalife were those of employeremployee. The Insurance Code may govern the licensing requirements and
other particular duties of insurance agents, but it does not bar the application
of the Labor Code with regard to labor standards and labor relations.
It is well-settled that the existence of an employer-employee relationship
is ultimately a question of fact, and such findings of fact of the labor arbiter
and the NLRC shall be accorded not only respect but even finality when
supported by substantial evidence [RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation v. NLRC,
G.R. Nos. 63550-51, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 454; Asim v. Castro, G.R. Nos.
75063-64, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 344; Murillo v. Sun Valley Realty, Inc., G.R.
No. 67272, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 271], as in this case.
With respect to the second issue, petitioner argues that private
respondents are not entitled to separation pay since there was clear finding of
just cause for dismissal, and furthermore "neither the law nor the rules
implementing the same authorizes the award of separation pay as 'penalty."
The Court held therein that an indemnity, not "separation pay", must be
imposed on the employer for failure to observe the procedural requirements of
notice and hearing prior to the dismissal of an employee for just cause.
Considering the circumstances of the case at bar, petitioner must indemnify
private respondents in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) each
[See also Shoemart, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 74229, August 11, 1989].
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the NLRC is hereby
MODIFIED insofar as the award of "separation pay" is concerned. In lieu of
"separation pay" petitioner Grepalife is hereby ordered to indemnify private
respondents Rodrigo Ruiz and Ernesto Ruiz the amount of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) each.
50. Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Inc. vs. Maalat, 187 SCRA 773
FACTS:
Sometime in 1962, petitioner Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Inc.
engaged the services of private respondent Noli Maalat as a "supervisor" to
handle the solicitation of mortuary arrangements, sales and collections. The
funeral services which he sold refer to the taking of the corpse, embalming,
casketing, viewing and delivery. The private respondent was paid on a
commission basis of 3.5% of the amounts actually collected and remitted.
On January 15, 1987, respondent Maalat was dismissed by the petitioner
for commission of the following violations despite previous warnings: (a)
Understatement of the reported contract price against the actual contract
price charged to and paid by the customers;(b) Misappropriation of funds or
collections by non-remittance of collections and non-issuance of Official
Receipt; (c) Charging customers additional amount and pocketing the same for
the cost of medicines, linen, and security services without issuing Official
Receipt; (d) Non-reporting of some embalming and re-embalming charges and
pocketing the same and non-issuance of Official Receipt; (e) Engaging in tomb
making and inclusion of the price of the tomb in the package price without
prior knowledge of the customers and the company
Maalat filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
commissions.
On the basis of the parties' position papers, Labor Arbiter Newton R.
Sancho rendered a decision declaring Maalat's dismissal illegal and ordering
the petitioner to pay separation pay, commission, interests and attorney's fee
in the total amount of P205,571.52.
In an appeal from the decision, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), on May 31, 1988, reversed the Arbiter's action and rendered a new
decision with judgment rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant Noli
Maalat by respondent-appellant as justified and with lawful cause
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC erred in ruling that an employment relationship
existed between the parties
RULING:
In determining whether a person who performs work for another is the
latter's employee or an independent contractor, the prevailing test is the "right
of control" test. Under this test, an employer-employee relationship exists
where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to
control not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be
used in reaching that end.
The petitioner argues that Maalat was never its employee for he was
only a commission agent whose work was not subject to its control. Citing
Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines v. Social Security System
(21 SCRA 924 [1967]), the petitioner states that the work of its agents
approximates that of an independent contractor since the agent is not under
control by the latter with respect to the means and methods employed in the
performance of the work, but only as to the results.
The fact that the petitioner imposed and applied its rule prohibiting
superiors from engaging in other funeral business which it considered inimical
to company interests proves that it had the right of control and actually
exercised its control over the private respondent. In other words, Maalat
worked exclusively for the petitioner.
The non-observance of regular office hours does not sufficiently show
that Maalat is a "supervisor on commission basis" nor does the same indicate
that he is an independent salesman. As a supervisor, although compensated
on commission basis, he is exempt from the observance of normal hours of
work for his compensation is measured by the number of sales he makes. He
may not have had the usual fixed time for starting and ending his work as in
other types of employment but he had to spend most of his working hours at
his job. People die at all times of the day or night.
All considered, we rule that private respondent is an employee of
petitioner corporation.
proceed with her plan and assigned the units to other drivers instead. Nelly
traversed that the 13th month pay was personal to Raul and therefore didn't
survive the death of Raul. Nelly contend too that the drivers were not entitled
of the benefits of PD 851 because paid on purely boundary basis which are not
covered by PD 851, the relationship was not employer-employee but that od
lessee-lessor.
On 30 August 1993 the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the
following grounds:(a) private respondents' claims being personal were
extinguished upon the death of Raul Martinez; (b) petitioner was a mere
housewife who did not possess the required competence to manage the
business; and, (c) private respondents were not entitled to 13th month pay
because the existence of employer-employee relationship was doubtful on
account of the boundary system adopted by the parties. However, respondent
National Labor Relations Commission viewed the case differently. According to
NLRC, (a) private respondents were regular drivers because payment of
wages, which is one of the essential requisites for the existence of
employment relation, may either be fixed, on commission, boundary, piecerate or task basis; (b) the management of the business passed on to petitioner
who even replaced private respondents with a new set of drivers; and, (c) the
claims of private respondents survived the death of Raul Martinez considering
that the business did not cease operation outright but continued presumably,
in the absence of proof of sale, up to the moment. On 28 January 1994
respondent NLRC thus set aside the appealed decision, and as alternative to
reinstatement, ordered petitioner to grant respondents separation pay. On 30
September 1994 the motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
recourse of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the petition is meritorious.
RULING:
The claim for 13th month pay pertains to the personal obligation of Raul
Martinez which did not survive his death. The rule is settled that unless
expressly assumed, labor contracts are not enforceable against the transferee
of an enterprise. In the present case, petitioner does not only disavow that
she continued the operation of the business of her son but also disputes the
existence of labor contracts between her son and private respondents. The
reason for the rule is that labor contracts are in personam, and that claims for
back wages earned from the former employer cannot be filed against the new
owners of an enterprise. Nor is the new operator of a business liable for claims
for retirement pay of employees. Thus the claim of private respondents should
have been filed instead in the intestate proceedings involving the estate of
Raul Martinez in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 86, of the Rules of Court.
In National Labor Union v. Dinglasan,[9] this Court ruled that the
relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney
drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee
and not of lessor-lessee. In the present case, however, private respondents
simply assumed the continuance of an employer-employee relationship
between them and petitioner, when she took over the operation of the
business after the death of her son Raul Martinez, without any supporting
evidence. Consequently, we cannot sustain for lack of basis the factual finding
of respondent NLRC on the existence of employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondents. Clearly, such finding emanates
from grave abuse of discretion. With this conclusion, consideration of the
issue on illegal dismissal becomes futile and irrelevant.
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated 28 January 1994 ordering petitioner Nelly Acta
Martinez to grant respondents separation pay as well as its Order of 30
September 1994 denying reconsideration is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated 30 August 1993 dismissing the complaint is REINSTATED.
52. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, 160 SCRA 533
FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was
killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for
damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of
the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint
was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should
have been filed against the State Insurance Fund.
The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the
position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.
The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that
the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an
overseas worker.
ISSUE:
Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under
Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and
monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It
replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the
Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA
is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including
seamen."
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2,
which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a
standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2
itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model
contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the
cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before
it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited
as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
FACTS:
This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the
holiday pay award and the change of the divisor in the computation of benefits
from 251 to 261days.
On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines,
Inc.) filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for
declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting
claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay in the light of the Court's
decision in Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople (138 SCRA 273
[1985]). Both Filipro and the Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) agreed to
submit the case for voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno
Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator. Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking
(1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) the exclusion of salesmen,
sales
representatives,
truck
drivers,
merchandisers
and
medical
representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales personnel) from the award of
the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment
for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use
of 251 divisor. (Rollo, pp. 138-145) Petitioner UFE answered that the award
should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, that
their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to
holiday pay, and that the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee
benefit which cannot be diminished.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent's sales personnel are not field personnel
under Article 82 of the Labor Code?
RULING:
The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding
sales volume based on sales target; (2) good collection performance; (3)
proper compliance with good market hygiene; (4) good merchandising work;
(5) minimal market returns; and (6) proper truck maintenance. (Rollo, p. 190).
The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from
the date of promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of
effectivity of the Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984, the date of
promulgation of the IBAA case.
WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby MODIFIED.
The divisor to be used in computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday
pay as above directed shall be computed from October 23, 1984. In all other
respects, the order of the respondent arbitrator is hereby AFFIRMED.
employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping
or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be
extremely unfair and unreasonable.
55. Stolt Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 264 SCRA 307
FACTS:
Respondent Meynardo J. Hernandez was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine
Services Inc. as radio officer on board M/T Stolt Condor for a period of ten months.
He boarded the vessel on January 20, 1990.On April 26, 1990, the ship captain
ordered private respondent to carry the baggage of crew member Lito Loveria
who was being repatriated. He refused to obey the order out of fear in view of the
utterance of said crew member "makakasaksak ako" and also because he did not
perceive such task as one of his duties as radio officer. As a result of such refusal,
private respondent was ordered to disembark on April 30, 1990 and was himself
repatriated on May 15, 1990. He was paid his salaries and wages only up to May
16, 1990.
