Aglipay v.

Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq.,
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold.
The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity
the blessings of independence under a regime ofjustice, liberty and democracy, they thereby manifested their
intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to
determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the Government. Of course, the
phrase advantageous to the Government does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate,
use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at
bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to
take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people
and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of
the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal

Case No. 11 G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)
FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13, section 2 of which provided that all
owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing, with nets denominated cuakit and pantukos, before
engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality, are
obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government, after payment of a fee of P50
annually, payable every three months. The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of
the Administrative Code.
ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of
1917, is invalid.

HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided that no private or local bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of
the bill because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill. The Administrative Code of 1917 has
for its title, An Act amending the Administrative Code. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones
Law, which provided that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill, because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the
Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act.

Sumulong v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 149 G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)
FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive right to
propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party
of Petitioner, the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Eleven days later,
Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority
parties, the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled,
cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the
discretion to choose the minority inspector.
People v. Echaves
G.R. Nos. L-47757-61. January 28, 1980
FACTS:
On October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate information against sixteen persons
charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information provides that sometime
in the year 1974 continuously up to the present, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into,
occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la
Serna, accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has
rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for
has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr.
Five of the information were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. who dismissed the five information on the
grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the
decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence
or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the
cultivation of a grazing land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not by Presidential Decree No. 772 applies to agricultural lands.
HELD:
No. The court agrees to the lower court that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows
that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in
squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. It

should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished
by Republic Act No. 947. The rule of ejusdem generis invoked by the trial court, however, does not apply to this
case. The decree is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule
of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is
uncertain.

Primicias v. Urdaneta
GR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)
First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.
Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as amended (Revised
Motor Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) became effective. Section
63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.
On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within Urdaneta when a member of Urdanetas
Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance 3 (S.
1964), for overtaking a truck. The policeman then asked for plaintiffs license which he surrendered, and a
temporary operators permit was issued to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school
building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of
Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance 3 (S. 1964).
Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with
prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta,
Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was
issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal case. On 29 June 1966, the Court of
First Instance Lingayen held in its decision that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by RA 4136.
The writ of preliminary injunction against Judge Soriano definite and permanent. It also restrained Perez, Suyat, and
Andrada from enforcing said ordinace throughout Urdaneta, ordering them to return the plaintiffs drivers license,
and to pay the cost of the suit. The public officials appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.
Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The ordinances validity should be determined
vis-a-vis RA 4136, the mother statute (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought
against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase vehicular traffic (Section 1,
Ordinance) it did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses.
Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more important so
that an average man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur
a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any
classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, RA 4136. The
Ordinance refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The classifications
which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that no provincial, city or
municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other
than those provided in this Act. The ordinance, therefore in view of the foregoing, is void.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.
U.S. v. Abad Santos
Case No. 294 G.R. No. 12262 (February 10, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote No. 28

FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law by failing to make an
entry for the January 5, 1915 indicating whether any business was done on that day or not. He had employed a
bookkeeper with the expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his position, including the
entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law.
HELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part in the keeping of the book in
question and that he never personally made an entry in it as he left everything to his bookkeeper. Courts will not hold
one person criminally responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent, unless the law clearly
so provides.
People v. Purisima
G.R. No. L-42050, Nov. 20, 1978
FACTS:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the Philippines charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common
ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree
No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense
of illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under PD No. 9.
HELD:
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3)
must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency
of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey
the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the
intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or,
whereas" clauses.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.

Serfino v. CA
GR L-40858, 15 September 1987
Second Division, Paras (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT 1839). On 14
December 1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18 January 1946). OCT 1839
was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R (1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of
Pacifico Casamayor. On that same day, TCT 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the
cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On 15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Central
Mill Co., and the latter did not present the documents for registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the
Registry of Deeds. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another
certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, the spouses Serfinos
mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00; which was
inscribed in TCT No. 38985.
The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the lower court rendered a decision ordering
the cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the payment of the plaintiff
PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties appealed from this decision of the trial court.
Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in
its decision setting aside the decision of the trial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however,
ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and
penalties paid by the latter when they repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.
Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in auction sales of property
for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict adherence to the
statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible
suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to
the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the nonfulfillment of which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its
payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor was
obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses
Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the property thus sold. In turn,
the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from that of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void.
However, the fact that the public auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way be attributed
to the mortgagees fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of
the scheduled public auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land in its name
for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of the
mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of costs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit must be paid by
Lopez Sugar Central.
Manahan v. ECC
GR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of Enteric Fever while
employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias Municipal High School, Las Pias, Rizal, on 8 May, 1975. The deceased

