108. Gonzales vs.

Comelec ()
18 Apr 1969 Fernando *limiting campaign period/speech violates freedom of speech

Facts:
Felicisimo Cabigao, then a candidate for vice mayor of Manila under the Nacionalista Party
who subsequently won, and Arsenio Gonzales, a taxpayer, challenged the constitutionality of
two new sections in the Revised Election Code. Comelec argued that it was an exercise of
the police power of the state. The first assailed section (50-A) declared it unlawful for any
political party to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large
earlier than 150 days before the elections. The second (50-B) declared that it was unlawful
for any person whether or not a voter or a candidate to engage in election
campaign or partisan political
activity to engage in an election campaign except during the campaign period of 120 days
before the elections. It defined the term candidate as any person aspiring for or seeking
an elective public office and election campaign as acts designed to have a candidate
elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person.
The petition was initially an action for declaratory relief which the court instead viewed as a
petition for prohibition. It took cognizance of the case due to the proximity of the elections
and the transcendental importance of the issue. Sen. Lorenzo Tanada, the author of the
measure, was invited as amicus curiae where he argued the existence of undeniable
conditions that called for the regulation of the electoral process and that the Act can indeed
be looked upon as a limitation on the rights of speech and press, of
assembly and of association because of the clear and present danger doctrine, there being
the substantive evil of elections.
Issue: Does the challenged section limiting political activity violate the freedom of speech?
Held: Yes. But it was not declared unconstitutional for lack of the required votes.
Ruling:
Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. It was in this light
that the majority of the Court declared that Section 50-B suffers from the fatal
constitutional infirmity of vagueness and may be stricken down though it lacked one
vote to declare such unconstitutional. The prohibition of any speeches for or against
the election of any candidate for public office is repugnant to a constitutional
command. The challenged section could have been more narrowly drawn and the
practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional
requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. Even
though the governmental purposes be legitimate and substantial, the limitation on free
speech cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. Thus, the majority feels compelled to view the
statutory provisions in question as unconstitutional on their face inasmuch as they appear to
range too widely and indiscriminately. On the other hand, the latter part of Section 50-B was
declared as constitutional since the curtailment on the activities of political parties
does not render meaningless the right to association. The scope of legitimate
activities was not unduly narrowed neither was there an infringement on their freedom to
assemble. The objection that may be raised as to its vagueness was minimized or eliminated
by the enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms election campaign.