Private respondent filed before public respondent POEA a complaint for
illegal dismissal and breach of contract paying for, among other things, payment
of salaries, wages, overtime and other benefits due him for the unexpired portion
of the contract which was six (6) months and three (3) days. Petitioner in its
answer alleged that private respondent refused to follow the "request" of the
master of the vessel to explain to Lolito Loveria, the reason for the latter's
repatriation and to assist him in carrying his baggage, all in violation of Article
XXIV, Section I of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and the POEA
Standard Contract. Hence, private respondent, after being afforded the
opportunity to explain his side, was dismissed for gross insubordination and
serious misconduct. Respondent denied that the master of the vessel requested
him to explain to Loveria the reason for the latter's repatriation.
Thereafter, POEA Administrator rendered an award in favor of private
respondent. Aggrieved, petitioner Stolt-Nielsen appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC concurred with the POEA Administrator in
ruling that private respondent, having been illegally dismissed, was, therefore,
entitled to the monetary award. It further stated that private respondent's duty
as a radio officer or radio operator does not include the carrying of the luggage of
any seaman or explaining to said seaman the reason for his repatriation. Thus,
concluded the NLRC, his termination on this ground was not proper and, therefore,
he had every right to the monetary award. The NLRC likewise granted private
respondent's claim for fixed overtime pay and attorney's fees.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondent was legally dismissed on the ground
of gross insubordination and serious misconduct.
2. Whether or not private respondent was entitled to the award of over-time
pay.
RULING:
1. YES. Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause
for the dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two (2)
requisites. The employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional,
the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude", and the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee
and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. The
Court agrees that by virtue of the aforementioned CBA and POEA Standard
Contract provisions cited by petitioner, private respondent is indeed bound to
obey the lawful commands of the captain of the ship, but only as long as these
pertain to his duties. The order to carry the luggage of a crew member, while
being lawful, is not part of the duties of a radio officer. Assuming arguendo that
lawful commands of a ship captain aresupposed to be obeyed by the complement
of a ship, private respondent's so-called act of disobedience" does not warrant the
supreme penalty of dismissal. In instant case, the POEA found that private
respondent's actuation which led to his dismissal was the first and only act of
disobedience during his service with the petitioner, Furthermore, examination of
the circumstances surrounding private respondent'sdisobedience shows that the
repatriated seaman's utterance of "makakasaksak ako" so instilled fear in private
respondent that he was deterred from carrying out the order of the captain.
FACTS:
The case above-mentioned was filed by herein petitioner NWSA
Consolidated Unions against herein respondent National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority demanding implementation of the 40-Hour Week Law
(Republic Act No. 1880), and alleging violations of the collective bargaining
agreement, dated 28 December 1956, concerning "distress pay"; minimum
wage of P5.25; promotional appointments and filling of vacancies of newly
created positions; additional compensation for night work; wage increases to
some laborers, and employees; and strike duration pay.
Two lawyers of the petitioner union, Attys. Cipriano Cid and Israel
Bocobo, who had participated in both Cases Nos. 19-IPA and 66-IPA, moved for
the payment of their attorney's fees. On agreement of the parties, their fees
were fixed and ordered paid by the court. A third lawyer, Atty. Atanacio Pacis,
who did not appear in Case No. 66-IPA but was a counsel for the union in Case
No. 19-IPA as member of the Cid Law firm, from which he later separated, also
moved for his fees. His motion was granted in the appealed order of 18 July
1966, issued "pursuant, to the order of 27 November 1964," and allowing
payment of ttorney's fees to Atty.
Records further show that there exists a contract for professional
services entered into, by and between the Consolidated Unions in the NWSA
and Cipriano Cid and Associates, providing for a twenty per cent (20%)
attorney's fee for the latter, for any and all sums that may be collected by the
unions, in this case, or five (5%) of which shall be given to the general fund
of the union.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the petition is meritorious.
RULING:
The claim of Attys. Cipriano Cid and Atanacio E. Pacis of Twenty Per
centum (20%) attorney's fee is hereby approved and shall be noted as lien
upon the amount of money that may be due and payable to the employees
involved in the above-entitled case. Briefly, the participations of Attys. Cid,
Pacis and Bocobo in the prosecution of this case may be given as follows. Atty.
Cipriano Cid as chief counsel prepared the basic pleadings. He headed the
union panel during the negotiation and he appeared on trial during the initial
stage of the proceedings. Atty. Atanacio E. Pacis, on the other hand actively
handled the prosecution of the case during the trial on the merits. He was the
one who filed the opposition to the motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondent against the decisions of the trial judge. And finally, when the
resolution of the Court en banc affirming the decisions of the trial judge, was
appealed by respondent to the Supreme Court, Atty Israel Bocobo, handled the
appeal. Court is constrained to modify the order of the trial judge dated 26 July
1961, under its power granted under Section 17 Commonwealth Act 103.
It is just that Atty. Pacis should share in the 23% counsel fees
corresponding to the amounts appropriated by the NWSA under Item IV abovementioned of the collective bargaining agreement since these were the claims
57. Manggagawa ng PRC vs. Phil. Refining Co., 194 Phil 608
FACTS:
On April 15,1966, the Bisig ng Manggagawa ng Philippine Refining
Company, Inc., as the representative union of the rank and file employees of
the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
a petition for declaratory relief praying that the Christmas bonus of one month
or thirty days pay and other de determinable benefits should be included for
the purpose of computation of the overtime pay.
On May 3, 1966, the Philippine Refining Co.. Inc. filed its answer to the
petition alleging, among others, that never did the parties intend to include
the employees' Christmas bonus and other fringe benefits in the computation
of the overtime pay. After the requisite pre-trial was held, the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued an order dated September 16, 1966, limiting the
issues to the proper interpretation of the above quoted provision of the 1965
collective bargaining agreement and to the applicability to the case of the
NAWASA ruling and requiring the parties to submit evidence as to the
circumstances under which the questioned provision had been included in the
agreement of 1965.
During the trial, the parties presented their respective witnesses.
On December 8, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered declaring
that the term "regular base pay" in Section 6, Ararticle VI of Exhibit A refers
only to "regular base pay" and does not include Christmas bonus and other
fringe benefits.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed by the petitioner
union but the same was denied in an order dated February 17, 1967.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the phrase "regular base pay" as used in the abovequoted provision of the 1965 CBA includes Christmas bonus and other fringe
benefits; and
(2) whether or not the stipulation in the CBA on overtime pay violates
the Nawasa doctrine if the answer to question No. I is in the negative.
RULING:
We answer both questions in the negative. The phrase "regular base
pay" is clear, unequivocal and requires no interpretation. It means regular
basic pay and necessarily excludes money received in different concepts such
as Christmas bonus and other fringe benefits. In this connection it is necessary
to remember that in the enforcement of previous collective bargaining
agreements containing the same provision of overtime pay at the rate of
regular base pay plus 50@'c thereof", the overtime compensation was
invariably based only on the regular basic pay, exclusive of Christmas bonus
and other tinge benefits. Appellant union knew all the while of such
interpretation and precisely attempted to negotiate for a provision in the
58. Shell Oil Workers Union vs. Shell Oil Co., 70 SCRA 223
FACTS:
Respondent Shell Company of the Philippines (COMPANY) dissolved its
security guard section stationed at its Pandacan Installation, notwithstanding
its (guard section) continuance and that such is assured by an existing
collective bargaining contract. The respondent company transferred 18
security guards to its other department and consequently hired a private
security agency to undertake the work of said security guards. This resulted in
a strike called by petitioner Shell Oil Workers Union (UNION), The President
certified it to respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). CIR declared the
strike illegal on the ground that such dissolution was a valid exercise of a
management prerogative. Thus this appeal is taken.
Petitioner argued that the 18 security guards affected are part of the
bargaining unit and covered by the existing collective bargaining contract, as
such, their transfers and eventual dismissals are illegal being done in violation
of the existing contract. The Company maintained that in contracting out the
security service and redeploying the 18 security guards affected, it was merely
performing its legitimate prerogative to adopt the most efficient and
economical method of operation, that said action was motivated by business
consideration in line with past established practice and made after notice to
and discussion with the Union, that the 18 guards concerned were dismissed
for wilfully refusing to obey the transfer order, and that the strike staged by
the Union is illegal.
ISSUE:
Whether the existing collective bargaining contract on maintaining
security guard section, among others, constitute a bar to the decision of the
management to contract out security guards.
RULING:
YES. The strike was legal because there was a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement by Company. It was part of the CBA that the Security
Guard Section will remain. Yet, the Company did not comply with the
stipulation in CBA. It was thus an assurance of security of tenure, at least,
during the lifetime of the agreement.
For what is involved is the integrity of the agreement reached, the terms
of which should be binding on both parties
The stand of Shell Company as to the scope of management prerogative
is not devoid of plausibility, management prerogative of the Company would
have been valid if it were not bound by what was stipulated in CBA. The
same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least 25% additional. The
law did not define what is a regular wage or salary. What the law emphasized
is that in addition to regular wage, there must be paid an additional 25% of
that regular wage to constitute overtime rate of pay. Parties were thus
allowed to agree on what shall be mutually considered regular pay from or
upon which a 25% premium shall be based and added to makeup overtime
compensation.