was in perfect health when he entered government service on 20 July 1969, and that in the course of his employment
in 1974, he was treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the petitioner filed
a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In a
letter dated 19 June 1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid
fever, is not an occupational disease, and that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid fever, in the
sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the decision of the
GSIS on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by or aggravated by the nature of
the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Workmens Compensation should be resolved in favor of the worker
Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims accruing prior
to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at thetime of their accrual and
under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses and Claims), workmens compensation
claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the period from 1 November 1974 up to 31 December
1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action
accrued Hence, this Court applied the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon
petitioners claim.. The illness that claimed the life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December 1974,
thus, his action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt, the same should be resolved
in favor of the worker, and that social legislations like the Workmens Compensation Act and the Labor Code
should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his
dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now
the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor
of the claimant.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner the amount of
P6,000.00 as death compensation benefit and P600.00 as attorneys fees, to reimburse the petitioners expenses
incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported
by proper receipts, and to pay administrative fees.
Villavert v. ECC
GR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA 233)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring
Facts: Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner, is the mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis on 12 December 1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. The
deceased also performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist. On 11 December 1975, the deceased
reported as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center in Camp Crame. He performed his duties not only as Code
Verifier but also handled administrative functions, computer operation and typing jobs due to shortage of civilian
personnel. Although he was complaining of chest pain and headache late in the afternoon of said day, he was
required to render overtime service until late in the day, typing voluminous classified communications, computing
allowances and preparing checks for the salary of PC-INP personnel throughout the country for distribution on or
before 15 December 1975. Gasping for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling incoherent words while asleep,
and when he was not able to regain consciousness, he was rushed to the University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay
(UERM) Memorial Hospital where he died at 5:30 am. The NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis is still unknown, although most research data agree that physical and mental stresses are strong causal
factors in the development of the disease.
On 18 March 1976, she filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under PD 626, as amended, with
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). GSIS denied the claim on the ground that acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal
connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert and the nature of his employment. The petitioner

appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). On 31 May 1978, the ECC affirmed the decision of
GSIS denying the claim. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to her sons death benefits.
Held: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis (acute
inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of the pancreas) is still unknown despite extensive researches in this field,
although most research data are agreed that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development
of the disease. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a bout of alcoholic intoxication shortly
before he died, neither is there a showing that he used drugs; negating the association provided by Principles of
Internal Medicine (by Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N.
Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he
performed as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. Further, Article 4 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner death benefits in the
amount of P6,000.00.
Ty v. First National Surety
GR L-16138, 29 April 1961 (1 SCRA 1324)
En Banc, Labrador (p): 8 concurring
Facts: At different times within a period of two months prior to 24 December 1953, Diosdado C. Ty, employed as
operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway Cotton Factory insured himself in 18 local insurance companies, among
which being the 8 above-named defendants, which issued to him personal accident policies. Plaintiffs beneficiary
was his employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, which paid the insurance premiums. On 24 December 1953, a fire
broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, plaintiff was
injured on the left hand by a heavy object. He was brought to the Manila Central University hospital, and after
receiving first-aid, he went to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries (fractures in index,
middle, fourth, and fifth fingers of left hand). From 26 December 1953 to 8 February 1954, he underwent medical
treatment in the hospital. The above-described physical injuries have caused temporary total disability of plaintiffs
left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the above-named
defendants to recover indemnity. Defendants rejected plaintiffs claim for indemnity for the reason that there being
no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy.
Plaintiff sued the defendants in the Municipality Court of this City, which dismissed his complaints. Thereafter, the
plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance Manila, presided by Judge Gregorio S. Narvasa, which absolved the
defendants from the complaints. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy for the disability of his left hand.
Held: The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies
are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an
interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would
certainly be unwarranted. In the case at bar, due to the clarity of the stipulation, distinction between temporary
disability and total disability need not be made in relation to ones occupation means that the condition of the
insurance is such that common prudence requires him to desist from transacting his business or renders him
incapable of working. While the Court sympathizes with the plaintiff or his employer, for whose benefit the policies
were issued, it can not go beyond the clear andexpress conditions of the insurance policies, all of which define
partial disability as loss of either hand by a amputation through the bones of the wrist. There was no such
amputation in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping Lines