No rule of universal application to other cases may be justifiably
extracted from the NAWASA case. CIR relies on the part of the NAWASA
decision where the SC cited American decisions whose legislation on overtime
is at variance with the law in this jurisdiction. The US legislation considers
work in excess of forty hours a week as overtime; whereas, what is generally
considered overtime in the Philippines is work in excess of the regular 8 hours
a day. It is understandably material to refer to precedents in the US for
purposes of computing weekly wages under a 40-hour week rule, since the
particular issue involved in NAWASA is the conversion of prior weekly regular
earnings into daily rates without allowing diminution or addition.
Disposition decision appealed from is REVERSED
price of the goods were properly included in the term basic salary for
purposes of computing the 13th month pay.
Commissions of medical representatives of Boie-Takeda Chemicals and
rank-and-file employees of Fuji Xerox Co. were not included in the term basic
salary because these were paid as productivity bonuses which is not
included in the computation of 13th month pay.
61. Shell Co. of the Phil. vs. National Labor Union, 81 Phil 315
FACTS:
National Labor Union instituted this action to ask for 50% additional
compensation for the employees of Shell Company who work at night to attend to
the foreign planes landing and taking off (at night), to supply petrol and
lubricants, and perform other duties. Court of Industrial Relations held that The
Shell Company pay its workers working at night an additional compensation of
50% over their regular salaries by working during daytime. Shell argues that
there is no legal provision empowering CIR to order payment of additional
compensation to workers who work at night, and that Act No. 444 relieved the
employer of such obligation as it is provided in the Act where it made compulsory
the "overtime" (additional compensation) pay for work rendered beyond 8 hours,
and such cases do not include the work at night. NLU argues decision of the CIR is
part of its broad and effective powers as granted by Commonwealth Act No. 103 the charter of the Industrial Relations Court, and that Act No. 444 has no
Application to this case because it is referring only to particular and the maximum
working day permitted in industrial establishments - the 8-hour day.
ISSUES:
WON CIR has the authority to order payment of additional compensation to
workers who work at night?
RULING:
YES. Articles 1, 4 and 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103:
It is evident from the Com Act. No. 103 : SECTION 1. (a) that when a
dispute arises between the principal and the employee or worker on the question
of wages, CIR has jurisdiction throughout the Philippines to consider, investigate
and resolve the dispute, setting the wages they deem fair and reasonable,
SEC. 4. (b) that for the purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
arrangement, CIR also has jurisdiction over any dispute - industry and agriculture
- resulting from any differences in wages, compensation or participation, working
hours, conditions of employment or tenancy between the employers and
employees or between workers and owners and the landowners or farm workers
subject to the fulfillment of certain requirements and conditions when it sees that
the dispute could cause results or a strike,
SEC. 13. (c) that in exercising its powers specified above, the Court
Industrial Relations is not limited, to decide the dispute, to grant the remedy or
remedies requested by the parties to the dispute, but may include in any order or
decision or determination relating to the purpose of settling the dispute or to
prevent further agricultural or industrial disputes.
The argument of Shell is mistaken. Law No. 444 does not apply to this
case, it is evident that it has a specific objective, namely: (a) set at 8 hours the
maximum working day, (b) at some exceptional cases employees could be
allowed Work off the day, (c) provide increment, which must be not less than 25%
of regular salary for the "overtime" or work in excess of 8 hours.
The work required by Shell is not covered by the overtime of Com Act. 444
since the work which is the subject of controversy in this case is not overtime but
a full day of work for 8 hours, done at night or in night shift.Hence, if CIR has the
authority to fix wages for the work done during the day, it also has the authority
to fix wages done at night.(Work Day- 24-hr period commencing from the time an
employee regularly starts to work regardless of whether the work is broken or
continuous. It may not coincide with a calendar day. -Beda Reviewer). WON those
who work at night are entitled to 50% additional compensation?(YES)
SC discussed a lot of issues about the pernicious effect of working at night
justifying the award of additional 50% to the compensation of affected workers,
affirming the decision of CIR. Conclusion of SC
The case against nightwork, then, may be said to rest upon several
grounds. In the first place, there are the remotely injurious effects of permanent
nightwork manifested in the later years of the worker's life. Of more immediate
importance to the average worker is the disarrangement of his social life,
including the recreational activities of his leisure hours and the ordinary
associations of normal family relations. From an economic point of view,
nightwork is to be discouraged because of its adverse effect upon efficiency and
output. A moral argument against nightwork in the case of women is that the
night shift forces the workers to go to and from the factory in darkness. Recent
experiences of industrial nations have added much to the evidence against the
continuation of nightwork, except in extraordinary circumstances and unavoidable
emergencies. The immediate prohibition of nightwork for all laborers is hardly
practicable; its discontinuance in the case of women employees is unquestionably
desirable. 'The night was made for rest and sleep and not for work' is a common
saying among wage-earning people, and many of them dream of an industrial
order in which there will be no night shift. (Labor Problems, 3rd Edition, pp. 325328, by Watkins & Dodd.).
62. NARIC vs. Workers Union, 105 Phil. 891
FACTS:
Luis Mabagos started working in the service of the Government in 1918.
He had three civil service eligibilities, third grade, second grade and typist. In
1937 he transferred to the Naric. He served in said Government corporation in
various capacities, namely, as provincial inspector, district inspector, branch
manager, provincial buyer and cashier, warehouseman, and lastly supervisor
of all Naric warehouses in Manila. According to the records he was an efficient
employee. In July, 1948, he was suspended because he was implicated in a
case of theft in a warehouse under his supervision. The case was not finished
until 1950, when he was acquitted by the Court of Appeals. Upon his acquittal,
he demanded his reinstatement and the payment of his back wages. He was
paid back wages until December 31, 1949, but the reinstatement was denied
on the ground that his position had been abolished. He sought the payment of
his gratuity under the Osmea Retirement Act, but this was also denied. So his
union instituted these proceedings for his reinstatement and for the payment
of his back salary from January 1, 1950 until he is actually reinstated. The
Court of Industrial Relations found that his separation was without just cause
and granted the petition. The Naric appealed from this decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mabagos should be considered separated from the
service.
RULING:
In order to decide the issue presented, it seems pertinent and relevant
to determine the status of Mabagos as an employee by reason of his
suspension.
unworked regular holiday pay considering that these regular holidays have
been excluded in the programming of the student contact hours.4. NLRC
decision: Modified. Teaching personnel paid by the hour are declared to be
entitled to holidaypay5. In counting student contract hours, legal holidays are
excluded and labeled in the schedule as "no class day." On the other hand, if a
regular week day is declared a holiday, the school calendar is extended to
compensate for that day. Thus petitioner argues that the advent of any of the
legal holidays within the semester will not affect the faculty's salary because
this day is not included in their schedule while the calendar is extended to
compensate for special holidays. Thus the required number of lecture hours is
not diminished.
ISSUE:
Whether the school faculty who according to their contracts are paid per
lecture hour are entitled tounworked holiday pay
RULING:
NO (for regular holidays) YES (for special holidays)
(a) petitioner is exempted from paying hourly paid faculty members their
pay for regular holidays, whether the same be during the regular semesters of
the school year or during semestral, Christmas, or Holy Week vacations;(b)
petitioner is ordered to pay said faculty members their regular hourly rate on
days declared as special holidays or for some reason classes are called off or
shortened for the hours they are supposed to have taught, whether extensions
of class days be ordered or not; in case of extensions said faculty members
shall likewise be paid their hourly rates should they teach during said
extensions.
RATIO:
The Court held that the aforementioned implementing rule is not
justified by the provisions of the law which after all is silent with respect
to faculty members paid by the hour who because of their teaching
contracts are obliged to work and consent to be paid only for work
actually done.- On the other hand, both the law and the Implementing
Rules governing holiday pay are silent as to payment on Special Public
Holidays.1. It is readily apparent that the declared purpose of the holiday
pay which is the prevention of diminution of the monthly income of the
employees on account of work interruptions is defeated when a regular
class day is cancelled on account of a special public holiday and class
hours are held on another working day to make up for time lost in the
school calendar.
The petitioners also argued that the private respondents are not entitled
to a 13th month pay. They maintained that each of the private respondents
receive a total monthly compensation of more that Pl,000.00 and that under
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 851, such employees are not entitled to
receive a 13th month pay. The petitioners likewise alleged that the company is
in bad financial shape and that pursuant to Section 3 of the Decree, the firm is
exempted from complying with the provisions of the Decree.
The Labor arbiter rendered decision in favor of the private respondents,
and the same was affirmed by NLRC.
ISSUE:
WON the private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to a 13th
month pay.
RULING:
Presidential Decree No. 851 was signed into law in 1975 by then
President Ferdinand Marcos. Under the original provisions of Section 1 thereof,
all employers are required to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary
of not more than Pl,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of their
employment, a 13th month pay not later than December 24 of every year.
Under Section 3 of the rules and regulations implementing said Presidential
Decree financially distressed employers, i., e., those currently incurring
substantial losses, are not covered by the Decree. Section 7 thereof requires,
however, that such distressed employers must obtain the prior authorization
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment before they may qualify for such
exemption.
On May 1, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1364 was signed into law. The
Decree enjoined the Department of Labor and Employment to stop accepting
applications for exemption under, inter alia, Presidential Decree No. 851.
On August 13, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum
Order No. 28 which modified Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 851. The said
issuance eliminated the Pl,000.00 salary ceiling.
From the foregoing, it clearly appears that the petitioners have no basis
to claim that the company is exempted from complying with the pertinent
provisions of the law relating to the payment of 13th month compensation.
The Pl,000.00 salary ceiling provided in Presidential Decree No. 851
pertains to basic salary, not total monthly compensation. The petitioners
admit that the private respondents work only five days a week and that they
each receive a basic daily wage of P40.00 only. A simple computation of the
basic daily wage multiplied by the number of working days in a month results
in an amount of less than Pl,000.00. Thus, there is no basis for the contention
that the company is exempted from the provision of Presidential Decree No.
851 which mandated the payment of 13th month compensation to employees
receiving less than P1,000.00 a month.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
The present petition for certiorari is directed at: (1) the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 29 August 1985 in NLRC
Case No. RB-IV-20056-78-T, entitled "Lydia Santos, complainant-appellee,
versus Security Bank and Trust Company, respondent-appellant;" and (2) the
Resolution issued by the NLRC on 7 November 1986 denying petitioner Lydia
Santos's Motion for Reconsideration of the mentioned Decision.
On 10 January 1978, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. On
16 October 1978, Labor Arbiter Bienvenido S. Fernandez rendered a decision
finding petitioner's dismissal to be illegal and ordering private respondent
Bank to reinstate her with backwages and other accrued benefits. The
dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent is ordered to immediately
reinstate complainant to her position as Branch Manager without loss of rights
and with backwages from May 1976 at P2,650.00 per month, plus other
accrued benefits.
Private respondent appealed to NLRC in which, NLRC modified the
decision rendered by the labor arbiter on the matters of the orders for the
reinstatement of the complainant with full backwages of petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to an award for backwages, in addition to: (1)
her separation pay,-and (2) gratuities accruing before the Labor Arbiter's order
for reinstatement was modified.
RULING:
It was grievous error amounting to grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC to have considered an award of separation pay as equivalent to
the aggregate relief constituted by reinstatement plus payment of backwages
under Article 280 of the Labor Code. The grant of separation pay was a proper
substitute only for reinstatement; it could not be an adequate substitute both
for reinstatement and for backwages. In effect, the NLRC in its assailed
decision failed to give to petitioner the full relief to which she was entitled
under the statute.
We conclude that petitioner Lydia Santos is entitled to receive, and
private respondent Bank is obligated to pay, (1) the benefits which had
accrued in petitioner's favor during the period from her illegal dismissal and
until reinstatement was declared non-available; (2) separation pay equivalent
to one-half (1/2) month's pay for every year of service, in lieu of
reinstatement; and (3) backwages for three (3) years without qualification and
deduction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The private
respondent Bank is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P223,685.50,
which represents the totality of the accrued benefits petitioner is entitled to as
a result of her illegal dismissal. The decision of public respondent NLRC dated
29 August 1985 in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-20056-78-T is hereby modified
accordingly. This decision is immediately executory.
71. State Marine Corp. vs. Cebu Seamen's Asso. 7 SCRA 294
FACTS:
The Union (CEBU SEAMEN'S ASSOCIATION, INC) alleged that the officers
and men working on board the petitioners' vessels have not been paid their
sick leave, vacation leave and overtime pay; that the petitioners threatened or
coerced them to accept a reduction of salaries, observed by other shipowners;
that after the Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the petitioners required
their employees on board their vessels, to pay the sum of P.40 for every meal,
while the masters and officers were not required to pay their meals and that
because Captain Carlos Asensi had refused to yield to the general reduction of
salaries, the petitioners dismissed said captain who now claims for
reinstatement and the payment of back wages from December 25, 1952, at
the rate of P540.00, monthly. The petitioners' shipping companies, answering,
averred that there is no law which provides for the payment of sick leave or
vacation leave to employees or workers of private firms, and that in enacting
Rep. Act No. 602 (Minimum Wage Law), the Congress had in mind that the
amount of P.40 per meal, furnished the employees should be deducted from
the daily wages. A decision was rendered on February 21, 1957 in favor of the
respondent union. The motion for reconsideration thereof, having been denied,
the companies filed the present writ of certiorari, to resolve legal question
involved.
ISSUES:
1) WON there is a conflict between Section 3, par. F and SEC. 19 of the
Minimum Wage Law, (R.A. No. 602).
2) WON the CIR erred in declaring that the deduction for costs of meals
from the wages or salaries after August 4, 1951, is illegal and same should be
reimbursed to the employee concerned, in spite of said section 3, par. (f) of
Act No. 602.
RULING:
Section 3, par. f, of the Minimum Wage Law, (R.A. No. 602), provides as
follows
(f) xxx the furnishing of meals shall be valued at not more than thirty
centavos per meal for agricultural employees and not more than forty
centavos for any other employees covered by this Act, and the furnishing of
housing shall be valued at not more than twenty centavos daily for agricultural
workers and not more than forty centavos daily for other employees covered
by this Act.
However, section 19, same law, states:
SEC. 19. Relations to other labor laws and practices.
Nothing in this Act shall deprive an employee of the right to seek fair
wages, shorter working hours and better working conditions nor justify an
employer in violating any other labor law applicable to his employees, in
reducing the wage now paid to any of his employees in excess of the minimum
wage established under this Act, or in reducing supplements furnished on the
date of enactment.
It is evident that Section 3(f) constitutes the general rule, while section
19 is the exception. In other words, if there are no supplements given, within
the meaning and contemplation of section 19, but merely facilities, section 3(f)
governs. There is no conflict; the two provisions could, as they should be
harmonized. And even if there is such a conflict, the respondent CIR should
resolve the same in favor of the safety and decent living laborers (Art. 1702,
new Civil Code).. 2) The benefit or privilege given to the employee which
constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic or ordinary
earning or wage, is supplement; and when said benefit or privilege is part of
the laborers' basic wages, it is a facility. The criterion is not so much with the
kind of the benefit or item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but its
purpose. Considering, therefore, as definitely found by the respondent court
that the meals were freely given to crew members prior to August 4, 1951,
while they were on the high seas "not as part of their wages but as a
necessary matter in the maintenance of the health and efficiency of the crew
personnel during the voyage", the deductions therein made for the meals
given after August 4, 1951, should be returned to them, and the operator of
the coastwise vessels affected should continue giving the same benefit.
73. PNB vs. Andrada Electric and Engineering Co., April 17, 2002
FACTS:
Respondent is a partnership duly organized, existing, and operating
under the laws of the Philippines is a semi-government corporation duly
organized, existing and operating under the laws of the Philippines; whereas,
NASUDECO is also a semi-government corporation and the sugar arm of the
PNB; and the defendant Pampanga Sugar Mills (PASUMIL), is a corporation
organized, existing and operating under the 1975 laws of the Philippines. The
plaintiff is engaged in the business of general construction for the repairs
and/or construction of different kinds of machineries and buildings. On August
26, 1975, PNB acquired the assets of the defendant PASUMIL that were earlier
foreclosed by the DBP. PNB organized the defendant NASUDECO in September,
1975, to take ownership and possession of the assets and ultimately to
nationalize and consolidate its interest in other PNB controlled sugar mills.
Prior to October 29, 1971, the defendant PASUMIL engaged the services of
defendant for electrical rewinding and repair, most of which were partially paid
by the defendant PASUMIL, leaving several unpaid accounts with the plaintiff.
On October 29, 1971, the plaintiff and the defendant PASUMIL entered into a
construction contract. The defendant PASUMIL and the defendant PNB, and
now the defendant NASUDECO, failed and refused to pay the plaintiff their
just, valid and demandable obligation based on the contract. Defendant
prayed that judgment be rendered against the defendants PNB, NASUDECO,
and PASUMIL.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Veil of Corporate Fiction should be pierced in this
case
RULING:
NO. The absence of the elements in the present case precludes the
piercing of the corporate veil. First, other than the fact that petitioners
acquired the assets of PASUMIL, there is no showing that their control over it
warrants the disregard of corporate personalities. Second, there is no evidence
that their juridical personality was used to commit a fraud or to do a wrong; or
that the separate corporate entity was farcically used as a mere alter ego,
business conduit or instrumentality of another entity or person. Third,
respondent was not defrauded or injured when petitioners acquired the assets
of PASUMIL. Being the party that asked for the piercing of the corporate veil,
respondent had the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence to
justify the setting aside of the separate corporate personality rule. However, it
utterly failed to discharge this burden; it failed to establish by competent
evidence that petitioners separate corporate veil had been used to conceal
fraud, illegality or inequity.
otherwise, any decision that would be rendered in favor of the latter would be
useless and ineffective for there would be no one against whom it can be
enforced. Thus, where the employer corporation is no longer existing and
unable to satisfy the judgment in favor of the employee, the officer should be
held liable for acting on behalf of the corporation
job
RULING:
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to
an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the
person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the
employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and
extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
Under the general rule set out in the first and second paragraphs of
Article 106, an employer who enters into a contract with a contractor for the
performance of work for the employer, does not thereby create an employeremployee relationship between himself and the employees of the contractor.