GR L-34382, 20 July 1983 (123 SCRA 425)
First division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 2 on leave.
Facts: On 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation,
shipped on board the SS Eastern Jupiter from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods.
The vessel is owned and operated by Eastern Shipping Lines. The shipment was insured with Home Insurance
against all risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06. 53 of the 2361 coils discharged from the vessel were in bad order.
The Consignee ultimately received the 2,361 coils with 73 coils loose and partly cut, and 28 coils and partly cut,
which had to be considered as scrap. The weight also had a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kgs, or 1,209.56 lbs. For the
loss/damage suffered by the cargo, Home Insurance paid the consignee under its insurance policy the amount of
P3,260.44, by virtue of which Home Insurance became subrogated to the rights and actions of the Phelps Dodge.
Home Insurance made demands for payment against Eastern Shipping and the transportation company for
reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the same. (A case Home insurance v. NV Nedlloyd
Lijnen consolidated with this case is of the same nature).
Filing its cases in court, Home Insurance avers that it is a foreign insurance company authorized to do business in the
Philippines through its agent, Victor Bello (who holds office at Makati) in both cases. In L-34382, Eastern Shipping
Lines denies the allegation of plaintiffs capacity to sue for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof, while Angel Jose Transportation admits the allegation. In L-34383, NV Nedlloyd
Lijnen, Columbian Philippines, and Guacods denied plaintiffs capacity to sue. The court dismissed the complaints in
the two cases on the same ground, that the plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to sue, even if the petitioner had
already secured the necessary license to conduct its insurance business in the Philippines during the filing of the
case. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines initially without a license can claim
indemnity through Philippine Courts.
Held: The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The
Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the
development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries. A harsh
interpretation would disastrously embarrass trade, unlike if the law is given a reasonable interpretation, it would
markedly help in the development of trade. The law simply means that no foreign corporation shall be permitted to
transact business in the Philippine Islands, as this phrase is known in corporation law, unless it shall have the license
required by law, and, until it complies with the law, shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts. A
contrary holding would bring the law to the verge of unconstitutionality, a result which should be and can be easily
avoided. In the present case, the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts was cured by the
subsequent registration. Such is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these cases.The petitioner sufficiently
alleged its capacity to sue when it averred in its complaints that it is a foreign insurance company, that it is
authorized to do business in the Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is the
Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati; as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. General denials
inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue in the light of its positive averment that it is
authorized to do so. Nevertheless, even if the plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue was not properly raised as an issue
by the answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it had the authority to engage in the insurance
business at the time it filed the complaints.
The Supreme Court consolidated and granted the petitions, reversed and set aside the CFI decisions. In L-34382
(Civil Case 71923), Eastern Shipping Lines and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered to pay the Home
Insurance Company the sum of P1,630.22 each with interest at the legal rate from 5 January 1968 until fully paid.
Each shall also pay one-half of the costs. The Court dismissed the counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. In
L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its agent Columbian Phil. Inc. was ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of
P2,426.98 with interest at the legal rate from 1 February 1968 until fully paid, the sum of P500.00 attorneys fees,
and costs. The Court dismissed the complaint against Guacods, Inc.

Co v. Republic
GR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)
First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6 concurring
Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist
Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of
Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra
Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the Colegio in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the
government. He has a child two months old. He has never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He
is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in,
nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a
democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the government either in the
military or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store
in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00 which he claims to have been
accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross
and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time.
During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which
he claims to be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth
of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a salesman
therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims
that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his income tax return
when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his
tobacco business.
Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing, the court ordered that a certificate of
naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all the
requisites provided for in RA 503. The government appealed the decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did
not state what principles of the Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes
in, he answered democracy.; that he stated that his father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why
he did not file his income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certificate of registration, but not the alien
certificates of registration of his wife and child.
Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to
become a Filipino citizen.
Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution, which is
the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution. Further, Philippine
law requires that an alien to conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which
he is living. In the present case, in so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those
principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a democratic
form of government is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the
principles underlying our constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show that he has complied with his obligation to
register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Actl; and further
failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of P1,440.00 a year and his profit of P1,000.00 in his
tobacco business, and received an amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the sale
of the store, the total of which is more than what is required by law for one to file an income tax return.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in granting the petition for
naturalization, without pronouncement as to costs.