Thus, the employees of the contractor remain the contractor's employees and
his alone. Nonetheless, when a contractor fails to pay the wages of his
employees in accordance with the Labor Code, the employer who contracted
out the job to the contractor becomes jointly and severally liable with his
contractor to the employees of the latter "to the extent of the work performed
under the contract" as if such employer were the employer of the contractor's
employees. The law itself, in other words, establishes an employer-employee
relationship between the employer and the job contractor's employees for a
limited purpose, i.e., in order to ensure that the latter get paid the wages due
to them.
A similar situation obtains where there is "labor only" contracting. The
"labor-only" contractor ---- i.e. "the person or intermediary" ---- is considered
"merely as an agent of the employer." The employer is made by the statute
responsible to the employees of the "labor only" contractor as if such
employees had been directly employed by the employer. Thus, where "labor
only" contracting exists in a given case, the statute itself implies or establishes
an employer-employee relationship between the employer (the owner of the
project) and the employees of the "labor only" contractor, this time for a
comprehensive purpose: "employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any
violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code." The law in effect
holds both the employer and the "labor-only" contractor responsible to the
latter's employees for the more effective safeguarding of the employees'
rights under the Labor Code.
The definition of "labor-only" contracting in Rule VIII, Book III of the
Implementing Rules must be read in conjunction with the definition of job
contracting given in Section 8 of the same Rules. The undertaking given by
CESI in favor of the bank was not the performance of a specific job ---- for
instance, the carriage and delivery of documents and parcels to the addresses
thereof. There appear to be many companies today which perform this
discrete service, companies with their own personnel who pick up documents
and packages from the offices of a client or customer, and who deliver such
materials utilizing their own delivery vans or motorcycles to the addresses. In
the present case, the undertaking of CESI was to provide its client ---- the bank
---- with a certain number of persons able to carry out the work of messengers.
Such undertaking of CESI was complied with when the requisite number of
persons were assigned or seconded to the petitioner bank. Orpiada utilized the
premises and office equipment of the bank and not those of CESI.
Messengerial work ---- the delivery of documents to designated persons
whether withi nor without the bank premises ---- is of course directly related to
the day-to-day operations of the bank. Section 9(2) quoted above does not
require for its applicability that the petitioner must be engaged in the delivery
of items as a distinct and separate line of business.
Succinctly put, CESI is not a parcel delivery company: as its name
indicates, it is a recruitment and placement corporation placing bodies, as it
were, in different client companies for longer or shorter periods of time. It is
this factor that, to our mind, distinguishes this case from American President
Lines v. Clave et al., 114 SCRA 826 (1982) if indeed such distinguishing way is
needed. We hold that, in the circumstances of this case, CESI was engaged in
"labor-only" contracting vis-a-vis the petitioner bank and in respect of Ricardo
Orpiada, and that consequently, the petitioner bank is liable to Orpiada as if
Orpiada had been directly employed not only by CESI but also by the bank. It
may well be that the bank may in turn proceed against CESI to obtain
reimbursement of, or some contribution to, the amount which the bank will
have to pay to Orpiada; but this it is not necessary to determine here. The
petition for certiorari is denied and the decision promulgated on 29 December
1983 of the National Labor Relations Commission is affirmed.
80. Guarin, et. al., vs. NLRC & Lipercon Services, 178 SCRA 267
FACTS:
Novelty Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation that is engaged in the
garment manufacturing business. Lipercon Services, Inc. is also a domestic
corporation which is engaged in business as a service contractor providing
workers for other companies. A Contract of service was entered into by
Lipercon as the contractor and Novelty as the company. Petitioners were hired
by Lipercon and assigned to Novelty as helpers, janitors, janitresses, firemen,
and mechanics under the above agreement. Petitioners worked for Novelty for
some three years. On December 31, 1986, Novelty terminated its agreement
with Lipercon, resulting in the dismissal of the petitioners.
On January 9, 1987, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against both Lipercon and Novelty (Case No. NLRC-NCR-1-107-87). Lipercon
did not answer. In a decision dated June 29, 1987, the Labor Arbiter ruled that
the petitioners were regular employees of Novelty and declared their dismissal
illegal. Both employers appealed. The appealed decision was set aside and
another judgement was entered ordering Lipercon Service to reinstate the
complainants their former position.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for certiorari as found by the NLRC, respondent
Lipercon Sevices Inc. is an independent contractor and that petitioners are its
employees.
RULING:
NO. It is clear from the foregoing definitions that under the "Contract of
Services" between Lipercon and Novelty, Lipercon was a "labor-only"
contractor, hence, only an agent of Novelty to procure workers for the latter,
the real employer.
The NLRC's finding that Lipercon was not a mere labor-only contractor
because it has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, is based on insubstantial evidence,
as the NLRC pointed out, that "it (Lipercon) claims to be possessed among
others, of substantial capital and equipment essential to carry out its business
as a general independent contractor" (p. 25, Rollo).
The law casts the burden on the contractor to prove that he/it has
substantial capital, investment, tools, etc. The petitioners, on the other hand,
need not prove the negative fact that the contractor does not have substantial
capital, investment, and tools to engage in job contracting.
The jobs assigned to the petitioners as mechanics, janitors, gardeners,
firemen and grasscutters were directly related to the business of Novelty as a
garment manufacturer. In the case of Philippine Bank of Communications vs.
NLRC, 146 SCRA 347, we ruled that the work of a messenger is directly related
to a bank's operations. In its Comment, Novelty contends that the services
which are directly related to manufacturing garments are sewing, textile
cutting, designs, dying, quality control, personnel, administration, accounting,
finance, customs, delivery and similar other activities; and that allegedly, "[i]t
is only by stretching the imagination that one may conclude that the services
of janitors, janitresses, firemen, grasscutters, mechanics and helpers are
directly related to the business of manufacturing garments" (p. 78, Rollo). Not
so, for the work of gardeners in maintaining clean and well-kept grounds
around the factory, mechanics to keep the machines functioning properly, and
firemen to look out for fires, are directly related to the daily operations of a
garment factory. That fact is confirmed by Novelty's rehiring the workers or
renewing the contract with Lipercon every year from 1983 to 1986, a period of
three (3) years.
As Lipercon was a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it supplied Novelty
became regular employees of the latter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC is set aside and that of the Labor
Arbiter is reinstated. Novelty Philippines, Inc. is ordered to reinstate the
petitioners with backwages for one (1) year without qualification or deduction.
In case reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondent Novelty Philippines,
Inc. is hereby ordered to grant the complainants separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months to
be considered as one (1) whole year, in addition to their backwages. Costs
against respondent Novelty Philippines, Inc.
time that the petitioners have worked with the respondent company, there is
justification to conclude that they were engaged to perform activities
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the respondent, and
the petitioners are, therefore regular employees.
83. Deferia vs. NLRC, 194 SCRA 525
FACTS:
On May 3, 1979, the private respondent Erma Industries, Inc. (ERMA), as
private corporation engaged in exporting shrimps, prawns, squids and other
marine products and as represented by its Vice-President Sergio Oritz Luis, Jr.,
entered into a contract with the private co-respondent Cirilo Undan for the latter
to supply the former with marine products in Bacolod City. Under the said
contract, ERMA would provide both the financing and the equipment to Undan
while the latter would be responsible for hiring the workers. Since the
employment of the petitioners in 1982 up to June 30, 1984, they worked
continuously for Undan who paid them on a piece-work basis or pakiao.
Sometimes in April, 1984, the petitioners constituting a majority of the
employees of Undan, joined and became members of the co-petitioner
Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization (CAILO), a duly registered and
existing labor union.
On May 9, 1984, the petitioners filed a petition for certification for nonpayment of wage differentials, emergency and cost allowances, 13th month pay,
night shift differentials and service incentive pay with the National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, which case was designated as
RAB 0230-84. A letter complaint was likewise filed with the Social Security System
for the failure of the private respondents to register the petitioners as their
employees.
Consequently, the petitioners filed another case designated for unfair labor
practice committed by the private respondents through the alleged pretended
closure of the said business. The petitioners contended that the same business
continued to operate at another place which was at the residence of Undan's
relative and that the purported closure was made without prior notice to the then
Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment.
All petitions were dismissed on the same ground that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the said parties. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission in a Resolution dated August 31, 1987, affirmed the
said decision of the Labor Arbiter and denied a subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between ERMA
and the petitioners; and
2. Whether or not ERMA is the indirect employer of petitioners so as to
make it jointly and severally liable with Cirilo Undan for the petitioners' claims.
RULING:
With regard to the first issue, we affirm the challenged ruling of the National
Labor Relations Commission that, indeed, there is no employer-employee
relationship between ERMA and the petitioners. Settled jurisprudence enumerates
RULING:
It could be deduced that wage is used in its generic sense and obviously
refers to the basic wage rate to be ascertained on a time, task, piece or
commission basis or other method of calculating the same. It does not,
however, mean that commission, allowances or analogous income necessarily
forms part of the employee's salary because to do so would lead to anomalies
(sic), if not absurd, construction of the word "salary." For what will prevent the
employee from insisting that emergency living allowance, 13th month pay,
overtime, and premium pay, and other fringe benefits should be added to the
computation of their separation pay. This situation, to our mind, is not the real
intent of the Code and its rules.
We rule otherwise. The ambiguity between Article 97(f), which defines
the term 'wage' and Article XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article
284 of the Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing Rules,
which mention the terms "pay" and "salary", is more apparent than real.
Broadly, the word "salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a
person for his pains or industry in another man's business. Whether it be
derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman
soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services
rendered. Indeed, there is eminent authority for holding that the words
"wages" and "salary" are in essence synonymous (Words and Phrases, Vol. 38
Permanent Edition, p. 44 citing Hopkins vs. Cromwell, 85 N.Y.S. 839,841,89
App. Div. 481; 38 Am. Jur. 496). "Salary," the etymology of which is the Latin
word "salarium," is often used interchangeably with "wage", the etymology of
which is the Middle English word "wagen". Both words generally refer to one
and the same meaning, that is, a reward or recompense for services
performed. Likewise, "pay" is the synonym of "wages" and "salary" (Black's
Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.). Inasmuch as the words "wages", "pay" and "salary"
have the same meaning, and commission is included in the definition of
"wage", the logical conclusion, therefore, is, in the computation of the
separation pay of petitioners, their salary base should include also their
earned sales commissions. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
the principal, PTSI in this case, would directly pay the security guards the
wage and allowance increases because there is no privity of contract between
them. The security guards' contractual relationship is with their immediate
employer, EAGLE. Eagle an employer, EAGLE is tasked, among others, with the
payment of their wages.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. No. 81314
and G.R. No. 81447 are hereby DISMISSED and the decision and resolution of
the NLRC in NLRC-NCR-11-3652-85 dated November 27, 1987 and December
29, 1987, respectively, are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued
by the Court on June 20, 1988 is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
Ratio For the specific purposes of Article 1109 and in the context of
insolvency termination or separation pay is reasonably regarded as forming
part of the remuneration or other money benefits accruing to employees or
workers by reason of their having previously rendered services to their
employer; as such, they fall within the scope of remuneration or earnings
for services rendered or to be rendered Liability for separation pay might
indeed have the effect of a penalty, so far as the employer is concerned. So
far as concerns the employees, however, separation pay is additional
remuneration to which they become entitled because, having previously
rendered services, they are separated from the employers service.
We note, in this connection, that in Philippine Commercial andIndustrial
Bank (PCIB) us. National Mines and Allied Workers Union, the Solicitor General
took a different view and there urged that the term wages under Article 110 of
the Labor Code may be regarded as embracing within its scope severance pay
or termination or separation pay. In PCIB, this Court agreed with the position
advanced by the Solicitor General. We see no reason for overturning this
particular position.
The resolution of the issue of priority among the several claims filed in
the insolvency proceedings instituted by the Insolvent cannot, however, rest
on a reading of Article 110 of the labor Code alone.
Article 110 of the Labor Code, in determining the reach of its terms,
cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather, Article 110 must be read in relation to
the provisions of the Civil Code concerning the classification, concurrence and
preference of credits, which provisions find particular application in insolvency
proceedings where the claims of all creditors, preferred or non-preferred, may
be adjudicated in a binding manner. Disposition MODIFIED and REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings in insolvency.
public respondent runs counter to the consistent rulings of this Court in a long
line of cases emphasizing that the applicant of Art. 110 of the Labor Code is
contingent upon the institution of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation
proceedings against the employer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 110 of the Labor Code, as amended, which refers to
worker preference in case of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's
business, is applicable to the present case notwithstanding the absence ofany
formal declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of TPWII.
RULING:
Article 110 is NOT applicable in the absence of any formal declaration of
bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of TPWII. We hold that public respondent
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Art.
110 should not be treated apart from other laws but applied in conjunction
with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Insolvency Law to the
extent that piece-meal distribution of the assets of the debtor is avoided.
The present controversy could have been easily settled by public
respondent had it referred to ample jurisprudence which already provides the
solution. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Once a case is decided by this
Court as the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy one way, then another
case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner. Public respondent had no choice on the matter. It could not have
ruled any other way. This Court having spoken in a string of cases against
public respondent, its duty is simply to obey judicial precedents. Any further
disregard, if not defiance, of our rulings will be considered a ground to hold
public respondent in contempt.
Petitioners filed their reply to the opposition and at the same time filed a
motion to resolve the third party claim (Rollo, Annex "G, pp. 58-62; Annex "G1", pp. 63- 67).
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners enjoy preferential right or claim over the
funds of Sabena Mining Corporation as provided for under the provisions of
Article 110 of the New Labor Code, as amended, and Section 10, Rule VIII,
Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code.
RULING:
In the case at bar, there was no showing of any insolvency proceeding or
declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation that was being filed by Sabena
Mining Corporation. It is only an extra-judicial foreclosure that was being
enunciated as when DBP extra-judicially foreclosed the assets of Sabena
Mining Corporation. Conversely, to hold that Article 110 is also applicable in
extra-judicial proceedings would be putting the worker in a better position
than the State which could only assert its own prior preference in case of a
judicial proceeding. Article 110 must not be viewed in isolation and must
always be reckoned with the provisions of the Civil Code (DBP v. Labor Arbiter,
supra).
The reason behind the necessity for a judicial proceeding or a
proceeding in rem before the concurrence and preference of credits may be
appealed is to bind all interested persons whether known to the parties or not.
The claims of all credits whether preferred or non-preferred, the Identification
of the preferred ones and the totality of the employer's assets should be
brought into the picture. There can then be an authoritative, fair and binding
adjudication instead of the piece meal settlement which would result from the
questioned decision in this case 1(DBP v. Labor Arbiter, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the questioned Order dated January 5, 1988 issued by the
respondent court is hereby AFFIRMED.
of moral damages and attorney's fees. Both parties appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission which increased the award due Dizon and further
ordered payment of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees. The award
of moral damages was later deleted in the resolution of February 24, 1988 of
the Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Dizon is entitled to his separation pay.
RULING:
It is common knowledge that the taking over of the management and
assets of Banco Filipino by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank is being
contested by some stockholders of the bank who insist that the bank is solvent
and in sound financial condition and that its closure was illegal. The
controversy has generated quite a number of cases in this Court and in one of
them, G.R. No. 70054, entitled Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v.
The Monetary Board, et al., We adopted a resolution, dated August 29, 1985,
enjoining the Monetary Board, its officers, and the Central Bank appointed
receivers "from executing further acts of liquidation of a bank "save" acts such
as receiving collectibles and receivables or paying off creditors claims and
other transactions pertaining to normal operations of a bank," and later,
further ordered that a hearing be conducted by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 146 to afford the former management/stockholders of the bank
an opportunity to prove that the bank's closure was illegal. The temporary
restraining order still stands and it appears that a report and recommendation
on the hearing has yet to be filed. For the moment, therefore, the bank is not
being liquidated and the possibility lurks that it might not be at all.
Respondent Dizon, cognizant of these, argues that it is the labor arbiter and
the NLRC which has jurisdiction over his money claims since there is no
liquidation court to speak of.
Such was our ruling in International Hardware, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
80770, August 10, 1989. As regards the commutation to cash of Dizon's
accumulated vacation and sick leaves, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
found that this was authorized by the Collective Bargaining Agreement then
existing before the bank's closure and which CBA the liquidators manifested to
honor. This is a factual issue which We are not inclined to disturb. Also, since
Dizon was forced to litigate, he is entitled to attorney's fees.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision under review is AFFIRMED save that the
money due the private respondent should be presented to the liquidators for
processing.
The three (3) Complainants in this case charged the University with
Illegal Dismissal, Non-payment of separation pay, retirement pay, and gratuity
pay, Unfair Labor Practice with Damages, and Attorney's Fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding in this
case that petitioners were not illegally dismissed.
RULING:
Following the First GAUF Case as a precedent, the answer must be in the
affirmative. Under the guidelines to the retrenchment program given by the
University and the Ministry of Labor, the following considerations emerge
clear: (1) there was to be a separation or retirement of ALL personnel with
corresponding grant of termination pay or retirement benefits, whichever is
higher; (2) top-to-bottom University-wide reorganization subject, however, to
the condition of rehiring of ALL personnel so separated or retired; (3) but with
the exception of those whose present positions will be affected by the
proposed reorganizational changes.
And in regards attorney's fees, respondent NLRC properly disallowed the
award as the same is granted only in case of unlawful withholding of wages
(Gregorio Araneta University Foundation vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. L-75583,
November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 79; Article III (a), P.D. 442 as amended). In this
case, it cannot be said that wages had been unlawfully withheld by the
University. In fact, it had made partial payments of retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is REVERSED in so far as it holds that the dismissal of petitioners
was not illegal and hereby ORDERS respondent Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation to REINSTATE petitioners to their former positions with three (3)
years backwages under the new terms and conditions of employment in the
University as reorganized. In all other respects, the Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No costs.
91. Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor et. al., 174 SCRA 632
FACTS:
Petitioner has first- one (4) employees. Aside from the salary and hiring
allowance, the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is
dedicated from their respective salaries.
On May 23, 1986; ten(10) employees of the refiner employed in Afferent
Capauties/ positions bled a complaint with the coffle of the Regional Director
of Labor and employment for underpayment of the Salaries and EZOLAS.
On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor SFLS
and Welfare appliers to inspect the records of the petitioner to as certain the
truth of the Allegations in the complaints.
ISSUE:
Won the Regional Director had prediction over the case.
RULING:
This is a Labor standards are, and is governed my article 128-b of the
Labor cod, as amended by ED.III under the present rules, the Regional Director
Exercises both visiterial and enforcement prever over labor standards cases,
and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still
exists an EE-ER relationship, and the bidings of the Regional Office is not
contested by the employer amounted Petition Dismissed
92. M. Ramirez Industries vs. DOLE, 266 SCRA 111
FACTS:
Petitioner M. Romirez Industries is a single proprientship in Tungkop,
Minglanilla, Cebu. It is engaged in the manufacture of handmade valter
baskets for expert abroad, principally to japan, and has in its employ from 400
to 500 employees.
On April, 1 1986, Carelyn Alfonso and 2000 employees filed a complaint
with the Regional office No. VII of the Department of Labor in Cebu City,
alleging non-payment of minimum arge, living allowances and non-Compliance
granted the employees belonging to private respondent midyear and year end
bemuses, it was exempt from the operation of the presidential decree 857.
ISSUE:
WON there was a grave abuse of discretion as under the term of the
decree, petitioner is excluded from its coverage.
RULING:
The Decree is Specific and mandatory, employees without exception, are
required to pay their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than
P1,000.00 a month irrespective of the nature of employment, a 13th month
pay not labor than December 24 of every year, where the employers,
however, actually grant such for the 13th month pay they could be exampled
from the operation of the Decree. To fall within the exempting clause, it must
be shown that there is such actual payment. There is no such showing here,
since the payment of business is obligatory a the part of the petitioner, then
the petitioner does not come under the exempting clause of PD No. 857 and it
has to pay its employees the 13th month pay required under said Decree.
Petition Dismissed
ISSUE:
WON the grant of separation pay to the private respondent is
uncertified.
RULING:
The courts, rule in a case devised in San Miguel corporation V. the
deputy minister of labor and employment, et al.,. a similar issue was involved
in Philippines long Distance telephone company V. NLRC, et al.,. in that case,
the court undertook a review of past precedents, sanctioned the grant of
separation pay to employees dismissed for some first cause. The court then
proceeded to lay down principle which are hereby affirmed; a contrary rule
would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect of rewarding rather
than punishing the erring employ for his offense. And we do not agree that the
punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do
with the wrong he has committed, indeed, if the employee who steals from the
company is granted separation pay even as he is rahdly dismissed, it is not
unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because
he think he can expect a little leniency if he is again found out. This kind of
misplaced compression is not going to do labors in general any good as it will
encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the
protection and concern of the constitution
Wherefore, Termination affirmed, Separation pay Disallowed
ISSUE:
WON the computation of the 13th month pay under PD No. 851, may be
excluded in the computation and payment thereof.
RULING:
Basic salary does not hereby exclude the benefits expressly, mentioned
but all payments which may be in the form of fringe benefits or allowances.
Sec; 4 of the supplementary IRR rules and regulations PD. No. 851 provider
that every time pay, earnings, and other resurrections which are not part of
the basic salary, shell not be included in the computation of the 13th month
pay. whatever compensation an employee receives for an 8-hour work daily
on the daily wage rate is the basic salary. My compensation recommender
other them the daily wage rate is excluded it follows, therefore, that the
payments for sick, reation , and maturing leaves, premiums for work dene an
rest days and special holidays, as well as pay for regular holidays, are likewise
excluded in computing basic salary for the purpose of determining the 13th
month pay.
98. Phil. Fuji Xerox Corp. vs. Trajano et. al., 228 SCRA 329
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation pays its salesmen a small fixed or guaranteed
wage; the greater part of the latters wages or salaries being composed of the
sales or incentive commissions earned on actual sales of duplicating machines
closed by them. Thus the sales commissions received for every duplicating
machine sold constituted part of the basic compensation or remuneration of
the salesmen of the Philippine Duplicators for doing their job.
The Labor Arbiter directed Petitioner Duplicators to pay 13th month pay
to private respondent employees computed on the basis of their fixed wages
plus sales commission.
the company rule regarding the use of the bunkhouse. Private respondents
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. On 10 July 1991 the Labor Arbiter found
the dismissal of private respondents illegal and ordered their reinstatement as
well as the payment to them the back wages, proportionate 13th month pay
for the year 1990 and attorney's fees.
ISSUES:
Whether a writ of execution is still necessary to enforce the Labor
Arbiter's order of immediate reinstatement pending appeal; (b) whether
dismissal for cause results in the forfeiture of the employee's right to a 13th
month pay; and, (c) whether the award of attorney's fees is proper in the
instant case.
RULING:
As regards the first issue, i.e., whether a writ of execution is still
necessary to enforce the Labor Arbiter's order of immediate reinstatement
even when pending appeal, we agree with petitioners that it is necessary. The
third paragraph of Art. 223 of the Labor Code provides
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
be immediately executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be
admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated
in the payroll.
In the case at bench, there was no occasion for petitioners to exercise
their option under Art. 223 of the Labor Code in connection with the
reinstatement aspect of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The motions of
private respondents for the issuance of a writ of execution were not acted
upon by NLRC. It was not shown that respondent exerted efforts to have their
motions resolved. They are deemed to have abandoned their motions for
execution pending appeal. They cannot now ask that the writ of execution be
issued since their dismissal was found to be for cause.
On the second issue, which refers to the propriety of the award of a 13th
month pay, paragraph 6 of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of
the 13th Month Pay Law (P. D. 851) provides that "(a)n employee who has
resigned or whose services were terminated at any time before the payment
of the 13th month pay is entitled to this monetary benefit in proportion to the
length of time he worked during the year, reckoned from the time he started
working during the calendar year up to the time of his resignation or
termination from the service . The payment of the 13th month pay may be
demanded by the employee upon the cessation of employer-employee
relationship. This is consistent with the principle of equity that as the employer
can require the employee to clear himself of all liabilities and property
accountability, so can the employee demand the payment of all benefits due
him upon the termination of the relationship."
With respect to the third issue, the disputed attorney's fees can only be
assessed in cases of unlawful withholding of wages. 7 It cannot be said that
petitioners were guilty of unlawfully withholding private respondents' salaries
since, as earlier discussed, the occasion never arose for them to exercise that
option under Art. 223 of the Labor Code. Clearly, the award of attorney's fees
is baseless.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly granted. The challenged
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 11 August 1992 is
MODIFIED by deleting that portion ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents their salaries from 19 September 1991 to 20 September 1992 as
well as that portion awarding 10% of the total judgment award as attorney's
fees for lack of legal and factual basis. In other respects, the Decision is
AFFIRMED.
101. United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. Valenzuela, 149 SCRA 424
FACTS:
Sometime in May, 1972, the petitioner and the Universal Corn Products
Workers Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement in which it was
provided, among other things, that: the company agrees to grant all regular
workers within the bargaining unit with at least one (1) year of continuous
service, a Christmas bonus equivalent to the regular wages for seven (7)
working days, effective December, 1972. The bonus shall be given to the
workers on the second week of December.
The agreement had duration of three years, effective June 1, 1971, or
until June 1, 1974.
On account however of differences between the parties with respect to
certain economic issues, the collective bargaining agreement in question
expired without being renewed. On June 1, 1979, the parties entered into an
"addendum" stipulating certain wage increases covering the years from 1974
to 1977.
For failure of the petitioner to pay the seven-day Christmas bonus for
1975 to 1978 inclusive, in accordance with the 1972 CBA, the union went to
the labor arbiter for relief. In his decision, 6 the labor arbiter ruled that the
payment of the 13th month pay precluded the payment of further Christmas
bonus. The union appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). The NLRC set aside the decision of the labor arbiter appealed from and
entered another one, "directing respondent company [now the petitioner] to
pay the members concerned of complainants [sic] union their 7-day wage
bonus in accordance with the 1972 CBA from 1975 to 1978."
ISSUE:
WON employer paying its13th month pay provided under PD 851 is no
longer required to pay Christmas bonus.
WON the Carlota ruling is applicable in the case herein.
RULING:
We hold that in the case at bar, Ovejera (La Carlota) case does not apply.
We apply instead, United CMC Textile Workers Union v. Valenzuela 8 a
recent decision. In that case this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Edgardo
Paras,held that if the Christmas bonus was included in the 13th month pay,
then there would be no need for having a specific provision on Christmas
bonus in the CBA. But it did not provide for a bonus in graduated amounts
depending on the length of service of the employee. The intention is clear
therefore that the bonus provided in the CBA was meant to be in addition to
the legal requirement.
It is claimed, however, that as a consequence of the impasse between
the parties beginning 1974 through 1979, no collective bargaining agreement
was in force during those intervening years. Hence, there is allegedly no basis
for the money award granted by the respondent labor body. But it is not
disputed that under the 1972 collective bargaining agreement, if no
agreement and negotiations are continued, all the provisions of this
Agreement shall remain in full force up to the time a new agreement is
executed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Decision of the public respondent NLRC promulgated on February 11,
1982, and its Resolution dated March 23, 1982, are hereby AFFIRMED. The
temporary restraining order issued on May 19, 1982 is LIFTED.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
106. Alpha Investigation & Security Agency vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 653
FACTS:
AISA is a private corporation engaged in providing security
services and the Don Mariano Marcos State University is their client. The
private respondents were as security guards by ASIA for DMMSU. Five months
after, private respondents filed a complaint against AISA and then included
DMMSU for non compliance with the current minimum wage order. The
agreement was that they will be paid 1,200php every month but was only paid
900php as their monthly salary. AISA made representations for an increase in
the contract rates to make up for the mandated minimum wage rates.
DMMSU replied that it cannot grant said request due to budgetary
constraints. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding AISA and DMMSU
solidarily liable and ordering
them to pay each of the
complainant
Php41,459.51 representing salary differential from Feb 16, 1990-Sept 30,
1991. NLRC affirmed this decision. Only AISA filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied by the NLRC. The judgment against DMMSU is final and
executor since no motion for certiorari was filed while AISA filed a motion to
the SC.
AISA argues that the payment of wage increases under the current
minimum wage order should be borne exclusively by DMMSU citing Section 6
of RA 6727 which states that In case of contracts for construction projects
and security...the prescribed increases in the wage rates of the workers shall
be borne by the principals or clients... Articles 106, 107 and 109 generally
refer to the failure of the contract or sub-contractor to pay wages in
accordance with the labor code with a mandate that failure to pay such wages
would make the employer and contractor jointly and severally liable. AISA
insists that the matter involved in this case hinges on wage differentials or
wage increase not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code.
NLRC cited Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Article 106
states that,...In the event the contractor or sub contractor fails to
pay
the
pages
of
his employees in accordance with this Code, the
employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor... Article 107 states that, The provisions shall apply to any person,
partnership, corporation, which not being an employer, contracts with an
independent contractor for the performance of any work, task , job or project.108: every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his
contractor or sub-contractor for any violation of any provision of this Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AISA was solidarily liable with DMMSU
RULING:
Yes. Wage orders cannot be waived since it is mandatory and statutory.
AISA cannot escape liability since the law provides for a joint and
solidary
liability
of
the
principal
(DMMSU)
and
the contractor
(AISA).Section 6 of RA 6727 merely provides that in the case of wage increase
resulting in a salary differential, the liability of the principal and contractor
shall be joint and several. Same goes with the liability attached in Articles 106,
107 and 109 which refer to the standard minimum wage.
107. Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa vs. NLRC et. al., 198 SCRA 586
FACTS:
IBM representing 4500 employees of SMC working at various plants,
offices and warehouses in NCR presented to the company a demand for
correction of the significant distortion in the workers wages pursuant to the
Wage Rationalization Act. Demand unheeded by company hence the union
members refused to render overtime services until the distortion has been
corrected by SMC. It appears that the employees working hours/schedule has
been freely observed by the employees for the past 5 years and due to the
abandonment of the longstanding schedule of work and reversion to the eighthour shift substantial losses were incurred by SMC. SMC filed a complaint with
arbitration branch of NLRC then before the NLRC for the latter to declare the
strike illegal. Unions contention: workers refusal to work beyond 8 hours was
a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct distortion.
Per SMC, the coordinated reduction by the Unions members of the work
time in order to compel SMC to yield to the demand was an illegal and
unprotected activity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the strike was legal
RULING:
It was illegal. The strike invoking the issue of wage distortion is illegal.
The legality of these activities depends on the legality of the purposes sought
to be attained. These joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or
restricted by law or contract.
The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions
shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes,
lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or management, is
made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of the
Act. Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the
policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and
eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, Any issue involving wage
distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout.
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and
the Union, relevant provisions of which are quoted by the former without the
latters demurring to the accuracy of the quotation, also prescribes a similar
eschewal of strikes or other similar or related concerted activities as a mode of
resolving disputes or controversies, generally, said agreement clearly stating
that settlement of all disputes, disagreements or controversies of any kind
should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure and ultimately by
arbitration.
109. Mindanao Terminal & Brokerage Services Inc. vs. RoldanConfesor, 272 SCRA 161
FACTS:
Petitioner the Company and respondent the Union entered into a CBA for
a period of five years. The period was August 31, 1989 to July 31, 1994. On
August 1, 1992, parties met to renegotiate CBA provisions for the fourth and
fifth years. A deadlock between the parties followed. Deadlock is a state of
inaction resulting from opposition or lack of compromise. It is a standstill
resulting from the opposition of two unrelenting forces or factions
(defnitions.uslegal.com). On November 12, Notice of deadlock for the following
issues was sent: wages, vacation leave, sick leave, hospitalization, optional
retirement, 13th month pay and signing bonus. On November 18, the
company announces retrenchment program (A strategy used by corporations
to reduce the diversity or the overall size of the operations of the company from businessdictionary.com). On December 3, Union filed notice of strike with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). On December 18, both
parties re-bargained for the following agreed provisions: wage increase,
vacation and sick leaves, hospitalization, 13th month pay, signing bonus, and
seniority. Retirement was not resolved until another meeting with the NCMB on
Jan. 14, 1993. Notice of strike and its issues are dissolved as a result. On Jan.
28, 1993, Union again filed a notice of strike resulting from issues regarding
retroactivity and creditability in compliance with future mandated wage
increases. On March 7, Union staged the strike itself. On March 9, the
Company demanded that Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor assume jurisdiction
over the case. As NCMB's attempt to resolve the issue proved futile, the board
handed the conflict resolution over to Labor Secretary Confesor. Secretary of
Labor issued an Order for both parties to incorporate all improved provisions
which were results from the course of their renegotiations. Company sought
reconsideration for May 14 order. Motion is denied for lack of merit by
Confesor on July 7.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a perfected contract between the two parties
RULING:
Yes. The signing of the CBA does not determine whether the agreement
was entered into within the 6 month period from the date of expiration of the
old CBA. In the present case, there was already a meeting of the minds
between the company and the union prior to the end of the 6 month period
after the expiration of the old CBA. Hence, such meeting of the mind is
sufficient to conclude that an agreement has been reached within the 6 month
period as provided under Art. 253A of th
110. C. Plans Commercial et. al., vs. NLRC, Feb. 11, 1999
FACTS:
In September 1993, Morente, Allauigan and Ofialda and others filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay, and premium pay for rest day and holiday
and night shift differential against petitioners in the Arbitration Branch of
NLRC. It alleged that Cohu is engaged in the business of wholesale of plastic
products and fruits of different kinds with more than 24 employees.
Respondents were hired on January 1990, May 1990 and July 19991 as
laborers and were paid below the minimum wage for the past 3 years. They
were required to work for more than 8 hours a day and never enjoyed the
minimum benefits. Petitioners filed their comment stating that the
respondents were their helpers. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
dismissing the money claims. Respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC
where it granted the money claims. Petitioners appealed with the CA but it
was denied. It said that the company having claimed of exemption of the
coverage of the minimum wage shall have the burden of proof to the claim.
Petitioners insist that C. Planas Commercial is a retail establishment principally
engaged in the sale of plastic products and fruits to the customers for personal
use, thus exempted from the application of the minimum wage law; that it
merely leases and occupies a stall in the Divisoria Market and the level of its
business activity requires and sustains only less than ten employees at a time.
Petitioners contend that private respondents were paid over and above the
minimum wage required for a retail establishment, thus the Labor Arbiter is
correct in ruling that private respondents claim for underpayment has no
factual and legal basis. Petitioners claim that since private respondents
alleged that petitioners employed 24 workers, it was incumbent upon them to
prove such allegation which private respondents failed to do.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is exempted from the application of minimum
wage law
RULING:
No. Petitioners have not successfully shown that they had applied for the
exemption. R.A. No. 6727 known as the Wage Rationalization Act provides for
the statutory minimum wage rate of all workers and employees in the private
sector. Section 4 of the Act provides for exemption from the coverage, thus:
Sec. 4. (c) Exempted from the provisions of this Act are household or domestic
helpers and persons employed in the personal service of another, including
family drivers. Also, retail/service establishments regularly employing not
more than ten (10) workers may be exempted from the applicability of this Act
upon application with and as determined by the appropriate Regional Board in
accordance with the applicable rules and regulations issued by the
Commission. Whenever an application for exemption has been duly filed with
the appropriate Regional Board, action on any complaint for alleged noncompliance with this Act shall be deferred pending resolution of the application
for exemption by the appropriate Regional Board. In the event that
applications for exemptions are not granted, employees shall receive the
appropriate compensation due them as provided for by this Act plus interest of
one percent (1%) per month retroactive to the effectivity of this Act.
111. Ems Manpower & Placement Services vs. NLRC, July 24, 1997
FACTS:
Luisa G. Manuel was hired as a domestic helper in Hong Kong by
Deborah Li Siu Yee. Her contract was for two years, but stayed for only two
months because she was dismissed and repatriated to the Philippines after
she made repeated demands for her rights under the employment contract.
Luisa filed a complaint with POEA for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
Was Manuel illegally dismissed?
RULING:
Yes. There was illegal dismissal in the case at bar although Yee
adequately complied with the employment contract. Said contract is not in
conformity with our laws in as much as it failed to stipulate the "just causes for
the termination of the contract or of the service of the workers," as mandated
by Section 14(e), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code.